As far back as September 1809, while his army still lay at Badajoz and the Talavera campaign was hardly over, Wellington had foreseen the oncoming invasion of Portugal, which did not actually begin till August 1810[165]. Writing to his brother, then on his special mission to Seville, he had laid down his conclusions. Bonaparte would, in consequence of the cessation of the Austrian war, be enabled to pour unlimited1 reinforcements into Spain. The British army, even if raised to 40,000 men, would not be strong enough to cover both Seville and Lisbon. Considering the temper of the Spanish government and the Spanish troops, he thought it would be most unadvisable to commit himself to the defence of Andalusia. But he was prepared to undertake the defence of Portugal. He implored2 the British Ministry3 not to sacrifice its strong position on the Tagus in order to embark4 upon a hazardous5 campaign in the South[166]. His views as to Portugal were simply the development of those which he had drawn6 up for Castlereagh’s eye on his first sailing for the Peninsula[167]. Portugal though ‘all frontier’ might be defended against any French army of less than 100,000 men, if its resources were placed at his disposal, and he were given a free hand to utilize7 them according to his own plan. The Portland Cabinet, though much doubting whether Wellington could carry out his pledge, and though reluctant to abandon the idea that Andalusia might be defended and Cadiz made[p. 168] secure by British troops, finally yielded to the General’s appeal.
But on December 2, 1809, the Portland Cabinet gave place to Spencer Perceval’s new administration, and Wellington had to reiterate8 the arguments which he had used to Castlereagh and Canning to new correspondents, Lord Liverpool and Lord Bathurst. Fortunately the incoming ministers resolved to adhere to the promises made by their predecessors9, and to persist in the defence of Portugal. It was of immense value to Wellington that his brother Wellesley soon replaced Lord Bathurst at the Foreign Office, so that he could command in this Ministry a supporter as firm as Castlereagh had been in the last. Nevertheless his position was not entirely10 fortunate: the new administration was being fiercely assailed11 by the Whigs over the general policy of risking British armies on the Continent. The calamities12 of the Walcheren expedition supplied a text on which the Opposition13 could preach interminable sermons. The men who were not ashamed to allege14, for party reasons, that Wellington was a rash general, and that the Talavera campaign had been a disaster, were continually harassing15 the Ministry, by their suggestions that when the French Emperor marched in person to Spain the British army in the Peninsula must inevitably16 be destroyed. It was probably to aid them that Napoleon kept inserting in the Moniteur articles in which it was asserted that the maintenance of the incapable17 ‘Sepoy General’ at the head of the British forces was the thing which France must most desire. In Lord Liverpool’s correspondence with Wellington it is easy to see that the idea that it might be necessary to evacuate18 Portugal, when the French attack was delivered, almost preponderated19 over that of preparing for the defence of that realm. While Wellington’s whole mind is set on working out the details of a campaign from which he hopes great things, his correspondent is always thinking of the possibility of a disastrous20 embarkation21 at the end of it. The General could not pledge himself that Portugal might be defended against any odds22 whatever: it was possible that the Emperor might lead or send against him an army of absolutely overpowering strength, though he did not think such a contingency23 probable. But since he could not say that his[p. 169] position was impregnable, he was being continually worried with suggestions as to all the possible contingencies24 that might occur to his discomfiture25. The ministers dreaded27 that the Peninsular venture might end in a fiasco, like the Duke of York’s Dutch expedition of 1799, and thought that such a failure would lose them their offices. Hence they were nervous about every false rumour28 that reached them from France concerning the Emperor’s approaching departure; and the more certain information about the immense numbers of troops that were passing the Pyrenees filled them with dread26. It required all Wellington’s robust29 self-confidence to keep them reassured30. He had to be perpetually repeating to them that all his preparations for retreat and embarkation, if the worst should happen, had been already thought out—they might make up their minds that he would do nothing rash. But he was inclined to think that there would in the end be no need to depart. ‘I shall delay the embarkation,’ he wrote, ‘as long as it is in my power, and shall do everything that is in my power to avert31 the necessity of embarking32 at all. If the enemy should invade this country with a force less than that which I should think so superior to ours as to create a necessity for embarking, I shall fight a battle to save the country, and for this I have made the preparations.’ He did not think he could be beaten; but if, by some mischance, the fortune of war went against him, he had still no doubt that he could bring off the army in safety. ‘If we do go, I feel a little anxiety to go like gentlemen, out of the hall door (particularly after all the preparations I have made to enable us to do so), and not out of the back door or by the area.’
It is curious to find that in this most interesting dispatch to Lord Liverpool Wellington distinctly asserts that his worst enemy was the ghost of Sir John Moore[168]. ‘The great disadvantage under which I labour is that Sir John Moore, who was here before me, gave his opinion that Portugal could not be defended by the army under his command. It is obvious that the country was in a very different situation at that time from what it is at present, and that I am in a very different situation from that in which he found himself ..., yet persons who ought[p. 170] to be better acquainted with these facts entertain a certain prejudice against the adoption33 of any plan for opposing the enemy of which Portugal is to be the theatre. I have as much respect as any man for the opinion and judgement of Sir John Moore, and I should mistrust my own if it were opposed to his in a case where he had had the opportunity of knowing and considering. But he positively34 knew nothing about Portugal, and could know nothing about its existing state[169].’
The most vexatious thing for Wellington was that ‘the persons who ought to have known better,’ yet were perpetually uttering melancholy35 vaticinations as to the approach of disaster, included some of his own senior officers. I have seen a letter from a general in Portugal to his friend in England containing such phrases as this: ‘I most strongly suspect that before many months are over our heads there will be no opportunity for this employment (that of a cavalry36 brigadier) left to any one, on the Continent at least. The next campaign will close the eventful scene in the Peninsula, as far as we are concerned; for I am decidedly of opinion that neither (Marshal) Wellington nor (Marshal) Beresford will prevent the approaching subjugation39 of Portugal.’ Or again: ‘I am quite surprised at Lord W.’s pliant40 disposition41. I suspect he feels himself tottering42 on his throne, and wishes to conciliate at any sacrifice[170].’ The frequent complaints in Wellington’s correspondence as to the sort of letters that were going home to England in the spring of 1810 sufficiently43 show that these down-hearted views were not uncommon44 among his subordinates. If the generals on the spot foresaw disaster, it is no wonder that the ministers in London felt anxious, and refused to be comforted by the confident dispatches of the Commander-in-Chief.
[p. 171]
The preparations which Wellington was making during the winter of 1809-10 and the ensuing spring, for the reception of the inevitable45 French invasion, may be arranged, in the main, under three heads. We must first treat of the complete reorganization of the Portuguese46 military forces, not only the regulars but the militia47, and the old levée en masse of the Ordenan?a. Second come the elaborate plans for the construction of enormous field-works for the protection of Lisbon, the famous lines of Torres Vedras, and the fortification of certain other, and more advanced, points. The third, and in some ways the most important of all, was the arrangement of the great scheme for devastating48 the country-side in front of the invader49, and fighting him by the weapon of starvation, a device new to the French, but not unprecedented51 in the earlier history of Portugal.
The Portuguese regular army had taken hardly any part in the campaigns of 1809. The only sections of it that had been under fire were Silveira’s two regiments53, the four battalions54 that marched with Wellington to Oporto in May, and Wilson’s Loyal Lusitanian Legion, which had fought with more valour than success at the bridge of Alcantara and the Pass of Ba?os[171]. Beresford, with the greater part of the troops that were in a condition to take the field, had been out on the border in July, and had remained for some days in Spain, on the side of Coria and Zarza Mayor, but he had never been in contact with the enemy[172]. The fighting power of the reorganized Portuguese army was still a doubtful quantity.
