On the 18th of November, 1810, Masséna had completed the movement to the rear which he had commenced on the 14th. His army no longer threatened the Lines of Torres Vedras: he had abandoned the offensive for the defensive2. Concentrated in the triangle Santarem-Punhete-Thomar, with his three corps3 so disposed that a march of twenty miles would suffice to concentrate everything save outlying detachments, he waited to see whether his enemy would dare to attack him; for he still hoped for a battle in the open field, and was prepared to accept its chances. At Bussaco, so he reasoned, his defeat had been the result of an over-bold attack on a strong position. The event might go otherwise if he threw the responsibility of the offensive on Wellington. He had secured for himself an advantageous4 fighting-ground: his left flank was protected by the formidable entrenchments around Santarem; his front was covered by the rain-sodden valley of the Rio Mayor, which during the winter season could be crossed only at a few well-known points. His right wing could not be turned, unless his adversary5 were ready to push a great force over villainous roads towards Alcanhede and the upper course of the Rio Mayor. And if Wellington should risk a large detachment in this direction, it might be possible to burst out from Santarem, against the containing force which he would be compelled to leave on the banks of the Tagus, about Cartaxo, and to beat it back towards the Lines—a movement which would almost certainly bring back the turning column from the North. For the English general could not dare to leave Lisbon exposed to the chances of a sudden blow, when there was little but Portuguese7 militia8 left to occupy[p. 2] the long chain of defensive works from Alhandra to Torres Vedras. For some weeks after his retreat to his new position at Santarem, Masséna lived in hopes that Wellington would either deliver an attack on his well-protected front, or undertake the dangerous turning movement towards his left.
No such chance was granted him. His adversary had weighed all the arguments for and against the offensive, and had made up his mind to rely rather on his old weapon—starvation—than on force. In several of his December dispatches he sums up the situation with perfect clearness; on the 2nd he wrote to Lord Liverpool, ‘It would still be impossible to make any movement of importance upon the right flank of the enemy’s position at Santarem without exposing some divisions of troops to be insulated and cut off. The enemy having concentrated their army about Torres Novas, &c., I do not propose to make any movement by which I incur9 the risk of involving the army in a general action, on ground less advantageous than that which I had fixed10 upon to bring this contest to an issue [i. e. the Lines]. The enemy can be relieved from the difficulties of their situation only by the occurrence of some misfortune to the allied11 army, and I should forward their views by placing the fate of the campaign on the result of a general action on ground chosen by them, and not on that selected by me. I therefore propose to continue the operation of light detachments on their flanks and rear, to confine them as much as possible, but to engage in no serious affair on ground on which the result can be at all doubtful[1].’ At the end of the month he simply restates his decision: ‘Having such an enemy to contend with, and knowing (as I do) that there is no army in the Peninsula capable of contending with the enemy, excepting that under my command; that there are no means of replacing any large losses I might sustain; and that any success acquired by a large sacrifice of men would be followed by disastrous12 consequence to the cause of the allies, I have determined13 to persevere14 in the system which has hitherto saved all, and which will, I hope, end in the defeat of the enemy[2].’
[p. 3]Accordingly Wellington’s main army was kept for the three winter months of December, January, and February almost precisely15 on the same ground on which it had been placed in the last week of November. The three British cavalry16 brigades formed a line in front of the whole, reaching from Porto de Mugem on the Tagus to S?o Jo?o de Ribiera on the upper Rio Mayor[3]. The infantry17 divisions (save the 2nd) were arranged in successive lines of cantonment behind them, watching the course of the Rio Mayor, while the reserves had retired18 as far as the Lines of Torres Vedras. Practically the whole force could be concentrated in a single march—or a march and a half at most—in case Masséna should take the improbable—but still conceivable—step of sallying out from Santarem to resume the offensive. When the first French reinforcements began to come up—about the New Year of 1810-11—such a sally seemed to Wellington quite worth guarding against[4]. The disposition19 of the infantry was as follows: On the right, near the Tagus, lay the Light Division, immediately in front of Santarem, quartered in Valle and other villages. On the left the front line was formed by Pack’s Portuguese, who lay at Almoster, on heights overlooking the middle course of the Rio Mayor. In support of the Light Division, but five miles to the rear, at Cartaxo and other places, was the large and powerful 1st Division, 7,000 bayonets. The 4th Division lay at an equal distance behind the 1st, at Azambuja and Aveiras da Cima. Behind Pack, on the inland or Leiria road, Picton and his 3rd Division were placed at Alcoentre. Their support was the 5th Division at Torres Vedras in the old Lines, seventeen miles to the rear, from which a circuitous20 road led to Alcoentre. Finally the newly-formed 6th Division was placed at the other end of the Lines, but just outside them, at Alemquer and Arruda, with Le Cor’s Portuguese division immediately behind, at Alhandra.
