SEPTEMBER 1811
The long-threatened advance of the French for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo began at last on September 22nd, when Marmont brought all the infantry1 of the Army of Portugal, save the single division of Foy, across the Sierra de Gata, and appeared with his vanguard at Tamames, the little town on the Leonese side of the mountains where del Parque had beaten Marchand in 1809. Foy alone had been left in New Castile, with orders to demonstrate from his base at Plasencia against Wellington’s posts between Castello Branco and Sabugal, where (as it will be remembered) the 5th Division was lying, placed on this side for the express purpose of warding2 off any attempt to strike at the communications of the allied3 army.
On the day that Marmont with five divisions of infantry and Montbrun’s cavalry4 began to debouch5 from Tamames, his colleague Dorsenne had brought forward the disposable portion of the Army of the North to San Mu?oz, a long march in front of Salamanca, and was in easy touch with the Army of Portugal. Dorsenne had concentrated four divisions of infantry—the two of the Imperial Guard under Roguet and Dumoustier, Souham’s newly arrived battalions6, and the division so long commanded by Serras, but now under General Thiébault, the governor of Salamanca, which had been lying about the Esla and the Orbigo ever since 1809. He had also with him two brigades of cavalry, Lepic’s 800 sabres of the Imperial Guard, and Wathier’s chasseurs. The two armies joined on the 23rd, and showed a formidable total, larger than that which Masséna had collected for the battle of Fuentes de O?oro. For Marmont had brought 25,000 foot and over 2,500 horse, and Dorsenne a slightly larger contingent8, about 27,000 infantry and 2,000 sabres[716]. This[p. 560] heavy force of 58,000 men, if artillery9 be reckoned in, was, as Wellington had always foreseen, more than the Anglo-Portuguese10 army could face. For including the division south of the Sierra de Gata, which was protecting the southern communications of the army, Wellington had with him as we have seen no more than 2,200 British and 900 Portuguese cavalry, about 25,000 British and 16,000 Portuguese infantry, or a total strength (including artillery, &c.) of about 46,000 officers and men of all arms. The risk of fighting in the open plain in front of Ciudad Rodrigo would clearly be too great, though by a retreat into the Portuguese mountains it would be possible to find a position which should compensate11 for the numerical deficiency of the allied army. If the French should press forward, it would clearly be necessary to retire on to better battle-ground, and Wellington’s ready eye had found two successive positions, as we have already stated, the one at Fuente Guinaldo on the foot-hills, the other between Rendo and Aldea Velha, in front of Sabugal, well within the mountains.
Meanwhile it remained to be seen whether the French, with the large force that they had collected, would content themselves with throwing a new convoy12 into Ciudad Rodrigo, a thing that could not be prevented, or whether they intended to press the allied army hard, and to endeavour to bring it to action—in which case the retreat into the hills would become necessary. On the morning of the 23rd Wellington, perfectly13 informed as to the position of the enemy, and fairly well able to estimate their numbers, wrote to Charles Stuart, ‘the French have not yet appeared, but I think they will before evening. I shall have my hands very full of business for the next three or four days[717].’ They were to be fuller than was convenient, and partly by his own fault.
On learning that Marmont and Dorsenne were at San Mu?oz with over 50,000 men, Wellington, if he had practised his accustomed caution, would have concentrated on Fuente Gui[p. 561]naldo, withdrawing the two divisions which lay close into Ciudad Rodrigo, the Light Division at Martiago, the 3rd Division on the heights by El Bodon and Pastores. It would have been sufficient to leave a cavalry screen as close to the blockaded fortress14 as was practicable. But for once he showed an unwonted tendency to take dangerous risks. He did not wish to fall back unless he were pressed, and he thought it extremely probable that the enemy had no further design than to revictual Rodrigo. Refusing to give up valuable ground unless he were forced to do so, he left Craufurd and Picton in their advanced positions all through the 23rd and 24th of September. He did not call Graham and the 1st and 6th Divisions in from the left, where their present position on the Azava covered the road to Almeida and the valuable accumulation of artillery stores at Villa15 da Ponte. Nor did he bring up the 7th Division to his head quarters at Fuente Guinaldo, where he lay for these two days with the 4th Division alone.
The cavalry at the head of the French column appeared in the plain beyond Ciudad Rodrigo on the 23rd, as Wellington had expected, and communicated with the place. It was in no way hindered, as the British cavalry fell back beyond the Agueda by order, and left the Salamanca road open. On the 24th a very large force was up—observers on the heights of Pastores saw a great mass of cavalry in the plain below them, and four divisions of infantry, one of which was made out by telescopes to belong to the Imperial Guard, from its high plumes16 and bearskins[718]. It was presently discovered that an even larger mass was close behind, encamped on the Guadapero stream, beyond the low hills which lie east of Ciudad Rodrigo. But on this day the enemy, though he had some 4,000 cavalry in his front line, made no attempt to push forward either against Picton or against Craufurd. This quiescence17 on his adversary18’s part evidently made Wellington conclude that he need fear nothing, that the French had come merely to revictual their garrison20, not to take the offensive against the allied army. He left his divisions in the scattered21 posts which they were occupying, with sixteen miles between Graham on the left and[p. 562] Craufurd on the right. And he neglected the fact that his concentration point at Fuente Guinaldo was only fifteen miles from Ciudad Rodrigo, where the leading section of the French army, over 20,000 strong as he had seen, was already encamped. If it should march suddenly forward on the 25th, the 3rd Division was only five miles from its outposts, on the heights of Pastores and El Bodon, and there was no other division save the 4th placed directly to cover Fuente Guinaldo. If the flank divisions were called in on an alarm, Graham was fifteen miles from Fuente Guinaldo, Craufurd eleven, on the other side of a river with few fords. And by the time that they could concentrate, the French van might be supported by the large reserves which were known to be lying behind Ciudad Rodrigo. It is one of the best-known axioms of war that the concentration point of a scattered army must not be within one short march of the base from which the opponent can strike.
