We have considered the Aristotelian philosophy in relation to the great concrete interests of life, morals, politics, literature, and science. We have now to ask what it has to tell us about the deepest and gravest problems of any, the first principles of Being and Knowing, God and the soul, spirit and matter, metaphysics, psychology1, and logic2. We saw that very high claims were advanced on behalf of Aristotle in respect to his treatment of these topics; and had we begun with them, we should only have been following the usual example of his expositors. We have, however, preferred keeping them to the last, that our readers might acquire some familiarity with the Aristotelian method, by seeing it applied4 to subjects where the results were immediately intelligible7, and could be tested by an appeal to the experience of twenty-two centuries. We know that there are some who will demur8 to this proceeding9, who will say that Aristotle the metaphysician stands on quite different ground from Aristotle the man of science, because in the one capacity he had, and in the other capacity he had not, sufficient facts to warrant an authoritative10 conclusion. They will say, with Prof. St. George Mivart, that in accumulating natural knowledge men’s minds have become deadened to spiritual truth; or with Mr. Edwin Wallace, that the questions opened by Aristotle have not yet been closed, and that we may with advantage begin331 our study of them under his guidance. We, on the other hand, will endeavour to show that there is a unity11 of composition running through the Stagirite’s entire labours, that they everywhere manifest the same excellences12 and defects, which are those of an anatomising, critical, descriptive, classificatory genius; that his most important conclusions, however great their historical interest, are without any positive or even educational value for us, being almost entirely13 based on false physical assumptions; that his ontology and psychology are not what his admirers suppose them to be; and that his logic, though meriting our gratitude14, is far too confused and incomplete to throw any light on the questions raised by modern thinkers.
Here, as elsewhere, we shall employ the genetic15 method of investigation16. Aristotle’s writings do not, indeed, present that gradual development of ideas which makes the Platonic18 Dialogues so interesting. Still they exhibit traces of such a development, and the most important among them seems to have been compiled from notes taken by the philosopher before his conclusions were definitely reasoned out, or worked up into a consistent whole. It is this fragmentary collection which, from having been placed by some unknown editor after the Physics, has received a name still associated with every kind of speculation19 that cannot be tested by a direct or indirect appeal to the evidence of external sense.
Whether there exist any realities beyond what are revealed to us by this evidence, and what sensible evidence itself may be worth, were problems already actively20 canvassed21 in Aristotle’s time. His Metaphysics at once takes us into the thick of the debate. The first question of that age was, What are the causes and principles of things? On one side stood the materialists—the old Ionian physicists23 and their living representatives. They said that all things came from water or air or fire, or from a mixture of the four elements, or from the interaction of opposites, such as wet and dry, hot and cold.332 Aristotle, following in the track of his master, Plato, blames them for ignoring the incorporeal24 substances, by which he does not mean what would now be understood—feelings or states of consciousness, or even the spiritual substratum of consciousness—but rather the general qualities or assemblages of qualities which remain constant amid the fluctuations26 of sensible phenomena27; considered, let us observe, not as subjective28 thoughts, but as objective realities. Another deficiency in the older physical theories is that they either ignore the efficient cause of motion altogether (like Thales), or assign causes not adequate to the purpose (like Empedocles); or when they hit on the true cause do not make the right use of it (like Anaxagoras). Lastly, they have omitted to study the final cause of a thing—the good for which it exists.
