ARROYO1 DOS MOLINOS. SEPTEMBER 1811
The moment that he had satisfied himself that the French were all in full retreat, and were clearly about to disperse2 to their old garrisons4 and cantonments, Wellington also broke up the army which had been lying on the Alfayates-Rendo position. On the 29th September Graham received orders to retire with the 1st and 6th Divisions to regular winter quarters in the interior of Beira, about Guarda, Celorico, and Freixadas. The 7th Division was sent southward to Penamacor. But the 3rd, 4th, and Light Divisions returned to the frontier of Spain, to establish the same sort of distant blockade (or rather observation) of Ciudad Rodrigo, which they had been keeping up in August and September. The Light Division once more crossed the Agueda, and occupied its old position at Martiago and Zamorra. The 4th Division watched the Agueda from Gallegos to Barba del Puerco[746]; the 3rd Division, in reserve behind the other two, was cantoned at Aldea da Ponte and Fuente Guinaldo. The three light cavalry5 brigades of Anson, Alten, and Slade took in turns the charge of covering the front of the Light and 4th Divisions along the Agueda; the two brigades not on duty were kept twenty miles to the rear, about Freixadas, Goveias, and Castel Mendo. De Grey’s heavy dragoons and the head quarters of the cavalry division were close behind, at Alverca. Soon after the line of observation along the Agueda had been taken up, Wellington found it possible to send cavalry pickets7 forward to Tenebron and Santi Espiritus, on the other side of the Agueda, so as to block the road between Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca. But these were mere8 posts occupied by half a troop—there was no intention of risking any serious force in such advanced positions. Meanwhile a more effective[p. 584] hindrance9 to communication between Rodrigo and Salamanca was provided. Julian Sanchez and his guerrilleros were pushed forward to their old haunts along the Yeltes, and overran the whole country-side. Carlos de Espa?a’s Spanish infantry10 brigade also recrossed the Agueda, and took up a forward position facing Ledesma.
Thus the posture11 of affairs on the frontiers of Leon was restored to the same aspect that it had displayed in the early autumn. It was clear that when Ciudad Rodrigo again needed to be revictualled, it ought to be necessary for the French to make another great effort, and to concentrate once more an army of 50,000 men. Marmont had thrown a great convoy12 into the place, but his calculations as to the time that these stores would suffice to feed the garrison3 had been wrecked13, by the fact that his own army and that of Dorsenne had lived on the magazines of Rodrigo for five days, and had consumed more than 200,000 rations14. It had been intended that the convoy should feed Rodrigo for six months, but only two months’ food remained for its garrison of 2,000 men after this enormous deduction15 had been made. Meanwhile Wellington thought that there was nothing to be accomplished16 in the north for some time. His ultimate design was to make a serious blow at Ciudad Rodrigo, when he should learn that the disposition17 of the armies of Dorsenne and Marmont rendered such a blow practicable. As long as they lay so close together as to make their rapid concentration possible, he did not intend to press matters. But two indispensable preliminaries for the regular leaguer of Rodrigo were being perfected. Dickson’s great siege-train was being completed at Villa18 da Ponte, and the repairs to the walls of Almeida were at last finished. It was Wellington’s intention to transfer the siege-train to Almeida when that fortress19 was absolutely secure against an attack. Placed there, it would be in a position to move up against Rodrigo in two days, when the time for action should come. But it was not till November was far spent that the order to move forward reached Dickson; meanwhile the roads between Villa da Ponte, Pinhel, and Almeida were put in good order, by a corvée levied20 on the local peasantry[747].
[p. 585]The dispositions21 of the enemy remained the all-important factor in the situation, and for the next two months Wellington was scrutinizing22 them with the greatest care. The Army of Portugal, after it had recrossed the Sierra de Gata, had been distributed by divisions in much the same cantonments that it had occupied in September, save that no force was sent to the distant southern post of Truxillo, to keep up communications with Drouet in Estremadura. Foy’s division, which had held that town during the early autumn, was reduced to such a state of dilapidation23, by its late march in the mountains, that Marmont sent it to rest at Toledo, in comfortable cantonments. He replaced it at Plasencia, its later base, by the troops of Brennier. The 2nd Division (Clausel) occupied Avila and its province; the remaining three divisions (Ferey, Maucune, Sarrut) settled down at Almaraz, Talavera, Bejar, Oropesa, and the intermediate places. Montbrun’s heavy cavalry remained near head quarters at Talavera; the light cavalry was placed with Brennier, along the line of the Alagon, to watch the frontier of central Portugal.
Dorsenne meanwhile executed a similar dispersion of his army. He left at Salamanca only Thiébault’s division, strengthened by some light cavalry, and one brigade of Souham’s[748]. The other troops that he had taken to Ciudad Rodrigo in September were sent back to Valladolid, Benavente, Palencia, and other posts in the valley of the Douro. The Army of the North ceased to threaten either Portugal or Galicia: but there was one task that it had to execute in order to replace itself in the position that it had held in the summer. Napoleon had protested at the time against the evacuation of the central Asturias and Oviedo by Bonnet24’s division, and had ordered that this region should be reoccupied as soon as was possible. The troops told off for its invasion were the same which had held it during the last twelve months, the division of Bonnet. To support their movement through the pass of Pajares, Dorsenne took to Leon one of his two divisions of the Guard, placing the[p. 586] other at Valladolid. Thiébault’s and Souham’s divisions alone were left in front line, facing towards Portugal and Galicia. Bonnet’s expedition against the Asturias was executed with complete success; indeed it met with hardly any opposition25. General Losada, who had occupied Oviedo after its evacuation, with the 1st Division of the Army of Galicia, judged himself too weak to fight. He abandoned the pass of Pajares after a mere skirmish, and made hardly a greater effort to defend the passage of the Nalon, withdrawing westward27 towards Galicia as the French advanced. Bonnet occupied Oviedo on the 6th of November without any fighting, and its port of Gijon on the 7th. Finding that Losada had retreated behind the Narcea, he sent a brigade under Colonel Gauthier to pursue him. This column reached Tineo on November 12th, but soon had to retire, for the Spaniards had scattered28 themselves in small bands among the mountains, and had turned back to attack Gauthier’s line of communication with Oviedo, as well as that between Oviedo and the pass of Pajares. Bonnet found that to maintain himself in the central Asturias was all that was in his power. He could not at the same time provide garrisons for Oviedo, Gijon, and the neighbouring places, and also put in the field a force strong enough to menace Galicia. In fact his fine division of 8,000 men was practically immobilized in the district that it had seized. It is more than doubtful whether the Emperor was wise to direct that the central Asturias should be once more occupied. He deprived the Army of the North of one of its five fighting divisions, and left the force holding Leon and Old Castile too weak to restrain Wellington, when it had at the same time to contain the Army of Galicia and to hunt all the Spanish irregular forces. Julian Sanchez in the plains of Leon, and Porlier and Longa in the mountains of Cantabria, were enemies whom it was impossible to neglect. If left alone they executed feats29 of great daring—it will be remembered that the former had surprised and captured Santander in August[749], and though his ventures in the autumn were less fortunate, they kept many hostile columns busy. Sanchez, on October 15th, executed a very ingenious coup30 de main. The garrison of Ciudad[p. 587] Rodrigo possessed31 a herd32 of cattle, which was habitually34 sent under guard to graze a mile or two from the ramparts. Watching his opportunity, on a day when the governor, Renaud, was inspecting the beasts, he swooped35 down on him, and carried him off with his escort and his cattle, though they were barely out of cannon36-shot of the fortress. Thiébault, who commanded in the province of Salamanca, had great difficulty in getting into Ciudad Rodrigo General Barrié, whom he chose as Renaud’s successor (November 1st, 1811).
