Lacoste’s first care, when the Pillar and San José had both fallen into his hands, was to connect the two works by his ‘third parallel,’ which was drawn1 from one to the other just above the edge of the ravine of the Huerba. In order to assail2 the walls of the city that stream had to be crossed, a task of some difficulty, for its bed was searched by the great batteries at Santa Engracia along the whole front between the two captured forts, while north of San José the ‘Palafox Battery’ near the Porta Quemada completely overlooked the lower and broader part of the river bed. The Spaniards kept up a fast and furious fire upon the lost works, with the object of preventing the besiegers from moving forward from them, or constructing fresh batteries among their ruins. In this they were not successful: the French, burrowing4 deep among the débris, successfully covered themselves, and suffered little.
The second stage of the siege work, the attack on the actual enceinte of Saragossa, now began. The two points on which it was directed were the Santa Engracia battery—the southern salient of the town—and the extreme south-eastern angle of the place, where lay the Palafox Battery and the smaller work generally known as the battery of the Oil Mill (Molino de Aceite). The former was less than 200 yards from the Pillar fort, the latter not more than 100 from San José, but between them ran the deep bed of the Huerba.
From the twelfth to the seventeenth the French were busily engaged in throwing up batteries in the line of their third parallel, and on the morning of the last-named day no less than nine were ready. Five opened on Santa Engracia, four on the Palafox battery: at both points they soon began to do exten[p. 116]sive damage, for here the walls had not been entirely6 reconstructed (as on the western front of the city), but only patched up and strengthened with earthworks at intervals7. The masonry8 of the convent of Santa Engracia suffered most, and began to fall in large patches. Palafox saw that the enceinte would be pierced ere long, and that street-fighting would be the next stage of the siege. Accordingly he set the whole civil population to work on constructing barricades10 across the streets and lanes of the south-eastern part of the city, in the rear of the threatened points, and turned every block of houses into an independent fort by building up all the doorways11 and windows facing towards the enemy. The spirits of the garrison12 were still high, and the Captain-General had done his best to keep them up by issuing gazettes containing very roseate accounts of the state of affairs in the outer world. His communication with the open country was not completely cut, for thrice he had been able to send boats down the Ebro, which took their chance of running past the French batteries at night, and always succeeded. One of these boats had carried the Captain-General’s younger brother, Francisco Palafox, who had orders to appeal to the Catalans for help, and to raise the peasants of Lower Aragon. Occasional messengers also got in from without: one arrived on January 16 from Catalonia, with promises of aid from the Marquis of Lazan, who proposed to return from Gerona with his division, in order to fall upon the rear of the besiegers. Palafox not only let this be known, but published in his Official Gazette some utterly13 unfounded rumours14, which the courier had brought. Reding, it was said, had beaten St. Cyr in the open field: the Duke of Infantado was marching from Cuenca on Aragon with 20,000 men. Sir John Moore had turned to bay on the pursuing forces of the Emperor, and had defeated them at a battle in Galicia in which Marshal Ney had been killed[129]. To celebrate this glorious news the church bells were set ringing, the artillery15 fired a general salute16, and military music paraded the town. These phenomena18 were perfectly19 audible to the besiegers, and caused them many searchings of[p. 117] heart, for they could not guess what event the Saragossans could be celebrating.
The garrison needed all the encouragement that could be given to them, for after the middle of January the stress of the siege began to be felt very heavily. Food was not wanting—for, excepting fresh meat and vegetables, everything was still procurable20 in abundance. But cold and overcrowding were beginning to cause epidemic21 disorders22. The greater part of the civil population had taken refuge in their cellars when the bombardment began, and after a few days spent in those dark and damp retreats, from which they only issued at night, or when they were called on for labour at the fortifications, began to develop fevers and dysentery. This was inevitable23, for in most of the dwellings24 from twenty to forty persons of all ages were crowded in mere25 holes, no more than seven feet high, and almost unprovided with ventilation, where they lived, ate, and slept, packed together, and with no care for sanitary26 precautions[130]. The malignant27 fevers bred in these refuges soon spread to the garrison: though under cover, the soldiery were destitute28 of warm clothing (especially the Murcian battalions30), and could not procure32 enough firewood to cook their meals. By January 20 there were 8,000 sick among the 30,000 regular troops, and every day the wastage to the hospital grew more and more noticeable. Many officers of note had already fallen in the useless sorties, and in especial a grave loss had been suffered on January 13, when Colonel San Genis, the chief engineer of the besieged33, and the designer of the whole of the defences of the city, was killed on the ramparts of the Palafox battery, as he was directing the fire against the new entrenchment34 which the French were throwing up across the gorge37 of the San José fort[131]. He had no competent successor as a general director, for his underlings had no grasp of siege-strategy, and were only good at details. They built batteries and barricades and ran mines[p. 118] in pure opportunism, without any comprehensive scheme of defence before their eyes.
The French meanwhile were very active, though the constant increase of sickness in the 3rd Corps38 was daily thinning the regiments39, till the proportion of men stricken down by fever was hardly less than that among the Spaniards. On the seventeenth and eighteenth Lacoste began to contrive41 a descent into the bottom of the ravine of the Huerba, by a series of zigzags42 pushed forward from the third parallel, both in the direction of Santa Engracia and in that of the Palafox battery. The latter was repeatedly silenced by the advanced batteries of the besiegers, but they could not subdue43 the incessant44 musketry fire from windows and loopholes which swept the whole bed of the Huerba, and rendered the work at the head of the new sap most difficult and deadly. Sometimes it had to be completely abandoned because of the plunging46 fire from the city[132]. Yet it was always resumed after a time: the French found that their best and easiest work was done in the early morning, when, for day after day, a dense47 fog rose from the Ebro, which rendered it impossible for the Spaniards to see what was going on, or to aim with any certainty at the entrenchments. Irritated at the steady if slow progress of the enemy, Palafox launched on the afternoon of January 23 the most desperate sortie that his army had yet essayed against the advanced works of the French. At four o’clock on that day[133] three columns dashed out and attacked the line of trenches48: one, as a blind, was sent out opposite the Aljafferia, to distract the attention of Morlot’s division from the main sally. The other two were serious attacks, but both made with too small numbers—apparently49 no more than 200 picked men in each. The left-hand column became hotly engaged with the trenches to the north of San José, and got no further forward than a house a little beyond the Huerba, from which they expelled a French post. But the right-hand force carried out a very bold programme. Crossing[p. 119] the Huerba below Santa Engracia, they broke through the third parallel, and then made a dash at two mortar-batteries in the second parallel which had particularly annoyed the defence on that morning. The commander of the sortie, Mariano Galindo, a captain of the Volunteers of Aragon, led his men so straight that they rushed in with the bayonet on the first battery and spiked50 both its pieces. They were making for the second when they were overwhelmed by the trench36 guard and by reinforcements hurrying up from Musnier’s camp. Of a hundred men who had gone forward with Galindo from the third parallel twelve were killed and thirty, including their brave leader, taken prisoners. The French stated their loss at no more than six killed and five wounded, a figure that seems suspiciously low, considering that the first line of trenches had been stormed by the assailants, and a battery in the second line captured and disabled. Galindo had gone forward more than 500 yards, into the very middle of the French works, before he was checked and surrounded. It was a very gallant51 exploit, but once more we are constrained52 to ask why Palafox told off for it no more than a mere handful of men. What would have happened had he thrown a solid column of 10,000 men upon the siege-works, instead of a few hundred volunteers?