Wellington was so far right in his judgement of the enemy’s designs, that it was true that Marmont had come forward without any definite intention of forcing on a fight, or of advancing far into Portugal. His subsequent offensive move, however, was provoked by his discovery that the allied army was quite close to him, but wholly unconcentrated. On the morning of the 25th it occurred to the Marshal that it would be desirable to find out by reconnaissance whether Wellington had been making any provision for a regular siege of Ciudad Rodrigo—whether he had been collecting fascines and gabions in the neighbouring villages, or had brought up heavy artillery close to his blockading line[719]. If this should turn out to be the case, the knowledge of it would have a serious effect on all the future movements of the Army of Portugal. For a siege is a different thing from a blockade, and, if Rodrigo were in danger of actual leaguer, his own army would have to canton itself in regions less remote from the Portuguese frontier than those which it had hitherto occupied.
Dorsenne was persuaded to assist the Army of Portugal in a great reconnaissance, which was to push back Wellington’s[p. 563] cavalry screen and see what lay behind it. In the morning of September 25th the two cavalry brigades of the Army of the North went out on the Carpio-Espeja roads to sweep the line of the Azava, with Wathier in command. At the same time Montbrun took the bulk of the cavalry of Marmont, two brigades of dragoons and two of light horse, and advanced along the southern road, that which runs from Ciudad Rodrigo past El Bodon towards Fuente Guinaldo. Only one infantry division, that of Thiébault, the weakest in the two armies, was put under arms to support the cavalry, and even these 4,000 men did not leave the immediate23 vicinity of Ciudad Rodrigo—they merely crossed the Agueda and halted. The two reconnaissances brought on two separate engagements, at a distance of ten miles from each other, of which one had no importance, immediate or ulterior, while the other led to sharp fighting and revealed to the French the weakness of Wellington’s position. The cavalry screen of the allied army was formed as follows: Madden’s Portuguese division lay along the line of the lower Agueda, which was not threatened this day. Anson’s brigade held the line of the Azava, and lay across the Carpio road. Alten’s brigade was strung out along the low hills from south of Carpio to the upper Agueda near Pastores, and had one of its squadrons detached with the Light Division beyond that river, in front of Martiago. Slade’s and De Grey’s brigades were far to the rear, behind Fuente Guinaldo, in Villar de Toro and other villages along the Coa river, and only came up to the front after midday on the 25th.
Wathier’s insignificant24 engagement on the lower Azava may be dealt with first. About eight in the morning the pickets25 of the 14th Light Dragoons detected a strong column of cavalry coming out of Rodrigo, and were forced to retire from Carpio and other posts beyond the stream. The enemy could be counted from the hills above, and it was noted26 that they left six squadrons beside Carpio in reserve, and were advancing with eight more. These crossed the river and felt their way cautiously towards the heights. They were coming straight against the front of the 6th Division, and Graham sent out the light companies of Hulse’s brigade to line the wood which covered the position which he was holding. The two British[p. 564] cavalry regiments28 (14th and 16th Light Dragoons) gave back to the edge of the wood also, and formed up close to their infantry supports. Misliking the look of the long belt of trees which hid all from him, Wathier halted four squadrons more on the flat ground just beyond the Azava, and moved the other four towards Graham’s unseen line. This advanced guard consisted of the Lancers of Berg and the 26th Chasseurs. When they were feeling their way up the slope their leading squadron was charged and driven back by a squadron of the 14th. The main body, however, picked up the beaten unit and advanced again: when they had got close to the wood, the light companies of the 11th, 61st, and 53rd fired a volley into them, and while they stood staggered by the unexpected salute29 four squadrons of the 14th and 16th charged them, broke them, and chased them for two miles down to and across the Azava[720]. The French reserve left close to that stream retired30 at once, covering the broken squadrons. The French lost one officer and ten men killed, and five officers and thirty-two men taken, mostly wounded. The British loss was very small—an officer and ten men wounded and one man missing.
Wathier stayed in line at Carpio, without making a further advance, till evening, and reported that the English were in position with all arms beyond the Azava, and not inclined to give way. This was important news, for, if there were infantry so far north, it was clear that Wellington had not yet concentrated his army on the Fuente Guinaldo line.
Montbrun’s reconnaissance, along the Fuente Guinaldo road, turned out a much more lively and important affair. He started out with a heavy column consisting of two brigades of his own dragoons and two of light cavalry[721], which came into touch with the vedettes of Alten’s brigade almost the moment that it had crossed the Agueda, for the British outposts lay within two[p. 565] miles of Rodrigo. Driving straight before him, Montbrun pierced the screen, and pressing up the slope found himself in the middle of the scattered fractions of the 3rd Division, which Wellington had only just begun to draw together when he saw that the reconnaissance was being made by no less than 2,500 horse. There was not time to concentrate, because the posts of Picton’s battalions were too close to the enemy, and the position was unsatisfactory. Graham, who had surveyed it a few weeks before, remarks in his diary that it was ‘by no means favourable—extensive, yet very narrow, and the right thrown back across the plain towards the ford22 by Pastores, where there is little advantage of ground but a bank and a little water-run[722].’
At the moment when Montbrun broke through the cavalry screen, Picton’s infantry was strung out on a front of six miles—the 74th and three companies of the 5/60th were at Pastores, near the Agueda, the remainder of Wallace’s[723] brigade (the 1/45th and 1/88th) was three miles south-west of Pastores in the village of El Bodon. Colville’s brigade and the Portuguese were equally split up—the 1/5th and 77th, with the 21st Portuguese in support, being on high ground across the road from Rodrigo to Fuente Guinaldo, in the centre, while the left section of the front of the division (94th, 2/83rd and 9th Portuguese) was on lower ground, two miles west of Colville, in the direction of Campillo. Alten’s cavalry brigade, having sent a squadron of the 11th Light Dragoons to watch Craufurd’s front, beyond the Agueda, and having strong pickets out to right and left, had only 500 sabres left as its main body. These five weak squadrons (three of the 1st Hussars K.G.L., two of the 11th Light Dragoons) were across the high-road, near the 5th and 77th, and with them the two Portuguese batteries under Major Arentschildt which formed the divisional artillery of Picton.
