Though Suchet had successfully pacified1 the plains of Aragon during the autumn of 1809, and though Augereau in the last month of that year had received the surrender of the much-enduring garrison2 of Gerona, the position of the French in North-Eastern Spain was still far from satisfactory. It was not yet possible for the 3rd and the 7th Corps3 to combine their operations. While the broad strip of territory in Western Catalonia reaching from the foot of the Pyrenees to the sea—whose places of strength were Lerida, Tarragona, and Tortosa—still remained intact, Augereau and Suchet could still communicate only by the circuitous5 route through France: a letter from Saragossa to Barcelona took a fortnight or more to arrive at its destination. It was high time that they should endeavour to get into touch with each other, by cutting through the Spanish line of defence. Both of the corps-commanders had now a comparatively free hand, and could assemble a considerable force for offensive operations. Suchet’s position was the happier: he had no Spanish army opposed to him at the moment. His only opponents were—to the West the bold guerrillero Mina the Younger on the borders of Navarre; to the South Villacampa with the dilapidated remains7 of his band on the side of the Sierra de Albaracin and Molina; and to the East the governor of Lerida, who kept a flying force under Colonel Perena on foot between the Cinca and the Segre, for the encouragement of the insurgents8 of Eastern Aragon. None of[p. 283] these three opponents could do any serious mischief9 to the 3rd Corps, which had risen by the New Year of 1810 to a strength of 24,000 men[329], now that its drafts from France were beginning to arrive. Mina was the most tiresome10 of the three: he was a young man of untiring energy, and kept the borders of Navarre in a perpetual ferment11, till he was finally put down by mere12 force of numbers. For while Suchet sent a number of columns under General Harispe to hunt him, Lagrange’s division of the newly arrived 8th Corps came down from the side of Pampeluna, and swept the valleys of the Arga and the Aragon from the other quarter. Pursued from one refuge to another by 12,000 men, Mina ended by bidding his followers13 disperse14. He did not appear again as a combatant till the 8th Corps had passed on into Castile in the month of February 1810.
Villacampa and Perena being very weak adversaries15, Suchet could now dispose of the greater part of his corps for offensive operations. Two lines of attack were open to him: the more natural and obvious one was to attack Lerida or Tortosa, while Augereau and the 7th Corps moved against them from the other side. This was Suchet’s own intention, and he had received dispatches from Paris which approved of the plan. But another objective was pointed16 out to him from another quarter. It will be remembered that while King Joseph and Soult were planning the details of their Andalusian expedition, one of the schemes which they discussed was the use of the 3rd Corps as a flanking detachment to cover their attack on Seville[330]: it was to march on Valencia while Mortier marched on Badajoz. The plan was rejected in favour of the direct frontal march against the passes of the Sierra Morena. Nevertheless, when the defiles17 had been passed, and the King had entered Cordova in triumph, he recurred19 to his original scheme, and on January 27 Soult sent orders to Suchet directing him to make a dash at Valencia, and assuring him that the demoralization of the Spaniards was so great that he would probably enter the city without meeting with much resistance. Similar orders, as we have already seen,[p. 284] were sent to Ney, who was directed at the same moment to make himself master of Ciudad Rodrigo[331], which Soult and the King imagined to be likely to surrender at the first summons.
Suchet, though doubting (as he says) the wisdom of the plan of campaign imposed upon him, prepared to obey, and concentrated 8,000 men, consisting of Laval’s division and half that of Musnier, at Teruel, on the borders of Valencia, while Habert, with six battalions21 more, was to move in a separate parallel column from Alca?iz, and to strike down on to the sea-coast of Valencia by way of Morella. On their way to Teruel some of Laval’s columns made a side-stroke at Villacampa, and drove off his band into the mountains of New Castile.
The march on Valencia had already begun, when Suchet received at Teruel, on March 1, the dispatch from the Emperor which announced to him that the kingdom of Aragon had been made an independent ‘military government’ under his charge[332], and that he was for the future to take no orders from Madrid, but to seek all his instructions from Paris. By the same dispatch Suchet was informed that the Emperor approved of the plan for directing the 3rd Corps against Lerida and the rear of Catalonia which he had himself always advocated. But since Habert’s column had already disappeared in the mountains, and could not be recalled, and since his own advanced guard had actually crossed the borders of Valencia, Suchet thought that it was now too late to turn back, and that he must endeavour to carry out Soult’s orders, even though they were now countermanded22 by the Emperor. Accordingly he marched by Sarrion, on the road which leads from Teruel to Segorbe, and from thence to Murviedro on the Valencian coast, where Habert was to join him.
The force opposed to Suchet was that Valencian army which the governor—or rather the dictator—José Caro had so persistently24 refused to lend to Blake in the preceding autumn for the relief of Gerona. It was about 12,000 strong at the moment, and as some nine months had elapsed since the disaster of Belchite, where the Valencian troops had fared so badly, the regiments26 had been recruited up to their old strength, and had been thoroughly27 reorganized and re-equipped. Nevertheless,[p. 285] Caro did not wish to risk them in the open field, and, when Suchet’s approach was reported to him, ordered the troops to prepare to retreat within the walls of the city of Valencia, which had been so successfully defended against Moncey two years before. He was probably right in his decision: having no great superiority of numbers over the French invading columns, he would have been risking over much if he had offered battle on the frontier, even in an advantageous29 position. Behind the fortifications of Valencia, which had been improved and enlarged during the last two years, he could at least be certain of making a long and formidable resistance. If the enemy appeared without a great battering-train, and unprepared for a regular siege, the garrison would be absolutely safe. Accordingly, Caro sent out only a single brigade to observe and retard30 Suchet’s advance: this force, assisted by some armed peasants, tried to hold the defile18 of Alventosa against the French (March 4), but was beaten out of the position with ease, lost four guns, and retired31 by Segorbe and Murviedro on to Valencia, without offering further resistance. Suchet, following in the wake of the Spanish detachment, reached Murviedro on March 5, and there met Habert, whose march by Morella and Castellon-de-la-Plana had been absolutely unopposed.
A day later the French appeared in front of the fortifications of Valencia. Having surveyed the outworks, and summoned the place in vain, Suchet found that there was no more to be done. His bolt was shot: the city intended to defend itself: it was full of troops, and the whole population had been armed. Caro had given notice that the defence was to be conducted in the style of Saragossa, and as a foretaste of his intentions court-martialled and hanged several persons who were accused of being traitors[333]. After lying four days in front of Valencia, Suchet marched off again on the night of March 10-11, having[p. 286] convinced himself that he had been sent on a fool’s errand by Soult and King Joseph. For the expedition had only been undertaken on the hypothesis that the enemy was demoralized and ready to surrender—which was clearly not the case. No siege train had been brought, and without heavy artillery32 Valencia was impregnable. The retreat of the French was hastened by the fact that their communications with Aragon had already been cut off. Villacampa, undismayed by his defeat in February, had returned to the front the moment that the invading columns had passed on to the Valencian coast. He had blockaded the garrison of Teruel, cut off two small columns which were moving in its neighbourhood, and captured four guns and some 300 prisoners. At the same moment, though Suchet was unaware33 of the fact, Colonel Perena, with a detachment from Lerida, had made a demonstration34 against Monzon, and when the garrison of Eastern Aragon concentrated to defend it, had fallen on Fraga and burnt the bridge there—the only crossing of the Cinca which was in French hands. Mina, too, warned of the departure of the main body of the 3rd Corps for the South, had reassembled some of his levies35, and begun to render the road from Saragossa to Pampeluna once more unsafe.
Suchet, therefore, on withdrawing from Valencia, found plenty of occupation awaiting him in Aragon. Villacampa was once more chased into the wilds of the Sierra de Albaracin: and several columns were detached in pursuit of Mina. This time the young partisan36 was unfortunate—he was caught between one of Suchet’s detachments and a party sent out by the governor of Navarre, and taken prisoner on March 31, with some scores of his followers. His place, however, was taken ere long by his uncle Espoz y Mina, who rallied the remnant of the guerrilleros of North-Western Aragon, and continued the struggle with an energy as great, and a success far greater, than that of his nephew.
Meanwhile, the months of February and March had been wasted, so far as the 3rd Corps was concerned, and it was not till April that Suchet was able to take in hand the enterprise which he himself had approved, and to which the Emperor had now given his consent—the siege of Lerida. A few weeks after his return to Saragossa he received from Paris two imperial[p. 287] letters denouncing his late campaign as presumptuous37, objectless, and altogether deserving of high condemnation[334].
