Between the 20th of August, 1809, when Robert Craufurd’s Light Brigade[1] withdrew from the Bridge of Almaraz, to follow the rest of the British army across the mountains to the neighbourhood of Badajoz, and February 27, 1810, when part of that same brigade was engaged in the first skirmish of Barba del Puerco, not a shot was fired by any of Wellington’s troops. This gap of over six months in his active operations may appear extraordinary, and it was bitterly criticized at the time. Between August and March there was hard fighting both in the south of Spain and along the north-eastern frontier of Portugal; but the British army, despite many invitations, took no part in it. Wellington adhered to his resolve never to commit himself again to a campaign in company with the Spaniards, unless he should be placed in a position in which he could be independent of the freaks of their government and the perversity2 of their generals. Two months’ experience of the impracticability of Cuesta, of the deliberate disobedience of Venegas, of the fruitless promises of the commissary-general Lozano de Torres, of the insane demands and advice sent in by the Central Junta, had convinced him that he dare not risk his army in a second venture such as that which had led him to Talavera. If he were made commander-in-chief by the Spanish Government, and granted a free hand in the direction of the Spanish armies, matters would look different[2]. But[p. 2] there was at present no chance whatever that he would receive such a mark of confidence. Only a small minority of the leading men at Seville could endure with patience the idea of a British commander-in-chief. Wellington himself had long dismissed the project—which Frère had broached3 in the spring[3]—as impracticable.
Meanwhile the French advance had no sooner ceased—after the rather objectless combat of Arzobispo—than the Junta began to press upon the British general schemes for a resumption of the offensive and a second march toward Madrid. The political situation, and not any military considerations, was the originating cause of their untimely activity. They felt that their authority was waning4, that their popularity had vanished, that their critics were daily growing more venomous, and they saw that success in the war would be the only possible way out of their difficulties. Hence at the very moment when Wellington was withdrawing his half-starved army from the Tagus, and impeaching5 in letters of stinging irony6 the conduct of the Junta’s mendacious7 commissaries, he was being pressed to resume the offensive. Countless8 appeals were made to him. Both formal and argumentative invitations from the ministers at Seville, and private remonstrances9 by individuals, Spanish and English, were showered upon him[4]. The Junta even went so far as to offer him command of the Spanish troops in Estremadura, though this offer was qualified10 by their statement that they intended to reduce those troops to 12,000 men, the larger half of the army being under orders to march eastward11 into La Mancha and join the force of Venegas. This proposal did not in the least meet Wellington’s main objection to resuming active operations; viz. that he could not trust the Spanish Government to feed his army, nor the Spanish generals to carry out with punctual accuracy any scheme for a joint12 campaign which might be laid before him. He put the matter very plainly—‘till the evils of which I think that I have reason to complain are remedied: till I see magazines established[p. 3] for the supply of the troops, and a regular system adopted for keeping them filled: till I see an army upon whose exertions13 I can depend, commanded by officers capable and willing to carry into execution the operations which have been planned by mutual14 agreement, I cannot enter upon any system of co-operation with the Spanish armies[5].’ This statement was for publication: in private correspondence with his brother, the ambassador at Seville, he added still more cogent15 reasons for declining to take the field with Venegas or Eguia. He had witnessed with his own eyes the panic of Portago’s division on the night before Talavera, ‘when whole corps16 threw away their arms and ran off in my presence, while neither attacked nor threatened with attack, but frightened (I believe) by their own fire’: he had seen Albuquerque’s cavalry17, the day after the combat of Arzobispo, lurking18 in every village for twenty miles round, and ‘had heard Spanish officers telling of nineteen or twenty actions of the same description as that of Arzobispo, an account of which (I believe) has never been published.’ The army of Estremadura consisted, he concluded, ‘of troops by no means to be depended upon’—on every ground, therefore, he ought to avoid ‘risking the King’s army again in such company[6].’
There was no getting over this fundamental objection of Wellington’s, and his brother, therefore, was placed in a very uncomfortable position. During all his negotiations19 with the Central Junta, Lord Wellesley’s task indeed was a most invidious one. He had been directed by his government to profess20 an earnest desire to aid the Spaniards in bringing the war to a successful conclusion, and to pledge the aid of Great Britain, yet he was forced to refuse every definite proposal made to him by the Junta. On the other hand, there were clauses in his instructions which provoked the most openly-displayed suspicion and resentment21, when he touched upon them in his conversations with Martin de Garay and the other Spanish ministers. Such were the proposal to place the whole Spanish army under a British commander (i.e. Wellington), the attempt[p. 4] to open up the subject of a certain measure of free trade with Spanish America, and—most of all—the offer to send British troops to garrison22 Cadiz. For despite the fiasco of the preceding winter, the Portland ministry23 were still harping24 on this old string, and allusions25 to it occur in nearly every dispatch sent from London to the ambassador at Seville[7].