In all the main army consisted of about 48,000 men of all[p. 4] arms; but this did not compose the whole of Wellington’s available resources. He had transferred a considerable detachment to the southern bank of the Tagus, to protect the Alemtejo against any possible descent by the French. It will be remembered that as early as the beginning of November[5] he had sent across the river Fane’s Portuguese cavalry and a battalion21 of Ca?adores, who were directed to watch the road along the further bank, to prevent any trifling22 force of French from crossing in search of provisions, and to keep open the communications with Abrantes. As long as Masséna was threatening the Lines of Torres Vedras, there was no danger that he would throw anything more than a raiding party across the Tagus; he would want every man for the great assault. But when the Marshal gave up the offensive and retired to Santarem, the aspect of affairs was changed; it was quite possible that, with his army in a state of semi-starvation, he might venture to send a considerable detachment over the river, to gather the food which was so necessary to him. Nor was it unlikely that he might have a still more cogent23 reason for invading the Alemtejo. If, as Wellington thought probable[6], the army of Andalusia were to be ordered up to assist the army of Portugal, it would be of great importance for the latter to possess a footing on the left bank of the Tagus, as the communication with Soult’s troops must certainly be made in this direction. Accordingly there was good reason for securing the line of the river, and for cooping up Masséna in his limited sphere on its western bank. On the 19th-20th of November, Hill and the 2nd Division, attended as usual by Hamilton’s two Portuguese brigades, and with the 13th Light Dragoons attached, crossed the Tagus in boats a little to the north of Salvaterra, to reinforce Fane’s detachment. This was a serious force—10,000 men—which Wellington could ill spare, and he made elaborate arrangements to enable it to return in haste, in the event of Masséna’s once more taking the offensive on the western bank of the Tagus. The flotilla of[p. 5] gunboats and river craft, which had been guarding the river, was to be kept ready at Alhandra to bring back the 2nd Division, at the first alarm of a movement of the French from Santarem. Meanwhile Hill moved up the river and established his head quarters at Chamusca, a little north of Santarem, from which point he could both observe the main body of the French and impede24 any attempt that they might make to cross the river, and also could keep in touch with Abrantes, and reinforce it, supposing that Masséna showed any signs of molesting26 it. The British brigades of the 2nd Division were distributed along the river, William Stewart’s at Pinheiros and Tramagal most to the north, Hoghton’s at Chamusca, Lumley’s at Almeirim, exactly facing Santarem. Hamilton’s two Portuguese brigades continued the line southward, Fonseca’s brigade at Mugem, Campbell’s at Salvaterra. Fane’s four regiments28 of Portuguese cavalry, and the British 13th Light Dragoons, were strung out by squadrons along the whole front from the neighbourhood of Abrantes to Almeirim, patrolling the river bank with unceasing care[7].
On the 29th of November Hill was disabled by a severe attack of fever, and the control of all the troops beyond the Tagus devolved on his senior brigadier, William Stewart. Wellington only allowed this hard-fighting but somewhat too venturesome officer to retain his very responsible command for a few weeks. Troubled by Stewart’s constant requests to be allowed to make offensive movements against the French, which did not enter into his own plans[8], and dreading29 the consequences of his enterprise, the Commander-in-Chief superseded30 him, by sending over Beresford to take the charge of all the forces on the Alemtejo bank of the Tagus (December 30). He would have preferred to give the duty to Hill, who had in the preceding summer carried out a similar task with complete success, while he watched Reynier from Castello Branco[9]. But Hill’s fever[p. 6] lingered on for many weeks, and when he was convalescent the medical men insisted that he must return to England for change of air. This he did in February, and we miss his familiar name in the records of the Peninsular War for a space of three months, till his reappearance at the front in May.
Beresford therefore began, with the New Year, to exercise a semi-independent command over the detached force beyond the Tagus, which he was to retain for nearly six months. The experiment of giving him this responsible duty was not altogether a happy one; and after his unsuccessful operations in Estremadura, and his ill-fought victory at Albuera, Wellington withdrew him to other duties in June, and once more handed over the troops south of the Tagus to the cautious yet capable hands of Hill.
The main force, meanwhile, faced the front of Masséna’s army; Beresford’s detachment observed its left flank along the Tagus. But this was not all; Wellington had also taken his precautions to cast around the rear of the irregular parallelogram held by the French a screen of light troops, which effectually cut their communications with Spain, and restricted, though they could not altogether hinder, their marauding raids in search of provisions. This screen was weakest beyond Abrantes, on the line of the Zezere; but here the land was barren, and the enemy had little or nothing to gain by plundering32 excursions. The Castello Branco country was only guarded by its own Ordenan?a levy33, which was trifling in force, as the whole ‘corregedoria’ from the Zezere to the Elga had only 40,000 souls, and it had sent its two militia regiments within the Lisbon lines. But, save in the small upland plain about Castello Branco itself, there was practically neither population nor tillage. The less barren and deserted34 mountain land between the Zezere and the Mondego was much more worth plundering, and was protected by the militia brigade of John Wilson, who lay at Espinhal on the Thomar-Coimbra road, with a force of four battalions35, which ought to have numbered 3,000 men, but often shrank down to 1,500. For the militiamen, unpaid36 and ill-fed, deserted freely during the winter season, and as their homes lay far northward37, by the Douro, it was not easy to gather them back to their colours. But Wilson had always a sufficient nucleus38 about him[p. 7] to check any marauding party that fell short of a regiment27, and was a real restraint on the foragers of the 6th Corps, when they pushed out from Ourem or Thomar to gather food. He was only once seriously engaged, when, on December 23rd, General Marcognet, with two battalions and a cavalry regiment, came up against him, drove him out of Espinhal after some skirmishing, and pushed a reconnaissance as far as the Mondego, of which we shall hear in its due place.
Beyond Wilson to the west, the line of observation was taken up by Trant’s militia brigade, which lay at Coimbra, to which town many of its fugitive40 inhabitants had by this time returned. He had a larger force than Wilson—seven militia regiments, whose strength varied41 from day to day but seldom fell below 3,000 men. With this irregular force he watched the line of the lower Mondego, keeping pickets42 out some way to the south of the river, as far as Louri?al and Redinha. They were only once driven in, when on Dec. 6th-8th one of Montbrun’s dragoon regiments pushed up the high road, and verified the fact that all the passages of the lower Mondego, including the bridge of Coimbra, were guarded.
