FRENCH AND SPANISH PREPARATIONS
While the Supreme1 Junta2 was expending3 its energy on discussing the relative merits of benevolent4 despotism and representative government, and while Casta?os fretted5 and fumed6 for the moving up of reinforcements that never arrived, the French Emperor was getting ready to strike. It took many weeks for the veteran divisions from Glogau and Erfurt, from Bayreuth and Berlin, to traverse the whole breadth of the French Empire and reach the Pyrenees. While they were trailing across the Rhineland and the plains of France, well fêted and fed at every important town[387], their master employed the time of waiting in strengthening his political hold on Central Europe. We have seen that he was seriously alarmed at the possibility of an Austrian war, and alluded7 to it in his confidential8 letters to his kinsfolk. But the court of Vienna was slow to stir, and as August and September slipped by without any definite move on the Danube, Bonaparte began to hope that he was to be spared the dangerous problem of waging two European wars at the same time. Meanwhile he assumed an arrogant9 and blustering10 tone with the Austrian Government, warning them that though he was withdrawing 100,000 men from Germany, he should replace them with new levies11, and was still strong enough to hold his own[388]. Metternich gave prudent12 and[p. 377] evasive answers, and no immediate13 signs of a rupture14 could be discerned. But to make matters sure, the Emperor hastened to invite his ally the Emperor Alexander of Russia to meet him at Erfurt. The ostensible15 object of the conference was to make a final effort to induce the British Government to accept terms of peace. Its real meaning was that Bonaparte wished to reassure16 himself concerning the Czar’s intentions, and to see whether he could rely upon the support of Russia in the event of a new Austrian war. There is no need to go into the details of the meeting (September 27 to October 14), of the gathering17 of four vassal18 kings and a score of minor19 princes of the Confederation of the Rhine to do homage20 to their master, of the feasts and plays and reviews. Suffice it to say that Napoleon got what he wanted, a definite promise from the Czar of an offensive and defensive21 alliance against all enemies whatsoever22: a special mention of Austria was made in the tenth clause of the new treaty[389]. In return Alexander obtained leave to carry out his designs against Finland and the Danubian principalities: his ally was only too glad to see him involved in any enterprise that would distract his attention from Central Europe. The Emperor Francis II hastened to disarm23 the suspicions of Napoleon by sending to Erfurt an envoy[390] charged with all manner of pacific declarations: they were accepted, but the acceptance was accompanied by a message of scarcely concealed24 threats[391], which must have touched the court of Vienna to the quick. Strong in his Russian alliance, Bonaparte chose rather to bully25 than to cajole the prince who, by the strangest of chances, was destined26 within eighteen months to become his father-in-law. The quiet reception given to his hectoring dispatches showed that, for the present at least, nothing need be feared from the side of Austria. The Emperor’s whole attention could be turned towards Spain. After telling off a few more regiments27 for service beyond[p. 378] the Pyrenees, and giving leave to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine to demobilize their armies, he left Erfurt [October 14] and came rushing back across Germany and France to Paris; he stayed there ten days and then started for Bayonne, where he arrived on the twentieth day after the termination of the conference [November 3].
Meanwhile the ostensible purpose of that meeting had been carried out, by the forwarding to the King of England of a joint29 note in which France and Russia offered him peace on the basis of Uti Possidetis. It was a vague and grandiloquent30 document, obviously intended for the eye of the public rather than for that of the old King. The two Emperors expatiated31 on the horrors of war and on the vast changes made of late in the map of Europe. Unless peace were made ‘there might be greater changes still, and all to the disadvantage of the English nation.’ The Continental32 System was working untold33 misery34, and the cessation of hostilities35 would be equally advantageous36 to Great Britain and to her enemies. King George should ‘listen to the voice of humanity,’ and assure the happiness of Europe by consenting to a general pacification37.