The field-strength of the Portuguese regular forces should have been, according to its establishments, 56,000 men. In September 1809 there were only 42,000 men with the colours[173], and of these much more than half were recruits, who had recently been thrust into the depleted56 cadres of the old army. There were many regiments which had been practically destroyed by the French, and which showed, when Beresford first marched out to the frontier, only 200 or 300 men instead of their normal[p. 172] 1,500[174]. Many others had less than half their complement57. The first thing that required to be done was to fill up the gaps, and this was accomplished58 during the winter of 1809-10 by a stringent59 use of the conscription law already existing. The line regiments in the Bussaco campaign showed, with hardly an exception, 1,200 or 1,300 effectives present—i.e. if the sick and ‘details’ are added they were nearly or quite up to their establishment of 1,500[175]. The cavalry was less effective: the number of men could be filled up, but horses were hard to find, and in the end Wellington sent four of the twelve regiments to do dismounted duty in garrison60, and served out their mounts to the remaining eight, which nevertheless could never show more than 300 or 400 sabres present, out of their nominal61 594. Portugal is not a horse-breeding country, and the British cavalry was competing with the native for the small supply of remounts that could be procured62. The artillery63, on the other hand, was high in strength and very satisfactory.
Mere64 numbers are no test of the efficiency of a host. The weak point of the old national army had been—as we mentioned in another place—the effete65 and unmilitary character of its body of officers—more especially of its senior officers[176]. The junior ranks, filled up since the French invasion with young men who had taken up the military career from patriotic66 motives68, were infinitely69 better. By the second year of the war there were many admirable officers among them. But it was men capable of handling a battalion55 or a regiment52 that were wanting. We saw how Beresford had been forced to introduce many British officers into the service, though he was aware that the personal pride of the Portuguese officers was bitterly hurt thereby70. His justification71 may be deduced from a confidential[p. 173] memorandum72 written for him by his chief-of-the-staff, Benjamin D’Urban[177], which is well worth quoting:—
‘There are yet among the field officers, captains, and older subalterns a number of incorrigible73 officers of the old school, who are a dead weight upon their respective regiments, and mischievous74 in the way of example. Whenever it may be thought expedient75, from time to time, to get rid of them, there will be no difficulty in finding excellent young men to replace them from the ranks respectively below.... But I feel it incumbent76 upon me to give it you as my decided37 opinion, resulting from a close investigation77 into the causes of the defects of the Portuguese, that it will be utterly78 impossible either to make a regiment fit for service, or to preserve it when made so, without giving it an English commanding-officer and at least two English captains.
‘The Portuguese soldier is naturally indolent. He falls with the greatest facility into slouching and slovenly79 habits, unless he is constantly roused and forced to exert himself. But many a Portuguese officer, if not constantly spurred and urged to do his duty, is at least as indolent as his men. Nothing (I am persuaded by experience) will counteract80 this, and create activity among the officers and consequent diligence and care among the men, but the strictness, energy and vigilance of an English commanding-officer.
‘Even supposing a sufficient energy of character in the native officer, he does not and will not, if he be not a Fidalgo himself, exercise coercive or strong measures to oblige one of that class to do his duty. He is aware that in doing so he makes a powerful enemy, and all the habits of thought in which he has been educated inspire him with such a dread of this, that no sense of duty will urge him to encounter it. Thus, whenever a regiment is commanded by a non-Fidalgo, it never fails to suffer extremely: for the noblemen are permitted to do as they please, and afford a very bad example, for they are at least as indolent as the ordinary Portuguese.
[p. 174]
‘The English captains will be found invaluable81, especially in the hands of an English commandant. Their example is infinitely useful. The Portuguese captains are piqued82 into activity and attention, when they see their companies excelled in efficiency by those of the English, and they do from emulation83 what a sense of duty would perhaps never bring them to. There are a variety of by-paths and oblique84 means by which the parts of a Portuguese corps85 are constantly, and almost insensibly, endeavouring to return to the old habits that they are so much attached to. To nip this, from time to time, in the bud, it is necessary to be aware of it: without the faithful surveillance of English subordinate officers (who, ever mixing with the mass of the men, can’t well be ignorant of what is going on) the commanding-officer can rarely be warned in time.’
Beresford replied that all this was true, but that ‘the national feeling required management,’ and that to place every regimental or brigade command in British hands would provoke such fierce jealousy86 that he was ‘compelled to humour the prejudices and satisfy the pride of the nation.’ His device for doing this was to make a general rule that wherever a Portuguese officer was in chief command he should have a British officer second in command under him, and vice50 versa[178]. When a brigade was given to a Portuguese, he managed that the two colonels of the regiments forming it should be Englishmen; similarly, if a Portuguese commanded a regiment his senior major was always an Englishman. By this means it was secured that a fair half of the higher pieces of promotion87 should be left to the native officers, but that every Portuguese placed in a responsible position should have a British officer at his back. In addition there were from two to four British captains in each battalion, but no subalterns; for, to encourage good men to volunteer into the Portuguese service, it was provided that all who did so should receive a step of promotion, and a British lieutenant88 became a Portuguese captain on exchange, and a British captain a Portuguese major. The system seems to have[p. 175] worked well, and with far less friction89 than might have been expected[179]. The better class of native officers were piqued into emulation, just as D’Urban had expected; the worst was gradually eliminated[180]. It must be noted90 that to every battalion there were added one or two British sergeants91, whose services were needed for the drilling of the men in the English exercises, which now superseded92 the old German system left behind by La Lippe, the last reorganizer of the Portuguese army. For the whole drill of the infantry93 was changed, and the British formations and man?uvres introduced. Dundas’s ‘Eighteen Man?uvres’ were translated, and became the Bible of the Lusitanian no less than the British officer[181]. The employment of the two-deep line, the essential feature of the system, was made the base of all Portuguese drill; at Bussaco it justified94 itself. The Ca?adores were trained on the ‘Rifle Regulations’ of Coote Manningham, and their uniform was modified in cut, though not in colour, to a close resemblance of that of the British rifleman[182]. The net result of all these changes was that for the future the British and Portuguese units of Wellington’s army could be moved by the same words of command, and in the same formations, and that all the disadvantages resulting from the coexistence of two different systems of drill disappeared.
Two principal difficulties still remained in the administration of the Portuguese army. The first was, what to do with the few senior officers of undoubted patriotism95 but more doubtful capacity, who were too important and influential96 to be placed upon the shelf, yet might cause a disaster if placed in a critical position of responsibility. The most notable of them was Silveira, who had acquired much popularity by his obstinate97, if ill-managed, resistance to Soult in the spring of 1809. Wellington, with many searchings of heart, placed him in com[p. 176]mand of the Tras-os-Montes, where it was most unlikely that any serious irruption of the French would take place[183]. He had a large force placed under him, but it did not include a single regular regiment, and, with militia only at his disposition, it was hoped that he would be discouraged from attempting any hazardous experiments. Moreover, he was given a British second-in-command, first John Wilson and afterwards Miller98, to curb99 his eccentricities100 so far as was possible. Baccelar, another officer of doubtful merit, but more dangerous from torpidity101 than from rashness, was given charge of the militia of the three northern provinces, so that Silveira was technically102 under his orders—though the nominal subordinate would seem to have paid little attention to his superior. The most important post, however, assigned to a Portuguese officer was the governorship of Elvas, the strongest fortress103 of Portugal, and one which would stand in the forefront of the battle if the French made the subsidiary invasion south of the Tagus, which Wellington was inclined to expect. The command of this great stronghold and the 6,000 men of its garrison (of whom half were regulars) was given to General Leite, an active and ingenious officer, and (what was more important) a man who obeyed orders. Of all the Portuguese he was the one whom Wellington most trusted; every British narrator of the war who came in contact with him has a word of praise in his behalf. Of the other native generals, Lecor, in command of a division, and Fonseca, in command of a brigade, were with the field army. Miranda was given charge of the militia of Northern Estremadura, who were likely to be in the thickest of the trouble. But the other Portuguese units of the allied104 host were under British officers: Pack, Archibald and Alexander Campbell, MacMahon, Coleman, Harvey, Collins, and Bradford[p. 177] had charge of the regular brigades of the field army. The native generals, save those above mentioned, were placed in administrative105 posts, or in charge of those sections of the militia which were probably destined106 to see no service.