On the twenty-second, the day before Galindo’s sortie, Junot was superseded54 in command of the besieging55 army by Lannes, who had been restored to health by two months’ holiday, and was now himself again. He arrived just in time to take charge of the important task of storming the main enceinte, for which Junot’s preparations were now far advanced. But though the siege operations looked not unpromising, he found the situation grave and dangerous. Belmas and the other French historians describe this as the most critical epoch56 of the whole Saragossan episode[134]. The fact was that at last there were beginning to be signs of movement in the open country of Aragon. During the month that had elapsed since the siege began, the peasantry had been given time to draw together. Francisco Palafox, after escaping from the city, had gone to Mequinenza, and was arming the local levies57 with muskets58 procured59 from Catalonia. He had already a great horde60 assembled in the direction of[p. 120] Alca?iz. On the other bank of the Ebro Colonel Perena had been organizing a force at Huesca, from northern Aragon and the foot-hills of the Pyrenees. Lastly, it was known that Lazan was on his way from Gerona to aid his brothers, and had brought to Lerida his division of 4,000 men[135], a comparatively well-organized body of troops, which had been under arms since October. Even far back, on the way to Pampeluna, insurgents61 had gathered in the Sierra de Moncayo, and were threatening the important half-way post of Tudela, by which the besieging army kept up its communication with France.
Hitherto these gatherings62 had looked dangerous, but had done no actual harm. General Wathier, with the cavalry63 of the 3rd Corps, had scoured64 the southern bank of the Ebro and kept off the insurgents; but now they were pressing closer in, and on January 20 a battalion31, which Gazan had sent out to drive away Perena’s levies, had been checked and beaten off at Perdiguera, only twelve miles from the camp of the besiegers.
Lannes could not fail to see that if he committed himself to the final assault on Saragossa, and entangled65 the 3rd Corps in street-fighting, he might find himself assailed66 from the rear on all points of his lines. There were no troops whatever in front of Saragossa to form a ‘covering-force’ to beat off the insurgents, if they should come down upon his camps while he was storming the city, for the 3rd Corps and Gazan’s division had now only 20,000 infantry67 for the conduct of the siege.
Accordingly the Marshal resolved to undo68 the Emperor’s arrangements for keeping up the line of communication with Madrid, and to draw in Mortier, with Suchet’s strong and intact division, from Calatayud, where he had been lying for the last three weeks. This was the only possible force which he could use to provide himself with a covering army. The touch with Madrid, a thing of comparatively minor69 importance, had to be sacrificed, except so far as it could be kept up by the division of Dessolles, which had now come back from the pursuit of Sir John Moore, and had pushed detachments back to its old posts at Sigüenza and Guadalajara.
Mortier therefore evacuated70 Calatayud by the orders of[p. 121] Lannes, and came back to the Ebro: passing behind the besieging army he crossed the river and took post at Perdiguera with 10,000 men, facing the levies of Perena in the direction of Huesca. It was only when he had made certain of having this powerful reinforcement close at hand, ready to deal with any interference from without, that Lannes dared to proceed with the assault. At the same time that Mortier arrived at Perdiguera, he sent out Wathier, with two battalions and two regiments of cavalry, to deal with the insurgents of the Lower Ebro, where Francisco Palafox had been busy. Four or five thousand peasants with one newly-levied regiment40 of Aragonese volunteers tried to resist this small column, but were beaten on the twenty-sixth in front of the town of Alca?iz, which fell into Wathier’s hands, and with it 20,000 sheep and 1,500 sacks of flour, which had been collected for the revictualling of Saragossa, in case the investment should be broken. They were a welcome windfall to the besieging army, where food was none too plentiful72, since the plain country where it lay encamped had now been eaten bare, and convoys73 of food from Tudela and Pampeluna were rare and inadequate74.
On January 24 the French had succeeded in pushing three approaches across the Huerba, and were firmly established under its northern bank. Two days later they made lodgements in ruins, cellars, and low walls where buildings had been pulled down, in the narrow space between the town wall and the river bank, below the Palafox battery. The cannon75 of the defenders76 could only act intermittently77: every night the parapets were repaired, but every morning after a few hours of artillery duel78 the Spanish guns were silenced by the dreadful converging79 fire poured in upon them. Meanwhile Palafox was heaping barricade9 upon barricade in the quarters behind the threatened points, and fortifying80 the houses and convents which connected them.
The final crisis arrived on the twenty-seventh. There were now three practicable breaches82,—two were on the side of the Palafox battery, one in the convent of Santa Engracia. To storm the first and second Lannes told off the light companies of the first brigade of Grandjean’s division; to the third was allotted83 the 1st regiment of the Vistula from Musnier’s division. Heavy[p. 122] supports lay behind them, in the third parallel, with orders to rush in if the storming parties should prove successful.
The assault was delivered with great dash and swiftness at noon on the twenty-seventh. On two points it was successful. At the most northern breach81 the assailants reached the summit of the wall, but could not get down into the city, on account of the storm of musketry from barricades and houses that swept the gap into which they had advanced. They merely made a lodgement in the breach itself, and could penetrate84 no further. But in the central breach, close beneath the Palafox battery, the voltigeurs not only passed the walls, but seized the ‘Oil Mill’ which abutted85 on them, and a triangular86 block of houses projecting into the town. At the Santa Engracia breach they were even more fortunate: the Poles carried the convent with their first rush: its outer wall had been battered87 down for a breadth of thirty yard and entering there the stormers drove out the Spaniards from the interior buildings of the place, and got into the large square which lies behind it, where they seized the Capuchin nunnery. Thus a considerable wedge was driven through the enceinte, and the Spaniards had to evacuate71 the walls for some little distance on each side of Santa Engracia. From the stretch to the west of that convent they were driven out by an unpremeditated assault of Musnier’s supports, who ran out from the trenches on the left of the Huerba, and escaladed the dilapidated wall in front of them, when they saw the garrison drawing back on account of the flanking fire from Santa Engracia. They got possession of the whole outer enceinte as far as the Trinitarian convent by the Carmen gate.
These successes were bought at the moderate loss of 350 men, of whom two-thirds fell in the fighting on the Santa Engracia front; the Spaniards lost somewhat more, including a few prisoners. In any ordinary siege the day would have settled the fate of the place, for the besiegers had broken through the enceinte in two places, and though the space seized inside the Palafox battery was not large, yet on each side of Santa Engracia the assailants had penetrated88 so far that a quarter of a mile of the walls was in their possession. But Saragossa was not as other places, and the garrison were perfectly prepared with a new front of defence, composed of batteries and crenel[p. 123]lated houses in rear of the lost positions. Two wedges, one large and one small, had been driven into the town, but they had to be broadened and driven further in if they were to have any effect.
On the twenty-eighth, therefore, a new stage of the siege began, and the street-fighting, which was to last for twenty-four days more, had its commencement. Lannes had heard, from those who had served under Verdier in the first siege, of the deplorable slaughter89 and repeated repulses90 that had followed the attempt to carry by main force the internal defences of the city. To hurl91 solid columns of stormers at the barricades and the crenellated houses was not his intention. He had made up his mind to advance by sap and mine, as if he were dealing92 with regular fortifications. His plan was to use each block of houses that he gained as a base for the attack upon the next, and never to send in the infantry with the bayonet till he had breached93 by artillery, or by mines, the building against which the assault was directed. This form of attack was bound to be slow, but it had the great merit of costing comparatively little in the way of casualties. The fact was that the Marshal had not the numbers which would justify94 him in wasting lives by assaults which might or might not be successful, but which were certain to prove very bloody95. The whole Third Corps, as we have already seen, did not now furnish much more than 13,000 bayonets, while Gazan’s men were all occupied in watching the suburb, and Suchet’s lay far out, as a covering corps set to watch Perena and Lazan.
There was no one single dominating position in the city whose occupation was likely to constrain53 the besieged to surrender. The whole town is built on a level, and its fifty-three solidly-built churches and convents formed so many forts, each of which was defensible in itself and could not be reduced save by a direct attack. All that could be done was to endeavour to capture them one by one, in the hope that at last the Saragossans would grow tired of their hopeless resistance, and consent to surrender, when they realized that things had gone so far that they could only protract96, but could not finally beat off, the slow advance of the besieging army.