Marmont, on discovering the scattered position of the Allies, could hardly believe that they had nothing more in his front than what he saw—four groups of two or three battalions each, with huge gaps between them. He suspected that Wellington must have reserves close behind, not thinking it likely that he[p. 566] would have kept infantry so close to Ciudad Rodrigo unless he were in force to resist an attack. He accordingly resolved not to send for his infantry from the rear and engage in a serious action, but to direct Montbrun to drive in one section of the hostile front with his heavy column of cavalry, and so to discover the exact strength and position of the Allies[724]. It was lucky for Wellington that the Marshal limited his ambitions to this modest scheme. Montbrun resolved to break in the allied centre, across the high-road, and advanced up it, leaving on his left the two fractions of Wallace’s brigade in Pastores and El Bodon. If he could pierce the centre, this wing would be in a disastrous31 plight32, being cut off from its line of retreat and its power of rejoining Wellington at Fuente Guinaldo. Accordingly the whole of the French horse came up against the position across the road, where Colville’s two battalions and Arentschildt’s batteries blocked the way, while Alten’s five squadrons were covering their flank. The contest was of an abnormal sort, 2,500 horse with one battery attacking a smaller force of all arms—1,000 infantry, 500 sabres, and two batteries[725].
It was most important to Wellington that the detachment across the road should not be driven in, and he gave orders that it was to hold its ground to the last possible minute, in order to allow the battalions in Pastores and El Bodon time to escape from their compromised position, and to fall into the line of retreat behind the detaining force. His command was well obeyed, and a most gallant33 struggle was kept up for more than an hour, under the Commander-in-Chief’s own eyes.
Montbrun came on with three columns abreast34, each formed of a brigade, while a fourth brigade formed his reserve. His left column tried to turn the right of Alten’s cavalry, his centre column attacked its front, his right column, supported by a[p. 567] horse-artillery battery, moved up against the Portuguese guns and their infantry supports. There was fierce fighting all along the line: the allied horse, aided by the steep slope in their favour, made a wonderful fight against the superior numbers of the enemy, who had to attack in each point on a narrow front, since only parts of the hillside were open ground suitable for cavalry movements. Each time that the leading French squadron neared the crest35 it was charged and thrown back. The 11th and one squadron of the Germans dealt with the flank attack, the rest of the legionary hussars with that in the centre. The defence was most desperate, consisting in a long series of partial charges, in which one or more of the defending squadrons beat back the head of the hostile advance, and then retired under cover of the others. Montbrun, having six or seven regiments with him, was always able to launch a new attack up the hillside the moment that the last had been foiled. The colonel of the German hussars wrote that from first to last the enemy came on nearly forty times, yet never was allowed to reach the crest: the individual squadrons of his regiment27 and of the 11th had charged eight or nine times each[726].
Meanwhile, to the right of the plateau which the cavalry defended so gallantly36, the third French cavalry column had attacked the Portuguese batteries whose fire was sweeping37 down the road. A dragoon brigade, though suffering heavily from the grape poured into it as the range grew close, succeeded in making its way to the guns, and burst in among them, capturing four pieces; the artillerymen had held their ground to the last, and earned Wellington’s praise for their steadiness. But the pieces were not lost; close in support of them was the first battalion7 of the 5th regiment under Major Ridge38, who, when the hostile horsemen halted for a moment around the captured guns, attacked them without hesitation39 in line. The battalion advanced firing, and with three volleys broke the dragoons, who were blown with their charge and in much disorder40. They recoiled41 down the hill in complete rout42, and[p. 568] the Portuguese gunners were able to get their pieces in action again and resume their very effective fire[727]. This was a rare example of a successful attack on cavalry by infantry in line: it could not have been tried against intact squadrons, for there was no flank-support for the 5th, and an enemy in good order would have turned the battalion and cut it up from the side. But Ridge saw that the French were in complete disarray43, and unfit for the moment to man?uvre, wherefore he was justified44 in trying the dangerous-looking movement which had such complete success.
The French at last gave up their frontal attacks; it is said that when the trumpets45 blew for one more advance, the Allies saw the regiment at the head of the column refuse to move forward. Montbrun thereupon tried a move which he might well have made half an hour earlier; he began to extend his hitherto concentrated brigades, and thrust one of them into the gap between the hill that he could not force and the village of El Bodon.
Wellington then gave back; Picton and the two battalions in El Bodon had by this time evacuated47 it, and were, as ordered, on their way to the rear. The still more compromised detachment in Pastores had also got away, and was making for Fuente Guinaldo by a very circuitous48 road: it forded the Agueda, went ten miles on its further side, where no French were as yet visible, and then recrossed again near Robleda, joining the 4th Division at dusk.
The second period of the combat of El Bodon—to give its usual name to the engagement—was less bloody49 than the first, but quite as exciting. Wellington’s order of retreat was that the two batteries of Arentschildt with a cavalry escort went first, then the 21st Portuguese, which had remained in reserve all through the earlier fighting, then the 5th and 77th in a single square[728], and lastly two squadrons of the German hussars,[p. 569] which remained on the position till the last moment. This column, retreating along the high-road, had in front of it, and ultimately caught up, the other fractions of the 3rd Division, Picton’s two battalions which had come in from the right, and the 94th, 2/83rd, and 9th Portuguese, which had fallen into the road from the left. But in the first hour of the retreat these detachments had not yet been overtaken.