While the Valencian expedition had been in progress Marshal Augereau had been trying his hand at the Catalan problems which Verdier and St. Cyr had found so puzzling. His luck had been bad—and his faults had been many—for of all the commanders-in-chief who successively endeavoured to subjugate38 the untameable principality he was decidedly the least capable. When Gerona fell, the main body of his army was let loose for operations in the open field. But Verdier’s divisions, on whom the burden of the siege work had fallen, were in much too dilapidated a condition for active service[335]. Leaving them to recover their strength and gather up their convalescents, in cantonments between Figueras and Gerona, Augereau moved southwards in January, at the head of the troops of Souham and Pino, whose two divisions still counted 12,000 bayonets with the eagles, though they left behind them 5,000 sick in the hospitals of Figueras and Perpignan.
The Marshal’s main duty at this moment was to clear the road from Figueras to Barcelona, which the Spanish fortress39 of Gerona had so effectually blocked during the whole year 1809. All further advances were suspended till this operation should have been completed, by the Emperor’s special orders. Duhesme, indeed, isolated40 in Barcelona with some 6,000 men, communicating with France only by sea, and surrounded by a discontented population, which was reduced to semi-starvation by the blockade kept up by the British fleet, was in a perilous42 condition. There had been many who thought that if Blake, in October 1809, had marched against Barcelona instead of trying to throw succours into Gerona, he would have forced Augereau to abandon the siege of the latter place. For Duhesme would have been in such danger, since he was neither strong enough to fight in the open nor to man efficiently44 the immense circuit of the walls of Barcelona, that Augereau might[p. 288] probably have judged that it was better to save the capital of Catalonia than to continue the interminable blockade of the smaller town that was holding out so obstinately45 against him. Be this as it may, Augereau set Souham’s and Pino’s columns on the march early in January 1810, after having first executed at their head a sort of battue of the somatenes of the mountains around Gerona, as far as Ripol and Campredon. His progress was a reign47 of terror: he had issued on December 28th a proclamation stating that all irregulars taken with arms in their hands were to be treated as simple highway robbers, and hung without any form of trial[336]. He was as good as his word, and all the prisoners taken by the flying columns of Souham and Pino were suspended on a line of gallows48 erected49 on the high-road between Gerona and Figueras. These atrocities50 turned the war in Catalonia into a struggle even more ferocious51 than that of 1809, for the natives, very naturally, retaliated52 upon every French straggler that they caught, and the Spanish regular officers had great difficulty in saving the lives even of large bodies who had laid down their arms upon formal terms of surrender.
Two roads lead from Gerona and the valley of the Ter to Barcelona—that by Vich and that by Hostalrich. They unite near Granollers, twenty miles outside Barcelona. Augereau marched with the Italian division of Pino by the second road, while he sent Souham by the other. Both met with opposition53: the small castle of Hostalrich was still held by the Spaniards—it was the only fortified54 place in central Catalonia which was now in their hands, and commanded, though it did not actually block, the main road to Barcelona. On arriving before it, the Marshal ordered Mazzuchelli’s Italian brigade to form the siege, trusting that the place would fall in a few days; but finding the resistance more serious than he had expected, he finally continued his march, with the remainder of the Italian division, towards Granollers and Barcelona. He had ordered Duhesme to come out to meet him at the former place, with as many of his troops as he could spare from garrison duty.
Map ofCcatalonia
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[p. 289]Souham meanwhile, on the eastern road, had entered Vich on January 11. He found that it had just been evacuated55 by the main body of the Spanish Army of Catalonia, whose head quarters had been maintained in that town all through the later months of the siege of Gerona. This force, still numbering about 7,000 men, was no longer under the command of its old general. Blake had resigned at Christmastide, after a lively altercation57 with the Junta58 of Catalonia, who laid the blame for the fall of Gerona on his shoulders, while he maintained that they were to blame for not having ordered the general levée en masse of the principality at an earlier date[337]. The command then passed in quick succession to the two senior general officers of the Catalan army, first to the Marquis of Portago, and then, after he had fallen ill, to General Garcia Conde, Governor of Lerida. But these interim59 commanders-in-chief were replaced in a few weeks by a younger and much more active leader, Henry O’Donnell—the man who had conducted the second convoy60 for Gerona, and had cut his way out of the place with such splendid address and resolution. He had only just been raised to the rank of Major-General, yet was now entrusted61 by the Central Junta with the control of the entire army of Catalonia. As he was setting to work to reorganize it, Souham arrived in front of his head quarters. Judging it unwise to offer battle at the head of demoralized troops, O’Donnell evacuated Vich, and fell back to the mountains above it. Souham followed him with an advanced guard as far as the pass called the Col de Suspina, where the Spaniard suddenly turned upon the pursuing force, and hurled62 it back with loss upon the main body of the division (January 12, 1810). He refused, however, to face Souham next day, and retreated towards Manresa; thereupon the French general also turned back, thinking it profitless to leave the Vich-Barcelona road, and to plunge63 into the hills in pursuit of an evasive enemy. He ended by making his way across the mountains to join the Marshal.
Meanwhile, Augereau, with Pino’s Italian brigades, reached Granollers, and came into touch with Duhesme’s troops, just in time to find that a disaster had preceded his arrival. The Governor of Barcelona, in obedience64 to the orders sent him, had[p. 290] marched out on January 16 with three battalions and 250 cuirassiers in order to meet the Marshal. He waited four days at Granollers, and then left the brigade under the charge of Colonel Guétry, and returned in person to Barcelona, recalled by rumours65 of a threatened attack from the side of Tarragona. On the morning after his departure Guétry’s force, which believed itself in complete security, was suddenly surprised in its camps by a detachment sent out by O’Donnell. That enterprising officer had heard that Augereau was still twenty miles away, and that Guétry had scattered66 his men in the three villages of Santa Perpetua, Mollet, and Granollers, in order to cover them from the bitter January weather. Accordingly, he resolved to risk an attack on this unwary detachment. Two brigades—about 4,000 men—under the Marquis of Campo Verde, made a forced march across the mountains, and fell upon the villages at dawn. The battalion20 of the 112th in Santa Perpetua was completely cut to pieces or captured—only two men are said to have escaped. The 7th and the cuirassiers at Mollet fared somewhat better, but were driven back to Barcelona with heavy loss. Part of the third battalion, one of the 5th Italian Line regiment25, which was posted at Granollers, escaped destruction by throwing itself into a fortified convent, and held out for two days, till it was saved by the approach of Augereau along the high-road. Altogether, Duhesme’s division was thinned by the loss of 1,000 men on January 21-22: Guétry had been taken prisoner, with some 600 men more and two guns. The Spaniards disappeared the moment that Augereau came in sight, and rejoined O’Donnell in the hills.
Augereau entered Barcelona on the twenty-fourth, and at once asserted his authority by deposing68 Duhesme from the governorship and sending him home to France. They were old enemies, and the general’s friends regarded his disgrace as a display of spite on the part of his superior[338]. But as all the Spanish narratives69 describe the eighteen-months’ dictatorship of Duhesme as having been as much distinguished70 for private[p. 291] rapacity71 as for public oppression, it is probable that the Marshal’s action was wholly justifiable72. The Emperor, however, refused to sanction the prosecution73 of the general on the charges laid against him, remarking that such proceedings74 would give too much pleasure to the Catalans, ‘il y avait bien autre chose à faire que de réjouir les Espagnols par6 cette réaction[339].’
Having concentrated Pino’s and Souham’s troops at Barcelona, Augereau would have proceeded to advance against the Catalans, and lay siege to Tarragona, but for one fact—the magazines of the city were almost empty, and no food could be procured76 for the army. Indeed, after a very few days it was necessary for the Marshal to retrace77 his steps, in order to bring up an enormous convoy for the revictualling of the place, which was being collected at Perpignan and Figueras. All that he had done by his march was to open up the road, and to muzzle78 the fortress of Hostalrich, which was still being blockaded by the Italians. Accordingly, on February 1 his two divisions marched back each by the way that it had originally taken—Souham to Vich, where he halted, Pino to Gerona, where the convoy began presently to gather, escorted thither79 in detachments by a large body of reinforcements which had just come up from France. For the Emperor had strengthened the Army of Catalonia by a division of troops of the Confederation of the Rhine, under General Rouyer, and by a Neapolitan brigade—some 8,000 men in all. But the long train of carts and mules80 came in slowly, and March began before Augereau was ready to move.