The work of the French, therefore, consisted in spreading out[p. 124] from their two separate lodgements on the eastern and southern sides of the city, with the simple object of gaining ground each day and of driving the Spaniards back towards the centre of the place. On the right attack the most important objective of the besiegers was the block of monastic buildings to the north of the Palafox battery, the twin convents of San Augustin and Santa Monica, which lay along the northern side of the small wedge that they had driven into the north-eastern corner of the town. As these buildings lay on ground slightly higher than that which the French had occupied, it was difficult to attack them by means of mines. But an intense converging fire was brought to bear upon them, both from batteries outside the walls, playing across the Huerba, and by guns brought inside the captured angle of the enceinte. The outer walls of Santa Monica were soon a mass of ruins: nevertheless the first attack on it [January 29] was beaten off, and it was only on the next day, after twenty-four hours more of furious bombardment, that Grandjean’s men succeeded in storming, first the convent and then its church, after a furious hand-to-hand fight with the defenders.
After establishing themselves in Santa Monica the French were able to capture some of the adjoining houses, and to turn their attention against its neighbour San Augustin. They ran two mines under it, and at the same time battered it heavily from the external batteries beyond the Huerba. On February I the explosion took place: it opened a breach in the east end of the convent church, and the storming party, entering by the sacristy, got possession of the choir97 chapels98 and the high altar. But the Spaniards rallied in the nave99, ran a barricade of chairs and benches across it, and held their own for some time, firing down from the pulpit and the organ loft100 with effect. Some climbed up into the roof and picked off the French through the holes which the bombardment had left in the ceiling. For some hours this strange indoor battle raged within the spacious101 church. But at last the French carried the nave, and at night only the belfry remained untaken. Its little garrison pelted102 the French with grenades all day, and saved themselves at dusk by a sudden and unexpected dash through the enemy.
In the first flush of success, after San Augustin had been[p. 125] stormed, the 44th regiment, from Grandjean’s division, tried to push on through the streets towards the centre of the town. They captured several barricades and houses, and struggled on till they had nearly reached the Coso. But this sort of fighting was always dangerous in Saragossa: the citizens kept up such a fierce fire from their windows, and swarmed103 out against the flanks of the column in such numbers, that the 44th had to give back, lost all that it had taken beyond San Augustin, and left 200 dead and wounded behind. Even the formal official reports of the French engineers speak with respect of the courage shown by the besieged on this day. The houses which they had lost in the afternoon they retook in the dusk, by an extraordinary device. Finding the French solidly barricaded104 in them, and proof against any attack from the street, hundreds of the defenders climbed upon the roofs, tore up the tiles and entered by the garrets, from which they descended105 and drove out the invaders106 by a series of charges which cleared story after story[136]. Many monks107, and still more women, were seen among the armed crowds which swept the assailants back towards Santa Monica. It was especially noticed that the civilians108 did far more of the fighting than the soldiers. This was their own special battle.
Irritated at his losses on this day, Lannes issued a general order, expressly forbidding any attempts to storm houses and barricades by main force. After an explosion, the troops were to seize the building that had been shattered, and to cover themselves in it; they were not to go forward and fall upon intact defences further to the front.
While the struggle was raging thus fiercely from January 28 to February 1, in the eastern area of street-fighting, there had been a no less desperate series of combats all around Santa Engracia, on the southern front of attack. Here Musnier’s division was endeavouring to drive the Spaniards out of the blocks of houses to the right and left of the captured convent. They worked almost entirely by mines, running tunnels forward from beneath the convent to blow down the walls of the adjoining dwellings. But even when the mines had gutted110 the doomed111 buildings, it was not easy to seize them: the few men who[p. 126] survived the explosion did not fly, but held out among the ruins, and had to be bayonetted by the assailants who rushed out from the convent to occupy the new lodgements. Time after time the defenders, though perfectly conscious that they were being undermined, and that by staying on guard they were courting certain death, refused to evacuate the threatened houses or to retire into safety. Hence their losses were awful, but the French too suffered not a little, while pushing forward to occupy each building as it was cleared by the explosion. The constant rain of musket45 balls from roofs and church towers searched out the ruins in which they had to effect their lodgements, and many of the assailants fell before they could cover themselves among the débris.
On the thirty-first the Spaniards made a sudden rush from the Misericordia buildings, to recover the Trinitarian convent, the most western point on the enceinte which had fallen into the hands of the French at the assault of the twenty-seventh. They charged in upon it with the greatest fury, and blew open the gate with a four-pounder gun which they dragged up by hand to the very threshold. But the French had built up the whole entrance with sandbags, which held even when the doors had been shattered; and, after persisting for some time in a fruitless attempt to break in, the Saragossans had to retire, foiled and greatly thinned in numbers.
On the following day (February 1) the French began to move forward from Santa Engracia towards the Coso, always clearing their way by explosions, and risking as few men as possible. Nevertheless they could not always keep under cover, and this day they suffered a severe loss: their chief engineer, General Lacoste, was shot through the head, while reconnoitring from a window the houses against which his next attack was to be directed[137]. He was succeeded in command by Colonel Rogniat, one of the French historians of the siege. That officer, as he tells us, discovered that his sappers were using too large charges of powder, which destroyed the roofs and four walls of each[p. 127] house that they undermined, so that the infantry who followed had no cover when they first took possession. He therefore ordered the substitution of smaller measures of powder, so as to throw down only parts of the wall of the building nearest to the French lines, and to leave the roof and the outer walls uninjured. In this way it was much more easy to establish a lodgement, since the storming-party were covered the moment that they had dashed into the shattered shell. The only plan which the Spaniards could devise against this method of procedure, was to set fire to the ruins, and to prevent the entry of the assailants by burning down all that was left of the house. As the buildings of Saragossa contained little woodwork, and were not very combustible[138], the besieged daubed the walls with tar17 and resin112 to make them blaze the better. When an explosion had taken place, the surviving defenders set fire to the débris of floors and roofs before retiring[139]. In this way they sometimes kept the French back for as much as two days, since they could not make their lodgement till the cinders113 had time to cool. Countermining against the French approaches was often tried, but seldom with success, for there were no trained miners in the city: the one battalion of sappers which Palafox possessed114 had been formed from the workmen of the Canal of Aragon, who had no experience in subterranean115 work. On the other hand the French had three whole companies of miners, beside eight more of sappers, who were almost as useful in the demolition116 of the city. They maintained a distinct ascendent underground, though they not unfrequently lost men in the repeated combats with knife and pistol which ensued when mine and countermine met, and the two sides fought for the possession of each other’s galleries.
The first week of February was now drawing to its close, and the advance of the French into the city, though steady, had been extremely slow. Every little block of five or six houses cost a day to break up, and another to entrench35. The waste of life, though not excessive, was more than Lannes could really afford, and he waited impatiently, but in vain, for any signs that the[p. 128] obstinacy117 of the defence was slackening. But though he could not see it, the garrison were being tried far more hardly than the besiegers. It was not so much the loss by fire and sword that was ruining them as the silent ravages118 of the epidemic fevers. Since the French had got within the walls, and the bombardment of the city was being carried on from a shorter range than before, the civilian109 population had been forced to cling more closely than ever to its fetid cellars, and the infectious fever which had appeared in January was developing at the most fearful rate. Living under such insanitary conditions, and feeding on flour and salt fish, for the vegetables had long been exhausted119, the Saragossans had no strength to bear up against the typhus. Whole families died off, and their bodies lay forgotten, tainting120 the air and spreading the contagion121. Even where there were survivors122, they could not easily dispose of the dead, for the urban cemeteries123 were gorged124, and burials took place in trenches hastily opened in streets or gardens. Outside the churches there were hundreds of corpses125, some coffined126, others rolled in shrouds127 or sheets, waiting in rows for the last services of the church, which the surviving clergy128 were too few to read. The shells from the incessant bombardment were continually falling in these open spaces, and tearing the dead to pieces. Ere the siege was over there was a mass of mutilated and decaying bodies heaped in front of every church door. Hundreds more lay in the debatable ground for which the Spaniards and French were contending, and the whole town reeked129 with contagion. The weather was generally still and warm for the time of year, with a thick fog rising every morning from the low ground by the Ebro. The smoke from the burning houses lay low over the place, and the air was thick with the mingled130 fumes131 of fire and pestilence132. If it nauseated133 the French, who had the open country behind them, and were relieved by regiments at intervals, and allowed a rest in their camps outside the walls, it was far more terrible to the Spaniards. The death rate rose, as February drew on, from 300 up to 500 and even 600 a day. The morning state of the garrison on the fourth day of the month showed 13,737 sick and wounded, and only 8,495 men under arms. As the total had been 32,000 when the siege began, nearly 10,000 men must already have[p. 129] perished by the sword or disease. The civil population, containing so many women, children, and aged5 persons, was of course dying at a much quicker rate. Yet the place held out for sixteen days longer! Palafox himself was struck down by the fever, but still issued orders from his bed, and poured out a string of hysterical134 proclamations, in which his delirium135 is clearly apparent.