Between the Tagus, therefore, and the Bay of Biscay matters had come once more to a deadlock37 after the short campaign of September 24th-29th, 1811. For the following three months neither the Allies nor the French made any serious movement, with the exception of Bonnet’s invasion of the central Asturias. The main armies on both sides were dispersed38. Wellington, with his troops distributed into cantonments, was waiting his opportunity for another and more effective blow at Ciudad Rodrigo; Dorsenne was striving to put down the guerrilleros, by hunting them ineffectually with many small columns—a task which he found more difficult now that he was deprived of Bonnet’s powerful division. Marmont, with his troops dispersed from Plasencia to Toledo, was practically waiting on Wellington’s movements, and showed no signs of wishing to take the offensive. His quiescence39 was not in the least affected40 by an Imperial dispatch sent from Compiègne on September 18th, which reached him shortly after his return to the valley of the Tagus[750]. In this document a most ambitious plan of operations was proposed to him. Berthier explained that the Emperor took it for granted that Ciudad Rodrigo would have been revictualled for three months before October 1st, and that the Army of Portugal would have received the cavalry drafts which General Vandermaesen was bringing from the north[751]. When these had arrived Marmont would have 41,000 men present with the colours. Let him march with this force into[p. 588] Estremadura, pick up Drouet and the 5th Corps41, which should be placed under his orders, and lay siege to Elvas. Soult should be asked to find him 3,000 cavalry, and he would have a force of 57,000 men, which would be more than Wellington would be able to face. For if the English general hurried to save Elvas, a course which he was almost bound to take, he would probably leave two divisions in front of Almeida to ‘contain’ Dorsenne and the Army of the North. Though he would pick up instead the corps of Hill, which had so long been lying in the Alemtejo, yet he would still have no more than 45,000 men of all nations, even including Casta?os’s Spanish levies42. This would not be enough to cope with 57,000 French: if Wellington fought he would be beaten; if he did not, he would lose Elvas, the most important fortress of Portugal. ‘This is the only movement, M. le Maréchal, which can bring back honour to our arms, free us from the defensive43 attitude in which we lie, strike terror into the English, and take us a step forward to the end of the war.... The prospect44 of capturing a great fortress under the eyes of the English army, of conquering a province of Portugal which covers our Army of the South, of uniting to your forces 25,000 men of that army [the 5th Corps and the cavalry] should serve you as incentives45 for glory and success.’ Berthier then grants that it is just possible that Wellington may refuse to march to the relief of Elvas, and reply to the menace against that fortress by invading Leon and falling upon Dorsenne, who would be too weak to face him. If he does this, the Army of the North may retire first to Salamanca, then to Valladolid, then even to Burgos. At the latter point, having called in all its detachments, it would be 50,000 strong, and able to ‘contain’ the allied46 forces, even if Wellington had brought forward every available man. But Marmont might take it for granted that his adversary47 would do nothing of the kind: he would hurry south to save Elvas and cover his base at Lisbon. If he left no troops behind him on the Coa, Dorsenne should dispatch 15,000 men of the Army of the North to Estremadura, and bring up the force before Elvas to a total of 62,000 men, a number which Wellington could not possibly resist. Elvas must infallibly fall. Only one caution was added to this scheme of[p. 589] campaign: Marmont must be sure that Wellington had not a siege-train at Almeida, or any other place near Ciudad Rodrigo. For if he were to answer the French movement on Elvas by laying formal siege to Rodrigo, Dorsenne would not be strong enough to prevent him from taking it, and the Army of Portugal would have to turn back to the rescue from its distant position in the Alemtejo.
This last caution was, in effect, a fatal block to the whole plan. For Marmont, during the El Bodon campaign, had heard of the existence of Wellington’s siege-park at Villa da Ponte. And he had also found in the cantonments of the 3rd and 4th Divisions a stock of gabions and fascines, whose preparation could only mean that the British had been contemplating48 regular siege operations at some future date. The wood and wickerwork had been burned[752], but there was nothing to prevent Wellington from replacing it at short notice.
