On the morning of June 17th the five divisions of the Anglo-Portuguese1 army which had hitherto remained on the south bank of the Guadiana crossed that river, and retired2 to the positions along the line Elvas, Campo Mayor, Ouguella, which Wellington had already selected for them. The water was low, and the bulk of the troops used the fords between Jerumenha and Badajoz[564] which are practicable during the summer months, except after days of exceptional rain[565]. Head quarters were moved back to the country-house known as the Quinta de S?o Jo?o, near S?o Vicente, a spot equidistant from Elvas and Campo Mayor. The 7th Division, from the north side of Badajoz, made a corresponding movement, and fell back into the same general line. Spencer’s column from the Beira was now all across the Tagus, save Slade’s cavalry3 and the 5th Division, and its head was resting at Portalegre, to which its rear was rapidly coming up. As there are only two marches between Portalegre and Elvas, it was clear that the two sections of the allied4 army were certain of their junction5. For since on the 18th Marmont’s column-head had only reached Merida, and Soult’s was at Almendralejo, it would take some days for the two French armies to draw together, and concert further operations on the northern side of Badajoz.
But there was one section of the allied forces which Wellington was anxious not to withdraw across the Guadiana, but to send[p. 444] on another quest, and all his future movements depended on the march of this corps7. The moment that Soult began to advance from Llerena on the 14th, and to edge off in the direction of Merida and Marmont, he had left the western roads into Andalusia uncovered. Except a trifling8 detachment at Guadalcanal, there was now no force protecting Seville on that side. From the day that he got the news of the Marshal’s northerly march, Wellington began to press General Blake to return at once into his old haunts in the Condado de Niebla, passing round the left rear of the enemy, and to begin to threaten Seville. There was now nothing to prevent him from doing so, and it was well known that the Andalusian capital was left to a scanty9 garrison10, largely composed of convalescents and untrustworthy Juramentados. As long as Soult lay at Llerena, he could easily throw a column to the flank to succour Seville; but when he had moved on, this was no longer in his power. As early as June 10 Wellington had written to Casta?os[566] that Soult would ultimately move on Merida, and that Blake would then be able to slip into Andalusia either by the route of Xeres de los Caballeros and Fregenal, or if he preferred a safer though longer road, by that hugging the Portuguese frontier, following which he would emerge into Spain by Mertola. He could not be stopped on either route, and his appearance before Seville would bring back Soult in haste from Badajoz, and cure him of any desire to cross the Guadiana or to besiege11 Elvas. On June 12th Wellington ordered his commissaries to prepare rations6 at Mertola for the benefit of the Spaniards, who would probably be in their usual state of semi-starvation, and wrote to Blake to urge him to march at once[567]. The Captain-General consented to move, but asked for more food; he was told in reply that he should be fed from Jerumenha to Mertola while he was on Portuguese soil, but must rely on his own exertions12 while he was in Spain. On the morning of the 17th Blake crossed the Guadiana at Jerumenha with Loy’s 1,000 horse, the 10,000 infantry13 of Zayas and Ballasteros, and two batteries, and started to march down-stream for his destination. He was quite out of touch with[p. 445] the enemy, and so well protected by the Guadiana and the mountains that it was certain that his movement would be unobserved. Marching fast, he reached Mertola on June 22nd, and Castillejos, across the Andalusian frontier, on the 24th. Thus Wellington was serenely14 confident, when the enemy came up against his front, that he had thrown a bomb behind them, whose explosion would cause no small stir, and infallibly draw back a large section of the Army of Andalusia to defend Seville. Without these troops Soult would be in no condition to attack him[568], even with Marmont’s aid. The crisis between Elvas and Badajoz, therefore, could only last for a few days.