Wellesley’s position was made even more difficult by the fact that all the Spanish factions26 opposed to the Central Junta tried to draw him into their schemes, by making lavish27 professions of what they were ready to do if only the present government were evicted28 from office. Of these factions there were many: the old ‘Council of Castile,’ which the Junta had superseded29, still clung together, making protests as to the legality of their successor’s position. The local assemblies were equally jealous of the central authority—the Juntas31 of Estremadura and Valencia, in especial, were always intriguing32 behind its back, and the former at least made many tempting33 proposals both to Wellesley and to Wellington. But the most dangerous enemies of the existing government were the malcontents close at its gates—the Andalusian conspirators34, led by the members of the old Junta of Seville, and by the intriguers like the Conde de Montijo, the dukes of Infantado and Ossuna, and Francisco Palafox. The dissatisfaction caused by the incapacity, indecision, and—as it was openly said—the nepotism35 and venality36 of the Junta was so general, that a plan was formed in Seville to seize them, deport37 them all to the Canaries, and proclaim a Regency. The troops in the place were tampered38 with, some demagogues were ready to raise the mob, and Infantado[8], who was in the thick of the plot, came to Wellesley one night to divulge39 the arrangements for the ‘Pronunciamento’ and to bespeak40 his aid. Much as he disliked the Junta and its methods, the Ambassador scornfully refused to make himself a member of a conspiracy41, and after warning Infantado of his intention, went straight to the Secretary Garay and gave him all the information as to the project, though without divulging[p. 5] any names. Some of the plotters fled, others were arrested. ‘For the last two days,’ writes Wellesley to his brother, ‘I have been employed in endeavouring to save the necks of these caitiffs from the just fury and indignation of the people and soldiery, and I have succeeded. A regular plot was formed to seize (and I believe to hang) them all. But I could not suffer such outrages42 under my nose, so I interfered43 and saved the curs from the rope. They were all gratitude44 for an hour [Wellesley was offered and refused the Order of the Golden Fleece next morning], but now that they think themselves secure they have begun to cheat me again[9].’
Much as every patriot45 should deprecate the employment of coups46 d’état while a foreign war is on hand, there was much to excuse the conduct of the enemies of the Junta. That body was now more than a year old; it had been from the first regarded as a stop-gap, as a provisional government which was destined47 to give place to something more regular and constitutional when occasion should serve. A ‘Committee of Public Safety’ which fails to preserve the state stands self-condemned, and the history of the Central Junta had been one record of consistent disaster. A body of over thirty persons is too large for a ministry, too small for a representative assembly. Every intelligent Spaniard, whatever his politics, was desirous of seeing it give place to a regular government. The Conservatives and bureaucrats48 would have been contented49 if it had appointed a Regency of four or five persons, and then abdicated50. The Liberals demanded that it should summon the national Cortes, and leave to that body the creation of an executive. Pamphlets were showered by dozens from the press—now more or less free, for the first time in Spanish history—to advocate one or other of these courses. The Junta, however, had no intention of surrendering its power, whatever pretence51 of disinterestedness52 it might assume and proclaim. Its first attempts to put off the evil day when it must yield to public opinion were ingeniously absurd. It issued, as early as May 22, a proclamation acknowledging the advisability of summoning a Cortes, and then invited all well-thinking Spaniards to send in schemes and suggestions during the[p. 6] next two months concerning the best way in which the national assembly could be organized, and the reforms and constitutional improvements which it should take in hand. These documents were to be read and pondered over by a Commission, mainly composed of members of the Junta, which was to issue a report in due time, embodying53 the best of the suggestions and the results of its own discussion[10]. This was an admirable device for wasting time and putting off the assembly of the Cortes. The Commission finally decided54, on September 19, after many weeks of session, that a supreme55 Executive Council of five persons should be appointed, carefully avoiding the name of Regency. But only existing members of the Central Junta were to be eligible56 as Councillors, and the Council was to be changed at short intervals57, till every member of the Junta had taken a turn in it[11]. The only laudable clause of this scheme was one providing that Spanish America should be represented in the Junta, and therefore ultimately in the Executive Council. The arrangement satisfied nobody—it merely substituted a rapidly changing committee of the Junta for the whole of that body as the supreme ruling power: and it was clear that the orders of the Council would be those of the Junta, though they might be voiced by fewer mouths. The assembly of the Cortes would be put off ad infinitum.
