It will have occurred to every student of the operations of the army of Portugal during the month of April, that it was strange that Marshal Soult should have remained quiescent4 at Oporto, while the fate of his entire campaign was at stake during the fighting on the Tamega. His head quarters were only thirty miles from Amarante—but one day’s ride for himself and his staff—yet he never paid a single flying visit to the scene of operations, even after he had come to the conclusion that Loison was mismanaging the whole business. He sent his lieutenant5 many letters of reproach, forwarded to him guns of position, and ample reinforcements, but never came himself to the spot to urge on the advance, even when ten and twelve days had elapsed since the first unsuccessful attempts to force the passage of the Tamega.
The explanation of this persistent6 refusal of the Marshal to quit Oporto is to be found in the political not the military state of affairs. At Chaves he had proclaimed himself Viceroy of Portugal: his viceroyalty at that moment embraced only just so much soil as was covered by the encampments of his battalions8. But after the capture of Oporto and the occupation of the neighbouring towns of the Entre-Douro-e-Minho, his position assumed an air of reality, and he himself allowed the duties of the viceroy to trespass9 on those of the commander of the Second Corps10 d’Armée. Nay11 more, there is good reason to believe that he was not merely dreaming of setting up a stable government in northern Portugal, but of something else. The evidence as to his intentions is hard to weigh, for most of it comes from the letters and diaries of men who disliked him, but there are certain facts which cannot be disguised, and the inference from them is irresistible12.
[p. 274]
With the example of Murat’s exaltation before them, the more ambitious and capable of Napoleon’s marshals could not refrain from dreaming of crowns and sceptres. Nothing seemed impossible in those astounding13 days, when the Emperor was creating sovereigns and realms by a stroke of the pen, whenever the notion seized him. The line between an appanaged duke and a vassal15 prince was a very thin one—as the case of Berthier shows. Junot had dreamed of royalty7 at Lisbon in 1808, and there seems little doubt that the same mirage16 of a crown floated before Soult’s eyes at Oporto in 1809. The city itself suggested the idea: in the Treaty of Fontainebleau Napoleon had put on paper the project for creating a ‘king of Northern Lusitania,’ with Oporto as his capital and the Entre-Douro-e-Minho as his realm. Soult was cautious and wary17, but he was also greedy and ambitious. If, on the one hand, he had a wholesome18 fear of his master, he had on the other good reasons for believing that it might be possible to force his hand by presenting him with a fait accompli.
There was in the city the nucleus19 of a party which was not wholly indisposed to submit to the French domination. It was mainly composed of those enemies of the Bishop20 of Oporto who had been suffering from his anarchical rule of the last two months. They were the friends and relatives of those who had perished by the dagger21 or the rope, during the mob-law which had prevailed ever since Dom Antonio returned from Lisbon. To these may be added some men of purely22 material interests, who saw that the insurrection was ruining them, and a remnant of the old corrupt23 bureaucracy which had submitted once before to Junot—whose only thought was to keep or gain profitable posts under the government of the day, whatever that government might be. The whole body of dissidents from the cause of patriotism24 and independence was so small and weak, that it is impossible to believe that they would have taken any overt25 action if they had not received encouragement from Soult.
This much is certain—that when the disorders26 which accompanied the capture of Oporto were ended, Soult showed himself most anxious to conciliate the Portuguese27, not only by introducing a regular and orderly government, but by going out of his way to soothe28 and flatter any notable who lingered in the city. In[p. 275] his anxiety to win over the clergy29 he caused new silver vessels30 and candelabra to be made to replace those which had been stolen from the churches in the sack[320]. He filled up all civil appointments, whose holders31 had fled, from the small number of persons who were ready to adhere to the French. He again, as already at Chaves, endeavoured to enlist32 a native military force, by putting tempting33 offers before those officers of the regular army who had been made prisoners. All this might have had no other cause than the wish to build up a party of Afrancesados, such as already existed in Spain, and Soult openly declared that such was his object[321]. This was the only purpose that he avowed34 in his dispatches to the Emperor, and in his communications with his colleagues.
