Oporto had been conquered: the unhappy levies2 of the Bishop3 had been scattered4 to the winds: by the captures which it had made the French army was now, for the first time since its departure from Orense, in possession of a considerable store of provisions and an adequate supply of ammunition5. Soult was no longer driven forward by the imperative6 necessity for finding new resources to feed his troops, nor forced to hurry on the fighting by the fear that if he delayed his cartridges7 would run short. He had at last leisure to halt and take stock of his position. The most striking point in the situation was that he was absolutely ignorant of the general course of the war in the other regions of the Peninsula. When he had been directed to march on Oporto, he had been assured that he might count on the co-operation of Lapisse, who was to advance from Salamanca with his 9,000 men, and of Victor, who was to stretch out to him a helping8 hand from the valley of the Tagus. It was all-important to know how far the promised aid was being given: yet the Marshal could learn nothing. More than two months had now elapsed since he had received any dispatches from the Emperor. It was a month since he had obtained his last news of the doings of his nearest colleague, Ney, which had been brought to him, as it will be remembered, just as he was about to leave Orense. At that moment the Duke of Elchingen had been able to tell him nothing save that the communications between Galicia and Leon had been broken, and that the insurrection was daily growing more formidable. After this his only glimpse of the outer world had been afforded by Portuguese letters, seized in the post-offices of Braga and Oporto, from which[p. 251] he had learnt that his garrisons9 left behind at Vigo and Tuy were being beleaguered11 by a vast horde12 of Galician irregular levies. ‘The march of the 2nd Corps13,’ wrote one of Soult’s officers, ‘may be compared to the progress of a ship on the high seas: she cleaves14 the waves, but they close behind her, and in a few moments all trace of her passage has disappeared[295].’ To make the simile15 complete, Fantin des Odoards should have compared Soult to the captain of a vessel16 in a dense17 fog, forging ahead through shoals and sandbanks without any possibility of obtaining a general view of the coast till the mists may lift. To all intents and purposes, we may add, the fog never dispersed18 till May had arrived, and Wellesley hurtled down in a dreadful collision on the groping commander, ere he had fully20 ascertained21 his own whereabouts.
When the whole country-side is up in arms, as it was in Galicia and northern Portugal in the spring of 1809, it is useless to dispatch small bodies of men in search of news. They are annihilated23 in a few hours: but to make large detachments and send them out on long expeditions, so weakens the main army that it loses its power of further advance. This was the fate of the 2nd Corps after the fall of Oporto. Soult, compelled to seek for information at all costs, had to send one of his four infantry24 divisions back towards Galicia, to succour Tuy and Vigo and obtain news of Ney, while another marched eastward25 to the Tras-os-Montes, to look for signs of the advance of Lapisse from Salamanca. When these detachments had been made, the remainder of the army was too weak to resume the march on Lisbon which the Emperor had commanded, and was forced to remain cantoned in the neighbourhood of Oporto.
The details of Soult’s disposition26 of his troops after the fall of Oporto were as follows: Franceschi’s cavalry27, supported by Mermet’s division of infantry, were pushed forward across the Douro on the road to Coimbra, to watch the movements of the wrecks28 of the Bishop’s army, which had retired29 to the line of the Vouga. Merle’s division and half Delaborde’s remained in garrison10 at Oporto, while Lorges’ and one brigade of Lahoussaye’s dragoons were kept not far from them, in the open country north of the city, about Villa30 de Conde and[p. 252] Vallongo. The other brigade of Lahoussaye’s division, supported by Foy’s infantry, was sent out on an expedition towards the Tras-os-Montes, with orders to brush away Silveira and seek for news of the expected approach of Lapisse. Loison was placed in command of this detachment. Finally, Heudelet’s division, which had been guarding the sick and the stores of the army at Braga, was ordered to send on all the impedimenta to Oporto, and then to prepare to march northward31 in order to relieve Tuy and Vigo, and to get into touch with Ney and the 6th Corps.
It was clear that the further movements of the Duke of Dalmatia would depend on the intelligence which Loison and Heudelet might obtain. If Ney should have crushed the Galician insurgents32, if Lapisse should be met with somewhere on the borders of Spain, matters would look well for the resumption of the advance on Lisbon. It was also to be hoped that Lapisse would be able to give some information as to the doings of Victor and the 1st Corps. For it was necessary to find out how the Duke of Belluno had been faring in Estremadura, and to know whether he was prepared to co-operate in that general movement against the Portuguese capital which the Emperor had prescribed in his parting instructions from Valladolid.
As a matter of fact, Victor, having beaten Cuesta at Medellin on the day before Soult captured Oporto (March 28), had reached the end of his initiative, and was now lying at Merida, incapable33, according to his own conception, of any further offensive movement till he should have received heavy reinforcements. Ney in Galicia was fighting hard against the insurgents, and beginning to discover that though he might rout34 them a dozen times he could not make an end of them. He had not a man to spare for Soult’s assistance.
There remained Lapisse, who in his central position at Salamanca should have been, according to Napoleon’s design, the link between Ney, Victor, and Soult. He had been directed, as it will be remembered[296], to move on Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, to capture both these fortresses36, and then to advance into Portugal and to strike at Abrantes: when he arrived there it was hoped that he would find Soult on his right and Victor[p. 253] on his left, and would join them in the general assault on Lisbon. There can be no doubt that Napoleon was giving too heavy a task to Lapisse: he had but a single division of infantry—though it was a strong one of twelve battalions37—and one provisional brigade of cavalry[297], in all about 9,000 men. This was ample for the holding down of the southern parts of the kingdom of Leon, or even for the attack on Almeida and Rodrigo: but it was a small force with which to advance into the mountains of central Portugal or to seize Abrantes. If he had carried out his instructions, Lapisse would have had to march for nearly 200 miles through difficult mountain country, beset39 every day by the Ordenanza, as Soult had been in his shorter route from Orense to Oporto. And if he had ever cut his way to Abrantes, he ought to have found himself faced by Cradock’s 9,000 British troops and by the reorganized Portuguese regular army, which lay in and about Lisbon, with a strength which even in February was not less than 12,000 men.
