While Cartaojal and his Andalusian levies1 were faring so ill in La Mancha, the army of Estremadura and its obstinate2 old general were going through experiences of an even more disastrous3 kind. Cuesta, it will be remembered, had rallied about Badajoz and Merida the demoralized troops that had served under San Juan and Galluzzo. He was, contrary to all expectation, allowed to remain unmolested for some weeks. The irrational5 movement of Lefebvre to Plasencia and Avila[163] had left him for the moment almost without an enemy in his front. Along the middle Tagus he had nothing opposed to him save Lasalle’s four regiments6 of light cavalry8, supported by Leval’s German division at Talavera. While Victor was engaged in the campaign of Ucles, and in his subsequent circular march through La Mancha to Toledo, the army of Estremadura enjoyed a time of complete rest. Cuesta’s fault was not want of energy: after shooting a competent number of mutineers, and disgracing some officers who had shown signs of cowardice9, he distributed his troops into three new divisions under Henestrosa, Trias, and the Duke Del Parque, and began to move them back towards the Tagus. As there was nothing in his way except Lasalle’s light horse, he was able to take up, at the end of January, the same line which Galluzzo had been forced to evacuate10 in December. The French cavalry retired11 behind the river to Oropesa, abandoning the great bridge of Almaraz, the main passage of the Tagus, on January 29. Thereupon Cuesta broke the bridge, a difficult task, for his mines failed, and the work had to be completed with the pick. It was so badly managed that when the key-stone at last gave way, an engineer officer[p. 150] and twenty-six sappers were still upon the arch, and were precipitated12 into the river, where they were every one drowned. The Captain-General then established his head quarters at Deleytosa, a central point in the mountains, from which he commanded the two passages of the Tagus, that at Almaraz and that by the Puente del Conde, near Meza de Ibor. He arranged his 15,000 men with advanced guards at the water’s edge, opposite each of the possible points of attack, and reserves on the high ground to the rear. This forward position gave much encouragement to the peasantry of New Castile, and bands of guerrillas began (for the first time) to be seen on the slopes of the Sierra de Gredos and the Sierra de Toledo. There was a feeling of uneasiness even up to the gates of Madrid.
To restrain the advances of the Spaniards, King Joseph sent out Lasalle’s cavalry and Leval’s Germans on February 19, with orders to clear the nearer hills. They crossed the Tagus at the bridge of Arzobispo, a little below Talavera, and forced back the division of Trias, which was watching this flank of Cuesta’s position. But the country was almost impassable for cavalry, a mere13 mass of ravines and spurs of the Sierra de Guadalupe, and after advancing as far as the pass of San Vincente, and seeing the Spaniards begin to gather in force on his front and flank, Lasalle retreated, and recrossed the Tagus without having effected anything of importance.
It was not till a month later that the French took the offensive in earnest. Victor was now returned from his excursion into La Mancha, with his two divisions of the 1st Corps14, and the six dragoon regiments of Latour-Maubourg, whom he had drawn15 off to Toledo, handing over the charge of observing Cartaojal to Milhaud and Sebastiani. Uniting these forces to those of Leval and Lasalle, he massed at Talavera an army of some 22,000 or 23,000 men, of whom 5,000 were admirable cavalry[164].
Joseph and Jourdan were now of the opinion that it was time for Victor to move forward on Estremadura, in accordance with the great plan for the conquest of southern Spain, which the Emperor had left behind as his legacy16 when he[p. 151] departed from Valladolid. It was true that this movement was to have been carried out in co-operation with the advance of Marshal Soult upon Portugal; but no news could be got of the Duke of Dalmatia’s present position. The last dispatch from him was nearly a month old. Writing from Orense on February 24 he had stated that he hoped to be at Chaves by March 1, and should then march on Oporto and Lisbon. According to Napoleon’s calculations he was to be at the last-named city within ten days of the capture of Oporto. It was therefore, in the opinion of Joseph and Jourdan, high time that Victor should start, in order to get in touch with Soult when the Portuguese17 capital should be occupied.
The Duke of Belluno, however, raised many difficulties, even when he had been shown the Emperor’s orders. He complained that he ought to have the help of Lapisse’s division, the second of his own Corps, which still lay at Salamanca. He doubted whether he could dare to take on with him, for an expedition into Estremadura, the German division of Leval: he ought, perhaps, to leave it at Talavera and Almaraz, in order to keep up his communications with Madrid. If this were done he would muster18 only 16,000 men for his great forward movement, and he had the gravest doubt whether Soult could or would give him the assistance of which the Emperor had written, even if he seized Lisbon within the appointed time. Finally, he was short of engineer officers, sappers, horses, and reserve ammunition19.
Much of what the Duke of Belluno wrote was true: in particular, the idea of co-operation with Soult was perfectly20 chimerical21: Napoleon had worked out all his logistics to an erroneous result, from want of a real conception of the conditions and difficulties of war in the Peninsula. But some of the pleas which Victor urged merely serve to show his disinclination to accept the task which had been set him; and in especial he underrated the numbers of his troops beyond the limit of fair statement. He had with him nine battalions23 of Ruffin’s division, twelve of Villatte’s, eight of Leval’s; of cavalry he had six regiments of Latour-Maubourg’s dragoons, three of Lasalle’s light cavalry[165], two regiments of his own corps[p. 152]-cavalry, and the Westphalian regiment7 of the 4th Corps which was attached to Leval’s Germans. The total must have amounted to 15,000 infantry24, and about 5,500 cavalry: he had also sixty guns with 1,600 artillerymen[166].