Meanwhile, his lieutenant81 Souham had been exposed to a sudden and unexpected peril43. O’Donnell had discovered that the division at Vich was completely isolated and did not count much more than 5,000 sabres and bayonets. Having reorganized his own field army at Moya, near Manresa, and brought it up to a strength of 7,000 foot and 500 horse by calling a few troops from Tarragona, he directed the somatenes of Northern Catalonia to muster82 on the other side of Vich, so as to fall on Souham from the rear. The indefatigable83 miquelete leaders Rovira and Milans got together between 3,000 and 4,000 men, despite of all their previous losses and defeats. On February 19 these levies thrust in the pickets85 of the French division on the eastern[p. 292] side, but Souham did not see his danger till, on the following morning, he found O’Donnell’s regular troops pouring down into the plain of Vich in three columns, and challenging him to a battle in the open. Since the day of Valls the Catalan army had never tried such a bold stroke.
The French general was greatly outnumbered—he had but 4,000 infantry86 and 1,200 horse to oppose to O’Donnell’s 7,500 regulars and the 3,500 miqueletes. The action fell into two separate parts—while Rovira and Milans bickered87 with two battalions left to guard the town of Vich, Souham fought a pitched battle against the Spanish main body with the eight battalions and two and a half regiments of cavalry88[340] which constituted the remainder of his force. It was a fierce and well-contested fight: O’Donnell took the offensive, and his men displayed an unwonted vigour89 and initiative. Unhappily for this enterprising general his small body of horsemen was utterly90 unable to restrain or to cope with the superior French cavalry. Twice the battle was turned by the charge of Souham’s squadrons: after the first repulse91 O’Donnell rallied his beaten right wing, threw in all his reserves, and tried to outflank the shorter French line on both sides. The enemy was losing heavily and showing signs of yielding, when the whole of his cavalry made a second desperate charge on the Spanish right. It was completely successful; O’Donnell’s turning column, composed of the Swiss regiments of Kayser[341] and Traxler, was broken, and the larger part of it captured. Thereupon, the Spanish general, who had displayed undaunted courage throughout the day, and headed several charges in person, thought it time to retire. He fell back on the mountains, leaving behind him 800 killed and wounded, and 1,000 prisoners. The French[p. 293] had suffered at least 600 casualties[342], including Souham himself, desperately92 wounded in the head, and had been within an ace4 of destruction: but for their superiority in cavalry, the day was lost.
On March 13, Augereau had at last collected his vast convoy at Gerona—there were more than a thousand waggons93 laden94 with flour, besides pack-mules, caissons, carriages, and other vehicles of all sorts. He marched in person to escort it, with the Italians—who were now under Severoli, Pino having gone home on leave,—and the newly arrived German division of Rouyer. Verdier was left behind—as in January—to defend the Ampurdam from the incursions of the miqueletes of Rovira and Milans. Meanwhile, Souham’s division, which had passed into the hands of General Augereau, the Marshal’s brother, since its old chief had been invalided95 to France, pursued a line of march parallel to that of the main force. Moving from Vich by the Col de Suspina and Manresa, it came down into the valley of the Llobregat, on the same day that Pino’s and Rouyer’s troops reached it by the other route. The Marshal and the main column had made their way past Hostalrich, which was found still unsubdued, and still blockaded by Mazzuchelli’s brigade, which had been left opposite it in January. These troops were ordered to join their division, a mixed detachment under Colonel Devaux being left in their stead to watch the castle. The Marshal then took up his residence in the palace at Barcelona, and had himself proclaimed Governor of Catalonia with great state, in consonance with the imperial decree of February 8, which had taken the principality out of the hands of King Joseph, and made its administrator96 responsible to Paris alone, and not to Madrid.
Augereau established himself permanently97 at Barcelona, and proceeded during the next two months to act rather as a viceroy than as a commander-in-chief. The conduct of military operations he handed over to his brother, to the unbounded disgust of the other generals. In what proportions the responsibility[p. 294] for the disasters which followed should be distributed between the two Augereaus it is hard to say. But Napoleon, very naturally and reasonably, placed it on the Marshal’s shoulders, and wrote that ‘Ce n’est point en restant dans les capitales éloignées de l’armée que des généraux en chef peuvent acquérir de la gloire ou mériter mon estime[343].’ The force assembled on the Llobregat was now a very large one, consisting of three divisions, those of Augereau, Severoli, and Rouyer. It numbered nearly 20,000 men, for along with the convoy there had marched a mass of drafts for the old regiments of the 7th Corps, which brought their battalions up to full strength[344].
There were only two rational plans of campaign open to the French: the one was to march on Tarragona with a siege-train, and to complete the conquest of Catalonia by the capture of its greatest fortress. The other was to mask Tarragona, and to strike across the principality westward98, in order to get into communication with Suchet and the Army of Aragon, by way of Igualada, Cervera, and Lerida. If the two corps could meet, Northern Catalonia would be completely isolated from Tarragona, Tortosa, and Valencia. It was this latter plan which Augereau had been ordered to carry out by his master. He was directed to march on Lerida, and to join Suchet before that place. By a dispatch of February 19 he had been informed that on March 1 the Army of Aragon would have arrived before Lerida, and would be forming its siege[345]. This prophecy was false: for Suchet, as we have seen, had gone off on his Valencian expedition, and was at Teruel on the appointed day. It was impossible to direct from Paris a combined movement depending on accurate timing99 for its success. But Augereau should have attempted to carry out the order sent him by his master with proper zeal100 and dispatch. This he failed to do: his own inclination101 was to strike a blow at Tarragona, and the movements of his corps show that this was the operation which he had determined102 to carry out. Instead of marching in person[p. 295] with his main body, on Cervera and Lerida, he directed his brother to take his own and Severoli’s divisions and to move by Villafranca on Reus, a large town twelve miles to the north-west of Tarragona, and suitable as a base of operations against that city (March 29). A battalion and a half was dropped at Villafranca, to keep open the communications between Reus and Barcelona, while a brigade of Rouyer’s newly arrived Germans, under the ever-unlucky Schwartz—the vanquished103 of Bruch and Esparraguera[346]—was placed as a sort of flank-guard at Manresa. On March 27 a summons was sent in to Tarragona demanding surrender. This was, of course, refused—the town was full of troops, for Henry O’Donnell had just strengthened its garrison by retiring into it himself, with the 6,000 men who represented the remains of his field army.
The Spanish general, contemplating104 the position of affairs with a wary67 eye, had convinced himself that he could stop General Augereau’s further movements by striking at his line of communication with Barcelona. This he proceeded to do in the most skilful105 and successful fashion. Before the enemy closed in upon Tarragona, he sent out a picked force under General Juan Caro, with orders to attack Villafranca and Manresa without a moment’s delay. This daring stroke was completely successful: Caro stormed Villafranca at dawn on March 30, and took or captured the whole of the 800 men posted there. He was wounded, and had to hand over his command to Campo Verde, who, after some preliminary skirmishing lasting106 for three days, completed the little campaign by driving Schwartz out of Manresa, after a heavy fight, on April 5, in which the German brigade lost 30 officers and 800 men[347]. The somatenes turned out to hunt the routed force as it retired on Barcelona, and inflicted107 many further losses, so that Schwartz only brought back a third of his brigade to the Marshal.
The touch between the two divisions at Reus and the garrison of Barcelona was thus completely severed108. Moreover, Augereau[p. 296] feared lest the next move of the raiding force might be an attack on the isolated force under Colonel Devaux which was blockading Hostalrich. He therefore sent out a brig with one of his aides-de-camp on board, bearing orders to his brother and Severoli to return at once to his head quarters with their troops. By good fortune the messenger reached his destination without being intercepted109 by English cruisers, and the two divisions started on their march back to Barcelona on April 7. Only two days before, Severoli, more by luck than by skill, had got for a moment into touch with the Army of Aragon. An exploring column of two battalions under Colonel Villatte, which he had sent out westward to Falcet, in the direction of the Ebro, met—entirely110 by chance—a similar detachment of Musnier’s division of the 3rd Corps, which had advanced to Mora. On interchanging news of their respective armies, Villatte learnt from his colleague that Suchet was at this moment marching on Lerida, where, according to the Emperor’s instructions to Marshal Augereau, he ought to have arrived more than a month before. Villatte brought back the information to Severoli, but the latter could make no use of it while he was under orders to return without delay to Barcelona[348]. He and General Augereau accomplished111 their retreat in three days, much harassed112 on the way, not only by the somatenes of the mountains but also by O’Donnell, who followed them with a detachment of the garrison of Tarragona. They took some small revenge on him, however, at Villafranca, where they turned on the pursuers and inflicted a sharp check on their advanced guard, which was pressing in, with more courage than discretion114, on a force which outnumbered it by four to one. On April 9 the whole army was encamped outside the walls of Barcelona. Counting the garrison, Augereau had now more than 20,000 men in hand, but, not contented41 with this concentration, he sent orders back to the Ampurdam, ordering Verdier to bring forward as many troops as possible to Gerona, and from thence to push forward down the high-road as far as Granollers, so as to succour Devaux, if the Spaniards should show any intention of relieving Hostalrich.