Meanwhile it had to be faced, and from the 22nd to the 29th of June Wellington might have found himself engaged in a general action on any day of the week. Soult and Marmont had met at Merida on the 18th—the day after Wellington’s army had crossed the Guadiana. The elder marshal had overwhelmed the younger with compliments—it was the first time, he said, that the Army of Portugal had done anything for the Army of the South; with a colleague who was unselfish and enterprising, he felt himself able to undertake any task[569]. It was settled that the combined armies should march against the Albuera positions next morning, in three columns. Marmont and his six divisions would move along the bank of the Guadiana by the road running through Lobon and Talavera Real: the main body of the Andalusian forces would take the route Almendralejo-Solana-Albuera. One division detached by Soult (it was the ten battalions15 of Conroux, the undistributed fraction of Drouet’s 9th Corps) was to turn the British line by a flanking movement through Almendral to Valverde. Thus just 60,000 men were put in motion, Marmont having brought about 32,000 of all arms, while Soult, including Drouet, had about 28,000. Expecting an action, for Wellington was known to have been at Albuera on the 16th, and his departure was unsuspected, the three columns advanced cautiously, and ready to deploy16. But[p. 446] no enemy was found, and by the evening of the 19th it was known that the Anglo-Portuguese were all behind the Guadiana. At dusk the head of Marmont’s light cavalry got in touch with the garrison of Badajoz, and learnt that the last of the Allies had disappeared from in front of its walls on the 16th. Phillipon was justified17 of his long and obstinate18 defence: on the very day before his half-rations would have given out, and at the moment when he was thinking seriously of blowing up his works, and making a dash to get away, the expected succours had appeared.
On the 20th Marmont entered Badajoz in triumph, amid the blare of military music, and a few hours later Soult arrived and exchanged felicitations with him and with the trusty governor. The two main columns of each of their armies converged19 on the fortress20, but Briche’s light cavalry and the divisions of Conroux and Godinot went to Olivenza, to see if by chance the Allies were holding that unlucky and ill-protected town. It was found empty (June 21st), the small Portuguese garrison having retired to Elvas on the 17th.
With 60,000 men in hand (or more, if the 3,500 bayonets of the Badajoz garrison are counted) and with one bridge and many good fords at their disposition21, for the crossing of the Guadiana, the two marshals had the power to thrust a general action upon their adversary22—unless indeed he should retire far beyond the Portuguese frontier, and so give them the chance of laying siege to Elvas. It remained to be seen what was his purpose, and on June 22nd a general reconnaissance on the further bank of the Guadiana was carried out. On the left Godinot’s division advanced from Olivenza to a point opposite Jerumenha, where, being very visible from the further bank, it was furiously but ineffectively cannonaded by the Portuguese garrison. Two dragoon regiments23 under General Bron forded the river, but found no allied troops in this direction. On the right, Montbrun, with two cavalry brigades of the Army of Portugal, passed the Badajoz bridge, and marched on Campo Mayor. After driving in a cavalry screen belonging to De Grey’s and Madden’s regiments, he found himself feeling the front of a defensive25 line, which he estimated at two division of infantry and 1,400 horse, and could get no further for[p. 447]ward[570]. He returned to report that Wellington was showing fight.
In the centre, where Latour-Maubourg in person, with fourteen squadrons of dragoons and Polish lancers, forded the Guadiana almost in front of Elvas, there was hard fighting, ending in a petty disaster for the allied outposts. Here the cavalry screen was formed on the right by the 2nd Hussars of the King’s German Legion, on the left by the 11th Light Dragoons. The French column drove in the pickets27 of the hussars, who resisted from the water’s edge onward28 with great obstinacy29. Presently the main body of this weak corps (only two squadrons strong[571]) came up, and with more courage than discretion30 charged the leading French regiment24, which they broke. But being outflanked by the enemy’s reserves, they were surrounded on three sides, and had to cut their way out with a loss of three officers wounded, two dead, and twenty prisoners. The remains31 of the hussars rallied behind the Quinta de Gremezia, where they were presently joined by the main body of the 11th Light Dragoons. The enemy pushed them no further, but turning to the right swept along Wellington’s outpost line in the direction of Badajoz. By so doing they found themselves in the rear of the outlying picket26 of the 11th, formed by Captain Lutyens’s troop. This little force had, by some mischance, not paid much attention to the disturbance32 in front of the hussars, nor had any orders been sent to them by their brigadier (Long) to bid them be cautious as to their flank. Warned at the last moment by a German sergeant33, Lutyens had just collected his men, and was about to retire, when he saw a body of cavalry, not on his flank but directly in his rear, cutting him off from Elvas. Thinking that a bold dash was his only chance, he closed up his men and charged the front French squadron, which he broke through. But a second line was behind, and he and his whole[p. 448] party of sixty-four sabres were ridden down and captured[572]. Only one wounded officer (Lieutenant Binney) cut his way through and brought the news of the mishap[573].