The last link in the chain of detachments which Wellington had cast around the French was the garrison43 of the sea-girt fortress44 of Peniche, half-way between Lisbon and the mouth of the Mondego. It was held by the dép?ts of several infantry regiments of the regular army, under General Blunt of the Portuguese service, not by any single organized unit. But there were some 2,000 or 3,000 recruits, more or less trained, in the place, and the enterprising Major Fenwick, whom Blunt had put in charge of his outpost-line, kept large pickets out in the direction of Caldas and Obidos, which frequently came in contact with the raiding parties of the 8th Corps, and did them much harm. Fenwick was mortally wounded in action near Obidos on Dec. 4th[10], but the forward position of these outposts of the Peniche garrison was maintained, and the French could never forage39 in the coast-land for a radius45 of some[p. 8] fifteen miles around that fortress, though they moved as they pleased about Leiria and the deserted abbeys of Batalha and Alcoba?a. The Portuguese outposts at Caldas were in close and regular touch with Anson’s cavalry pickets from S?o Jo?o de Ribiera on the Rio Mayor.
It will be seen therefore that the limited space in which Masséna’s army could seek its living was a parallelogram, bounded by the Tagus on the south, the lower Zezere on the east, the Rio Mayor and the Alcoa (the river of Alcoba?a) on the west, and on the north by an irregular line drawn46 from Leiria through Pombal to Caba?os near the Zezere. Outside these limits food could only be got by large detachments, moving with all military precautions, and obliged to keep up a constant running fight with the Portuguese militia. The profit from such expeditions, whose march was necessarily very slow, was so small that Masséna sent out very few of them, since the peasantry got off with their flocks into the hills, whenever the first skirmishing shots along the high road were heard. The sustenance47 of the French was mainly obtained by harrying48 and re-harrying the area bounded by the limits stated above, where they could work their will without meeting with any resistance. There was very little change in the cantonments of Masséna’s army during the three months of their stay between the Tagus and the Zezere. Of the 2nd Corps both divisions were in the Santarem fortifications, holding the town and the banks of the Rio Mayor to the west of it. Close in touch with the 2nd Corps came the 8th, with Clausel’s division in front line from Tremes to Alcanhede and Abrah?o, and Solignac’s in second line at Torres Novas, Pernes, and the adjacent villages. Both corps had their cavalry brigades out in front of them, along the line of the Rio Mayor. Ney and the 6th Corps formed the general reserve of the army, having Mermet’s division at Thomar (the Marshal’s head quarters), and Marchand’s at Goleg?o near the Tagus; Loison’s, the third division of the corps, was detached on the Zezere, guarding the bridge which had been established across that river at Punhete, and watching the garrison of Abrantes. Its front post was at Montalv?o beyond the Zezere, only five miles from the Portuguese fortress; its remaining battalions were ranged along the river from Punhete as far north as Dornes. Montbrun and[p. 9] the cavalry reserve (less certain squadrons lent to Loison), lay at Ch?o-de-Ma?ans on the northern skirts of the plain of Thomar; they had one infantry regiment (lent by Ney) to support them, at Caba?os, and their main duty was to watch and restrain Trant and Wilson, with whose advanced posts they were always bickering49.
The situation of the French army was remarkably50 compact: Ney’s division at Goleg?o was only one long march (eighteen miles) behind Reynier; his second division at Thomar was less than two marches (twenty-six miles) behind Junot. Only Loison could not have been brought up at short notice, supposing that Wellington had attacked the line of the Rio Mayor. If, on the other hand, an Anglo-Portuguese force had debouched from Abrantes to attack Loison—no impossible plan, and one that William Stewart had strenuously51 urged Wellington to adopt—the division at Punhete could have been reinforced from Goleg?o and Thomar in one march, since the former of these places is about thirteen miles from the Zezere, and the latter not more than ten.
Masséna’s dispositions52, as can be seen at a glance, were purely53 defensive. They could not be otherwise, when his army had dwindled54 down by the beginning of December to 45,000 efficient sabres and bayonets, while his hospitals were encumbered55 by 8,000 or 9,000 sick. All that he aspired56 to do was to hold on in the Santarem-Rio Mayor position, pinning his adversary down to the neighbourhood of Lisbon, till he should be restored to the power of taking the offensive once more, by the arrival of reinforcements; his aid must come on one side from Soult and the Army of Andalusia, on the other from Drouet’s 9th Corps, whose services had been promised to him by the Emperor long before the invasion of Portugal began. But down to the end of the year he had not the slightest breath of information as to whether this assistance was close at hand, or whether it had, perchance, not even begun to move in his direction. Since he had cut himself loose from the frontier of Spain in September, not a single dispatch had reached him, not even a secret emissary had penetrated58 to his head quarters. For all that he knew Napoleon might be dead, or engaged in a new war with some continental59 enemy. It is an astonishing testimony60 to the[p. 10] efficiency of the screen of Portuguese Ordenan?a and militia, which Wellington had cast round the French army, to find that nothing had slipped through. And the Marshal’s attempts to send out news of himself had been almost equally well foiled; all his messengers had been intercepted61 save Foy, who (as it will be remembered) had forced his way over the unfrequented Estrada Nova road on October 31st[11]. And Foy had got through to Ciudad Rodrigo because he had been given such a large escort—600 men—that no mere62 gathering63 of local Ordenan?a could stop him.