In spite of his reluctance26 Victor was forced to yield to the pressure of Jourdan and the Emperor’s explicit27 orders. On March 14 he began to make his preparations to cross the Tagus and to attack Cuesta: it was reported to him that the roads starting from the two bridges which were in his power, those of Talavera and Arzobispo, were neither of them practicable for artillery25, and that only the route by Almaraz was suitable for the guns and heavy baggage. But the bridge of Almaraz was broken, and beyond it were visible entrenchments thrown up by the Spaniards, and a considerable body of troops—the division of General Henestrosa. The Duke of Belluno determined29 to clear the way for a crossing at Almaraz, by sending infantry across the Tagus by the passages higher up-stream, with orders to sweep the southern bank till they came opposite to the broken bridge. They were to dislodge the force behind it, and then the artillery, the baggage, and cavalry were to cross on a bridge of rafts, which was being prepared close to Almaraz, in order to be ready the moment that it should be wanted.
On March 15, therefore, Leval’s Germans crossed the Tagus by the bridge of Talavera, with some of Lasalle’s cavalry, while on the next morning Victor himself passed at Arzobispo with the divisions of Villatte and Ruffin. The combined column pushed westward30 by a bad road on the hillside overhanging the river, in a difficult country of rocks and woods, seamed with countless31 ravines, where cavalry could barely act and artillery would have been perfectly useless. Cuesta, on hearing of this movement to turn his flank, threw back his right wing, and bade[p. 153] it make a stand behind the ravine of the little river Ibor, which falls into the Tagus half-way between Arzobispo and Almaraz. His force in this direction consisted of the division of the Duke del Parque, about 5,000 strong, with six guns. On the seventeenth Victor’s columns, with the Germans of Leval at their head, arrived before the defiles32 of Meza de Ibor, and found themselves confronted by the Duke, who was firmly established on the other side of the ravine, in a fine position, with his guns on a projecting rock which enfiladed the high-road. Victor directed Leval’s eight[167] battalions to cross the ravine, and storm the heights on the other side. This they did in very gallant34 style, but not without heavy losses, for the Estremadurans, confident in the strength of their rugged35 fighting-ground, made a long and vigorous resistance, till the Germans actually came to close quarters with them and ran in with the bayonet. Del Parque’s line then crumpled36 up, and dispersed37 over the hillsides: finding it impossible to bring off his guns, he cast them over the precipice38 into the ravine below. The Germans lost seventy killed and 428 wounded while climbing the difficult slopes: Del Parque’s men probably suffered far less, as they absconded39 when the enemy closed, and had been under cover till that moment. The supposition of some French authorities that the defenders40 of Meza de Ibor lost 1,000 men is most improbable. The country was one exactly suited for a cheap defence, and for an easy scattering41 over the hills in the moment of defeat.
The Duke fell back on Deleytosa, higher up the side of the Sierra de Guadalupe, where Cuesta had established his head quarters. Here he was joined by another of the Estremaduran divisions, that of General Trias, nearly 5,000 strong. Henestrosa, with the rest of the army, was still watching the passage at Almaraz, where Cuesta had made up his mind that the main attack of the French would be delivered. He persisted for some time in believing that Victor’s movement across the Talavera and Arzobispo bridges was merely a feint; and thus it was that Del Parque had been left alone to bear the first brunt of the attack. When he was at last convinced that the bulk of Victor’s infantry was on his flank, and that Almaraz was hopelessly[p. 154] turned, the old Captain-General hastily sent orders to Henestrosa to abandon his entrenchments opposite the bridge, and to retreat on Truxillo across the mountains. He himself took that path without delay, and got off in safety with his two leading divisions, but Henestrosa had to brush across the front of the advancing French, and was in some danger. Luckily for him Victor was more set on clearing the road from Almaraz than on pursuing the enemy.
When Henestrosa had disappeared, the passage was open, and the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg and Beaumont, guarding the artillery and baggage-train of the 1st Corps, crossed on the rafts which had been prepared long before, and joined the infantry and the Marshal. The passage presented more difficulties than had been expected, for it proved impossible to construct a permanent bridge; the stream was very fierce, and the anchors by which the floats were moored42 found no hold in the smooth rocky bottom. The guns passed either by being sent over on rafts or by means of a rope ferry, which was with some difficulty rigged up. It was not till some time later that a solid bridge of boats was built at this most important passage[168]. One cavalry regiment was left behind to protect it[169].
Cuesta, when he had united his three divisions, would have dearly loved to give battle to Victor behind Truxillo, in the excellent position of the Puerto de Santa Cruz, where the chaussée from Madrid to Badajoz crosses the Sierra de Guadalupe. His love for general engagements was by no means cured by the event of his experiments at Cabezon and Medina de Rio Seco. But he was withheld43 from offering battle not by mere prudence44, but by the fact that he was expecting to receive two considerable reinforcements. The Marquis de Portago was bringing up a detachment from Badajoz—three battalions[170] which had been intended to form the nucleus46 of a new Fourth division that was being organized in that fortress47. At the same moment Albuquerque was expected from the east, at the head of the 4,500 men whom the Supreme48 Junta49 had detached from the[p. 155] army of La Mancha, and had sent down the Guadiana to join that of Estremadura. Cuesta wished to pick up these 7,000 men before he gave battle.