Napoleon had given Lapisse too much to do: but on the other hand that general performed far too little. Though he could never have reached Abrantes, he ought to have reached Almeida, where his presence would have been of material assistance to Soult, more especially if he had from thence pushed exploring columns towards Lamego and Vizeu, before plunging40 into the mountains on the road to the south. As a matter of fact, Lapisse in February and March never advanced so much as fifty miles from Salamanca, and allowed himself to be ‘contained’ and baffled, for two whole months, by an insignificant41 opposing force, commanded by a general possessing that enterprise and initiative which he himself entirely42 lacked.
The officer who wrecked43 this part of Napoleon’s plan for the invasion of Portugal was Sir Robert Wilson, one of the most active and capable men in the English army, and one who might have made a great name for himself, had fortune been propitious44. But though he served with distinction throughout the Napoleonic war, and won golden opinions in Belgium and Egypt, in Prussia and Poland, no less than in Spain, he never obtained that command on a large scale which would have[p. 254] enabled him to show his full powers. It may seem singular that a man who won love and admiration45 wherever he went, who was decorated by two emperors for brilliant feats46 of arms done under their eyes, who was equally popular in the Russian, the Austrian, or the Portuguese camp, who had displayed on a hundred fields his chivalrous47 daring, his ready ingenuity48, and his keen military insight, should fail to achieve greatness. But Wilson, unhappily for himself, had the defects of his qualities. When acting49 as a subordinate his independent and self-reliant character was always getting him into trouble with his hierarchical superiors. He was not the man to obey orders which he believed to be dangerous or mistaken: he so frequently ‘thought for himself’ and carried out plans quite different from those which had been imposed upon him, that no commander-in-chief could tolerate him for long. His moves were always clever and generally fortunate, but mere50 success did not atone51 for his disobedience in the eyes of his various chiefs, and he never remained for long in the same post. All generals, good and bad, agree in disliking lieutenants54 who disregard their orders and carry out other schemes—even if they be ingenious and successful ones[298]. It must be added that Wilson dabbled55 in politics on the Whig side, and was not a favourite with Lord Castlereagh, a drawback when preferments were being distributed.
But when trusted with any independent command, and allowed a free hand, Wilson always did well. Not only had he all the talents of an excellent partisan56 chief, but he was one of those genial57 leaders who have the power to inspire confidence and enthusiasm in their followers58, and are able to get out of them double the work that an ordinary commander can extort59. He was in short one of those men who if left to themselves achieve great things, but who when placed in a subordinate position quarrel with their superiors and get sent home in disgrace. From the moment when Beresford assumed command of the Portuguese army his relations with Wilson were one long story of friction60 and controversy61, and Wellesley (though[p. 255] acknowledging his brilliant services) made no attempt to keep him in the Peninsula. He wanted officers who would obey orders, even when they did not understand or approve them, and would not tolerate lieutenants who wished to argue with him[299].
It was Wilson who first showed that the new levies of Portugal could do good service in the field. While Silveira and Eben were meeting with nothing but disaster in the Tras-os-Montes and the Entre-Douro-e-Minho, he was conducting a thoroughly62 successful campaign on the borders of Leon. From January to April, 1809, he, and he alone, protected the eastern frontier of Portugal, and with a mere handful of men kept the enemy at a distance, and finally induced him to draw off and leave Salamanca, just at the moment when Soult’s operations on the Douro were becoming most dangerous.
The force at his disposal in January, 1809, consisted of nothing more than his own celebrated63 ‘Loyal Lusitanian Legion.’ We have already had occasion to mention this corps while speaking of the reorganization of the Portuguese army (see page 199). On December 14, as we have seen, he had led out his little brigade of Green-coats towards the frontier[300].
Wilson’s reasons for moving forward were partly political, partly military: on the one hand he wished to get away from the neighbourhood of the Bishop of Oporto, whose intrigues64 disgusted him; on the other he saw that it was necessary to[p. 256] bring up a force to cover the frontier of Portugal, when Moore marched forward into Spain. As long as Moore had remained at Salamanca, there was a strong barrier in front of Portugal: but when he departed it was clear that the kingdom must defend itself. Wilson therefore advanced to Pinhel, near Almeida, and there established his little force in cantonments.
He was at this place when the startling developments of the campaign in the last ten days of December, 1808, took place. Moore retired on Galicia, Napoleon’s army swept on into Leon, and Wilson found himself left alone with the whole defence of the north-eastern frontier of Portugal thrown on his hands. He soon heard of the storming of Zamora and Toro, and learnt that Lapisse’s division had arrived at Salamanca. Three marches might bring that general to the border.
A few days later Wilson received from Sir John Cradock the news that he had ordered the British garrison to evacuate65 Almeida[301], and to retire on Lisbon, as the whole remaining force in Portugal would probably have to embark66 in a few days. The new commander-in-chief added that he should advise Wilson to bring off his British officers and depart with the rest, as the Portuguese would be unable to make any head against Bonaparte, and it would be a useless sacrifice to linger in their company and be overwhelmed. This pusillanimous67 counsel shocked and disgusted Wilson: he called together his subordinates, and found that they agreed with him in considering Cradock’s advice disgraceful. They resolved that they could not desert their Portuguese comrades, and were in honour bound to see the campaign to an end, however black the present outlook might appear[302].
When therefore the British garrison of Almeida was withdrawn68, Wilson entered that fortress35 with the Legion and took charge of it. He obtained from the Regency leave to appoint his lieutenant53-colonel, William Mayne, as the governor, and also received permission to assume command of the local levies[p. 257] in the neighbourhood. These consisted of the skeletons of two line regiments70 (nos. 11 and 23) whose reorganization had but just begun. There were also two militia71 regiments (Guarda and Trancoso) to be raised in the district, but at this moment they existed only in name, and possessed72 neither officers nor arms. For immediate73 action Wilson could count upon nothing but the 1,300 men of the Lusitanian Legion.