Yet even if Marmont had not been aware of the existence of Dickson’s guns, the plan proposed to him was not so tempting49 at a second as at a first glance. He was well aware that such parts of it as depended on the loyal co-operation of his colleagues might not work out easily. Would not Soult find some excuse for refusing to send the 3,000 cavalry from Andalusia? Could Dorsenne be trusted to dispatch 15,000 men to the Alemtejo, if he discovered that Wellington had left no serious force on the Coa? And even if he did show such an unwonted self-abnegation as to detach two of his divisions to such a distant destination, would they get up in time for the crisis? For if Wellington marched promptly50 with his whole army, by Alfayates, Castello Branco, and the bridge of Villa Velha, he would be at Elvas many days before Dorsenne’s detachment, which would have to take the circuitous51 route by Bejar, the bridge of Almaraz, Truxillo, Merida, and Badajoz. Supposing that the whole allied army came down from the north, and picked up Hill and Casta?os, it would consist of well over 60,000 men, and the Army of Portugal when joined by Girard’s corps would only make 57,000 men if Soult sent his cavalry, or 54,000 if (as was more likely) he found some excuse[p. 590] for refusing his co-operation. Could 54,000 men lay siege to a first-class fortress, and at the same time provide a covering force strong enough to fend26 off 64,000 of the Allies? If they tried to do so, would not the covering force be beaten in all probability? And it was probable that Wellington would come to save Elvas with every available man, for he knew that Dorsenne was not able to make any serious irruption into northern Portugal. The Army of the North could not collect more than 27,000 men for field operations (as the late campaign had shown) and such a force, destitute52 of stores and acting53 at short notice, would not get far into the wilderness54 of the devastated55 Beira, much less threaten Lisbon.
These arguments, in all probability, must have occurred to Marmont, but we have no proof that he used them. In his reply to Berthier, written at Talavera on October 21st[753], he takes another line—he reports that the difficulties of supply are so great that he has, after returning from the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, dispersed his army from Plasencia to Toledo. He is beginning to collect great central magazines at Navalmoral, near Almaraz, which will serve for his army when next it is massed either for offensive or defensive purposes. Meanwhile, till the magazines are formed, he asks for the Emperor’s leave to wait with his troops in their present positions. Wellington, he thinks, can do nothing serious for want of numbers, and the dispersion of his army into cantonments has been caused by the difficulty of feeding his men in the highlands, from which he has just retired56. If, nevertheless, he tries some forward movement into Estremadura, the Army of Portugal is well placed for falling on him in the valley of the Guadiana. As for offensive plans, nothing can be done till magazines are formed, but he hopes to submit a scheme of his own to the Emperor when leave has been granted.
But meanwhile Napoleon’s mind had swerved57 away from the scheme for an attack on Elvas and the Alemtejo, which had been formulated58 in the Compiègne dispatch of September 18th. Just a month later Berthier writes, by his orders, from Amsterdam, to lay down a wholly new plan. This dispatch of October[p. 591] 18th contains the germ of the great central error which was to make possible Wellington’s sudden offensive move of the following midwinter, and the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo—the exploit which was to be the turning-point of the whole Peninsular War. Suchet had now started upon his long-projected march on Valencia, with which we shall deal in its proper place. He had made a good commencement, but had been brought to a stand before the walls of Saguntum. The Spaniards had begun to reinforce their eastern armies, and the Emperor realized that Suchet needed support. Therefore the army of Wellington ceased for a moment to be the central point on which his attention was fixed59. ‘Le principal objet aujourd’hui est Valence,’ writes Berthier in obedience60 to his master’s changed opinion. And he thereupon instructs Marmont that the Army of the Centre will have to stretch itself eastward61 to Cuenca, to support Suchet, and that in consequence the Army of Portugal will have to ‘facilitate the task of the King of Spain,’ i. e. spare troops to occupy those parts of New Castile from which Joseph must withdraw men for the expedition to the Valencian border. This was but the beginning of the scheme, which was to end by distracting a great body of Marmont’s host to the shore of the Mediterranean62, out of call of their commander. As we shall see, the Duke of Ragusa was finally ordered to make such a huge detachment to aid Suchet, that Wellington at last got his opportunity to strike, when the Army of Portugal was so lowered in numbers that it could not hope to restrain him. The first hint came in the above-cited orders of October 18th; in the second crucial dispatch, that of November 21st[754], Marmont is told not only that he will have to ‘facilitate the task’ of King Joseph, but that he must select a body of 12,000 men to march at once on Valencia, and set aside 3,000 more to keep up the line of communication with the expeditionary force. ‘We are informed,’ continues Berthier, ‘that the English army has 20,000 sick[755], and barely 20,000 able-bodied men with the colours, so that they cannot possibly try any offensive enterprise.’
[p. 592]This is a typical result of the endeavour to conduct the Peninsular War from Paris as head quarters. On the wholly false hypothesis that Wellington’s army is reduced to a skeleton, and can do nothing, the Emperor orders his lieutenant63 to detach a third of the Army of Portugal beyond the reach of recall. But the English, though indeed there were many sick, had not 20,000 but exactly 38,311 men with the colours at that moment, not to speak of 24,391 Portuguese64, of whom the Emperor (as usual) took no account in his calculations[756]. Wellington had been patiently waiting for months for the moment when the Army of Portugal should no longer be able to ‘contain’ him. The Emperor was obliging enough to provide the opportunity in December 1811, and when Montbrun had marched with two divisions of foot and one of horse to the other side of the Peninsula, Wellington struck, suddenly and successfully. ‘The movements of Marmont’s army towards Toledo, to aid Suchet as is supposed, have induced us to make preparations for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo,’ wrote Wellington on the 28th of that month[757]. On the 9th of January, 1812, the place was invested; on the 19th it fell; and then followed in rapid succession all the triumphs of 1812. There were other circumstances, to be mentioned in their due place, which facilitated Wellington’s advance: but the departure of Montbrun’s 15,000 men for Valencia, by the Emperor’s direct command, was the main governing fact. It is impossible to deny assent65 to Marmont’s bitter criticism on the orders that kept coming to him during the autumn and early winter of 1811. ‘Napoleon was at this period living in a non-existent world, created by his own imagination. He built structures in the air, he took his[p. 593] desires for realities, and gave orders as if ignorant of the true state of affairs, as if the actual facts had been purposely hidden from him[758].’ It was no use to tell him that magazines were non-existent, that numbers were low, that roads were impracticable, that communications were intercepted67, that he had undervalued the enemy’s forces; he continued, with all serenity68, to ignore tiresome69 hindrances70, and to issue orders grounded on data many weeks old, often on data which had never been true at any moment, but which it suited him to believe. And so the catastrophe71 of 1812 came nearer.