Accordingly he evacuated50 the pass of Santa Cruz, and fell back southward towards his reinforcements, leaving Henestrosa with the bulk of his cavalry to act as a rearguard. That officer carried out his duty with a dash and a vigour51 that were rare in Spanish armies at this date. When the fiery52 Lasalle came pressing up against him with his usual fury, the Spanish general contrived53 to inflict54 on him two distinct checks. At Berrocal, half-way down the defile33 of Santa Cruz, he made a sudden halt and drove in the leading squadron of the French by a charge of his Royal Carbineers, a small remnant of the Guard-Cavalry which had been serving with the Army of Estremadura since its formation [March 20]. The French lost ten killed and fifteen wounded[171].
This was a trifle, but on the next day Henestrosa scored a far more tangible55 advantage. Noting that Lasalle’s leading regiment, the 10th Chasseurs, had got far ahead of the rest of the division, and was pushing on with reckless haste, he laid a trap for it in front of the village of Miajadas. Presenting a small body of cavalry on the high-road, he hid on each side of it a strong regiment of his own horse, with orders to fall upon the flank and rear of the French when they should have passed the ambush56. The two corps set aside for this surprise were Infante and Almanza, both regiments of La Romana’s army from Denmark, which had not yet drawn their sabres since the war commenced.
Colonel Subervie of the 10th Chasseurs, advancing with heedless confidence to charge the body of Spaniards in front of him, suddenly saw himself enveloped57 and surrounded by the two regiments placed in ambush. There was a furious mêlée, in which the chasseurs lost one officer and sixty-two men killed and about seventy more wounded, before they could cut their way out of the snare59. The sight of Lasalle’s main body coming up in haste to the rescue made Henestrosa give the order for a prompt retreat, which he accomplished60 without loss. ‘We arrived,’ writes a French officer of one of the supporting regiments, ‘too late, and saw nothing but a cloud of dust in the distance,[p. 156] made by the Spaniards as they rode away, and the colonel of the 10th tearing his hair at the sight of his numerous wounded[172].’ This lesson taught Lasalle more caution: it was creditable to Henestrosa, though it must be confessed that he had two men to one in the skirmish, in addition to the advantage of taking his enemy by surprise. Oddly enough the regiments which accomplished this successful coup61 on the twenty-first were the same which behaved worst in the great battle of the next week[173].
At Miajadas, where this skirmish had taken place, the road descending62 from the pass of Santa Cruz forks in two directions. One branch goes towards Merida and Badajoz, the other and less important to Medellin, La Serena, and the upper Guadiana. It would have been natural for Cuesta to take the former route, which brought him nearer to his base at Badajoz, and at the same time enabled him to cover the main road to Andalusia, at which Victor was presumably aiming. But the old general left this line unprotected, and retired by the eastern path to Medellin. His main object was to secure his junction63 with the reinforcements from La Mancha, which Albuquerque was bringing to him. They were nearing La Serena, and would be cut off from him if he took the road to Badajoz. At the same time he argued that, as he had thus placed himself on the flank of the French, they could not afford to march past him, since the moment that they left Merida behind them he would be enabled to cut their communications with Madrid. He imagined that Victor would prefer to fight him, and would not dare either to take in hand the siege of Badajoz, or to advance against Andalusia, without clearing his flank by a general action. The moment that he should have picked up Albuquerque, Cuesta was prepared to indulge the enemy with a fight, and if he were not attacked himself he intended to take the offensive. This was sheer madness; even when he had drawn in his last reserves the old general had but 20,000 foot and 3,000 horse[174], a number which only exceeded Victor’s total by[p. 157] three or four thousand men because the latter had been dropping detachments between Almaraz and Merida. Considering the relative value of the individual soldiery of the two armies, Cuesta’s behaviour was that of a criminal lunatic. We shall see that his tactics were as bad as his strategy.
The Marshal had left the two Dutch battalions of Leval’s division at Truxillo, in charge of his sick: he dropped the 1st Dragoons of Latour-Maubourg’s division at Miajadas, to guard the cross-roads, and sent out the 4th and 9th from the same division along the upper Guadiana, where they soon learnt of Cuesta’s presence on the other side of the river. Lasalle’s light horse rode down to Merida, and occupied the old Roman capital of western Spain without having to strike a blow. Learning that the Spaniards had not retreated in this direction, but by the eastern road, the Marshal (as Cuesta had supposed likely) directed the bulk of his infantry on Medellin; only the division of Ruffin remained behind, at the cross-roads of Miajadas.
Meanwhile Cuesta had evacuated Medellin, and fallen back to La Serena, where Albuquerque joined him on the twenty-seventh. The moment that the army was united, he turned back, and retraced64 his steps towards his former position. On the twenty-eighth he reached the town of Don Benito, only five miles from Medellin, and learnt to his great pleasure that Victor was before him and quite ready to fight. The Marshal had swept the whole country-side with his numerous cavalry during the last four days, and discovering that there was no Spanish force opposite him in any direction save that of La Serena, had ordered Lasalle and Ruffin to march up and join him from Merida and Miajadas. On the morning of the twenty-ninth he had his entire army united, save the two Dutch battalions left at Truxillo, two more of Leval’s battalions left at Merida[175], the 1st Dragoons at Miajadas, and one other cavalry regiment which had been told off to guard the bridge of Almaraz. He cannot have had less than 13,000 infantry and 4,500 horse, even when allowance is made for the sick and the losses at Meza de Ibor and Miajadas. Cuesta outnumbered him by 6,000 infantry,[p. 158] but was overmatched in cavalry by more than three to two, since he had but 3,000 sabres, and even more hopelessly in artillery, since Victor had brought over fifty guns to the field, while he had only thirty.