The terrible situation of the Saragossans was to a large extent concealed136 from the besiegers, who only saw the line of desperate fighting-men which met them in every house, and could only guess at the death and desolation that lay behind. Every French eye-witness bears record to the low spirits of the troops who were compelled to fight in the long series of explosions and assaults which filled the early weeks of February. The engineer Belmas, the most matter-of-fact of all the historians of the siege, turns aside for a moment from his traverses and mining-galleries, to describe the murmurs137 of the weary infantry of the 3rd Corps. ‘Who ever heard before,’ they asked, ‘of an army of 20,000 men being set to take a town defended by 50,000 madmen? We have conquered a quarter of it, and now we are completely fought out. We must halt and wait for reinforcements, or we shall all perish, and be buried in these cursed ruins, before we can rout138 out the last of these fanatics139 from their last stronghold[140].’ Lannes did his best to encourage the rank and file, by showing them that the Spaniards were suffering far more than they, and by pointing out that the moment must inevitably140 come when the defence must break down from mere exhaustion141. He also endeavoured to obtain reinforcements from the Emperor, but only received assurances that some conscripts and convalescents for the 3rd Corps should be sent to him from Pampeluna and Bayonne. No fresh regiments could be spared from France, when the affairs of Central Europe were looking so doubtful[141]. The best plan which the Marshal could devise for breaking down the resolution of the Spaniards was to lengthen142 his front of attack, and so endeavour to distract the attention of the besieged from the main front of advance towards the Coso.
[p. 130]
This was only to be done by causing the division of Gazan, which had so long remained passive in front of the suburb, to open an energetic attack on that outlying part of the fortress143. The advantage to be secured in this direction was not merely that a certain amount of the defenders would be drawn away from the city. If the suburb were captured it would be possible to erect144 batteries in it, which would search the whole northern side of Saragossa, the one quarter of the city which was still comparatively unaffected by the bombardment. Here the bulk of the civil population was crowded together, and here too Palafox had collected the greater part of his stores and magazines. If the last safe corner of the city were exposed to a bombardment from a fresh quarter, it would probably do much to lower the hopes of the defenders.
During the last days of January Gazan’s division had pressed back the Spanish outposts in front of the suburb, and on the thirtieth of that month Lannes had sent over two companies of siege artillery, to construct batteries opposite the convents of Jesus and San Lazaro. It was not till February 2-3, however, that he ordered a serious and active attack to be pressed in this quarter. From the trench which covered the front of Gazan’s investing lines a second parallel was thrown out, and two breaching145 batteries erected146 against the Jesus convent: on the fourth an advance by zigzags was pushed still further forward, and more guns brought up. Some little delay was caused by an unexpected swelling147 of the Ebro, which inundated148 that part of the trenches which lay nearest to the river: but by the eighth all was ready for the assault. The Jesus convent, as a glance at the map will readily show, was the most projecting point of the defences of the suburb, and was not well protected by any flanking fire from the other works—indeed it was only helped to any appreciable149 extent by a long fire across the water from the northern side of Saragossa, and by the few gunboats which were moored150 near the bridge. It was a weak structure—merely a brick convent with a ditch beyond it—and the breaching batteries had found no difficulty in opening many large gaps in its masonry. On the eighth it was stormed by Taupin’s brigade of Gazan’s division: the garrison made a creditable resistance, which cost the French ninety men, and then[p. 131] retired151 to San Lazaro and the main fortifications of the suburb. The French established themselves in the convent, and connected it with their siege-works, finally turning its ruins into part of the third parallel, which they began to draw out against the remaining transpontine works. They would probably have proceeded to complete their operations in this direction within the next two or three days, if it had not been for an interruption from without. The two brothers, Lazan and Francisco Palafox, had now united their forces, and had come forward to the line of the Sierra de Alcubierre, only twenty miles from Saragossa, the former with his 4,000 men from Catalonia, the latter with a mass of peasants. Mortier, from his post at Perdiguera, reported their approach to Lannes, and the latter went out in person to meet them, taking with him Guérin’s brigade of Gazan’s division, and leaving only that of Taupin to hold the lines opposite the suburb. Faced by the 12,000 veteran bayonets of the 5th Corps, the two Palafoxes felt that they were helpless, and retreated towards Fraga and Lerida, without attempting to fight. On the thirteenth, therefore, Lannes came back to the siege with the troops that he had drawn away from it. While he was absent Palafox had a splendid opportunity for a sortie on a large scale against Taupin and his isolated152 brigade, for only 4,000 men were facing the suburb. But the time had already gone by in which the garrison was capable of such an advance. They could not now dispose of more than 10,000 men, soldiers and peasants and citizens all included, and none of these could be drawn away from the city, where the fighting-line was always growing weaker. Indeed, its numbers were so thinned by the epidemic that Palafox was guarding the Aljafferia with no more than 300 men, and manning the unattacked western front with convalescents from the hospitals, who could hardly stand, and often died at their posts during the cold and damp hours of the night. All his available efficients were engaged in the street-fighting with the 3rd Corps.
For while the attack on the suburb was being pressed, the slow advance of the besiegers within the walls was never slackened. On some days they won a whole block of houses by their mining operations: on others they lost many men and gained no advantage. The right attack was extending[p. 132] itself towards the river, and working from the convent of San Augustin into the quarter of the Tanneries. At the same time it was also moving on toward the Coso, but with extreme slowness, for the Spaniards made a specially29 desperate defence in the houses about the University and the Church of the Trinity. One three-storied building, which covered the traverse across the Coso to the south of the University, stood ten separate assaults and four explosions, and held out from the ninth to the eighteenth, effectually keeping back the advance of the besiegers in this direction[142]. Nor could the French ever succeed in connecting their field of operations on this front with that which centred around Santa Engracia. Down to the very end of the siege the Saragossans clung desperately153 to the south-eastern corner of the city, and kept control of it right down to the external walls and the bank of the Huerba, where they still possessed a narrow strip of 300 yards of the enceinte.
The left attack of the French, that from the Santa Engracia side, made much more progress, though even here it was slow and dearly bought. On February 10, however, in spite of several checks, the besiegers for the first time forced their way as far as the Coso, working through the ruined hospital which had been destroyed in the first siege. On the same day, at the north-western angle of their advance, they made a valuable conquest in the church and convent of San Francisco. A mine was driven under this great building from the ruins of the hospital, and filled with no less than 3,000 pounds of powder. It had not been discovered by the Spaniards, and the convent was full of fighting-men at the moment of the explosion. The whole grenadier company of the 1st regiment of Valencia and 300 irregulars were blown up, and perished to a man[143]. Nor was this all: in the northern part of the building was established the main factory for military equipment of the Army of Aragon: it was crammed154 with workpeople, largely women, for Palafox had forgotten or refused to withdraw the dép?t to a less convenient and spacious but more safe position. All these unfortunate non-combatants, to the number of at least 400, perished,[p. 133] and the roof-tops for hundreds of yards around were strewn with their dismembered limbs.