Masséna, down to the end of December, did not know in the least whether Foy or any other of his emissaries had got through. He had simply to wait till news should penetrate57 to him. Meanwhile the one governing preoccupation of his life was to get food for his army, since if food failed he must be driven to the disastrous winter retreat, across flooded streams and between snow-clad mountains, to which Wellington hoped to force him. The English general’s forecast of the time which would be required to starve out the French army was wrong by some eight or nine weeks. He thought that they would have consumed every possible morsel64 of food that could be scraped together by December—as a matter of fact they held out till the end of February, in a state of constantly increasing privation. It seems that Wellington underrated both the capacity for endurance that the enemy would show, and still more the resources which were available to him. The Portuguese government had ordered the peasantry to destroy all food-stuffs that they could not carry off, when the country-side was evacuated66 in October, and the people retired within the Torres Vedras lines. Ostensibly the decree had been carried out; but it was impossible to induce these small cultivators to make away with good food, the worst of crimes to the peasant’s mind. The large majority hid or buried, instead of burning, their stores, trusting to recover what they had concealed68 when the French should have departed. Many of the hiding-places were very ingenious—in some cases caves in the hills had been used, and their[p. 11] mouths plastered up with stones and earth. In others, pits or silos had been dug in unlikely places, and carefully covered up, or cellars had been filled, and their entrances bricked up and concealed. The ingenuity70 that is bred by an empty stomach soon set the French on the search for these hoards71. When it was once discovered that there was much hidden grain and maize72 in the country, every man became a food-hunter. Whole villages were pulled down in the search for secret places in their walls or under their floors. Parties scoured73 every ravine or hillside where caves might lurk74. We are told that one effective plan was for detachments to go about with full barrels in fields near houses, and to cast water all over the surface. Where the liquid sank in suddenly, there was a chance that a silo lurked75 below, and the spade often turned up a deposit of hundreds of bushels. But more drastic methods than these were soon devised. In the sort of no-man’s-land between the actual cantonments of the French army and the outposts of Wilson, Trant, and Blunt, the population had not entirely76 disappeared. Though the large majority had retired, some of the poorest or the most reckless had merely hidden themselves in the hills for a week or two, and came down cautiously when the French had marched by towards Lisbon. A sprinkling of miserable77 folk lived precariously79 in or near their usual abodes80, always ready to fly or to conceal67 themselves when a foraging81 party was reported in the neighbourhood. Hence came the horrid82 business that one French diarist calls the ‘chasse aux hommes’; it became a regular device for the marauders to move by night, hide themselves, and watch for some unwary peasant. When he was sighted he was pursued and often caught. He was then offered the choice between revealing the hiding-places of himself and his neighbours, and a musket-ball through the head. Generally he yielded, and the party went back with their mules83 loaded with grain, or driving before them some goats and oxen. Sometimes he was himself starving, could reveal nothing, and was murdered. We are assured by more than one French narrator of these hateful times that it was discovered that torture was more effective than the mere fear of death. If the prisoner could or would discover nothing, he was hung up for a few minutes, and then let down and offered[p. 12] a second chance of life. Sometimes this led to revelations; if not he was strung up again for good[12]. Torture by fire is also said to have been employed on some occasions.
Naturally these atrocities84 were not practised under the eyes of the officers commanding regular foraging parties[13]. But when a company had dispersed85 in search of plunder31, the men who were separated in twos or threes without control acted with such various degrees of brutality86 as suited themselves. Moreover, there was a floating scum of unlicensed marauders, who had left their colours without leave, and were in no hurry to rejoin them. These were responsible for the worst crimes: sometimes they gathered together in bands of considerable strength, and it is said that they were known to fire on regular foraging parties who tried to arrest or restrain them[14], and that one troop, several hundred strong, fought a desperate skirmish with a whole battalion sent to hunt them down. But it was not these fricoteurs, as they were called, who were the sole offenders87; many horrors were perpetrated within the limits of the cantonments by the authorized88 raiding companies. Guingret of the 39th, in Ney’s corps, mentions in his diary that he had seen such a detachment return to camp, after having surprised a half-deserted village, with a number of peasant girls, whom they sold to their comrades, some for a couple of gold pieces, others for a pack-horse[15], and assures us that rape65 was habitual89 when such a surprise had succeeded. It was in vain that Masséna and the corps-commanders issued general orders prohibiting misconduct of any kind, and even executed one or two offenders caught flagrante delicto. For the regimental officers, who depended on the individual efficiency of their men in marauding for their daily food, were not too eager to make inquiries90 as to what had passed outside their own vision, and the soldier who brought home much booty was not[p. 13] too closely questioned as to the manner in which he had obtained it. When a foraging party had turned over many bushels of wheat or maize, or a hundred sheep, to the store of their battalion, it could hardly be expected that their colonel would show his gratitude91 by inquiring whether the happy find had been procured92 by torture or by simple murder.
Of the three corps which formed Masséna’s army, that of Reynier, in the Santarem entrenchments, seems to have suffered most, because it was concentrated on a narrow position, with no unexhausted country around it, and with other troops immediately in its rear, who had sucked dry the resources of the plain of Goleg?o. Its foraging parties had to go thirty miles away before they had a chance of finding ground that had not been already picked over most carefully by the men of the 6th or the 8th Corps. Junot’s men were a little better off, as they had the Leiria-Alcoba?a country immediately on their flank, and could plunder there without molestation93, unless they pressed in too closely upon the outposts of Trant’s or Blunt’s detachments. Nevertheless the 8th Corps lost more men by disease than either of the others during this hard winter. It was composed to a great extent of conscript battalions new to Spain, young and unacclimatized, whose men died off like flies from cold, dysentery, and rheumatism94. Clausel’s division, which contained all these raw units, sank from 6,700 to 4,000 men in the three months that preceded the New Year, without having been engaged in any serious fighting—a loss of forty per cent.: while the case-hardened troops of Reynier, who had been in the Peninsula since 1808, and had already gone through the privations of Soult’s marches to Corunna and Oporto, only shrank from 17,000 to 12,000 bayonets in the same three months. Moreover, of the 5,000 lost by them, 2,000 were the casualties of Bussaco, not the victims of Wellington’s scheme of starvation. Ney’s corps and the cavalry reserve were better off than either Junot’s or Reynier’s troops, having at their disposition the fertile country between Goleg?o, Thomar, and Abrantes, where, at the commencement of their sojourn96, food was to be got with comparative ease—many fields of maize were still standing97 unreaped when they first arrived, and it was not till after the New Year of 1811 that they began to be seriously pinched, and to be[p. 14] driven far afield, up the valley of the Zezere and into the mountains in the direction of Espinhal and Coimbra. The 6th Corps was still 18,000 strong out of its original 24,000 on January 1st, and of the 6,000 missing, 2,000 represented Bussaco casualties in actual fighting.