The second point of difficulty in the organization of the Portuguese army was the commissariat. In the old days it had been a purely107 civilian108 branch of the service, non-military intendants dealing109 with contractors110 and merchants. For this had been substituted a Junta111 de Viveres mainly composed of officers, which proved as ineffective, if not as corrupt112, as the body which had preceded it. The British government had taken over the responsibility of paying half the Portuguese army[184], but not that of feeding it, and despite of the handsome subsidies113 that it paid to the Regency for the general purposes of the war, the native troops, especially those quartered far from Lisbon, were often in a state of semi-starvation. ‘The Portuguese corps ought to have a commissariat attached to them, and I believe each brigade has a commissary,’ wrote Wellington, ‘but they have no magazines and no money to purchase supplies[185].’ One main difficulty arose from the fact that the Junta de Viveres shrank from the heavy expense of organizing a proper transport train, and tried to make shift with requisitioned carts and oxen, which were difficult to get (since the British army was competing with the Portuguese for draught114 animals) and still harder to retain—for the peasant driver always absconded115 with his beasts when he found an opportunity. Another difficulty was that the Junta tried to feed the troops with requisitioned corn, instead of paying for it with money down; hence it got grudging116 service. ‘I know from experience,’ observes Wellington, ‘that the Portuguese army could not be in the distress117 under which it suffers, from want of provisions, if only a part of the food it receives from the country were paid for.’ And he suggested as a remedy that the British ministers should earmark part of the subsidy118 for use on the commissariat and no other purpose[186]. It was long before this[p. 178] matter was set to rights. Beresford’s correspondence in 1810 bristles119 with complaints as to the inefficiency120 of the Junta de Viveres[187].
If the regular army was badly fed, so that desertion and sickness were both too prevalent in some corps, it was not to be expected that the militia would fare better. Wellington had ordered, and Beresford had arranged for, the embodiment of every one of the 48 militia regiments of the national establishment. They should properly have given 70,000 men, but such a figure was never reached. Some of the regimental districts were too thinly peopled to give the full 1,500 men at which each was assessed. In others the officers placed in charge were incapable, or the local magistrates121 recalcitrant122. Many regiments could show only 500 or 600 bayonets in 1810, few over 1,000[188]. The total number under arms at the time of Masséna’s invasion may have reached 45,000 bayonets. Of the 48 regiments eight belonged to the lands south of the Tagus, and were never brought up to the front; they furnished the garrisons123 of Elvas and Campo Mayor, and a corps of observation on the lower Guadiana, destined to watch the French in the direction of Ayamonte and the Condado de Niebla, lest any unexpected raid might be made in that quarter[189]. The five regiments from the district immediately round the capital were at work on the ever-growing lines of Torres Vedras. One regiment was in garrison at Peniche, two at Abrantes, three at Almeida. The main force, consisting of the remaining units contributed by the[p. 179] North and the Beira, was divided into five corps, destined partly for active operations against the enemy’s flanks and rear, when he should enter Portugal, partly for the defence of Oporto and the Tras-os-Montes, if any assault should be threatened in that direction. These divisions stood as follows:—three regiments under Lecor were left in the Castello Branco country, to protect it against raids from Spanish Estremadura. Seven under Trant, all corps from the coast-land between the Douro and the Mondego, were to cover Oporto from the south, or to operate against the rear of the invading army, if it should leave that city alone and keep on the direct road to Lisbon. Six under Silveira guarded the Tras-os-Montes, and watched the French detachments in the northern part of the plains of Leon. Eight under Miller lay around Oporto, ready to support either Silveira or Trant if occasion should arise[190]. After the campaign began, and Masséna’s intention to leave the North[p. 180] alone became evident, half Miller’s division was placed under John Wilson (who had originally been Silveira’s chief-of-the-staff and second-in-command) and sent south into the Beira to co-operate with Trant. Finally, four regiments under the Portuguese brigadier Miranda lay at Thomar, apparently124 for the purpose of aiding Lecor or strengthening the garrison of Abrantes. This division ultimately retreated into the lines of Torres Vedras.
All these troops were entirely unfitted for a place in the line of battle; Wellington refused to mix them with the regular brigades, save in the garrisons of Almeida, Abrantes, and Elvas. He directed the brigadiers never to risk them in battle, even against a much inferior force of the French. Their sole purpose was to cut lines of communication, to render marauding by the enemy’s small detachments impossible, and to restrict his power of making reconnaissances far afield. They were told that they might defend a pass or a ford38 for a time, so as to delay the advance of a hostile column, but that they were never to commit themselves to a serious combat with any considerable body. Convoys125, stragglers, small detachments, were the game on which they must prey126. The programme was not a brilliant one to lay down before an ambitious officer, and more than once Silveira, Trant, and Wilson disobeyed orders, and tried to withstand a full French division in some chosen position. Such experiments almost always ended in a disaster. It was not surprising, for the militia were not troops from whom much could be expected. The best men in every district had been taken for the regular army; all the trained officers were also needed there. The militia cadres were composed of civilians127 who had to learn their duties just as much as the privates whom they were supposed to instruct. All the patriotic and energetic young men of the governing classes had sought commissions in the line; the less willing and active were driven into the militia. Service therein brought neither much credit nor much promotion. If the Regency half-starved the regulars, it three-quarter-starved the militia, which was normally in a state of destitution128 of clothing, shoes, and food. Hardly a regiment was provided with uniforms; as a rule only the officers showed the regulation[p. 181] blue and silver. As long as the corps was in its own district it was fed somehow, but when moved to some strategical point in the rugged129 mountains of the Beira, it was liable to go wholly to pieces from sheer privation. Fortunately the Portuguese peasant led a frugal130 life at all times, and expected little; the desertion, though large, was not nearly so great as might have been expected. The fact was that the men were essentially131 loyal, and hated the French with a perfect hatred132. They might be very poor soldiers, but they were very bitter personal enemies of the invader. Nevertheless, they were liable to panics on very slight provocation133. ‘At the best they are a very daily and uncertain sort of fighting people[191],’ remarked one of their leaders. Another wrote in a more forcible language, ‘Scripture says, Put not your trust in princes—I say, Fool is the man who puts his trust in a damnable militia.’ Each of these sentences was indited134 the day after a disastrous and wholly unnecessary rout135.