It might have been expected that, as the immediate155 consequence of this awful catastrophe156, the French would have made a long step forward in this direction. But such was not the case: before the smoke had cleared away Spaniards rushed forward from the inner defences, and occupied part of the ruins of San Francisco. A body of peasants, headed by the émigré colonel de Fleury, got into the bell-tower of the convent, which had not fallen with the rest, and kept up from its leads a vigorous plunging fire upon the besiegers, when they stole forward to burrow3 into the mass of débris. But with the loss of some thirty men the French succeeded in mastering two-thirds of the ruins: next day they cleared the rest, and stormed the belfry, where de Fleury and his men were all bayonetted after a desperate fight on the winding157 stairs. It was first from the commanding height of this steeple that the French officers obtained a full view of the city. The sight was encouraging to them: they could realize how much the inner parts of the place had suffered from the bombardment, and noted158 with their telescopes the small number of defenders visible behind the further barricades, the heaps of corpses in the streets, and the slow and dejected pace of the few passengers visible. Two great gallows159 with corpses hanging from them especially attracted the eyes of the onlookers[144]. Other circumstances united on this and the following day (February 11-12) to show that the defence was at last beginning to slacken. A great mob of peasants, mainly women, came out of the Portillo gate towards Morlot’s trenches, and prayed hard for permission to go through the lines to their villages. They were not fired on, but given a loaf apiece, and then driven back into the city. It was still more significant that at night, on the eleventh, four or five bodies of deserters stole out to the French; they were all foreigners, belonging to the ‘Swiss’ battalion[145] which was shut up in Saragossa: several officers were among them. To excuse themselves they said that Palafox and the friars were mad, and that[p. 134] they judged that all further defence had become impossible. Yet the siege was to endure for nine days longer[146]!
Though the two main attacks continued to press slowly forward, and that on the left had now reached the Coso and covered a front of 100 yards on the southern side of that great street, it was not on this front that the decisive blow was destined160 to be given. On the eighteenth Lannes determined161 to deliver the great assault on the suburb, where the batteries in the third parallel and about the Jesus convent had now completely shattered the San Lazaro defences. All Gazan’s men being now back in their trenches, since Mortier’s expedition had driven off the Marquis of Lazan, Lannes considered that he might safely risk the storm. Fifty-two siege-guns played on San Lazaro throughout the morning of the eighteenth, and no less than eight practicable breaches were opened in it and the works to its right and left. At noon three storming columns leaped out of the trenches and raced for the nearest of these entries. All three burst through: there was a sharp struggle in the street of the suburb, and then the French reached and seized a block of houses at the head of the bridge, which cut the defence in two and rendered a retreat into Saragossa almost impossible. The Spaniards, seeing that all was lost, split into two bodies: one tried to force its way across the bridge; but only 300 passed; the rest were slain162 or captured. The main part, consisting of the defenders of the western front of the suburb, formed in a solid mass and, abandoning their defences, tried to escape westward163 up the bank of the Ebro, into the open country. They got across the inundation164 in their front, but when they had gone thus far were surrounded by two regiments of French cavalry, and forced to surrender. They numbered 1,500 men, under General Manso, commanding the 3rd division of Palafox’s army, the one which furnished the garrison of the suburb. The officer commanding the whole transpontine defence, Baron165 de Versage, had been killed by a cannon-ball on the bridge.
Map of the second siege of Saragossa
Enlarge SECOND SIEGE of SARAGOSSA
DEC. 1808 to FEB. 1809
This was not the only disaster suffered by the Saragossans on the eighteenth: at three in the afternoon, when the news of the loss of the suburb had had time to spread round the town, [p. 135]and the attention of the besieged was distracted to this side, Grandjean’s division attacked the houses and barricades in the north-eastern part of the city, which had so long held them at bay. A great mine opened a breach in the University, which was stormed, and with it fell the houses on each side, as far as the Coso. At the same time another attack won some ground in the direction of the Trinity convent, and the Ebro. Next day the Spaniards in this remote corner of the town, almost cut off from the main body of the defenders, and now battered from the rear by new works thrown up in the suburb, in and about San Lazaro, drew back and abandoned the quarter of the Tanneries, the quays166, and the outer enceinte looking over the mouth of the Huerba.
On the nineteenth it was evident that the end had come: a third of the ever-dwindling force of effective men of which Palafox could dispose had been killed or captured at the storm of San Lazaro. The city was now being fired on from the north, the only side which had hitherto been safe. The epidemic was worse than ever—600 a day are said to have died during the final week of the siege. The last mills which the garrison possessed had lately been destroyed, and no more flour was issued, but unground corn, which had to be smashed up between paving-stones, or boiled and eaten as a sort of porridge. The supply of powder was beginning to run low; not from want of material to compound it, but from the laboratories having been mostly destroyed and from the greater part of the arsenal167 workmen having died. Only about 700 pounds a day [six quintals] could now be turned out, and the daily expenditure168 in the mines and barricades came to much more.
On this morning the French noted that at many points the defence seemed to be slackening, and that parts of the line were very feebly manned. They made more progress this day than in any earlier twenty-four hours of the siege. Their main work, however, was to run six large mines under the Coso, till they got below the houses on its further side, somewhat to the right of San Francisco. Rogniat placed 3,000 pounds of powder in each, a quantity that was calculated to blow up the whole quarter.
It was not necessary to use them. The spirits of the defenders[p. 136] had at last been broken, and surrender was openly spoken of—though its mention ten days earlier would have cost the life of the proposer. Palafox on his sick bed understood that all was over; he sent for General St. March and resigned the military command to him. But in order that he might not seem to be shirking his responsibility, and trying to put the ignominy of asking for terms on his successor, he sent his aide-de-camp Casseillas to Lannes, offering surrender, but demanding that the troops should march out with the honours of war and join the nearest Spanish army in the field. Then he turned his face to the wall, and prepared to die, for the fever lay heavy upon him, and broken with despair and fatigue169 he thought that he had not many hours to live. St. March’s appointment not being well taken—the loss of the Monte Torrero was still remembered against him—Palafox’s last act was to give over charge of the city to a Junta170 of thirty-three persons[147], mainly local notables and clergy, to whom the finishing of the negotiations171 would fall.
Of course Lannes sent back the Captain-General’s aide-de-camp with the message that he must ask for unconditional172 surrender, and that the proposal that the garrison should be allowed to depart was absurd. The fighting was resumed on the morning of the twentieth, and the French were making appreciable progress, when the Junta once more sent to ask terms from the besiegers. It was not without some bitter debate among themselves that they took this step, for there was still a minority, including St. March and the priest Padre Consolation173, who wished to continue the resistance. They were backed by a section of the citizens, who began to collect and to raise angry cries of Treason. But the whole of the soldiery and the major part of the civilian defenders were prepared to yield. At four o’clock in the afternoon they sent out to ask for a twenty-four hours’ truce174 to settle terms of surrender. Lannes granted them two hours to send him out a deputation charged with full powers to capitulate, and ordered the bombardment and the mining to cease. His aide-de-camp, who bore the message, was nearly murdered by fanatics in the street[148],[p. 137] and was rescued with difficulty by some officers of the regular army. But the Junta sent him back with the message that the deputation should be forthcoming, and within the stipulated175 time eleven of its members came out from the Portillo gate[149], to the Marshal’s head quarters on the Calatayud road. There was not much discussion: Lannes contented176 himself with pointing out to the Spaniards that the place was at his mercy: he had the plan of his siege-works unrolled before them, and pointed177 out the position of the six great mines under the Coso[150], as well as those of the advanced posts which he had gained during the last two days. The deputies made some feeble attempts to secure that the name of Ferdinand VII should appear in the articles of capitulation, and that the clergy should be guaranteed immunity178 and undisturbed possession of their benefices. Lannes waved all such proposals aside, and dictated179 a form of surrender which was on the whole reasonable and even generous. The garrison should march out on the following day, and lay down its arms 100 yards outside the Portillo gate. Those who would swear homage180 to King Joseph should have their liberty, and might take service with him if they wished. Those who refused the oath should march as prisoners to France. The city should be granted a general pardon: the churches should be respected: private property should not be meddled181 with. The citizens must surrender all their weapons of whatever sort. Any civil magistrates182 or employés who wished to keep their places must take the oath of allegiance to King Joseph.