It must be confessed that the French army displayed splendid fortitude98 and ingenuity in maintaining itself on the Tagus so long beyond the period of Wellington’s estimate. That it did not altogether dissolve, when it was living from hand to mouth, with a fifth or a quarter of the men habitually99 absent on foraging expeditions, is surprising. Desertions to the allied lines, save from the foreign battalions in Loison’s and Solignac’s divisions, were very rare; the native French gave many recruits to the marauding fricoteurs, but seldom passed over to the enemy. The regimental officers succeeded in organizing a regular system by which the exploitation of the country-side was made as effectual as could be managed. They repaired and set going the ruined mills, discovered and rebuilt the bakers’ ovens of every village and town, and in most cases organized regimental food-reserves which made them independent of the general commissariat[16]. For there was little or nothing to be got from head quarters. Shoes proved the greatest difficulty, but the men learnt to make rude mocassins or ‘rivlins’ of untanned hide, which served fairly well, though they needed constant replacing[17]. In some regiments a third of the men might be seen wearing this primitive100 footgear. Another weak point was ammunition101—there had been no great consumption of it since Bussaco, or the state of the army would have been perilous102 indeed, since it had to depend on what it had originally brought down from Spain in September. No more had been received, and attempts to establish a powder factory at Santarem failed for lack of saltpetre. If Masséna had been forced to fight two or three general engagements, his stores would have been so depleted103 that he would have had to abscond104 at once, lest the army should be left without cartridges105. Meanwhile he hung on to his position, conscious that his power of endurance was[p. 15] limited, but hoping at any moment to see reinforcements break through from the north or the east, to refill his ranks and bring him the needful convoys106.
Of military operations, as opposed to mere raids by detachments in search of food, hardly anything was undertaken by the Army of Portugal down to the end of the year. Between the 22nd and the 29th of December, General Ferey, with five battalions and a cavalry regiment, carried out a useless excursion beyond the Zezere, into the desolate107 region of Castello Branco as far as Corti?ada; apparently108 he had been sent out because of rumours109 that a French force was operating in this direction, and he was told to get into touch with it. But these reports were idle—they were tardy110 echoes of Gardanne’s unhappy march on the Estrada Nova[18] a full month before. The brigade returned, wearied and more than half-starved, on the seventh day, equally destitute111 of news and of the plunder that it had hoped to find in a hitherto untouched district. The only fruitful action, indeed, which the French carried out in this month was the completion of the great bridge-equipage at the mouth of the Zezere, which Masséna had ordered General Eblé to construct many weeks back[19]. His object was to have at his disposition means for crossing the Tagus, in case he should wish to invade the Alemtejo, or to co-operate with any friendly troops that might appear from that direction. Originally he had intended to make Santarem his crossing-point, but, after some boats had been built there, with immense difficulties owing to the entire lack of appliances, he determined that the place was too near the British lines, and too much exposed to attacks by Wellington’s river flotilla. Obviously a serious attempt to cross the Tagus near Santarem, even if its initial stages succeeded, and the larger part of the army got over, would expose the rear divisions to almost certain destruction, since Wellington could throw 30,000 men upon them within the next twelve hours. There is no more certain way of ruining an army than to allow it to be caught divided into two halves by a broad river spanned by one or two precarious78 bridges. On the other hand, the mouth of the Zezere was very remote from Wellington’s main[p. 16] army, and a crossing made opposite to it could only be opposed by a part of Beresford’s force, which was not very large, and was spread along fifty miles of the river front. Moreover, the corps executing the passage would not have any great danger on its flank or rear, since there was only the Portuguese garrison of Abrantes to molest25 it. It was an additional advantage that a bridge-equipage at Punhete could be kept in perfect safety a mile or two up the Zezere, out of range of guns on the further bank of the Tagus, and could be floated down at the last moment: while at Santarem the boats had to be stored on the actual bank of the Tagus, exposed to attacks from the side of the water by Wellington’s gunboats. One effort to sink or fire them by a bombardment and the use of Congreve rockets had already been made[20].
Accordingly Masséna resolved that if he made any attempt to cross into the Alemtejo, he would take Punhete and the estuary112 of the Zezere as his starting-point. Here he established his dockyard, and hither he transferred most of the busy workers from Santarem. In the course of a month they got ready for him the materials for two bridges broad enough to span the Tagus, besides ninety flat-bottomed boats. The mouth of the Zezere was protected by a number of batteries, to keep down the fire of any guns that Beresford might bring up to sink the bridges when they were being cast across.
These preparations did not long escape Wellington’s notice; he saw that the ground opposite Punhete was the most crucial point in Beresford’s long front, and bade him close up his troops toward it. The detachment beyond the Tagus was reinforced by a Spanish brigade under Carlos de Espa?a, drawn from La Romana’s army, which was placed at Barca just opposite the mouth of the Zezere, with William Stewart’s brigade of the 2nd Division close by at Santa Margarida, Tramagal, and Pinheiros. Three batteries were established on the Tagus bank opposite Punhete, and armed with six-pounders; but as these were overmatched by the French guns across the water, nine-pounders were requisitioned from Lisbon[21]. The rest of the[p. 17] 2nd Division and Hamilton’s two Portuguese brigades were to be ready to march to support Carlos de Espa?a and Stewart at the shortest notice. These dispositions were sufficient to keep Masséna quiet; he had no real intention of crossing the Tagus unless he heard of Soult’s approach from the direction of the Alemtejo[22].