Over and above the regular army and the militia, the Portuguese military system contemplated136 the utilization137 of the whole levée en masse of the nation under the name of the Ordenan?a. This was no foreshadowing of the modern idea of universal service, but a survival of the mediaeval practice which, in Portugal as in England, made every freeman liable to be called out in time of extremity138, at his own cost and with his own weapons. Every peasant between sixteen and sixty was theoretically supposed to be enrolled139 in one of the companies of 250 which each group of villages was supposed to possess. The organization had been effective enough in the old mediaeval wars with Castile: it had even proved serviceable in the ‘War of Independence’ that followed the successful rising of 1640. But against modern regular armies it was comparatively useless; when called out in the war of 1762 the Ordenan?a had not justified its old reputation. Little could be expected of mobs armed with pikes and fowling-pieces, save that they should cut off a few convoys and stragglers, or occasionally obstruct141 a defile142. A French officer who deeply studied this forgotten campaign[p. 182] wrote that, ‘whatever the Spaniards may say to the contrary, this war of the peasantry is by no means important, except against ignorant and undisciplined troops[192].’
When Wellington resolved to call out the Ordenan?a in 1810 he was ignorant of none of these facts. Nevertheless, he insisted that the Regency should issue the old royal ‘Ordinance’ to call out the levy143. His object was threefold: from the political and moral point of view it was necessary to take this measure, because it was the ancient and established method of proclaiming that the country was in danger. It was so understood by the peasantry, in whose memories the traditions of the Spanish invasions were still fresh; they expected to be summoned, and would have doubted the imminence144 of the emergency if they had not been. The call was at once an appeal to their patriotism, and equivalent to a proclamation of martial145 law. Secondly146, Wellington hoped to find assistance to a certain degree for the work which he had set aside for the militia, by the aid of the Ordenan?a. Pervading147 the whole country-side, and knowing every goat-track and inaccessible148 fastness, their motley companies would surround the invading army as it marched, prevent marauding by small parties, and render inter-communication between columns impossible, save by large detachments. French narrators of the campaign speak of ‘the cruel callousness149 with which Wellington exposed these half-armed peasants to the wrath150 of the most efficient army in the world,’ and wax sentimental151 over the miseries152 of the Portuguese. But sentiment from such a quarter is suspicious: it is absurd to find old soldiers writing as if the main duty of a general defending a country were to spare its peasantry as much inconvenience as possible. Did not Napoleon in 1814 make every endeavour to raise Lorraine and Champagne153 en masse in the rear of the Allies, and has any French critic ever blamed him for doing so? Was the actual misery154 suffered by the inhabitants of Beira so much greater than what they would have endured if they had remained at home, and offered no resistance? The country-side would have been stripped bare by an army forced to make ‘war[p. 183] support war,’ and one can hardly believe, judging from parallel incidents in Spain, that outrages155 would have been conspicuous156 by their absence.
But it would seem that the third of Wellington’s reasons for calling out the Ordenan?a was far more cogent157, and lay nearer to the heart of his scheme than the other two. Throughout Portuguese history the summons to the levy en masse had always been combined with another measure, from which indeed it could not be disentangled—the order to the whole population to evacuate and devastate158 the land in face of the advancing enemy. The use of the weapon of starvation against the French was an essential part of Wellington’s plan for defending Portugal. When he told the British Ministry that he would undertake the defence of the realm, this was one of the main conditions of his pledge. He had realized the great fact that the conduct of the war in the Peninsula depended on supplies: the old aphorism159 that ‘beyond the Pyrenees large armies starve and small armies get beaten’ was at the back of all his schemes for the year 1810. He calculated that the French would find the greatest difficulty in accumulating stores sufficient to feed an army of invasion large enough to attack Portugal, and that, even if such stores could be gathered, there would be a still greater difficulty in getting them to the front as they were needed. For not only would it be hard to collect the mass of transport required for an army of 70,000, 80,000, or 100,000 men, but the convoys which it formed would find it impossible to move over the vast stretch of bad roads between Salamanca and Lisbon, when the communications were cut and the Militia and Ordenan?a were infesting160 every pass and hillside. It was almost certain that the invaders161 would make no such attempt to feed themselves from the rear, but would start with a moderate train, carrying no more than provisions for a week or two, and hoping to subsist162 (in the usual French style) on the resources of the invaded country. Such resources Wellington was determined163 that they should not find. They would ere long be starved out, and forced to fall back on their magazines, certainly losing a large proportion of their men from privations by the way. If this scheme had been carried out with rigid164 perfection, Masséna’s invasion would have amounted to no more than a promenade165 to[p. 184] Torres Vedras, and a prompt return to the borders of Spain with a famished166 army. Unfortunately the device, though it worked well and was ultimately quite successful, was not perfectly167 executed in every corner and by every subordinate, so that the French, showing a magnificent obstinacy168, and suffering untold169 privations, remained before the Lines for three months before they retired170. But retire they did, and with a loss of a third of their army, and a deplorable decadence171 of their morale172, so that Wellington’s scheme was fully173 justified[193].
The plan for defeating the enemy by the system of devastation174 was neither ‘dictated175 by the hard heart of a general trained in the atrocious wars of the East,’ as certain French authors have written, nor was it (as some of the English authors have supposed) suggested to Wellington by the measures which had been taken in 1803-4 for withdrawing all food and transport from the south coast of England, if Napoleon should be successful in crossing from Boulogne. It was an ancient Portuguese device, practised from time immemorial against the Castilian invader, which had never failed of success. Nor had it come to an end with the War of Independence of 1640, or the war of the Spanish Succession of 1704. When Spain had made her last serious assault on Portugal in 1762 (Godoy’s miserable176 mock-war of 1801 does not deserve to be counted), the plan had worked admirably. When the Conde d’Aranda invaded the Beira ‘the country had been “driven” in the most systematic177 style, and everything that could not be carried off had been destroyed, so that the Spaniard found himself in a desert, being unable to discover either provisions, cars, or peasants: the inhabitants had abandoned their villages, and carried off everything. The enemy had to be supplied with every necessary from Spain: the infantry were harassed178 with fatigue179 in remaking the roads, and the cavalry-horses destroyed[p. 185] in conducting provisions. At last d’Aranda retreated, leaving his sick and wounded at Castello Branco, with a letter commending them to the attention of the allies[194].’ Of this same war Dumouriez wrote: ‘As soon as the Spaniards enter Portugal the King publishes a declaration, by which he enjoins180 on his subjects to fall upon the invaders, and the national hatred always excites them to execute the “Ordinance.” As the Spanish army pushes on, the villages are depopulated, and the inhabitants fall back on the capital. The peasantry arrive there in crowds with wives and children, so that the king at the end of three months has 200,000 or 300,000 extra mouths to feed[195].’
This sounds like a description of the great migration181 of 1810, but was actually written in 1766. It is clear, then, that Wellington did not invent the system of devastation, but simply utilized182, and carried out to its logical end, an old custom essentially national, and familiar to the Portuguese from time immemorial. It was the regular device of the weak against the strong in the Middle Ages, and differed in nothing from ‘Good King Robert’s Testament,’ the time-honoured system applied183 by the Scots to the English in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
‘In strait placis gar hide all store,
And byrnen ye plaineland thaim before,
Thanne sall thei pass away in haist,
When that thai find na thing but waist,
So sall ye turn thaim with gret affrai,
As thai were chasit with swerd awai.’
Fortunately for himself, for England, and for Europe, Wellington had to deal with a peasantry almost as frugal, as tough, and as stubborn in their hatred as the mediaeval Scot. They saw nothing strange in the demand now made to them, and obeyed. The difficulty lay with the townsfolk of large places, such as Coimbra, Thomar, or Santarem, which lay far from the frontier, and had not the old traditions of the peasantry, since the Spaniards had never penetrated184 to their doors since the seven[p. 186]teenth century. Here there was much recalcitrance185, as was but natural; the burgher had much to abandon where the peasant had little. Yet, as we shall see, the scheme was carried out in the end, and those who stayed behind to greet the French could be counted on one hand in places of the size of Vizeu, Coimbra, or Leiria. That fanatical patriotism went far towards producing such a result is true, but does not explain the whole matter: quite as strong a motive67 was the unforgotten tale of the horrors that had followed Soult’s entry into Oporto. To the Portuguese citizens the approach of the French meant probable murder and rape186, hence came the readiness that they showed to depart. There were exaggerated rumours187 abroad of the ruthlessness of the French: was not Loison, the ‘Maneta’ of whom so many atrocious (and mostly false) stories were told, known to be in high command?
