The situation which had been created by King Joseph’s rapid conquest of the open country of Andalusia in January and February 1810, and by his failure to capture Cadiz, was destined1 to remain unchanged in any of its more important details for a full year. Soult, with the three corps2 of Victor, Sebastiani, and Mortier, was strong enough to hold the towns and plains, strong enough also to blockade Cadiz and to spare expeditionary forces at intervals3 for operations outside the limits of his own sphere of command. From time to time he sent the greater part of Mortier’s corps against Estremadura, and the greater part of Sebastiani’s corps against Murcia. But his 70,000 men were not sufficient to provide an army for the permanent conquest of either of these provinces. And every time that 10,000 or 15,000 sabres and bayonets were distracted to one of these raids, the total of troops left behind to watch Cadiz, to guard Seville, and to repress the interminable activity of the guerrilleros of the mountains was found to be dangerously small. Ere long the force that had marched out for external operations had to be called back in haste, to ward4 off some peril5 to one or other of the vital points of Andalusia.
Soult himself remained for the greater part of his time at Seville, occupied not only in keeping the movements of his three corps in unison—no easy task, for both Victor and Sebastiani had wills of their own, and even the placid6 Mortier occasionally murmured—but in superintending the details of civil administration. It was very seldom that he marched out in person at the head of his last reserves, to strengthen some weak point in his line of offence or defence. During the next two years he was quite as much the Viceroy as the Commander-in-Chief in Andalusia. Though the Emperor had refrained from naming that[p. 316] kingdom one of the ‘Military Governments,’ which he had created by his decree of Feb. 15, 1810, yet Soult made himself in fact, if not in name, as independent as the governors of Aragon or Navarre or Catalonia. The bond of common interests and desires which had united him to King Joseph during the winter of 1809-10 was soon broken. The monarch7 at Madrid soon discovered that his presence was not desired in Andalusia—some good military reason could always be discovered which made it impracticable that he should revisit Seville. Little or no money was remitted8 to him from the South: rich as was Soult’s sphere of governance, it was always made to appear that the expenses of the sustenance9 of the army and of the siege of Cadiz were so great that no surplus remained for the central government. When the King murmured, and appealed to Paris, his brother usually supported the Marshal[363]; it was Napoleon’s first maxim10 that war should maintain war, and he thought it of far more importance that the army of Andalusia should pay for itself, than that the bankrupt exchequer11 at Madrid should be recruited[364]. As the months rolled on, and Joseph gradually realized the position, his hatred12 for the plausible13 Marshal became as bitter as it had been during their earlier quarrel in the summer of 1809. He had good reason to be angry, for Soult undoubtedly14 sacrificed the interests of the King of Spain to those of the Viceroy of Andalusia. He played a selfish game, though he had always a good military excuse for any particular refusal to fall in with the King’s plans or to obey his orders. In 1810 his conduct may be justified15, but in 1811 and 1812 he undoubtedly—as will be shown in chapters to come—ruined what small chance there was of bringing the Peninsular War to a successful termination, by pursuing a policy which made the maintenance of the French authority in Andalusia its chief end, and not the general good of the imperial arms in Spain.
Soult’s conduct at Oporto in the days of his invasion of Portugal must never be forgotten when his doings in Andalusia are discussed. He undoubtedly yearned16 after supreme17 power, and though the lesson which he had received after his[p. 317] vain attempt to create himself king of ‘Northern Lusitania’ had not been forgotten, his ambitions were as great as ever. He suppressed his desire for the royal name, but gave himself the reality of the royal power. He practically kept a court, a ministry18, and a revenue of his own[365], despite of all the angry complaints of his immediate19 master at Madrid. Secure in the support of the Emperor, who reckoned him the ‘best military head in Spain,’ he ignored or disobeyed all such communication from Joseph as did not suit his purpose. To a great extent he justified his policy by success: the plain-land of Andalusia was undoubtedly the part of the French holding in Spain where the administration was most successful, and the occupation most thorough. Soult not only built up, but kept together, an Afrancesado party among the local population, which was stronger and more compact than in any other part of the Peninsula. He even succeeded in raising a small permanent force of Spanish auxiliaries20, which was decidedly more trustworthy and less given to desertion than the regiments22 of the same class which King Joseph was perpetually creating in Madrid—only to see them crumble23 away under his hand. The Army of Andalusia was strengthened by two regiments of Chasseurs à Cheval, which were attached to the 5th Corps[366], and some free companies of infantry24[367], which were used for garrison25 and blockhouse work. But it was far more important that Soult succeeded in enlisting26 many battalions28 of a sort of national guard, which he called Escopeteros (fusiliers); with them he kept the peace of the larger towns, such as Seville, Cordova, and Jaen. The very existence of such a force, which King Joseph had vainly attempted to establish in Madrid, was of evil omen29 for the patriotic30 cause in Andalusia. On several occasions they fought well against the[p. 318] guerrilleros, when the latter attempted raids dangerously close to the great cities. For the Juramentado was well aware that if the national cause were at last to triumph an evil fate would await him. Having once committed himself to the French side, he was forced to defend his own neck from the gallows31.
Soult’s civil government was conducted with a far greater decency32 than that of Duhesme, Kellermann, and other noted33 plunderers among the French governors. But it involved, nevertheless, a considerable amount of more or less open spoliation. The Marshal’s own hands were not quite clean: his collection of the works of Murillo and Velasquez, the pride of Paris in after years, represented blackmail35 on Andalusian church-corporations, when it did not come from undisguised confiscation36. Unless he was much maligned37 by his own compatriots, no less than by the Spaniards, hard cash as well as pictures did not come amiss to him[368]. But his exactions were moderate compared with those of some of his subordinates: though Mortier and Dessolles had good reputations Sebastiani had an infamous38 one, and Perreymond, Godinot (who shot himself early in 1812 when called to face a commission of inquiry), and certain other generals have very black marks against them. Still the machine of government worked, if not without friction39, at least with an efficiency that contrasted favourably40 with the administration of any other province of Spain save Suchet’s domain41 of Aragon.
But it was only the valley of the Guadalquivir which lay subdued42 beneath the feet of Soult. Cadiz and the mountains had yet to be dealt with, and, as the months went on, the difficulties of the French Army of Andalusia became more and more evident. It was only by degrees that the French generals came to comprehend the absolute impregnability of Cadiz, and the advantage that the possession of the island-city and the fleet depending on it gave to the Spaniards. In the first months of the siege Victor[p. 319]’s engineers and artillerists had flattered themselves that something might be done to molest43 the place, if not to reduce it to surrender, by pushing batteries forward to the extreme front of the ground in their possession all around the harbour. Within the first weeks of his arrival in front of Cadiz, Victor made an attempt to push forward his posts along the high-road which crosses the broad salt-marshes of the Santi Petri. But the bogs45 and water-channels were found impracticable, and the Spanish works in front of the bridge of Zuazo too strong to be attacked along the narrow causeway. The French drew back to Chiclana, which became the head quarters of the left wing of the blockading force, and where Ruffin’s division was permanently46 encamped. It was then thought that something might be accomplished47 further to the north, by working against the Arsenal48 of La Carraca, at the one end of the Spanish line, or the projecting castle of Puntales at the other. The struggle for the points of vantage from which Puntales could be battered49 formed the chief point of interest during the early months of the siege. The French, pushing down from the mainland on to the peninsula of the Trocadero, began to erect50 works on the ground most favourable51 for attacking the fort of Matagorda, which had once more become the outermost52 bulwark53 of Cadiz.