On that side all was tranquil—as indeed it was destined113 to remain for many a week more. But just at the end of the month of December the isolation114 in which the Army of Portugal had so long been living at last came to an end, and reinforcements and news were at last received, though the news was disheartening and the reinforcements inadequate115. On the 26th the reconnoitring party under General Marcognet, which had just beaten up Wilson’s quarters at Espinhal, was surprised by the appearance of a party of regular cavalry pushing towards them on the road from Ponte de Murcella. The uniforms were soon seen to be those of French dragoons, and a joyful116 meeting took place[23]. The new-comers announced that they were the advanced guard of Drouet’s 9th Corps, which was pushing down the valley of the Mondego in search of the Army of Portugal, but had no exact knowledge of where it was to be found.
The 9th Corps, it will be remembered, was a promiscuous117 assembly of some twenty newly-raised fourth battalions, belonging to the regiments which were already in Spain. Eleven were fractions of corps serving in Soult’s Army of Andalusia, five of regiments of Ney’s 6th Corps, the rest of units under Reynier’s and Junot’s command. Drouet had been originally ordered to do no more than conduct these battalions, which were little better than a mass of drafts, to join the regiments to which they belonged. They were divided into two provisional divisions under Generals Conroux and Claparéde. Thrust, as it were, into Spain without any regular organization, destitute of battalion transport, and with an improvised118 and insufficient119 staff,[p. 18] they had made very slow progress since they crossed the Pyrenees, mainly owing to difficulties of commissariat. When Foy passed Salamanca on November 10th, the head of Claparéde’s division had only just entered that city; the tail of the corps was struggling up from Valladolid and Burgos. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that Claparéde only reached the neighbourhood of Almeida on the 15th of November, and that Drouet had not concentrated his whole force at that place till December 14th. He had about 16,000 men, having left three of his own battalions to garrison Ciudad Rodrigo, and picked up instead the remains120 of Gardanne’s column, which had retreated on to the Spanish frontier in such disorder121 at the end of the preceding month[24]. This detachment, by reason of its losses during its disastrous flight, had been reduced to about 1,400 men fit for service—about the same number that Drouet had left behind him from his own corps. Drouet was acting122 under stringent123 orders from the Emperor to move forward at the earliest possible moment[25], and open up communication with Masséna. His original instructions had been to go no further forward than Almeida himself, but to send a column under Gardanne, 6,000 strong, to clear and keep open the way to the Tagus. The march and failure of Gardanne have been already related, and Drouet saw that to carry out the Emperor’s orders he must use a larger force. At the same time his dispatches told him that he must at all costs keep in touch with Almeida, and not merely join Masséna and allow himself to be cut off from Spain[26].
Drouet’s solution of the problem was that with Conroux’s division and Gardanne’s detachment, some 8,000 men, he would march down the Mondego by Celorico and Ponte de Murcella, and cut his way to join Masséna, but that he would leave his second division under Claparéde behind him, about Celorico and Trancoso, to keep in touch with Almeida and maintain his communications. This was about as much as could be done to carry[p. 19] out Napoleon’s instructions, which were essentially124 impossible to execute. For the Portuguese militia, with which the 9th Corps had to deal, were, when properly managed, a very intangible enemy, who could retire whenever a column passed, and return to block the way when it had gone by. It is impossible to see how Drouet could have kept open the whole road from Almeida to Thomar, without leaving all along the way a couple of battalions, entrenched125 in a good position, at distances of fifteen or twenty miles from each other. And if he had done this, he would have had no force left at the moment when he joined Masséna. It was useless for Napoleon to tell him in one breath to keep the road open from end to end, and in the next to forbid him to make any small detachments[27]. But the Emperor neither fully69 understood the military situation in Portugal, nor grasped the relative merits of its roads or the relative resources of its various regions. In a dispatch sent out to Masséna on December 4th (but not delivered till February) he advised that Marshal to try to open his communications with Spain by the awful mountain road from the Zezere by Cardigos and Belmonte to Guarda, and at the same time to use the desolate Castello Branco country ‘pour faire des vivres.’ Ferey’s fruitless expedition up that very road and into that very region, carried out a fortnight before the Emperor’s dispatch was even written, had sufficiently126 proved the futility127 of the suggestion.
But to return to Drouet: he left Almeida on December 14th, and crossed the Coa with both his divisions and Gardanne’s detachment. The only enemy near him was Silveira, who with his six militia regiments and the reorganized 24th of the Line (the absconding128 garrison of Almeida, which had eluded129 its forced oath to Masséna in the preceding autumn[28]) was lying at Trancoso. To that place the Portuguese general had retired (abandoning the blockade of Almeida) when the 9th Corps arrived on the frontier. Of the other militia brigades of the north Miller130 with four battalions was at Vizeu, Trant with seven at Coimbra; Baccelar, the Commander-in-Chief, lay at Oporto with the small remainder.