Any effect which the report of the Commission might have had, was spoilt by the fact that it was followed by a minority report, or manifesto58, drawn59 up by the Marquis of La Romana, who had been one of the Commissioners60. The Junta had called him back from Galicia, and compelled him to surrender the army that he had re-formed, under the pretext61 that he had been co-opted as a member of their own body. A death-vacancy had been created in the representation of the kingdom of Valencia: he had been named to fill it, summoned to Seville, and placed on the constitutional Commission. Dissenting62 from every word of the report of the majority, he published on October 14 a counter-scheme, in which he declared that the[p. 7] venality, nepotism, and dilatory63 incapacity of the Junta made it necessary for Spain to seek a new executive which should be wholly independent of that body. Accordingly he suggested that a Regency of five members should be constituted, as the supreme governing body of the realm. No member of the Junta was to sit therein. It was to be assisted, for consultative purposes, by a body of six persons—one of whom was to be a South American. This second committee, to be called ‘the Permanent Deputation of the Realm,’ was to be considered to represent the Cortes till that assembly should meet. It was not to meddle64 with executive matters, but was to devote itself to drawing up the details of the constitution of the future Cortes, and to suggesting practical reforms.
So far as the declaration in favour of a Regency went, most sensible Spaniards liked La Romana’s scheme, and it obtained Wellesley’s approval also. But the idea of the ‘Permanent Deputation’ frightened the Liberals, who feared that its existence would be made the excuse for putting off the summoning of the Cortes for an indefinite time. Moreover it was rumoured65 that La Romana intended to resign his seat in the Junta, and to become a candidate for the position of Senior Regent, so that his proposals must be intended to benefit himself. The suspicion that his personal ambitions inspired his patriotic66 denunciation of the Junta’s misdoings was made the more likely by events that occurred at the same moment in Valencia. There the leading personage of the moment was the governor, General José Caro, the younger brother of La Romana, who had complete control of the local Junta, and exercised what his enemies called a tyranny in the province. He and his following were already on the worst terms with the Seville Government, and now took the opportunity of bursting out into open rebellion. They issued a sounding manifesto against the Supreme Junta, declared their intention of refusing to obey it any longer, and republished and sent in all directions to the other local Juntas La Romana’s report in favour of a Regency, of which Caro had struck off 6,000 copies. They threatened to turn back by force General Castro whom the Supreme Junta had sent to supersede30 Caro, and declared their second representative in that body, the Conde de Contamina, deposed67 for ‘disobedience to the will of[p. 8] the people.’ It looked as if La Romana might be intending to overthrow68 the central government by means of his brother’s Valencian army. Apparently69 he must be acquitted70 of this charge, his fiery71 and ambitious kinsman72 having gone far beyond his intentions.
In the midst of all these intrigues73, plots, and manifestos the Central Junta had only one hope—to rehabilitate74 themselves by means of a great military success. With ruinous consequences they tried to direct the course of the war with political rather than strategical ends in view. Of the unhappy autumn campaign which their rashness precipitated75 we shall speak in its proper place; but before narrating76 the disasters of Oca?a and Alba de Tormes, we must turn back for some months to consider the situation of Eastern Spain, where the continuous chronicle of events has been conducted no further than Blake’s rout77 at Belchite in June, and St. Cyr’s victory of Valls in February 1809. Much had happened in Catalonia and Aragon even before the day of Talavera. Much more was to take place before the ill-judged November campaign of the Junta’s armies in New Castile and Leon had begun.
N.B.—This is a military history: for the war of pamphlets and manifestos, plots and intrigues, between the Seville Government and its adversaries78, the reader who is anxious to master the disheartening details may consult Toreno’s Tenth Book; Schepeler, iii. 460-86; Baumgarten, vol. i. chapter viii; Arteche, vol. vii. chapter vi, and above all the volume of the Marquis of Wellesley’s Spanish Dispatches (London, 1838). There is a good and lively description of the chief members of the Junta and the ministry, and of the intrigues against them, in William Jacob’s Travels in the South of Spain (London, 1811).