There was a bitter fight over this work, which stands on the tidal flats below the Trocadero, surrounded by mud for one half of the day, and by water for the other. It will be remembered that Matagorda had been blown up at the time of the first arrival of the French before Cadiz. But after a few days of reflection the English and Spanish engineer officers in command of the defence grew uneasy as to the possibilities of mischief54 which might follow from the seizure55 of the ruined fort by the enemy. Their fears, as it afterwards turned out, were unnecessary. But they led to the reoccupation of Matagorda on February 22 by a detachment of British artillery56, supported by a company of the 94th regiment21. The front of the work facing toward the mainland was hastily repaired, and heavy guns brought over the harbour from Cadiz were mounted on it. Moreover, it was arranged that it should be supported by a Spanish ship-of-the-line and some gunboats, as far as the mud banks permitted.
[p. 320]
Victor took the reoccupation of the fort as a challenge, and thought that the Allies must have good reasons for attaching so much importance to it. Accordingly he multiplied his batteries on the Trocadero, till he had got forty guns mounted in a dominating position, with which to overwhelm the garrison in their half-ruinous stronghold. There was a long and fierce artillery contest, but the French had the advantage both in the number of guns and in the concentric fire which they could pour upon the fort. The naval58 help promised to Matagorda proved of little assistance, partly owing to the impracticability of the mud flats when the tide was out, partly because the gunboats could not endure the fire of the French heavy artillery. On April 22 General Graham, who had arrived at Cadiz and taken command of the British forces over the head of General Stewart, ordered Matagorda to be evacuated59. It was high time, for the fort was shot to pieces, and 64 men out of a garrison of 140 had been killed or wounded[369]. The enemy took possession of the ruins, and rebuilt and rearmed the fort; they also re-established the ruined forts of San Luis and San José, on the firm ground facing Matagorda, to which they had not possessed60 a safe access till the outer work in the mud had been captured. These were the most advanced points toward Cadiz which the French could hold, and here they mounted their heaviest guns, in the hope of demolishing61 the Castle of Puntales on the other side of the water, and of making the inner harbour useless for shipping62. Their purpose was only partly accomplished: the ships, it is true, had to move east or west, into the outer harbour or nearer to the Carraca and the Isla de Leon. But Puntales was never seriously injured, and maintained an intermittent63 artillery duel64 with Matagorda across the strait as long as the siege lasted. The occasional bombs that fell beyond Puntales, in the direction of the Cortadura, did not seriously incommode the garrison, and ships could always pass the strait between the two forts at night without appreciable65 risk. Later on Soult caused mortars66 of unprecedented67 dimensions to be cast in the arsenal of Seville, on the designs presented to him by an artillery officer of the name[p. 321] of Villantroys. But even when these had been mounted on Matagorda no great damage was done, one bomb only—as a Spanish popular song recorded—ever touched Cadiz town, and that only killed a street dog.
Spanish Infantry 1810
Enlarge Spanish Infantry 1810
(showing the new uniform introduced under British influence)
Note: Under the influence of the immense quantity of British materials supplied, the uniform has completely changed since 1808. The cut is assimilated to that of the British army—the narrow-topped shako, and long trousers have been introduced. The coat is dark-blue, the trousers grey-blue, the facings red. Grenadiers have the grenade, light-companies the bugle-horn on their shakos.
After the fall of Matagorda, the next most notable event of the spring in front of Cadiz was a fearful hurricane, lasting68 from the 6th to the 9th of March, which caused grave losses to the vessels69 in the outer harbour. A south-wester from the Atlantic drove three Spanish line-of-battle ships, one of which, the Concepcion, was a three-decker of 100 guns, and a Portuguese71 74, upon the coast about Puerto Santa Maria and Rota. The French opened upon them with red-hot shot, and destroyed them all, slaying72 a great part of the unfortunate crews, who had no thought of resistance, and were only trying to escape to land, where they were bound to become prisoners. More than thirty merchant ships, mostly British, were destroyed by the same storm. One was a transport containing a wing of the 4th regiment, which was coming to reinforce the garrison of Cadiz. Some 300 men from this unlucky vessel70 got ashore73 and were captured by the French.
A month after the loss of Matagorda the outer harbour of Cadiz again saw some exciting scenes. Moored74 beside the Spanish fleet were a number of pontoons, old men-of-war from which the masts and rigging had been removed, and which were used as prison-ships. On them there were still kept several thousands of French prisoners, mostly the men captured with Dupont in 1808. It is astonishing that the Regency had not ordered their removal to some more remote spot the moment that Victor’s army appeared in front of Cadiz. Overcrowded, and often kept without sufficient food for days at a time, these unhappy captives were in a deplorable position. The sight of their fellow-countrymen in possession of the opposite coast drove them to desperation, and they were prepared to take any risks for a chance of escape. Having noted, during the hurricane of March 6th-9th, that every vessel which broke loose from its moorings had been cast by the set of the tide upon the coast in the direction of Rota, the prisoners on the Castilla, on which nearly all the officers were confined, waited for the next south-wester. When it came, on the night of the 15th-16th[p. 322] May, they rose upon their small guard of Spanish marines, overpowered them, and then cut the cables of the pontoon, committing themselves to the perils75 of the sea as well as to the risk of being sunk by the neighbouring men-of-war. But it was supposed that they had got adrift by accident, and they had been carried by the tide almost to the opposite shore before it was realized that an escape was on foot. Two gunboats sent to tow the Castilla back met with resistance, the prisoners firing on them with the muskets76 taken from their guard, and throwing cold shot down upon the little vessels when their crews tried to board. Just as they were beaten off, the pontoon went ashore. The French garrisons77 of the neighbouring batteries ran down to help their countrymen to escape; at the same moment other gunboats, Spanish and English, came up, and began firing on the crowd, who strove to swim or scramble78 ashore. Some were killed, but over 600 got to land. It is surprising that after this incident the Spaniards did not take better care of the remaining pontoons, but ten days later the prisoners on the Argonauta were able to repeat the trick of their comrades. On this occasion the absconding79 vessel ran ashore upon a mud-bank some hundreds of yards from the shore of the Trocadero. The stranded80 vessel remained for hours under the fire of the gunboats which pursued it, and a large proportion of the men on board perished, for when the troops on shore brought out boats to save the survivors81, many of them were sunk as they plied57 between the Argonauta and the land. Finally the pontoon was set on fire, and several wounded Frenchmen are said to have been burnt alive. The English seamen82 who were engaged in this distressing83 business were heartily84 disgusted with their share in it[370].