Nevertheless he resolved to advance at once, and to endeavour to impose on Lapisse by a show of activity. Leaving the Portuguese regulars and 700 men of the Legion to garrison Almeida, he crossed the frontier with his handful of cavalry (not 200 sabres), two guns, and 300 men of his light companies. Passing the Spanish fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo he advanced some distance on the Salamanca road, and took up his position behind the Yeltes river, with his right resting on the inaccessible74 Sierra de Francia, and his left at San Felices, half way to the Douro. His whole force constituted no more than a thin line of pickets75, but he acted with such confidence and decision, beating up the French outposts with his dragoons, raiding well forward in the direction of Ledesma and Tamames, and stirring up the peasants of the mountain country to insurrection, that Lapisse gave him credit for having a considerable force at his back. The French general had expected to meet with no opposition76 on his way to Almeida, believing that Cradock was about to embark, and that the Portuguese would not fight. He was accordingly much surprised to find a long line in his front, occupied by troops dressed like British riflemen, and commanded by British officers—whose strength he was unable to ascertain22. He halted, in order to take stock of his opponent, when a bold push would have shown him that only a skeleton army was before him. In an intercepted77 dispatch of February[303] he reported that the peasantry informed him that Wilson had 12,000 men, and that as many more were in garrison at Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.
As the weeks wore on, and the winter drew to an end, Wilson obtained some slight reinforcements. When he first advanced the Spaniards could give him no help, for the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo itself consisted of nothing but its six companies of[p. 258] urban militia, and a new battalion38 of 500 men, which had been on the point of setting out to join La Romana when its way to Leon was intercepted by the French. There were 1,400 men to man a fortress which required a garrison of 4,000[304]! But before January was out, Pignatelli, the captain-general of Castile, had sent into the place a regiment69 which he had raised in the mountains of Avila, and Carlos d’Espa?a[305] had begun to form some new battalions from the peasantry of the Ciudad Rodrigo district, stiffened78 by stragglers from La Romana’s army[306]. In February the Central Junta79 gave Wilson a provisional command over the Spanish forces in Leon, and he used his authority to draw upon the garrison of Rodrigo for detachments to strengthen his outposts. He also requisitioned men from Almeida, when the Portuguese regiments there placed had begun to fill up their ranks to a respectable strength. A few cavalry of the re-formed 11th of the line were especially useful to him for scouting80 work.
With this small assistance, Wilson, whose total force never exceeded 400 horse and 3,000 infantry, kept Lapisse employed throughout February and March. He beat up the French quarters on several occasions, and twice captured large convoys83 of provisions which were being directed on Salamanca; to fall upon one of these, a great requisition of foodstuffs84 from Ledesma, he dashed far within Lapisse’s lines, but brought out all the wagons85 in safety and delivered them to the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo. At last, emboldened86 by his adversary’s timidity, he extended his right beyond the Sierra de Francia, and established part of the Legion under Colonel Mayne in the Puerto de Ba?os, the main pass between Salamanca and Estremadura. Thus Lapisse was completely cut off from all communication[p. 259] with Victor and the French army on the Tagus, save by the circuitous87 route through Madrid.
Jourdan, writing in the name of King Joseph, had duly transmitted to Lapisse the Emperor’s orders to march on Abrantes, the moment that it should be known that Soult had arrived at Oporto. He had even reiterated88 these directions in February, though both he and the King doubted their wisdom. Victor had written to Madrid to suggest that Alcantara would be a much better and safer objective for the division to aim at than Abrantes[307]. He wished to draw Lapisse’s troops (which properly belonged to the 1st Corps) into his own sphere of operations, and repeatedly declared that without them he had no hope of bringing his Estremaduran campaign to a happy end, much less of executing any effective diversion against Portugal. Jourdan agreed with him, opining that Lapisse would miscarry, if he invaded central Portugal on an independent line of operations. But no one was so convinced of this as Lapisse himself, who, with his exaggerated ideas of the strength of Wilson, was most reluctant to move forward. As late as the end of March the Emperor’s orders were still ostensibly in vigour[308], and the general only excused himself for not marching, by pretending that he could not venture to advance till he had certain news of Soult’s movements. This the Galician insurgents were obliging enough to keep from him.
At last, however, Jourdan yielded to Victor’s wishes, and authorized89 Lapisse to drop down on to Alcantara, keeping outside the limits of Portugal, instead of making the attack on Rodrigo and the subsequent dash at Abrantes which the Emperor had prescribed[309]. Overjoyed at escaping from the responsibility which he dreaded90, Lapisse first prepared to march[p. 260] southward by the Puerto de Ba?os. But when he found it held by Mayne and the troops of Wilson’s right wing, he made no attempt to force the passage, but resolved to carry out his design by stratagem91. Massing his division, he marched on Ciudad Rodrigo upon April 6. He pierced with ease the feeble screen of Wilson’s outposts and appeared in front of the Spanish fortress, which he duly summoned to surrender. But though the place might easily have been carried by a coup92 de main in January, it was now safe against anything but a formal siege, and Lapisse had neither a battering-train nor any real intention of attacking. When the governor returned a defiant93 answer, the French division made a show of sitting down in front of the walls. This was done in order to draw Wilson to the aid of the place, and the move was successful. Calling in all his outlying detachments from the nearer passes and collecting some of Carlos d’Espa?a’s levies, Sir Robert took post close to the walls of Ciudad Rodrigo, with a battalion of the Legion under Colonel Grant, some other Portuguese troops and four guns[310].