But if the Marshal had no ulterior object in view, it is singular that all his native partisans35 concurred36 in setting on foot a movement for getting him saluted37 as king of northern Portugal. The new municipal authorities, whom he had established in the half-deserted towns occupied by his troops, sent in petitions begging him to assume the position of sovereign. Documents of this kind came in from Braga, Barcelos, Guimaraens, Feira, Oliveira and Villa38 de Conde. In Oporto proclamations were posted on the walls declaring that ‘the Prince Regent by his departure to Brazil had formally resigned his crown, and that the only salvation39 for Portugal would be that the Duke of Dalmatia, the most distinguished40 of the pupils of the great Napoleon, should ascend41 the vacant throne[322].’ A priest named Veloso and other persons went about in the street delivering harangues42 in favour of the creation of the ‘kingdom of Northern Lusitania.’ A register was opened in the municipal buildings[p. 276] to be signed by all persons who wished to join in the petition to the Marshal to assume the regal title, and a certain number of signatures were collected. A newspaper, called the Diario do Porto, was started, to support the movement, and ran for about a month. It is said that Soult’s partisans even succeeded in gathering43 small crowds together, before the mansion44 where his head quarters were established, to shout Viva o Rei Nicolao! and that the acclamations were acknowledged by showers of copper45 coins thrown from the windows[323]. The latter part of this story is no doubt an invention of Soult’s enemies, but it was believed at the time by the majority of the French officers, and ‘Le Roi Nicolas’ was for the future his nickname in the army of Portugal[324]. On April 19 the Marshal ordered his chief of the staff, General Ricard, to issue a circular letter to the generals of divisions and brigades[325], inviting46 their co-operation in the movement, and assuring them that no disloyalty to the Emperor would be involved even if the Marshal assumed regal powers[326]. This document is the most convincing piece of evidence that exists as to Soult’s intentions. In it there is no attempt made to conceal47 the movement that had been set on foot: the writer’s only preoccupation is to show that it was not directed against Napoleon. When, five months later, Ricard’s circular came under the Emperor’s eye, it roused his wrath48 to such a pitch that he wrote in the most stinging and sarcastic49 terms to Soult. ‘He is astounded,’ he says, ‘to find the chief of the staff suggesting to the generals that the Marshal should be requested to take up the reins50 of government, and assume the attributes of supreme51 authority. If he had assumed[p. 277] sovereign power on his own responsibility, it would have been a crime, clear lèse-majesté, an attack on the imperial authority. How could a man of sense, like Soult, suppose that his master would permit him to exercise any power that had not been delegated to him? No wonder that the army grew discontented, and that rumours52 got about that the Marshal was working for himself, not for the Emperor or France. After receiving this circular, it is doubtful whether any French officer would not have been fully53 justified54 in refusing to obey any further orders issued from Oporto[327].’
This was written from Vienna, before the Emperor had received any full and exact account of the details of Soult’s intrigues. Had he but known them all, it is doubtful if he would have granted his lieutenant the complete pardon and restoration to favour with which his dispatch concludes[328].
There can be no doubt that the Duke of Dalmatia might have put a stop to all the activity of his Portuguese friends by merely raising his hand. It would have sufficed for him to assure the deputations which visited him that his duty as the lieutenant of the Emperor forbade him to listen to their proposals. He[p. 278] could have caused the proclamations to be torn down, and have silenced the street orators55. ‘They could not have made him king against his own will,’ as one of his officers remarked[329]. But no action of the kind was taken; and the movement was openly encouraged. The Marshal’s explanation, that he was only taking the best means in his power to build up a French party in Oporto, will not stand examination. Why should the scheme involve his own promotion56 to the throne, if his views were disinterested57, and his actions merely intended to serve his master’s ends? Is it conceivable that the Portuguese should, of their own accord, and without any suggestion from without, have hit upon the idea of crowning a conqueror58 whose very name was strange to them three weeks before, and whose hands were red with the blood of thousands of their fellow countrymen? Clever and cautious though the Marshal was, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that he had for once allowed his ambition to take the bit between its teeth, and to whirl him off into an enterprise that was worthy59 of the most hair-brained of adventurers.