Though well aware of the hollowness of these protestations, which were only intended to throw on England the odium of continuing the war, the British Cabinet took them into serious consideration. The replies to the two powers were carefully kept separate, and were written, not in the name of the King (for the personal appeal to him was merely a theatrical39 device), but in that of the ministry40. To Russia a very polite answer was returned, but the question on which the possibility of peace rested was brought straight to the front. Would France acknowledge the existing government of Spain as a power with which she was prepared to treat? Canning, who drafted the dispatch, was perfectly41 well aware that nothing was further from the Emperor’s thoughts, and could not keep himself from adding an ironical42 clause, to the effect that Napoleon had so often spoken of late of his regard for the dignity and welfare of the Spanish people, that it could not be doubted that he would consent. The late transactions at Bayonne, ‘whose principles were as unjust as their example was dangerous to all legitimate43 sovereigns,’ must clearly have been carried through without his concurrence44 or approbation45.
The reply to France was still more uncompromising. ‘The[p. 379] King,’ it said, ‘was desirous for peace on honourable46 terms. The miserable47 condition of the Continent, to which allusion48 had been made, was not due to his policy: a system devised for the destruction of British commerce had recoiled49 on its authors and their instruments.’ But the distress50 even of his enemies was no source of pleasure to the King, and he would treat at once, if the representatives of Sweden, Portugal, Sicily, and Spain were admitted to take part in the negotiations51. It was to be specially52 stipulated53 that the ‘Central Junta of Government’ at Madrid was to be a party to any treaty of peace.
The two British notes brought the replies from St. Petersburg and Paris that Canning expected. Count Romanzoff, writing for the Czar, could only state that his master had acknowledged Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain, and could not recognize the existence of any other legal authority in that kingdom. But if this point (the only really important one) could be got over, the Russian Government was ready to treat on a basis of Uti Possidetis, or any other just and honourable terms. The French reply was, as was natural, couched in very different language. Napoleon had been irritated by Canning’s sarcastic54 allusions55 to the failure of the Continental System: he thought the tone of the British note most improper56 and insulting—‘it comes from the same pen which the English ministry employs to fabricate the swarm57 of libels with which it inundates58 the Continent. Such language is despicable, and unworthy of the imperial attention[392].’
Considering the offensive and bullying59 tone which Bonaparte was wont60 to use to other powers—his note written to Austria a few days before was a fair example of it—he had little reason to be indignant at the epigrams of the English minister. Yet the latter might perhaps have done well to keep his pen under control, and to forget that he was not writing for the Anti-Jacobin, but composing an official document. Even though Napoleon’s offer was hollow and insincere, it should have been met with dry courtesy rather than with humorous irony61.
Of course Bonaparte refused to treat the Spaniards as a free and equal belligerent62 power. He had declared his brother King of Spain, and had now reached that pitch of blind autolatry in which he regarded his own fiat63 as the sole source of legality. In common honour England could not abandon the insurgents64; for[p. 380] the Emperor to allow his brother’s claim to be ignored was equally impossible. In his present state of mind he would have regarded such a concession65 to the enemy as an acknowledgement of disgraceful defeat. It was obvious that the war must go on, and when the Emperor suggested that England might treat with him without stipulating66 for the admission of the Junta as a party to the negotiations[393], he must have been perfectly well aware that he was proposing a dishonourable move which the ministry of Portland could not possibly make. His suggestions as to a separate treaty with England on the basis of Uti Possidetis were futile67: he intended that they should be declined, and declined they were. But he had succeeded in his end of posing before the French nation and the European powers as a lover of peace, foiled in his devices by the unbending arrogance68 of Great Britain. This was all that he had desired, and so far his machinations attained69 their object[394].