We have now taken the operations of Wellington and his chief adversaries72, Marmont and Dorsenne, down to the winter of 1811. But there still remains73 to be told the story of the autumn months in the secondary fields of operations in southern Spain. The doings of Soult in Andalusia have been followed no further than July and August, when, returning from the relief of Badajoz, he freed Seville from the menaces of Blake, and forced the Murcian army to take refuge with undignified haste within the boundaries of its own province[759]. Nor has anything been said about the operations of Hill in Estremadura, where he lay opposite Drouet and the French 5th Corps from August to December. With these subsidiary affairs we now have to deal.
Soult’s victorious74 campaign on the border of Murcia, and the flight of Freire’s army homewards, had reaffirmed the French domination in eastern Andalusia, to the extent that the large towns and the main lines of communication were again safe. But the Alpujarras were still in arms, and Ballasteros was giving much trouble from his new base in the extreme south. Excited by his presence, the Serranos of the Sierra de Ronda spread their incursions on every side, as far as Osuna and Marbella, in spite of all the efforts of Godinot, who had been told off to crush them. The strength of Ballasteros’s position was that he had behind him two secure places of refuge—the old Spanish lines in front of Gibraltar, with the great fortress behind them, and, thirty miles away, the newly-repaired stronghold of Tarifa, which had been held since the late winter by a detachment of[p. 594] the British garrison of Gibraltar. Avoiding serious combats, and confining his ambition to the surprise of small posts and the cutting off of detachments, Ballasteros made himself such a nuisance to the French that Soult at last prepared a great combined scheme for surrounding him. Godinot’s force, operating from the north, was to work in unison75 with two other columns under Generals Barrois and Sémelé, sent out by Victor from the lines in front of Cadiz. The concentric advance only succeeded in driving Ballasteros southward, not in trapping him. He evacuated76 San Roque and Algesiras, and went under the protection of the cannon of Gibraltar, from which secure position he defied the enemy (October 14th-15th). For a moment 10,000 French lay before the English fortress, but they had not come prepared for a siege, and soon departed when their provisions failed. Godinot then made a dash at the much weaker walls of Tarifa, but was caught on the march along the seaside road—the only one that cannon could take—by a squadron of British warships77, which did him so much damage that he drew off inland without even reaching his objective (October 18).
Meanwhile Ballasteros, slipping out from under the cover of Gibraltar the moment that his enemy was gone, followed Sémelé’s column, which was returning to the Cadiz lines by a separate route, and surprised it at Bornos (November 5). The French (1,500 men of the 16th Léger) cut their way through the enemy with the loss of only 100 men[760]; but a Juramentado battalion78 which was accompanying them threw up the butts79 of its muskets80 and surrendered en masse or dispersed, and a howitzer was captured.
Soult was incensed81 at the failure of his great combined movement, and laid the blame on Godinot, who after a stormy interview with his chief at Seville committed suicide. The chase of Ballasteros began again, with a new set of hunters; but, as we shall see in a later chapter, was destined82 to prove fruitless. Nor did a serious attempt to beleaguer83 Tarifa with a heavy siege-train come to any good. But its siege, though commenced in the last days of the old year 1811, belongs rather to the cam[p. 595]paign of 1812, and will be dealt with in the next volume of this work.
There remains only to be considered the state of affairs in Estremadura, where we left Hill with his two divisions, facing Drouet and the 5th Corps, in July. Their forces were not unequal[761], and each had been given by his commander a defensive rather than an offensive r?le. Soult had directed Drouet to see that Badajoz was not molested84, to keep up communication, via Truxillo, with the Armies of Portugal and the Centre, and to risk nothing. If the Allies detached more troops into the Alemtejo, he was to make no attempt to face superior numbers, but to call without delay for help to his neighbours, and to retire on Merida or on Monasterio as seemed more suitable at the moment. But it was judged unlikely that Wellington would be able to make any serious detachment southward, so long as he was ‘contained’ by the Army of Portugal, which lay in the valley of the Tagus, ready to move towards Ciudad Rodrigo on the one hand, or Badajoz on the other, as necessity might dictate85. Meanwhile here, as everywhere else in western Spain, the French had completely abandoned the offensive, and their plans contemplated86 the parrying of Wellington’s strokes, rather than the delivery of any blows of their own. The scheme for an attack on the Alemtejo, which Napoleon had suggested to Marmont[762], was never within any measurable distance of being put into practical operation. By this time the only part of the Peninsula in which the Imperial armies retained an offensive posture was the east coast. Suchet had started on that Valencian expedition which was to have such brilliant success in itself, but was to indirectly87 destroy the French hold on Spain, by calling away troops from opposite Wellington at the critical moment in the midwinter of 1811-12.
[p. 596]Hill’s orders from Wellington corresponded very closely to Drouet’s orders from Soult. That is to say, Hill was to content himself with ‘containing’ the French force opposite him; to see that Elvas and Campo Mayor were covered, to make no attempt on Badajoz, and to apply for aid to his chief in the event of an increase of the hostile force on the Guadiana. The summing up of the situation, in the original dispatch which Wellington wrote to Hill when he left for the north, is simply that the force in Estremadura must pair off against Drouet. ‘My wish is that you should observe the movements of the 5th Corps. If the 5th Corps should move off to cross the Tagus at Almaraz, you will then march to cross the Tagus at Villa Velha, and proceed on by Castello Branco to join this [the main] army.... If the 5th Corps should, instead of crossing the Tagus, man?uvre upon you in Alemtejo, I request you to move upon Portalegre, and there either stand their attack or not, as you may think proper, according to your notion of their force as compared with your own. If you cannot stand their attack, you will retire by Gavi?o towards Abrantes, and thence across the Zezere, taking the line of the Tagus, with Santarem on your right[763].’ It being possible, though not likely, that Marmont might make an advance against the central Portuguese frontier north of the Tagus, from the Zarza la Mayor and Coria district, Hill was directed to keep one British and one Portuguese brigade in the direction of Castello Branco, as a nucleus88 on which troops coming from north and south might concentrate, for serious opposition to an invasion. This precautionary move was made in August, and the detachment remained north of the Tagus till September, when Foy’s removal from Truxillo, and Marmont’s march to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, showed that there was no longer any possible danger in this direction[764]. Meanwhile the main body of the allied force in Estremadura lay about Portalegre, Villa Vi?osa, and Santa Olalla, waiting for developments of the enemy’s plans which never came about. For Drouet kept very quiet, generally with his head quarters at Zafra, and a strong detachment at Merida, as anxiously expectant of Hill’s movements as Hill was of his.