Wellington, with his usual clear perception, attributed this little disaster to the fact that the two regiments engaged had both landed in the Peninsula only a few weeks before, and were utterly34 unpractised in outpost duty. The hussars ought to have retired skirmishing—it was not their duty to try to fight five regiments of French. The light dragoon pickets had clearly not kept touch with the detachments on their flanks, or they would have heard of the advance of the enemy in force, and would not have been surrounded before they were aware that the French had got well round their rear. ‘This disagreeable circumstance,’ he writes, ‘tends to show the difference between old and new troops. The old regiments of cavalry, throughout all their service, with all their losses put together, have not lost so many men as the 2nd Hussars and the 11th Light Dragoons in a few days. However, we must make the new as good as the old[574].’ Wellington also blamed General Long. ‘Let him attend to the directions he before received from Sir Stapleton Cotton, to throw out only small picquets of observation on the Caya and Guadiana. If he had had his whole brigade, instead of one large picquet, on the Caya, he could not have prevented the enemy from advancing.... This principle is well known and understood in the army, and if it had not been acted upon invariably, we should have lost all our cavalry long ago, in the way in which Captain Lutyens lost the picquet of the 11th this morning[575].’
[p. 449]By the evening of the 22nd the two French marshals, as the result of their wide-spreading reconnaissances, were fully35 aware that Wellington lay in force from Campo Mayor to Elvas, and had no intention of retiring. But they had not been able to make out the details of his position, which lay across an undulating country wooded in many parts, and not to be embraced in a single view from any commanding spot. As a matter of fact their adversary had now got up all his troops; the last division from the Beira came into touch with the main body on the morning of the 23rd. Elaborate orders issued for the conduct of the army in case the French should advance for battle, show what were the intentions of Wellington[576].
His front extended from Ouguella near the Gebora river almost to Elvas, a distance of twelve miles. Ouguella was a little town with mediaeval fortifications, susceptible36 of defence for some hours. It was garrisoned37 by two companies of Portuguese from Elvas. Beyond it rises the mountain of the Dos Hermanas, and there is no practicable route to turn it, save by an immense détour in the direction of Albuquerque, so that the flank was very secure. Between Ouguella and Campo Mayor lay the 3rd and 7th Divisions under Picton. Campo Mayor had been repaired since its recapture, and had received a Portuguese garrison; it had some heavy guns (24-pounders) which would sweep the level ground in front of it. West of this fortress lay the allied centre under Hill, composed of the 2nd and 4th Divisions and Hamilton’s Portuguese, extending from Campo Mayor to the Caya. Beyond that river in the direction of Elvas, in a somewhat ‘refused’ position leaning backward to the north-west, lay the three brigades of the 1st Division, under Spencer, forming the right wing, and resting on the great fortress as their flank-guard. This formed the front line. The reserves were the Light Division on the Monte Reguingo in front of Arronches, ready to support Picton, and the 5th and 6th Divisions, which were on the Portalegre road, échelonned in advance from that place, behind Spencer, and able to reinforce the right or[p. 450] centre. The cavalry was out in front, Madden’s Portuguese on the left, Long’s brigade on the right, with De Grey’s, Slade’s, and Anson’s regiments ready in reserve to transfer themselves where they should be wanted[577]. The whole force available was about 46,000 infantry, of which 29,000 were British, 5,000 cavalry, of which 1,400 belonged to the weak Portuguese brigades of Madden, Otway, and Barba?ena, and 14 batteries with 80 pieces and 2,800 gunners. The gross total was 54,000, not including two regular and two militia38 regiments of Portuguese forming the garrison of Elvas. Thus the allied army, though still appreciably39 inferior in numbers to the enemy, more especially in the cavalry arm, was strong enough to take the defensive in a good position[578]. Every available