The teleology29 of Aristotle requires a word of explanation, which may appropriately find its place in the present connexion. In speaking of a purpose in Nature, he does not mean that natural productions subserve an end lying outside themselves; as if, to use Goethe’s illustration, the bark of cork-trees was intended to be made into stoppers for ginger-beer bottles; but that in every perfect thing the parts are interdependent, and exist for the sake of the whole to which they belong. Nor does he, like so many theologians, both ancient and modern, argue from the evidence of design in Nature to the operation of a designing intelligence outside her. Not believing in any creation at all apart from works of art, he could not believe in a creative intelligence other than that of man. He does, indeed, constantly speak of Nature as if she were a personal providence30, continually exerting herself for the good of her creatures. But, on looking a little closer, we find that the agency in question is completely unconscious, and may be identified with the constitution of each particular thing, or rather of the type to which it belongs. We have said that Aristotle’s intellect was essentially31 descriptive, and we have here another illustration of its characteristic quality.333 The teleology which he parades with so much pomp adds nothing to our knowledge of causes, implies nothing that a positivist need not readily accept. It is a mere32 study of functions, an analysis of statical relations. Of course, if there were really any philosophers who said that the connexion between teeth and mastication33 was entirely accidental, the Aristotelian doctrine34 was a useful protest against such an absurdity35; but when we have established a fixed36 connexion between organ and function, we are bound to explain the association in some more satisfactory manner than by reaffirming it in general terms, which is all that Aristotle ever does. Again, whatever may be the relative justification37 of teleology as a study of functions in the living body, we have no grounds for interpreting the phenomena of inorganic38 nature on an analogous39 principle. Some Greek philosophers were acute enough to perceive the distinction. While admitting that plants and animals showed traces of design, they held that the heavenly bodies arose spontaneously from the movements of a vortex or some such cause;222 just as certain religious savants of our own day reject the Darwinian theory while accepting the nebular hypothesis.223 But to Aristotle the unbroken regularity40 of the celestial41 movements, which to us is the best proof of their purely42 mechanical nature, was, on the contrary, a proof that they were produced and directed by an absolutely reasonable purpose; much more so indeed than terrestrial organisms, marked as these are by occasional deviations43 and imperfections; and he concludes that each of those movements must be directed towards the attainment45 of some correspondingly consummate46 end;224 while, again, in dealing47 with those precursors49 of Mr. Darwin, if such they can be called, who argued that the utility of an organ does not disprove its spontaneous origin, since only the creatures which, by a happy accident, came to possess it would survive—he334 answers that the constant reproduction of such organs is enough to vindicate51 them from being the work of chance;225 thus displaying his inability to distinguish between the two ideas of uniform causation and design.
As a result of the foregoing criticism, Aristotle distinguishes four different causes or principles by which all things are determined52 to be what they are—Matter, Form, Agent, and Purpose.226 If, for example, we take a saw, the matter is steel; the form, a toothed blade; the agent or cause of its assuming that shape, a smith; the purpose, to divide wood or stone. When we have enumerated54 these four principles, we have told everything that can be known about a saw. But Aristotle could not keep the last three separate; he gradually extended the definition of form until it absorbed, or became identified with, agent and purpose.227 It was what we should call the idea of function that facilitated the transition. If the very essence or nature of a saw implies use, activity, movement, how can we define it without telling its purpose? The toothed blade is only intelligible as a cutting, dividing instrument. Again, how came the saw into being? What shaped the steel into that particular form? We have said that it was the smith. But surely that is too vague. The smith is a man, and may be able to exercise other trades as well. Suppose him to be a musician, did he make the saw in that capacity? No; and here comes in a distinction which plays an immense part in Aristotle’s metaphysics, whence it has passed into our every-day speech. He does not make the saw qua musician but qua smith. He can, however, in the exercise of his trade as smith make many other tools—knives, axes, and so forth56. Nevertheless, had he only learned to make saws it would be enough. Therefore, he does not make335 the saw qua axe-maker, he makes it qua saw-maker. Nor, again, does he make it with his whole mind