The Marshal’s next move lost him the favour of Napoleon,[p. 297] and led to his removal in disgrace to Paris. On April 11 he issued orders to Severoli to march on Hostalrich, and there to take over the conduct of the siege from Devaux, while at the same time he himself moved back to Gerona with his brother’s French division, and an immense train, consisting partly of the empty carts of the convoy which he had brought south in March, partly of confiscated115 property of all sorts from Barcelona[349]. Augereau’s excuse for this retrograde movement, which abandoned all Central Catalonia to the enemy, was that his army would have exhausted116 the magazines of Barcelona if he had kept it concentrated for ten days more, and that he had no other way of feeding it, since the activity of the somatenes made the dispatch of foraging117 detachments utterly impossible. The moral effect of the move was deplorable: after taking in hand an offensive movement against Tarragona, he had allowed himself to be checked by an enemy hopelessly inferior in numbers, had lost over 3,000 men in petty combats, and then had retired to the base from which he had started in January. Three months had been wasted, and nothing had been gained save that the small castle of Hostalrich was now in a desperate condition for want of food, and must fall if not speedily succoured. What rendered the position of Augereau the more shameful118 was that he had now in front of him only a skeleton enemy. For O’Donnell at this moment was distracted by the advance of Suchet against Lerida, and had been forced to draw off towards the borders of Aragon two of the four divisions into which he had reorganized his little field army. Facing Augereau there was only Campo Verde’s division of regulars—not over 5,000 strong—and the bands of the mountains. It was against such an enemy that the Marshal had concentrated 25,000 men—including Verdier’s force—between Hostalrich and Gerona.
The food-problem, on which those who defend Augereau lay all the stress possible[350], was no doubt a very real one.[p. 298] The feeding of Barcelona, with its garrison and its large civil population, by means of convoys119 brought from France, was no easy task. But it seems clear that with the large force at his disposition—the 7th Corps was over 50,000 strong[351]—Augereau could have organized convoy-guards sufficiently120 powerful to defy the Spaniards, without abandoning the offensive position in front of Barcelona, which was all-important to him. He might have set aside 10,000 men for that purpose, and still have kept a strong field army together. Had he done so, O’Donnell could not have dared to march with 8,000 men, the pick of the Catalan army, to relieve Lerida, while his old enemies were massed, awaiting an impossible attack, a hundred miles away.
Meanwhile, the one task which was completed by the 7th Corps during the months of April and May was the reduction of Hostalrich. The little castle was a place of strength, perched high above the abandoned town to which it belonged. It was garrisoned121 by two battalions, one of Granadan regulars from Reding’s old division, the other of local Catalan levies[352], under Colonel Juliano Estrada, an officer of high spirit and commendable122 obstinacy123. To the first summons made to him in January by Augereau, he had replied that ‘Hostalrich was the child of Gerona, and would know how to emulate124 the conduct of the mother-city.’ Nor was this high-flown epigram belied125 by the after-conduct of the garrison. Hostalrich held out from January 16 to May 12 without receiving either a convoy from without or any reinforcements. Twice the local miqueletes attempted to pass succours into the castle, but on each occasion they were driven off, after having barely succeeded in communicating with Estrada. Their convoys never got close enough to enter the gates. At last, on May 12, the provisions of the place were completely exhausted: thereupon Estrada took in hand a scheme which was only tried by one other governor during the whole Peninsular War—the Frenchman Brennier at Almeida in May 1811. He put every able-bodied man of the garrison under arms at midnight, issued[p. 299] silently from the castle, and charged at the besiegers’ lines, with the intention of cutting his way through to Campo Verde’s head quarters in the mountains. He was fortunate enough to pierce the Italian outposts at the first rush. But two whole brigades were presently at his heels, his guides lost their way among cliffs and ravines, and he was overtaken. Turning back with his rearguard to fend28 off the pursuers, he was wounded and taken prisoner. Ten other officers and some 300 soldiers shared his fate: the rest of the garrison dispersed127 in the hills, and reached Vich in small parties to the number of 800 men. If only their gallant128 commander had escaped with them, the exploit would have been an exact parallel to the Almeida sortie of 1811.
The reduction of Hostalrich and of a small fort on the Isles129 of Las Medas near the mouth of the Ter, were the last achievements of the Army of Catalonia while it was under the command of Augereau. On April 24 the Emperor had resolved to remove him from his post, and had ordered Marshal Macdonald, Duke of Tarentum, to relieve him. In the Moniteur it was merely stated that the elder Marshal had been forced by ill-health to resign his charge. But the real causes of his displacement130 are plainly stated in Napoleon’s letter to the Minister of War. They were the blow which he had given to the imperial prestige by his retreat to Gerona, and his disobedience in having failed to march on Lerida in aid of Suchet. It must be confessed that the wrath131 of the Emperor was justifiably132 roused. Its final manifestation133 took the shape of a minute directing that when the Moniteur published the news of the successes at Hostalrich and Las Medas, the name of Augereau was to be kept out of the paragraph, and only those of his subordinates mentioned[353].
While the new commander of the 7th Corps was on his way from Italy to Perpignan, and for some time after his arrival on May 22, there was a complete suspension of active operations. None of the French generals in the principality could do more than await orders, and keep the neighbourhood of his cantonments safe from the irrepressible miqueletes. The whole interest[p. 300] of the French operations in North-Western Spain during this period turns on the movements of the Army of Aragon.
On returning from his futile134 Valencian expedition, Suchet had found awaiting him at Saragossa orders to commence without delay the siege of Lerida, and promising135 that Augereau would ‘contain’ the Spanish army of Catalonia, and would ultimately open up communication with him by way of Cervera or Momblanch. In obedience to the imperial mandate136, the commander of the 3rd Corps collected more than half his troops for the expedition against Lerida. This concentration entailed137 the abandonment of the rough country of Southern Aragon to Villacampa and his bands; for having determined to leave only Laval’s division behind him to protect the central parts of the province, Suchet had to evacuate56 the region of Teruel, Albaracin and Montalvan. Laval’s two brigades remained in the valley of the Jiloca, between Saragossa and Daroca, watching the debouches from the mountains. The other two divisions of the Army of Aragon were destined138 for the siege of Lerida. Musnier, with one column, marching down from Caspe and Alca?iz[354], crossed the Ebro at Flix, and approached Lerida from the south. Habert, with his division, coming from the side of Saragossa, made for the same goal by way of Alcubierre and Monzon. It might seem a dangerous experiment to march the two isolated columns across the Spanish front, for a junction139 at a point so remote from their respective starting-points. But, for the moment, there was no hostile force of any importance in their neighbourhood. Severoli and Augereau being still at Reus, when Musnier and Habert started on their way, O’Donnell could spare no troops for the relief of Lerida. It was not till they had retired, and the Duke of Castiglione had withdrawn140 all his forces to Hostalrich and Gerona, that the Captain-General found himself free for an expedition to the West. In front of Musnier, while he was marching on Lerida, there were nothing but trifling141 detachments sent out for purposes of observation by the Governor of Tortosa. In front of Habert there were only 2,000 men under Colonel Perena, thrown out from Lerida to observe the open[p. 301] country between the Segre and the Cinca. This was the sole field-force which remained from the old Spanish Army of Aragon, with the exception of the two dilapidated regiments that formed the nucleus142 of Villacampa’s band.
On April 10, Suchet arrived at Monzon with a brigade of infantry, and the six companies of artillery and four of engineers which were destined for the siege of Lerida. On the thirteenth he was before the walls of the place on the west bank of the Segre, while on the next day Habert appeared on the other bank, driving before him Colonel Perena and his battalions. This second French column had passed the Segre at Balaguer, from which it had expelled the Spanish brigade. Perena, having the choice between returning into the mountains or strengthening the garrison of Lerida, had taken the latter alternative. On the same day Musnier came up from the South, and joined the army with the force that had started from Alca?iz and had crossed the Ebro at Flix. Suchet had now concentrated the whole of the 13,000 men[355] whom he destined for the siege.