Having been joined in the early morning by Lasalle’s and Ruffin’s detachments, Victor had drawn out his army in front of Medellin, when his cavalry brought him the news of the approach of the Spaniards. Medellin, an ancient town dominated by a Moorish65 citadel66 on a lofty hill, lies in the angle between the river Guadiana and the Hortiga torrent67. The latter, easily fordable in March and dry in June, is an insignificant68 stream but flows at the bottom of a steep ravine. The Guadiana, on the other hand, is a river of the first class: the great bridge which leads into Medellin is no less than 450 yards long. There were several fords up-stream from the bridge, but in March, when the river was high, it is doubtful whether they were practicable. Victor’s line, drawn in a quarter of a circle from the Hortiga to the Guadiana, was well protected on either flank by the broad river and the steep ravine. His order of battle was rather odd: its front line was composed of a division of infantry (Villatte’s of twelve battalions) in the centre, with two projecting wings, each composed of a cavalry division supported by two battalions of Leval’s Germans. On the right, near the Hortiga, was Latour-Maubourg with five of his six regiments of dragoons[176] and ten horse artillery guns. On the left, beside the Guadiana, was Lasalle with three of his own light cavalry regiments, and the 2nd Hussars of Victor’s corps-cavalry. The remaining battalion22 of Leval’s division[177] was with Villatte in the centre. Ruffin’s division, forming the reserve, lay far to the rear on the further side of the Hortiga. He had with him one cavalry regiment[178] and a reserve of artillery: one[p. 159] battalion was detached to guard the baggage, which was parked at the bridge-head below the town.
Victor’s army, therefore, formed a short and compact arc of a circle, a mile and a half outside of Medellin. Facing him, three or four miles away, was the Spanish army, ranged in a much larger arc, also extending from the Hortiga to the Guadiana, in front of the town of Don Benito. It was deployed69 along a series of gentle heights, on either side of the main road from Medellin. The position, though rather long for the Spanish numbers, presented many advantages for a defensive70 battle: but it was Cuesta’s intention to go forward, not to receive the attack of the French. He saw with pleasure that the enemy had come half-way to meet him, and was about to fight with a difficult defile (the bridge of Medellin) in his rear. Secure from being outflanked by Victor’s numerous cavalry, for the two streams covered his wings, he resolved to march straight before him and to bear down the French line by a direct frontal attack. On his left were the divisions of Del Parque and Henestrosa, eight battalions in a single line, all deployed four deep. They had no supports whatever, save one battalion of grenadiers which marched behind their centre. On their outside flank rode three regiments of cavalry, close to the ravine of the Hortiga[179]. The centre was composed of the four battalions of the division of Trias, all drawn up in the same fashion as the left wing. The right was formed by Portago’s incomplete division[180] (only three battalions) and by the contingent71 from La Mancha which Albuquerque had just brought up—seven strong battalions with 4,500 bayonets. Outside Albuquerque’s extreme right, and on the banks of the Guadiana, was placed a cavalry force corresponding to that on the extreme left, and also formed of three regiments[181]. A few remaining squadrons of cavalry were[p. 160] posted in the intervals72 between the wings and the centre[182]. The artillery went forward, each battery with the division to which it was attached. This was a most extraordinary order of battle: with the object of securing his flanks and of covering the whole space between the rivers, Cuesta was advancing with a front of nearly four miles and a depth of only four men! There is no parallel in modern history for such a dangerous array. If any single point in the long line gave way, there was no reserve with which to fill the gap and save the day. And it was morally certain that a weak point would be found somewhere, for many of the battalions were raw troops which had never seen fire, and the greater part of the others had graduated in the school of panic under Belvedere and San Juan.
Cuesta, however, was eminently73 satisfied with himself and with his order of battle: he intended to envelop58 the shorter French line with converging74 fire, to thrust it back on to the defile of Medellin, and if possible to seize the bridge behind its left flank, and to endeavour to cut off its retreat. Blind self-confidence could go no further!
When Victor advanced from Medellin he was aware of the proximity75 of the Spaniards, and could see their cavalry vedettes on all the hills in front of Don Benito, but it was not till his army had marched some distance across the bare and level fields, that Cuesta revealed his order of battle. When the French were well advanced in the plain, the whole Army of Estremadura crowned the heights, and then swept downward from them, in one continuous line forming an exact quarter of a circle. The infantry was well closed up; each regiment had its mounted officers in front, and the generals were riding up and down the line, perpetually supervising the dressing76 of their battalions, for they were quite conscious that in the order which Cuesta had chosen any gap or wavering in the line would be ruinous. Each division had its battery in front, and in the long intervals between the guns a very thick line of skirmishers covered the advance of the main body.
Facing this imposing77 line, as it will be remembered, the[p. 161] French had the five dragoon regiments of Latour-Maubourg on the right, and the four light cavalry regiments of Lasalle on the left, each supported by two of Laval’s German battalions. The centre under Villatte was somewhat ‘refused,’ and was much farther from the Spaniards than were the two powerful wings of cavalry. As the enemy advanced, Victor bade Latour-Maubourg and Lasalle to seize any good opportunity for a charge, but not to risk, unless circumstances favoured them, a general attack on the Spaniards, until they should have begun to lose their order. The wings of the enemy being covered by the two rivers, there could be no question of flank attacks, and frontal charges by cavalry on unbroken infantry are proverbially dangerous.