Wellington’s scheme for the clearing of the country-side in face of the enemy had long been thought out. It included not merely the evacuation of the towns and villages, but the destruction of bridges, mills, even ovens; the removal of all animals and means of transport, the destruction of all food-stuff that could not be carried off, the burning of all ferry-boats and other small craft on the navigable rivers. ‘The moment that the enemy crosses the frontier,’ he wrote to Beresford, ‘the governor of the province of Estremadura must be told that it is necessary to order all carts, carriages, and other means of conveyance188, with all the provisions they can carry, away. He ought to have all his arrangements prepared for ordering them off as soon as the French approach. The Captains Mor[196] and their Ordenan?a must be prepared to give the enemy all the opposition in their power, not by assembling in large bodies, but by lying out in the mountains and the strong parts of the roads, annoying their patrols and small parties, and interrupting their communications[197].’ This comes from an order of February: by August, when a new harvest had been gathered in, the question of the destruction of food stuffs became more difficult. The peasantry, as was natural, persisted in hiding rather than[p. 187] burning what could not be carried off. By one means or another a certain number of these concealed189 stores, even when buried in pits or removed to remote ravines, were discovered by the French, and enabled them to prolong their precarious190 stay in front of the Torres Vedras lines.
As to the displacement191 of the population, Wellington considered that in many parts it would be sufficient if it took to the hills for a few days, while the French army was passing. His military arrangements were such that he thought it impossible that the enemy would be able either to leave small posts behind him, or to maintain his lines of communication with Spain. It would suffice, therefore, that the peasantry in parts off the main roads, and remote from large towns or points of strategical importance, should make ready for a merely temporary migration. They must always, however, be ready to flit again, if fresh columns of the enemy, advancing or retreating, should come near their abodes192. The townsfolk and the inhabitants of the fertile coast plains of Estremadura and Western Beira were recommended to retire either to Lisbon or to Oporto, according as they were nearer to one or to the other. It was clear that the problem of feeding them there would be a matter for the Government, for individuals of the poorer classes could not be expected to carry or to buy provisions for many weeks. Hence there was a need for the accumulation of immense stores, over and above those required for the army. The Portuguese Regency did what it could, but in its usual slip-shod and inefficient193 fashion, and there is no doubt that much misery and a certain amount of starvation fell to the lot of the unhappy emigrants194. Fortunately Lisbon and Oporto were great ports and full of food; but despite of this, the position of the refugees became deplorable, when Masséna tarried at Santarem two months longer than Wellington had considered probable. But their suffering was not in vain: the French were starved out, even if it was a few weeks later than had been expected.
Having dealt with the organization of the military force of Portugal, and the arrangements for the depopulation of the country, we have still to explain the third section of Wellington’s great scheme of defence—that consisting of fortifications. We have already mentioned that Almeida and Elvas had been[p. 188] repaired and garrisoned196, the former with 5,000 men, consisting of one regiment of regulars and three of militia, under the English general William Cox, the other by 8,000 men,—two regiments of regulars and five of militia,—under General Leite. These were the outer bulwarks197 of the realm. Campo Mayor, a small and antiquated198 fortress, a sort of outlying dependency of Elvas, was held by one militia battalion under a Colonel Talaya, a retired engineer officer. It was not expected to make a serious resistance, but did so in the time of need, and detained a French division before its walls for some precious days in the spring of 1811, to the great glory and credit of its governor.
Only two other of the ancient fortresses199 of Portugal were placed in a state of defence, and made to play a notable part in Wellington’s general scheme for checking the French. These were Peniche and Abrantes. The former is a very strong isolated200 sea-fortress, on a projecting headland in the Atlantic, forty miles north of Lisbon. It commands several good creeks201 and landing-places, suitable for the embarkation and disembarkation of troops, and is nearly impregnable, because of the narrowness of the isthmus202 connecting it with the mainland. Placed where it is, just in the rear of the position which an enemy must take who is meditating203 an attack on Lisbon, it offers unique opportunities for making incursions on his rear and his communications. Moreover, it afforded a refuge and a safe point of departure by sea, for any section of the allied troops which might become isolated, and be pressed towards the water by the advancing enemy. Some of Wellington’s officers considered that it was an even better place for embarkation than Lisbon, if the French should prove too strong, and the British should be compelled to abandon Portugal. The Commander-in-Chief thought otherwise, but caused its fortification to be carefully restored, and garrisoned it with a picked regiment of militia[198].
[p. 189]
Even more important than Peniche was Abrantes, the one great crossing-place of the Tagus above Lisbon where there was a permanent bridge, and free communication by good roads between Beira and Alemtejo. It lies at the point where the road from Spain by way of Castello Branco crosses the road from north to south down the Portuguese frontier, from Almeida and Guarda to Evora and Elvas. An invader who has advanced towards Lisbon through Beira has it on his flank and rear, equally so an invader who has advanced on the same objective from Badajoz and the Guadiana. It is the natural point at which to move troops north and south along the frontier, though Wellington had established an alternative temporary crossing-point at Villa140 Velha, thirty miles higher up the river, by means of pontoons. But this secondary passage was inferior in safety, since it was not protected by a fortress like Abrantes. Orders were given to burn the pontoons if ever a French force from the East should came near. At Abrantes, on the other hand, the boat-bridge could be pulled up and stacked under the city walls in the event of an attack, and did not need to be destroyed. The town is situated204 on a lofty eminence205 upon the north bank of the Tagus. Its fortifications were antiquated in 1809, but had been for many months in process of being rebuilt and strengthened by the English engineer Patton. With new earthworks and redoubts it had been made a strong place, which could not be taken without a regular siege and plenty of heavy artillery. Here Wellington had placed a garrison of two militia regiments under the Portuguese general Lobo, whose orders were to resist to the last, and to make sure of burning the boat-bridge, down to the last plank206, before surrendering. The French never put him to the test, since they had no heavy guns with them, and[p. 190] therefore regarded it as hopeless to attempt an attack on the place[199].
Almeida and Elvas, Peniche and Abrantes, were regular fortresses with large garrisons. There were, however, other points where Wellington ordered fortifications of a less permanent kind to be thrown up, because he thought them of first-rate strategical importance. The two most important were one on the northern line of advance which the French might take, the other on the central or Castello Branco line. The first was a line of redoubts behind the river Alva, just where it joins the Mondego, on either side of the bridge and village of Ponte de Murcella. It was here, he thought, that Masséna would choose his road, along the south bank of the Mondego, if he marched on Lisbon by the Beira line. But the Marshal moved by Vizeu, partly (as it seems) because he had heard of the fortifications of this defile, and the works were never used. Equally unprofitable (so it chanced) was another important series of field-works, constructed to cover the lowest reach of the Zezere against an invader who should come by the Castello Branco road, and should have masked or taken Abrantes. This was a line of redoubts and trenches207, almost a fortified208 camp, on the east bank of the river from Tancos to opposite Martinchel, blocking both the roads which lead from Castello Branco into Estremadura. Masséna, coming not by the route which was guarded against, but from Leiria and Thomar, took the lines of Zezere in the rear, and they proved useless.