Montbrun pressed on fiercely, the moment that he saw that the hill so long held against him had been abandoned, and beset50 the retreating column on all sides as it marched along the flat. The hussars in the rear were driven in by overwhelming numbers, and had to retire to the neighbourhood of the 21st Portuguese. This left the square composed of the 5th and 77th exposed to the full force of the enemy. Montbrun caused it to be charged on three sides at once; but the British infantry showed no disorder, reserved their fire till the enemy was within thirty paces, and then executed such a regular and effective series of volleys that the dragoons were beaten off with loss, and could not close at any point. The German squadrons then turned back and charged them as they retired in disorder.
This repulse51 checked the French for half an hour, but presently they were up again, not only hovering52 round the two squares, that of the 5th and 77th and that of the 21st Portuguese, which brought up the rear, but riding all down the side of the division, which now formed one long column of march. But they dared not charge again: Montbrun merely brought up his horse-artillery battery, and plied53 the enemy with fire from several successive positions. It was not ineffective, but the allied infantry refused to be troubled with it, and continued to march as hard as they could along the high-road. ‘For six miles across a perfect flat,’ writes an eye-witness, ‘without the slightest protection from any incident of ground, without their artillery, and almost without cavalry (for what were five squadrons against twenty or thirty?) did the 3rd Division continue its march. During the whole time the French cavalry never quitted them: six guns were taking the division in flank and rear, pouring in a shower of round shot, grape, and canister. This was a trying and pitiable situation for troops to be placed in, but it in no way shook their courage or confidence: so far[p. 570] from being dispirited or cast down the men were cheerful and gay. The soldiers of my own corps54, the 88th, told their officers that if the French would only charge, every officer should have a nate horse to ride upon. General Picton conducted himself with his usual coolness. He rode on the left flank of the column, and repeatedly cautioned the different battalions to mind their quarter-distance and the “tellings off.” We had at last got close to the entrenched55 camp at Fuente Guinaldo when Montbrun, impatient that we should escape from his grasp, ordered his troopers to bring up their right shoulders and incline towards our marching column. The movement was not exactly bringing his squadrons into line, but the next thing to it, and they were within half pistol-shot of us. Picton took off his hat, and holding it over his eyes as a shade from the sun, looked sternly but anxiously at the French. The clatter56 of the horses and the clanking of the sabres was so great, when the right squadrons moved up, that many thought it the preliminary to a general charge. Some mounted officer called out, “Had we not better form square?” “No,” replied Picton, “it is only a ruse57 to frighten us, and it won’t do.”[729]’
Montbrun’s bolt, indeed, was shot. For by this time troops were coming out from Fuente Guinaldo to cover the retreating division, De Grey’s heavy dragoons, who had just come up from the Coa, at the head of them. The French horse slackened their pace, and finally drew off. Half an hour later the retreating column had taken up its destined58 position in the half-completed entrenched camp where the 4th Division was awaiting it.
This long straggling fight cost the Allies only 149 casualties. The cavalry had lost 70 men[730] in their long fight to hold the hill, which they so long guarded, on the flank. Of the infantry the 1/5th and 77th had lost 42 men, not by the sabres of the cavalry whom they had driven off so serenely59, but by the artillery fire which followed. The other eight infantry battalions of the 3rd Division, British and Portuguese, had lost only 34 men in all, mostly, it is to be presumed, by the cannonade during the[p. 571] retreat. The Portuguese gunners had only 5 men hurt—a light loss considering that the enemy’s dragoons had been among their pieces for five minutes.
Montbrun’s loss is nowhere accurately60 stated, but was probably about 200 at the least. Thirteen officers had been hit in the four brigades engaged, and though cavalry was more heavily officered in proportion to its numbers than infantry, we can hardly suppose that where 13 officers fell less than 190 rank and file were killed or wounded[731].
Wellington was lucky to have paid no greater price for his rash maintenance of a position so dangerously close to the walls of Ciudad Rodrigo. If Marmont had brought up infantry close behind his great cavalry force, the 3rd Division would have suffered far more; it might even have been destroyed. But there was, as we have seen, only one French infantry division under arms on the morning of the 25th, that of Thiébault. Three more were encamped beyond Rodrigo, the rest were still some miles to the rear, halting by the Guadapero river. Marmont sent for Thiébault, when he had discovered the position and the weakness of Picton’s scattered brigades. But, luckily for the British, Dorsenne had also dispatched orders to this division, which formed part of his own Army of the North. He had been alarmed at the strength of the Allies on the Azava, which Wathier had discovered, and had told Thiébault to march to his right and support the cavalry on the Carpio road. When Masséna’s aide-de-camp arrived, to hurry up this infantry, it was found to have gone off some miles to the north-west; and though promptly61 recalled it did not reach the ground in front of Fuente Guinaldo till late in the evening. Deprived of Thiébault’s battalions by this chance—one of the many results of a divided command—Marmont summoned up the three divisions which lay on the other side of Rodrigo. Not having been warned for service on this day, they took some time to get under arms, and more to file over the narrow bridge over the Agueda. They only reached and joined the Marshal and Montbrun a short time before Thiébault arrived. Thus all day[p. 572] Marmont had no infantry in hand, with which to support his cavalry[732]. But at nightfall he had 20,000 bayonets at the front, and the five rear divisions, left hitherto on the Guadapero, were also coming up, and had reached and passed the Agueda. There would be nearly 60,000 men at the front by noon on the 26th.