Long before the English replies had been sent off to Champagny and Romanzoff, the much-delayed campaign on the Ebro had commenced. All through the months of August and September the French had behaved as if their adversaries70 were acting71 on proper military principles, and might be expected to throw their whole force on the true objective point. Jourdan and his colleagues had no reason to foresee that the Spanish Government would launch out into the hideous72 series of blunders which, as a matter of fact, were committed. That no commander-in-chief would be appointed, that the victorious73 troops of Baylen would be held back for weeks in Andalusia, that no strenuous74 effort would be made to raise new[p. 381] armies in Leon and the two Castiles, were chances that seemed so improbable that King Joseph and his advisers75 did not take them into consideration. They expected that the Spaniards would mass the armies of Andalusia, Estremadura, Castile, and Aragon, and endeavour to turn their left flank on the side of Sanguesa and Pampeluna, or that (the other rational course) they would send the Asturians, the Andalusians, and the Castilians to join Blake, and debouch76 down the line of the Upper Ebro, from Reynosa on to Vittoria and Miranda. In the first case 70,000, and in the latter case 80,000 men would be flung against one flank of the French position, and it would be necessary to concentrate in hot haste in order to hold them back. But, as a matter of fact, the Spanish forces did not even come up to the front for many weeks, and when they did appear it was, as we have seen, not in the form of one great army concentrated for a stroke on a single point, but as a number of weak and isolated77 columns, each threatening a different part of the long line that lay along the Ebro from Miranda to Milagro. When feeble demonstrations78 were made against so many separate sections of his front, Jourdan supposed that they were skilful79 feints, intended to cover some serious attack on a weak spot, and acted accordingly, holding back till the enemy should develop his real plan, and refusing to commit himself meanwhile to offensive operations on a serious scale. It must be confessed that the chaotic80 and inconsequent movements of the Spaniards bore, to the eye of the observer from the outside, something like the appearance of a deep plan. On August 27 the Conde de Montijo, with a column of the Aragonese army, felt his way up the Ebro as far as the bridge of Alfaro, nearly opposite the extreme left flank of the French at Milagro. When attacked by Lefebvre-Desnouettes at the head of a few cavalry81 and a horse-battery, the Spanish general refused to stand, and retreated on Tudela. Marshal Moncey then pressed him with an infantry82 division, but Montijo again gave back. The French thought that this move must be a mere38 diversion, intended to attract their attention to the side of Aragon, for Montijo had acted with such extreme feebleness that it was unnatural83 to suppose that he was making anything but a feint. They were quite wrong however: Palafox had told the count to push as far up the Ebro as he could, without any thought of favouring operations by Blake or Casta?os, the former of whom was at this moment not far in front of Astorga, while the latter was still at Madrid. Montijo[p. 382] had given way simply because his troops were raw levies, and because there were no supports behind him nearer than Saragossa. It was to no effect, therefore, that King Joseph, after the fighting in front of Alfaro and Tudela, moved his reserves up the river to Miranda, thinking that the real attack must be coming from that side. There was no real attack intended, for the enemy had not as yet brought any considerable force up to the front.
It was not till nearly three weeks later that the Spaniards made another offensive move. This time Blake was the assailant. On September 10 he had at last concentrated the greater part of his army at Reynosa—the centre of roads at the source of the Ebro, of which we have already had to speak on several occasions. He had with him four divisions of the army of Galicia, as well as a ‘vanguard brigade’ and a ‘reserve brigade’ of picked troops from the same quarter. Close behind him were 8,000 Asturians under General Acevedo. The whole came to 32,000 men, but there were no more than 400 cavalry with the corps84—a fact which made Blake very anxious to keep to the mountains and to avoid the plains of Old Castile[395]. He had left behind him in Galicia and about Astorga more than 10,000 men of new levies, not yet fit to take the field. There were also some 9,000 Asturians in similar case, held back within the limits of their own principality[396].