Along with the precautions taken on the banks of the Alva and the Zezere, two other pieces of engineering must be mentioned. The one, the destruction of the Estrada Nova,—the mountain-road which leads from Fund?o and Belmonte to the lower Zezere without passing through Castello Branco,—has already been noticed, when we were dealing with the possible lines of invasion in Portugal. The other move was constructive209, not destructive, in character. Foreseeing that Abrantes might be masked, or besieged210 on the northern bank of the Tagus, and[p. 191] all the roads in that direction thereby blocked, while it might still be very profitable to have free communication between Lisbon and the Castello Branco region, he caused the road above the south bank of the Tagus, from opposite Abrantes to the flying-bridge at Villa Velha, to be thoroughly211 reconstructed. This route, by Gavi?o and Niza, was so much easier in its slopes than the old high-road Abrantes-Castello Branco, that, even when the latter was safe, troops moving from east to west, along the Tagus often used it during the next two years of the war, though it involved two passages of the river instead of one.
But all the matters of engineering hitherto mentioned were unimportant and merely subsidiary, when placed beside the one great piece of work which formed the keystone of Wellington’s plan for the defence of Portugal. His whole scheme depended on the existence of an impregnable place of refuge, available both for his army, and for the emigrant195 population of the country-side which he was about to devastate. He must have a line on which the invader could be finally checked and forced to halt and starve. If such a line had not existed, his whole scheme would have been impracticable, and after a lost battle he might have been driven to that hurried embarkation which the ministers in London foresaw and dreaded. But his eye had been fixed212 upon the ground in front of Lisbon ever since his second landing in the Peninsula in April 1809, and there he thought that the necessary stronghold might be found. A full year before Masséna’s invasion he had informed the British cabinet that though he could not undertake to defend all Portugal, ‘for the whole country is frontier, and it would be difficult to prevent the enemy from entering by some point or other,’ he yet conceived that he might protect the essential part of the realm, the capital, against anything save the most overwhelming odds[200]. The scheme had taken definite shape in his head when, on October 20, 1809, he wrote his famous dispatch to Colonel Fletcher, the commanding engineer at Lisbon, directing him to draw up without delay a scheme for the construction of two successive lines of trenches and redoubts, covering the whole stretch of country from the Atlantic to a point on the estuary213 of the Tagus twenty miles or more north of the capital. This[p. 192] was, in its essentials, the order for the construction of the lines of Torres Vedras, for though the front designated does not exactly tally214 with that ultimately taken up, it only differs from it in points of detail. Fletcher is directed to survey a line from the mouth of the Castanheira brook215 to the mouth of the Zizandre, and another, a few miles behind, from Alhandra on the Tagus by Bucellas and Cabe?a de Montechique towards Mafra. These roughly represent the two lines of defence ultimately constructed, though in the end the extreme right flank was drawn back from the Castanheira to the Alhandra stream. Fletcher is told that the works will be on the largest scale: the fortified camp above Torres Vedras is to hold 5,000 men, the works at Cabe?a de Montechique alone will require 5,000 workmen to be set to dig at once; great operations, such as the damming up of rivers and the creation of marshes216 many miles long, are suggested.
How the great scheme worked out, and how the works stood when Masséna’s long-expected army at last appeared in front of them, will be told in a later chapter, in its due place. Suffice it here to say that all through the spring and summer of 1810 they were being urged forward with feverish217 haste.
It must not be supposed that it was an easy matter to carry out all these preparations. The Portuguese government ended by adopting all Wellington’s suggestions: but it was not without friction that he achieved his purpose. While he was planning works at the very gates of Lisbon, and making provisions for the devastation of whole provinces in view of the approaching invasion, he was often met by suggestions that it would be possible to defend the outer frontiers of the realm, and that his schemes were calculated to dishearten the Portuguese people, rather than to encourage them to a firm resistance. The Regency, moreover, had enough national pride to resent the way in which a policy was dictated to them, without any reference to their own views. The governing party in Portugal had accepted the English alliance without reserve, but it often winced218 at the consequences of its action. There was a view abroad that the little nation was being set in the forefront of the battle of European independence mainly for the benefit of Great Britain. Fortunately the memory of Junot’s dictatorship and Soult’s ravages219 was still fresh enough to overcome all other considera[p. 193]tions. A moment’s reflection convinced Wellington’s most ardent220 critics that though the British yoke221 might sometimes seem hard, anything was better than a return to French servitude. The Regency murmured, but always ended by yielding, and issued the edicts necessary to confirm all the orders of the general.
The state of the Portuguese government at this moment requires a word of explanation. The original Regency confirmed by Sir Hew222 Dalrymple in 1808 had been somewhat changed in its personnel. It was now a more numerous body than at its first installation; of the original members, only the Patriarch (Antonio de Castro, late bishop223 of Oporto), and the Marquez de Olh?o (Francisco de Mello e Menezes, the Constable224 or Monteiro Mor, as he is more frequently called), now survived. But four new members had been appointed in 1810. The most important of them was José Antonio de Menezes e Sousa, generally known as the ‘Principal Sousa,’ an ecclesiastic225 who was one of the band of three Sousa brothers, who formed the backbone226 of the anti-French party in Portugal. The eldest227 of them, Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, Conde de Linhares, was prime minister of the Prince Regent at Rio de Janeiro. The third, Domingos Antonio de Sousa Coutinho, afterwards Conde de Funchal, was Portuguese minister in London. Thus when the Principal entered the Regency, this busy and capable family could pull the strings228 alike at Rio, London, and Lisbon, in the interests of their relations and dependants229. This they did without scruple230 and without ceasing. Domestic politics in Portugal had always been a matter of family alliances, as much as of principles. They presented, indeed, a considerable resemblance to those of Great Britain during the Whig domination of the eighteenth century. Hence there was considerable danger that the policy of the alliance against Napoleon might become identified in the eyes of the Portuguese nation with the domination of the Sousa faction231. That this peril232 was avoided was not their fault: they did their best to keep all promotion, civil and military, for their own adherents233; hence came interminable quarrels on petty personal questions both with Wellington and Beresford. Fortunately the two Marshals could generally get their way in the end, when large interests[p. 194] were at stake, because the Sousas were pledged to the British alliance, and dared not break with it. To do so would have brought other politicians to the front. But, meanwhile, unending controversies234 wasted Wellington’s time and soured his temper: more than once he is found writing in his dispatches to Lord Liverpool that the ‘impatient, meddling235, mischievous’[201] Principal ought to be got out of the Regency and promoted to some foreign embassy, or great civil post, where he could do less harm. But the British government thought, and probably was right in thinking, that it was better to bear with known evils than to quarrel with the Sousa family, and thereby to break up the pro-British party in Portugal. Wellington had to endure the Principal’s small intrigues236 and petty criticism till the end.