Having thus lured94 Wilson away from the passes, the French general suddenly broke up by night, and made a forced march for the Puerto de Perales, the nearest mountain-road to Alcantara. He thus obtained a full day’s start, and got off unmolested. Sir Robert and Carlos d’Espa?a followed on his track as soon as they discovered his departure, and Mayne also pursued, from the Puerto de Ba?os, but none of them could do more than harass95 his rearguard, with which they skirmished for three days in the passes. It would not have been wise of them to attempt more, even if they could have got into touch with the main body, for the French division was double their strength. Meanwhile the peasantry of the Sierra de Gata endeavoured to stop Lapisse’s progress, by blocking the defiles96; but he swept them away with ease, and they never succeeded in delaying him for more than a few hours. Their incessant97 ‘sniping’ and night attacks exasperated98 the French, who dealt most ruthlessly with the country-side as they passed. When[p. 261] they arrived at Alcantara, and found the little town barricaded100, they not only refused all quarter to the fighting-men when they stormed the place, but committed dreadful atrocities101 on the non-combatants. Not only murder and rape102 but mutilation and torture are reported by credible103 witnesses[311]. After the houses had been sacked, the very tombs in the churches were broken open in search of plunder104. Leaving Alcantara full of corpses105 and ruins [April 12], the division marched on by Caceres and joined Victor in his camp near Merida[312] [April 19].
Since Lapisse, then, had moved off far to the south, and thrown in his lot with his old comrades of the 1st Corps, it was in vain that Soult sought for news of him on the Douro after the fall of Oporto. When Loison set out to cross the Tamega and to enter the Tras-os-Montes, in order that he might obtain information of the movements of the division at Salamanca, that division was making ready for its march to Alcantara; a fortnight later it had disappeared from the northern theatre of operations altogether, and Soult’s last chance of obtaining external help for his invasion of Portugal was gone. This section, in short, of Napoleon’s great plan for the march on Lisbon had been foiled, and foiled almost entirely by Sir Robert Wilson’s happy audacity106 and resourceful generalship. But for[p. 262] him, the timidity of Cradock, the impotence of the Spaniards, and the disorganization of the Portuguese army might have brought about the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, at the same moment that Soult was entering Portugal on its northern frontier. His services have never received their proper meed of praise, either from the government which he served so well, or from the historians who have told the annals of the Peninsular War.
We must now return to the details of the Duke of Dalmatia’s operations. His movements were clearly dependent on the results of the two expeditions under Heudelet and Loison, which he had sent out to the north and the east after his victory of March 29.
Heudelet, after discharging on to Oporto the sick and wounded and the stores which he had been guarding at Braga, started out northward on April 6, with the 4,000 infantry of his own division and Lorges’ dragoons, whom the Marshal had ordered up to his aid from Villa de Conde. Heudelet was ordered to disperse19 the insurgents in the valleys of the Lima and Minho, and to relieve Tuy and Vigo, where the French garrisons were known to be in a state of siege. To reach them it was necessary to pierce through the screen of militia and Ordenanza under General Botilho, which had cut off all communication between Galicia and the army of Portugal since the month of February.
On April 7 the French general neared the line of the Lima, only to find the bridges barricaded and Botilho’s horde entrenched107 behind them. After some preliminary skirmishing, fords were discovered, which Heudelet’s infantry passed upon the following morning, sending the unfortunate Portuguese flying in every direction and capturing the three guns which formed their sole artillery108. On the tenth the frontier fortress of Valenza was reached: it was found to be in a dilapidated condition, and garrisoned109 by only 200 men, who surrendered at the first summons. Tuy, where General Lamartinière had been shut up for the last seven weeks, faces Valenza across the broad estuary110 of the Minho, so that Heudelet was now in full communication with it.
Lamartinière, as it will be remembered[313], had been left behind,[p. 263] with Soult’s heavy artillery, wheeled transport, and sick, when the 2nd Corps marched for Orense on February 16. He had gathered in several belated detachments which had started from Santiago in the hope of joining the rear of the marching column, so that he had the respectable force of 3,300 men, though 1,200 of them were invalids111 or convalescents. The walls of Tuy were in a bad state of repair, but the governor had found no great difficulty in maintaining himself against the Galician insurgents on his own side of the Minho, and the Portuguese levies from the other bank which Botilho sent to the aid of the Spaniards. But he had been completely shut in since Soult’s departure, and could give no information concerning Ney’s operations in northern Galicia, or the general progress of the war in the other parts of Spain. The only news which he could supply was that Vigo, the next French garrison, had fallen into the hands of the enemy. On his way to Portugal Soult had dropped a force of 700 men at that fortress, lest its excellent harbour should be utilized112 by the British for throwing in supplies to the Galician insurgents. The paymaster-general of the 2nd Corps, with his treasure and its escort, had lagged behind during the Marshal’s advance, and, being beset by the peasantry, had entered Vigo instead of pushing on to Tuy.
When Soult had passed out of sight on the way to Orense, the Galicians of the coast-land, headed by Pablo Morillo, a lieutenant of the regular army whom La Romana had sent down from the interior, and by Manuel Garcia Del Barrio[314], a colonel dispatched by the Central Junta from Seville, had taken arms in great numbers, and blockaded Vigo. The French commander, Colonel Chalot, found himself unable to defend the whole extent of the fortifications for sheer want of men, and could not prevent the insurgents from establishing themselves close under the walls and keeping up a continual fire upon the garrison. He believed that a serious assault would infallibly succeed, and only refused to surrender because he was ashamed to yield to peasants. On March 23 two English frigates113, the Lively and Venus, appeared off the harbour mouth, and began to supply the insurgents with ammunition, and to land heavy[p. 264] naval114 guns for their use. On the twenty-seventh one of the gates was battered115 in, and the Galicians were preparing to storm the place, when Chalot surrendered at discretion116, only stipulating117 that he and his men should be handed over to the British, and not to the Spaniards. This request was granted, and Captain Mackinley received twenty-three officers and nearly 800 men as prisoners, besides a number of sick and several hundred non-combatants belonging to the train, and camp-followers. The plunder taken consisted of sixty wagons, 339 horses, and more than ￡6,000 in hard cash, composing the military chest of the 2nd Corps [March 28].
The Galicians had somewhat relaxed the blockade of Tuy in order to press that of Vigo, and on the very day when Chalot surrendered, General Lamartinière had sent out a flying column to endeavour to communicate with his colleague. It returned pursued by the Spaniards, to report to the governor that Vigo had fallen[315]. On its way back to Tuy it suffered a loss of seventy prisoners and nearly 200 killed and wounded.
