THE SIEGE AND FALL OF TARRAGONA. MAY-JUNE 1811
Suchet had marched, as has been already mentioned, from Lerida, with Harispe’s division, on April 28th, Frère’s division following. On the 29th the head of the column reached Momblanch, where half a battalion1 was left behind in a fortified2 post, to keep open the Lerida road. On May 2nd the large manufacturing town of Reus, only ten miles from Tarragona, was occupied: on May 3rd the French advanced guard, Salme’s brigade, approached the city, and drove in the Catalan advanced posts as far as the river Francoli. But the siege could not begin till Habert’s force, escorting the battering3-train, should come up from Tortosa; and this all-important column was much delayed. Its road ran along the seaside from the Col de Balaguer onward4, and Codrington’s squadron of English frigates5 and gunboats accompanied it all the way, vexing7 and delaying it, by bombarding it whenever it was forced to come within gunshot of the beach. This was practically all the opposition8 that Suchet met with: a few miqueletes had shown themselves in the hills between Reus and Momblanch, but they were too weak to fight. Campoverde had carried off the best both of regulars and irregulars to the relief of Figueras, and Courten, who had barely 4,500 men in his division[638], had wisely shut himself up in Tarragona, where every man was wanted: for the enceinte was very long, and the sedentary garrison9 consisted of only five or six battalions10. The troops inside the walls did not amount, when the siege began, to 7,000 men: hence came the weakness[p. 498] shown in the early days; it was not till Campoverde’s army came back from the north (May 10) that an adequate defensive11 force was in existence for such a large fortress12.
Tarragona, though some of its fortifications were not skilfully13 planned, was a very strong place. The nucleus14 of the works was the circuit of the old Celtiberian town of Tarraco, which afterwards became the capital of Roman Spain. This forms the upper city in modern times. It is built on an inclined plane, of which the eastern end (530 feet above sea-level), where the cathedral lies, is the higher side, and the slope goes downhill, and westward15: the southern face, that towards the sea, is absolutely precipitous, the northern one hardly less so. Large fragments of the Cyclopean walls built by the Celtiberians, or perhaps by the Carthaginians, are visible along the crest16 on both of these sides. On the west, the lowest part of the old town, a line of modern fortifications divided the upper town from the lower; there was a sharp drop along this line: in most places it is very steep, and the road of to-day goes up the hillside in zigzags18, to avoid the break-neck climb[639]. Below the fortifications of the upper city, and divided from them by a broad belt of ground free of houses[640], lay the port-town or lower city, clustering around the harbour, which is an excellent roadstead shut in by a mole19 1,400 feet long, which runs out from the south-west corner of the place. The lower city was enclosed on its northern and western sides by a front of six bastions; its southern side, facing the port and the open sea, had not, and did not need, any great protection; it could only have been endangered by an enemy whose strength was on the water, and who could bring a fleet into action. There was a sort of citadel20 in the port-town, a work named the Fuerte Real, which lies on an isolated21 mound22 inside the north-west angle of the walls. About 400 yards west of the most projecting bastion of[p. 499] the place the river Francoli flows into the sea, at the western end of the harbour. In the angle between the river and the port was an outlying work, Fort Francoli, destined23 to keep besiegers away from the shipping25, which they might easily bombard from this point, if it were not occupied. This fort was connected with the lower town by a covered way protected by a long entrenchment26 containing two lunettes.
Notwithstanding the great strength of the high-lying upper city, it had been furnished with a second line of defence, outside its old Roman walls. Low down the hillside five forts, connected by a wall and covered way, protected its whole eastern front from the edge of the heights as far as the sea. The Barcelona road, crawling along the water’s edge, enters the place between two of these forts, and goes to the Lower, after sending a steep bypath up to a gate in the Upper, city[641].
On the west and north-west the high-lying fortress commands all the surrounding country-side. But to the due north there is a lofty hill about 800 yards from the walls, called Monte Olivo. This dominates the lower town, since it is 200 feet high, or more, though it is itself dominated by the upper town. An enemy in possession of it has every advantage for attacking the north front of the lower town. Wherefore, during the course of the last two years, the summit of the hill had been entrenched28, and a very large hornwork, the Fuerte Olivo, constructed upon it. This was a narrow fort, following the shape of the crest of the hill, with a length of 400 yards, and embrasures for forty-seven guns. Its outer front was protected by a ditch hewn in the solid rock: its rear was only slightly closed with a low wall crowned by palisades, so as to leave it exposed to the fire of the upper city, if by any chance the enemy should get possession of it. Such an extensive work required a garrison of over 1,000 men—a heavy proportion of the 6,500 which formed the total force of the Spaniards at the commencement of the siege.
When Suchet arrived in front of Tarragona, and had driven the Spaniards within their works (May 3rd-4th), his chief engineer and artillery29 officers, Rogniat and Vallée, had to conduct a long and careful survey of the fortifications opposed to them.[p. 500] They concluded that the northern front of the city was practically impregnable, from its precipitous contours, and that the eastern front, though a little less rocky, was equally ineligible30, because of the trouble which would be required to transport guns first across the high ground to the north-east, and then down to the seashore. The south front, being all along the water’s edge, was inaccessible32. There remained only the western front, that formed by the lower city, where the defences lay in the plain of the Francoli, and had no dominance over the ground in front of them. There was an additional advantage for the besieger24 here, in that the soil was partly river sand, partly the well-broken-up loam33 of suburban34 market gardens, and in all cases very easy to dig. But if they were to attack the west front, the engineers required the General-in-Chief to accomplish two preliminary operations for them. He must take Fort Olivo, which commanded with its flanking fires much of the ground on which they intended to work, and he must drive away from the northern side of the harbour the Anglo-Spanish squadron which lay there, since its heavy guns would enfilade all works started for the purpose of approaching the western front of Tarragona in the neighbourhood of the mouth of the Francoli.
This being the programme laid down, Suchet took up his positions round the fortress—Harispe’s division had charge of the main part of the northern front, its French brigade (Salme) occupying the ground in front of Fort Olivo, while its two Italian brigades stretched eastward35 along the distant heights, curving round so as to cut the Barcelona road along the sea-coast with their extreme detachment. Frère’s division had the central part of the lines, and lay on both sides of the course of the Francoli river, its main force, however, being on the left bank. Habert’s division, which had just come up from Tortosa, was placed near the mouth of the river, and facing towards the port; it formed the right wing of the army, and covered the siege-park, which was established at the village of Canonge, about a mile and a half from the walls of Tarragona. The magazines and hospitals were fixed36 at the large town of Reus, nine miles to the rear, under a considerable guard; for though the road from thence to the French lines ran over the gentle undulations of the coast plain, yet there was always danger that bands of miqueletes might[p. 501] descend37 from the hills for some daring enterprise. Several of the intermediate villages were fortified, to serve as half-way refuges for convoys38 and small parties on the move.
Some days were lost to the French in completing the survey of Tarragona, in settling down the troops into their permanent camps, and in bringing up from the rear, along the Tortosa road, the remainder of the battering-train and its munitions39. It was not till May 8th that serious operations began. Suchet’s first object was to drive away from the northern end of the harbour the English and Spanish ships, whose fire swept the ground about the mouth of the Francoli, across which his siege-works were to be constructed. With this object a large fort was constructed on the shore, in which very heavy guns, fatal to shipping, were to be placed. Commodore Codrington, who was lying in the harbour with a small squadron of two 74’s and two frigates, assisted by several Spanish gunboats, bombarded the fort incessantly40, but what he destroyed in the day the French rebuilt with additions every night, and on May 13th the fort was sufficiently41 completed to receive its armament of 24-pounders. The ship-guns were unable to cope with them, and the vessels42 of the Allies during the rest of the siege were compelled to keep to the south end of the port, and could only vex6 the besieger’s subsequent trench27-building by a distant and ineffective fire. On the 16th a first parallel, directed against the most advanced Spanish work, Fort Francoli, was begun in the low ground beside the new fort.