The town of Lerida, then containing some 18,000 inhabitants, lies in a vast treeless plain on the western bank of the broad and rapid Segre. Its topography is peculiar143: out of the dead level of the plain rise two steep and isolated hills. One of these, about 800 yards long by 400 broad, and rising 150 feet above the surrounding flats, is crowned by the citadel144 of the town; the other, somewhat longer but rather narrower, is no other than the hill about which Caesar and Afranius contended in the old Civil Wars of Rome, when Lerida was still Ilerda. It lies about three-quarters of a mile from the first-named height. In 1810 its culminating summit was covered by a large work called Fort Garden, and its southern and lower end was protected by the two small redoubts called San Fernando and El Pilar. The town occupies the flat ground between the citadel-height and the river. It has no trans-pontine suburb, but only a strong[p. 302] tête-du-pont on the other side of the Segre. The strength of the place lay in the fact that its whole eastern front was protected by the river, its whole western front by the high-lying citadel. The comparatively short southern front was under the guns of Fort Garden, which commanded all the ground over which an enemy could approach this side of the town. There only remained, unprotected by outer works, the northern front, and this was the point which a skilful enemy would select as his objective. Another fact which much favoured the defence was that the besieger126 was forced to make very long lines of investment, since he had to shut in not only the town, but the whole plateau on which lie Fort Garden and its dependent works. Moreover, he must keep a force beyond the Segre, to block the tête-du-pont, and this force must be a large one, because the east was the quarter from which succours sent from Catalonia must certainly appear. The garrison, on the other hand, was quite adequate to man the works entrusted to it; the entry into the town of Perena’s Aragonese battalions had brought it up to a strength of over 8,000 men. The artillery were the weak point—there were only 350 trained men to man over 100 pieces. The Governor was Major-General Garcia Conde, who owed his promotion145 to his brilliant achievements at Gerona in the preceding September.
Suchet’s 13,000 men were insufficient146 for a close and thorough investment of such a large space as that covered by the Lerida-Garden fortifications. He was forced to leave a considerable part of its southern front watched by cavalry posts alone. Of his total force, Musnier, with six battalions and the greater part of the cavalry—about 4,000 men in all, was beyond the river. Three battalions blocked the tête-du-pont, the rest formed a sort of covering force, destined to keep off the approach of enemies from the side of Catalonia. On the hither side of the Segre the three brigades of Habert, Buget, and Vergès were encamped facing the western and north-western fronts of Lerida. They counted only thirteen battalions, being weakened by 1,200 men who had been detached to garrison Monzon and Fraga. The communication between Musnier’s division and the rest of the army was by a flying bridge thrown across the Segre two miles above the town; it was guarded by a redoubt. The artillery[p. 303] park was placed at the village of San Rufo, opposite the north-western angle of the town, from which it is distant about 2,500 yards. It was evident from the first that this would be the point of attack selected by the French engineers.
The army had barely taken up its position when, on April 19, rumours were spread abroad that O’Donnell was on his way to relieve Lerida. They must have been pure guesses, for the Spanish general on that day was still at Tarragona and had made no movement. They were, however, sufficiently persistent23 to induce Suchet to take off Musnier’s covering corps, strengthened by three other battalions, on a mission of exploration, almost as far as Tarrega, on the Barcelona road. No Spanish force was met, nor could any information be extracted from the inhabitants. The absence of the troops on the left bank of the Segre was soon detected by Garcia Conde, who—to his great regret three days later—sent messengers to inform O’Donnell that the French lines to the east of the city were now almost unoccupied.
The fiery147 O’Donnell was already on his way when this news reached him. The moment that he was sure that Augereau had left Barcelona and was retreating northward148, he had resolved to fly to the relief of Lerida with the two divisions of which he could dispose. On the twentieth he marched from Tarragona by Valls and Momblanch, with 7,000 regular infantry, 400 horse, a single battery, and some 1,500 miqueletes. On the twenty-third he had reached Juneda, twelve miles from Lerida, without having seen a French picket84 or having been detected himself. He intended to drive off the few battalions blocking the bridge-head, and to open up communication with the besieged149 town that same day. Unfortunately for him, Suchet and Musnier had returned on the previous night from their expedition to Tarrega, and were now lying at Alcoletge, three miles north of the bridge-head, with seven battalions and 500 cuirassiers.
Pushing briskly forward along the high-road, in a level treeless plateau, destitute150 of cover of any kind, the leading Spanish division—that of Ibarrola—came into contact about midday with the small force guarding the bridge-head, which was now in charge of Harispe, Suchet’s chief-of-the-staff. To the surprise of the Spaniards, who had expected to see these three battalions and two squadrons of hussars retire in haste, the French showed[p. 304] fight. Harispe was aware that Musnier could come up to his aid within an hour, and was ready for battle. His hussars charged the leading regiment of Ibarrola’s column, and threw it into disorder151, while his infantry formed up in support. At this moment the Spanish general received news that Musnier was moving in towards his flank; he therefore retired, to get the support of O’Donnell, who was following him with the second division. But at the ruined village of Margalef, six miles from Lerida, the column of Musnier came up with Ibarrola, and he was so hard pressed that he formed line, with 300 cavalry on his right wing and his three guns on his left. The position was as bad a one as could be found for the Spanish division—a dead flat, with no cover. Musnier, on reaching the front, flung his cavalry, 500 cuirassiers of the 13th regiment, at the Spanish right wing. The horsemen placed there broke, and fled without crossing sabres, and the French charge fell on the flank battalion of the infantry, which was caught while vainly trying to form square. It was ridden down in a moment, and the horsemen then rolled up the whole line, regiment after regiment. A great part of Ibarrola’s corps was captured, and O’Donnell, who came on the field with the division of Pirez just as the disaster took place, could do no more than retire in good order, covering the scattered remnants of his front line. A Swiss battalion, which he told off as his rearguard, was pierced by the cuirassiers and for the most part captured. In this disastrous152 affair the Spaniards lost 500 killed and wounded and several thousand prisoners[356], as also four flags and the half-battery belonging to Ibarrola’s division. The French, of whom the cavalry alone were seriously engaged, are[p. 305] said by Suchet to have had no more than 23 killed and 82 wounded[357].
It is clear that O’Donnell must take the blame for the ruin that fell upon his little field army. He should not have been caught with his two divisions marching with an interval153 of four miles between them. Nor ought he to have been ignorant of the return of Musnier’s force, considering that he had 400 cavalry, who should have been exploring the whole country-side for miles around, instead of riding in a mass along with Ibarrola’s infantry. The carelessness shown was unpardonable: relying, apparently154, on Garcia Conde’s dispatch—now two days old—concerning the weakness of the French beyond the Segre, the Spanish general was caught moving as if for an unopposed entry into Lerida, instead of in battle order. It may be added that he would have done well to collect more men before advancing against Suchet—8,000 bayonets and sabres were too small a force to tackle the main body of the 3rd Corps, even if they were aided by a sortie from Lerida, as O’Donnell had intended. It would have been well to make some endeavour to get troops from the Valencian army, whose 12,000 men were absolutely idle at the moment. It is true that José Caro and the Valencian Junta were very chary155 of sending their men outside their own border. But for such a great affair as the relief of Lerida a brigade or two might have been borrowed. There was a considerable Valencian force, at the moment, in the neighbourhood of Alca?iz.
After the combat of Margalef Suchet summoned Lerida for a second time, and offered to allow the Governor to see the prisoners and guns which he had taken from O’Donnell. Garcia Conde very rightly answered that he relied on his own forces alone, and should fight to the end. Accordingly, the regular siege began. The trenches156 were opened opposite the north front of the town on April 29; several days of heavy rain hindered the completion of the first parallel, but on May 7 the breaching157 batteries were ready and the bombardment began. The front attacked—the Carmen and Magdalena bastions—was weak: it was not protected by any flanking fires, and had neither a ditch[p. 306] nor a covered way. It was bound to succumb158 before the very heavy fire directed against it, unless the defence should succeed in beating down the fire of the breaching batteries. The Spaniards did their best, bringing up every gun that could be mounted, and replacing each injured piece as it was disabled. But the end was obvious from the first: the walls were not strong enough to resist the attack.