and body, but only with just those thoughts and movements required to give the steel that particular shape. Now, what are these thoughts but the idea of a saw present in his mind and passing through his eyes and hands, till it fixes itself on the steel? The immaterial form of a saw creates the real saw which we use. Let us apply the preceding analogies to a natural object; for example, a man. What is the Form, the definition of a man? Not a being possessing a certain outward shape, for then a marble statue would be a man, which it is not; nor yet a certain assemblage of organs, for then a corpse57 would be a man, which, according to Aristotle, criticising Democritus, it is not; but a living, feeling, and reasoning being, the end of whose existence is to fulfil all the functions involved in this definition. So, also, the creative cause of a man is another man, who directly impresses the human form on the material supplied by the female organism. In the same way, every definite individual aggregate58 becomes what it is through the agency of another individual representing the same type in its perfect manifestation59.228
The substantial forms of Aristotle, combining as they do the notion of a definition with that of a moving cause and a fulfilled purpose, are evidently derived60 from the Platonic Ideas; a reflection which at once leads us to consider the relation in which he stands to the spiritualism of Plato and to the mathematical idealism of the Neo-Pythagoreans. He agrees with them in thinking that general conceptions are the sole object of knowledge—the sole enduring reality in a world of change. He differs from them in maintaining that such conceptions have no existence apart from the particulars in which they reside. It has been questioned whether Aristotle ever really understood his master’s teaching on the subject. Among recent critics, M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire asserts,336 with considerable vehemence61, that he did not. It is certain that in some respects Aristotle is not just to the Platonic theory, that he exaggerates its absurdities62, ignores its developments, and occasionally brings charges against it which might be retorted with at least equal effect against his own philosophy. But on the most important point of all, whether Plato did or did not ascribe a separate existence to his Ideas, we could hardly believe a disciple63 of twenty years’ standing229 to be mistaken, even if the master had not left on record a decisive testimony64 to the affirmative side in his Parmenides, and one scarcely less decisive in his Timaeus.230 And so far as the controversy65 reduces itself to this particular issue, Aristotle is entirely right. His most powerful arguments are not, indeed, original, having been anticipated by Plato himself; but as they were left unanswered he had a perfect right to repeat them, and his dialectical skill was great enough to make him independent of their support. The extreme minuteness of his criticism is wearisome to us, who can hardly conceive how another opinion could ever have been held. Yet such was the fascination66 exercised by Plato’s idealism, that not only was it upheld with considerable acrimony by his immediate5 followers,231 but under one form or another it has been revived over and over again, in the long period which has elapsed since its first promulgation67, and on every one of these occasions the arguments of Aristotle have been raised up again to meet it, each time with triumphant68 success. Ockham’s razor, Entia non sunt sine necessitate69 multiplicanda, is borrowed from the Metaphysics; Locke’s principal objection to innate70 ideas closely resembles the sarcastic71 observation in337 the last chapter of the Posterior Analytics, that, according to Plato’s theory, we must have some very wonderful knowledge of which we are not conscious.232 And the weapons with which Trendelenburg and others have waged war on Hegel are avowedly73 drawn74 from the Aristotelian arsenal75.233
In his criticism on the ideal theory, Aristotle argues that it is unproved; that the consequences to which it leads would be rejected by the idealists themselves; that it involves a needless addition to the sum of existence; that it neither explains the origin of things nor helps us to understand them, while taking away from them their substantial reality; that the Ideas are merely sensible objects hypostasised, like the anthropomorphic divinities of primitive76 men; that, to speak of them as patterns, in whose likeness77 the world was created, is a mere idle metaphor78; that, even assuming the existence of such patterns, each individual must be made in the likeness, not of one, but of many ideas—a human being, for instance, must be modelled after the ideal biped and the ideal animal, as well as after the ideal man; while many of the ideas themselves, although all are supposed to exist absolutely, must be dependent on other and simpler types; finally, that, assuming an idea for every abstract relation, there must be ideas to represent the relation between every sensible object and its prototype, others for the new relations thus introduced, and so on to infinity79.