Meanwhile the consequences of his intrigue2 were strange and various. The army received the news of what was going on at Oporto with puzzled surprise. Of those who were not present at the centre of affairs, some refused to believe the stories that reached them, and merely observed that the Marshal was not such a fool as to take in hand a plan that was both treasonable to his master and preposterous60 in itself[330]. Others, particularly his personal enemies, not only credited the information but began to concert measures for resisting him if he should try to carry out his scheme. This party was very strong among the officers of Junot’s old army of Portugal, who had been transferred in large numbers to the 2nd Corps. They disliked the expedition, had been prophesying62 disaster from the first, and had criticized every move of the Marshal. Now they found in the news of his intrigue another excuse[p. 279] for running counter to his orders. There is good reason for believing that Loison and Delaborde had actually conferred on the necessity for seizing and imprisoning63 the Marshal if he should take the final step and allow himself to be proclaimed king. Both these generals were faithful adherents64 of Napoleon, and had no thought save that of serving their master. But there were other officers who watched the progress of affairs with very different eyes.
There had existed in the French army from the day when the empire was first proclaimed, a party of malcontents who still regarded Bonaparte as a usurper65, and were only biding66 their time till it might be safe to deal a blow at him. Hitherto his career had been so uniformly successful that no opportunity had arisen. But secret societies, of which the Philadelphes was the best known, were at work all through the years of the Emperor’s reign14: their one object was to be ready for a coup67 d’état when the favourable68 moment should arrive. The history of these associations is so obscure that it is impossible to estimate their strength at any given time—no trustworthy historian ever arose from their ranks to tell the story of their schemes, when lips were unsealed by the fall of Napoleon[331]. It is only by the sudden appearance of phenomena69 like Malet’s conspiracy of 1812, and the plot which we are now about to describe, that the reality of the existence of these secret societies is proved.
In the army of Portugal there was a group of officers who belonged to the band of the discontented, and were perfectly70 prepared to execute a pronunciamiento against the empire if the times and circumstances proved propitious71. We know the names of four[332]: Donadieu, colonel of the 47th of the line; Lafitte, colonel of the 18th Dragoons; his brother, a captain in the same regiment72, who was serving on Soult’s staff; and Argenton, another captain, who was adjutant of Lafitte’s regiment; two other plotters are hidden under the assumed names of ‘Dupont’ and ‘Garis,’ by which they were introduced to Wellesley.[p. 280] There were certainly other officers implicated73, for it is inconceivable that six men could have planned an insurrection unless they were sure of a certain measure of support. At this moment they were carrying on an active propaganda of discontent, especially among the officers of Delaborde’s division and of Lahoussaye’s dragoons. There were many men who saw the full iniquity74 of the Spanish War, and were disgusted at finding themselves involved in it[333]. Others loathed75 the hanging and burning, the shooting of priests and women, the riding down of half-armed peasants, which had been their lot for the last two months. Still more were simply discontented at being lost in a remote corner of Europe, where glory and profit were both absent, and where ignominious76 death at the hands of the lurking77 ‘sniper’ or the midnight assassin came all too frequently—sometimes death accompanied by torture. It was three months since the army had received a mail from France; they might as well have been in Egypt or America, and they felt themselves forgotten by their master. In many a mind the question arose whether the game was worth playing: must they for ever persist in this wretched interminable campaign, in order that the Duke of Dalmatia might become a king, or even in order that the Emperor might be able to apply the Continental78 System in its full rigour to this land of brutish peasants and fanatical monks79? A speedy return to France seemed the one thing desirable.