After this the Regency at last ordered the removal of the rest of the French prisoners from Cadiz. The few remaining officers were sent to Majorca, and afterwards to England. Of the men part were dispatched to the Canaries, part to the Balearic Islands. But the islanders protested against the presence of so[p. 323] many French in their midst, raised riots, and killed some of the prisoners. Thereupon the Regency ordered 7,000 of them to be placed upon the desolate85 rock of Cabrera, where there were no inhabitants and no shelter save one small ruined castle. The wretched captives, without roofs or tents to cover them, and supplied with food only at uncertain intervals and in insufficient86 quantity, died off like flies. Once, when storms hindered the arrival of the provision ships from Majorca, many scores perished in a day of sheer starvation[371]. The larger half did not survive to see the peace of 1814, and those who did were for the most part mere87 wrecks88 of men, invalids89 for life. Even allowing for the desperate straits of the Spanish government, which could not feed its own armies, the treatment of the Cabrera prisoners was indefensible. They might at least have been exchanged for some of the numerous Spanish garrisons taken in 1810-11; but the Regency would not permit it, though Henry O’Donnell had arranged with Macdonald a regular cartel for prisoners in the neighbouring Catalonia. This is one of the most miserable90 corners of the history of the Peninsular War.
But to return to Andalusia. By the month of May the Regency at Cadiz had recovered a certain confidence, in view of the utter inefficacy of Victor’s attempt to molest their city. From that month began a systematic91 attempt to organize into a single system all the forces that could be turned to account against Soult. There were now in the Isla some 18,000 Spanish troops, as well as 8,000 British and Portuguese. This was a larger garrison than was needed, now that the defences had been put in order; and it was possible to detach small expeditionary corps to east and west, to stir up trouble in the coast-land of Andalusia, and serve as the nuclei92 round which the insurgents93 of the mountains might gather. For the insurrection in the remoter corners of the kingdom of Granada had never died down, despite of all the efforts of Sebastiani to quell94 it. The Regency had now determined95 that an effort[p. 324] should be made to extend it westward—the Sierra de Ronda being quite as well suited for irregular operations as the Alpujarras. At the other end of the line, too, there were opportunities in the Condado de Niebla and the lands by the mouth of the Guadiana, which the French had hardly touched: trifling96 detachments of the 5th Corps at Moguer and Niebla observed rather than occupied that region. By means of the large fleet always moored in Cadiz harbour, it was possible to transfer troops to any point of the coast, for the French could not guard every creek97 and fishing-village, and if an expedition failed it had a fair chance of escaping by sea. Moreover any force thrown ashore in the south had the option of retiring into Gibraltar if hard pressed, just as any force sent to the west might retire on Portugal.
In addition to the insurgents and the garrison of Cadiz there were two regular armies whose energies might be turned against Soult. The relics98 of Areizaga’s unfortunate host, which had fled into the kingdom of Murcia, and had been rallied by Blake, were now 12,000 strong, and since Suchet’s expedition against Valencia had failed, and there was no danger from the north, this force could be employed against Sebastiani and the French corps in the kingdom of Granada. It was in a deplorable condition, but was yet strong enough to render assistance to the insurgents of the Alpujarras, by demonstrating against Granada, and so forcing Sebastiani to keep his troops massed for a regular campaign. Whenever the French general was threatened from the east, he had to abandon his smaller posts, and to desist from hunting the guerrilleros, who thus obtained a free hand.
The Regency could also count to a certain extent upon aid from La Romana and the Army of Estremadura. The Marquis—it will be remembered—was now confronted in his own province by Reynier and the 2nd Corps[372], but he had thrust his flanking division, under Ballasteros, into the mountains of North-Western Andalusia, where it had been contending with Mortier’s corps in the direction of Ara?ena and Zalamea, as has already been recounted[373]. This outlying division was in[p. 325] communication with Cadiz, via Ayamonte and the lower Guadiana, and could always compel Soult to detach troops from Seville by descending99 into the plains. La Romana himself could, and occasionally did, provide further occupation for the 5th Corps by moving other troops southward, on the Seville high-road, when he was not too much engrossed100 by Reynier’s demonstrations102 in his front.
Thus it was possible to harass103 the French troops in Andalusia on all sides. With the object of securing some sort of unity104 for their operations, the Regency made Blake Commander-in-Chief of the forces in Cadiz as well as of those in Murcia, declaring them parts of a single ‘Army of the Centre.’ Albuquerque’s separate charge had come to an end when, after many quarrels with the Cadiz Junta105, he resigned the post of governor, and accepted that of Ambassador to the Court of St. James’s at the end of March. He died not long after his arrival in London, engaged to the last in a hot warfare106 of pamphlets and manifestos with the Junta, whose monstrous107 insinuations against his probity108 and patriotism109 are said to have driven him into the brain-fever which terminated his life. He was a man of unsullied honour and high personal courage, but not a lucky general, though his last military action, the direction of the Army of Estremadura on Cadiz, was a sound and meritorious110 piece of strategy. He and La Romana were the only Spanish officers with whom Wellington was able to work in concert without perpetual friction, but the British Commander-in-Chief had a greater respect for his allies’ hearts than for their heads as may be gathered from constant references in the Wellington Dispatches, as well as from the confidential111 conversations of the Duke’s later years[374].
Blake arrived in Cadiz on April 22, having turned over the temporary command of the Murcian army to General Freire, the ever-unlucky cavalry112 commander who had served under Venegas and Areizaga in the campaigns of Almonacid and Oca?a. He set himself to reorganize the various Estremaduran and other troops in Cadiz into one division of horse and three divisions of foot, which he numbered Vanguard, 2nd, and 4th of the Army[p. 326] of the Centre. The Murcian forces were distributed into the 1st, 3rd, and 5th infantry divisions of the same army, and two small cavalry divisions. This reorganization of the regular troops was followed by systematic attempts to foster the insurrection to right and left of Seville. General Copons was sent to Ayamonte, at the mouth of the Guadiana, with 700 men, round whom he collected a miscellaneous assemblage of peasantry, which often descended113 from the hills to worry the French garrisons of Moguer and Niebla. When chased by stronger forces detached from Mortier’s corps, he would retire into Portugal. When unmolested he joined hands with Ballasteros and the flanking division of the army of La Romana, or executed raids of his own in the central plain of the kingdom of Seville. Often chased, and sometimes dispersed115, his bands were never completely crushed, and kept Western Andalusia, or ‘Spanish Algarve,’ as it was called in the old days when the boundaries of Castile and Portugal had only just been fixed116, in a state of constant ferment117.