Aristotle’s objections to the Neo-Pythagorean theory of ideal numbers need not delay us here. They are partly a repetition of those brought against the Platonic doctrine in its338 original form, partly derived from the impossibility of identifying qualitative80 with quantitative81 differences.234
Such arguments manifestly tell not only against Platonism, but against every kind of transcendental realism, from the natural theology of Paley to the dogmatic agnosticism of Mr. Herbert Spencer. A modern Aristotle might say that the hypothesis of a creative first cause, personal or otherwise, logically involves the assumption of as many original specific energies as there are qualities to be accounted for, and thus gives us the unnecessary trouble of counting everything twice over; that every difficulty and contradiction from which the transcendental assumption is intended to free us, must, on analysis, reappear in the assumption itself—for example, the God who is to deliver us from evil must be himself conceived as the creator of evil; that the infinite and absolute can neither cause, nor be apprehended83 by, the finite and relative; that to separate from Nature all the forces required for its perpetuation84, and relegate85 them to a sphere apart, is a false antithesis86 and a sterile87 abstraction; lastly, that causation, whether efficient or final, once begun, cannot stop; that if this world is not self-existing, nothing is; that the mutual88 adaptation of thoughts in a designing intelligence requires to be accounted for just like any other adaptation; that if the relative involves the absolute, so also does the relation between the two involve another absolute, and so on to infinity.
These are difficulties which will continue to perplex us until every shred89 of the old metaphysics has been thrown off. To that task Aristotle was not equal. He was profoundly influenced by the very theory against which he contended; and, at the risk of being paradoxical, we may even say that it assumed a greater importance in his system than had ever been attributed to it by Plato himself. To prove this, we must resume the thread of our exposition, and follow the339 Stagirite still further in his analysis of the fundamental reality with which the highest philosophy is concerned.
II.
Ever since the age of Parmenides and Heracleitus, Greek thought had been haunted by a pervading90 dualism which each system had in turn attempted to reconcile, with no better result than its reproduction under altered names. And speculation had latterly become still further perplexed91 by the question whether the antithetical couples supposed to divide all Nature between them could or could not be reduced to so many aspects of a single opposition92. In the last chapter but one we showed that there were four such competing pairs—Being and Not-Being, the One and the Many, the Same and the Other, Rest and Motion. Plato employed his very subtlest dialectic in tracing out their connexions, readjusting their relationships, and diminishing the total number of terms which they involved. In what was probably his last great speculative93 effort, the Timaeus, he seems to have selected Sameness and Difference as the couple best adapted to bear the heaviest strain of thought. There is some reason for believing that in his spoken lectures he followed the Pythagorean system more closely, giving the preference to the One and the Many; or he may have employed the two expressions indifferently. The former would sooner commend itself to a dialectician, the latter to a mathematician94. Aristotle was both, but he was before all things a naturalist95. As such, the antithesis of Being and Not-Being, to which Plato attached little or no value, suited him best. Accordingly, he proceeds to work it out with a clearness before unknown in Greek philosophy. The first and surest of all principles, he declares, is, that a thing cannot both be and not be, in the same sense of the words, and furthermore that it must either be or not be. Subsequent340 logicians prefixed to these axioms another, declaring that whatever is is. The three together are known as the laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle. By all, except Hegelians, they are recognised as the highest laws of thought; and even Hegel was indebted to them, through Fichte, for the ground-plan of his entire system.235
The whole meaning and value of such excessively abstract propositions must lie in their application to the problems which they are employed to solve. Aristotle made at once too much and too little of his. Too much—for he employed them to refute doctrines97 not really involving any logical inconsistency—the theory of Heracleitus, that everything is in motion; the theory of Anaxagoras, that everything was originally confused together; the theory of Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things. Too little—for he admitted a sphere of possibilities where logical definition did not apply, and where subjects simultaneously99 possessed100 the capacity of taking on one or other of two contradictory101 attributes.