regular unit in[p. 451] Portugal had been gathered in by the 23rd, even Pack’s and Barba?ena’s small Portuguese brigades, which had remained down to the last possible moment in the Beira. The ground was most formidable for defence, covered by three fortresses40, and having in its front an open plain which, though interspersed41 with occasional groves42, was sufficiently43 commanded by the heights on the British flanks to make it impossible for any large body of troops to move across it in any direction without being detected. Wellington had placed observation parties at the many ‘Atalayas,’ the old Moorish44 watch-towers, which line the Portuguese frontier, and had arranged for a system of flag-signalling to convey news from one flank to the other. There were also warnings to be given by gun-fire, from pieces detailed45 for that purpose at Ouguella and Campo Mayor[579]. The cross-roads along the rear of the position being good, and the Caya fordable in many places, Wellington thought that he was certain of being able to transfer troops with swiftness and security to any part of the line that might be threatened. The only way in which the enemy could approach him unseen would be by moving at night, and even so there would be ample warning, since the cavalry pickets were out far in front of the line, and would give notice betimes. Moreover, a night-march of some nine miles out from Badajoz over unknown ground, towards an undiscovered position, would have little temptation for the enemy. The danger of blundering into a trap in the dark would be too great.
But as a matter of fact the French Marshals were not proposing to attack. They had learnt that Spencer’s divisions were up, so that the whole of the Anglo-Portuguese army was in front of them, and they shrank from committing themselves to a general action. Marmont wrote to Berthier on June 21st, Soult on June 22nd, and in neither of their dispatches is there the least intention displayed of making any further offensive move. Both state that they intended to attack the Albuera position on the 19th, if Wellington had stayed in it. ‘The enemy,’ says Marmont,[p. 452] ‘retired in haste, repassed the Guadiana, and returned into Portugal, without leaving us any chance of tackling him. It is tiresome46 that he would not make trial of his fortune, for a decisive victory would infallibly have marked our arrival in this region.’ Soult, in very similar terms, writes: ‘The Duke of Ragusa and I had resolved to give battle, but Lord Wellington prudently47 retreated before we could come up with him. Yet he had 60,000 men, of whom 30,000 were English, including General Spencer’s divisions just drawn48 in from the north, 14,000 Portuguese, and 16,000 Spaniards; there were 5,000 cavalry among them. It is vexatious that no general action could take place: our success would not be doubtful. But we may hope that another occasion may present itself, especially if the Army of Portugal continues to keep in touch with the Army of the South, and communicates with it, as it is now doing. Of that I have no doubt, from the alacrity49 with which the Duke of Ragusa marched to join in the relief of Badajoz with all his disposable forces.’ Soult then proceeds to state with great gravity that Albuera was a signal victory, and the sole cause of the preservation50 of Badajoz—ignoring the fact that he retreated sixty miles after it, and could not move again till he had been joined by Drouet and Marmont[580].
If Soult wanted another signal victory of the type of Albuera he had only to march nine miles towards Campo Mayor, on the day after he wrote this dispatch to Berthier. The temptation was surely great, since the defeat of Wellington’s army would have shaken to its foundations the whole defence of the Peninsula. To assemble the force now lying by Badajoz, Andalusia and Leon had been stripped of all disposable troops, and left exposed to the raids of the Spanish Armies of Galicia and Murcia, and to the omnipresent guerrilleros, who had already cut communications in every direction. If Wellington could be beaten, the concentration was justified; if he were left unmolested nothing had been gained, save the reprovisioning of Badajoz—and the game might go on for ever. Battle was now offered to the Marshals if they chose to accept it—the recon[p. 453]naissance of June 22nd proved that the Allies had taken up a position and were standing51 on it.