The diversion which was prepared on the other flank by Blake and the Regency was far more important. Their intention was to wrest118 from the French the whole district of the Sierra de Ronda, the mountain region between Gibraltar and Malaga, and so to thrust in a wedge between Victor and Sebastiani. There was already the nucleus119 of an insurrection in this quarter; soon after King Joseph’s triumphal progress from Xeres by Ronda and Malaga to Granada, the first small bands had appeared. They were headed by local chiefs, such as Becerra, Ruiz, and Ortiz—better known as El Pastor—whose original followers120 were a party of the smugglers who, in times of peace and war alike, had been wont121 to ply122 a contraband123 trade with Gibraltar. In March and April they were not strong enough to do more than molest the convoys125 passing from Malaga and Seville to the French garrison of Ronda. But finding the enemy in their neighbourhood weak and helpless—the bulk of the 1st Corps was before Cadiz, and that of the 5th Corps was still watching La Romana on the roads north of Seville—they multiplied in numbers and extended their raids far afield. They asked for aid both from the British Governor of Gibraltar and from the Regency at Cadiz, promising126 that, if they were backed by regular[p. 327] troops, they would easily expel the French and master the whole country-side. Already their activity had produced favourable results, for Soult sent down from Seville Girard’s division of the 5th Corps, a detachment which left Mortier too weak for any serious operations on the side of Estremadura, and Sebastiani drew back from an expedition against Murcia, which might otherwise have proved most prejudicial to the Spanish cause.
This raid deserves a word of notice: just after Blake had left Murcia for Cadiz, Sebastiani (who had for the moment got the better of the insurgents in the Alpujarras) assembled at Baza, in the eastern extremity127 of the kingdom of Granada, the greater part of the 4th Corps, and marched with 7,000 men on Lorca. Freire, distrusting his troops, refused to fight, threw 4,000 men into the impregnable harbour-fortress128 of Cartagena, and retired129 with the rest of his army to Alicante, within the borders of Valencia. Thus, the rich city of Murcia, along with the whole of the rest of its province, which had never seen the French before, was exposed undefended to Sebastiani. He entered it on April 23, and commenced by fining the corporation 50,000 dollars for not having received him with a royal salute130 and the ringing of the bells of their churches. The rest of his behaviour was in keeping: he entered the cathedral while mass was in progress, and interrupted the service to seize the plate and jewels. He confiscated131 the money and other valuables in all the monasteries132, hospitals, and banks. He permitted his officers to blackmail many rich inhabitants, and his rank and file to plunder34 houses and shops. Two days after his entry he retraced133 his footsteps, and retreated hastily towards Granada, leaving a ruined city behind him[375]. The cause of his sudden departure was the news that the insurgents of the Alpujarras, whom he had vainly imagined that he had crushed, were beleaguering134 all his small garrisons, and that Malaga itself had been seized by a large band of the Serranos, and held for a short space, though General Perreymond had afterwards succeeded in driving them out. But the whole of the Alhama and Ronda Sierras were up in arms, no less than the more eastern hills where the rising had begun. It would have been absurd for Sebastiani to proceed any further[p. 328] with the offensive campaign in Murcia, when Southern Andalusia was being lost behind his back.
Throughout the month of May Girard and Sebastiani, with some small assistance from Dessolles, who spared a few battalions from the kingdom of Cordova, were actively135 engaged in endeavouring to repress the mountaineers. The larger bands were dispersed, not without severe fighting—Girard’s men had hot work at Albondonates on May 1, and at Grazalema on May 3[376]. But just as the main roads had been reopened, and the blockade of the French garrison of Ronda raised, the whole situation was changed by the landing at Algeciras of General Lacy, with a division of 3,000 regulars sent from Cadiz by the Regency (June 19). His arrival raised the spirits of the insurgents, and they thronged136 in thousands to his aid, when he announced his intention of marching against Ronda. Lacy, however, was both irresolute137 and high-handed—as he afterwards showed on a larger stage when he became Captain-General of Catalonia. On arriving before Ronda he judged the rocky stronghold too formidable for him to meddle139 with, and turned aside to Grazalema, to the disgust of his followers. He then fell into a quarrel with the Serranos, dismissed many of them—smugglers and others—from his camp, as unworthy to serve alongside of regular soldiers, and even imprisoned140 some of the more turbulent chiefs. At this moment Girard from the north and Sebastiani from the east began to close in upon him. Uneasy at their approach, Lacy fell back towards the coast, and after some insignificant141 skirmishes re-embarked his force at Estepona and Marbella, from whence he sailed round to Gibraltar and landed at the Lines of San Roque, under the walls of that fortress (July 12)[377]. Almost the only positive gain produced by his expedition had been the occupation of Marbella, where he left a garrison which maintained itself for a considerable time. It was no doubt something to have detained Girard and Sebastiani in the remote mountain[p. 329] of the south for a full month, when they were much needed by Soult in other directions. Yet the evil results of Lacy’s timid man?uvres and hasty flight upon the morale142 of the insurgents might have been sufficiently143 great to counterbalance these small advantages, if the Serranos had been less tough and resolute138. It is surprising to find that they did not lose courage, but kept the rising afoot with undiminished energy, being apparently144 confirmed in their self-confidence by the poor show made by the regular army, rather than disheartened at the ineffective succour sent them from Cadiz. Despite of all the efforts of Soult’s flying columns, they could not be entirely145 dispersed, though they were hunted a hundred times from valley to valley. The power of the viceroy of Andalusia stopped short at the foot-hills, though his dragoons kept the plains in subjection. Every time that Ronda and the other isolated146 garrisons in the mountains had to be revictualled, the convoy124 had to fight its way to its destination through swarms147 of ‘sniping’ insurgents[378].
The Regency had not yet done with Lacy and his expeditionary force. After they had lain for some time under the walls of Gibraltar, they were re-embarked and taken back to Cadiz, from where a short time after they were dispatched for a raid in the Condado de Niebla. In this region, where Copons was already in arms, the French forces, under Remond and the Duke of Aremberg, were so weak that the Junta believed that Lacy’s division would easily clear the whole country-side of the enemy. Its liberation would be most valuable, because Cadiz was wont to draw both corn and cattle from the lands between the Rio Tinto and Guadiana, and had felt bitterly the want of its accustomed supplies since the war had been carried thither148.
Lacy landed in the Bay of Huelva on August 23 with nearly 3,000 men. He had the good fortune to meet and to overcome in succession two small French columns which marched against him from Moguer and from San Juan del Puerto. Thereupon the Duke of Aremberg—whose whole force in this region was less than 1,500 men (two battalions of the 103rd of the line and the 27th Chasseurs)—evacuated Niebla and fell back on Seville.[p. 330] Copons, who had been told to join Lacy but had failed to receive his instructions in time, pursued a separate French column under General Remond for some distance, but was soon stopped by the news that a large force was moving against him, to repair this check to the French arms. Lacy, meanwhile, to the surprise and disgust of the inhabitants of the Condado, re-embarked on August 29 and went back to Cadiz, professing149 to regard the purpose of his expedition as completed. He had this much justification150, that the news of his raid had induced Soult to send out against him, at a most critical moment, the main body of Gazan’s division, which marched to Niebla, vainly sought the expeditionary force, and returned to its base after wasting a fortnight. But a larger garrison was now left in Western Andalusia, Copons was hunted more vigorously than before, and cruel reprisals151 were made on the inhabitants of Moguer and Huelva, who had aided Lacy.