Heudelet and Lamartinière had now some 7,000 men collected at Tuy, a force with which they could easily have routed the whole of the insurgents of the Minho, and forced them to retire into the mountains. But Soult’s orders to his lieutenants were to avoid operations in Galicia, and to concentrate towards Portugal. Tuy was evacuated118, and its garrison transferred across the frontier-river to the Portuguese fortress of Valenza. Before the transference was completed, the French generals received an unexpected visit from some troops of the 6th Corps. Ney, disquieted119 as to the condition of Tuy and Vigo, had sent a brigade under Maucune to seek for news of their garrisons. This force, cutting its way through the insurgents, came into[p. 265] Tuy on April 12. Thus Heudelet was at last able to get news of the operations of Ney. The information received was not encouraging: the Duke of Elchingen was beset by the Galicians on every side: La Romana had cut off one of his outlying garrisons, that of Villafranca, and his communications with Leon were so completely cut off that he had no reports to give as to the progress of affairs in the rest of Spain. Finding that Vigo was lost, and the garrison of Tuy relieved, Maucune retraced120 his steps and returned to Santiago, harassed121 for the whole of his march by the insurgents of the coast-land.
Meanwhile Heudelet’s communication with Oporto had been interrupted, for the Portuguese, routed on the Lima a week before, had come back to their old haunts, seized Braga, and blocked the high-road and the bridges. Soult only got into touch with his expeditionary force by sending out Lahoussaye with 3,000 men to reopen the road to the North. When this was done, he bade Heudelet evacuate Valenza (whose fortifications turned out to be in too bad order to be repaired in any reasonable space of time), and to disperse his division in garrisons for Braga, Viana, and Barcelos. The whole of the convoy82 and the sick from Tuy were sent up to Oporto.
The net result of Heudelet’s operations was that the Marshal, at the cost of immobilizing one of his four infantry divisions, obtained a somewhat precarious122 hold upon the flat country of Entre-Douro-e-Minho. The towns were in his hands, but the Ordenanza had only retired to the hills, and perpetually descended123 to worry Heudelet’s detachments, and to murder couriers and foraging124 parties. Meanwhile 4,000 men were wasted for all purposes of offensive action. Vigo, Tuy, and Valenza had all been abandoned, and touch with the army of Galicia had been completely lost.
Even this modest amount of success had been denied to Soult’s second expedition, that which he had sent under Loison towards the Tras-os-Montes. The enemy with whom the French had to deal in this region was Silveira, the same officer who had been defeated between Monterey and Chaves in the early days of March, when the 2nd Corps crossed the Portuguese frontier. He had fled with the wrecks of his force towards Villa Real, at the moment when Soult marched on Braga, and[p. 266] the Marshal had fondly hoped that he was now a negligible quantity in the campaign. This was far from being the case: the moment that Silveira heard that the French had crossed the mountains and marched on Braga, he had rallied his two regular regiments and his masses of Ordenanza, and pounced125 down on the detachment under Commandant Messager, which Soult had left in garrison at Chaves. This, it will be remembered, consisted of no more than a company of infantry, a quantity of convalescents and stragglers, and the untrustworthy Spanish-Portuguese ‘legion,’ which had been formed out of the prisoners captured on March 6 and 12[316]. On the very day upon which Soult was routing Eben in front of Braga, Silveira appeared before the walls of Chaves with 6,000 men. Messager retired into the citadel126, abandoning on the outer walls of the town a few guns, which the Portuguese were thus enabled to turn against the inner defences. After a siege of five days and much ineffective cannonading, the governor surrendered, mainly because the native ‘legion’ was preparing to open the gates to Silveira. Twelve hundred men were captured, of whom only one-third were Frenchmen capable of bearing arms, the rest being sick or ‘legionaries.’
Having made this successful stroke, Silveira marched down the Tamega to Amarante, making a movement parallel to Soult’s advance on Oporto. His recapture of Chaves brought several thousands more of Ordenanza to his standard, and at Amarante he was joined on the thirtieth by many of the fugitives128 who had escaped from the sack of Oporto on the previous day. He spread his army, now amounting to 9,000 or 10,000 men, along the left bank of the Tamega, whose bridges and fords he protected with entrenchments. Advanced[p. 267] guards were pushed out on the further side of the river on the three roads which lead to Oporto.
When, therefore, the troops under Loison, which Soult had sent out towards the Tras-os-Montes, drew near the Tamega, they found the Portuguese in force. The cavalry could get no further forward than Penafiel; when Foy’s infantry came up (April 7) Loison tried to force the enemy back, both on the Amarante and on the Canavezes road. He failed at each point, and sent back to the Marshal to ask for reinforcements. Seeing him halt, Silveira, whose fault was not a want of initiative, actually crossed the river with his whole army, and fell upon the two French brigades. He was checked, but not badly beaten, and Loison remained on the defensive129 (April 12).
At this moment Soult heard of the fall of Chaves, full seventeen days after it had happened. Realizing that Silveira was now growing formidable, he sent to Loison’s aid General Delaborde with the second of his infantry brigades, and Lorges’ dragoons. These reinforcements brought the troops facing Silveira up to a total of some 6,500 men—nearly a third of Soult’s whole disposable force. As Heudelet was still absent on the Minho with 4,000 men more, the Marshal had less than 10,000 left in and about Oporto. It was clear that the grand march on Lisbon was not likely to begin for many a long day.