General Map of Estremadura
Enlarge ESTREMADURA
But neither Soult nor Marmont would advance. The cause of their reluctance52 to engage was undoubtedly53 a moral one. As Napier very truly remarks in a typical sentence[581], ‘Marmont’s army was conscious of its recent defeats at Bussaco, at Sabugal, at Fuentes de O?oro; the horrid54 field of Albuera was fresh; the fierce blood there spilt still reeked55 in the nostrils56 of Soult’s soldiers.’ The generals, no less than the rank and file, felt a qualm at the idea of attacking Wellington in a position which he had taken up with deliberation, and where he showed himself serenely expectant of their attack. They were aware that an attempt to dislodge him would be rendered very tiresome by the fact that Elvas and Campo Mayor protected his line. They over-valued his forces by the number of Blake’s army, which, till the 24th June, they wrongly supposed to be still with him. So contenting themselves with dictating57 pompous58 dispatches concerning the importance of the relief of Badajoz—which was indeed a notable advantage—they went each upon his separate way. Instead of attempting to inflict59 a defeat on Wellington, the Marshals did no more than patch up a scheme by which they thought he might be contained and held in check for the present. In short, the offensive spirit was gone: the French armies in Spain found themselves thrown upon the defensive; and so things were to remain for the rest of the Peninsular War. The offensive, though it was hardly realized as yet, had passed to Wellington[582].
[p. 454]Meanwhile the Allies could not tell what might be the intentions of the enemy. Seeing the enormous advantage that a victory would bring the French, and remembering the way in which they had stripped all Spain of troops in order to produce the army which now lay opposite him, Wellington thought that he was to be attacked, and continued for some days to perfect his preparations. The period of intent waiting was from the 23rd to the 28th of June, during which nothing was to be made out concerning the main purpose of the French. Petty cavalry reconnaissances in the direction of the Albuquerque and Montijo roads, much moving about of small columns between Olivenza and Badajoz, were observed—but no certain deductions60 could be drawn from them. ‘No judging what he means yet: meanwhile everything is ready for him,’ wrote D’Urban, Beresford’s chief of the staff, in his diary on June 25th. As a matter of fact, the small movements hitherto observed were merely matters of foraging61 and exploration, and had no occult meaning. On the 27th, however, there was something definite to be learnt; on the morning of that day Godinot’s division blew up the walls of Olivenza, and marched to Valverde. This disappearance62 of the French left wing might have meant that all the columns were being drawn in for an attack in the centre; but it might also mean that Soult was about to send back troops to Seville. That the latter was the true interpretation63 was shown on the 28th, when Godinot definitely marched not towards Badajoz, but southward along the chaussée leading to Andalusia by Los Santos and Monasterio. It was certain that, if Soult was sending away men from the front, he could not be intending to attack, since every man would be required, if a dash at the Anglo-Portuguese lines was in contemplation. When Wellington had news from the peasantry of Godinot’s southward march on the 29th June, he could see that the die had been cast, and that he need no longer look for an attack upon his lines. He was soon afterwards informed that two divisions were gone southward, not[p. 455] merely one; but for some time he could get no certitude of the departure of the second division, though it was perfectly64 true that this unit (Conroux’s ten battalions of Drouet’s old corps) had departed almost immediately after Godinot.