On the following morning the garrison marched out: of peasants and soldiers there were altogether about 8,000 men, 1,500 of whom were convalescents from the Hospitals. ‘Never[p. 138] had any of us gazed on a more sad or touching183 sight,’ writes Lejeune; ‘these sickly looking men, bearing in their bodies the seeds of the fever, all frightfully emaciated184, with long black matted beards, and scarcely able to hold their weapons, dragged themselves slowly along to the sound of the drum. Their clothes were torn and dirty: everything about them bore witness to terrible misery185. But in spite of their livid faces, blackened with powder, and scarred with rage and grief, they bore themselves with dignity and pride. The bright coloured sashes, the large round hats surmounted186 by a few cock’s-feathers which shaded their foreheads, the brown cloaks or ponchos187 flung over their varied188 costumes, lent a certain picturesqueness189 to their tattered190 garb191. When the moment came for them to pile their arms and deliver up their flags, many of them gave violent expression to their despair. Their eyes gleamed with rage, and their savage192 looks seemed to say that they had counted our ranks, and deeply regretted having surrendered to such a small army of enemies[151].’
Another and more matter-of-fact eye-witness adds, ‘They were a most motley crowd of men of all ages and conditions, some in uniform, more without it. The officers were mostly mounted on mules193 or donkeys, and were only distinguished194 from the men by their three-cornered hats and their large cloaks. Many were smoking their cigarillos and talking to each other with an aspect of complete indifference195. But all were not so resigned. The whole garrison, 8,000 to 10,000 strong, defiled196 in front of us: the majority looked so utterly unlike soldiers, that our men said openly to each other that they ought not to have taken so long or spent so much trouble in getting rid of such a rabble[152].’ The column was promptly197 put in motion for France, under the escort of two of Morlot’s regiments. Many died on the way from the fever whose seeds they carried with them. Few or none, as might have been supposed, took advantage of the offer to save themselves from captivity198 by taking the oath to King Joseph.
It is sad to have to confess that the French did not keep to the terms of the capitulation. That Lannes could not restrain his men from plunder199, as he had promised, was hardly surprising.[p. 139] There were so many empty houses and churches containing valuables, that it was not to be wondered at that the victors should help themselves to all they could find. But they also plundered200 occupied houses, and even stole the purses of the captive officers. What was worse was that many assassinations201 took place, especially of clergy, for the French looked upon the priests and friars as being mainly responsible for the desperate defence. Two in especial, Padre Basilio Bogiero, the chaplain of Palafox, and Santiago Sass, a parish priest, were shot in cold blood two days after the surrender[153]. Public opinion in the French ranks was convinced that they, more than any one else, had kept the Captain-General up to the mark. Palafox himself was treated with great brutality202. As he lay apparently moribund203, the French officer who had been made interim204 governor of Saragossa came to his bedside, and bade him to sign orders for the surrender of Jaca and Monzon. When he refused, this colonel threatened to have him shot, but left him alone when threats had no effect. Ere he was convalescent he was sent off to France, where the Emperor ordered that he should be treated, not as a prisoner of war, but as guilty of treason, and shut him up for many years as a close captive in the donjon of Vincennes.
The state in which Saragossa was found by the French hardly bears description. It was a focus of corruption205, one mass of putrefying corpses. According to a report which Lannes elicited206 from the municipal officers, nearly 54,000 persons had died in the place since the siege began[154]. Of these about 20,000 were fighting-men, regular or irregular, the rest were non-combatants. Only 6,000 had fallen by fire and sword: the remainder were victims of the far more deadly pestilence. A few days after the siege was ended Lannes stated that the total population of the town was now only 15,000 souls, instead of the 55,000 which it had contained when the siege began. But his estimate does not include some thousands of citizens who had fled into the open country, the moment that they were released from investment, in order to escape from the contagion in the city. ‘Il est impossible que Saragosse se relève,’ wrote[p. 140] the marshal; ‘cette ville fait horreur à voir.’ It was weeks indeed before the dead were all buried: months before the contagion of the siege-fever died out from the miserable207 city. Even after five years of the capable and benevolent208 government of Suchet it was still half desolate209, and no attempt had been made to rebuild the third of its houses and churches which had been reduced to ashes by the mines and the bombardment.
The French losses in front of Saragossa are not easy to calculate. Belmas says that the total of casualties was about 3,000 in the infantry, but he takes no notice of the losses by siege-fever, except to say that many died from it. He does not give the losses of the artillery, except of that small part of it which was not attached either to the 3rd or to the 5th Corps. Considering that the 3rd Corps alone had 13,123 sick on January 15, and that typhus is a notoriously deadly disease, it is probable that the total losses of the French during the siege amounted to 10,000 men. It is hard otherwise to explain the difference between the 37,000 men that the 3rd Corps counted in October, and the 14,000 men which it mustered210 when Suchet took over its command in April. The sufferings of the 5th Corps were small in comparison, for till February began it took no very serious part in the siege, and its health was notoriously far better than that of Junot’s divisions[155]. But we cannot be far wrong in concluding with Schepeler and Arteche that the total French loss must have been 10,000 men, rather than the 4,000 given by Napier, who is apparently relying on Rogniat. That officer gives only the casualties in battle, and not the losses in hospital.
So ended the siege of Saragossa—a magnificent display of civic211 courage, little helped by strategy or tactics. For Palafox, though a splendid leader of insurgents, was, as his conduct in[p. 141] October and November had shown, a very poor general. He made a gross initial mistake in shutting up 40,000 fighting-men in a place which could have been easily defended by 25,000. If he had sent one or two divisions to form the nucleus212 of an army of relief in Lower Aragon, with orders to harass213, but not to fight pitched battles, it is hard to see how the siege could have been kept up. His second fault was the refusal to make sorties on a large scale during the first half of the siege, while he was still in possession of great masses of superfluous214 fighting-men. He sent out scores of petty sallies of a few hundred men, but never moved so many as 5,000 on a single day. Such a policy worried but could not seriously harm the French, while it destroyed the willing men of the garrison; if the Captain-General had saved up all the volunteers whom he lost by tens and twenties in small and fruitless attacks on the trenches, he could have built up with them a column-head that would have pierced through the French line at any point that he chose. Anything might have been done during the three weeks while Mortier was at Calatayud, and especially during the days when Gazan with his 8,000 men was cut off by the floods, and isolated on the further bank of the Ebro.