On April 18 Loison advanced against Silveira, who boldly but unwisely offered him battle on the heights of Villamea in front of Amarante. Considering that he had but 2,000 regulars and 7,000 or 8,000 half-armed militia and Ordenanza, his conduct can only be described as rash in the extreme. He was, of course, beaten with great loss, and hustled130 back into the town of Amarante. He would have lost both it and its bridge, but for the gallantry of Colonel Patrick, an English officer commanding a battalion of the 12th of the line, who rallied his regiment in the streets, seized a group of houses and a convent at the bridge-head and beat off the pursuers[317]. Patrick was mortally wounded, but the passage of the river was prevented. This saved the situation: Silveira got his men together, planted[p. 268] his artillery so as to command the bridge, and took post in entrenchments already constructed on the commanding heights on the left bank. Next day Loison stormed the buildings at the bridge-head, but found that he could get no further forward. The town was his, but he could not debouch131 from it, as the bridge was palisaded, built up with a barricade99 of masonry132 and raked by the Portuguese artillery. Soult now sent up to aid Loison still further reinforcements, Sarrut’s brigade of infantry from Merle’s division and the second brigade of Lahoussaye’s dragoons. Thus no less than 9,000 French troops, nearly half the army of Portugal, were concentrated at Amarante.
The fact that twelve whole days elapsed between the arrival of these last succours and the forcing of the passage of the Tamega had no small influence on the fate of Soult’s campaign. Hitherto the initiative had lain with him, and he had faced adversaries133 who could only take the defensive. This period was nearly at an end, for on April 22 Wellesley had landed at Lisbon, the English reinforcements had begun to arrive, and an army, differing in every quality from the hordes134 which the Marshal had encountered north of the Douro, was about to assume the offensive against him. By the time that Loison at last forced the bridge of Amarante, the British were already on the march for Coimbra and Oporto.
Silveira and his motley host, therefore, were doing admirable service to the cause of their country when they occupied 9,000 out of Soult’s 21,000 men from April 20 to May 2 on the banks of the Tamega. The ground was in their favour, but far stronger positions had been forced ere now, and it was fortunate that this one was maintained for so many days. The town of Amarante, it must be remembered, lies on comparatively low ground: its bridge is completely commanded by the heights on which Silveira had planted his camp and his batteries. The river flows in a deep-sunk ravine, and was at this moment swollen135 into an impassable torrent136 by the melting of the mountain snows. Loison more than once sent swimmers by night, in search of places where the strength of the current might be sufficiently137 moderate to allow of an attempt to pass on rafts or boats. Not one of these explorers could get near the further[p. 269] bank: they were swept off by the rushing water and cast ashore138 far down stream, on the same side from which they had started. There had been bridges above Amarante at Mondim and Aroza, and below it at Canavezes, but reconnaissances showed that they had all three been blown up, and that Portuguese detachments were watching their ruins, to prevent any attempt to reconstruct them. Loison found, therefore, that he could not turn Silveira’s position by a flanking movement: there was nothing to do save to wait till the river should fall, or to attempt to force the bridge of Amarante at all costs. Continual rains made it hopeless to expect the subsidence of the Tamega for many days, wherefore Loison devoted139 all his energies to the task of capturing the bridge. Even here there was one difficulty to be faced which might prove fatal: the French engineers had discovered that the structure was mined. It was necessary, therefore, not only to drive back the Portuguese, but to prevent them from blowing up the bridge at the moment of their retreat.
Loison had entrusted140 the details of the attack on the bridge to Delaborde, whose infantry held the advanced posts. That officer first tried to approach the head of the bridge by means of a flying sap; but when it had advanced a certain distance the fire of the Portuguese from across the river became so deadly, that after many men had been killed in the endeavour to work up to the palisades on the bridge, the attempt had to be abandoned. The next device recommended by the engineers was that an attempt should be made to lay a trestle bridge at a spot some way below the town, where a mill-dam contracted the width of the angry river. This was found to be impossible, the stream proving to be far deeper than had been supposed, while the Portuguese from the left bank picked off many of the workmen [April 25].
Soult was now growing vexed141 at the delay, and sent two guns of position from Oporto to Loison, to enable him to subdue142 the fire of the enemy’s batteries. He also offered to call up Heudelet’s division from Braga, even at the cost of abandoning his hold on the northern part of the province of Entre-Douro-e-Minho. But a mere increase of his already considerable force would have been of no service to Loison; it was a device for passing the Tamega that he needed.
[p. 270]
Such a scheme was at last laid before him by Captain Bouchard, one of his engineers[318]. The French officers had discovered, by a careful use of their glasses, that the Portuguese mine, which was to destroy the bridge, was situated143 in its left-hand arch, and that the mechanism144 by which it was to be worked was not a ‘sausage’ or a train of powder[319], but a loaded musket145, whose muzzle146 was placed in the mine, while to its trigger was attached a cord which ran to the nearest trenches147 beyond the river. The musket was concealed148 in a box, but its cord was visible to those provided with a good telescope. Bouchard argued that if the cord could be cut or broken, the enemy would not be able to touch off the mine, and he had thought out a plan for securing his end. He maintained that an explosion at the French side of the bridge would probably sever81 the cord without firing the mine, and that a sudden assault, made immediately after the explosion, and before the Portuguese could recover themselves, might carry the barricades149. In spite of the strongly-expressed doubts of Foy and several other generals, Bouchard was finally permitted to carry out his scheme.
He executed it on the night of May 2, when a dense fog chanced to favour his daring and hazardous150 proceedings151. Having first told off some tirailleurs to keep up a smart fire on the enemy’s trenches and distract his attention, he sent four sappers, each provided with a small powder-barrel, on to the bridge. The men, dressed in their grey capotes, crawled on hands and knees, each rolling his barrel (which was wrapped in cloth to deaden the sound) before him. They kept in the shadow, and getting close under the parapet of the bridge crept on till they reached the outermost152 Portuguese palisade. One after another, at long intervals153, each got forward unobserved, left his barrel behind, and crawled back. The fourth sapper, starting to his feet on his return journey, was observed by the Portuguese and shot down, but Silveira’s men did not realize what he had been doing, and merely took him for some daring explorer who was[p. 271] endeavouring to spy out the state of the defences. After waiting for an hour, Bouchard sent out a fifth sapper, who dragged behind him a ‘sausage’ of powder thirty yards long, which he successfully connected with the four barrels. All was now ready, and a battalion of picked grenadiers from Delaborde’s division, filed silently down into the street near the bridge-head: a whole brigade came behind them.