[p. 597]All this time the space to the north of Hill’s cantonments was occupied by the small remains of the Spanish Army of Estremadura, still under Casta?os. Since the Captain-General had sent off Carlos de Espa?a to the borders of Leon, he remained with the rest of his troops in the hilly region between the Guadiana and the Tagus, with his head quarters at Valencia de Alcantara, and part of his infantry in Albuquerque, which fortress he was engaged in repairing. His advance lay at Ca?eres, observing the French garrison in Truxillo, with which it often bickered89. But Casta?os occasionally sent a flying column out under Morillo or Penne Villemur to beat up the cantonments of the 5th Corps south of the Tagus. They ranged as far as La Serena and the Sierra del Pedroso, and on one occasion got even to Benalcazar on the very border of Andalusia, whose garrison Morillo surprised and captured[765]. Such raids were profitable for distracting the enemy, and gave Drouet much trouble. But as Casta?os’s whole force did not amount to much more than 600 horse and 3,000 foot, the menace was not a serious one. In the thinly peopled region of northern Estremadura it was impossible to get recruits to fill the old cadres, and the army did not grow as the commander had hoped. The regiments90 remained mere skeletons.
The removal of Foy’s division from Truxillo in September, when Marmont drew him in to co-operate in the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, had serious consequences in Estremadura. It will be remembered that, when the campaign of El Bodon was over, the Army of Portugal did not send back any detachment to reoccupy Truxillo—the connecting-point between the Armies of Portugal and of the South. The responsibility for keeping touch was thrown on to Drouet, who had already quite enough ground to cover with his 14,000 men. But he was forced to send a strong detachment northward92 from Merida, or his communication with Marmont would have been wholly intercepted by Morillo’s habitual33 raids. Accordingly Girard’s division of the 5th Corps was moved up to occupy the front between the Guadiana and the Tagus, leaving the whole stretch from the Guadiana south[p. 598]ward to the Sierra Morena held by only one division, that of Claparéde[766], and two cavalry brigades.
Wellington, seeing the weakness of Drouet, and knowing that Soult had crushed the Murcian army in August, and therefore could find some reinforcements for Estremadura if he should please, was for some time under the belief that Hill would see new troops brought up against him from the south[767]. He reiterated93 his old orders: ‘If you only had cavalry, you certainly have infantry in sufficient numbers to beat the 5th Corps out of Estremadura. But your cavalry is not sufficiently94 strong. I think, however, that you are able to prevent the 5th Corps from doing anything, even though Soult should add to it another division.... You must proceed with great caution, and endeavour to have the best intelligence of the force Soult brings with him.... Canton your troops (as soon as you find the enemy are serious in their advance upon Badajoz) nearly on the ground which we occupied with the army in the end of June and the beginning of July [the Caya position].... If you should find Soult collects in too great force for you, retire upon Portalegre, and thence, if necessary, upon Gavi?o and Abrantes. It appears to me, however, scarcely possible for Soult to bring such a force as to be able to attack you at Campo Mayor, or to cut your communications at the same time both with Elvas and with Portalegre.... If Soult should bring a large army into Estremadura, with the view to enable the Army of Portugal to co-operate in the invasion of Valencia, I shall reinforce your corps with some infantry and nearly all my cavalry—and I think we shall soon have back again the Army of Portugal. If Soult comes only to throw provisions into Badajoz, I am afraid we cannot prevent it under existing circumstances[768].’
[p. 599]Soult, however, neither came in person to Estremadura with a large force, nor even drafted another division into the province to succour Drouet, who got no reinforcements during the autumn. He was at this time wrapped up in the internal affairs of Andalusia, and had no intention of sending troops away, unless there was urgent necessity for it. Hill, therefore, seeing that the 5th Corps had received no succours, and remained spread out on the long front from the Tagus to the Sierra Morena, while its two divisions were not in supporting distance of each other, asked for leave to make a blow at Girard, whose position was decidedly dangerous, because of his remoteness from Drouet’s main body (October 15). Wellington saw the opportunity and gave instant consent: ‘I should approve of adopting the measure, which should be effectual, and should drive Girard from Ca?eres over the Guadiana, if you think you can do it without risking the safety of Campo Mayor and Ouguella. It appears to me you are too strong for Girard in every way, if the other division of the 5th Corps has not crossed the Guadiana[769].’
Circumstances were at this moment very much in Hill’s favour, for Girard, seeking new regions to plunder95 for food, and angered by the raids of Casta?os’s detachments on the road from Merida to Truxillo, had just marched to drive the Spaniards back. Sweeping96 them before him, he had advanced as far as Ca?eres, fifty miles from his base at Merida, and was raising contributions there. He had with him his own division of twelve battalions97, a provisional brigade of cavalry under General Bron[770], and one battery—in all about 5,000 foot and nearly 1,000 horse. Hill could concentrate against him a much larger force, while still leaving something in front of Drouet, who (as he had taken pains to discover) was cantoned about Zafra with the rest of his corps—Claparéde’s division, and the bulk of the cavalry. He was not in a position to accomplish anything against Campo Mayor or Elvas, for his troops were scattered over the country-side, and he showed no signs of any intention to move.
On October 20th Hill wrote to Casta?os to say that he[p. 600] relied on the help of Morillo’s infantry and Villemur’s cavalry for a blow at Girard. He himself would bring up Howard’s and Wilson’s (late Abercrombie’s) brigades of the 2nd Division, nine battalions of Portuguese[771] and Long’s cavalry brigade. The column would consist of 3,000 British and 4,000 Portuguese infantry, 900 horse and two batteries. To this Casta?os could add about 2,000 infantry and 600 horse, so that a striking force of 10,000 men would be collected. Meanwhile there would be left in Portugal, to make a front against Drouet, if he should move, the remaining brigade (Byng’s) of the 2nd Division[772], four battalions and two cavalry regiments of Portuguese[773], and a British cavalry brigade under Le Marchant recently arrived from home, which lay at Castello Branco, but could be called south if required.