It is easy to understand that the conspirators80 found many sympathizers, so long as they confined themselves to setting forth81 the miseries82 of the campaign, and to criticizing the Marshal and the Emperor. But they erred61 when they took a general readiness to grumble83 for a sign that the army was ripe for revolt. However discontented the officers might be, there were very few of them who were prepared to engage in the game of high treason. The vast majority were still unable to dissociate the idea of the Emperor from the idea of France.[p. 281] It was only a few who could rise (or sink) to the conception of turning their arms against Bonaparte in order to free France from autocracy84. This bore too close a resemblance to treachery to be palatable85 to men of honour. None save exalted86 Jacobins, or men of overweening ambition and few scruples87, could contemplate88 the idea with patience. When we find that the plans of the conspirators included not merely a pronunciamiento, but the conclusion of a secret pact89 with the enemies in arms against them, we are driven to conclude that they belonged to the last-named of these classes—that their heads were turned with the grandiose90 notion of getting an army into their power and changing the fate of Europe.
The conspirators, observing the course of affairs at Oporto, were fully convinced that Soult would within a few days declare himself ‘King of Northern Lusitania.’ This act would produce an outburst of wrath in the army, and they hoped to turn the inevitable91 mutiny to their own profit. They intended to seize the Marshal, and then to make an appeal to the soldiery, not in the name of Napoleon but in that of France. They were also prepared to lay hands on any general who might attempt to assume command of the troops in the Emperor’s interest[334]. Donadieu and Lafitte had secured some of the officers of their own regiments92, and believed that the men would follow them. The other corps, as they hoped, would be drawn93 away after them, and the cry of liberty and the promise of an instant return to France would lure94 the whole army into rebellion. So far the plot, though rash and hazardous95, might conceivably have been carried out. But their next step was to be the issue of an appeal to Ney’s divisions and the other French troops in northern Spain to join them, and march upon the Pyrenees. Even though there were members of the secret societies scattered96 all through the army, it seems absolutely impossible to believe[p. 282] that they could have carried away with them into open revolt the whole of their companions. The movement of protest against Napoleon would have begun and ended with the 2nd Corps, if even it got so far as the initial pronunciamiento[335]. To be effective it would have required a strong backing in France, and the list of the leaders in that country, on whom the conspirators said that they relied for aid, does not give us a high opinion of the strength and organization of the plot. The persons named were the old Jacobin general Lecourbe, Macdonald who—though they did not know it—had just been taken back into favour by the Emperor, and Dupont, who was in prison and incapable97 for the moment of helping98 himself or any one else[336]. They also spoke99 of sending for Moreau from America, and placing him at the head of the whole movement. But it is clear that they were not in actual communication with the generals in France, much less with the exiled victor of Hohenlinden. The whole plan was ill-considered; it was the result of the intense irritation100 against Soult and Bonaparte felt by the officers of the army of Portugal, acting101 upon the disordered ambition of a knot of intriguers. Anger and vain self-confidence blinded them to the inadequacy102 of their resources.
It was a main condition of the projected outbreak that Soult’s position should be made impossible: the most favourable course of events, so the conspirators held, would be that he should persist in his monarchical103 ambitions and proclaim himself king. When he did so, the party loyal to Bonaparte among his officers would make an attempt—successful or unsuccessful—to seize his person. Chaos104 and civil strife105 within the army would result, and it was then that the conspirators intended to show their hand. It would seem that their Machiavellian106 foresight[p. 283] went so far that they proposed to wait till the Marshal should be imprisoned107, or should find himself involved in hostilities108 with the Bonapartists, and then offer him the aid of their regiments, on condition that he should put himself at the head of the anti-imperialist movement. All this was too ingenious for practical work. But the next development of the plot was even more astonishing in its futile109 cunning.
The conspirators wished to draw the English commander at Lisbon into their scheme—it was Cradock whom they had in view, for Wellesley was in England when the plot began, and when it developed he had landed indeed, but his arrival was not known. The part which they had allotted110 to Cradock was twofold—he was to be asked to send secret advice to the Portuguese notables of the north, ordering them to feign111 an enthusiastic approval of Soult’s designs on the crown, and to join with all possible clamour in the demonstrations112 at Oporto. When this unexpected outburst of devotion to his person should be forthcoming, they supposed that the Marshal would not hesitate any longer to assume the crown. Then would follow civil strife and the desired opportunity for intervention113 by the conspirators. The second request which they intended to make was that Cradock should bring up the British army to the front, and place it so as to make it dangerous or impossible for Soult to force his way out of Portugal in the direction of the middle Douro and Salamanca. They suggested Villa Real in the Tras-os-Montes as a suitable position for him. Their idea in making this proposal was that the army would be filled with despair at seeing its best line of retreat cut off (that by Galicia was growing to be considered impossible), and would therefore be more incensed114 against Soult, and at the same time more inclined to secure safety by coming to a pact and agreement with the enemy[337].
