By the middle of the month of February, as we have already seen, Andalusia was once more covered by two considerable Spanish armies: Cartaojal, with the wrecks2 of Infantado’s host and the new levies3 of Del Palacio, was holding the great passes at the eastern end of the Sierra Morena. Cuesta had rallied behind the Guadiana the remains4 of the army of Estremadura. He was at present engaged in reducing it to order by the only method of which he was master, the shooting of any soldier who showed signs of disobedience or mutiny[158]. The army deserved nothing better: its dastardly murder of its unfortunate general in December justified5 any amount of severity in his successor.
Meanwhile Victor, after his victory at Ucles, and his vain attempt to surprise Del Palacio, had passed away to the west, leaving nothing in the plains of La Mancha save the dragoons of Milhaud and Latour-Maubourg, who were placed as a cavalry6 screen across the roads to the south, with their divisional head quarters at Oca?a and Madridejos respectively.
The Marshal drew back to the valley of the Tagus, and marched by Toledo on Almaraz; this was in strict execution of the plan dictated7 by Napoleon before he left Spain. It will be remembered that he had directed that, when the February rains were over, Victor should move on Badajoz, to assist by his presence[p. 144] in that direction the projected attack of Soult on Lisbon. Only when Estremadura and Portugal had been subdued8 was the attack on Andalusia to be carried out. Soult, as we shall see, was (by no fault of his own) much slower in his movements than Napoleon had expected, and Victor waited in vain at Talavera for any news that the invasion of Portugal was in progress. Hence the Spaniards gained some weeks of respite9: the ranks of their armies were filled up, and the spirits of their generals rose.
Cartaojal remained for some time at La Carolina, reorganizing and recruiting the depleted10 and half-starved battalions11 which Infantado had handed over to him. He had expected to be attacked by Victor, but when he learnt that the Marshal had gone off to Toledo, and that La Mancha was covered only by a thin line of cavalry, he began to dream of resuming the offensive. Such a policy was most unwise: it shows that Cartaojal, like so many other Spanish generals, was still possessed12 with the fatal mania13 for grand operations and pitched battles. He had in his head nothing less than a plan for thrusting back the cavalry screen opposite to him, and for recovering the whole of La Mancha. If Victor’s corps14 had been the only force available to oppose him, there would have been something to say for the plan. An advance on Toledo and Madrid must have brought back the Duke of Belluno from his advance towards Estremadura. But, as a matter of fact, Jourdan and King Joseph had not left the roads to La Mancha unguarded: they had drafted down from Madrid two infantry15 divisions of the 4th Corps, whose command Sebastiani had now taken over from Lefebvre. The first division lay at Toledo: the third (Valence’s Poles) at Aranjuez; thus the former supported Latour-Maubourg, the latter Milhaud.
Ignorant, apparently16, of the fact that there was anything but cavalry in his front, Cartaojal resolved to beat up the French outposts. With this object he told off half his infantry and two-thirds of his horse, under the Duke of Albuquerque, a gallant17 and enterprising, but somewhat reckless, officer, of whom we shall hear much during the next two years of the war. Marching with speed and secrecy18, Albuquerque, with 2,000 horse and 9,000 infantry, fell upon Digeon’s brigade of dragoons at Mora on February 18. He tried to cut it off with his[p. 145] cavalry, while he attacked it in front with his foot. But Digeon saw the danger in time, and fell back in haste, after losing a few men of the 20th Dragoons and some of his baggage. His demand for assistance promptly19 brought down Sebastiani, with the 1st division of the 4th Corps, and the two remaining brigades of Latour-Maubourg’s cavalry. The moment that he heard that a heavy force had arrived in his front, Albuquerque retired20 as far as Consuegra, where the French caught up his rear, and inflicted21 some loss upon it. He then fell still further back, crossed the Guadiana, and took post at Manzanares. Sebastiani did not pursue him beyond Consuegra, giving as his excuse the exhausted22 condition of the country-side[159].