In the elaborate plan of operations which had been sketched85 out at Madrid on September 5, it will be remembered that Blake’s army was intended to co-operate with those of Casta?os and of Eguia. But he paid no attention whatever to the promises which his representative, Infantado, had made in his name, and executed an entirely86 different movement: there was no commander-in-chief to compel him to act in unison87 with his colleagues. The Castilian and Estremaduran armies were not ready, and Casta?os had as yet only a feeble vanguard facing the enemy on the Central Ebro, his rear divisions being still far back, on the road from Andalusia. Blake neither asked for nor received any assistance whatever from his colleagues, and set out in the most light-hearted way to attack 70,000 French with his 32,000 Galicians and Asturians.
His plan was to threaten Burgos with a small portion of his[p. 383] army, while with the main body he marched on Bilbao, in order to rouse Biscay to a second revolt, and to turn the right flank of the French along the sea-shore. Accordingly he sent his ‘vanguard’ and ‘reserve’ brigades towards Burgos, by the road that passes by O?a and Briviesca, while with four complete divisions he moved on Bilbao. On the twentieth his leading column turned out of that town General Monthion, who was in garrison88 there with a weak brigade of details and detachments.
Here at last, as it seemed to Joseph Bonaparte and to Jourdan, was the long-expected main attack of the Spaniards. Accordingly they concentrated to their right, with the object of meeting it. Bessières evacuated89 Burgos and drew back to the line of the Upper Ebro. He there replaced the King’s reserve, and the incomplete corps that was forming at Miranda and Vittoria under the command of Marshal Ney: thus these troops became available for operations in Biscay. Ney, with two small infantry divisions, marched on Bilbao by way of Durango: Joseph, with the reserve, followed him. But when the Marshal reached the Biscayan capital, the division of Blake’s army[397], which had occupied it for the last six days, retired90 and took up a defensive attitude in the hills above Valmaceda, twenty miles to the west. Here it was joined by a second division of the Galician army[398], and stood fast in a very difficult country abounding91 in strong positions. Ney therefore held back, unwilling92 to attack a force that might be 30,000 strong (for all that he knew) with the 10,000 men that he had brought. Clearly he must wait for King Joseph and the reserve, in case he should find that Blake’s whole army was in front of him.
But the King and his corps failed to appear: Bessières had sent to inform him that Blake, far from having moved his whole army on to Bilbao, had still got the bulk of it in positions from which he could march down the Ebro and attack Miranda and Vittoria. This was to a certain extent true, for the first and second divisions of the Galician army were now at Villarcayo, on the southern side of the Cantabrian hills, a spot from which they could march either northward93 to Bilbao or eastward94 to Miranda. Moreover, Blake’s ‘reserve’ and ‘vanguard’ brigades were still about Frias and O?a, whither they had been pushed before the French evacuated Burgos.[p. 384] Bessières, therefore, had much to say in favour of his view, that the point of danger was in the Ebro valley and not in Biscay. King Joseph, convinced by his arguments, left Ney unreinforced, and took post with the 6,000 men of the central reserve at Vittoria. His conclusion that Bilbao was not the true objective of the Spaniards was soon confirmed by other movements of the enemy. The feeble columns of Casta?os were at last showing on the Central Ebro, and Palafox was on the move on the side of Aragon.
Under the idea that all Blake’s Biscayan expedition had been no more than a feint and a diversion, and that the real blow would be struck on the Ebro, Jourdan and the King now directed Ney to come back from Bilbao and to take up his old positions. The Marshal obeyed: leaving General Merlin with 3,000 men in the Biscayan capital, he returned with 7,000 bayonets to La Guardia, on the borders of Alava and Navarre. His old head quarters at Logro?o, beyond the Ebro, had been occupied by the head of one of Casta?os’s columns. He did not attack this force, but merely encamped opposite it, on the northern bank of the river [October 5][399].
Map of part of northern Spain
Enlarge Part of Northern Spain.