At two o’clock Bouchard fired his sausage, and the explosion followed. There were two chances of failure—one that the apparatus154 for firing the mine might not be disturbed by the concussion155, the other that the shock might prove too strong, reach the mine, and destroy the bridge. Neither of these fatalities156 took place: the explosion duly broke the cord, shattered the nearest palisades, but did not affect the mine. Before the smoke had cleared away Delaborde’s grenadiers had dashed out on to the bridge, scrambled157 over the barricades, and driven off the guard on the further side. Regiment after regiment followed them, and charged up the mountain-side towards Silveira’s batteries and entrenchments. None of the Portuguese were under arms, save the few companies guarding the debouches from the bridge. These were swept away, and the French columns came storming into the bivouacs of the enemy before he was well awake. Hardly half a dozen cannon127 shots were fired on them from the batteries, and the greater part of the army of the Tras-os-Montes fled without firing a shot. Silveira escaped almost naked by the back window of the house above the bridge in which he had been sleeping.
All the ten guns in the Portuguese batteries, five standards, and several hundred prisoners fell into the hands of the victorious158 French, who lost (it is said) no more than two killed and seven wounded. Their good fortune had been extraordinary: without the opportune159 fog which hid their advance, their preliminary operations would probably have been discovered. If their explosion had done a little more or a little less than was hoped, the bridge might have been totally destroyed, or its barricades left practically uninjured—either of which chances would have foiled Bouchard’s plan. But the luck of the army of Portugal was still in the ascendant, and all went exactly as had been intended.
[p. 272]
Thus the Tamega was passed, and Silveira decisively beaten: his levies had fled in all directions, and Soult opined that it would take a long time to rally them. The day after the fight Loison was joined at Amarante by Heudelet’s division from Braga, which, in obedience52 to the Marshal’s orders, had marched to join the expeditionary force, leaving only a single battalion behind to hold Viana. This was an unfortunate move, as on Heudelet’s departure the Ordenanza came down from the Serra de Santa Catalina, and overran the district which had been evacuated, in spite of Lorges’ dragoons, who had been directed to keep the roads clear after the infantry had been withdrawn.
Meanwhile there were far more troops at Amarante than were needed for the pursuit of Silveira, so Soult called back to Oporto the division of Delaborde, leaving to Loison the infantry of Heudelet and Sarrut, with Lahoussaye’s two brigades of dragoons, a force of about 7,000 men. He ordered his lieutenant to scour160 the country as far as Villa Real, and to send reconnaissances on the roads toward Chaves and Braganza, with the object of frightening the insurgents to retreat as far as possible. But Loison was not to advance for more than two days’ march into the Tras-os-Montes, for rumours161 were beginning to arrive concerning the appearance of British troops in the direction of Coimbra, and the Marshal wished to keep his various divisions close enough to each other to enable them to concentrate with ease. If there were any truth in the news from the south, it would be dangerous to allow a force which formed a third of the whole army of Portugal to go astray in the heart of the mountains beyond the Tamega. Loison accordingly marched off on May 8 towards Villa Real, which he occupied without meeting with resistance. He learnt that Silveira and his regulars had crossed the Douro, and gone off in the direction of Lamego; but Botilho had fled up the Tamega towards Chaves, and the Ordenanza were lurking162 in the hills. He then returned to Amarante, where we may leave him, at the end of his tether, while we describe the state of affairs in Oporto.
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1
Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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bishop
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| n.主教，（国际象棋）象 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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5
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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cartridges
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| 子弹( cartridge的名词复数 )； （打印机的）墨盒； 录音带盒； （唱机的）唱头 | |
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helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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11
beleaguered
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| adj.受到围困[围攻]的；包围的v.围攻( beleaguer的过去式和过去分词)；困扰；骚扰 | |
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horde
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| n.群众，一大群 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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14
cleaves
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| v.劈开，剁开，割开( cleave的第三人称单数 ) | |
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15
simile
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| n.直喻，明喻 | |
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16
vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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17
dense
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| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
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18
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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disperse
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| vi.使分散；使消失；vt.分散；驱散 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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21
ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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22
ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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23
annihilated
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| v.（彻底）消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 )；使无效；废止；彻底击溃 | |
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24
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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eastward
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| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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28
wrecks
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| n.沉船( wreck的名词复数 )；（事故中）遭严重毁坏的汽车（或飞机等）；（身体或精神上）受到严重损伤的人；状况非常糟糕的车辆（或建筑物等）v.毁坏[毁灭]某物( wreck的第三人称单数 )；使（船舶）失事，使遇难，使下沉 | |
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retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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villa
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| n.别墅，城郊小屋 | |
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northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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rout
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| n.溃退，溃败；v.击溃，打垮 | |
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fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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fortresses
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| 堡垒，要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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39
beset
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| v.镶嵌；困扰，包围 | |
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plunging
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| adj.跳进的，突进的v.颠簸( plunge的现在分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
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insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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42
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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43
wrecked
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| adj.失事的，遇难的 | |
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propitious
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| adj.吉利的；顺利的 | |
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45
admiration
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| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
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46
feats
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| 功绩，伟业，技艺( feat的名词复数 ) | |
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47
chivalrous
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| adj.武士精神的；对女人彬彬有礼的 | |
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48
ingenuity
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| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
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49
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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50
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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51
atone
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| v.赎罪，补偿 | |
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52
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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53
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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lieutenants
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| n.陆军中尉( lieutenant的名词复数 )；副职官员；空军；仅低于…官阶的官员 | |
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55
dabbled
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| v.涉猎( dabble的过去式和过去分词 )；涉足；浅尝；少量投资 | |
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56
partisan
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| adj.党派性的；游击队的；n.游击队员；党徒 | |
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genial
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| adj.亲切的，和蔼的，愉快的，脾气好的 | |
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58
followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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59
extort
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| v.勒索，敲诈，强要 | |
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friction
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| n.摩擦，摩擦力 | |
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61
controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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63
celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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65
evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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66
embark
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| vi.乘船，着手，从事，上飞机 | |
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67
pusillanimous
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| adj.懦弱的，胆怯的 | |
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68
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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72
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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73
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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74
inaccessible
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| adj.达不到的，难接近的 | |
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75
pickets
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| 罢工纠察员( picket的名词复数 ) | |
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76
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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intercepted