Wellington’s position at Fuente Guinaldo was therefore very hazardous62. When night fell on the 25th he had only assembled in the half-finished entrenchments the 3rd and 4th Divisions, Pack’s independent Portuguese brigade, and the cavalry of Alten, De Grey, and Slade, or about 15,000 men. He had sent orders to the other fractions of his army to concentrate there, but it was certain that some, and possible that others, of them would not get up on the morning of the 26th. The concentration orders had gone out too late. Graham was directed to unite the 1st and 6th Divisions and McMahon’s Portuguese at Nava de Aver63, abandoning the lower Azava to a rearguard composed of Anson’s cavalry. He was, as he wrote to his brother-in-law Cathcart, ‘amazingly relieved’ to have permission to draw in towards the centre[733]; but the orders came late and did not go far enough—at Nava de Aver, which he reached at noon on the 26th, he had 13,000 men collected, but he was still twelve miles from Fuente Guinaldo, and the road to that point by Puebla de Azava was not out of reach of molestation64 by the French. It was only in the afternoon that he received a second dispatch, telling him not to move on Fuente Guinaldo, but to get behind the Villar Mayor stream, and march by a circuitous route, through Villar Mayor and Bismula, to join the main army at a point more to the rear[734]. The Commander-in-Chief had resolved to evacuate46 Fuente Guinaldo.
Thus, by his own fault, Wellington was short of two divisions and a brigade from his left, in the perilous65 afternoon hours of[p. 573] the 26th. And on his right also he was weak, owing to the fact that he had deliberately66 left Craufurd upon the Vadillo, beyond the Azava, till the 25th. At the moment when the combat of El Bodon began, tardy67 directions were sent to Craufurd to move the Light Division to join the army, by the ford of Carros, near Robleda, high up the Azava. For it was no longer possible for him to use the easy passage by the ford of Zamorra, close under Pastores, since the French had gained possession of it when they thrust the 3rd Division southward. Craufurd, leaving only cavalry pickets along the Vadillo river, retreated that night to Cespedosa, a few miles south of his former post at Martiago. But he refused to make a night march to the ford of Carros, because the road was rough and difficult, and he thought it likely that his column might get astray and that some or all of his baggage might be lost[735]. Very possibly he was right, but the result of his not starting from Cespedosa till the dawn of the 26th was that, all through the long morning hours and early afternoon of that day, he was not in line at Fuente Guinaldo, where his chief wished to have him. He only got there, after a fatiguing68 march of 16 miles along the upper Agueda and over the ford of Carros, at four o’clock, when dusk was drawing near[736]. Meanwhile Marmont had been, for all the day, in a position to attack Wellington with very superior numbers.
It has often been remarked, especially by French critics, that Craufurd and his men were in grave danger on the afternoon of the 25th and the morning of the 26th, since if Marmont had sent out a heavy column on the right bank of the Agueda, to push the Light Division, it would not have been able to use the ford[p. 574] near Robleda, and must have fallen back into the rough country at the sources of the Agueda, where it might have been overtaken, and have suffered heavily for want of a road that would have served for its baggage. The danger has been exaggerated: though the baggage might very probably have been lost, there was nothing to prevent the troops from taking to the hill-paths, and getting to Payo or the passes of Gata by some circuitous route. All that a hot pursuit could have done would have been to make Craufurd unable to reach Fuente Guinaldo, as he actually did, upon the 26th. This would, no doubt, have been something of an advantage to the French. But Marmont would have lost the services of the force sent in pursuit, which would have had to be very strong, since no mere19 detachment would have been able to venture near the Light Division, on pain of being brought to action and defeated[737].
It seems that Marmont’s quiescence in front of the half-occupied camp of Fuente Guinaldo, during the perilous hours of the morning and noon of September 26th, was caused by a reluctance69 to tackle Wellington when he had taken up a position and was offering battle. He writes in his Mémoires that, ‘as the day wore on, I had 40,000 men assembled, within cannon-shot of the English front. But the enemy was known to have collected if not all, at any rate a very great part of his force, and was in an entrenched position. Much tempted70 to take advantage of the union of the Armies of Portugal and the North, and to make a stroke for victory, I passed the day in studying the English position. Attacks made without careful preparation during the recent campaigns [i. e. Bussaco and Fuentes de O?oro] had succeeded so badly that I was deterred71 from inconsiderate action. Moreover General Dorsenne, who was only under my command accidentally and by his own consent, had no wish for a battle, and this rendered the enterprise more delicate. Then, too, if we tried our luck and were successful, we were not in a condition to make profit of a successful engage[p. 575]ment, by pursuing the English into Portugal if they were beaten. So finally I gave up the idea of forcing on a fight[738].’
There is an amusing picture of Marmont’s hesitation drawn72 by General Thiébault in his clever but malicious73 autobiography74. In this a very different r?le is attributed to the commander of the Army of the North: ‘At nine o’clock the Marshal and General Dorsenne rode to the front with their glittering staffs. The troops were put under arms at once. But the great men descended75 from their horses and got out telescopes, with which they began to study the English position. “Yes,” began the Marshal, determined76 to see that which was not visible, as he peered through the large glass balanced on the shoulder of one of his aides-de-camp, “Yes, my information was correct. The right of the English line is flanked by an inaccessible77 declivity78.” General Dorsenne and I had excellent telescopes, but we could not see any such precipice79. Dorsenne told the Marshal as much. Taking no notice of his remark, Marmont continued, “The whole camp is protected by closed redoubts.” Dorsenne, after exchanging some words with me, replied that he could only make out a few points at which earthworks had been thrown up. The Marshal, ignoring the observations of his interlocutor, went on, “And, just as I have been told, these closed redoubts are armed with heavy guns of position forwarded from Almeida. Nothing can be done[739].” He forthwith adjourned80 his reconnoitring, and invited the generals to a heavy and sumptuous81 meal, served on silver plate in front of the line. After the feast Montbrun remarked, “The English position is impregnable—the thing that proves it so is that Wellington is offering us battle upon it. We shall never make an end of him by running at him head down; that would have no good result.” Marmont soon after delivered his decision that Rodrigo, having been relieved, and the position of the English being too strong, he intended to advance no further, and should retire next day.’