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1
junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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perversity
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| n.任性；刚愎自用 | |
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broached
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| v.谈起( broach的过去式和过去分词 )；打开并开始用；用凿子扩大（或修光）；（在桶上）钻孔取液体 | |
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waning
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| adj.（月亮）渐亏的，逐渐减弱或变小的n.月亏v.衰落( wane的现在分词 )；（月）亏；变小；变暗淡 | |
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impeaching
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| v.控告（某人）犯罪( impeach的现在分词 )；弹劾；对（某事物）怀疑；提出异议 | |
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irony
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| n.反语，冷嘲；具有讽刺意味的事，嘲弄 | |
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mendacious
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| adj.不真的，撒谎的 | |
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countless
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| adj.无数的，多得不计其数的 | |
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remonstrances
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| n.抱怨，抗议( remonstrance的名词复数 ) | |
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qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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eastward
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| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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cogent
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| adj.强有力的，有说服力的 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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lurking
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| 潜在 | |
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negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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profess
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| v.声称，冒称，以...为业，正式接受入教，表明信仰 | |
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resentment
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| n.怨愤，忿恨 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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harping
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| n.反复述说 | |
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allusions
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| 暗指，间接提到( allusion的名词复数 ) | |
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factions
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| 组织中的小派别，派系( faction的名词复数 ) | |
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lavish
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| adj.无节制的；浪费的；vt.慷慨地给予，挥霍 | |
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evicted
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| v.（依法从房屋里或土地上）驱逐，赶出( evict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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superseded
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| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
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supersede
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| v.替代；充任 | |
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juntas
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| n.以武力政变上台的军阀( junta的名词复数 ) | |
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intriguing
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| adj.有趣的；迷人的v.搞阴谋诡计(intrigue的现在分词)；激起…的好奇心 | |
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tempting
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| a.诱人的, 吸引人的 | |
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conspirators
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| n.共谋者，阴谋家( conspirator的名词复数 ) | |
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nepotism
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| n.任人唯亲；裙带关系 | |
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venality
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| n.贪赃枉法，腐败 | |
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deport
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| vt.驱逐出境 | |
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tampered
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| v.窜改( tamper的过去式 )；篡改；（用不正当手段）影响；瞎摆弄 | |
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divulge
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| v.泄漏(秘密等)；宣布，公布 | |
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bespeak
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| v.预定；预先请求 | |
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conspiracy
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| n.阴谋，密谋，共谋 | |
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outrages
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| 引起…的义愤，激怒( outrage的第三人称单数 ) | |
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interfered
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| v.干预( interfere的过去式和过去分词 )；调停；妨碍；干涉 | |
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gratitude
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| adj.感激，感谢 | |
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patriot
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| n.爱国者，爱国主义者 | |
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coups
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| n.意外而成功的行动( coup的名词复数 )；政变；努力办到难办的事 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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bureaucrats
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| n.官僚( bureaucrat的名词复数 )；官僚主义；官僚主义者；官僚语言 | |
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contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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abdicated
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| 放弃（职责、权力等）( abdicate的过去式和过去分词 )； 退位，逊位 | |
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pretence
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| n.假装，作假；借口，口实；虚伪；虚饰 | |
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disinterestedness
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embodying
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| v.表现( embody的现在分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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eligible
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| adj.有条件被选中的；(尤指婚姻等)合适(意)的 | |
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intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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manifesto
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| n.宣言，声明 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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commissioners
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| n.专员( commissioner的名词复数 )；长官；委员；政府部门的长官 | |
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pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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dissenting
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| adj.不同意的 | |
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dilatory
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| adj.迟缓的，不慌不忙的 | |
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meddle
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| v.干预，干涉，插手 | |
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rumoured
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| adj.谣传的；传说的；风 | |
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patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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deposed
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| v.罢免( depose的过去式和过去分词 )；（在法庭上）宣誓作证 | |
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overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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acquitted
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| 宣判…无罪( acquit的过去式和过去分词 )； 使（自己）作出某种表现 | |
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71
fiery
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| adj.燃烧着的，火红的；暴躁的；激烈的 | |
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72
kinsman
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| n.男亲属 | |
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73
intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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74
rehabilitate
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| vt.改造(罪犯)，修复；vi.复兴，(罪犯)经受改造 | |
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75
precipitated
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| v.（突如其来地）使发生( precipitate的过去式和过去分词 )；促成；猛然摔下；使沉淀 | |
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76
narrating
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| v.故事( narrate的现在分词 ) | |
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77
rout
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| n.溃退，溃败；v.击溃，打垮 | |
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78
adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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