It is now time to review the position and forces of the Spanish armies, which were at last up in the fighting line. Blake’s 32,000 Asturians[400] and Galicians were divided into two masses, at Valmaceda and Villarcayo, on the two sides of the Cantabrian hills. They were within three marches of each other, and the whole could be turned either against Biscay or against Vittoria, as the opportunity might demand. But between Blake and the central divisions of the Spanish army there was a vast gap. This, at a later period of the campaign, was filled up by bringing forward the 12,000 men of the Estremaduran army to Burgos: but this force, insufficient95 as it was for the purpose, had not reached the front: in the middle of October it had not even arrived at Madrid[401]. There seems to have been at Burgos nothing more than a detached battalion96 or two, which had occupied the place when Bessières drew back towards the Ebro[402]. Of all the Spanish forces, the nearest organ[p. 385]ized corps on Blake’s right consisted of the main body of this same army of Castile. This division, for it was no more, consisted of about 10,000 or 11,000 men: it contained a few regular corps (Regiment28 of Cantabria, a battalion of Grenadiers, the Leon Militia) which had been lent to it by the army of Andalusia, and twelve raw Leonese and Castilian battalions97, of the new levy98 which Cuesta had raised. There were also some 800 cavalry with it. The commander was now Pignatelli, for Eguia (who had originally been told off to the post) had fallen sick. This small and inefficient99 force was at Logro?o on the Central Ebro, having taken possession of that place when it was evacuated by Marshal Ney in the last week of September. A little further down the river lay the 2nd Division of the army of Andalusia, which, under the orders of Coupigny, had taken a creditable part in the battle of Baylen. Released by the Junta of Seville in September, it had at last gone forward and joined Casta?os. But it was somewhat changed in composition, for three of its original fourteen battalions had been withdrawn[403] and sent to Catalonia, while three new Andalusian corps had replaced them. Its commander was now General Grimarest, Coupigny having been told off to another sphere of duty. The division numbered about 6,000 bayonets, with 400 or 500 cavalry, and a single battery. It occupied Lodosa, on the north bank of the Ebro, some twelve miles down-stream from Logro?o. Quite close to its right there lay at Calahorra the 4th Division of the army of Andalusia, under La Pe?a—a somewhat stronger force—about 7,500 foot, with 400 horse and two batteries. The only remaining division of Casta?os’ ‘Army of the Centre’ consisted of the Murcian and Valencian corps under Llamas. This had entered Madrid 8,000 strong on August 13, but one of its regiments had been left behind at Aranjuez to guard the Junta. It now consisted of no more than 7,000 men, and lay at Tudela, in close touch with La Pe?a’s Andalusians. The total, therefore, of Casta?os’ army in the second half of October did not amount to more than 31,000 foot and 3,000 horse. The 1st and 3rd divisions of the Andalusian army, long detained beyond the Morena by the Junta of Seville, were but just commencing to arrive at Madrid:[p. 386] of their 15,000 men less than half reached the front in November, in time to take their share in the rout101 of Tudela. Even these were not yet at Casta?os’ disposition102 in October[404].
The right wing of the Spanish army of the Ebro consisted of the raw and half-organized masses composing the army of Aragon. Palafox had succeeded in getting together a great body of men from that loyal province, but he had not been able to form them into a force fit to take the field. Owing to the way in which Aragon had been stripped of regular troops before the commencement of the war, there was no solid body round which the new levies could be organized, and no supply of trained officers to drill or discipline the thousands of eager recruits. It would seem that in all no less than 32,000 were raised, but no force in any degree approaching these numbers took the field. Every village and every mountain valley had contributed its partida or its company, but with the best of wills Palafox had not yet succeeded in incorporating all these small and scattered103 units into regiments and brigades. Many of them had not even been armed: very few had been properly clothed and equipped. Nevertheless no fewer than thirty-nine battalions in a state of greater or less organization were in existence by the end of October. They varied104 in strength to the most extraordinary degree: many were no more than 300 strong[405], one or two were enormous and ran up to 1,300 or 1,400 bayonets. Of the whole thirty-nine battalions only three belonged to the old regular army, and these corps—whose total numbers only reached 2,350 men—had been largely diluted105 with raw recruits[406]. Of the remainder some belonged to the tercios who had taken arms in June, and had served through the first siege of Saragossa, but a large number had only been raised after Verdier had retired from before the city in August. It would seem that[p. 387] the total of Palafox’s Aragonese, who went to the front for the campaign of October and November, was about 12,000 men. The rest were left behind at Saragossa, being not yet organized or equipped for field service.