When, however, the armies drew near, Latour-Maubourg thought that he saw his chance, and bade one of his brigades (2nd and 4th Dragoons) charge Del Parque’s infantry in the Spanish left-centre. The attack completely failed: a fortunate discharge of the Duke’s divisional battery blew a gap in the centre of the charging line; the battalions on each side stood firm and opened a heavy fire, and the dragoons went to the rear in disorder78. Their flight exposed the flank of the two German battalions which formed the centre of Latour-Maubourg’s line. The Spanish infantry pressed forward, and engaged them with vigour. This determined Victor to order his right wing to fall back and to get into line with Villatte, before making another stand. Accordingly Latour-Maubourg retired, his unbroken regiments moving off in very good order, but suffering considerably79 from the fire of the Spanish skirmishers, who ran forward with great rapidity and pressed them hard.
The retreat of the right wing made it necessary for Lasalle on the left to conform to the general movement. He also began to draw back towards Medellin. ‘For two hours,’ writes one of his officers[183], ‘we gave back slowly and quietly, facing about at every fifty yards to show a front, and to dispute the ground. Amid the endless whizzing of bullets flying over our heads, and the deafening80 roar of the shells, which rent the air and tore up the earth around us, we heeded81 only the voice of our commanders. The further we retired the louder shouted our foes82. Their skirmishers were so numerous and daring that[p. 162] they sometimes compelled ours to fall back for protection into our ranks. They kept calling to us from a distance that no quarter should be given, and that Medellin should be the Frenchman’s grave. General Lasalle was riding backward and forward in front of his division, with a lofty, fearless air. In the space which separated us there might be seen the horses of disabled friends and foes, running on every side, most of them wounded, some of them dragging their dead masters by the stirrup, and struggling to free themselves from the unmanageable load.’
In this fashion the French retired before the advancing army of Cuesta, till they drew near the point where Victor intended to make his stand. The right wing reached the new line of defence first: it halted on the crest83 of the rising-ground to the north of the point where Villatte’s infantry stood. The Marshal placed ten guns in line, ordered the two German battalions to stand firm on each flank of the artillery, and sent up the 94th of the Line from Villatte’s division to aid them, as well as a battalion of picked grenadiers. Latour-Maubourg’s horsemen, now all in good order again, covered their flanks.
Then came the critical moment of the battle. If the Spaniards could still push their advance, and thrust back the French infantry, Victor’s position would be very serious. For a moment it seemed that they might succeed. The battalions of Henestrosa and Del Parque came forward with a steadiness that Spanish troops had not yet often shown during the war. They closed upon the guns, in spite of their rapid fire, and attacked the three battalions on their flanks, which had been thrown into square for fear of cavalry attacks, and were therefore not in very good order for defending themselves against infantry.
The leading Spanish officers had actually ridden into the battery[184], and were cutting down the gunners, when Latour-Maubourg ordered his dragoons to charge. The moment that he saw them on the move, Cuesta, who had been riding on this flank, with the three regiments of cavalry which covered the end of his line, ordered a counter-charge against the flank[p. 163] of the advancing French. Then followed a disgraceful scene: the Spanish squadrons rode forward in an irresolute84 way for a few score yards, and then suddenly halted, turned, and galloped85 to the rear in a disorderly mass before they had arrived anywhere near the French dragoons. They collided with Cuesta, upset him and rode over him[185]: the old man was with difficulty saved and set upon his horse by his aides-de-camp. The fugitives86 never drew rein45, and fled far away to the north, almost without losing a man. Their conduct was all the more disgraceful, because two of the three regiments were old troops from the Baltic, which had come back with La Romana and had not shared in any of the early disasters of the Spanish armies.
The result of this shameful87 panic was instant disaster to the whole Spanish right wing. Of Latour-Maubourg’s division one brigade went off in pursuit of the routed cavalry, but the other three regiments charged in flank the battalions of Henestrosa and Del Parque, just as they stormed the French battery on which they were intent. A long line without supports, such as that which these two divisions presented, was helpless when attacked by cavalry on the flank—it suffered exactly the same fate which befell Colborne’s brigade at Albuera two years later. While engaged in front with the three battalions already before it, and with the regiment which Villatte had sent up to aid them, it could not throw back its flank to face the horsemen: nor had it any reserve whatever that could be utilized88 to hold off Latour-Maubourg. The whole line was rolled up, and dashed into atoms. Many men were cut down, a few captured, the remainder fled in utter disorder towards the north. The French urged the pursuit with cruel vigour, merciless all the more because they had for a moment doubted of their victory.
While this struggle was raging on the northern part of the field, Lasalle had been still falling back before the divisions of Albuquerque, Portago, and Trias, across the plain which borders the Guadiana. The Spanish line were still moving forward with great steadiness, but had begun to fall into a sort of échelon formation, with the cavalry near the river most in[p. 164] advance, the infantry of Albuquerque a little behind, and the Estremaduran battalions of the centre still further to the rear. The fact was that General Eguia, to whom Cuesta had given the charge of his whole right wing, was trying to edge his cavalry between Lasalle and the Guadiana, in order to cut him off from the bridge of Medellin. This end of the line, therefore, was pushing forward very rapidly, while Trias, on the other hand, was coming forward rather slowly, from a desire not to lose touch with Del Parque’s division, the nearest troops to him in the other half of the army.