The essential part of Hill’s scheme was that Girard should be attacked and brought to action before he was aware that there was anything in his front save the Spaniards whom he had just hunted out of Ca?eres. If he were to discover that there was a large Anglo-Portuguese force in his front, he would probably retire by forced marches upon Merida. It was therefore necessary to concentrate the striking force with suddenness, and to move it with the greatest possible speed. On October 22nd the three infantry and one cavalry brigades were collected at Portalegre. On the 23rd they made a tremendous march, thirty miles across the steep Sierra de San Mamed to the Spanish fortress of Albuquerque. Here Hill received news from Casta?os that Girard was still at Ca?eres, and had sent out flying parties to Arroyo del Puerco and other places, sweeping the country-side for food. The allied column at Albuquerque was as near Merida as the enemy, and had every chance of intercepting98 him if he continued quiescent99. Morillo and Penne Villemur had moved to Aliseda, twenty miles from Albuquerque, and could join the British force next day. On the 24th Hill advanced to[p. 601] Aliseda and Casa de Santillana, and picked up the Spaniards. Next morning Penne Villemur’s horse drove the French outposts out of Arroyo del Puerco. When Girard’s cavalry screen had been driven in, Hill’s whole column made a night march to Malpartida, only eight miles from Ca?eres, but learnt, after some delays, on the morning of the 26th that Girard had left Ca?eres on the preceding afternoon by the Torremocha road, making a leisurely100 journey towards Merida. He had just received vague rumours101 that there was an Anglo-Portuguese force coming from Portugal, and thought it well to draw near to his base. Thus Hill’s precautions had not been altogether successful. Girard’s departure was tiresome to Hill, as the night-march to Malpartida had taken the allied columns too far to the north, and the enemy was now between them and his own base. But if it was too late to intercept66 him, there was still time to pursue and overtake him, unless he should chance to quicken his pace. Before dawn on the morning of the 27th Hill turned his face southward, and marched on Torremocha; but when he had reached the pass of Trasquillon he was informed by the peasantry that Girard had left Torremocha, marching for Arroyo dos Molinos on the other side of the Sierra de Montanches. The General called on his troops to make a final effort—if Girard halted at Arroyo dos Molinos it was possible to cut him off by continuing the long march. The men responded well to the appeal, and by nightfall on the 27th the two British brigades were at Alcuescar, five miles south-west of the camp of the French, and the Portuguese and Spaniards close behind at Don Antonio. Girard had only gone twelve miles that day—the Allies no less than twenty-eight, in abominable102 weather, across two rough mountain ranges. It is astonishing that the French general had not made more haste, and still more so that, with three cavalry regiments for reconnoitring, he had not hit upon the track of the Allies. Bron was evidently a poor director of cavalry—his 1,000 men should have sufficed to sweep the whole country-side. But it is said that Girard was convinced that Hill had gone to Ca?eres, and would listen to no warnings[774].
[p. 602]At half-past two o’clock on the morning of the 28th the weather was still tempestuous103, as it had been for the last twenty-four hours, and Hill, covered by the driving rain, marched in the dark on Arroyo dos Molinos, and covered the five miles which separated his comfortless bivouac from the French head quarters without meeting a single hostile vedette. He was able to arrange his force within half a mile of the little town undiscovered, and to make his provisions for blocking all the three roads by which Girard might escape. Arroyo dos Molinos lies under the shoulder of the precipitous Sierra de Montanches, with no track going directly northwards from it, but with country roads to Truxillo, Medellin, and Merida diverging104 north-eastward, south-eastward, and south-south-westward. Hill directed Wilson’s brigade, supported by three Portuguese battalions, to march round the town on its southward side, and block the Truxillo road, while the rest of the infantry should attack the enemy in front, and the cavalry, both English and Spanish, should form a central column which should seize the Merida and Medellin roads and prevent the escape of Girard southward.
Not a Frenchman was seen till Howard’s brigade, leading the advance of the main body, ran upon a picket6 half a mile outside Arroyo, the men huddling105 together under trees with their faces away from the driving rain and the approaching enemy. Most of them were captured, but some escaped to warn Girard, who till this moment had no knowledge that a British column was within striking distance of him. As it chanced, the French general had been preparing to start early, and Remond’s brigades (the 64th and 88th of the line), escorted by one cavalry regiment91, had marched an hour before on the Merida road, and were now three miles away. Girard had not, therefore, even his whole force assembled, but only the six battalions of Dombrouski’s brigade (34th and 40th of the line[775]), two cavalry[p. 603] regiments and half a battery with him—not more than 4,000 men—while 10,000 of the Allies were converging106 upon him from three separate quarters. At the moment when the first shots were heard on the Alcuescar road, his infantry was just getting ready to march, his baggage and a rearguard of one battalion were still in the street of Arroyo dos Molinos, many of his horsemen had not yet saddled up, and he himself was breakfasting in the Alcaide’s house.
Within a few minutes of the first alarm the 71st and 92nd, at the head of Howard’s brigade, burst into the little town, drove out the battalion that was holding it, and captured the whole of Girard’s baggage and many prisoners. General Bron was taken in the doorway107 of the house which he had been occupying, just as he was about to mount. Hurrying out on the other side of the place, the advancing British found Dombrouski’s brigade hastily forming up for the march. Girard had ordered an instant retreat along the Merida road. The formation of his troops was soon disordered by the fire of the advancing 71st, followed by that of three guns of Arriaga’s battery, which galloped108 out to the town end and opened on the nearest regiment. The column, however, started off, and had gone a little way, when it discovered the allied cavalry advancing along the Merida road to meet it, Penne Villemur in front, Long in support. Girard, seeing this road blocked, bade his chasseurs and dragoons hold off the British and Spanish horse at all costs, and turned the infantry column towards the Truxillo road, which skirts the precipitous foot of the Sierra de Montanches. His cavalry became engaged in a confused fight, first with Penne Villemur’s Spaniards and then with the 9th Light Dragoons and the 2nd Hussars of the King’s German Legion. Being outnumbered, they were soon broken, many were taken, and the rest scattered and tried to get off in small parties.