Cartaojal meanwhile, with the rest of his army, had come up from the passes to Ciudad Real, following in wake of Albuquerque’s advance. When he met with his lieutenant23 they fell to quarrelling, both as to what had already occurred, and as to what should now be done, for the Duke was anxious to induce his chief to make a general advance on Toledo, while Cartaojal desired him to take a single division of infantry and to try the adventure himself. While they were disputing, orders came from the Supreme24 Junta25 that troops were to be detached from the Army of La Mancha to strengthen that of Estremadura. Cartaojal took the opportunity of getting rid of Albuquerque, by putting him at the head of the detachment which was to be sent to Cuesta. The Duke, not loth to depart, went off with a division of 4,500 infantry and a regiment26 of cavalry[160], and marched down the Guadiana into Estremadura.
Cartaojal remained for the first three weeks of March at Ciudad Real and Manzanares with the main body of his force, about 2,500 horse and 10,000 foot, keeping behind him, at the foot of the passes, a reserve of 4,000 men under La Pe?a. This was tempting27 providence28, for he was now aware that the whole[p. 146] 4th Corps, as well as a great mass of cavalry, was in front of him, and that he might be attacked at any moment. His position, too, was a faulty one; he had descended29 into the very midst of the broad plain of La Mancha, and had occupied as his head quarters an open town, easy to turn on either flank, and with a perfectly30 fordable river as its sole defence. As if this peril31 was not sufficient, Cartaojal suddenly resolved that he would make the dash at Toledo which Albuquerque had proposed to him, though he had refused to send his whole army against that point when the scheme was pressed upon him by his late second-in-command. The nearest hostile troops to him were a regiment of Polish lancers, belonging to Lasalle’s division, which lay at Yébenes, twenty miles outside Toledo. Making a swift stroke at this force, while it was far from expecting any advance on his part, Cartaojal drove it in, killing32 or taking nearly 100 of the Poles (March 24). But Sebastiani came up to their aid with an infantry division and three regiments33 of Milhaud’s dragoons. The Spaniard refused to accept battle, and fell hastily back to Ciudad Real, where he established his whole army behind the river Guadiana, in and about the open town. He was most unsafe in the midst of the vast plain, and was soon to rue34 his want of caution. Sebastiani had been joined by his Polish division and by part of his corps-cavalry, and having some 12,000 or 13,000 men in hand[161], had resolved to pay back on Cartaojal the beating up of his outpost at Yébenes. On March 26, Milhaud’s division of dragoons seized the bridge of Peralvillo, close to Ciudad Real, and crossed to the southern bank of the Guadiana. The Spanish general called up all his cavalry, and some of his foot, and marched to drive the dragoons back. They withdrew across the water, but still held the bridge, behind which they had planted their artillery35. Next morning Sebastiani’s infantry came up, and he determined36 to attack Ciudad Real. Cartaojal, who was taken completely off his guard, was suddenly informed that column after column was pressing across the bridge and marching against him. He did[p. 147] not dream for a moment of fighting, but gave orders for an instant retreat towards the passes. He threw out his cavalry and horse artillery to cover the withdrawal37 of his infantry, who hurried away in half a dozen small bodies across the interminable plain. Sebastiani charged the Spanish horse with his Polish lancers and Dutch hussars, supported by Milhaud’s dragoons. The covering force broke and fled, and the pursuers came up with several of the columns of the retreating infantry. Some of them were dispersed38, others were surrounded and taken prisoners. The pursuit was continued next morning, till it was interrupted by a fearful burst of rain, which darkened the horizon, hid the fugitives39, and stopped the chase, or Cartaojal’s army might have been entirely40 destroyed. He lost in this rout, which it would be absurd to call a battle, five guns, three standards, and more than 2,000 prisoners, among whom were sixty-one officers. The loss in killed and wounded was probably not very great, for there had been no attempt at a stand, and the troops which were cut off had surrendered without resistance[162]. The loss of the French was insignificant41, probably less than 100 men in all. They had stayed their pursuit at Santa Cruz de Mudela, from whence they returned to Ciudad Real, where they lived on the magazines which Cartaojal had collected before his unfortunate march on Yébenes. Sebastiani dared not follow the fugitives into the mountains, as he had received orders to clear La Mancha, but not to invade Andalusia: that was to be the task of Victor.