Feeble as it had been, Lacy’s raid on the Condado had staved off a serious danger to the Spanish Army of Estremadura, by forcing Soult to detach Gazan against him, at a moment when he was concentrating the 5th Corps for a blow at La Romana, and was already engaged in active operations against the Marquis. A complete change had taken place in the situation in Estremadura at the end of July, when Reynier, acting152 under orders from Masséna[379], had marched northward153 from his old base at Merida and Medellin, and crossed the Tagus at the ferry of Alconetar above the broken bridge of Alcantara[380] (July 16). This removal of the whole 2nd Corps to the north, followed (as we have already seen) by the corresponding transference of Hill’s British force from Portalegre to the neighbourhood of Castello Branco, had left La Romana at Badajoz with no enemy in front of him, and had caused a complete rupture154 of communications between the French Army of Andalusia and the Army of Portugal, who could for the future only hear of each other by the circuitous155 route through Madrid, since that by Almaraz was closed.
[p. 331]
Soult had now thrown upon his hands, to his immense disgust, the task of containing the whole of La Romana’s force, which Reynier had been keeping in check from March till July. Accordingly he called back from the Sierra de Ronda the division of Girard, wishing to reunite the whole 5th Corps for the protection of the northern approaches to Seville. He was only just in time, for La Romana had seen his opportunity, and had resolved to concentrate his army for a demonstration101 against Andalusia, which seemed to offer great temptations while nothing but the solitary156 division of Gazan stood between him and Seville, and that division, moreover, was weakened by the detachments under Remond and Aremberg which lay in the Condado de Niebla. Accordingly the Marquis, leaving Charles O’Donnell to watch Reynier on the Tagus, and another division to guard Badajoz, marched with his cavalry and the infantry of La Carrera[381] and Ballasteros to invade Andalusia. He also told Copons to come up to reinforce him with his levies157 from the lower Guadiana. Even without the help of the latter, who never succeeded in reaching him, he had 10,000 foot and 1,000 horse. But La Romana was always unlucky when he fought: just as he started, Girard had returned from Ronda to Seville. On hearing that the Army of Estremadura was on the move, Soult pushed the newly returned division, strengthened by part of Gazan’s regiments and a brigade of cavalry, out towards the passes of the Morena. On August 11, Girard, with about 7,000 bayonets and 1,200 sabres, encountered La Romana at Villagarcia, just outside the town of Llerena. The Spaniards were eager to fight, believing that they had only to deal with some fraction of Gazan’s division; the news of Girard’s return from Ronda had not yet reached them. They got involved in a severe combat, were beaten, and were forced back to Zafra and Almendralejo, with a loss of 600 men—triple that of the French.
Soult then strengthened Girard’s column, placed Mortier in command, and bade him push for Badajoz. But just as the Duke of Treviso was preparing to advance, the news of Lacy’s disembarkation at Moguer arrived. There were hardly any troops left in Seville, wherefore Soult hastily recalled from[p. 332] Mortier such of Gazan’s regiments as were with him, and nearly all the cavalry, and sent them off against Lacy. Girard’s division retired from Zafra and took up a defensive158 position in the passes covering Seville. Thus a dangerous crisis was avoided, for if the whole 5th Corps had marched on Badajoz in August, and had driven back La Romana into Portugal, Wellington’s flank in the Alemtejo would have been left exposed. There was no longer a British division south of the Tagus to support the Spanish Army of Estremadura, since Hill had transferred himself to Castello Branco in order to ‘contain’ Reynier. Of regular troops, indeed, Wellington had nothing left on the Alemtejo frontier save Madden’s brigade of Portuguese horse, and the two infantry regiments of the same nation, who formed part of the garrison of Elvas. Hence he was much troubled at La Romana’s tendency to take the offensive against Seville, and repeatedly begged him to content himself with defensive operations, and not to attract the notice of Soult. For the Duke of Dalmatia, if left alone, had enough to occupy his attention in Andalusia, yet, if provoked, might abandon some outlying part of his viceroyalty, in order to concentrate a force which might crush the Estremaduran army, and then execute that diversion against Portugal south of the Tagus which Wellington so much dreaded159[382].
Yet despite the warning that he had received at the combat of Villagarcia, and, despite of his ally’s entreaties160, La Romana renewed in September the project that had cost him so dear in August. Learning that the passes in front of Seville were once more weakly held by the French, he began to move his army southward in detachments, till he had gathered a heavy force at Guadalcanal and Monasterio. Attributing his misfortunes in the last month to the weakness of his cavalry, he brought down with him Madden’s Portuguese horsemen, a weak brigade of 800 men[383], which Wellington had put at his disposition161, not foreseeing[p. 333] that its existence would add to the inclination162 which the Marquis felt for offensive demonstrations. The inevitable163 result followed. Disquieted164 by the activity of the Estremaduran army—its raiding parties had already pressed as far as Santa Olalla on the Seville road, and Constantina on the Cordova road—Soult ordered Mortier to concentrate the main body of the 5th Corps at Ronquillo, and to attack the enemy. La Romana gave back at once, evacuating165 the passes, but his rearguard was overtaken at Fuente Cantos, behind Monasterio, by the French horse (Sept. 15). His cavalry, under La Carrera[384], turned to bay to cover the retreat, but was charged and scattered166 with heavy loss by Briche’s Chasseurs, who captured the battery that accompanied it, and enveloped167 a large mass of the beaten horsemen, who would have been forced to surrender if Madden’s Portuguese, charging at the right moment, and with great vigour168, had not checked the French advance, and given time for the routed brigades to save themselves in the hills. Madden, though pursued by the French reserves, made a steady and successful retreat, with small loss. The Spaniards, however, left behind them six guns and 500 killed and wounded, while the French loss had not exceeded 100.
Mortier then pursued La Romana to Zafra, and pushed his advanced cavalry as far as Fuente del Maestre, only thirty miles from Badajoz. Thus the situation which Wellington most dreaded had come into existence once again: a considerable French army was moving into central Estremadura, and threatening the Alemtejo frontier south of the Tagus, at a moment when every man of the Anglo-Portuguese field army was fully169 employed in Beira by the advance of Masséna. But again, as in August, Mortier did not push his advantage, though La Romana actually retired behind the Tagus to Montijo, after raising the garrison of Badajoz to its full strength, and left the Duke of Treviso the opportunity of laying siege either to that city, to Olivenza, or even to Elvas, if he should so please. But the governing fact in all the operations of Soult and his lieutenants170 at this period was, as we have already pointed171 out, that if any great concentration of the French for offensive purposes took place, it was only made[p. 334] by withdrawing the garrison troops from some one of the many disturbed regions of Andalusia. When the whole 5th Corps was united, and had advanced to Zafra, Western Andalusia was almost stripped of troops. Indeed, at Seville itself, Soult had nothing but his new Spanish levies, and the convalescents from his central hospital, together with some detachments escorting convoys which happened to be passing through the city, and had been detained in order to add a few hundred bayonets to its garrison. When, therefore, Copons began to make himself felt once more in the Condado de Niebla, and a second raiding expedition from Cadiz landed at Huelva, Soult felt very uncomfortable.