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| 拦截( intercept的过去式和过去分词 )； 截住； 截击； 拦阻 | |
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78
stiffened
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| 加强的 | |
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79
junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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80
scouting
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| 守候活动，童子军的活动 | |
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81
sever
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| v.切开，割开；断绝，中断 | |
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82
convoy
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| vt.护送，护卫，护航；n.护送；护送队 | |
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83
convoys
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| n.（有护航的）船队( convoy的名词复数 )；车队；护航（队）；护送队 | |
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84
foodstuffs
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| 食物，食品( foodstuff的名词复数 ) | |
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85
wagons
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| n.四轮的运货马车( wagon的名词复数 )；铁路货车；小手推车 | |
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86
emboldened
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| v.鼓励，使有胆量( embolden的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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87
circuitous
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| adj.迂回的路的，迂曲的，绕行的 | |
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88
reiterated
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| 反复地说，重申( reiterate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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89
authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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90
dreaded
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| adj.令人畏惧的；害怕的v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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91
stratagem
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| n.诡计，计谋 | |
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92
coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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93
defiant
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| adj.无礼的，挑战的 | |
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94
lured
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| 吸引，引诱（lure的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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95
harass
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| vt.使烦恼，折磨，骚扰 | |
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96
defiles
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| v.玷污( defile的第三人称单数 )；污染；弄脏；纵列行进 | |
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97
incessant
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| adj.不停的，连续的 | |
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98
exasperated
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| adj.恼怒的 | |
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99
barricade
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| n.路障，栅栏，障碍；vt.设路障挡住 | |
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100
barricaded
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| 设路障于，以障碍物阻塞( barricade的过去式和过去分词 )； 设路障[防御工事]保卫或固守 | |
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101
atrocities
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| n.邪恶，暴行( atrocity的名词复数 )；滔天大罪 | |
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102
rape
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| n.抢夺，掠夺，强奸；vt.掠夺，抢夺，强奸 | |
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103
credible
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| adj.可信任的，可靠的 | |
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104
plunder
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| vt.劫掠财物，掠夺；n.劫掠物，赃物；劫掠 | |
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105
corpses
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| n.死尸，尸体( corpse的名词复数 ) | |
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106
audacity
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| n.大胆，卤莽，无礼 | |
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107
entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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108
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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109
garrisoned
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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110
estuary
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| n.河口，江口 | |
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111
invalids
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| 病人，残疾者( invalid的名词复数 ) | |
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112
utilized
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| v.利用，使用( utilize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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113
frigates
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| n.快速军舰( frigate的名词复数 ) | |
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114
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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115
battered
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| adj.磨损的；v.连续猛击；磨损 | |
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116
discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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117
stipulating
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| v.（尤指在协议或建议中）规定，约定，讲明（条件等）( stipulate的现在分词 )；规定，明确要求 | |
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118
evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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119
disquieted
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| v.使不安，使忧虑，使烦恼( disquiet的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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120
retraced
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| v.折回( retrace的过去式和过去分词 )；回忆；回顾；追溯 | |
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121
harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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122
precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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123
descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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124
foraging
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| v.搜寻（食物），尤指动物觅（食）( forage的现在分词 )；（尤指用手）搜寻（东西） | |
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125
pounced
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| v.突然袭击( pounce的过去式和过去分词 )；猛扑；一眼看出；抓住机会（进行抨击） | |
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126
citadel
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| n.城堡；堡垒；避难所 | |
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127
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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128
fugitives
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| n.亡命者，逃命者( fugitive的名词复数 ) | |
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129
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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130
hustled
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| 催促（hustle的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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131
debouch
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| v.流出，进入 | |
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132
masonry
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| n.砖土建筑；砖石 | |
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133
adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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134
hordes
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| n.移动着的一大群( horde的名词复数 )；部落 | |
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135
swollen
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| adj.肿大的，水涨的；v.使变大，肿胀 | |
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136
torrent
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| n.激流，洪流；爆发，(话语等的)连发 | |
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137
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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138
ashore
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| adv.在(向)岸上，上岸 | |
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139
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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140
entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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141
vexed
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| adj.争论不休的；（指问题等）棘手的；争论不休的问题；烦恼的v.使烦恼( vex的过去式和过去分词 )；使苦恼；使生气；详细讨论 | |
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142
subdue
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| vt.制服，使顺从，征服；抑制，克制 | |
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143
situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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144
mechanism
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| n.机械装置；机构，结构 | |
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145
musket
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| n.滑膛枪 | |
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146
muzzle
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| n.鼻口部；口套；枪(炮)口；vt.使缄默 | |
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147
trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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148
concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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149
barricades
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| 路障，障碍物( barricade的名词复数 ) | |
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150
hazardous
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| adj.(有)危险的，冒险的；碰运气的 | |
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151
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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152
outermost
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| adj.最外面的，远离中心的 | |
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153
intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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154
apparatus
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| n.装置，器械；器具，设备 | |
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155
concussion
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| n.脑震荡；震动 | |
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156
fatalities
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| n.恶性事故( fatality的名词复数 )；死亡；致命性；命运 | |
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157
scrambled
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| v.快速爬行( scramble的过去式和过去分词 )；攀登；争夺；（军事飞机）紧急起飞 | |
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158
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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159
opportune
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| adj.合适的，适当的 | |
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160
scour
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| v.搜索；擦，洗，腹泻，冲刷 | |
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161
rumours
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| n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 )；风闻；谣言；谣传 | |
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162
lurking
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| 潜在 | |
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