Before this check to the squadron had been completed a great change in the situation was made by the arrival of Campoverde on May 10, with 4,000 regular troops brought by sea from Mataro—fractions of the divisions of Eroles and Sarsfield, though neither of these generals had come in person[642]. The garrison being strengthened up to 10,000 men, and raised in morale44 by the reinforcement, became very bold and enterprising. Sorties began almost at once: Harispe’s division having seized on the[p. 502] 13th May two slight outlying entrenchments below Fort Olivo, three battalions sallied out on the 14th and made a desperate attempt to retake them. It failed, but on the 18th an equally vigorous sortie was made against the fort beyond the Francoli, and the first parallel near it, by about 2,000 men, who drove in the trench-guards and destroyed a section of the works, but were finally thrust back into the lower city by the arrival of reinforcements led by General Habert. How hot the fighting had been here is shown by the fact that Suchet’s dispatch owns to a loss of over 150 men, with three officers killed and eleven wounded. The sallying force lost 218, a figure which Suchet enlarges in his report to 250 killed and 600 wounded. On the 20th the Spaniards made a third sally, on a different front, far to the north-east, across the high ground north of the Barcelona road, and tried to break through the line of blockade kept up by Harispe’s Italian brigades. This was on a smaller scale, and had no luck; it was apparently45 intended to open up communication with Sarsfield, who (marching by circuitous46 ways across central Catalonia) had reached Valls and Alcover, only ten miles from Tarragona, on the upper Francoli, with 1,200 men. This trifling47 force was to be the nucleus of an ‘army of relief’ which was to be collected from all quarters to threaten Suchet’s rear. Sarsfield made his appearance known to his chief in Tarragona by lighting48 beacons49 on the mountain tops. Learning that the Spanish force was insignificant50, Suchet detached two battalions and some cuirassiers to drive Sarsfield further away from Alcover, and did so with small loss, forcing him to retire to the mountains above Valls.
About this time the French artillery and engineer commanders reported to their chief that it would be at least ten days before they were in a position to begin a serious attack against the western front of the city, and Suchet resolved that the enforced delay should be utilized51 for an attack on Fort Olivo, whose capture would sooner or later be a necessity, if the main operations against the city were to prosper53.
Accordingly, while the approaches against the west front went steadily54 on, a separate offensive advance against the Olivo was prepared. Between the 22nd and the 28th of May trenches55 were pushed towards the fort, and batteries containing thirteen[p. 503] guns erected56 to bear upon it. Their fire had effected serious damage on the parapets and the artillery of the fort by the 29th, yet the engineers reported that they could not fill the ditch, which was dug in the solid rock, and could not promise to make accessible breaches59 beyond it. But they reported that the rear face of the work, which the French artillery could not reach, was very weak, the low wall and palisade closing the gorge60 being no more than nine feet high. There was also a gap in the front protection caused by the entry, into the right end of the fort, of an aqueduct which carried water down into Tarragona. This structure made a sort of bridge across the ditch; it had not been cut, but only closed with palisades, which were being rapidly demolished61 by the French cannonade[643].
On the night of the 29th Suchet made the rather rash venture of trying to escalade Fort Olivo at the two weak points. One column was to turn the work under cover of the darkness, and to endeavour to break in at the gorge in its rear. The other was to try the imperfect breach58 in the right front, by crossing the aqueduct, though it was only seven feet broad, if it should be found that the ditch was impassable. Meanwhile a general demonstration63 was to be made by scattered64 tirailleurs against the whole face of the Olivo, so as to distract the attention of the enemy, and the batteries down by the Francoli were to bombard the lower city with the same purpose. Both attacks were successful—more by luck than by their deserts, for the plan was most hazardous65. The column which had gone round to the rear of the fort ran in upon a Spanish regiment66[644] which was coming up the hill to relieve the garrison. The two forces hustled67 against each other in the dark, and became hopelessly mingled68 in a close combat just outside the postern gate of the gorge. The garrison was unable to fire upon their enemies, because they were intermixed among their friends, and, when the fight surged against the postern and the palisades, the French succeeded in[p. 504] entering the gorge, some by scrambling69 up the low and weak defences, others by bursting in at the gate along with the Spanish reinforcements with whom they were engaged. They might have been checked, for the defenders70 were fighting fiercely, if the other attack had not also succeeded. But at the right front of the fort, where the second assault was made, though many of the forlorn hope fell into the ditch, a desperate charge took the storming-party across the seven-foot gangway of the aqueduct, and over the shattered palisades that blocked it. The garrison could tell by the noise of the musketry that the enemy had entered both in front and in rear, and were stricken by despair[645]. But the greater part of them clubbed together and continued a desperate resistance, which was only subdued71 when Suchet sent in all his reserves and the trench-guards to back the stormers. They were then beset72 on all sides, and finally overwhelmed.
The losses of the garrison were terrible—of the five battalions of Iliberia and Almeria, and the two companies of artillery which had been engaged—some 3,000 men in all—very nearly one-third, as it would appear, were slain73 or captured[646]. The pri[p. 505]soners were about 970 in number, many wounded, including the commander of the fort, Colonel Gomez, who had received no less than ten bayonet stabs. Three or four hundred men had been killed—the French had given little quarter during the earlier part of the fighting. The remainder of the garrison had escaped into the city, by climbing over the low wall of the gorge and running down the slopes, at the moment of the final disaster. The French loss, according to Suchet, was only about 325 killed and wounded, and probably did not greatly exceed that figure. The assailants had, it must be confessed, extraordinary luck. If the turning column had not become mingled with the Spanish reinforcements it might never have been able to break into the gorge; while the other attack could not have succeeded if the governor had taken the proper precaution of cutting the aqueduct, which served the stormers as a bridge—for the ditch proved wholly impracticable, and the breach could not be approached.
On the morning after the assault the spirit of the Spaniards was so little broken that a sortie was made with the purpose of retaking the Olivo, the survivors74 of the two regiments75 which had lost it volunteering to head the attack. Campoverde thought that the French might be caught before they had made new defences to protect the weak rear face of the fort, but they had built up the entry of the gorge with sandbags, and the assault—led by Colonel O’Ronan, a Spanish-Irish officer—was beaten off with loss, though a few daring men not only reached the gorge, but scrambled76 in through its broken palisades to die inside the work. All the guns of the upper city were then turned upon the Olivo, and reduced its rear to a shapeless mass of earth. But this did not seriously harm the French, who burrowed77 into its interior and made themselves strong there. They only wanted to be masters of the hill because it flanked their projected approaches in the low ground, and did not intend to use it as their base for any further active operations.
After the Olivo disaster Campoverde held a council of war (May 30th), and announced to his officers that the means by which Tarragona could be saved was the collecting of a great army of succour to fall upon Suchet’s rear. He was himself about to depart, in order to take command of it; Sarsfield’s and Eroles’s small detachments, all of which he would collect, must[p. 506] form its nucleus. The somatenes of all central Catalonia should be called in, and the province of Valencia had promised to lend him a whole division of regulars. So saying, he departed by sea along with his staff and a number of the richer inhabitants of the city (May 31st). General Caro, who had hitherto acted as governor, was sent to hurry up the Valencians, and the command of the place was made over to an officer newly arrived from Cadiz, General Juan Senen Contreras[647], who by no means liked the task assigned to him. The garrison was still 8,000 strong, for just after the fall of the Olivo two battalions of regulars arrived from Valencia[648]—the first-fruits of the succours promised from that province—and a draft of 400 recruits landed from Majorca. It seems to have been a mistake of Campoverde to come to Tarragona at all—his presence would have been much more valuable in the interior, where a supreme78 commander was much wanted, and while he was shut up in the fortress (from May 10th to May 31st) little had been done outside. The Junta79 of Catalonia, now sitting at Montserrat, had been issuing many proclamations, but had not accomplished80 much in the way of gathering81 in the somatenes.