Meanwhile, Suchet made two successive assaults on a part of the defences very far distant from the main front of attack—the two isolated redoubts which stood on the south end of the extramural plateau, of which Fort Garden formed the main protection. He wished to gain a footing on this high ground, both because he could from thence molest159 the south front of the town, and because he wished to prevent the Spaniards from using the plateau as a place of refuge after the fall of the city, which he regarded as inevitable160. The first attempt to take the works by escalade, on the night of April 23-24, was a disastrous failure: the Pilar was occupied for a moment, but the attack on San Fernando failed, and the dominating fire from it drove the stormers out of the smaller work, after they had held it for a few hours.
The second escalade was more successful: it was carried out on the night of May 12-13, and ended in the storming of both works. Only a small part of their garrison succeeded in escaping into Fort Garden: the besieged lost 300 men, the successful assailants only 120. The greater part of the plateau was now in the hands of the French.
On the next day, May 13, the engineers announced that the two breaches161 in the north front of the town walls were practicable, and that same evening Lerida was stormed. The breaches were carried with no great difficulty, but the garrison made a stubborn resistance for some time, behind traverses and fortified houses in the rear of them. When these were carried, the city was at Suchet’s mercy; but it was not at the city alone that he was aiming—he wished to master the citadel also. During the last siege of Lerida, that by the Duke of Orleans in 1707, the high-lying castle had held out for many days after the town had been lost. Suchet’s way of securing his end was effective but brutal162. On the whole, it was the greatest atrocity163 perpetrated by any[p. 307] combatant, French, Spanish, or English, during the whole Peninsular War. When his troops had entered the streets, he directed columns towards each gate, and having secured possession of them all, so as to make escape into the open country impossible, bade his troops push the whole non-combatant population of Lerida uphill into the citadel, where the beaten garrison was already taking refuge. ‘The soldiery,’ as he writes, with evident complacency and pride in his ingenuity164, ‘were set in a concentric movement to push the inhabitants, along with the garrison, towards the upper streets and the citadel. They were dislodged by musketry fire from street after street, house after house, in order to force them into the castle. That work was still firing, and its discharges augmented165 the danger and the panic of the civil population, as they were thrust, along with the wreck166 of the garrison, into the ditch and over the drawbridge. Pressed on by our soldiers, they hastily poured into the castle yard, before the Governor had time to order that they should not be allowed to enter.’ The castle being crammed167 with some fifteen thousand men, women, and children, Suchet gave orders to bombard it with every available mortar168 and howitzer. ‘Every shell,’ he writes, ‘that fell into the narrow space containing this multitude, fell on serried169 masses of non-combatants no less than of soldiery. It had been calculated that the Governor and the most determined officers would be influenced by the presence of these women, children, old folk, and unarmed peasants. As General Suchet had flattered himself would be the case, the scheme had a prompt and decisive effect.’ On the 14th at midday, Garcia Conde, unable to stand the slaughter170 any longer, hoisted171 the white flag.
It is difficult to see how the forcing of thousands of non-combatants, by means of musketry fire, on to the front of the enemy’s line of defence, differs in any way from the device, not unknown among African savages172 and Red Indians[358], of attacking under cover of captured women and children thrust in upon the weapons of their fathers and husbands. The act places that polished writer and able administrator Louis-Gabriel Suchet on the moral level of a king of Dahomey. He acknowledges that the plan was deliberately173 thought out, and that scores of his[p. 308] victims perished not in the subsequent bombardment, but by being shot down by his own men while the crowd was being collected and hunted forward[359]. Historians have denounced the atrocities committed by the French rank and file at Tarragona or Oporto, by the English rank and file at Badajoz or St. Sebastian, but the cultured general who worked out this most effective plan for the reduction of a hostile citadel has never had his due meed of shame. Napier’s remark that, ‘though a town taken by assault is considered the lawful174 prey175 of a licentious176 soldiery, yet this remnant of barbarism does not warrant the driving of unarmed and helpless people into a situation where they must perish,’ seems a sufficiently mild censure177, when all the circumstances are taken into account[360].
The total number of Spanish troops surrendered by Garcia Conde in the Citadel and Fort Garden, or captured by the French during the storm, amounted to over 7,000 men, of whom about 800 were wounded lying in the hospital. It was calculated that 1,200 or 1,500 more had perished during the siege, and that about 500 of the civil population had fallen victims to Suchet’s barbarous device. The French losses during the whole series of operations had been 1,100 killed and wounded. The Spaniards declared that Garcia Conde had betrayed Lerida, and ought never to have surrendered. But the only ground for this accusation178 was that, after a short captivity179, he did homage180 to King Joseph, and became an Afrancesado. Though he had shown dash and courage at Gerona, it is clear that he lacked the firmness of governors such as Mariano Alvarez, or Andrés Herrasti. His defence of Lerida had not been particularly skilful nor particularly resolute181: with over 8,000 men within the walls he ought to have been able to hold out longer against Suchet’s 13,000. The most blameworthy part of his arrangements was his neglect to retrench182 the breaches, and to form a strong second line of temporary works behind them. Alvarez, under similar conditions, and with a garrison far less strong in comparison to the besieging183 army, held out for months after his walls had been breached184, simply because he treated them only as an outer line of resistance, and was prepared to fight on behind his inner defences.
[p. 309]
After the fall of Lerida, Suchet, having received through France the news that the whole of Augereau’s army was collected in the neighbourhood of Hostalrich and Gerona, made up his mind that he had better attempt nothing ambitious until the 7th Corps was in a position to help him. But there was a small task close to his hand, which was well worth undertaking185 in a moment of enforced leisure. This was the siege of Mequinenza, the only fortress left in Spanish hands on the eastern side of Aragon. It was a small place, but not without its strategic importance, for not only did it cover the junction of the Segre and the Ebro, but it was the highest point open for navigation on the last-named river. Any one holding Mequinenza can use the Ebro as a high-road, except in times of drought, and this was an advantage of no small importance, since the country from thence to the sea chances to be singularly destitute of roads of any kind. A few months later, Suchet found the place invaluable186, as he was able to prepare his battering-train for the siege of Tortosa within its walls, and then to send all the heavy material down-stream with the minimum of trouble. Mequinenza was a small place, consisting of a few hundred houses along the river bank enclosed by a weak and old-fashioned wall, but dominated by a strong castle, which towers 500 feet above the water at the end of a spur of the Sierra de Montenegre. The garrison consisted of about 1,000 men, under a Colonel Carbon.
The very day after Lerida had fallen, Suchet sent a brigade to invest Mequinenza: more troops followed after an interval. It was clear that the taking of the town would offer small difficulty: but the castle was another matter. Its defences were independent of those of the place below, and its site was so lofty and rocky that it could not be battered187 from any ground accessible by existing roads. Indeed, it could only be approached along the crest188 of the Sierra, of which it forms the last lofty point. The main interest of the siege of Mequinenza lies in the fact that, in order to reduce the castle, the French engineers had to build a road practicable for heavy guns in zig-zags up the side of the Sierra. They had arrived in front of the place on May 15: by June 1 the road was completed: it was a piece of hard work, as in order to utilize189 the easiest possible slopes it had been made no less than five miles long. But when the guns had once been[p. 310] got up on to the crest of the mountain, Mequinenza—town and castle alike—was doomed190. The town was stormed on June 5; it might have been captured long before, but there was little use in taking possession of it until the attack upon the castle had been begun. Before the storm, Colonel Carbon had wisely ordered all the large river craft in the place, eleven in number, to run down-stream to Tortosa; he was well aware that Suchet wanted to open up the navigation of the Ebro, and was resolved that he should find no vessels191 ready for him. Two of the craft ran ashore192 and were captured; the other nine got off clear.
When the three batteries erected on the summit of the Sierra opened on the castle, the walls began to crumble193 at once. At the end of eight days its front towards the French trenches was a mass of shapeless ruins. Carbon then surrendered, without waiting for an assault, which must undoubtedly194 have proved successful. There was nothing particularly obstinate46, or, on the other hand, particularly discreditable, in the defence. The castle was not a modern fortress; its sole strength had lain in its inaccessible195 position; and when the French had climbed up on to a level with it, nothing more could be done.