But Palafox had also in his army troops which did not belong to his native kingdom. These were the Murcians and Valencians of Saint March and O’Neille, who after taking part in the campaign against Moncey, had not marched with Llamas to Madrid, but had turned off to aid in raising the siege of Saragossa. Saint March had brought with him fourteen battalions and a cavalry regiment, O’Neille had with him three more infantry corps. The total of their force reached 11,200 bayonets and 620 sabres. Adding these to the best of his own Aragonese levies, Palafox sent out 23,000 men: of these only about 800 were cavalry[407]. A force such as this, backed by the mass of unorganized levies at Saragossa, was barely sufficient to maintain a defensive position on the frontiers of Aragon. But the Junta, with great unwisdom, came to the conclusion that Palafox was strong enough not only to hold his own against the French in his immediate front, but to spare some troops to reinforce the army of Catalonia. By their orders he told off six battalions—some 4,000 men—who were placed under the command of his brother, the Marquis of Lazan, and dispatched to Lerida with the object of aiding the Captain-General of Catalonia to besiege106 Duhesme in Barcelona.
Nor was this the only force that was drawn100 off from the main theatre of the war in order to take part in helping107 the Catalans, who had hitherto proved quite strong enough to help themselves. The Junta directed Reding, the victor of Baylen, to take command[p. 388] of all the Granadan troops in the army of Andalusia, and lead them to Tortosa with the object of joining Lazan. With Reding there marched nearly 15,000 men[408]: to raise this force all the regiments belonging to the kingdom of Granada had been drafted out from the 1st and 2nd Divisions of Casta?os’ army, which were thus mutilated before they reached the Ebro. To those comparatively veteran troops were added eight new battalions of raw levies—the regiments of Baza, Almeria, Loxa, and Santa Fé. Starting on their long march from Granada on October 8, the head of Reding’s column had only reached Murcia on October 22, and was thus hopelessly distant from any point where it could have been useful when the campaign began[409]. Nor was this the last detachment which the Junta directed on Catalonia: it sent thither108 part of the prisoners from Lisbon, whom the Convention of Cintra had delivered—3,500 of the men who had once formed the division of Caraffa. Laguna, who now held the command, landed from English transports at La Rapita near Tortosa on October 25, and marched from thence on Tarragona[410].
It is safe to say that of these 23,000 men transferred to Catalonia from Aragon, Granada, and Portugal, every man ought to have been pushed forward to help Casta?os on the Ebro, and not distracted to the side-issue at Barcelona. It was mad to send them thither when the main force facing Jourdan and King Joseph did not yet amount to 75,000 men. Catalonia, with such small aid as the Balearic Islands could give, was strong enough to defend herself against the motley hordes109 of Duhesme and Reille.
At the moment when the feeble offensive of Casta?os and Palafox began, on the line of the Ebro, the French had some 65,000 men ranged opposite them[411], while a reserve of 10,000 was formed at[p. 389] Bayonne, and the leading columns of the ‘Grand Army’ from Germany were only ten or twelve marches away. Napoleon had, by a decree issued on September 7, recast the form of his army of Spain. It was in the future to consist of seven army corps. The 1st, 4th, and 5th were to be composed of old divisions from the Rhine and the Elbe. Of the forces already on the spot Bessières’ troops were to form the 2nd Corps, Moncey’s the 3rd, the still incomplete divisions under Ney the 6th. The army of Catalonia, where St. Cyr was superseding110 Reille, formed the 7th Corps[412]. Junot’s army from Portugal, when it once more appeared upon the scene, made the 8th, but in September Napoleon did not yet know of its fate, and it only received its number and its place in the host at a much later date. Many alterations111 of detail were made in the brigades and divisions that formed the new 2nd and 3rd Corps. All the bataillons de marche were abolished, and their men drafted into the old regiments. The fifteen ‘provisional regiments,’ which had composed the whole of Moncey’s and a considerable part of Bessières’ strength, were taken into the regular establishment of the army, and renumbered as the 114th-120th of the Line and the 33rd Léger, two provisional regiments being told off to form each of the new bodies[413]. There was a certain amount of shifting of units, but in the main the brigades and divisions of these two corps remained intact.