On June 3rd Campoverde reached Igualada, and established his head quarters there, but found only 3,000 men assembled under Sarsfield. He sent that general off to Tarragona, to act as second in command to Contreras, and took over charge of his few battalions; by calling in Eroles, and hunting up deserters and detachments, he had collected in a fortnight 5,280 regular infantry82 and 1,183 cavalry83—all that there were of mounted men in Catalonia. The whole was much too small a force to justify84 him in attacking Suchet in his lines—even when the somatenes should come in to join him. All depended on the expected succours from Valencia, and they were slow in arriving. Charles[p. 507] O’Donnell, the newly appointed Captain-General of that province, had made up a scheme for drawing off Suchet by attacking his garrisons85 in southern Aragon, and had gone off early in May with his main force against Teruel. This scheme had no effect whatever; Suchet had fixed his teeth into Tarragona, and was not to be distracted by any demonstrations86 against his more distant detachments. Campoverde grew so desperate that he offered to give over supreme command to O’Donnell, if the latter would come into Catalonia with his whole disposable force, and begin by attacking Mora, Suchet’s great dép?t on the Ebro. The Valencian Captain-General, though he refused to take this responsibility, finally agreed to send a division of regulars under General Miranda by sea to join the Catalans. This force, about 4,000 strong, appeared at Tarragona on June 14th, and came ashore31, but was immediately afterwards reshipped by Campoverde’s orders, and transferred to Villanueva de Sitjes, where it landed, and marched inland to Igualada to join the ‘army of succour,’ which by its arrival was raised to nearly 11,000 regular troops.
While Campoverde was slowly beating up his reinforcements, Tarragona was already in grave danger. The formal attack on the lower city began on the night of June 1st, when Vallée and Rogniat, the commanders of the French artillery and engineers, declared that they had everything ready. The front selected for attack was the two south-westerly bastions, those called San Carlos and Orleans, but as a preliminary task it was necessary to drive the Spaniards out of the subsidiary and external defence formed by the outlying Fort Francoli, at the mouth of the river, and by the long entrenchment which joined it to the city, with the lunette of the Prince, a very small work, inserted in its midst. For Fort Francoli had a position which would enable it to enfilade the French trenches when they should draw near to the enceinte of the city.
On the night of June 1st the French threw up their first parallel at a distance of only a little over 300 yards from the bastion of Orleans: it was connected with the entrenchments beyond the Francoli by a zigzag17 trench. On the second night the parallel was completed for a length of 600 yards, and three batteries begun in it—one directed against the lunette of the[p. 508] Prince and the line joining it to Fort Francoli, the other two against the bastion of Orleans and the adjacent curtain. On June 3rd the besiegers began to work forward by a flying sap towards the fort, and by the 7th had pushed their front trench to within twenty yards of the work. On that same day the artillery began to play against it, not only from the new batteries, but from the old ones beyond the river, which had previously88 been directed against the fleet. The fort was weakly built, and a practicable breach was made in its left face before the bombardment had been twelve hours in progress. Serious damage had also been done to the long entrenchment connecting Fort Francoli with the lower city. Contreras, rightly regarding the work as untenable, ordered its serviceable guns to be removed the moment after dusk set in, and bade its commander, Colonel Roten, to draw off the garrison, two battalions of the regiment of Almanza. They withdrew at 8.30, and an hour and a half later three French columns charged out of the trenches and seized the fort[649]. They were surprised to meet with no resistance, not having detected the withdrawal89 of the Spaniards. Finding themselves unopposed, they tried to push along the entrenchment from the fort towards the town, but were stopped, with some loss, by the guns of the Prince lunette.
The Spanish engineers had assured Contreras that the low-lying Fort Francoli would be untenable under the fire of the neighbouring bastion of San Carlos, the battery on the Mole on the other side of the harbour, and the heavy guns of the men-of-war. A fierce fire was opened against it from all these quarters, but proved insufficient90 to stop the French from burrowing91 into the ruins of the fort, connecting it with their trenches, and finally building in its right front a heavy battery, which bore along the line of the entrenchment and enfiladed the Prince lunette. This work faced northward92, and exposed only a weak flank to the attack. Fort Francoli having ceased to be an obstacle, the besiegers could now throw out a second parallel from the first, which they had constructed in front of the bastion[p. 509] of Orleans. Five new batteries were placed in it, some bearing on Orleans, some on San Carlos, and one having the special task of beating down the Prince lunette. The Spanish guns in the lower city answered with a fierce fire which caused much damage and took many lives, but the work, nevertheless, went on unceasingly. On June 16th all the new batteries were ready to commence their work.
Contreras had been much chagrined93 by the complete failure of the best efforts of his artillery to hold back the advance of the enemy, and reports that the morale of the troops was disagreeably affected94 by the arrival of the Valencian division of Miranda on June 14th and its prompt departure, after staying less than two days in the place. The garrison had looked upon it as a seasonable reinforcement, and were dashed in spirits when it made no stay with them. It seems to have been a complete mistake to have brought these 4,000 men to Tarragona at all: they should have been landed at once in Villanueva de Sitjes to join the army of succour.
Nevertheless the governor did his best to delay the progress of the French attack, and when his artillery proved ineffective, sent out two strong sorties on the 11th and 14th, which did some damage to the trenches[650] but were driven back in the end, as was inevitable95. On the 16th all the new French batteries were ready, as well as that in Fort Francoli, and the bombardment began. The advanced batteries were within 120 yards of the bastions which they were attacking, and had a tremendous effect. By evening there was the commencement of a breach in the left face of the Orleans bastion, and several other parts of the enceinte were badly damaged, as was also the Prince lunette. This had not been effected without grave loss: one French battery had been silenced, a reserve magazine had been blown up, and the loss in men among the artillery had been very heavy. Nevertheless the assailants had the superiority in the cannonade, and were well satisfied. After dark the columns of stormers carried the Prince lunette by assault, one of the parties having slipped round its flank by descending96 on to the beach, where[p. 510] a few yards at the water’s edge had been left unfortified. The battalion of the regiment of Almanza which held the work was practically exterminated97. Thus the Spaniards lost the last of the outer protections of Tarragona, and the captured lunette became the emplacement of one more battery destined to play upon the bastion of San Carlos (June 17).