If Thiébault’s report of Montbrun’s words and Marmont’s attitude be correct, it is clear that Wellington had by mere ‘bluffing’ brought the enemy to a standstill. He was using[p. 576] the reputation for caution which he had gained in his former campaigns as a moral weapon. The syllogism82, ‘Wellington never fights save when he has his army in hand, and has found a good position; he offers to fight now; therefore he feels himself safe against any attack,’ seemed a legitimate83 logical process to Marmont and Montbrun. So the English general had hoped; but he did not know how entirely84 successful his demonstration85 had been; and thought that the reconnaissance followed by a halt, which he had observed in the morning, meant that the enemy was going to bring up his last reserves before attacking. The rear divisions of the Army of Portugal were seen to arrive in the French lines when the day was far spent. Wellington supposed that Marmont had been waiting for them, and would use them for a great combined attack on the 27th. He had no intention of awaiting it, even though the Light Division had reached him, and instead of ordering the other absent units of his army to close in upon Fuente Guinaldo, sent orders to them all to place themselves in the second position, nine miles to the rear, which he had chosen as his real battle-ground.
The force at Fuente Guinaldo decamped after dusk, leaving the Light Division and the 1st Hussars K.G.L. to keep up the bivouac fires along the whole line till midnight. Marching in two columns, one by the direct road by Casillas de Flores and Furcalhos, the other by a secondary path through Aldea da Ponte, the whole reached the positions in front of Alfayates where Wellington was ready to make his real stand. On the morning of the 27th the main body was joined by the 5th Division, which came down from Payo in the Sierra de Gata, having found no enemy threatening the passes in that direction. The 7th Division also arrived from Albergaria. Meanwhile Graham, with the 1st and 6th Divisions and McMahon’s Portuguese, had arrived at Bismula and Rendo, and so was at last in close touch with the main body. The whole of Wellington’s 45,000 men were concentrated, and, well knowing the strength of the position which he had now reached, his mind was tranquil86. The front was hidden by a strong cavalry screen, Alten’s brigade covering the right, De Grey’s and Slade’s the centre, and Anson’s the left, where Graham’s divisions lay.
[p. 577]Marmont was so far from guessing that his adversary would abandon the position of Fuente Guinaldo, that he had ordered his own army to retreat towards Rodrigo, at the very moment that the Allies were absconding87 from his front. During the early hours of the night of the 26th-27th, the two adversaries88 were marching away from each other! But at midnight Thiébault, who was in charge of the rearguard, noted that the fires in Wellington’s lines seemed few and flickering89, and that his sentries90 had got out of touch with those of the British. A reconnaissance soon showed him that there was nothing left in his front. Prompt information was sent to Marmont, and the Marshal had to reconsider his position. He determined to follow up the retreating enemy, not with the fixed91 intention of bringing him to action, but rather that he might be ready to take advantage of any unforeseen chance that might occur. But the pursuit could not be rapid or effective, for during the night the bulk of the Army of Portugal had been marching back towards Ciudad Rodrigo. Montbrun’s and Wathier’s cavalry were still at the front, but only two infantry divisions, those of Souham and Thiébault, both belonging to the Army of the North. The Marshal dared not press his enemy too hard, lest Wellington should turn upon him, and find that only 11,000 infantry were up on the French side. While the countermarch of the other seven divisions was in progress, the vanguard must not commit itself unsupported to a general action.
Accordingly Wellington’s retreat was not seriously incommoded. Montbrun, followed by Souham’s division, took the road by Casillas de Flores and Furcalhos: Wathier, with Thiébault’s infantry in support, that by Aldea da Ponte. Montbrun ran about noon, against the Light and 5th Divisions and Alten’s horse, drawn up in position in front of Alfayates, and considered them too strongly placed to be meddled92 with. Wathier, on the western road, was stopped in front of Aldea da Ponte by the pickets of the 4th Division and of Slade’s dragoons. This village lay outside the intended line of battle of the allied army, but so close in front of it that Wellington had resolved not to let it go till he was pushed by a strong force, since it was the meeting-place of several roads and well placed for observation.
Wathier halted facing Aldea da Ponte, till Thiébault came[p. 578] up and assumed the command, being senior to the cavalry general. Seeing that the village was worth having, Thiébault resolved to attack it, and drove out the light companies of the Fusilier brigade by an advance of the three battalions of the 34th Léger, one of which cleared the village while the other two turned it on each flank. Wellington, observing that the enemy had only a single division on the ground, refused to allow Aldea da Ponte to be so lightly lost, and sent against the French the whole Fusilier brigade in line, flanked by a Portuguese regiment in column. This advance forced Thiébault’s first brigade back from the village, and thrust it northward93 some way upon the road. Here the French rallied upon their second brigade, and formed up with Wathier’s horse in support. Wellington would not push them further, and contented94 himself with having recovered Aldea da Ponte and the junction95 of the roads[740].
At dusk, however, Montbrun and Souham came up and joined Thiébault, with the column which had followed the Furcalhos road. Souham determined to try again the attack in which Thiébault had been checked, and assailed96 Aldea da Ponte just as the light was failing. The Fusiliers were driven out of the village, and Wellington refused to reinforce them, or to allow them to make a second counter-attack, because he did not wish to get entangled97 in heavy fighting in the dark, or to expend98 many lives upon keeping a place which was outside his line, and formed no essential part of it. There had been much skirmishing all through the afternoon between Slade’s two cavalry regiments and Wathier’s chasseurs, in which neither party had any appreciable99 losses, nor gained any marked advantage.
The Anglo-Portuguese casualties in this rearguard action were just 100, of which 71 were in the Fusilier brigade, 13 in the Portuguese battalions which had covered its flank, and 10 in Slade’s cavalry. Thiébault says that he lost 150 men, a very[p. 579] probable estimate[741]; he adds that the British lost 500, and that he was engaged against 17,000 allied troops—which, considering that he fought no one save the three battalions of the Fusilier brigade, one regiment of Portuguese, and Slade’s horse—3,300 sabres and bayonets—seems sufficiently100 astounding101. It may serve as a fair example of his method of dealing102 with figures.