His perturbation of mind was increased by news from the East: Sebastiani at this moment had been molested114 by demonstrations of the Spanish Army of Murcia against his flank. Blake had returned in August from Cadiz to inspect the section of his forces which he had left behind under Freire, and which he had not seen since April. He had pushed reconnaissances to Huescar in the kingdom of Granada, had sent supplies to aid the insurgents of the Alpujarras, and was beginning to stir up a new rising on the side of Jaen. This provoked Sebastiani to concentrate the larger part of the 4th Corps, and to march against him with 8,000 men[385]. Blake gave back before his enemy as far as the neighbourhood of Murcia, where he had prepared a fortified172 position by inundating173 the Huerta, or suburban174 plain, which is watered by many canals drawn175 from the river Segura, and by stockading all the villages. Fourteen thousand regulars, with a powerful artillery, held the approaches, while a mass of armed peasantry hung around Sebastiani’s flanks. The French, however, only advanced as far as Lebrilla, twelve miles from Murcia, and then halted (Aug. 28). Sebastiani, after reconnoitring Blake’s line, thought it too powerful to be meddled176 with, and retired two days later towards his base, much harassed177 by the peasantry on his way. But during the three weeks that it took for the French general to concentrate his field-force, to march on Murcia, and to return, all had gone to wrack178 and ruin behind[p. 335] him. The insurgents of the Alpujarras had captured the important seaport179 towns of Almunecar and Motril, and had garrisoned180 their castles with the aid of English guns sent from Gibraltar. The people of the Sierra de Alhama had cut the roads between Malaga and Granada, and 4,000 mountaineers had attacked Granada itself; they were defeated outside its gates by the garrison on Sept. 4, but were still hanging about its vicinity.
The news of all these troubles had reached Soult while Sebastiani was quite out of touch, lost to sight in the kingdom of Murcia. They undoubtedly had their part in inducing the Marshal to recall Mortier and the 5th Corps from Estremadura. He once more divided its two divisions, drawing back Gazan to Seville to form his central reserve, while Girard watched the passes as before. Meanwhile Copons had already been beaten in the Condado by the column of General Remond (Sept. 15), and Sebastiani on his return cleared the neighbourhood of Granada and Malaga of insurgents, and drove the untameable bands of the Alpujarras to take refuge in their mountains. Motril and Almunecar were both recovered. Thus the storm passed, as soon as the two French expeditionary forces under Mortier and Sebastiani returned once more to their usual garrison-posts.
Only two more incidents remain to be chronicled in the Andalusian campaign of 1810. Campbell, the governor of Gibraltar, had resolved—somewhat too late—to lend a small detachment to aid the Granadan insurgents. The plan which he concerted with the Spanish governor of Ceuta was that Lord Blayney with two British battalions from the Gibraltar garrison—the 82nd and 89th [erratum: “Lord Blayney’s force had only a half-battalion27, not a whole battalion of the 89th, but contained 4 companies of foreign chasseurs”], and a Spanish regiment (Imperial de Toledo) from Ceuta, 2,200 men in all, should be thrown on shore at Fuengirola, twenty miles on the nearer side of Malaga, where there was a small French garrison and a dép?t of stores, which was serving for a brigade then engaged in the siege of Marbella, the town which had been garrisoned by Lacy in June[386], and which was still holding out gallantly181 in October.
It was calculated that, on hearing of a descent at Fuengirola, Sebastiani would come with the larger part of the garrison[p. 336] of Malaga to relieve the fort. But the moment that he was known to be nearing the expeditionary force, Lord Blayney was to re-embark and to make a dash at Malaga itself, which he could reach more swiftly by water than Sebastiani by land. Secret partisans182 within the city were ready to take arms, and the peasantry of the Sierra de Alhama were also enlisted183 in the enterprise. The scheme seems liable to many criticisms—the whole was at the mercy of the winds and waves of stormy October: what would happen if the weather was too rough to allow of re-embarkation, or of easy landing at Malaga? And if Malaga were captured for the moment, for how long could 2,000 regulars, backed by a mass of undisciplined insurgents, hold it against the whole of Sebastiani’s corps, which would be hurled184 upon it at short notice? The expedition, however, was not actually wrecked185 on either of these dangers, but ruined by the folly186 of its chief. Lord Blayney landed successfully on October 13, and laid siege to Fuengirola, which was held by 150 Poles under a Captain Milokosiewitz. Instead of making the attack a mere demonstration, he brought some 12-pounders ashore, and set to work to batter44 the castle in all seriousness. Finding its walls commencing to crumble, he held on for two days, though, if he had reflected, he must have remembered that the garrison of Malaga might be with him at any moment. He was busily preparing for an assault, when Sebastiani suddenly fell upon him with 3,000 men from the rear. Apparently the English commander had neglected to keep up any watch on the side of the inland, and the peasantry had failed to send any intelligence of the fact that the French were on the move. The besiegers, taken entirely by surprise, and distracted also by a sortie of the little garrison, were rolled down to the sea-shore in confusion. Lord Blayney—a short-sighted man—rode in among some French whom he mistook for Spaniards, and was made prisoner in the most ignominious187 fashion. The Spanish regiment got off with little loss: it had kept its ranks, and forced its way to the boats after beating off an attack. The 82nd was partly on shipboard at the moment of the combat, and the companies which were on shore saved themselves by a steady rearguard action. But the battalion of the 89th was half destroyed, losing over 200 prisoners besides some forty[p. 337] killed. The utter incapacity of the British commander was best shown by the fact that if he had but carried out the plan on which he was acting, he would certainly have captured Malaga—for Sebastiani had left only 300 men in the city when he marched on Fuengirola, and, if the expeditionary force had re-embarked twenty-four hours before the disaster, it would have found the place practically undefended, and Sebastiani a long day’s march away, and incapable188 of returning in time to save it[387].
The very last military event of the year 1810 on the Andalusian side was a disaster far worse than that of Lord Blayney—suffered by a general whose almost unbroken series of defeats from Medina de Rio Seco down to Belchite ought to have taught him by this time the advantages of caution, and the doubtful policy of risking a demoralized army in a fight upon open ground. When Sebastiani retired from the kingdom of Murcia in the first days of September, Blake had brought back his army to its old positions on the frontier of that realm. Seven weeks later, finding the French line in front of him very weak, he resolved to try a demonstration in force, or perhaps even a serious stroke against the force of the enemy in Granada. On November 2 he crossed the Murcian border, with 8,000 foot and 1,000 horse, and occupied Cullar.
On the next day he was at the gates of Baza, where there were four battalions of the French force which covered Granada[388]. But on the next morning General Milhaud rode up with a powerful body of horsemen, the greater part of his own division of Dragoons and the Polish Lancers from Sebastiani’s corps-cavalry, some 1,300 men in all. Though he had only 2,000 infantry to back him, Milhaud determined to fight at once. Blake’s army invited an attack; it was advancing down the high-road with the cavalry deployed189 in front, one division of infantry supporting it, while a second division was some miles[p. 338] to the rear, on the hills which separate the plain of Baza from the upland of the Sierra de Oria. A rearguard of 2,000 men was still at Cullar, ten miles from the scene of action. The situation much resembled that of Suchet’s combat of Margalef, and led to the same results. For Milhaud’s squadrons, charging fiercely along and on each side of the road, completely routed Blake’s cavalry, and drove it back on to the leading infantry division, which broke, and was badly cut up before its remnants could take shelter with the other division in reserve on the hill behind. Blake gave the order for an instant retreat, and Milhaud could not follow far among the rocks and defiles190. But he had captured a battery of artillery and a thousand prisoners, and killed or wounded some 500 men more, in the few minutes during which the engagement lasted. The French cavalry lost no more than 200 men. The infantry had hardly fired a shot. Blake, not being pursued, retired only as far as the Venta de Bahul on the other side of Cullar, and remained on the Murcian border, cured for a time of his mania191 for taking the offensive at the head of a demoralized army.