It was clear that the crisis was now at hand: the French were now lodged98 close under the walls of the city, and had already damaged its enceinte. But to storm it would be a costly99 business, and Contreras showed no signs of slackening in his energy, though his letters to Campoverde and his narrative100 of the siege both show that he thought very badly of his position. It was clear that both sides must now utilize52 their last resources: Suchet had already ordered up from beyond the Ebro the brigade of Abbé, which had hitherto been observing the Valencians, in order that its 3,600 men might compensate101 him for the heavy losses that he had suffered[651]. Contreras began to call on the Captain-General very hotly for help; at his departure Campoverde had promised that the army of succour should be pressing Suchet’s rear within seven days, and now seventeen had elapsed and no signs of its approach were to be seen. He complained bitterly that many of his officers were failing him; even colonels had gone off by sea to Villanueva de Sitjes pretending sickness, or absconding102 without even that excuse[652]. Naturally the spirit of the rank and file had suffered from this desertion. There is good contemporary Spanish authority for the notion that Contreras himself contributed somewhat to the discouragement, by exhibiting too openly his failing hope, and stating that Tarragona must fall in a fortnight if the field army did not save it[653]. But so far as practical precautions went he did his duty,[p. 511] strengthened the damaged places in the walls as best he could, and devoted104 much energy to seeing that the troops were properly paid and fed, and that the breaches were mined, and protected to the rear by cuttings and traverses. Very different was the conduct of Campoverde, who showed that he was absolutely unfit for command by his miserable105 conduct during the critical weeks. After having been joined by Miranda’s Valencian division on June 16th he had 11,000 regular troops under his hand, a force insufficient to meet Suchet in the open field, but quite large enough to give the French grave trouble—indeed to make the continuance of the siege impossible if it were properly handled. But to bring effective pressure upon the enemy it was necessary to come up close to him, and Campoverde for many days tried a policy which was bound to fail. He kept far away, cut Suchet’s communication by placing himself at Momblanch, and sent Eroles and other officers to molest106 the French detachments on the Lower Ebro and to cut off the convoys coming up from Tortosa and Lerida. Apparently he hoped that these distant diversions would cause Suchet to draw off great part of his army from the siege, in order to succour his outlying posts. But the French general did nothing of the kind, and took no notice of the loss of convoys, or the danger to remote dép?ts; he stuck tight to the siege, and at this very time, by calling up Abbé’s brigade from the south to Tarragona, he had deliberately107 risked even more than before on the side of Valencia. Between the 16th and the 24th June, the critical days in the siege, Campoverde and his 11,000 men had no effect whatever on the course of operations. Yet he kept sending messages to Contreras promising108 him prompt assistance, and on the 20th bade him dispatch Sarsfield out of the city, to assume command of his old division in the fighting which was just about to begin. That fighting never took place—to the Captain-General’s eternal disgrace—for at the last moment he flinched109 from placing himself within engaging distance of Suchet. It seems clear that his true policy was to push much closer to the enemy’s lines, so as to force the French to come out against him, and then either to let[p. 512] them attack him in some strong position in the hills to the north-east of Tarragona, where their cavalry would have been useless, or else to avoid an engagement by a timely retreat when Suchet should have been drawn110 well away from the fortress. In either case he would have compelled his adversary111 to draw so many men away from the siege that it could not have proceeded. For it would have been useless for Suchet to march against him with less than 7,000 or 8,000 men, and the total of the besieging112 army had dwindled113 down to 16,000 by this time, while Abbé’s reserve brigade had not yet come up. Probably, as Napier suggests, a blow at the French magazines and hospitals at Reus, only ten miles from Tarragona, would have forced Suchet to draw off two divisions for a fight, and Campoverde need not have accepted it, unless he had found himself some practically impregnable position. But to skulk114 in the hills many miles away and send detachments against outlying French posts could have no effect.
While Campoverde hesitated, Suchet took the lower city of Tarragona by a vigorous effort. At seven o’clock on the evening of the 21st the assault was delivered by five storming-columns, composed of the massed grenadier and voltigeur companies of all his French regiments, 1,500 strong, and supported by a brigade under General Montmarie, There were now two good breaches in the bastions of San Carlos and Orleans, the curtain between them had also been much injured, and even the Fuerte Real, the inner stronghold behind the Orleans bastion, had been damaged by shot and shell which passed over the outer works. Contreras had sent down into the lower city 6,000 out of the 8,000 men who were still at his disposition115, and had handed over the charge of them to Sarsfield, the officer who had the best reputation in the whole of Catalonia. But by an ill-chance there was actually no one in command when the assault was delivered. Campoverde’s dispatch recalling Sarsfield to the field army had come to hand that morning, and Contreras, thinking himself bound to obey it, sent Sarsfield a passport to leave the city, and designated General Velasco to take his place. Sarsfield, whose courage cannot be impeached116, but whose judgement was evidently at fault on this afternoon, left at once, embarking117 on board a boat in the harbour at three o’clock,[p. 513] without going to see Contreras or waiting for the arrival of the officer who was to supersede118 him. He merely sent for the senior colonel in the lower city, handed over the command to him, and put out to sea at a moment’s notice. Four hours later, when the storm took place, Contreras was not aware that Sarsfield had yet departed, and Velasco, coming down to take charge of the troops, found himself in the middle of the fighting before he had reached the walls, or discovered the manner in which their garrison was distributed. There was clearly something wrong here—apparently Sarsfield and Contreras were not on good terms, and the former acted with small regard for the welfare of the service[654].
At seven o’clock Suchet let loose the stormers, who were led by the Italian General Palombini, while, to distract the attention of the garrison to other points, he ordered a general bombardment of the northern front, and showed a column on the side of Fort Olivo. The assault was immediately successful at both the critical points: the forlorn hope on the side of the Orleans bastion, starting from its ditch, went up the breach like a whirlwind, losing somewhat from the musketry fire of the defenders but not from their cannon62, for all had been silenced. The Spaniards were cleared out so quickly from the bastion that[p. 514] they had not time to fire two mines, which would have blown up the breach and the storming-column if they had worked. They rallied for a few minutes at the gorge, but were driven from it by the French reserve, who poured into the town. At the San Carlos breach matters went almost as rapidly: the first attacking column was checked, but when the second supported it, the united mass carried the breach and burst into the town; a retrenchment119 and a row of palisades erected behind the breach were crossed in face of a half-hearted defence. All the columns having penetrated120 within the walls, those who turned to the left attacked the Fuerte Real, the weak and somewhat damaged work which served as citadel to the lower city: it was carried by assault without any great difficulty, partly because its earthen ramp121 had been somewhat damaged by the bombardment, and could be climbed at some points, but more because the garrison defended themselves very badly, and gave way when they saw that the streets on their flanks and behind them were inundated122 by the enemy. The other section of the stormers, inclining to their right, moved towards the mole and the large magazines at its base, where they met General Velasco, who had only arrived at the moment that the assault began, with the Spanish reserve. There was fierce fighting here for a moment, but, turned by a column which had passed around their flank by the quay123 at the water’s edge, Velasco’s men broke like the rest. The whole of the garrison rushed up the slope, towards the one gate which leads into the upper city, and finally entered it under cover of a heavy fire kept up from the neighbouring ramparts. Contreras reports that some of the pursuers came on so fiercely that they were shot down while actually battering at the closed gate.
The losses of the two parties were about equal in numbers—Contreras reports that he found no more than 500 and odd men missing when the battalions from the lower city were reassembled; Suchet gives 120 killed and 362 wounded as his total loss. The casualties on both sides would have been heavier if the garrison had fought better—but it is clear that, when the breaches were once gained, no serious attempt was made to defend the Fuerte Real, the retrenchments, or the barricaded124 houses of the lower city. Only Velasco’s reserve battalions[p. 515] made any fight in the streets; the rest fled early. The French might perhaps have made more captures—they only took 200 wounded prisoners—if they had not turned at once to plundering125 the houses and magazines. But they fell into great disorder127; many of the unfortunate inhabitants of the quarter about the port were not only stripped of their goods but murdered, and a great number of dwellings128 were wantonly set on fire. Eighty guns were captured on the walls of the lower city, and a great quantity of food and stores in the dép?ts along the quay. But the soldiers destroyed more than was saved—especially in the wine stores.
Not the least disastrous129 result of this unhappy affair was that the harbour was now closed to the Spaniards. The English men-of-war and the native merchant vessels which had hitherto sheltered under the west end of the mole had to put out to sea. The traders went off to Villanueva, Minorca, or Valencia, but Codrington’s squadron sought the bare roadstead off Milagro Point, under the precipitous southern face of the upper city. Here there were no quays130, and when the sea was rough it was impossible to land. But in ordinary weather boats could communicate freely with the shore, and Tarragona was not yet deprived of its access to the water, though that access had become difficult and dangerous. Suchet proceeded to make it more so on the 23rd, when he erected a battery, near the base of the mole, to play on the roadstead. Landing, however, was made rather exciting than dangerous by these guns, which never did much harm.