Next morning Wellington’s line was drawn back into the position in which he had determined to fight, with the French column at Aldea da Ponte lying two miles in his front, on the lower ground. This position, which was about seven miles long, was covered on either flank by the ravine of the Coa, which here makes a deep hook or curve, with the town of Sabugal at its point. The right wing was formed of the 5th Division, holding the village of Aldea Velha on a steep hill by the source of the Coa. The right-centre, which projected somewhat, was composed of the 4th and Light Divisions ranged in front of the town of Alfayates, close by the convent of Sacaparte[742]. From that point westward103 the line was taken up by Pack’s and McMahon’s Portuguese brigades on each side of the village of Nave104. Finally, the left consisted of the 1st and 6th Divisions under Graham, reaching from near Rendo as far as the bridge of Rapoulla. This wing was covered in front by the ravine of a torrent105 flowing into the Coa. The central reserve was formed of the 3rd and 7th Divisions with De Grey’s and Slade’s dragoons, drawn up behind Alfayates. Alten’s light cavalry brigade was with the Light Division, its pickets thrown out on the Furcalhos[p. 580] road; Anson’s brigade was placed in front of Nave and Bismula, with its advanced vedettes watching the French in Aldea da Ponte. The position was well marked, high-lying, and masked by woods and ravines. Its only fault was that the Coa ran round its rear, with only two bridges, those of Sabugal and Rapoulla da Coa, though there were at least six or seven fords in addition, and the stream was low, and passable almost everywhere for infantry. A defeat, however, would probably have meant much loss of artillery and impedimenta, though Wellington had sent great part of his baggage over the Coa, and detached all his Portuguese horse and the Portuguese brigade of the 6th Division to cover its retreat. No position is perfect, but Wellington did not think he could possibly be evicted106 from this one, which was as strong as Bussaco and not nearly so long. ‘He wished to be attacked, being confident of success,’ wrote Graham three days later[743].
But his adversaries would not oblige him. After coming up to Aldea da Ponte, and rebuking107 Thiébault and Souham for engaging in a profitless skirmish on the preceding day[744], Marmont took a long survey of the position of the allied army, and refused to advance any further. The reasons which he had given for not attacking at Fuente Guinaldo on the 26th, when he still had a good chance of accomplishing great things, were doubly valid108 on the 28th. After reasserting to Dorsenne and the other generals that Wellington’s army was concentrated (which was now quite true) and that his position was far too strong to be meddled with, and adding that, even if there were a successful action, he could not pursue Wellington into the mountains for want of food, he gave his final orders for retreat. The main body of the army, which had not come further forward than Fuente Guinaldo, began to retire that same night towards Ciudad Rodrigo. The two infantry divisions at Aldea da Ponte[p. 581] and the cavalry of Montbrun and Wathier brought up and covered the rear. By the morning of the 29th the crisis was over, and Wellington was dictating109 orders for the breaking up of his army and its distribution into cantonments.
After retiring to Ciudad Rodrigo Marmont and Dorsenne parted company on October 1st, and each dispersed110 his troops into cantonments. The Army of Portugal recrossed the Sierra de Gata, and was distributed by divisions in the same regions of New Castile that it had occupied in September. On returning to his head quarters at Talavera, Marmont received the report of Foy, commanding the only section of his army which had not taken part in the recent campaign. That general had been ordered to demonstrate from Plasencia against Wellington’s rear during the revictualling of Ciudad Rodrigo. With six battalions and a regiment of light cavalry, about 2,800 men, he had taken the direction of the pass of Perales. He reached Moraleja at the foot of the mountains, near Coria, on September 27th, the day of the combat of Aldea da Ponte. Next morning he started to ascend111 the Sierra, and his advanced guard got to Payo on the 29th. There it was discovered that Marmont and Dorsenne had abandoned the offensive, and started on their retreat for Ciudad Rodrigo on the 28th, so that no French troops were anywhere in the neighbourhood, while Wellington’s whole army was near Alfayates, only fifteen miles away. Fearing to be discovered and overwhelmed, Foy returned to Plasencia by forced marches: his demonstration had been some days too late to be of any use. If he had appeared in the Perales pass on the 25th, while the 5th Division was still holding Payo, Wellington would have had to keep that force detached to protect his flank, and could not have withdrawn112 it to join the rest of his army on the Alfayates-Rendo position. But Foy came up only when the campaign was over, and his movements had no effect whatever.
The best commentary on this five days of man?uvring between El Bodon and Alfayates is that of the war-tried veteran Graham. ‘It was very pretty—but spun113 rather fine. Had the enemy behaved with common spirit on the 26th, we should not have got away so easily from Guinaldo. I should have preferred, after it was ascertained114 that the enemy’s force (54,000 infantry and[p. 582] 6,000 horse) was too formidable to be attacked beyond the Agueda, drawing back our infantry to the ultimate position (Aldea Velha, Alfayates, Rendo) which could have been made infinitely115 stronger during the interval116. There would have been no risk whatever, nor any appearance to the troops of retreat. The enemy, as you can see, might have amused us before Fuente Guinaldo, and, by a night march from Ciudad Rodrigo, have massed at San Felices, and so have crossed the river in force by the plain of Fuentes de O?oro. Then, pushing on rapidly by Nava de Aver, he would have tumbled us back in confusion. I thought this would have been his course, from his superiority in cavalry and artillery—all that country is like Newmarket Heath for galloping117 across. However, all is well that ends well[745]!’