Drouet, copying Masséna’s first dispositions in the preceding[p. 20] autumn, marched from Almeida in two columns; he himself took the high road by Celorico; Claparéde was sent along the more difficult mountain route by Trancoso, which place Silveira evacuated on his approach. At Celorico Drouet cut himself loose from his lieutenant131, who (in accordance with Napoleon’s orders) was to stay behind, to remain in touch with Almeida, and (vain thought!) to keep open the communications. Taking Conroux and Gardanne with him, he marched south of the Mondego, past Chamusca and Moita, as far as Ponte de Murcella, which he reached on the 24th. He met with no opposition132, for Baccelar, anxious only for Oporto, had told Silveira to keep in front of Claparéde, and Miller to stay at Vizeu, but both to be ready to fall back on Oporto if Drouet’s advance turned out to have that city as its objective. Similarly Trant was to hold on to Coimbra unless the French column took the northern road, in which case he too might be called back to Oporto[29]. Between Drouet, therefore, and Masséna’s army there was only left the weak brigade of John Wilson at Espinhal, and this force had been driven out of its usual position by Marcognet’s flying column on November 23rd, and had retired to Pe?acova beyond the Mondego, below the heights of Bussaco. On the 26th Drouet’s advance cavalry came into touch with Marcognet, as has been already related, at Espinhal, just as the latter was preparing to retire to Thomar, with the report that there was nothing stirring in the north.
Thus Drouet’s 8,000 men came into the sphere of Masséna’s operations; but he did not at first seem to realize the fact. He sent on Gardanne’s detachment (which mostly belonged to the 2nd Corps) to join the Marshal, but halted Conroux’s division at Espinhal, and only went forward in person as far as Thomar, where he stopped for two days conferring with Ney. Instead of reporting himself to Masséna, he merely sent on a dispatch, to say that he had opened the communications, and was under orders from the Emperor to keep them safe. With this purpose he intended to return to the Mondego, and get back into touch with Claparéde. Masséna was in no small degree irritated at this pretension133 of Drouet to act as an independent commander, and sent him a peremptory134 order to come to head quarters to[p. 21] make his report, and to send on Conroux’s division from Espinhal to occupy Leiria. After some slight friction135 Drouet obeyed. The communications with Almeida, re-established for a moment, were thus broken again after four days, for John Wilson, the instant that Conroux began to break up from Espinhal, came boldly back towards that place, attacked the French rearguard on December 30th, and, after doing it some little harm, blocked the high-road to the north once more[30]. Drouet was completely cut off from Claparéde, and his arrival brought no profit to Masséna beyond his 8,000 men and the moderate train of ammunition which he had escorted. It was not with such a reinforcement that the Marshal could hope to resume the offensive. Indeed, as Wellington sagely136 remarked[31], if nothing more came up to join him, his retreat looked more certain and necessary than ever.
While Drouet was on the march to Leiria, his lieutenant, Claparéde, the moment that he was no longer under his superior’s eye, had gone off on a bold and rather hazardous137 raid of his own. Finding that Silveira’s militia were sticking closely to his skirts, he resolved to make an attempt to surprise them by a forced march. Concentrating at Trancoso on December 30th, he fell upon the enemy on the following day at Ponte do Abbade, and routed them with a loss of 200 men. Silveira, notwithstanding this check, adhered to his orders to keep close to Claparéde, and retired no further than Villa6 da Ponte, some seven miles away. But the French general made a second sudden sally from Trancoso on January 11th[32], beat the Portuguese much more decisively, and pursued them as far as Lamego on the Douro. Silveira crossed the river in great disorder on the 13th, and the news of his defeat brought terror to Oporto. Baccelar at once ordered not only the brigade from Vizeu (Miller was just dead and no longer commanded it), but Trant from Coimbra, and Wilson from Pe?acova, to fall back and join him.[p. 22] They concentrated at Castro Daire, ten miles south of Lamego, with a force of 14,000 bayonets, whereupon Claparéde, who had only 6,000 men with him, began to fear that he would be cut off from Almeida and isolated138 in a difficult position. He evacuated Lamego and returned to Trancoso by forced marches, having accomplished139 nothing save the destruction of a few hundred militia and the spreading of panic as far as Oporto (January 18th)[33]. Shortly after he left Trancoso and moved southward to Celorico and Guarda[34], where he commanded the two roads to the Tagus, yet was not too far from Almeida and his base. But he was still completely cut off from Masséna, and the Portuguese at once resumed their old positions around him—Trant returning to Coimbra, Wilson to Pe?acova on the Mondego, while Baccelar with the reserves lay more to the rear, at S?o Pedro do Sul on the Vouga. Claparéde’s movement would have been dangerous for the allies if he had possessed140 a heavier force, but 6,000 men were too few for a serious march on Oporto, and if the column had not retreated in haste it would probably have suffered complete disaster.
The only use which Masséna could make of Drouet and the division of Conroux was to cover more ground for foraging by their means. When placed at Leiria they much restricted the activities of Blunt at Peniche and Trant at Coimbra, who could no longer push their advanced posts so far to the front, and had to cede95 to the enemy all the land about the Souré and Alcoa rivers. Here Drouet collected enough food both to feed himself and to give help to Ney; but the resources of the district were, after all, limited, and within a few weeks the men of the 9th Corps were living on the edge of daily starvation like their fellows. The Army of Portugal had got no solid help from this quarter. It remained to be seen whether they would obtain better aid from the other side from which Masséna had hoped to be reinforced—the Army of Andalusia.