On the morning after the storm of the lower city the French engineers began to make surveys for the attack on the inner line of defence of Tarragona. Its strength lay in its commanding position, and in the fact that along many parts of its short front the ground just below it was too steep and too rocky to allow of approaches being constructed on it. Its weakness was that the wall was weak and old—a seventeenth-century work built only to resist the cannon of that day. There was no ditch or other outer defence, unless a hedge of prickly aloes counted as such. The front was composed of four bastions; counting from north to south they were named San Pablo, San Juan (at whose left side lay the only gate), Jesus, and Cervantes. The last[p. 516] named overhung the precipitous cliff looking down to the sea above Milagro Point. The French engineers reported in favour of making the attack on the curtain wall between San Juan and San Pablo, the ground here being less steep than elsewhere, and showing soil which could be dug into; there was also some cover to be found, in half-ruined houses along the road up to the gate. Moreover the other, or southern section of the wall, was not only on a steeper ascent131, but might be exposed to high-trajectory fire from the ships in the roadstead below. The first parallel, therefore, was thrown up opposite San Juan and San Pablo, with a communication to the rear covered by the buildings and gardens along the road, and three batteries were planned in it, and commenced on June 24th. A fourth battery, down in the plain outside the city, was to co-operate by a flanking fire uphill.
This day saw Campoverde’s first and last demonstration in favour of the garrison. It was a miserable affair. Driven to do something by Contreras’s appeals, and by the openly displayed discontent of his own army, he at last drew in close to the French lines. On the 23rd his army marched from Momblanch to Villarodona, fifteen miles north-east of Tarragona. On the next day it was divided into two columns; the first (composed of Miranda’s Valencian division) marched over the hills, with orders to fall upon the encampments of Harispe’s Italian brigades on the north-east side of the French lines. The second, or Catalan division, under Sarsfield, with which went the Captain-General himself, marched by another road more to the east, and was to come into line on Miranda’s left. Meanwhile Contreras was to make a sally out of the eastern side of Tarragona with 4,000 men of the garrison, and to attack Harispe’s rear when he saw his front engaged with the ‘army of succour.’ Both Campoverde’s columns reached the points designated for them, Miranda getting unopposed to Pallaresos, and the second division to Cattlar, three miles further east. Suchet, warned by his outlying cavalry, concentrated Harispe’s and part of Frère’s divisions in the rear of his lines to the French left of Fort Olivo, leaving Habert, Abbé, and the rest of Frère’s troops to hold the lower city and the trenches. His line, composed of some 8,000 men including[p. 517] all his cavalry, was plainly visible both to the Spaniards outside and those within the city, and Contreras formed his sallying column ready to rush down when the first cannon-shot should be heard. But Miranda, on finding himself in touch with the enemy, sent back messages to the effect that he was not sure of his route, that the French seemed very strong, and that he dared not advance. Instead of depriving him of his command, and then bringing up the second column to the help of the first, Campoverde, after some hesitation132, gave him leave to draw back, and both divisions retired133 that night to Vendrils, ten miles to the rear, in the eastern hills. Not a shot had been fired, and Contreras, whose men had been waiting under arms the whole afternoon, had to draw them back into the city without having seen a single man of the relieving army, which, though only four miles away, was hidden from him by the intervening hills. So ended a day of great peril134 for Suchet, who with 11,000 men in front of him, and 4,000 more ready to attack his rear, might well have suffered a disaster, or at least have proved unable to prevent the junction135 of the two hostile forces. For the Spaniards were not bound to descend and attack him in the plain, but might have man?uvred along the hills and forced him to take the offensive in unfavourable ground, under pain of seeing them break his blockading line. Codrington summed up the situation by writing to his chief, Pellew, that ‘the Marquis [Campoverde] blamed Generals Miranda and Caro, while the latter retorted the accusation137, and I am inclined to think by giving full credit to what each says of the other, neither will suffer ignominy beyond that to which his conduct has entitled him.’ For Tarragona, as Contreras was truly repeating in every dispatch that he sent out, was in imminent138 danger, and if the army of succour did not give it immediate87 help might fall at any moment. The city, as a matter of fact, was taken only four days later.
Campoverde, however, had now formed the conclusion that he was still too weak to attack Suchet. He wrote orders to Contreras to send him out of the city his two best regiments, Iliberia and Almeria, and General Velasco to command them. He made a desperate appeal to the somatenes to rally to his colours, which had little effect, for his reputation was now gone, and he was sus[p. 518]pected of timidity or even of treason. Finally he got news that there was a small British expeditionary force in Catalan waters, and sent his lieutenant139 Eroles to sea, to look for it, and to invite it to land at Villanueva and join him. In a week or so he would have 20,000 men, as he supposed, and would then try something desperate. Meanwhile, unjustly suspecting Contreras of cowardice140, he sent secret letters into Tarragona to the brigadier-generals of the garrison, bidding them depose141 and confine the governor if he showed signs of capitulating. Disgusted at this move, the generals showed the epistles to Contreras, who was driven still deeper into despair by seeing that the Captain-General distrusted him, regarded his views as to the danger of the city as exaggerated, and was evidently deferring142 succour for an indefinite period. Nevertheless he concealed143 his knowledge of the plan for his deposition144, and prepared, under protest, to send the regiment of Almeria off by sea; to dispatch Iliberia also he refused, saying that his garrison was already insufficient. But rough weather on the 27th prevented the regiment from embarking from the dangerous Milagro roadstead, which was unapproachable by boats during an east wind.
Suchet, freed from a dire43 responsibility by the disappearance145 of the army of succour on the night of the 24th, resolved to hurry matters, lest it should presently come forward again in greater strength. On the following day the siege troops pushed forward by zigzag approaches to within 150 yards of the wall of the upper city, and commenced a second parallel in front of the curtain between San Juan and San Pablo. This was done under a hot and effective fire which cost many lives; the completion of the projected batteries, and more especially the hauling of their cannon up steep slopes and among ruins, took more time than the engineer officers had calculated to be necessary. It was not till the morning of the 28th that the twenty-two heavy guns destined for the breaching146 had been got into place, and that the fire was opened.
These three days, the 25th-26th-27th of June, were a time of agony for the unfortunate Contreras, who was distracted from his primary duty of preparing to receive the assault by having to deal with Campoverde’s plot for deposing147 him, and other problems. The most important of these was the arrival in the[p. 519] roadstead on the 26th of a flotilla, which brought not only some small reinforcements from Valencia and Murcia, but about 1,100 British infantry[655] and a half-company of artillery under Colonel Skerret. This little force had been sent by General Graham from Cadiz at the desire of the Regency, which was seeking in all quarters for help for Tarragona. Colonel Skerret had Graham’s orders to do everything that could be done for the place, short of placing his detachment in any position where it was exposed to serious danger of having to capitulate, i. e. he was forbidden to land it if he should think Tarragona untenable, unless he judged himself able to bring off the troops by sea in the moment of disaster. On the morning of his arrival the weather was so rough that no boat could get in to the shore, and communication with Contreras was opened up by a sailor who swam ashore with a letter. The governor thus found himself offered the aid of the British force if he would guarantee that it would be able to escape should the town fall—a most hampering148 condition. In the evening, the surf having somewhat abated149, Colonel Skerret came ashore, and was joined next morning by an engineer and an artillery officer, as also by General Charles Doyle, and by Codrington, the commander of the British squadron off the Catalonian coast. They conferred with Contreras, who told them that he feared the town was untenable, and that he intended, when the walls should be breached150, not to make a prolonged defence, but to sally out of the Barcelona gate, and to try to cut his way to join Campoverde. He thought that the sortie must succeed, since the French would be intent on a storm on the western side of the fortress, and would never expect an attack to be delivered at the same moment from its eastern side. He therefore invited Skerret to land his 1,200 men and take part in the enterprise. But if he preferred to join him in withstanding the approaching storm by the French, he might choose whatever point he liked in the enceinte, and defend it. It is clear that at this moment the governor was himself hesitating between the two alternatives, and that it[p. 520] relieved his mind to throw the responsibility of choice on Skerret.