What had happened was that on June 24th, the fourth day after the entry of the two Marshals into Badajoz, Soult had informed Marmont that he had such bad news from Andalusia that he must return at once to Seville with some of his troops. It was not so much Blake’s diversion which was working[583]—the French had learnt of his start on the 24th, but did not know that he had reached the Condado de Niebla—as the tidings of the spread of the insurrection in the Ronda mountains, and of threatening movements by Freire’s Army of Murcia against the 4th Corps. The force in Eastern Andalusia had lent so much to Soult’s field army[584], and so much more to garrison the province of Cordova[585], that it was much under strength. There were only 9,000 men, or less, left in the kingdom of Granada, and the Murcian army was 14,000 strong. Marmont refused to take Soult’s fears seriously, being (as he himself tells us[586]) convinced by this time that his colleague was wanting to throw all the responsibility of keeping Badajoz safe and ‘containing’ Wellington on the Army of Portugal. He replied that unless Soult promised to leave him the whole of the 5th Corps, and all Latour-Maubourg’s cavalry, he should order his troops to march for Truxillo and Almaraz, and throw the charge of Badajoz on the Army of the South, which might keep it if it could.
Soult was forced to assent65 to this demand, and took away only Godinot’s and Conroux’s provisional divisions, and three regiments of cavalry. The 5th Corps, now placed under Drouet[587], and six dragoon regiments, were left behind on the Guadiana, to enable[p. 456] Marmont to maintain a safe defensive against Wellington. They made up some 15,000 men, which, with the 32,000 of the Army of Portugal, provided a force quite insufficient66 to attack the Allies, yet large enough to prevent a siege of Badajoz. For no general, least of all the cautious commander of the Anglo-Portuguese army, would undertake to besiege a fortress of the first class, situated67 on two sides of a broad river, with 54,000 men, when a covering force of 47,000 men was supporting it in the near vicinity.
Meanwhile, for a fortnight after Soult had departed from Badajoz for Seville on June 28th, Marmont and Drouet on one side of the Guadiana, and Wellington on the other, stood observing each other, and waiting each for some move on the part of his adversary. The British general knew that the French in his front were no longer strong enough to attack him on his positions around the Caya. But he must keep his army concentrated, since, if he made detachments in any direction, Marmont might yet make a dash at Elvas; and that place, though it had been much improved of late[588], during the weeks when an attack on it seemed probable, still left something to be desired, especially in the quality of the guns on its walls—our old acquaintances of the siege of Badajoz, and their brethren. As long as Marmont and Drouet remained massed near Badajoz the allied army could not disperse68.
On the other hand, the French generals were compelled to keep together for a time, in order to superintend the victualling of Badajoz, whose magazines were absolutely empty at the moment of its relief. If they had drawn back into cantonments, and scattered69 their men, Wellington might have thrown a light corps and cavalry across the Guadiana, and have established once more a blockade of the fortress. Accordingly, from the 28th of June to the 15th of July the Army of Portugal and the 5th Corps remained concentrated in the quadrilateral Badajoz-Merida-Almendralejo-Almendral, sweeping70 the country-side for provisions. Each regiment was ordered to deposit in the[p. 457] magazines of Badajoz a prescribed number of fanegas of wheat or maize71, making in all six months’ rations for a garrison of 4,000 men. North of the Guadiana the French cavalry ranged about the region around Montijo and Torre del Fresno, where they were in constant touch with Wellington’s exploring squadrons sent out from Campo Mayor and Ouguella: but no serious collisions occurred. At last, on July 15th it was reported that Badajoz was fully provisioned, and Marmont informed Drouet that he was about to disperse his army in cantonments reaching as far as the Tagus, since northern Estremadura was wholly exhausted72. He would keep a division at Truxillo, half-way between Merida and the Tagus, and the rest of his army could be brought back at the shortest notice, if the Anglo-Portuguese should make a forward move. Drouet, after changing the garrison of Badajoz for new battalions of the same regiments which had endured the two sieges of May and June, and confiding73 its charge once more to the trusty Phillipon, drew back the 5th Corps to Zafra, Los Santos, and Merida, leaving Briche’s light cavalry at Santa Marta to keep the communication with Badajoz open. The Marshal and the general calculated that if Wellington should once more come forward, they could join again at Merida in six or seven days to ‘contain’ him. He could do nothing against Badajoz in the short time that would elapse before their concentration.