[p. 284]
The officer who volunteered for the dangerous task of going within the English lines was Captain Argenton, the adjutant of Lafitte’s regiment of dragoons. He was a vain, ready, plausible115 man, full of resources but destitute116 of firmness: his character is sufficiently117 shown by the fact that he ultimately wrecked118 the plot by his indiscretion in tampering119 with loyal Bonapartists, who delated him, and that when seized he betrayed the whole scheme to Soult in the hope of saving his life. Clearly he was deficient120 both in the caution and in the stoic121 courage required for a conspirator—successful or unsuccessful.
We must note that he started from the camp of Lahoussaye’s dragoons, near Amarante, on April 19, that he reached the French outposts on the Vouga and got into communication with Major Douglas, one of Beresford’s officers in the Portuguese service, on the twenty-first, finally, that at the invitation of Douglas and Beresford he came into Lisbon and reached that city on the twenty-fifth, just in time to meet the newly-landed Wellesley. The plot meanwhile stood still in his absence, for the Duke of Dalmatia did not take the overt step which would have given the plotters their opportunity—he refrained from accepting the crown which his Portuguese partisans were so continually pressing him to assume. Nothing decisive had occurred, when the situation was suddenly changed by the appearance of the British army upon the offensive on May 7[338].
[p. 285]
N.B.—For some documents bearing on Argenton’s conspiracy see Appendix at the end of this volume.
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intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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conspiracy
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| n.阴谋，密谋，共谋 | |
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quiescent
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| adj.静止的，不活动的，寂静的 | |
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lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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persistent
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| adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的 | |
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royalty
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| n.皇家，皇族 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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trespass
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| n./v.侵犯，闯入私人领地 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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astounding
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| adj.使人震惊的vt.使震惊，使大吃一惊astound的现在分词) | |
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reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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vassal
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| n.附庸的；属下；adj.奴仆的 | |
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mirage
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| n.海市蜃楼，幻景 | |
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wary
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| adj.谨慎的，机警的，小心的 | |
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wholesome
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| adj.适合；卫生的；有益健康的；显示身心健康的 | |
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nucleus
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| n.核，核心，原子核 | |
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bishop
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| n.主教，（国际象棋）象 | |
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dagger
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| n.匕首，短剑，剑号 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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overt
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| adj.公开的，明显的，公然的 | |
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disorders
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| n.混乱( disorder的名词复数 )；凌乱；骚乱；（身心、机能）失调 | |
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Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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soothe
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| v.安慰；使平静；使减轻；缓和；奉承 | |
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clergy
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| n.[总称]牧师，神职人员 | |
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vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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holders
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| 支持物( holder的名词复数 )； 持有者； （支票等）持有人； 支托（或握持）…之物 | |
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enlist
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| vt.谋取(支持等)，赢得；征募；vi.入伍 | |
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tempting
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| a.诱人的, 吸引人的 | |
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avowed
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| adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
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partisans
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| 游击队员( partisan的名词复数 )； 党人； 党羽； 帮伙 | |
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concurred
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saluted
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villa
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| n.别墅，城郊小屋 | |
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salvation
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| n.（尤指基督）救世，超度，拯救，解困 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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ascend
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| vi.渐渐上升，升高；vt.攀登，登上 | |
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harangues
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| n.高谈阔论的长篇演讲( harangue的名词复数 )v.高谈阔论( harangue的第三人称单数 ) | |
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gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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mansion
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| n.大厦，大楼；宅第 | |
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copper
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| n.铜；铜币；铜器；adj.铜(制)的；(紫)铜色的 | |
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inviting
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| adj.诱人的，引人注目的 | |
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conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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wrath
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| n.愤怒，愤慨，暴怒 | |
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sarcastic
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| adj.讥讽的，讽刺的，嘲弄的 | |
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reins
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| 感情，激情； 缰( rein的名词复数 )； 控制手段； 掌管； （成人带着幼儿走路以防其走失时用的）保护带 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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rumours
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| n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 )；风闻；谣言；谣传 | |
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53
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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orators
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| n.演说者，演讲家( orator的名词复数 ) | |
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promotion