Thus ended the inconclusive campaign of 1810 in Andalusia—the French on the last day of the year held almost precisely192 the same limits of territory that they had occupied on the 1st of March. They had beaten the enemy in four or five considerable actions, yet had gained nothing thereby193. They were beginning to understand that Cadiz was impregnable, and that the complete subjection of the mountains of the South and East was a far more serious task than had been at first supposed. Things indeed had come to a deadlock194, and Soult kept reporting to his master that another 25,000 men would be required to enable him to complete his task. Almost as many battalions belonging to the 1st, 4th, and 5th Corps as would have made up that force had been sent by the Emperor into Spain. They were intended to join their regiments in the end, but meanwhile they had been distracted into the 8th and 9th Corps, and were marching in the direction of Portugal, when Soult wished to see them on the Guadalquivir[389]. Very little of the mass of reinforcements which[p. 339] had been poured into the Peninsula in the spring of 1810 had come his way. While the whole battalions had been sent away with Junot or Drouet, the drafts in smaller units had been largely intercepted195 by the generals along the line of communication. There were 4,000 of such recruits detained in New Castile alone, and formed into ‘provisional battalions’ to garrison Madrid and its neighbourhood. King Joseph must not be blamed too much for thus stopping them on their way: he had been left with an utterly196 inadequate197 force, when the Emperor turned off everything on to the direction of Portugal. During the summer and autumn of 1810 there were with him only two French infantry regiments[390], the same number of light cavalry regiments[391], Lahoussaye’s weak division of dragoons[392], and the German division of the 4th Corps less than 4,000 strong, over and above his own guard and untrustworthy ‘juramentado’ battalions[393]. The royal troops numbered about 7,000 men, the other units, including Soult’s detained drafts, about 12,000: with them Joseph had to garrison Madrid, Avila, Segovia, Toledo, and Almaraz, and hold down all New Castile and La Mancha—which last province was described at the time as ‘populated solely198 by beggars and brigands’. He had the duty of maintaining the sole and very circuitous line of communication between Soult and Masséna, which, after Reynier went north in July, had to be worked via Almaraz. He was frequently annoyed not only by the Empecinado and other guerrilleros, but by Villacampa, who descended from higher Aragon into the Cuenca region, and by Blake’s cavalry, which often raided La Mancha. But his great[p. 340] fear was lest La Romana or Wellington should send troops up the vast gap left between Reynier at Zarza and Coria and Mortier in the Sierra Morena; there was nothing but Lahoussaye’s dragoons and two infantry battalions in the whole district about Almaraz and Talavera, where such a blow would have fallen. It was small wonder that he felt uncomfortable.
But military sources of disquietude formed only the smaller half of King Joseph’s troubles at this date. His political vexations, which engrossed a much larger portion of his time and energy, must be dealt with elsewhere. They will be relegated199 to the same chapter which treats of the new development of Spanish politics consequent on the long-delayed meeting of the Cortes in the winter of 1810-11.
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1
destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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ward
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| n.守卫，监护，病房，行政区，由监护人或法院保护的人（尤指儿童）；vt.守护，躲开 | |
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peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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placid
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| adj.安静的，平和的 | |
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monarch
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| n.帝王，君主，最高统治者 | |
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remitted
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| v.免除（债务），宽恕( remit的过去式和过去分词 )；使某事缓和；寄回，传送 | |
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sustenance
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| n.食物，粮食；生活资料；生计 | |
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maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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exchequer
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| n.财政部；国库 | |
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hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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yearned
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| 渴望，切盼，向往( yearn的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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auxiliaries
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| n.助动词 ( auxiliary的名词复数 )；辅助工，辅助人员 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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crumble
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| vi.碎裂，崩溃；vt.弄碎，摧毁 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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enlisting
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| v.（使）入伍， （使）参军( enlist的现在分词 )；获得（帮助或支持） | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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omen
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| n.征兆，预兆；vt.预示 | |
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patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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gallows
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| n.绞刑架，绞台 | |
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decency
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| n.体面，得体，合宜，正派，庄重 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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plunder
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| vt.劫掠财物，掠夺；n.劫掠物，赃物；劫掠 | |
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blackmail
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| n.讹诈，敲诈，勒索，胁迫，恫吓 | |
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confiscation
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| n. 没收, 充公, 征收 | |
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maligned
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| vt.污蔑，诽谤（malign的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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infamous
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| adj.声名狼藉的，臭名昭著的，邪恶的 | |
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friction
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| n.摩擦，摩擦力 | |
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favourably
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| adv. 善意地，赞成地 =favorably | |
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domain
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| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
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subdued
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| adj. 屈服的，柔和的，减弱的 动词subdue的过去式和过去分词 | |
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molest
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| vt.骚扰，干扰，调戏 | |
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batter
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| v.接连重击；磨损；n.牛奶面糊；击球员 | |
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bogs
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| n.沼泽，泥塘( bog的名词复数 )；厕所v.（使）陷入泥沼， （使）陷入困境( bog的第三人称单数 )；妨碍，阻碍 | |
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permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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arsenal
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| n.兵工厂，军械库 | |
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battered
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| adj.磨损的；v.连续猛击；磨损 | |
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50
erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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51
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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52
outermost
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| adj.最外面的，远离中心的 | |
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53
bulwark
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| n.堡垒，保障，防御 | |
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54
mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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55
seizure
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| n.没收；占有；抵押 | |
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56
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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57
plied
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| v.使用（工具）( ply的过去式和过去分词 )；经常供应（食物、饮料）；固定往来；经营生意 | |
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58
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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59
evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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60
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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61
demolishing
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| v.摧毁( demolish的现在分词 )；推翻；拆毁（尤指大建筑物）；吃光 | |
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62
shipping
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| n.船运（发货，运输，乘船） | |
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63
intermittent
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| adj.间歇的，断断续续的 | |
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64
duel
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| n./v.决斗；(双方的)斗争 | |
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65
appreciable
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| adj.明显的，可见的，可估量的，可觉察的 | |
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66
mortars
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| n.迫击炮( mortar的名词复数 )；砂浆；房产；研钵 | |
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67
unprecedented
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| adj.无前例的，新奇的 | |
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68
lasting
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| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
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69
vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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70
vessel
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| n.船舶；容器，器皿；管，导管，血管 | |
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71
Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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72
slaying
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| 杀戮。 | |
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73
ashore
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| adv.在(向)岸上，上岸 | |
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74
moored
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| adj. 系泊的 动词moor的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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75
perils
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| 极大危险( peril的名词复数 )； 危险的事（或环境） | |
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76
muskets
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| n.火枪，（尤指）滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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77
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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78
scramble
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| v.爬行，攀爬，杂乱蔓延，碎片，片段，废料 | |
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79
absconding
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| v.（尤指逃避逮捕）潜逃，逃跑( abscond的现在分词 ) | |
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80
stranded
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| a.搁浅的，进退两难的 | |
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81
survivors
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| 幸存者，残存者，生还者( survivor的名词复数 ) | |
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82
seamen
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| n.海员 | |
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83
distressing
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| a.使人痛苦的 | |
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84
heartily
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| adv.衷心地，诚恳地，十分，很 | |
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85
desolate
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| adj.荒凉的，荒芜的；孤独的，凄凉的；v.使荒芜，使孤寂 | |
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86
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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87
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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88
wrecks
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| n.沉船( wreck的名词复数 )；（事故中）遭严重毁坏的汽车（或飞机等）；（身体或精神上）受到严重损伤的人；状况非常糟糕的车辆（或建筑物等）v.毁坏[毁灭]某物( wreck的第三人称单数 )；使（船舶）失事，使遇难，使下沉 | |
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89
invalids
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| 病人，残疾者( invalid的名词复数 ) | |
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90
miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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91
systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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92
nuclei
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| n.核 | |
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93
insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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94
quell