Having mastered Lerida and Mequinenza, and obtained a firm footing in the plain of Western Catalonia, Suchet had now harder work before him. His first necessity was to clear the country behind him of the insurgents, who had swarmed196 down from the hills to attack the troops left behind in Central Aragon, while the main army had been concentrated before Lerida. Villacampa had half destroyed a column of 350 men at Arandija on the Xalon on May 14. Catalan somatenes had attacked the garrison of the valley of Venasque, on the very frontier of France, on May 16. Valencian bands had besieged the castle of Alca?iz for many days. But all the enemies of Suchet had to fly, as soon as his main army became once more free for field service. No attempt was made to oppose a serious resistance to his movable columns: the insurgents fled to right and left: the most extraordinary proof of their demoralization was that, on June 13, General Montmarie, at the head of one of these columns, found the strong fort of Morella, within the Valencian border, absolutely unoccupied. He seized and garrisoned it, knowing that this place, which commands the[p. 311] mountain-road from Aragon to Valencia, was of immense strategical importance.
When June came round, Suchet had once more mastered all Aragon, and was free for work outside its borders. A march against Valencia, on the one side, or against Tortosa and Tarragona on the other, was equally possible. But at this moment Napoleon was set on proceeding75 ‘methodically’—in Eastern Spain no less than in Portugal—and the orders issued to the Commander of the 3rd Corps were, to proceed against Tortosa, and cut off Valencia from Catalonia by its capture. The longer and more difficult advance against Valencia itself was relegated197 to a distant date; there must be no more fiascos like that of February. Accordingly, Suchet was ordered to follow up the capture of Lerida and Mequinenza by the reduction of Tortosa[361]. He was informed at the same time that Macdonald, the new commander of the Army of Catalonia, was ordered to attack Tarragona. In this way, the restless O’Donnell would find his hands full at home, and would not be able to spare time or men for the relief of Tortosa. Only from the Valencian Army, which had always been badly led, and managed with the most narrow particularism by José Caro and his Junta, need Suchet expect any trouble.
But until Macdonald was prepared to lead down his corps to the neighbourhood of Tarragona and the lower Ebro, Suchet felt that his own enterprise must be held back, or at least conducted with caution. And although Macdonald had received his orders in May, on taking over Augereau’s post, it was some time before he was able to execute them. June and July had passed, and August had arrived, before he appeared in the regions where Suchet had been told to expect him, and at last placed himself in communication with the Army of Aragon. This long delay was entirely due to the burden imposed upon him by the necessities of Barcelona, with its large garrison and its vast civil population. The provisions which Augereau had introduced into the city in the early spring were exhausted, and his successor was forced to replace them by escorting thither two new convoys of great size in June and July. So active were the miqueletes that Macdonald found himself obliged to[p. 312] take with him his French and his Italian division as escort on each occasion. For a first-class convoy is a vast affair, stretching out to long miles in a mountain country, and requiring to be strongly guarded at every point of its unwieldy length. The Emperor was bitterly disappointed at Macdonald’s delays: it was hard to convince him that the problem of food-supply in Catalonia was almost insoluble, and that neither Barcelona nor the field army could be permanently fed by seizing the resources of the valley of the Llobregat, or the Campo of Tarragona, and making war support war in the regular style. Catalonia had never fed its whole population even in time of peace, but had largely depended on corn brought up from Aragon or imported by sea. But the British Mediterranean198 squadron now made the transport of food to Barcelona by water impossible, while, till the 3rd Corps and the 7th Corps should finally meet, it was impossible to supply the latter from the Aragonese base. While neither of the normal ways of procuring199 a regular supply of provisions was practicable, nothing remained but the weary task of escorting convoys from Perpignan and Figueras to Barcelona. This Macdonald accomplished thrice, in June, July, and August: it was only after the third journey that he left the storeshouses of Barcelona so thoroughly replenished200 that he was able to think of further offensive operations, and to concert the long-delayed junction with Suchet and the 3rd Corps. The Marshal in his autobiography201 confesses that he hated the task set him, and found it entirely out of the lines of his experience. He began his career by repealing202 Augereau’s hanging edicts, and endeavoured to introduce more humane203 methods of warfare204. But his own men were out of hand, and the Spaniards being as fierce as ever, his task was a very hard one.
Meanwhile, Henry O’Donnell was granted three months in which to reorganize the Catalan army, which had suffered so severely205 at Margalef. His untiring energy enabled him to raise his force by the end of July to 22,000 men, organized in five divisions, with which he formed a double front, facing Suchet on the west and Macdonald on the east. One division under Campo Verde lay northward in the mountains, with head quarters at Cardona, and detachments pushed forward as far as[p. 313] Urgel and Olot: its main task was to harass113 the French garrison of the Ampurdam, and to threaten Macdonald’s rear every time that he moved forward towards Barcelona. A second division lay facing that city, on the lower Llobregat, with detachments at Montserrat and Manresa, which kept up the communications with Campo Verde and the North. Two more divisions lay westward, in the direction of Falcet and Borja Blanca, watching Suchet, and prepared to oppose any serious attempt on his part to close in upon Tortosa. The fifth division, or reserve, formed a central mass of troops, ready to reinforce either the detachments which watched Suchet or those which watched Macdonald; it lay south of Tarragona, at the Col de Alba. Thus posted O’Donnell waited for further developments, and continued to drill and exercise his new levies, to dismiss inactive and incompetent206 officers, to collect magazines, and to quarrel with the local Junta. For this active and intelligent, if reckless and high-handed, young officer was on even worse terms with the Catalan authorities than his predecessor207, Blake. The main cause of quarrel was that O’Donnell wished to strengthen his regular troops, by drafting into the depleted208 cadres of Reding’s and Coupigny’s old battalions every recruit that he could catch. He held that the French could only be brought to a final check by disciplined troops. The Junta, on the other hand, believed in guerrilla warfare, and preferred to call out from time to time the miqueletes and somatenes, who drifted back to their homes whenever a crisis was over. Both sides had much to say for themselves: the Catalans could point out that the regular troops had been beaten times out of number, while their own irregulars had achieved many small successes, and done the French much harm. O’Donnell, on the other hand, was quite right in holding that guerrilla operations, much as they might incommode the enemy, would never deal him a fatal blow or finish the war. He dreamed of recruiting his army up to a force of 50,000 men at some happy future date, and of delivering a stroke with superior numbers which should destroy the French hold on Catalonia. Meanwhile, much as they quarrelled, the Irish-Spanish general and the local Junta were both too good haters of France to allow their disputes to prevent a vigorous resistance from[p. 314] being kept up in the principality. O’Donnell carried his point to the extent of persuading the Junta to allow him to form many of the ever-changing tercios of miqueletes into ‘legions,’ which were to be kept permanently embodied[362], and to count as part of the regular army. Hence came the large rise in his muster-rolls.