On or about October 8-10 Bessières lay at Miranda and Murguia, guarding against any possible descent of Blake from Villarcayo upon the Upper Ebro. Ney was at La Guardia, facing Pignatelli’s Castilians, who occupied his old head quarters at Logro?o. Moncey had thrown back his left to guard against a possible descent of Palafox upon Navarre, and was behind the line of the river Aragon, with his right at Estella, his centre at Falces and Tafalla, and his left facing Sanguesa, where it was opposed by the advanced division of the army of Palafox under O’Neille. For the Captain-General of Aragon, pleased with a plan proposed to him by Colonel Doyle, the English military attaché in his camp, had resolved to make a long turning movement under the roots of the Pyrenees, exactly parallel to that which Blake was executing at the other end of the line. With this object he sent out from Saragossa, on September 29,[p. 390] O’Neille with a division of Aragonese strengthened by a few Murcian and Valencian battalions, and numbering some 9,000 bayonets. This detachment, marching in a leisurely112 way, reached Sanguesa on the Upper Aragon, but there stopped short, on getting information that Moncey’s corps lay before it in some strength. Palafox then sent up in support a second division, Saint March’s Murcians and Valencians, who advanced to Egea and there halted. There was considerable bickering113 all through the second half of October on this line, but Sanguesa remained in the hands of the Spaniards, Moncey being too much distracted by the movements of Casta?os in the direction of Tudela to dare to concentrate his whole force for a blow at Saint March and O’Neille. The latter, on the other hand, had realized that if they pressed further forward towards Pampeluna, as their commander-in-chief had originally intended, they would leave Moncey so much in their rear that he could cut them off both from Saragossa and from the Army of the Centre. Here then matters had come to a deadlock114; but the position was all in favour of the French, who lay compactly in the centre, while O’Neille and Saint March were separated from Casta?os by a gap of sixty miles, and Blake on the other wing was about seventy (as the crow flies) from the army of Castile.
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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expending
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| v.花费( expend的现在分词 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
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benevolent
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fretted
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fumed
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| 愤怒( fume的过去式和过去分词 )； 大怒； 发怒； 冒烟 | |
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alluded
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confidential
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arrogant
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blustering
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| adj.狂风大作的，狂暴的v.外强中干的威吓( bluster的现在分词 )；咆哮；（风）呼啸；狂吹 | |
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levies
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prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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rupture
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| n.破裂；(关系的)决裂；v.(使)破裂 | |
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ostensible
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| adj.(指理由)表面的，假装的 | |
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reassure
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| v.使放心，使消除疑虑 | |
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17
gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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18
vassal
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| n.附庸的；属下；adj.奴仆的 | |
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19
minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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20
homage
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| n.尊敬，敬意，崇敬 | |
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21
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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22
whatsoever
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| adv.（用于否定句中以加强语气）任何；pron.无论什么 | |
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23
disarm
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| v.解除武装，回复平常的编制，缓和 | |
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24
concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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25
bully
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| n.恃强欺弱者，小流氓；vt.威胁，欺侮 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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27
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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29
joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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30
grandiloquent
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| adj.夸张的 | |
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31
expatiated
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| v.详述，细说( expatiate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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32
continental
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| adj.大陆的，大陆性的，欧洲大陆的 | |
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33
untold
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| adj.数不清的，无数的 | |
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34
misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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35
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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36
advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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37
pacification
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| n. 讲和，绥靖，平定 | |
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38
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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39
theatrical
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| adj.剧场的，演戏的；做戏似的，做作的 | |
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40
ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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41
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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42
ironical
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| adj.讽刺的，冷嘲的 | |
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43
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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44
concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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45
approbation
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| n.称赞；认可 | |
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46
honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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47
miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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allusion
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| n.暗示，间接提示 | |
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49
recoiled
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| v.畏缩( recoil的过去式和过去分词 )；退缩；报应；返回 | |
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distress
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| n.苦恼，痛苦，不舒适；不幸；vt.使悲痛 | |
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51
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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52
specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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53