The Captain-General’s conduct, in short, was not that of a capable officer. But it is absurd to endeavour to represent him as a coward, or as a puppet whose strings215 were pulled by fanatical friars. He knew perfectly well what he was doing, and how to manage the disorderly but enthusiastic masses of the population[156]. There can be no doubt that his personal influence was all-important, and the effect of his constant harangues216 and proclamations immense. It would be quite as true to say that the friars and the mob-orators were his tools, as that he was theirs. He had to humour them, but by humouring them he got out of them the utmost possible service. Against the stories that his proclamations were written for him,[p. 142] and that he had to be goaded217 into issuing every order that came from his head quarters, we have the evidence of Vaughan and others who knew him well. It is unanimous in ascribing to him incessant activity and an exuberant218 fluency219 in composition. Arteche has preserved some minutes on the siege which he wrote long after the Peninsular War was over: they are interesting and well-stated, but more creditable to him as a patriot220 than as a military man[157]. There can be no doubt that the garrison might have been much more wisely handled: but it is doubtful whether under any other direction it would have shown so much energy and staying power. There is certainly no other Spanish siege, save that of Gerona, where half so much resolution was shown. If the defence had been conducted by regular officers and troops alone, the place would probably have fallen three weeks earlier. If the monks and local demagogues had been in command, and patriotic221 anarchy222 alone had been opposed to the French, Saragossa would possibly have fallen at an even earlier date, from mere want of intelligent direction. Palafox, with all his faults, supplied the connecting link between the two sections of the defenders, and kept the soldiery to work by means of the example of the citizens, while he restrained the citizens by dint223 of his immense personal influence over them, won in the first siege. In short, he may have been vain, bombastic224, and a bad tactician225, but he was a good Spaniard. If there had been a few dozen men more of his stamp in Spain, the task of the French in 1808-9 would have been infinitely226 more difficult. The example of Saragossa was invaluable227 to the nation and to Europe. The knowledge of it did much to sicken the French soldiery of the whole war, and to make every officer and man who entered Spain march, not with the light heart that he felt in Germany or Italy, but with gloom and disgust and want of confidence. They never failed to do their duty, but they fought without the enthusiasm which helped them so much in all the earlier wars of the Empire.
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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assail
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| v.猛烈攻击，抨击，痛斥 | |
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burrow
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| vt.挖掘(洞穴)；钻进；vi.挖洞；翻寻；n.地洞 | |
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burrowing
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| v.挖掘（洞穴），挖洞( burrow的现在分词 )；翻寻 | |
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aged
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| adj.年老的，陈年的 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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masonry
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| n.砖土建筑；砖石 | |
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barricade
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| n.路障，栅栏，障碍；vt.设路障挡住 | |
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barricades
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| 路障，障碍物( barricade的名词复数 ) | |
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doorways
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| n.门口，门道( doorway的名词复数 ) | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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rumours
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| n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 )；风闻；谣言；谣传 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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salute
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| vi.行礼，致意，问候，放礼炮；vt.向…致意，迎接，赞扬；n.招呼，敬礼，礼炮 | |
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tar
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| n.柏油，焦油；vt.涂或浇柏油/焦油于 | |
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phenomena
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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procurable
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| adj.可得到的，得手的 | |
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epidemic
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| n.流行病；盛行；adj.流行性的，流传极广的 | |
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disorders
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| n.混乱( disorder的名词复数 )；凌乱；骚乱；（身心、机能）失调 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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dwellings
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| n.住处，处所( dwelling的名词复数 ) | |
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mere
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sanitary
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| adj.卫生方面的，卫生的，清洁的，卫生的 | |
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malignant
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| adj.恶性的，致命的；恶意的，恶毒的 | |
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28
destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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29
specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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30
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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31
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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32
procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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33
besieged
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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34
entrenchment
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| n.壕沟，防御设施 | |
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35
entrench
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| v.使根深蒂固；n.壕沟；防御设施 | |
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36
trench
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| n./v.(挖)沟，(挖)战壕 | |
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37
gorge
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| n.咽喉，胃，暴食，山峡；v.塞饱，狼吞虎咽地吃 | |
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38
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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39
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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40
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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41
contrive
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| vt.谋划，策划；设法做到；设计，想出 | |
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42
zigzags
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| n.锯齿形的线条、小径等( zigzag的名词复数 )v.弯弯曲曲地走路，曲折地前进( zigzag的第三人称单数 ) | |
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43
subdue
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| vt.制服，使顺从，征服；抑制，克制 | |
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44
incessant
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| adj.不停的，连续的 | |
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45
musket
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| n.滑膛枪 | |
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46
plunging
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| adj.跳进的，突进的v.颠簸( plunge的现在分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
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47
dense
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| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
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48
trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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49
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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50
spiked
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| adj.有穗的；成锥形的；有尖顶的 | |
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51
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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52
constrained
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| adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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53
constrain
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| vt.限制，约束；克制，抑制 | |
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54
superseded
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| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
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55
besieging
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的现在分词 ) | |
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56
epoch
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| n.(新)时代；历元 | |
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57
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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58
muskets
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| n.火枪，（尤指）滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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59
procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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60
horde
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| n.群众，一大群 | |
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61
insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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62
gatherings
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| 聚集( gathering的名词复数 )； 收集； 采集； 搜集 | |
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63
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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64
scoured
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| 走遍（某地）搜寻（人或物）( scour的过去式和过去分词 )； （用力）刷； 擦净； 擦亮 | |
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65
entangled
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| adj.卷入的；陷入的；被缠住的；缠在一起的v.使某人（某物/自己）缠绕，纠缠于（某物中），使某人（自己）陷入（困难或复杂的环境中）( entangle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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66
assailed
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| v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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67
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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68
undo
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| vt.解开，松开；取消，撤销 | |
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69
minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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70
evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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71
evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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72
plentiful
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| adj.富裕的，丰富的 | |
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73
convoys
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| n.（有护航的）船队( convoy的名词复数 )；车队；护航（队）；护送队 | |
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74
inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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75
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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76
defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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77
intermittently
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| adv.间歇地；断断续续 | |
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78
duel
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| n./v.决斗；(双方的)斗争 | |
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79
converging
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| adj.收敛[缩]的，会聚的，趋同的v.（线条、运动的物体等）会于一点( converge的现在分词 )；（趋于）相似或相同；人或车辆汇集；聚集 | |
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80
fortifying
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| 筑防御工事于( fortify的现在分词 )； 筑堡于； 增强； 强化（食品） | |
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81
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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82
breaches
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| 破坏( breach的名词复数 )； 破裂； 缺口； 违背 | |
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83
allotted
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| 分配，拨给，摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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84
penetrate
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| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
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85
abutted
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| v.（与…）邻接( abut的过去式和过去分词 )；（与…）毗连；接触；倚靠 | |
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86
triangular
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| adj.三角（形）的，三者间的 | |
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87
battered
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| adj.磨损的；v.连续猛击；磨损 | |
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88
penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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89
slaughter
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| n.屠杀，屠宰；vt.屠杀，宰杀 | |
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90
repulses
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| v.击退( repulse的第三人称单数 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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91
hurl
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| vt.猛投，力掷，声叫骂 | |
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92
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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93
breached
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| 攻破( breach的现在分词 )； 破坏，违反 | |
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94
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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95
bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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96
protract
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| v.延长，拖长 | |
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97
choir
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| n.唱诗班，唱诗班的席位，合唱团，舞蹈团；v.合唱 | |
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98
chapels
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| n.小教堂， （医院、监狱等的）附属礼拜堂( chapel的名词复数 )；（在小教堂和附属礼拜堂举行的）礼拜仪式 | |
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99
nave
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| n.教堂的中部；本堂 | |
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100
loft
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| n.阁楼，顶楼 | |
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101
spacious
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| adj.广阔的，宽敞的 | |
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102
pelted
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| （连续地）投掷( pelt的过去式和过去分词 )； 连续抨击； 攻击； 剥去…的皮 | |
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103
swarmed
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| 密集( swarm的过去式和过去分词 )； 云集； 成群地移动； 蜜蜂或其他飞行昆虫成群地飞来飞去 | |
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104
barricaded
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| 设路障于，以障碍物阻塞( barricade的过去式和过去分词 )； 设路障[防御工事]保卫或固守 | |
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105
descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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106
invaders
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| 入侵者，侵略者，侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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107
monks
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| n.修道士，僧侣( monk的名词复数 ) | |
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108