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1
pacified
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| 使（某人）安静( pacify的过去式和过去分词 )； 息怒； 抚慰； 在（有战争的地区、国家等）实现和平 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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ace
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| n.A牌；发球得分；佼佼者；adj.杰出的 | |
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circuitous
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| adj.迂回的路的，迂曲的，绕行的 | |
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par
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| n.标准，票面价值，平均数量；adj.票面的，平常的，标准的 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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tiresome
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| adj.令人疲劳的，令人厌倦的 | |
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ferment
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| vt.使发酵；n./vt.（使）激动，（使）动乱 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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14
disperse
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| vi.使分散；使消失；vt.分散；驱散 | |
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adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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defiles
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| v.玷污( defile的第三人称单数 )；污染；弄脏；纵列行进 | |
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defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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recurred
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| 再发生，复发( recur的过去式和过去分词 )； 治愈 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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22
countermanded
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| v.取消（命令），撤回( countermand的过去分词 ) | |
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23
persistent
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| adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的 | |
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persistently
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| ad.坚持地；固执地 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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28
fend
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| v.照料（自己），（自己）谋生，挡开，避开 | |
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advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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30
retard
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| n.阻止，延迟；vt.妨碍，延迟，使减速 | |
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31
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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32
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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33
unaware
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| a.不知道的，未意识到的 | |
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demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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35
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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36
partisan
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| adj.党派性的；游击队的；n.游击队员；党徒 | |
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presumptuous
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| adj.胆大妄为的，放肆的，冒昧的，冒失的 | |
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38
subjugate
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| v.征服；抑制 | |
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39
fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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40
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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41
contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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42
perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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43
peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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44
efficiently
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| adv.高效率地，有能力地 | |
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45
obstinately
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| ad.固执地，顽固地 | |
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46
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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47
reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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48
gallows
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| n.绞刑架，绞台 | |
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49
ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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50
atrocities
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| n.邪恶，暴行( atrocity的名词复数 )；滔天大罪 | |
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51
ferocious
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| adj.凶猛的，残暴的，极度的，十分强烈的 | |
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52
retaliated
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| v.报复，反击( retaliate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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53
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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54
fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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55
evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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56
evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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57
altercation
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| n.争吵，争论 | |
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58
junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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59
interim
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| adj.暂时的，临时的；n.间歇，过渡期间 | |
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60
convoy
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| vt.护送，护卫，护航；n.护送；护送队 | |
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61
entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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62
hurled
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| v.猛投，用力掷( hurl的过去式和过去分词 )；大声叫骂 | |
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63
plunge
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| v.跳入，(使)投入，(使)陷入；猛冲 | |
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64
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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65
rumours
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| n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 )；风闻；谣言；谣传 | |
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66
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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67
wary
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| adj.谨慎的，机警的，小心的 | |
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68
deposing
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| v.罢免( depose的现在分词 )；（在法庭上）宣誓作证 | |
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69
narratives
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| 记叙文( narrative的名词复数 )； 故事； 叙述； 叙述部分 | |
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70
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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71
rapacity
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| n.贪婪，贪心，劫掠的欲望 | |
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72
justifiable
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| adj.有理由的，无可非议的 | |
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73
prosecution
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| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
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74
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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76
procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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77
retrace
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| v.折回；追溯，探源 | |
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78
muzzle
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| n.鼻口部；口套；枪(炮)口；vt.使缄默 | |
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79
thither
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| adv.向那里；adj.在那边的，对岸的 | |
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80
mules
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| 骡( mule的名词复数 )； 拖鞋； 顽固的人； 越境运毒者 | |
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81
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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82
muster
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| v.集合，收集，鼓起，激起；n.集合，检阅，集合人员，点名册 | |
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83
indefatigable
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| adj.不知疲倦的，不屈不挠的 | |
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84
picket
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| n.纠察队；警戒哨；v.设置纠察线；布置警卫 | |
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85
pickets
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| 罢工纠察员( picket的名词复数 ) | |
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86
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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87
bickered
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| v.争吵( bicker的过去式和过去分词 )；口角；（水等）作潺潺声；闪烁 | |
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88
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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89
vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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90
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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91
repulse
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| n.击退，拒绝；vt.逐退，击退，拒绝 | |
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92
desperately
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| adv.极度渴望地，绝望地，孤注一掷地 | |
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93
waggons
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| 四轮的运货马车( waggon的名词复数 )； 铁路货车； 小手推车 | |
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94
laden
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| adj.装满了的；充满了的；负了重担的；苦恼的 | |
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95
invalided
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| 使伤残（invalid的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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96
administrator
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| n.经营管理者，行政官员 | |
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97
permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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98
westward
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| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
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99
timing
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| n.时间安排，时间选择 | |
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100
zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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101
inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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102
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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103
vanquished
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| v.征服( vanquish的过去式和过去分词 )；战胜；克服；抑制 | |
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104
contemplating
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| 深思，细想，仔细考虑( contemplate的现在分词 )； 注视，凝视； 考虑接受（发生某事的可能性）； 深思熟虑，沉思，苦思冥想 | |
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105
skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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106
lasting
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| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
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107
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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108
severed
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| v.切断，断绝( sever的过去式和过去分词 )；断，裂 | |
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109
intercepted
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| 拦截( intercept的过去式和过去分词 )； 截住； 截击； 拦阻 | |
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110
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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111
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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112
harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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113
harass
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| vt.使烦恼，折磨，骚扰 | |
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114
discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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115
confiscated
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| 没收，充公( confiscate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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116
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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117
foraging
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| v.搜寻（食物），尤指动物觅（食）( forage的现在分词 )；（尤指用手）搜寻（东西） | |
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118
shameful
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| adj.可耻的，不道德的 | |
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119
convoys
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| n.（有护航的）船队( convoy的名词复数 )；车队；护航（队）；护送队 | |
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120
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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121
garrisoned
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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122
commendable
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| adj.值得称赞的 | |
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123
obstinacy
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| n.顽固；（病痛等）难治 | |
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124
emulate
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| v.努力赶上或超越，与…竞争；效仿 | |
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125
belied
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| v.掩饰( belie的过去式和过去分词 )；证明（或显示）…为虚假；辜负；就…扯谎 | |
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126
besieger
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| n. 围攻者, 围攻军 | |
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127
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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128
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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129
isles
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| 岛( isle的名词复数 ) | |
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130
displacement
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| n.移置，取代，位移，排水量 | |
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131
wrath
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| n.愤怒，愤慨，暴怒 | |
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132
justifiably
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| adv.无可非议地 | |
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133
manifestation
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| n.表现形式；表明；现象 | |
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134
futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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135
promising
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| adj.有希望的，有前途的 | |
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136
mandate
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| n.托管地；命令，指示 | |
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137
entailed
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| 使…成为必要( entail的过去式和过去分词 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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138
destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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139
junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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140
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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141
trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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142
nucleus
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| n.核，核心，原子核 | |
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143
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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144
citadel
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| n.城堡；堡垒；避难所 | |
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145
promotion
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| n.提升，晋级；促销，宣传 | |
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146
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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147
fiery
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| adj.燃烧着的，火红的；暴躁的；激烈的 | |
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148
northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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149
besieged
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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150
destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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151
disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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152
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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153
interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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154
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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155
chary
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| adj.谨慎的，细心的 | |
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156
trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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157
breaching
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| 攻破( breach的过去式 )； 破坏，违反 | |
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158
succumb
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| v.屈服，屈从；死 | |
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159
molest
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| vt.骚扰，干扰，调戏 | |
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160
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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161
breaches
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| 破坏( breach的名词复数 )； 破裂； 缺口； 违背 | |
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162
brutal
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| adj.残忍的，野蛮的，不讲理的 | |
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163
atrocity
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| n.残暴，暴行 | |
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164
ingenuity
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| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
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165
Augmented
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| adj.增音的 动词augment的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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166
wreck
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| n.失事，遇难；沉船；vt.(船等)失事，遇难 | |
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167
crammed
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| adj.塞满的，挤满的；大口地吃；快速贪婪地吃v.把…塞满；填入；临时抱佛脚( cram的过去式) | |
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168
mortar
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| n.灰浆，灰泥；迫击炮；v.把…用灰浆涂接合 | |
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169
serried
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| adj.拥挤的；密集的 | |
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170
slaughter
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| n.屠杀，屠宰；vt.屠杀，宰杀 | |
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171
hoisted
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| 把…吊起，升起( hoist的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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172
savages
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| 未开化的人，野蛮人( savage的名词复数 ) | |
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173
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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174
lawful
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| adj.法律许可的，守法的，合法的 | |
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175
prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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176
licentious
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| adj.放纵的，淫乱的 | |
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177
censure
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| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
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178
accusation
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| n.控告，指责，谴责 | |
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179
captivity
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| n.囚禁；被俘；束缚 | |
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180
homage
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| n.尊敬，敬意，崇敬 | |
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181
resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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182
retrench
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| v.节省，削减 | |
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183
besieging
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的现在分词 ) | |
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184
breached
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| 攻破( breach的现在分词 )； 破坏，违反 | |
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185
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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186
invaluable
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| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
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187
battered
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| adj.磨损的；v.连续猛击；磨损 | |
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188
crest
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| n.顶点；饰章；羽冠；vt.达到顶点；vi.形成浪尖 | |
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189
utilize
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| vt.使用，利用 | |
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190
doomed
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| 命定的 | |
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191
vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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192
ashore
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| adv.在(向)岸上，上岸 | |
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193
crumble
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| vi.碎裂，崩溃；vt.弄碎，摧毁 | |
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194
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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195
inaccessible
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| adj.达不到的，难接近的 | |
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196
swarmed
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| 密集( swarm的过去式和过去分词 )； 云集； 成群地移动； 蜜蜂或其他飞行昆虫成群地飞来飞去 | |
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197
relegated
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| v.使降级( relegate的过去式和过去分词 )；使降职；转移；把…归类 | |
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198
Mediterranean
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| adj.地中海的；地中海沿岸的 | |
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199
procuring
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的现在分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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200
replenished
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| 补充( replenish的过去式和过去分词 )； 重新装满 | |
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201
autobiography
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| n.自传 | |
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202
repealing
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| 撤销，废除( repeal的现在分词 ) | |
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203
humane
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| adj.人道的，富有同情心的 | |
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204
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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205
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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206
incompetent
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| adj.无能力的，不能胜任的 | |
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207
predecessor
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| n.前辈，前任 | |
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208
depleted
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| adj. 枯竭的, 废弃的 动词deplete的过去式和过去分词 | |
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