Cartaojal recrossed the Despe?a Perros, and established his head quarters at Sta Elena, in front of La Carolina. His army had been more frightened than hurt, and when the stragglers came in, still numbered 2,000 horse and 12,000 infantry. But he was not allowed to retain its command. Justly indignant at the carelessness with which he had allowed himself to be surprised in front of Ciudad Real, and at his general mismanagement, the Supreme Junta deposed42 him, and replaced[p. 148] him by Venegas, though the record of the latter’s operations at Ucles was hardly encouraging to the soldiery. By the middle of April the army had been reinforced by new Granadan levies, and could take the field, although its state of discipline was bad and its morale43 much shaken by the late events.
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1 rout | |
n.溃退,溃败;v.击溃,打垮 | |
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2 wrecks | |
n.沉船( wreck的名词复数 );(事故中)遭严重毁坏的汽车(或飞机等);(身体或精神上)受到严重损伤的人;状况非常糟糕的车辆(或建筑物等)v.毁坏[毁灭]某物( wreck的第三人称单数 );使(船舶)失事,使遇难,使下沉 | |
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3 levies | |
(部队)征兵( levy的名词复数 ); 募捐; 被征募的军队 | |
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4 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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5 justified | |
a.正当的,有理的 | |
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6 cavalry | |
n.骑兵;轻装甲部队 | |
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7 dictated | |
v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 );口授;支配;摆布 | |
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8 subdued | |
adj. 屈服的,柔和的,减弱的 动词subdue的过去式和过去分词 | |
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9 respite | |
n.休息,中止,暂缓 | |
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10 depleted | |
adj. 枯竭的, 废弃的 动词deplete的过去式和过去分词 | |
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11 battalions | |
n.(陆军的)一营(大约有一千兵士)( battalion的名词复数 );协同作战的部队;军队;(组织在一起工作的)队伍 | |
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12 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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13 mania | |
n.疯狂;躁狂症,狂热,癖好 | |
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14 corps | |
n.(通信等兵种的)部队;(同类作的)一组 | |
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15 infantry | |
n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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16 apparently | |
adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
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17 gallant | |
adj.英勇的,豪侠的;(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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18 secrecy | |
n.秘密,保密,隐蔽 | |
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19 promptly | |
adv.及时地,敏捷地 | |
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20 retired | |
adj.隐退的,退休的,退役的 | |
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21 inflicted | |
把…强加给,使承受,遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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22 exhausted | |
adj.极其疲惫的,精疲力尽的 | |
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23 lieutenant | |
n.陆军中尉,海军上尉;代理官员,副职官员 | |
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24 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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25 junta | |
n.团体;政务审议会 | |
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26 regiment | |
n.团,多数,管理;v.组织,编成团,统制 | |
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27 tempting | |
a.诱人的, 吸引人的 | |
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28 providence | |
n.深谋远虑,天道,天意;远见;节约;上帝 | |
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29 descended | |
a.为...后裔的,出身于...的 | |
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30 perfectly | |
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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31 peril | |
n.(严重的)危险;危险的事物 | |
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32 killing | |
n.巨额利润;突然赚大钱,发大财 | |
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33 regiments | |
(军队的)团( regiment的名词复数 ); 大量的人或物 | |
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34 rue | |
n.懊悔,芸香,后悔;v.后悔,悲伤,懊悔 | |
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35 artillery | |
n.(军)火炮,大炮;炮兵(部队) | |
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36 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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37 withdrawal | |
n.取回,提款;撤退,撤军;收回,撤销 | |
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38 dispersed | |
adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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39 fugitives | |
n.亡命者,逃命者( fugitive的名词复数 ) | |
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40 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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41 insignificant | |
adj.无关紧要的,可忽略的,无意义的 | |
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42 deposed | |
v.罢免( depose的过去式和过去分词 );(在法庭上)宣誓作证 | |
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43 morale | |
n.道德准则,士气,斗志 | |
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