civilians
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| 平民，百姓( civilian的名词复数 )； 老百姓 | |
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109
civilian
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| adj.平民的，民用的，民众的 | |
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110
gutted
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| adj.容易消化的v.毁坏（建筑物等）的内部( gut的过去式和过去分词 )；取出…的内脏 | |
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111
doomed
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| 命定的 | |
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112
resin
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| n.树脂，松香，树脂制品；vt.涂树脂 | |
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113
cinders
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| n.煤渣( cinder的名词复数 )；炭渣；煤渣路；煤渣跑道 | |
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114
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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115
subterranean
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| adj.地下的，地表下的 | |
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116
demolition
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| n.破坏,毁坏,毁坏之遗迹 | |
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117
obstinacy
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| n.顽固；（病痛等）难治 | |
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118
ravages
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| 劫掠后的残迹，破坏的结果，毁坏后的残迹 | |
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119
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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120
tainting
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| v.使变质( taint的现在分词 )；使污染；败坏；被污染，腐坏，败坏 | |
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121
contagion
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| n.(通过接触的疾病)传染；蔓延 | |
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122
survivors
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| 幸存者，残存者，生还者( survivor的名词复数 ) | |
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123
cemeteries
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| n.（非教堂的）墓地，公墓( cemetery的名词复数 ) | |
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124
gorged
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| v.（用食物把自己）塞饱，填饱( gorge的过去式和过去分词 )；作呕 | |
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125
corpses
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| n.死尸，尸体( corpse的名词复数 ) | |
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126
coffined
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| vt.收殓（coffin的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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127
shrouds
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| n.裹尸布( shroud的名词复数 )；寿衣；遮蔽物；覆盖物v.隐瞒( shroud的第三人称单数 )；保密 | |
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128
clergy
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| n.[总称]牧师，神职人员 | |
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129
reeked
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| v.发出浓烈的臭气( reek的过去式和过去分词 )；散发臭气；发出难闻的气味 (of sth)；明显带有（令人不快或生疑的跡象） | |
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130
mingled
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| 混合，混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 )； 混进，与…交往[联系] | |
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131
fumes
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| n.(强烈而刺激的)气味，气体 | |
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132
pestilence
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| n.瘟疫 | |
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133
nauseated
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| adj.作呕的，厌恶的v.使恶心，作呕( nauseate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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134
hysterical
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| adj.情绪异常激动的，歇斯底里般的 | |
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135
delirium
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| n. 神智昏迷,说胡话;极度兴奋 | |
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136
concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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137
murmurs
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| n.低沉、连续而不清的声音( murmur的名词复数 )；低语声；怨言；嘀咕 | |
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138
rout
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| n.溃退，溃败；v.击溃，打垮 | |
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139
fanatics
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| 狂热者，入迷者( fanatic的名词复数 ) | |
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140
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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141
exhaustion
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| n.耗尽枯竭，疲惫，筋疲力尽，竭尽，详尽无遗的论述 | |
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142
lengthen
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| vt.使伸长，延长 | |
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143
fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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144
erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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145
breaching
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| 攻破( breach的过去式 )； 破坏，违反 | |
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146
ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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147
swelling
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| n.肿胀 | |
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148
inundated
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| v.淹没( inundate的过去式和过去分词 )；（洪水般地）涌来；充满；给予或交予（太多事物）使难以应付 | |
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149
appreciable
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| adj.明显的，可见的，可估量的，可觉察的 | |
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150
moored
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| adj. 系泊的 动词moor的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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151
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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152
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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153
desperately
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| adv.极度渴望地，绝望地，孤注一掷地 | |
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154
crammed
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| adj.塞满的，挤满的；大口地吃；快速贪婪地吃v.把…塞满；填入；临时抱佛脚( cram的过去式) | |
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155
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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156
catastrophe
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| n.大灾难，大祸 | |
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157
winding
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| n.绕，缠，绕组，线圈 | |
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158
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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159
gallows
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| n.绞刑架，绞台 | |
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160
destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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161
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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162
slain
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| 杀死，宰杀，杀戮( slay的过去分词 )； (slay的过去分词) | |
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163
westward
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| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
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inundation
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| n.the act or fact of overflowing | |
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165
baron
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| n.男爵；(商业界等)巨头，大王 | |
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166
quays
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| 码头( quay的名词复数 ) | |
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167
arsenal
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| n.兵工厂，军械库 | |
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168
expenditure
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| n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出；使用，消耗 | |
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169
fatigue
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| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
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170
junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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171
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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172
unconditional
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| adj.无条件的，无限制的，绝对的 | |
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173
consolation
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| n.安慰，慰问 | |
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174
truce
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| n.休战，(争执，烦恼等的)缓和；v.以停战结束 | |
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175
stipulated
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| vt.& vi.规定；约定adj.[法]合同规定的 | |
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176
contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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177
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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178
immunity
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| n.优惠；免除；豁免，豁免权 | |
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179
dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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180
homage
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| n.尊敬，敬意，崇敬 | |
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181
meddled
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| v.干涉，干预（他人事务）( meddle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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182
magistrates
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| 地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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183
touching
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| adj.动人的，使人感伤的 | |
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184
emaciated
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| adj.衰弱的，消瘦的 | |
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185
misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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186
surmounted
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| 战胜( surmount的过去式和过去分词 )； 克服（困难）； 居于…之上； 在…顶上 | |
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187
ponchos
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| n.斗篷( poncho的名词复数 ) | |
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188
varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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189
picturesqueness
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190
tattered
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| adj.破旧的，衣衫破的 | |
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191
garb
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| n.服装，装束 | |
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192
savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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193
mules
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| 骡( mule的名词复数 )； 拖鞋； 顽固的人； 越境运毒者 | |
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194
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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195
indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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196
defiled
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| v.玷污( defile的过去式和过去分词 )；污染；弄脏；纵列行进 | |
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197
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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198
captivity
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| n.囚禁；被俘；束缚 | |
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199
plunder
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| vt.劫掠财物，掠夺；n.劫掠物，赃物；劫掠 | |
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200
plundered
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| 掠夺，抢劫( plunder的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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201
assassinations
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| n.暗杀( assassination的名词复数 ) | |
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202
brutality
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| n.野蛮的行为，残忍，野蛮 | |
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203
moribund
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| adj.即将结束的，垂死的 | |
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204
interim
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| adj.暂时的，临时的；n.间歇，过渡期间 | |
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205
corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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206
elicited
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| 引出，探出( elicit的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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207
miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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208
benevolent
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| adj.仁慈的，乐善好施的 | |
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209
desolate
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| adj.荒凉的，荒芜的；孤独的，凄凉的；v.使荒芜，使孤寂 | |
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210
mustered
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| v.集合，召集，集结（尤指部队）( muster的过去式和过去分词 )；（自他人处）搜集某事物；聚集；激发 | |
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211
civic
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| adj.城市的，都市的，市民的，公民的 | |
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212
nucleus
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| n.核，核心，原子核 | |
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213
harass
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| vt.使烦恼，折磨，骚扰 | |
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214
superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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215
strings
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| n.弦 | |
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216
harangues
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| n.高谈阔论的长篇演讲( harangue的名词复数 )v.高谈阔论( harangue的第三人称单数 ) | |
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217
goaded
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| v.刺激( goad的过去式和过去分词 )；激励；（用尖棒）驱赶；驱使（或怂恿、刺激）某人 | |
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218
exuberant
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| adj.充满活力的；（植物）繁茂的 | |
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219
fluency
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| n.流畅，雄辩，善辩 | |
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220
patriot
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| n.爱国者，爱国主义者 | |
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221
patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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222
anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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223
dint
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| n.由于，靠；凹坑 | |
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224
bombastic
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| adj.夸夸其谈的，言过其实的 | |
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225
tactician
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| n. 战术家, 策士 | |
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226
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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227
invaluable
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| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
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