The fact is that Wellington on the 25th made one of his rare slips. He judged that Marmont would not advance beyond Ciudad Rodrigo, and so left his troops dispersed along a vast front. When, contrary to his expectation, his enemy fell upon the 3rd Division, and pushed it back to Fuente Guinaldo, the chosen concentration point of the Allied army, he was for twenty-four hours in the gravest danger. For if Marmont had struck hard again at noon on the 26th, there was no mass of troops collected to oppose him. Craufurd and Graham would have been driven off sideways on eccentric lines of retreat, and the 3rd and 4th Divisions must surely have suffered considerable loss in the hasty retreat to Alfayates which would have been forced upon them. For on the 26th Marmont would not have been handicapped, as he was on the 25th, by having no infantry at the front to assist his numerous and daring cavalry. It may be added that, if the army had failed to concentrate at Alfayates, Almeida would have been in danger, and what was still more important, Dickson’s great siege-train at Villa da Ponte would have been exposed—unless indeed Graham, driven away from his proper line of movement, might have moved westward and covered it. But speculations118 as to the merely possible are fruitless.
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1
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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warding
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| 监护，守护（ward的现在分词形式） | |
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allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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debouch
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| v.流出，进入 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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contingent
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| adj.视条件而定的；n.一组，代表团，分遣队 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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compensate
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| vt.补偿，赔偿；酬报 vi.弥补；补偿；抵消 | |
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convoy
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| vt.护送，护卫，护航；n.护送；护送队 | |
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13
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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villa
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| n.别墅，城郊小屋 | |
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plumes
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| 羽毛( plume的名词复数 )； 羽毛饰； 羽毛状物； 升上空中的羽状物 | |
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quiescence
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| n.静止 | |
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adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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Ford
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| n.浅滩，水浅可涉处；v.涉水，涉过 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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pickets
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| 罢工纠察员( picket的名词复数 ) | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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salute
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| vi.行礼，致意，问候，放礼炮；vt.向…致意，迎接，赞扬；n.招呼，敬礼，礼炮 | |
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retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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plight
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| n.困境，境况，誓约，艰难；vt.宣誓，保证，约定 | |
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gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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abreast
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| adv.并排地；跟上(时代)的步伐，与…并进地 | |
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crest
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| n.顶点；饰章；羽冠；vt.达到顶点；vi.形成浪尖 | |
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gallantly
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| adv. 漂亮地，勇敢地，献殷勤地 | |
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sweeping
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| adj.范围广大的，一扫无遗的 | |
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ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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recoiled
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| v.畏缩( recoil的过去式和过去分词 )；退缩；报应；返回 | |
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rout
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| n.溃退，溃败；v.击溃，打垮 | |
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disarray
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| n.混乱，紊乱，凌乱 | |
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44
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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45
trumpets
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| 喇叭( trumpet的名词复数 )； 小号； 喇叭形物； （尤指）绽开的水仙花 | |
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46
evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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circuitous
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| adj.迂回的路的，迂曲的，绕行的 | |
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bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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50
beset
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| v.镶嵌；困扰，包围 | |
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51
repulse
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| n.击退，拒绝；vt.逐退，击退，拒绝 | |
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52
hovering
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| 鸟( hover的现在分词 )； 靠近（某事物）； （人）徘徊； 犹豫 | |
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53
plied
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| v.使用（工具）( ply的过去式和过去分词 )；经常供应（食物、饮料）；固定往来；经营生意 | |
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54
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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55
entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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56
clatter
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| v./n.(使)发出连续而清脆的撞击声 | |
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57
ruse
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| n.诡计，计策；诡计 | |
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58
destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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serenely
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| adv.安详地，宁静地，平静地 | |
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accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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hazardous
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| adj.(有)危险的，冒险的；碰运气的 | |
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aver
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| v.极力声明；断言；确证 | |
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64
molestation
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| n.骚扰，干扰，调戏；折磨 | |
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perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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67
tardy
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| adj.缓慢的，迟缓的 | |
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68
fatiguing
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| a.使人劳累的 | |
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reluctance
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| n.厌恶，讨厌，勉强，不情愿 | |
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tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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71
deterred
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| v.阻止，制止( deter的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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72
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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malicious
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| adj.有恶意的，心怀恶意的 | |
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autobiography
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| n.自传 | |
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descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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77
inaccessible
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| adj.达不到的，难接近的 | |
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78
declivity
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| n.下坡，倾斜面 | |
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79
precipice
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| n.悬崖，危急的处境 | |
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adjourned
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| （使）休会， （使）休庭( adjourn的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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81
sumptuous
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| adj.豪华的，奢侈的，华丽的 | |
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82
syllogism
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| n.演绎法，三段论法 | |
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83
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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84
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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85
demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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86
tranquil
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| adj. 安静的, 宁静的, 稳定的, 不变的 | |
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absconding
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| v.（尤指逃避逮捕）潜逃，逃跑( abscond的现在分词 ) | |
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adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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flickering
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| adj.闪烁的，摇曳的，一闪一闪的 | |
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sentries
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| 哨兵，步兵( sentry的名词复数 ) | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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meddled
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| v.干涉，干预（他人事务）( meddle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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assailed
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| v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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entangled
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| adj.卷入的；陷入的；被缠住的；缠在一起的v.使某人（某物/自己）缠绕，纠缠于（某物中），使某人（自己）陷入（困难或复杂的环境中）( entangle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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98
expend
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| vt.花费，消费，消耗 | |
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appreciable
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| adj.明显的，可见的，可估量的，可觉察的 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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101
astounding
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| adj.使人震惊的vt.使震惊，使大吃一惊astound的现在分词) | |
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102
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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103
westward
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| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
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nave
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| n.教堂的中部；本堂 | |
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105
torrent
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| n.激流，洪流；爆发，(话语等的)连发 | |
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evicted
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| v.（依法从房屋里或土地上）驱逐，赶出( evict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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107
rebuking
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| 责难或指责( rebuke的现在分词 ) | |
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108
valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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109
dictating
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的现在分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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110
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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111
ascend
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| vi.渐渐上升，升高；vt.攀登，登上 | |
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112
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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113
spun
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| v.纺，杜撰，急转身 | |
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114
ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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115
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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116
interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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117
galloping
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| adj. 飞驰的, 急性的 动词gallop的现在分词形式 | |
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118
speculations
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| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
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