stipulated
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| vt.& vi.规定；约定adj.[法]合同规定的 | |
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54
sarcastic
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| adj.讥讽的，讽刺的，嘲弄的 | |
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allusions
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| 暗指，间接提到( allusion的名词复数 ) | |
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56
improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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57
swarm
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| n.(昆虫)等一大群；vi.成群飞舞；蜂拥而入 | |
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58
inundates
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| v.淹没( inundate的第三人称单数 )；（洪水般地）涌来；充满；给予或交予（太多事物）使难以应付 | |
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59
bullying
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| v.恐吓，威逼( bully的现在分词 )；豪；跋扈 | |
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60
wont
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| adj.习惯于；v.习惯；n.习惯 | |
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61
irony
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| n.反语，冷嘲；具有讽刺意味的事，嘲弄 | |
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62
belligerent
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| adj.好战的，挑起战争的；n.交战国，交战者 | |
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63
fiat
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| n.命令，法令，批准；vt.批准，颁布 | |
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insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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66
stipulating
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| v.（尤指在协议或建议中）规定，约定，讲明（条件等）( stipulate的现在分词 )；规定，明确要求 | |
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67
futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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68
arrogance
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| n.傲慢，自大 | |
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69
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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70
adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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71
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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72
hideous
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| adj.丑陋的，可憎的，可怕的，恐怖的 | |
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73
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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74
strenuous
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| adj.奋发的，使劲的；紧张的；热烈的，狂热的 | |
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75
advisers
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| 顾问，劝告者( adviser的名词复数 )； （指导大学新生学科问题等的）指导教授 | |
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76
debouch
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| v.流出，进入 | |
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77
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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78
demonstrations
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| 证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威 | |
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79
skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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80
chaotic
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| adj.混沌的，一片混乱的，一团糟的 | |
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81
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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82
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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83
unnatural
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| adj.不自然的；反常的 | |
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84
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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85
sketched
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| v.草拟（sketch的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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86
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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87
unison
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| n.步调一致，行动一致 | |
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88
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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89
evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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90
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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91
abounding
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| adj.丰富的，大量的v.大量存在，充满，富于( abound的现在分词 ) | |
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92
unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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93
northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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94
eastward
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| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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95
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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96
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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97
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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98
levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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99
inefficient
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| adj.效率低的，无效的 | |
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100
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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101
rout
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| n.溃退，溃败；v.击溃，打垮 | |
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102
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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103
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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104
varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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105
diluted
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| 无力的，冲淡的 | |
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106
besiege
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| vt.包围，围攻，拥在...周围 | |
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107
helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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108
thither
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| adv.向那里；adj.在那边的，对岸的 | |
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109
hordes
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| n.移动着的一大群( horde的名词复数 )；部落 | |
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110
superseding
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| 取代，接替( supersede的现在分词 ) | |
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111
alterations
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| n.改动( alteration的名词复数 )；更改；变化；改变 | |
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112
leisurely
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| adj.悠闲的；从容的，慢慢的 | |
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113
bickering
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| v.争吵( bicker的现在分词 )；口角；（水等）作潺潺声；闪烁 | |
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114
deadlock
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| n.僵局，僵持 | |
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