Nor is this all. After sharply distinguishing what is from what is not, and refusing to admit any intermediary between them, Aristotle proceeds to discover such an intermediary in the shape of what he calls Accidental Predication.236 An accident is an attribute not necessarily or usually inhering in its subject—in other words, a co-existence not dependent on causation. Aristotle could never distinguish between the two notions of cause and kind, nor yet between interferences with the action of some particular cause and exceptions to the law of causation in general; and so he could not frame an intelligible theory of chance. Some propositions, he tells us, are necessarily true, others are only generally true; and it is the exceptions to the latter which constitute accident; as, for instance, when a cold day happens to come in the middle341 of summer. So also a man is necessarily an animal, but only exceptionally white. Such distinctions are not uninteresting, for they prove with what difficulties the idea of invariable sequence had to contend before even the highest intellects could grasp it. There was a constant liability to confound the order of succession with the order of co-existence, the order of our sensations with the order of objective existence, and the subjection of human actions to any fixed order, with the impossibility of deliberation and choice. The earlier Greek thinkers had proclaimed that all things existed by necessity; but with their purely geometrical or historical point of view, they entirely ignored the more complex questions raised by theories about classification, logical attribution, and moral responsibility. And the modifications102 introduced by Epicurus, into the old physics, show us how unanswerable Aristotle’s reasonings seemed to some of his ablest successors.
Absolute being is next distinguished103 from truth, which, we are told, has no objective existence237—a remarkable104 declaration, which throws much light on other parts of the Aristotelian system, and to which we shall subsequently return.238
After explaining at considerable length what Being is not, Aristotle now proceeds to ascertain105 what it is. He tells us that just as all number qua number must be either odd or even, so all Being qua Being must have certain universal attributes. These he sets himself to discover. When Descartes long afterwards entered on a somewhat similar inquiry106, he fell back on the facts of his own individual consciousness. Aristotle, on the contrary, appeals to the common consciousness of mankind as embodied107 in ordinary language. In how many senses do we say that a thing is? The first answer is contained in his famous Ten Categories.239 These342 are not what some have supposed them to be, summa genera of existence, but summa genera of predication. In other words, they are not a classification of things, but of the information which it is possible to receive about a single thing, more especially about the richest and most concrete thing known to us—a human being. If we want to find out all about a thing we ask, What is it? Of what sort? How large? To what does it belong? Where and when can we find it? What does it do? What happens to it? And if the object of our investigations108 be a living thing, we may add, What are its habits and dispositions110? The question has been raised, how Aristotle came to think of these ten particular categories, and a wonderful amount of rubbish has been written on the subject, while apparently111 no scholar could see what was staring him in the face all the time, that Aristotle got them by collecting all the simple forms of interrogation supplied by the Greek language,240 and writing out their most general expressions.
Having obtained his categories, Aristotle proceeds to mark off the first from the other nine. The subject or substance named in answer to the question, What is it? can exist without having any quality, size, and so forth predicated of it; but they cannot exist without it. Logically, they cannot be defined without telling what they are; really they cannot be conceived without something not themselves in343 which they inhere. They are like the tail of a kite, giving greater conspicuousness112 and buoyancy to the body, but entirely dependent on it for support. What our philosopher fails to perceive is, that the dependence113 is reciprocal, that substance can no more be conceived without attributes than attributes without substance; or rather that substance, like all other categories, can be resolved into Relation.241
Meanwhile, he had a logical machine ready to hand, which could be used with terrible effect against the Platonic Ideas. Any of these—and there were a great number—that could be brought under one of the last nine categories were at once deprived of all claim to independent existence. Take Equality, for instance. It cannot be discovered outside quantity, and quantity is always predicated of a substance. And the same is true of number, to the utter destruction of the Neo-Pythagorean theory which gave it a separate existence. Moreover, the categories served not only to generalise and combine, but also to specificate and divide. The idea of motion occurs in three of them; in quantity, where it means increase or diminution114; in quality, where it means alteration115, as from hot to cold, or vice116 versa; and in place, implying transport from one point to another. The Idea of Good, which stands at the very summit of Plato’s system, may be traced through all ten categories.242 Thus, the supposed unity and simplicity117 of such conceptions was shown to be an illusion. Platonism was, in truth, so inconsistent with the notions embodied in common language, that it could not but be condemned118 by a logic based on those notions.