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| v.压制，平息，减轻 | |
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95
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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96
trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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97
creek
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| n.小溪，小河，小湾 | |
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98
relics
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| [pl.］n.遗物，遗迹，遗产；遗体，尸骸 | |
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99
descending
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| n. 下行 adj. 下降的 | |
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100
engrossed
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| adj.全神贯注的 | |
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101
demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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102
demonstrations
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| 证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威 | |
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103
harass
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| vt.使烦恼，折磨，骚扰 | |
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104
unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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105
junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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106
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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107
monstrous
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| adj.巨大的；恐怖的；可耻的，丢脸的 | |
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108
probity
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| n.刚直；廉洁，正直 | |
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109
patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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110
meritorious
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| adj.值得赞赏的 | |
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111
confidential
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| adj.秘（机）密的，表示信任的，担任机密工作的 | |
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112
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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113
descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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114
molested
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| v.骚扰( molest的过去式和过去分词 )；干扰；调戏；猥亵 | |
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115
dispersed
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|
| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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116
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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117
ferment
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| vt.使发酵；n./vt.（使）激动，（使）动乱 | |
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118
wrest
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| n.扭，拧，猛夺；v.夺取，猛扭，歪曲 | |
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119
nucleus
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| n.核，核心，原子核 | |
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120
followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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121
wont
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| adj.习惯于；v.习惯；n.习惯 | |
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122
ply
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| v.(搬运工等)等候顾客，弯曲 | |
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123
contraband
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| n.违禁品，走私品 | |
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124
convoy
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| vt.护送，护卫，护航；n.护送；护送队 | |
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125
convoys
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| n.（有护航的）船队( convoy的名词复数 )；车队；护航（队）；护送队 | |
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126
promising
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| adj.有希望的，有前途的 | |
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127
extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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128
fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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129
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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130
salute
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| vi.行礼，致意，问候，放礼炮；vt.向…致意，迎接，赞扬；n.招呼，敬礼，礼炮 | |
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131
confiscated
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| 没收，充公( confiscate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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132
monasteries
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| 修道院( monastery的名词复数 ) | |
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133
retraced
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| v.折回( retrace的过去式和过去分词 )；回忆；回顾；追溯 | |
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134
beleaguering
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| v.围攻( beleaguer的现在分词 )；困扰；骚扰 | |
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135
actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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136
thronged
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| v.成群，挤满( throng的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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137
irresolute
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| adj.无决断的，优柔寡断的，踌躇不定的 | |
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138
resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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139
meddle
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| v.干预，干涉，插手 | |
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140
imprisoned
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| 下狱，监禁( imprison的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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141
insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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142
morale
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| n.道德准则，士气，斗志 | |
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143
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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144
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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145
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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146
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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147
swarms
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| 蜂群，一大群( swarm的名词复数 ) | |
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148
thither
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| adv.向那里；adj.在那边的，对岸的 | |
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149
professing
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| 声称( profess的现在分词 )； 宣称； 公开表明； 信奉 | |
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150
justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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151
reprisals
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| n.报复（行为）( reprisal的名词复数 ) | |
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152
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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153
northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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154
rupture
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| n.破裂；(关系的)决裂；v.(使)破裂 | |
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155
circuitous
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| adj.迂回的路的，迂曲的，绕行的 | |
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156
solitary
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| adj.孤独的，独立的，荒凉的；n.隐士 | |
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157
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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158
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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159
dreaded
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| adj.令人畏惧的；害怕的v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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160
entreaties
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| n.恳求，乞求( entreaty的名词复数 ) | |
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161
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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162
inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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163
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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164
disquieted
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| v.使不安，使忧虑，使烦恼( disquiet的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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165
evacuating
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| 撤离，疏散( evacuate的现在分词 )； 排空（胃肠），排泄（粪便）； （从危险的地方）撤出，搬出，撤空 | |
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166
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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167
enveloped
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| v.包围，笼罩，包住( envelop的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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168
vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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169
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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170
lieutenants
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| n.陆军中尉( lieutenant的名词复数 )；副职官员；空军；仅低于…官阶的官员 | |
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171
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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172
fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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173
inundating
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| v.淹没( inundate的现在分词 )；（洪水般地）涌来；充满；给予或交予（太多事物）使难以应付 | |
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174
suburban
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| adj.城郊的，在郊区的 | |
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175
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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176
meddled
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| v.干涉，干预（他人事务）( meddle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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177
harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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178
wrack
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| v.折磨；n.海草 | |
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179
seaport
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| n.海港，港口，港市 | |
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180
garrisoned
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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181
gallantly
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| adv. 漂亮地，勇敢地，献殷勤地 | |
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partisans
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| 游击队员( partisan的名词复数 )； 党人； 党羽； 帮伙 | |
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183
enlisted
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| adj.应募入伍的v.（使）入伍， （使）参军( enlist的过去式和过去分词 )；获得（帮助或支持） | |
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184
hurled
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| v.猛投，用力掷( hurl的过去式和过去分词 )；大声叫骂 | |
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185
wrecked
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| adj.失事的，遇难的 | |
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186
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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187
ignominious
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| adj.可鄙的，不光彩的，耻辱的 | |
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188
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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189
deployed
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| （尤指军事行动）使展开( deploy的过去式和过去分词 )； 施展； 部署； 有效地利用 | |
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defiles
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| v.玷污( defile的第三人称单数 )；污染；弄脏；纵列行进 | |
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191
mania
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| n.疯狂；躁狂症，狂热，癖好 | |
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192
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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193
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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194
deadlock
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| n.僵局，僵持 | |
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195
intercepted
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| 拦截( intercept的过去式和过去分词 )； 截住； 截击； 拦阻 | |
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196
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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197
inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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198
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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199
relegated
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| v.使降级( relegate的过去式和过去分词 )；使降职；转移；把…归类 | |
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