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| n.提升，晋级；促销，宣传 | |
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disinterested
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| adj.不关心的，不感兴趣的 | |
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conqueror
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| n.征服者，胜利者 | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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preposterous
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| adj.荒谬的，可笑的 | |
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erred
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| 犯错误，做错事( err的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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prophesying
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| v.预告，预言( prophesy的现在分词 ) | |
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imprisoning
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| v.下狱，监禁( imprison的现在分词 ) | |
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adherents
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| n.支持者，拥护者( adherent的名词复数 )；党羽；徒子徒孙 | |
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usurper
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| n. 篡夺者, 僭取者 | |
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biding
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| v.等待，停留( bide的现在分词 )；居住；（过去式用bided）等待；面临 | |
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coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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propitious
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| adj.吉利的；顺利的 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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implicated
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| adj.密切关联的；牵涉其中的 | |
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iniquity
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| n.邪恶；不公正 | |
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loathed
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| v.憎恨，厌恶( loathe的过去式和过去分词 )；极不喜欢 | |
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ignominious
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| adj.可鄙的，不光彩的，耻辱的 | |
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lurking
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| 潜在 | |
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continental
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| adj.大陆的，大陆性的，欧洲大陆的 | |
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monks
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| n.修道士，僧侣( monk的名词复数 ) | |
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conspirators
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| n.共谋者，阴谋家( conspirator的名词复数 ) | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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miseries
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| n.痛苦( misery的名词复数 )；痛苦的事；穷困；常发牢骚的人 | |
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83
grumble
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| vi.抱怨；咕哝；n.抱怨，牢骚；咕哝，隆隆声 | |
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autocracy
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| n.独裁政治，独裁政府 | |
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palatable
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| adj.可口的，美味的；惬意的 | |
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exalted
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| adj.(地位等)高的，崇高的；尊贵的，高尚的 | |
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scruples
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| n.良心上的不安( scruple的名词复数 )；顾虑，顾忌v.感到于心不安，有顾忌( scruple的第三人称单数 ) | |
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contemplate
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| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
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pact
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| n.合同，条约，公约，协定 | |
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grandiose
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| adj.宏伟的，宏大的，堂皇的，铺张的 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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lure
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| n.吸引人的东西，诱惑物；vt.引诱，吸引 | |
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hazardous
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| adj.(有)危险的，冒险的；碰运气的 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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99
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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100
irritation
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| n.激怒，恼怒，生气 | |
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101
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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102
inadequacy
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| n.无法胜任，信心不足 | |
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103
monarchical
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| adj. 国王的，帝王的，君主的，拥护君主制的 =monarchic | |
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chaos
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| n.混乱，无秩序 | |
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105
strife
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| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
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machiavellian
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| adj.权谋的，狡诈的 | |
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107
imprisoned
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| 下狱，监禁( imprison的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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108
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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110
allotted
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| 分配，拨给，摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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111
feign
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| vt.假装，佯作 | |
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112
demonstrations
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| 证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威 | |
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113
intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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114
incensed
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| 盛怒的 | |
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115
plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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116
destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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117
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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118
wrecked
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| adj.失事的，遇难的 | |
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tampering
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| v.窜改( tamper的现在分词 )；篡改；（用不正当手段）影响；瞎摆弄 | |
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deficient
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| adj.不足的，不充份的，有缺陷的 | |
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121
stoic
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| n.坚忍克己之人，禁欲主义者 | |
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