The British officers, military and naval151, spent the afternoon in going round the city. They agreed with Contreras that the wall was weak and likely to be breached without much difficulty. This being so, was it consistent with Graham’s directions to land the troops? The sortie might fail, and the garrison, Spanish and English, might be driven back into the town and captured. A defence of the breach might also fail, and in that case it would be almost impossible to get off the troops by sea, since if Skerret’s own single boat had had the greatest difficulty in coming ashore in the surf, it was certain that many boats, hastily manned and crammed152 with soldiers, and escaping under the fire of the pursuing French, would come to grief on a large scale. Skerret and Codrington, after much consultation153, resolved that they dared not bring the British troops ashore, for they could not guarantee that the men could be taken away again. They therefore refused both of Contreras’s alternative offers. Just at this moment Baron154 Eroles arrived from Campoverde, with an appeal to Skerret to land at Villanueva de Sitjes and join the ‘army of succour.’ With Codrington’s approval the colonel consented to do so[656], and set sail northward early in the morning of the 28th. It cannot be disputed that this whole business was most unhappy in its results. That a British force should appear in the roadstead for 36 hours, and then depart without landing a man, appeared to the garrison of Tarragona to prove that their own condition was hopeless. If there had been a reasonable hope of defending the town successfully, as they argued, the British would have come ashore. Their departure caused deep discouragement, and Contreras was no doubt right in stating that next after Campoverde’s conduct that of Skerret[p. 521] was the most active cause of the demoralization which the garrison showed on the next day. It would have been far better that the expedition should never have appeared. Yet it is hard to blame Skerret or his adviser155, Codrington. They had Graham’s orders that the men were not to be placed in a position where they might have to capitulate, and it could not be disputed that Tarragona on June 27th was such a position[657]. It would have been better not to tie Skerret’s hands by any conditions, and to leave him free to act as he thought best for the interest of Great Britain and Spain. The addition of 1,100 steady infantry to the force defending the breaches might very possibly have wrecked156 Suchet’s assault; even if their effort had failed, the loss of two battalions would have been a lesser157 shock to British prestige in eastern Spain than their withdrawal into ignominious158 safety at the moment of danger.
Contreras spent the few hours that remained to him after Skerret’s departure in hesitation between the idea of cutting his way out of Tarragona along the eastern road, and that of defending the town to the last possible moment. He finally resolved that he would hold the walls for one day only, and would evacuate159 the city on the night of the 28th, if the French had made any impression during the first twenty-four hours of the bombardment. The main body of the garrison, divided into three columns, was to make its exit from the Rosario gate, while 1,400 men remained to hold the walls as long as they could, with orders to save themselves if possible and follow the rest when the enemy should break in. Officers and men alike were informed of this, and had their destined positions in the sortie explained to them. It seems likely that the knowledge that they were intended to abscond103 in a few hours made the troops less obstinate160 in their defence when the assault came. But meanwhile Contreras made proper preparation for holding back the enemy till the destined time of departure. He told off[p. 522] his best regiments to the exposed front, and constructed a second line of defence behind it, by barricading161 and loopholing the houses of the Rambla, the broad street above the enceinte, and by blocking the narrow lanes which lead up to it with barrels filled with stones, so that from wall to wall there was a continuous inner fortification. But all this was a temporary arrangement—the garrison was to hold out till night only, and then escape by a great sortie.
Unfortunately the sortie was never made—for Suchet pushed matters so fast that the bombardment and the assault were all over in twelve hours. The twenty-two guns in the breaching batteries opened at dawn, and soon began to damage the weak old walls in the most effective style. The French had originally intended to make two breaches, one to the left in the curtain near the San Pablo bastion, the other to the right nearer the bastion of San Juan. But finding the latter hard to complete owing to the misdirection of one of his batteries, Suchet had the whole force of the battering turned on to the spot nearer to San Pablo, which he regarded as most favourable136 for his purpose. By four o’clock in the afternoon there was a breach over 30 feet broad at this point, all the guns in the adjacent flanks of the two bastions had been silenced, and nearly all those along the whole front. The explosion of a powder magazine had completely wrecked the Cervantes bastion at the other end of the Spanish line. Notwithstanding that the musketry fire of the garrison was still unsubdued, and that the breach was not very wide, Suchet determined162 to risk all, by assaulting the place in the later hours of the long summer afternoon. Three columns, each composed of 400 men of the compagnies d’élite of various regiments, were sent forward into the advanced trenches: 1,200 men more under General Habert crept up to the shelter of the front houses of the lower city. A separate force of five battalions under General Montmarie marched outside the walls, and placed itself in the low ground facing the Rosario gate, but out of gunshot. This column was to advance towards that gate if the assault succeeded, and was to be admitted by the stormers, if they won their way into the north-west angle of the upper city, just behind the breach, from which the gate was not far distant.
At five o’clock the three storming-columns burst out from[p. 523] three separate points of the trenches and raced for the breach, which they reached by no means simultaneously163, for two of them were somewhat hindered by the aloe hedge below the wall, which had not been entirely164 broken down by the bombardment. They received a tremendous musketry fire from the whole front, but only three guns in the left side of the San Juan bastion plied165 them with grape: the rest of the Spanish artillery had been dismounted or disabled. Contreras had filled the breach with the remains166 of the two battalions of Provincial167 Grenadiers of Castile, a corps168 which had been serving with credit in Catalonia since the autumn of 1808; in support was the regiment of Almeria, also reckoned a good unit. The important retrenchment in the Rambla was held by the regiment of Almanza; of the rest of his force there was a less proportion along the front of attack, and a greater proportion placed on the unassailed south and north flanks of the city than was wise. Troops should have been heaped unsparingly upon the breach.
The first French column that reached its destination came on in some disorder, got half-way up the crumbling169 débris on the breach, and recoiled170 under the musketry fire from its crest. But when the others arrived, and General Habert and a crowd of other officers put themselves at the head of the mass, and led a second assault, it was successful. The stormers rolled over the summit of the breach and trampled171 down the Provincial Grenadiers. The regiment of Almeria, which had been placed behind in column, with orders to charge the enemy with the bayonet the moment that he broke through, gave way—according to Contreras—without carrying out his command. The main body of the French then swept down into the street behind the breach, but some turned to their left to try to open the Rosario gate to Montmarie, and others made to their right and swept the ramparts as far as the Cervantes bastion. The Spaniards had rallied at the retrenchments along the line of the Rambla, and made here a better defence than on the far more tenable walls. The assault had succeeded in half an hour[658]—the street-fighting[p. 524] which followed was prolonged and bitter. But when the French reserves arrived and entered the upper city, the barricaded street was passed, the Rosario gate was burst open, so that Montmarie’s column got in upon the Spanish flank, and the resistance went to pieces. Contreras, manfully trying to bring up a battalion of Savoia, his last intact regiment, for a charge, was bayoneted and taken prisoner. One of the divisional generals, Courten, bethinking himself of the proposed sortie that was to have taken place that evening, led out a disorderly remnant of 3,000 men by the Barcelona gate, and tried to escape along the seashore. They had not got far when they ran into one of Harispe’s Italian brigades and some squadrons of chasseurs à cheval, which had been set to watch this obvious bolt-hole. When checked, some of the demoralized troops tried to turn back towards the city, others dispersed172 and strove to get away across the hills, some hundreds stripped, and endeavoured to swim out to the British ships, which were lying in the Milagro roadstead[659]. A fair number of these were saved by the boats of the Blake and her consorts173, which ran inshore to pick them up. But many more were cut down by the French cavalry on the beach, and it was some time before the excited riders would give quarter, and accepted the surrender of Courten and the survivors. General Velasco, the second-in-command in the city, had the luck to escape across the mountains almost alone, and brought the bad news to Campoverde.