Lasalle was keeping an anxious eye on the development of the action further to the north, and the moment that he saw Latour-Maubourg halt and prepare to charge, followed his example. His first blow was delivered at the cavalry next the river: he flung against them the 2nd Hussars, with a chasseur regiment in support. These two corps, charging with great fury, easily broke the Andalusian lancers, who were leading the pursuit, and hurled90 them back upon the other squadrons of the Spanish right. The whole body was thrown into disorder and driven off the field, leaving the flank of Albuquerque’s division completely uncovered. Lasalle then re-formed his men and prepared to charge the infantry. He had been reinforced meanwhile by one of Villatte’s brigades (63rd and 95th of the Line) and by the one battalion of Leval’s Germans, which had hitherto remained with the centre. While these seven battalions of fresh troops delivered a frontal attack on Albuquerque and Trias, Lasalle hurled his four regiments of cavalry upon their unprotected right flank. The Spaniards were doomed91 to destruction, but for some time kept up a show of resistance; Albuquerque had got two or three of his battalions out of line into column, and for a moment these held back Lasalle’s chasseurs. But the fight lasted for a few minutes only: a new French force was coming up. Latour-Maubourg, returning from the pursuit of Cuesta with two of his dragoon regiments, appeared upon the flank and rear of Trias’ division and charged in upon it from behind. This last assault was decisive: the whole Spanish line broke up and fled eastward92 over the open ground along the river. The six regiments of French cavalry were soon in pursuit, and rode in among the flying horde93, using the sabre[p. 165] with reckless cruelty, and far more intent on slaughter94 than on taking prisoners. Lasalle’s chasseurs were specially95 savage96, having to avenge97 the bloody98 check which they had received at Miajadas in the preceding week[186]. ‘Our troops,’ says a French witness, ‘who had been threatened with no quarter by the Spaniards if they had been overpowered, and who were enraged99 by five hours of preliminary fighting, at first spared no one. The infantry, following behind at a distance, dispatched the wounded with their bayonets. Most of all they were pitiless to such of the Spanish regiments as were without a proper military uniform[187].’ Another eye-witness describes the pursuit as ‘one continuous slaughter till night fell.’ Some of the Spanish battalions dispersed in the most helpless confusion, and fled in all directions when the line was broken. Others tried to close up and to defend themselves: this made their flight slower, and sometimes led to their complete extermination100. Rocca says that he saw the two regiments of Spanish and Walloon Guards lying dead en masse in the order which they had occupied at the moment of the breaking of the line[188]. The statement is borne out, at least as to the Walloons, by the fact that the next morning-state of Cuesta’s army which has been preserved shows that regiment with only 300 men surviving out of two whole battalions[189]. If any of the infantry of the Spanish right wing escaped at all, it was partly owing to the fact that the two cavalry regiments in the centre of the line[190] showed a much better spirit than their comrades on the wings, and protected the flight of some battalions. Moreover a frightful101 thunderstorm swept over the plains late in the afternoon, darkened the whole horizon, and caused the French squadrons to halt and cease their pursuit.
[p. 166]
Map of the battle of Medellin
Enlarge BATTLE of MEDELLIN
MARCH 28TH 1809
The slaughter, nevertheless, had been terrible. Of the 10,000 men whom the Spaniards lost on this fatal day three-fourths fell by the edge of the sword: only 1,850 prisoners were sent back to Talavera, and even if some others had succeeded in escaping during their march to the rear, it is certain that the Spanish casualty-list amounted to at least 7,500 men. Nine standards were taken—less than might have been expected, for the twenty-three Spanish battalions present must have brought forty-six to the field. Twenty pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the French, out of the thirty which Cuesta had possessed102. Some few batteries therefore (perhaps the horse artillery of the evasive cavalry brigades) had succeeded in escaping from the rout28.
Most French authors unite in stating that the total loss on their side was only 300 men[191]. This figure is as absurd as that given for Soult’s losses at Corunna: there were five hours of fighting, and for a long time the battle had gone by no means in favour of Victor’s men. It is improbable that they suffered less than 1,000 casualties, and the figure may have been higher, for one brigade of Latour-Maubourg’s dragoons was beaten back while charging guns—always a bloody business for cavalry—while the German battalions which retired across the plain in column, played on by artillery and harassed103 by skirmishers, must also have suffered severely104.
Cuesta’s cavalry, owing to the disgraceful cowardice shown by the majority of the regiments, had got off comparatively intact. The whole of his dreadful losses had fallen on his infantry, and they had been scattered105 so far and wide over the Estremaduran plain that it was many days before he could get together a respectable force. He took refuge at Monasterio[192] in the mountains in the direction of Andalusia, and sent urgent appeals for reinforcements to the Central Junta. It might [p. 167]have been expected that the Junta would disgrace him and remove him from command, as they had Cartaojal, Infantado, and Casta?os. But apparently106 they were rather cheered by the fact that Cuesta had seriously disputed the victory with the French, than angered with the want of generalship which he had shown. They voted that he and his army had deserved well of the State, and distributed honours and promotion107 to all the officers whom he recommended for good conduct during the action. Rocca remarks that they must have had in their minds the doings of the Romans after Cannae, when the steadfast108 Senate thanked the consul109 Varro ‘for not having despaired of the republic,’ instead of removing him for rashness and incompetence[193]. At any rate, they conferred on Cuesta the post of Captain-General of Estremadura, and hurried up to reinforce him all the troops that they could spare, a strong brigade of new Granadan levies[194], and a division drawn from the army of Cartaojal consisting of nine old battalions of regular troops with a force of 6,000 bayonets[195]. Thus reinforced the host of Cuesta was as strong as on the eve of Medellin, and once more mustered110 20,000 foot and 3,000 horse. By the middle of April the whole had been drawn together, and reorganized into five divisions of foot and two of horse. This was the army that was to co-operate with Wellesley in the campaign of Talavera.