The infantry, making the best speed that it could, but closely pursued by Howard’s regiments and the Spanish brigade in their rear, finally reached the spot where the Truxillo road turns the corner of the sierra, a mile and a half outside Arroyo dos Molinos. By this time the rain had ceased, and the mists dispersing109 showed the Frenchmen Wilson’s brigade marching hard to cut them off, and less than half a mile[p. 604] away. Both parties started to run, and the three light companies of the 28th, 34th, and 39th, who were well ahead of their regiments, reached the road just as the leading French battalion was pushing across their front. Only 200 men were up, but Blakeney (commanding the 28th company) saw that if the hostile column were closely attacked in flank, even by a small body, its progress would be stopped, and a few minutes’ delay would bring down both Wilson’s and Howard’s brigades upon it. Accordingly he led in person the charge of some scores of the men nearest him against the throat of the French column[776]; they were not exterminated110 (as might have been expected), for Girard, who was present at the spot, told his men not to stop to fight, but to escape by leaving the road and dashing uphill along the rocks of the sierra above. He himself with the leading companies got clear, hitting on a place where the side of the precipice111 was not too steep to climb, though the officers had to turn loose their horses before they could start on the scramble112. The main body of the column was less lucky. An absolutely impassable line of cliffs was above them, and after reaching its foot a thousand men, in two or three disorderly masses, had to halt and lay down their arms to the eager pursuers from both the British brigades, who were converging upon them. A few got away by incredibly dangerous climbing, and joined Girard on top of the sierra. Meanwhile Morillo’s Spanish infantry had taken an easier path up the heights, far to the left, and started in pursuit of the remnants of the French. They kept up the chase for eight leagues, and took or slew113 many stragglers. But Girard, Dombrouski, and four or five hundred men, bearing with them the eagles of the 34th and 40th, escaped eastward, and, after much wandering in the mountains, crossed the Guadiana at Orellana, beyond Medellin, and got back to join Drouet. Other small parties and many of the cavalry straggled in later, but Girard’s force had practically[p. 605] been destroyed. Nearly 1,300 prisoners had been taken, including General Bron, commanding the cavalry, the Prince of Aremberg, colonel of the 27th Chasseurs,[777] the chef d’état major of the 5th Corps, and more than thirty other officers. In addition the French lost their three guns and a contribution of 5,000 dollars levied on Ca?eres a few days before. Hill’s loss was insignificant—seven men killed and seven officers and fifty-seven men wounded. Penne Villemur’s Spaniards, who had behaved with excellent spirit, had about thirty casualties.
After the fighting was over, Hill directed Long’s cavalry, with the Portuguese regiments, who had not been engaged, to march on Merida, supporting them with Howard’s brigade when it had rested. It was hoped that Remond’s column, which had escaped the disaster of Arroyo dos Molinos by its early march, might be caught up. But the French brigadier had a long enough start to render this impossible: warned by fugitive114 cavalry of the fate of his chief, he marched through Merida without halting, and retired towards Drouet by way of Almendralejo.
Hill, after following his vanguard to Merida on the 29th and stopping there two days, returned by Wellington’s orders to his old cantonments at Portalegre, which he reached on November 3rd.
‘It would have been useless,’ wrote Wellington, ‘for him to push on his operations beyond the Guadiana—for Drouet would simply have retired before him,—and equally so to remain at Merida.’ By this somewhat cryptic115 phrase the British commander-in-chief meant that if he had chosen to direct Hill, after his success at Arroyo dos Molinos, to march against Drouet’s main body, there can be no doubt that he might have driven it into the Sierra Morena. This would have caused Soult to come to its aid with all the available troops that could be collected in Andalusia. The reason why no such orders were issued was that the British general did not wish to provoke Soult to concentrate. Hill could do nothing against the Army of the South if it came against him in force. But if it continued disseminated116 through all the four kingdoms of Andalusia, as it was at present, with one mass of troops opposite Cadiz, another at Granada, and the small available field force busily engaged in hunting Ballasteros, it was not to be feared. As to the uselessness of stopping at Merida, Wellington[p. 606] meant that Hill, if posted there, would have been liable to be cut off from Elvas if Soult should come up in haste from Andalusia to reinforce Drouet—as was extremely likely. Wellington was contented117 with having broken up a French division, and cut the communication between the Armies of the South and of Portugal for a time. For when Girard was driven out of the space between the Tagus and the Guadiana, Soult could no longer communicate with Marmont.
Napoleon recalled Girard in disgrace, which he well deserved for his reckless want of caution: his maltreated division was given to General Barrois. But he was afterwards pardoned, and survived to die, still a general of division, doing good service at the battle of Ligny.
In the first moment of alarm, after hearing of Girard’s disaster, Soult had expected to be pressed, had sent 4,000 infantry to reinforce Drouet, and had begun to collect other troops at Seville. But finding that Hill had no further intention of striking at the 5th Corps, and that Badajoz was not even threatened, he reverted118 to his earlier plans, left Estremadura alone, and continued to hunt Ballasteros, and to make preparation for his next important move—the siege of Tarifa. Drouet, for his part, having recovered from the dismay into which Girard’s defeat had thrown him, once more began to move his troops northward with caution. On December 5th he reoccupied Almendralejo, on the 18th he pushed Dombrouski with a brigade to Merida, and once more opened up communication with the Army of Portugal by way of Truxillo. But the road was not to be long open. Just before the year 1811 was out (December 27th) Hill was sent forth119 a second time against the 5th Corps, with far more serious intentions than in October, for this expedition was part of Wellington’s preliminary movements for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. It will be dealt with in its proper place.
For all intents and purposes the march to Arroyo dos Molinos forms the last episode of the campaign of 1811. Its main interest was that it showed Wellington in offensive mood, ready to take advantage of the scattered condition of his enemy. It also made it clear that in Hill he had an executive officer of the highest merit—but this was known before to all who had studied[p. 607] the career of that much-loved and well-served general, for whom the 2nd Division would do anything. There was no more popular promotion120 during the whole war than that which made him a Knight121 of the Bath in reward for his little campaign.