Map of the siege of Tarragona
Enlarge TARRAGONA
While this ineffective attempt at a sally was in progress, the street-fighting in the city above was still going on. Isolated bodies of the Spaniards made a most desperate resistance: Colonel Gonzales, the brother of Campoverde, attempted to hold out in the cathedral with 300 men, but was killed with all followers174 after a brave resistance. The fact that many small parties defended themselves for a time in barricaded private houses gave the French an excuse for something that almost amounted to the systematic175 massacre176 of non-combatants. All the larger dwellings were broken open, whether shots had been fired from their windows or no, and a great proportion of their inhabitants murdered. Of the 4,000 corpses177 which littered the[p. 525] streets of Tarragona more than half were those of civilians178, and according to the Spanish official report 450 women and children were among the slain[660]. As one Spanish authority bitterly remarks, the victorious179 stormers generally gave quarter to any man wearing a uniform, and let off their fury on priests and unarmed citizens. Plunder126 was even more general than murder, and there was the inevitable accompaniment of drunkenness and rape57. Knowing what happened at Badajoz in April 1812, it is not for the British historian to dilate180 with too great moral indignation on the doings of Suchet’s soldiery. Suffice it to say that all the atrocities181 afterwards seen at Badajoz were suffered by the unhappy people of Tarragona, and that the actual slaughter182 of non-combatants was much greater—about 100 inhabitants are believed to have been murdered at Badajoz, more than 2,000 in the Catalonian city. Spanish authorities state that the Poles and Italians behaved decidedly worse than the native French. The officers made some attempt to check the orgie, but (like the British at Badajoz) they failed: riot and slaughter went on all night, and it was not till the next day that order was restored. One of the most dreadful incidents of the storm was that many individuals, both soldiers and civilians, tried to escape to the Milagro roadstead by climbing down the precipitous south front of the city, and, losing their footing, were dashed to pieces or mortally maimed on the beach below.
The garrison, owing to the last-received reinforcements, was over 10,000 strong at the moment of the storm; as Suchet accounts for more than 8,000 prisoners[661], the actual loss at the storm cannot have been much over 2,000 men. But to the 10,000 Spaniards killed or captured on June 28th we must add the losses of the garrison during the earlier operations. It seems that the Army of Catalonia lost in all 14,000 or 15,000 men in this disastrous siege. A certain amount of the wounded, however, had been sent off from time to time on English ships to Majorca and other safe destinations, and survived to fight another day. The French casualties during the siege amounted[p. 526] to 924 killed and 3,372 wounded—a total of 4,296. This was a very heavy proportion out of the 22,000 men[662] who were from first to last engaged in the operations; and if the sick, who are not included in Suchet’s report along with the wounded, are deducted183 from the survivors, it is clear that the army must have been reduced to a dangerously low figure by June 28th, and that the Spanish authorities[663] who estimate the total loss of their enemies at 6,000 cannot be far out.
But the effect produced was worth the effort which had been made: nearly two-thirds of the regular troops of the Army of Catalonia had been destroyed. The great fortress, which for three years had been the base of the Spanish resistance, had been taken; there was now no considerable place left in the hands of the patriots—Solsona, Berga, Cardona, Seo de Urgel, and the other towns which they still retained were of small importance. They had lost their one fortified harbour, and for the future their communication by sea with Valencia, the Balearic Isles184, and the British fleet, could only be conducted hastily and, as it were, surreptitiously; for any port, to which their forces in the inland might descend for a moment, was always liable to be attacked and seized by a French flying column. How nearly the spirit of resistance was crushed in the principality by the stunning185 blow which Suchet had inflicted186 will be shown in our next chapter.
Meanwhile, having reorganized his troops, and determined that the upper town of Tarragona should be fortified and garrisoned187, but the harbour town dismantled188 and abandoned, the French commander was at liberty to proceed further with his scheme for the conquest of eastern Spain. But there was bound to be some preliminary delay before he could deliver his great blow against Valencia. One brigade had to be told off to escort the 8,000 Spanish prisoners to Saragossa; another had to return to the south to deal with the insurgents189 of Aragon, who had been left comparatively unmolested while Abbé was drawn off to the siege. Suchet himself—soon to be a marshal, for the Emperor carried out his promise that ‘he should find his baton190 within the walls of Tarragona’—marched with some 7,000 or 8,000 men, all that was left disposable, to open[p. 527] up communications with Barcelona. Before his departure he had a curious interview with Contreras: the wounded general, brought before him on a stretcher, was reproached with having violated the laws of war by persisting in the defence of an untenable town when capitulation had been his bounden duty! The Spaniard made the proper answer, that any commander who surrenders before he is obliged is a traitor191 and a coward. Thereupon Suchet changed his tone, and offered him tempting192 conditions if he would take service under King Joseph. This proposal being answered as it deserved, Contreras was sent as a prisoner to the castle of Bouillon, from which he escaped after a captivity193 of fifteen months in October 1812[664].
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1
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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battering
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| n.用坏，损坏v.连续猛击( batter的现在分词 ) | |
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onward
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| adj.向前的，前进的；adv.向前，前进，在先 | |
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frigates
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| n.快速军舰( frigate的名词复数 ) | |
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vex
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| vt.使烦恼，使苦恼 | |
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vexing
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| adj.使人烦恼的，使人恼火的v.使烦恼( vex的现在分词 )；使苦恼；使生气；详细讨论 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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skilfully
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| adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
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nucleus
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| n.核，核心，原子核 | |
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westward
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| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
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crest
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| n.顶点；饰章；羽冠；vt.达到顶点；vi.形成浪尖 | |
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17
zigzag
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| n.曲折，之字形；adj.曲折的，锯齿形的；adv.曲折地，成锯齿形地；vt.使曲折；vi.曲折前行 | |
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18
zigzags
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| n.锯齿形的线条、小径等( zigzag的名词复数 )v.弯弯曲曲地走路，曲折地前进( zigzag的第三人称单数 ) | |
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mole
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| n.胎块；痣；克分子 | |
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citadel
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| n.城堡；堡垒；避难所 | |
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isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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mound
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| n.土墩，堤，小山；v.筑堤，用土堆防卫 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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besieger
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| n. 围攻者, 围攻军 | |
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shipping
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| n.船运（发货，运输，乘船） | |
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entrenchment
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| n.壕沟，防御设施 | |
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trench
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| n./v.(挖)沟，(挖)战壕 | |
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entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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ineligible
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| adj.无资格的，不适当的 | |
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ashore
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| adv.在(向)岸上，上岸 | |
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inaccessible
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| adj.达不到的，难接近的 | |
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loam
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| n.沃土 | |
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suburban
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| adj.城郊的，在郊区的 | |
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eastward
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| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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descend
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| vt./vi.传下来，下来，下降 | |
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convoys
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| n.（有护航的）船队( convoy的名词复数 )；车队；护航（队）；护送队 | |
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39
munitions
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| n.军火，弹药；v.供应…军需品 | |
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incessantly
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| ad.不停地 | |
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41
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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42
vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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43
dire
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| adj.可怕的，悲惨的，阴惨的，极端的 | |
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44
morale
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| n.道德准则，士气，斗志 | |
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45
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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46
circuitous
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| adj.迂回的路的，迂曲的，绕行的 | |
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trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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48
lighting
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| n.照明，光线的明暗，舞台灯光 | |
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49
beacons
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| 灯塔( beacon的名词复数 )； 烽火； 指路明灯； 无线电台或发射台 | |
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50
insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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51
utilized
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| v.利用，使用( utilize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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52
utilize
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| vt.使用，利用 | |
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53
prosper
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| v.成功，兴隆，昌盛；使成功，使昌隆，繁荣 | |
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54
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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55
trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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56
ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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57
rape
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| n.抢夺，掠夺，强奸；vt.掠夺，抢夺，强奸 | |
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58
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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59
breaches
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| 破坏( breach的名词复数 )； 破裂； 缺口； 违背 | |
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60
gorge
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| n.咽喉，胃，暴食，山峡；v.塞饱，狼吞虎咽地吃 | |
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61
demolished
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| v.摧毁( demolish的过去式和过去分词 )；推翻；拆毁（尤指大建筑物）；吃光 | |
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62
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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64
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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hazardous
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| adj.(有)危险的，冒险的；碰运气的 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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hustled
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| 催促（hustle的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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mingled
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| 混合，混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 )； 混进，与…交往[联系] | |
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scrambling
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| v.快速爬行( scramble的现在分词 )；攀登；争夺；（军事飞机）紧急起飞 | |
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defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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71
subdued
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| adj. 屈服的，柔和的，减弱的 动词subdue的过去式和过去分词 | |
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72
beset
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| v.镶嵌；困扰，包围 | |
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73
slain
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| 杀死，宰杀，杀戮( slay的过去分词 )； (slay的过去分词) | |
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74
survivors
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| 幸存者，残存者，生还者( survivor的名词复数 ) | |
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75
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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76
scrambled
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| v.快速爬行( scramble的过去式和过去分词 )；攀登；争夺；（军事飞机）紧急起飞 | |