‘In any other country of Europe,’ wrote Marshal Jourdan, ‘the gaining of two such successes as Medellin and Ciudad Real would have reduced the country-side to submission111, and have enabled the victorious112 armies to press forward to new conquests. In Spain the reverse was the case: the greater the disaster suffered by the national troops, the more willing were the population to rise and take arms. Already the communications between Victor and Sebastiani were cut: several bearers of dispatches were massacred, and even some detachments cut off. An insurrection almost burst out at Toledo, where a garrison113 of insufficient114 strength had been left. It was only averted115 by[p. 168] the providential arrival of an officer with a reinforcement of 500 men. The communications of the 1st Corps with Madrid were in no better state: bands of insurgents116 gathered in the valley of the Tietar, and threatened to fall upon Almaraz and to break the bridge of boats. The King had to send down in haste 600 bayonets from Madrid to preserve this all-important post[196].’ At the same time the road from Almaraz to Salamanca was closed by a trifling117 Spanish force of two battalions under the brigadier Carlos d’Espa?a which had been levied118 about Caceres and Bejar, and occupied the pass of Ba?os. It was aided by a battalion of the Loyal Lusitanian legion, which Sir Robert Wilson had sent forward from Almeida. Thus Lapisse at Salamanca could only communicate with Victor at Merida by the circuitous119 route of Arevalo, Madrid, and Almaraz.
The Duke of Belluno had been ordered by the Emperor to beat the Army of Estremadura, and then to get into touch with Soult, who should have been due at Lisbon long ere this. But no news of the 2nd Corps had come to hand: it was known to have penetrated120 into northern Portugal, but its exact position could not be learnt. Victor, refusing to move till he had news of his colleague, cantoned his army at Merida and Medellin, and put the old castles of both these places, as well as that of Truxillo, in a state of defence. He would probably have done well to utilize89 the time of necessary waiting in laying siege to Badajoz. But he contented121 himself with watching that fortress and observing the reorganized army of Cuesta, which had now grown once more to a respectable force, and might have harassed considerably any part of the 1st Corps which should attempt to molest4 the capital of Estremadura. Instead of attacking the place, Victor contented himself with sending to it vain summonses to surrender, and with endeavouring to discover whether it might not contain traitors122 ready to negotiate with King Joseph. He brought down from Madrid, as his agent, a Spanish magistrate123 named Sotelo, who had become a zealous124 Afrancesado. Through this person he addressed letters both to the governor of Badajoz and to the Central Junta at Seville. After setting forth125 all the evils which the continuance of the war was bringing upon Spain, Sotelo stated that his king was ready to grant the most[p. 169] liberal and benevolent126 terms to the Junta, in order to spare further effusion of blood. The letter was duly forwarded to Seville, where it was laid before the government. The ironical127 answer was promptly128 returned ‘that if Sotelo possessed full powers to negotiate for peace on the basis of the restoration of Ferdinand VII, and the prompt evacuation of Spain by the French armies, peace would be possible. If not, the Junta must continue to carry out the mandate129 conferred upon it by the nation; according to which it could conclude no truce130 or treaty except on the two conditions stated above.’ Sotelo tried to continue the negotiation131, but his offers were disregarded, and Victor soon realized that he would obtain no further advantages save by his sword. He remained at Merida waiting in vain for the news of Soult’s advance on Lisbon, which was, according to Napoleon’s orders, to be the signal for the 1st Corps to resume its advance.
N.B.—For the campaign of Medellin I have used the narratives132 of Rocca and Sémélé (the latter often very inaccurate), the Mémoires of Jourdan, the day-book of the Frankfort regiment of Laval’s division, and Victor’s correspondence with King Joseph, and on the Spanish side the dispatches of Cuesta, also two letters from D’Urban (British attaché on Cuesta’s staff) to Cradock, and some enclosures sent by Frere to Castlereagh.