December had now arrived—the fatal detachment of 15,000 of Marmont’s men to Valencia had been ordered by the Emperor. Wellington was ready for his long-projected blow at Ciudad Rodrigo. How sharply it was delivered will be told in another volume.
The End
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1
arroyo
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| n.干涸的河床，小河 | |
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disperse
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| vi.使分散；使消失；vt.分散；驱散 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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picket
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| n.纠察队；警戒哨；v.设置纠察线；布置警卫 | |
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pickets
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| 罢工纠察员( picket的名词复数 ) | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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hindrance
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| n.妨碍，障碍 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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posture
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| n.姿势，姿态，心态，态度；v.作出某种姿势 | |
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12
convoy
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| vt.护送，护卫，护航；n.护送；护送队 | |
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wrecked
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| adj.失事的，遇难的 | |
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rations
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| 定量( ration的名词复数 )； 配给量； 正常量； 合理的量 | |
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deduction
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| n.减除，扣除，减除额；推论，推理，演绎 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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villa
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| n.别墅，城郊小屋 | |
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fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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levied
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| 征（兵）( levy的过去式和过去分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税 | |
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dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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scrutinizing
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| v.仔细检查，详审( scrutinize的现在分词 ) | |
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dilapidation
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| n.倒塌；毁坏 | |
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bonnet
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| n.无边女帽；童帽 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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fend
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| v.照料（自己），（自己）谋生，挡开，避开 | |
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westward
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| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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feats
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| 功绩，伟业，技艺( feat的名词复数 ) | |
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coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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herd
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| n.兽群，牧群；vt.使集中，把…赶在一起 | |
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habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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habitually
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| ad.习惯地，通常地 | |
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swooped
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| 俯冲，猛冲( swoop的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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deadlock
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| n.僵局，僵持 | |
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dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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quiescence
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| n.静止 | |
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affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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incentives
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| 激励某人做某事的事物( incentive的名词复数 )； 刺激； 诱因； 动机 | |
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46
allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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48
contemplating
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| 深思，细想，仔细考虑( contemplate的现在分词 )； 注视，凝视； 考虑接受（发生某事的可能性）； 深思熟虑，沉思，苦思冥想 | |
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tempting
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| a.诱人的, 吸引人的 | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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51
circuitous
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| adj.迂回的路的，迂曲的，绕行的 | |
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52
destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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53
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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wilderness
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| n.杳无人烟的一片陆地、水等，荒漠 | |
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55
devastated
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| v.彻底破坏( devastate的过去式和过去分词)；摧毁；毁灭；在感情上（精神上、财务上等）压垮adj.毁坏的；极为震惊的 | |
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56
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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swerved
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| v.（使）改变方向，改变目的( swerve的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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formulated
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| v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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eastward
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| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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Mediterranean
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| adj.地中海的；地中海沿岸的 | |
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lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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intercept
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| vt.拦截，截住，截击 | |
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intercepted
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| 拦截( intercept的过去式和过去分词 )； 截住； 截击； 拦阻 | |
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serenity
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| n.宁静，沉着，晴朗 | |
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tiresome
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| adj.令人疲劳的，令人厌倦的 | |
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hindrances
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| 阻碍者( hindrance的名词复数 )； 障碍物； 受到妨碍的状态 | |
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catastrophe
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| n.大灾难，大祸 | |
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adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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unison
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| n.步调一致，行动一致 | |
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evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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warships
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| 军舰，战舰( warship的名词复数 )； 舰只 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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butts
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| 笑柄( butt的名词复数 )； （武器或工具的）粗大的一端； 屁股； 烟蒂 | |
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muskets
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| n.火枪，（尤指）滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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incensed
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| 盛怒的 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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beleaguer
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| v.使困扰，使烦恼，围攻 | |
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molested
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| v.骚扰( molest的过去式和过去分词 )；干扰；调戏；猥亵 | |
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dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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nucleus
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| n.核，核心，原子核 | |
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bickered
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| v.争吵( bicker的过去式和过去分词 )；口角；（水等）作潺潺声；闪烁 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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reiterated
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| 反复地说，重申( reiterate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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plunder
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| vt.劫掠财物，掠夺；n.劫掠物，赃物；劫掠 | |
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sweeping
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| adj.范围广大的，一扫无遗的 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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intercepting
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| 截取（技术），截接 | |
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quiescent
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| adj.静止的，不活动的，寂静的 | |
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leisurely
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| adj.悠闲的；从容的，慢慢的 | |
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rumours
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| n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 )；风闻；谣言；谣传 | |
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abominable
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| adj.可厌的，令人憎恶的 | |
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tempestuous
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| adj.狂暴的 | |
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diverging
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| 分开( diverge的现在分词 )； 偏离； 分歧； 分道扬镳 | |
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huddling
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| n. 杂乱一团, 混乱, 拥挤 v. 推挤, 乱堆, 草率了事 | |
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converging
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| adj.收敛[缩]的，会聚的，趋同的v.（线条、运动的物体等）会于一点( converge的现在分词 )；（趋于）相似或相同；人或车辆汇集；聚集 | |
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doorway
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| n.门口，(喻)入门；门路，途径 | |
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108
galloped
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| （使马）飞奔，奔驰( gallop的过去式和过去分词 )； 快速做[说]某事 | |
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dispersing
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| adj. 分散的 动词disperse的现在分词形式 | |
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exterminated
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| v.消灭，根绝( exterminate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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precipice
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| n.悬崖，危急的处境 | |
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scramble
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| v.爬行，攀爬，杂乱蔓延，碎片，片段，废料 | |
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slew
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| v.（使）旋转；n.大量，许多 | |
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114
fugitive
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| adj.逃亡的，易逝的；n.逃犯，逃亡者 | |
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115
cryptic
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| adj.秘密的，神秘的，含义模糊的 | |
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116
disseminated
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| 散布，传播( disseminate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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117
contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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118
reverted
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| 恢复( revert的过去式和过去分词 )； 重提； 回到…上； 归还 | |
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119
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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promotion
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| n.提升，晋级；促销，宣传 | |
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121
knight
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| n.骑士，武士；爵士 | |
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