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burrowed
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| v.挖掘（洞穴），挖洞( burrow的过去式和过去分词 )；翻寻 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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80
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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81
gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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82
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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83
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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84
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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85
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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demonstrations
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| 证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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90
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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91
burrowing
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| v.挖掘（洞穴），挖洞( burrow的现在分词 )；翻寻 | |
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92
northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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93
chagrined
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| adj.懊恼的，苦恼的v.使懊恼，使懊丧，使悔恨( chagrin的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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descending
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| n. 下行 adj. 下降的 | |
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exterminated
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| v.消灭，根绝( exterminate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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lodged
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| v.存放( lodge的过去式和过去分词 )；暂住；埋入；（权利、权威等）归属 | |
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costly
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| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
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100
narrative
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| n.叙述，故事；adj.叙事的，故事体的 | |
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101
compensate
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| vt.补偿，赔偿；酬报 vi.弥补；补偿；抵消 | |
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102
absconding
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| v.（尤指逃避逮捕）潜逃，逃跑( abscond的现在分词 ) | |
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103
abscond
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| v.潜逃，逃亡 | |
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104
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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106
molest
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| vt.骚扰，干扰，调戏 | |
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107
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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108
promising
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| adj.有希望的，有前途的 | |
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109
flinched
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| v.（因危险和痛苦）退缩，畏惧( flinch的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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110
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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111
adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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112
besieging
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的现在分词 ) | |
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113
dwindled
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| v.逐渐变少或变小( dwindle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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114
skulk
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| v.藏匿；潜行 | |
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115
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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116
impeached
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| v.控告（某人）犯罪( impeach的过去式和过去分词 )；弹劾；对（某事物）怀疑；提出异议 | |
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117
embarking
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| 乘船( embark的现在分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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118
supersede
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| v.替代；充任 | |
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119
retrenchment
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| n.节省，删除 | |
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120
penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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121
ramp
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| n.暴怒，斜坡，坡道；vi.作恐吓姿势，暴怒，加速；vt.加速 | |
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122
inundated
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| v.淹没( inundate的过去式和过去分词 )；（洪水般地）涌来；充满；给予或交予（太多事物）使难以应付 | |
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123
quay
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| n.码头，靠岸处 | |
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124
barricaded
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| 设路障于，以障碍物阻塞( barricade的过去式和过去分词 )； 设路障[防御工事]保卫或固守 | |
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125
plundering
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| 掠夺，抢劫( plunder的现在分词 ) | |
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126
plunder
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| vt.劫掠财物，掠夺；n.劫掠物，赃物；劫掠 | |
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127
disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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128
dwellings
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| n.住处，处所( dwelling的名词复数 ) | |
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129
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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130
quays
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| 码头( quay的名词复数 ) | |
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131
ascent
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| n.(声望或地位)提高；上升，升高；登高 | |
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132
hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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133
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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134
peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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135
junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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136
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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137
accusation
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| n.控告，指责，谴责 | |
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138
imminent
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| adj.即将发生的，临近的，逼近的 | |
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139
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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140
cowardice
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| n.胆小，怯懦 | |
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141
depose
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| vt.免职；宣誓作证 | |
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142
deferring
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| v.拖延，延缓，推迟( defer的现在分词 )；服从某人的意愿，遵从 | |
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143
concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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144
deposition
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| n.免职，罢官；作证；沉淀；沉淀物 | |
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145
disappearance
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| n.消失，消散，失踪 | |
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146
breaching
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| 攻破( breach的过去式 )； 破坏，违反 | |
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147
deposing
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| v.罢免( depose的现在分词 )；（在法庭上）宣誓作证 | |
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148
hampering
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的现在分词 ) | |
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149
abated
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| 减少( abate的过去式和过去分词 )； 减去； 降价； 撤消（诉讼） | |
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150
breached
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| 攻破( breach的现在分词 )； 破坏，违反 | |
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151
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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152
crammed
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| adj.塞满的，挤满的；大口地吃；快速贪婪地吃v.把…塞满；填入；临时抱佛脚( cram的过去式) | |
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153
consultation
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| n.咨询；商量；商议；会议 | |
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154
baron
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| n.男爵；(商业界等)巨头，大王 | |
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155
adviser
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| n.劝告者，顾问 | |
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156
wrecked
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| adj.失事的，遇难的 | |
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157
lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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158
ignominious
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| adj.可鄙的，不光彩的，耻辱的 | |
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159
evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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160
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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161
barricading
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| 设路障于，以障碍物阻塞( barricade的现在分词 )； 设路障[防御工事]保卫或固守 | |
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162
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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163
simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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164
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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165
plied
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| v.使用（工具）( ply的过去式和过去分词 )；经常供应（食物、饮料）；固定往来；经营生意 | |
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166
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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167
provincial
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| adj.省的，地方的；n．外省人，乡下人 | |
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168
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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169
crumbling
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| adj.摇摇欲坠的 | |
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170
recoiled
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| v.畏缩( recoil的过去式和过去分词 )；退缩；报应；返回 | |
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171
trampled
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| 踩( trample的过去式和过去分词 )； 践踏； 无视； 侵犯 | |
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172
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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173
consorts
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| n.配偶( consort的名词复数 )；（演奏古典音乐的）一组乐师；一组古典乐器；一起v.结伴( consort的第三人称单数 )；交往；相称；调和 | |
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174
followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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175
systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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176
massacre
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| n.残杀，大屠杀；v.残杀，集体屠杀 | |
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177
corpses
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| n.死尸，尸体( corpse的名词复数 ) | |
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178
civilians
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| 平民，百姓( civilian的名词复数 )； 老百姓 | |
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179
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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180
dilate
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| vt.使膨胀，使扩大 | |
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181
atrocities
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| n.邪恶，暴行( atrocity的名词复数 )；滔天大罪 | |
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182
slaughter
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| n.屠杀，屠宰；vt.屠杀，宰杀 | |
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183
deducted
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| v.扣除，减去( deduct的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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184
isles
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| 岛( isle的名词复数 ) | |
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185
stunning
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| adj.极好的；使人晕倒的 | |
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186
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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187
garrisoned
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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188
dismantled
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| 拆开( dismantle的过去式和过去分词 )； 拆卸； 废除； 取消 | |
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189
insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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190
baton
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| n.乐队用指挥杖 | |
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191
traitor
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| n.叛徒，卖国贼 | |
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192
tempting
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| a.诱人的, 吸引人的 | |
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193
captivity
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| n.囚禁；被俘；束缚 | |
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