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1
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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2
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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3
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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4
molest
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| vt.骚扰，干扰，调戏 | |
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5
irrational
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| adj.无理性的，失去理性的 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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cowardice
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| n.胆小，怯懦 | |
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10
evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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12
precipitated
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| v.（突如其来地）使发生( precipitate的过去式和过去分词 )；促成；猛然摔下；使沉淀 | |
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13
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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14
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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15
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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16
legacy
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| n.遗产，遗赠；先人(或过去)留下的东西 | |
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Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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18
muster
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| v.集合，收集，鼓起，激起；n.集合，检阅，集合人员，点名册 | |
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19
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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20
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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21
chimerical
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| adj.荒诞不经的，梦幻的 | |
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22
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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23
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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24
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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25
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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26
reluctance
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| n.厌恶，讨厌，勉强，不情愿 | |
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27
explicit
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| adj.详述的，明确的；坦率的；显然的 | |
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28
rout
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| n.溃退，溃败；v.击溃，打垮 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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30
westward
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| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
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31
countless
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| adj.无数的，多得不计其数的 | |
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32
defiles
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| v.玷污( defile的第三人称单数 )；污染；弄脏；纵列行进 | |
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33
defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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34
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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35
rugged
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| adj.高低不平的，粗糙的，粗壮的，强健的 | |
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crumpled
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| adj. 弯扭的, 变皱的 动词crumple的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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37
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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38
precipice
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| n.悬崖，危急的处境 | |
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39
absconded
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| v.（尤指逃避逮捕）潜逃，逃跑( abscond的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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40
defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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41
scattering
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| n.[物]散射；散乱，分散；在媒介质中的散播adj.散乱的；分散在不同范围的；广泛扩散的；（选票）数量分散的v.散射(scatter的ing形式)；散布；驱散 | |
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42
moored
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| adj. 系泊的 动词moor的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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43
withheld
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| withhold过去式及过去分词 | |
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44
prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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45
rein
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| n.疆绳，统治，支配；vt.以僵绳控制，统治 | |
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46
nucleus
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| n.核，核心，原子核 | |
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47
fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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48
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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49
junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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50
evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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51
vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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52
fiery
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| adj.燃烧着的，火红的；暴躁的；激烈的 | |
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53
contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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54
inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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55
tangible
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| adj.有形的，可触摸的，确凿的，实际的 | |
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56
ambush
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| n.埋伏(地点)；伏兵；v.埋伏；伏击 | |
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57
enveloped
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| v.包围，笼罩，包住( envelop的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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58
envelop
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| vt.包，封，遮盖；包围 | |
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59
snare
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| n.陷阱，诱惑，圈套；（去除息肉或者肿瘤的）勒除器；响弦，小军鼓；vt.以陷阱捕获，诱惑 | |
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60
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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61
coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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62
descending
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| n. 下行 adj. 下降的 | |
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63
junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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64
retraced
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| v.折回( retrace的过去式和过去分词 )；回忆；回顾；追溯 | |
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65
moorish
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| adj.沼地的，荒野的，生[住]在沼地的 | |
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66
citadel
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| n.城堡；堡垒；避难所 | |
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67
torrent
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| n.激流，洪流；爆发，(话语等的)连发 | |
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68
insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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69
deployed
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| （尤指军事行动）使展开( deploy的过去式和过去分词 )； 施展； 部署； 有效地利用 | |
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70
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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71
contingent
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| adj.视条件而定的；n.一组，代表团，分遣队 | |
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72
intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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73
eminently
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| adv.突出地；显著地；不寻常地 | |
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74
converging
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| adj.收敛[缩]的，会聚的，趋同的v.（线条、运动的物体等）会于一点( converge的现在分词 )；（趋于）相似或相同；人或车辆汇集；聚集 | |
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75
proximity
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| n.接近，邻近 | |
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76
dressing
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| n.(食物)调料；包扎伤口的用品，敷料 | |
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imposing
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| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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deafening
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| adj. 振耳欲聋的, 极喧闹的 动词deafen的现在分词形式 | |
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81
heeded
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| v.听某人的劝告，听从( heed的过去式和过去分词 )；变平，使（某物）变平( flatten的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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82
foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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crest
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| n.顶点；饰章；羽冠；vt.达到顶点；vi.形成浪尖 | |
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84
irresolute
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| adj.无决断的，优柔寡断的，踌躇不定的 | |
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85
galloped
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| （使马）飞奔，奔驰( gallop的过去式和过去分词 )； 快速做[说]某事 | |
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86
fugitives
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| n.亡命者，逃命者( fugitive的名词复数 ) | |
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87
shameful
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| adj.可耻的，不道德的 | |
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88
utilized
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| v.利用，使用( utilize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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89
utilize
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| vt.使用，利用 | |
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90
hurled
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| v.猛投，用力掷( hurl的过去式和过去分词 )；大声叫骂 | |
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doomed
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| 命定的 | |
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92
eastward
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| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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93
horde
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| n.群众，一大群 | |
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94
slaughter
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| n.屠杀，屠宰；vt.屠杀，宰杀 | |
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95
specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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avenge
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| v.为...复仇，为...报仇 | |
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98
bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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enraged
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| 使暴怒( enrage的过去式和过去分词 )； 歜； 激愤 | |
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extermination
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| n.消灭，根绝 | |
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101
frightful
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| adj.可怕的；讨厌的 | |
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102
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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103
harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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104
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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105
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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106
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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107
promotion
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| n.提升，晋级；促销，宣传 | |
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108
steadfast
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| adj.固定的，不变的，不动摇的；忠实的；坚贞不移的 | |
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109
consul
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| n.领事；执政官 | |
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110
mustered
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| v.集合，召集，集结（尤指部队）( muster的过去式和过去分词 )；（自他人处）搜集某事物；聚集；激发 | |
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111
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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112
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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113
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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114
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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115
averted
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| 防止，避免( avert的过去式和过去分词 )； 转移 | |
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116
insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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117
trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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118
levied
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| 征（兵）( levy的过去式和过去分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税 | |
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119
circuitous
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| adj.迂回的路的，迂曲的，绕行的 | |
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120
penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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121
contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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122
traitors
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| 卖国贼( traitor的名词复数 )； 叛徒； 背叛者； 背信弃义的人 | |
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123
magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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124
zealous
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| adj.狂热的，热心的 | |
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125
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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126
benevolent
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| adj.仁慈的，乐善好施的 | |
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127
ironical
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| adj.讽刺的，冷嘲的 | |
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128
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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129
mandate
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| n.托管地；命令，指示 | |
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130
truce
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| n.休战，(争执，烦恼等的)缓和；v.以停战结束 | |
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131
negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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132
narratives
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| 记叙文( narrative的名词复数 )； 故事； 叙述； 叙述部分 | |
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