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1
deadlock
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| n.僵局，僵持 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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4
advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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villa
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| n.别墅，城郊小屋 | |
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7
Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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incur
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| vt.招致，蒙受，遭遇 | |
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10
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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13
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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persevere
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| v.坚持，坚忍，不屈不挠 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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17
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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18
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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circuitous
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| adj.迂回的路的，迂曲的，绕行的 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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cogent
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| adj.强有力的，有说服力的 | |
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impede
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| v.妨碍，阻碍，阻止 | |
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molest
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| vt.骚扰，干扰，调戏 | |
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molesting
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| v.骚扰( molest的现在分词 )；干扰；调戏；猥亵 | |
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27
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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29
dreading
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| v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的现在分词 ) | |
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30
superseded
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| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
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31
plunder
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| vt.劫掠财物，掠夺；n.劫掠物，赃物；劫掠 | |
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32
plundering
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| 掠夺，抢劫( plunder的现在分词 ) | |
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33
levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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34
deserted
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| adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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36
unpaid
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| adj.未付款的，无报酬的 | |
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northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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nucleus
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| n.核，核心，原子核 | |
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forage
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| n.(牛马的)饲料，粮草；v.搜寻，翻寻 | |
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fugitive
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| adj.逃亡的，易逝的；n.逃犯，逃亡者 | |
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varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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pickets
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| 罢工纠察员( picket的名词复数 ) | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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44
fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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radius
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| n.半径，半径范围；有效航程，范围，界限 | |
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46
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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47
sustenance
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| n.食物，粮食；生活资料；生计 | |
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48
harrying
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| v.使苦恼( harry的现在分词 )；不断烦扰；一再袭击；侵扰 | |
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49
bickering
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| v.争吵( bicker的现在分词 )；口角；（水等）作潺潺声；闪烁 | |
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50
remarkably
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| ad.不同寻常地，相当地 | |
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51
strenuously
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| adv.奋发地，费力地 | |
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52
dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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53
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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54
dwindled
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| v.逐渐变少或变小( dwindle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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55
encumbered
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| v.妨碍，阻碍，拖累( encumber的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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56
aspired
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| v.渴望，追求( aspire的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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57
penetrate
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| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
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58
penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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59
continental
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| adj.大陆的，大陆性的，欧洲大陆的 | |
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60
testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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61
intercepted
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| 拦截( intercept的过去式和过去分词 )； 截住； 截击； 拦阻 | |
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62
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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63
gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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morsel
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| n.一口，一点点 | |
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rape
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| n.抢夺，掠夺，强奸；vt.掠夺，抢夺，强奸 | |
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66
evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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67
conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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68
concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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69
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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ingenuity
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| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
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71
hoards
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| n.（钱财、食物或其他珍贵物品的）储藏，积存( hoard的名词复数 )v.积蓄并储藏（某物）( hoard的第三人称单数 ) | |
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72
maize
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| n.玉米 | |
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73
scoured
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| 走遍（某地）搜寻（人或物）( scour的过去式和过去分词 )； （用力）刷； 擦净； 擦亮 | |
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74
lurk
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| n.潜伏，潜行；v.潜藏，潜伏，埋伏 | |
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75
lurked
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| vi.潜伏，埋伏（lurk的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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76
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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77
miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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precariously
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| adv.不安全地；危险地；碰机会地；不稳定地 | |
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abodes
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| 住所( abode的名词复数 )； 公寓； （在某地的）暂住； 逗留 | |
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foraging
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| v.搜寻（食物），尤指动物觅（食）( forage的现在分词 )；（尤指用手）搜寻（东西） | |
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horrid
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| adj.可怕的；令人惊恐的；恐怖的；极讨厌的 | |
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mules
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| 骡( mule的名词复数 )； 拖鞋； 顽固的人； 越境运毒者 | |
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atrocities
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| n.邪恶，暴行( atrocity的名词复数 )；滔天大罪 | |
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dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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brutality
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| n.野蛮的行为，残忍，野蛮 | |
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offenders
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| n.冒犯者( offender的名词复数 )；犯规者；罪犯；妨害…的人（或事物） | |
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authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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inquiries
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| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
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gratitude
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| adj.感激，感谢 | |
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procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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molestation
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| n.骚扰，干扰，调戏；折磨 | |
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rheumatism
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| n.风湿病 | |
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cede
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| v.割让，放弃 | |
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sojourn
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| v./n.旅居，寄居；逗留 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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fortitude
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| n.坚忍不拔；刚毅 | |
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habitually
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| ad.习惯地，通常地 | |
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primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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102
perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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depleted
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| adj. 枯竭的, 废弃的 动词deplete的过去式和过去分词 | |
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abscond
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| v.潜逃，逃亡 | |
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cartridges
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| 子弹( cartridge的名词复数 )； （打印机的）墨盒； 录音带盒； （唱机的）唱头 | |
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106
convoys
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| n.（有护航的）船队( convoy的名词复数 )；车队；护航（队）；护送队 | |
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107
desolate
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| adj.荒凉的，荒芜的；孤独的，凄凉的；v.使荒芜，使孤寂 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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rumours
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| n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 )；风闻；谣言；谣传 | |
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tardy
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| adj.缓慢的，迟缓的 | |
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destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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112
estuary
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| n.河口，江口 | |
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113
destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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isolation
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| n.隔离，孤立，分解，分离 | |
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inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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joyful
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| adj.欢乐的，令人欢欣的 | |
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promiscuous
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| adj.杂乱的，随便的 | |
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118
improvised
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| a.即席而作的,即兴的 | |
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119
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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120
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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stringent
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| adj.严厉的；令人信服的；银根紧的 | |
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124
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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125
entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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126
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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127
futility
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| n.无用 | |
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128
absconding
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| v.（尤指逃避逮捕）潜逃，逃跑( abscond的现在分词 ) | |
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eluded
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| v.（尤指机敏地）避开( elude的过去式和过去分词 )；逃避；躲避；使达不到 | |
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130
miller
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| n.磨坊主 | |
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131
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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133
pretension
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| n.要求；自命，自称；自负 | |
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134
peremptory
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| adj.紧急的，专横的，断然的 | |
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135
friction
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| n.摩擦，摩擦力 | |
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136
sagely
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| adv. 贤能地，贤明地 | |
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137
hazardous
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| adj.(有)危险的，冒险的；碰运气的 | |
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138
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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139
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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140
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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