But Wellington had for the present no further designs against the fortress which had cost him so much useless labour. The moment that Marmont’s departure was announced to him, he too dispersed74 his army into cantonments. The banks of the Caya and Guadiana were notorious for their fever, and the troops were already beginning to suffer from it. On the 18th of July orders were issued for the 3rd and 6th Divisions to march for Castello Branco, the 7th for Niza, the 1st and 5th for Portalegre, the 4th for Estremos and then for Pedrog?o, the Light Division for Castello de Vide and Montalv?o. Only the 2nd and Hamilton’s Portuguese remained in the neighbourhood of Elvas—the former at Villa75 Vi?osa, the latter at Fronteira and Souzel, a little further to the north-west[589]. Hill retained charge of these[p. 458] two divisions, which formed the Anglo-Portuguese Army of the South for the next twelve months. His allowance of cavalry consisted of Barba?ena’s and Otway’s Portuguese brigades, and Long’s and De Grey’s British brigades, which are for the future spoken of as the ‘second cavalry division’ of the allied army. Its command was given not to Lumley, who had used the troops so effectively during the late campaign, for he had just gone on sick leave to England. It went to Sir William Erskine, of whom Wellington could find no more to say, when proposing him to Beresford for this post, than that he would at any rate do better than Long, and that, if very blind, ‘which is against him at the head of cavalry,’ he was at any rate very cautious[590]. The fact was that Erskine had given grave dissatisfaction at Sabugal and elsewhere, and that the Commander-in-Chief wished to shunt him on to some new line, where he would have less responsibility. Yet the experiment of trusting him with two cavalry brigades was a risky76 one!
There was more reorganization carried out in the allied army during the months of June, July, and August 1811 than at any other period of Wellington’s command. Owing to the arrival of more cavalry regiments,[591] there were by September 1st six cavalry brigades in existence instead of three, and they contained thirteen regiments instead of the original seven which had served in 1810 and the early months of 1811. Wellington’s mounted strength had been almost doubled—though most of the corps arrived too late to be available when the French were showing such a preponderant cavalry force on the Caya in June. But in the next campaign Wellington was to be, for the first time[p. 459] since his arrival in the Peninsula, possessed77 of an adequate proportion of mounted men.
As to the infantry, the 1st Division (as we have already seen[592]) had given a brigade to the 2nd to repair the losses of Albuera. The 2nd Division had taken over Howard’s brigade from the 1st, and had consolidated78 the remains of Colborne’s and Hoghton’s shattered regiments from two brigades into one. The 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Divisions were comparatively little altered, getting, between them all, only two more battalions on balance, after replacing certain old ones by newly arrived units[593]. But the 7th Division, hitherto containing only one British brigade (Sontag’s) was provided with a second one, by taking in Alten’s light infantry battalions, which had fought so well at Albuera.
The net result of all this change was that, when Wellington once more divided his army into a northern and a southern force in August, the latter (now under Hill) amounted to about 9,000 bayonets and nearly 4,000 sabres. This detachment having four cavalry brigades (five British and four Portuguese regiments) was able to ‘contain’ its normal adversary in Estremadura, Drouet’s 9th Corps, which had about the same number of cavalry and two or three thousand more infantry. Hill’s regular task was to cover Elvas and to keep Drouet in check, without committing himself to any large offensive operations, for which his force was manifestly inadequate79.