The other members who entered the Regency in 1810 were the Conde de Redondo, Fernando Maria de Sousa Coutinho—another of the Sousa clan—Doctor Raymundo Nogueira, a law professor of the University of Coimbra[202] and—far the most important of all—the newly appointed British Minister at Lisbon, Mr. Charles Stuart. The nomination237 of a foreigner to such a post touched Portuguese pride to the quick, and was looked upon by all enemies of the Sousa faction as an act of miserable weakness on the part of the Conde de Linhares and the Prince Regent. It was considered doubtful policy on the part of the Perceval Cabinet to consent to the appointment, considering the offence which it was certain to give. In their justification it must be pleaded that both the Patriarch and the Principal Sousa were men capable of causing any amount of difficulty by their ill-considered plans and their personal intrigues, and that a colleague who could be trusted to keep an eye upon their actions, and to moderate their ambitions was much needed. Stuart was a man of moderate and tactful bearing, but could be[p. 195] neither cajoled nor overruled. It was on his influence in the Regency that Wellington relied most for support. At this moment there were two questions in process of discussion which rendered it most necessary that the Portuguese government should not be left entirely to its own guidance. Taking advantage of the unhappy condition of Spain, and the weakness of the newly appointed executive at Cadiz, the Portuguese were pressing for the restoration of Olivenza, Godoy’s old conquest of 1801, and for the recognition of the Princess Carlotta of Spain, the wife of the Prince of the Brazils, as the person entitled to act as Regent of Spain during the captivity238 of her brothers at Valen?ay. Dom Pedro de Sousa Holstein, the Portuguese minister at Cadiz—a kinsman239 of Linhares and the Principal—was actively240 urging both these demands on the Spanish government. If he had succeeded in imposing241 them on Casta?os and his colleagues there would have been desperate friction between the allies. But by promising242 the active support of the Portuguese army within the Spanish frontiers—which he had no power to guarantee, and which Wellington had absolutely refused to grant—the minister won some support at Cadiz. Extra pressure was brought to bear upon the Spaniards by the massing of Brazilian troops on the South American frontier, on the side of Rio Grande do Sul—a most unjustifiable act, which might have led to an actual rupture243, a thing which the British government was bound to prevent by every means in its power. The only way to prevent an open breach244 between Spain and Portugal was to check the activity of Sousa Holstein, an end which Stuart found much difficulty in accomplishing, because the objects for which the minister was striving, and especially the restoration of Olivenza to its old owners, were entirely approved by his colleagues in the Regency. When it is added that there were numerous other points of friction between the British and the Portuguese governments—such as the question of free trade with Brazil, that of the suppression of the slave trade, and that of the form to be adopted for the payment of the subsidies which maintained the Portuguese army—it is easy to understand that Stuart’s position on the Council of Regency was no easy one. He often found himself in a minority of one when a discussion started: he frequently had to acquiesce[p. 196] in decisions which he did not approve, merely in order to avoid friction on matters of secondary importance. But in matters of really primary moment he generally succeeded in getting his way, owing to the simple fact that Portugal was dependent on Great Britain for the continuance of her national existence. Conscious of this, the other members of the Regency would generally yield a reluctant assent245 at the last moment, and Wellington’s plans, when set forth246 by Stuart, though often criticized, delayed, and impeded247, were in the end carried out with more or less completeness.
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1
unlimited
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| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
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implored
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| 恳求或乞求（某人）( implore的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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embark
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| vi.乘船，着手，从事，上飞机 | |
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hazardous
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| adj.(有)危险的，冒险的；碰运气的 | |
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6
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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7
utilize
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| vt.使用，利用 | |
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reiterate
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| v.重申，反复地说 | |
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9
predecessors
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| n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 )；前辈；（被取代的）原有事物；前身 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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assailed
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| v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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12
calamities
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| n.灾祸，灾难( calamity的名词复数 )；不幸之事 | |
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13
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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allege
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| vt.宣称，申述，主张，断言 | |
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harassing
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| v.侵扰，骚扰( harass的现在分词 )；不断攻击（敌人） | |
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16
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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17
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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18
evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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preponderated
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| v.超过，胜过( preponderate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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embarkation
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| n. 乘船, 搭机, 开船 | |
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odds
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| n.让步，机率，可能性，比率；胜败优劣之别 | |
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contingency
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| n.意外事件，可能性 | |
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contingencies
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| n.偶然发生的事故，意外事故( contingency的名词复数 )；以备万一 | |
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discomfiture
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| n.崩溃；大败；挫败；困惑 | |
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dread
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| vt.担忧，忧虑；惧怕，不敢；n.担忧，畏惧 | |
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dreaded
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| adj.令人畏惧的；害怕的v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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rumour
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| n.谣言，谣传，传闻 | |
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robust
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| adj.强壮的，强健的，粗野的，需要体力的，浓的 | |
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reassured
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| adj.使消除疑虑的；使放心的v.再保证，恢复信心( reassure的过去式和过去分词) | |
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avert
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| v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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embarking
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| 乘船( embark的现在分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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positively
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| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
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melancholy
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| n.忧郁，愁思；adj.令人感伤（沮丧）的，忧郁的 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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Ford
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| n.浅滩，水浅可涉处；v.涉水，涉过 | |
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subjugation
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| n.镇压，平息，征服 | |
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pliant
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| adj.顺从的；可弯曲的 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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42
tottering
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| adj.蹒跚的，动摇的v.走得或动得不稳( totter的现在分词 )；踉跄；蹒跚；摇摇欲坠 | |
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43
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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uncommon
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| adj.罕见的，非凡的，不平常的 | |
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45
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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46
Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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devastating
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| adj.毁灭性的，令人震惊的，强有力的 | |
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invader
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| n.侵略者，侵犯者，入侵者 | |
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50
vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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51
unprecedented
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| adj.无前例的，新奇的 | |
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52
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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53
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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54
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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55
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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56
depleted
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| adj. 枯竭的, 废弃的 动词deplete的过去式和过去分词 | |
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57
complement
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| n.补足物，船上的定员；补语；vt.补充，补足 | |
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58
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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59
stringent
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| adj.严厉的；令人信服的；银根紧的 | |
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60
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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61
nominal
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| adj.名义上的；(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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62
procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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63
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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64
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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65
effete
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| adj.无生产力的，虚弱的 | |
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66
patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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67
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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68
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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69
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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70
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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71
justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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72
memorandum
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| n.备忘录，便笺 | |
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73
incorrigible
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| adj.难以纠正的，屡教不改的 | |
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74
mischievous
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| adj.调皮的，恶作剧的，有害的，伤人的 | |
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75
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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76
incumbent
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| adj.成为责任的，有义务的；现任的，在职的 | |
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77
investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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78
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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79
slovenly
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| adj.懒散的，不整齐的，邋遢的 | |
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80
counteract
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| vt.对…起反作用，对抗，抵消 | |
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81
invaluable
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| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
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82
piqued
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| v.伤害…的自尊心( pique的过去式和过去分词 )；激起（好奇心） | |
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83
emulation
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| n.竞争；仿效 | |
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84
oblique
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| adj.斜的，倾斜的，无诚意的，不坦率的 | |
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85
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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86
jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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87
promotion
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| n.提升，晋级；促销，宣传 | |
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88
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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89
friction
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| n.摩擦，摩擦力 | |
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90
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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91
sergeants
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| 警官( sergeant的名词复数 )； （美国警察）警佐； （英国警察）巡佐； 陆军（或空军）中士 | |
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92
superseded
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| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
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93
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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94
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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95
patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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96
influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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97
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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98
miller
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| n.磨坊主 | |
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99
curb
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| n.场外证券市场，场外交易；vt.制止，抑制 | |
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100
eccentricities
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| n.古怪行为( eccentricity的名词复数 )；反常；怪癖 | |
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101
torpidity
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| n.麻痹 | |
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102
technically
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| adv.专门地，技术上地 | |
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103
fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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104
allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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105
administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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106
destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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107
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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108
civilian
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| adj.平民的，民用的，民众的 | |
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109
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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110
contractors
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| n.（建筑、监造中的）承包人( contractor的名词复数 ) | |
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111
junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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112
corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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113
subsidies
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| n.补贴，津贴，补助金( subsidy的名词复数 ) | |
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114
draught
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| n.拉，牵引，拖；一网（饮，吸，阵)；顿服药量，通风；v.起草，设计 | |
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115
absconded
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| v.（尤指逃避逮捕）潜逃，逃跑( abscond的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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116
grudging
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| adj.勉强的，吝啬的 | |
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117
distress
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| n.苦恼，痛苦，不舒适；不幸；vt.使悲痛 | |
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118
subsidy
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| n.补助金，津贴 | |
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119
bristles
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| 短而硬的毛发，刷子毛( bristle的名词复数 ) | |
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120
inefficiency
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| n.无效率，无能；无效率事例 | |
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121
magistrates
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| 地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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122
recalcitrant
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| adj.倔强的 | |
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123
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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124
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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125
convoys
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| n.（有护航的）船队( convoy的名词复数 )；车队；护航（队）；护送队 | |
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126
prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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127
civilians
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| 平民，百姓( civilian的名词复数 )； 老百姓 | |
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128
destitution
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| n.穷困，缺乏，贫穷 | |
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129
rugged
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| adj.高低不平的，粗糙的，粗壮的，强健的 | |
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130
frugal
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| adj.节俭的，节约的，少量的，微量的 | |
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131
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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132
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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133
provocation
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| n.激怒，刺激，挑拨，挑衅的事物，激怒的原因 | |
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134
indited
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| v.写（文章，信等）创作，赋诗，创作( indite的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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135
rout
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| n.溃退，溃败；v.击溃，打垮 | |
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136
contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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137
utilization
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| n.利用，效用 | |
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138
extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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139
enrolled
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| adj.入学登记了的v.[亦作enrol]( enroll的过去式和过去分词 )；登记，招收，使入伍（或入会、入学等），参加，成为成员；记入名册；卷起，包起 | |
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140
villa
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| n.别墅，城郊小屋 | |
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141
obstruct
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| v.阻隔，阻塞(道路、通道等)；n.阻碍物，障碍物 | |
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142
defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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143
levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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144
imminence
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| n.急迫，危急 | |
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145
martial
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| adj.战争的，军事的，尚武的，威武的 | |
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146
secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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147
pervading
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| v.遍及，弥漫( pervade的现在分词 ) | |
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148
inaccessible
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| adj.达不到的，难接近的 | |
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149
callousness
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150
wrath
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| n.愤怒，愤慨，暴怒 | |
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151
sentimental
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| adj.多愁善感的，感伤的 | |
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152
miseries
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| n.痛苦( misery的名词复数 )；痛苦的事；穷困；常发牢骚的人 | |
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153
champagne
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| n.香槟酒；微黄色 | |
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154
misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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155
outrages
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| 引起…的义愤，激怒( outrage的第三人称单数 ) | |
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156
conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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157
cogent
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| adj.强有力的，有说服力的 | |
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158
devastate
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| v.使荒芜，破坏，压倒 | |
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159
aphorism
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| n.格言，警语 | |
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160
infesting
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| v.害虫、野兽大批出没于( infest的现在分词 )；遍布于 | |
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161
invaders
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| 入侵者，侵略者，侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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162
subsist
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| vi.生存，存在，供养 | |
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163
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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164
rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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165
promenade
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| n./v.散步 | |
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166
famished
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| adj.饥饿的 | |
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167
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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168
obstinacy
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| n.顽固；（病痛等）难治 | |
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169
untold
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| adj.数不清的，无数的 | |
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170
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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171
decadence
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| n.衰落，颓废 | |
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172
morale
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| n.道德准则，士气，斗志 | |
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173
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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174
devastation
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| n.毁坏；荒废；极度震惊或悲伤 | |
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175
dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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176
miserable
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|
| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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177
systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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178
harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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179
fatigue
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| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
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180
enjoins
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| v.命令( enjoin的第三人称单数 ) | |
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181
migration
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| n.迁移，移居，（鸟类等的）迁徙 | |
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182
utilized
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| v.利用，使用( utilize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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183
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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184
penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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185
recalcitrance
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| n.固执，顽抗 | |
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186
rape
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| n.抢夺，掠夺，强奸；vt.掠夺，抢夺，强奸 | |
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187
rumours
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| n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 )；风闻；谣言；谣传 | |
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188
conveyance
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| n.(不动产等的)转让，让与；转让证书；传送；运送；表达；（正）运输工具 | |
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189
concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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190
precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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191
displacement
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| n.移置，取代，位移，排水量 | |
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192
abodes
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| 住所( abode的名词复数 )； 公寓； （在某地的）暂住； 逗留 | |
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inefficient
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| adj.效率低的，无效的 | |
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194
emigrants
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| n.（从本国移往他国的）移民( emigrant的名词复数 ) | |
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emigrant
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| adj.移居的，移民的；n.移居外国的人，移民 | |
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196
garrisoned
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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197
bulwarks
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| n.堡垒( bulwark的名词复数 )；保障；支柱；舷墙 | |
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198
antiquated
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| adj.陈旧的，过时的 | |
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199
fortresses
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| 堡垒，要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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200
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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201
creeks
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| n.小湾( creek的名词复数 )；小港；小河；小溪 | |
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202
isthmus
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| n.地峡 | |
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203
meditating
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| a.沉思的，冥想的 | |
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204
situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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eminence
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| n.卓越，显赫；高地，高处；名家 | |
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206
plank
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| n.板条，木板，政策要点，政纲条目 | |
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207
trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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209
constructive
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| adj.建设的，建设性的 | |
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besieged
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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estuary
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| n.河口，江口 | |
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tally
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| n.计数器，记分，一致，测量；vt.计算，记录，使一致；vi.计算，记分，一致 | |
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brook
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| n.小河，溪；v.忍受，容让 | |
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marshes
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| n.沼泽，湿地( marsh的名词复数 ) | |
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feverish
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| adj.发烧的，狂热的，兴奋的 | |
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218
winced
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| 赶紧避开，畏缩( wince的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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ravages
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| 劫掠后的残迹，破坏的结果，毁坏后的残迹 | |
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ardent
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，强烈的，烈性的 | |
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221
yoke
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| n.轭；支配；v.给...上轭，连接，使成配偶 | |
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hew
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| v.砍；伐；削 | |
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223
bishop
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| n.主教，（国际象棋）象 | |
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224
constable
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| n.(英国)警察，警官 | |
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225
ecclesiastic
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| n.教士，基督教会；adj.神职者的，牧师的，教会的 | |
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226
backbone
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| n.脊骨，脊柱，骨干；刚毅，骨气 | |
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227
eldest
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| adj.最年长的，最年老的 | |
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228
strings
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| n.弦 | |
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229
dependants
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| 受赡养者，受扶养的家属( dependant的名词复数 ) | |
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230
scruple
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| n./v.顾忌，迟疑 | |
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231
faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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233
adherents
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| n.支持者，拥护者( adherent的名词复数 )；党羽；徒子徒孙 | |
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controversies
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| 争论 | |
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235
meddling
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| v.干涉，干预（他人事务）( meddle的现在分词 ) | |
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236
intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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237
nomination
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| n.提名，任命，提名权 | |
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238
captivity
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| n.囚禁；被俘；束缚 | |
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239
kinsman
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| n.男亲属 | |
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240
actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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241
imposing
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| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
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242
promising
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| adj.有希望的，有前途的 | |
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243
rupture
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| n.破裂；(关系的)决裂；v.(使)破裂 | |
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244
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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245
assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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246
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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247
impeded
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| 阻碍，妨碍，阻止( impede的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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