But the Anglo-Portuguese northern corps, or main army, was now far stronger than it had ever been before, amounting to[p. 460] some 46,000 men, including 5,000 cavalry. It now became for the first time decidedly superior in numbers to its special opponent, the French Army of Portugal, which even after receiving its drafts and convalescents in the autumn did not amount to quite 40,000 men, and was very weak in cavalry, of which it did not possess more than 3,000. Clearly, then, for the future Marmont could not possibly take the offensive against Wellington with his own forces, and would have to depend for help on the Army of the North, if matters came to a crisis. He would be lucky if he were able to ‘contain’ the Anglo-Portuguese, and certainly could not think of doing more, unless he were able to get prompt reinforcements from Bessières—or, after that Marshal’s departure, from his successor, Dorsenne. Indeed, the Army of Portugal was so clearly inadequate to discharge the function of protecting the whole Spanish frontier from the Guadiana to the Douro, that the Emperor, though in October he once more proposed to Marmont an invasion of Portugal, was ultimately forced to make over to it 16,000 men from the Army of the North, the divisions of Souham and Bonnet[594]. But of this more in its own place. It must suffice here to say that the net results of the spring and summer campaigns of 1811 was to leave the French decidedly on the defensive all along the Portuguese border, and to transfer to Wellington the opportunity of trying the offensive. It was to be five months, however, before he succeeded in taking it up—his autumn operations of 1811 were tentative, and led to no definite results. From July to December there was much man?uvring, but little change came of it.
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Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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rations
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| 定量( ration的名词复数 )； 配给量； 正常量； 合理的量 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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scanty
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| adj.缺乏的，仅有的，节省的，狭小的，不够的 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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besiege
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| vt.包围，围攻，拥在...周围 | |
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exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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serenely
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| adv.安详地，宁静地，平静地 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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deploy
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| v.（军）散开成战斗队形，布置，展开 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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converged
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| v.（线条、运动的物体等）会于一点( converge的过去式 )；（趋于）相似或相同；人或车辆汇集；聚集 | |
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fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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picket
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| n.纠察队；警戒哨；v.设置纠察线；布置警卫 | |
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pickets
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| 罢工纠察员( picket的名词复数 ) | |
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onward
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| adj.向前的，前进的；adv.向前，前进，在先 | |
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obstinacy
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| n.顽固；（病痛等）难治 | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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sergeant
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| n.警官，中士 | |
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utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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susceptible
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| adj.过敏的，敏感的；易动感情的，易受感动的 | |
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garrisoned
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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appreciably
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| adv.相当大地 | |
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fortresses
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| 堡垒，要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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interspersed
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| adj.[医]散开的；点缀的v.intersperse的过去式和过去分词 | |
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groves
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| 树丛，小树林( grove的名词复数 ) | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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moorish
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| adj.沼地的，荒野的，生[住]在沼地的 | |
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detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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tiresome
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| adj.令人疲劳的，令人厌倦的 | |
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prudently
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| adv. 谨慎地，慎重地 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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alacrity
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| n.敏捷，轻快，乐意 | |
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preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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reluctance
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| n.厌恶，讨厌，勉强，不情愿 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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horrid
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| adj.可怕的；令人惊恐的；恐怖的；极讨厌的 | |
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reeked
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| v.发出浓烈的臭气( reek的过去式和过去分词 )；散发臭气；发出难闻的气味 (of sth)；明显带有（令人不快或生疑的跡象） | |
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nostrils
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| 鼻孔( nostril的名词复数 ) | |
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dictating
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的现在分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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pompous
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| adj.傲慢的，自大的；夸大的；豪华的 | |
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59
inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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deductions
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| 扣除( deduction的名词复数 )； 结论； 扣除的量； 推演 | |
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foraging
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| v.搜寻（食物），尤指动物觅（食）( forage的现在分词 )；（尤指用手）搜寻（东西） | |
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62
disappearance
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| n.消失，消散，失踪 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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66
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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68
disperse
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| vi.使分散；使消失；vt.分散；驱散 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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sweeping
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| adj.范围广大的，一扫无遗的 | |
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71
maize
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| n.玉米 | |
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72
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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confiding
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| adj.相信人的，易于相信的v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的现在分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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74
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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75
villa
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| n.别墅，城郊小屋 | |
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76
risky
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| adj.有风险的，冒险的 | |
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77
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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78
consolidated
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| a.联合的 | |
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inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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