Aristotle next takes the Idea of Substance and subjects it to a fresh analysis.243 Of all things none seem to possess so evident an existence as the bodies about us—plants and animals, the four elements, and the stars. But each of these344 has already been shown to consist of Form and Matter. A statue, for instance, is a lump of bronze shaped into the figure of a man. Of these two constituents120, Matter seems at first sight to possess the greater reality. The same line of thought which led Aristotle to place substance before the other categories now threatens to drive him back into materialism121. This he dreaded122, not on sentimental123 or religious grounds, but because he conceived it to be the negation124 of knowledge. He first shows that Matter cannot be the real substance to which individuals owe their determinate existence, since it is merely the unknown residuum left behind when every predicate, common to them with others, has been stripped off. Substance, then, must be either Form alone or Form combined with Matter. Form, in its completest sense, is equivalent to the essential definition of a thing—the collection of attributes together constituting its essence or conception. To know the definition is to know the thing defined. The way to define is to begin with the most general notion, and proceed by adding one specific difference after another, until we reach the most particular and concrete expression. The union of this last with a certain portion of Matter gives us the individual Socrates or Callias. There are no real entities125 (as the Platonists pretend) corresponding to the successive stages of generalisation, biped, animal, and so forth, any more than there are self-existing quantities, qualities, and relations. Thus the problem has been driven into narrower and narrower limits, until at last we are left with the infim? species and the individuals contained under them. It remains126 to discover in what relation these stand to one another. The answer is unsatisfactory. We are told that there is no definition of individuals, and also that the definition is identical with the individual.244 Such, indeed, is the conclusion necessarily resulting from Aristotle’s repeated declarations that all knowledge is of345 definitions, that all knowledge is of something really existing, and that nothing really exists but individual things. Nevertheless, against these we have to set equally strong declarations to the effect that knowledge is of something general, not of the perishing individuals which may pass out of existence at any moment. The truth is, that we are here, as Zeller has shown,245 in presence of an insoluble contradiction, and we must try to explain, not how Aristotle reconciled it with itself, for that was impossible, but how he reconciled himself to it.
His analysis of individuality was the first step in this direction. We have seen that he treats definition as a process of gradual specification127, beginning with the most general notions, and working down by successive differentiations to the most particular. Now, the completed conception is itself the integration128 of all these differences, the bond of union holding them together. Turning to an antithetical order of ideas, to the material substance of which bodies are composed, and its various transformations130, we find him working out the same vein131 of thought. According to the Aristotelian chemistry, an ultimate indeterminate unknowable something clothes itself with one or other of the opposing attributes, dry and moist, hot and cold; and when two of these are combined, manifests itself to our senses as one of the four elements. The elements combine in a particular manner to form homogeneous animal tissues, and these again are united into heterogeneous132 organs, which together constitute the living body. Here, then, we have two analogous series of specifications—one conceptual and leading down from the abstract to the concrete, the other physical, and leading up from the vague, the simple, and the homogeneous, to the definite, the complex, and the heterogeneous. Aristotle embraces both processes under a single comprehensive generalisation. He describes each of them as the continuous conversion133 of a346 possibility into an actuality. For the sake of greater clearness, let us take the liberty of substituting modern scientific terms for his cumbrous and obsolete134 classifications. We shall then say that the general notion, living thing, contains under it the two less general notions—plant and animal. If we only know of any given object that it has life, there is implied the possibility of its being either the one or the other, but not both together. On determining it to be (say) an animal, we actualise one of the possibilities. But the actualisation is only relative, and immediately becomes the possibility of being either a vertebrate or an invertebrate135 animal. The actuality vertebrate becomes the possibility of viviparous or oviparous, and so on through successive differentiations until we come (say) to a man. Now let us begin at the material end. Here are a mass of molecules136, which, in their actual state are only carbon, nitrogen, and so forth. But they are potential starch137, gluten, water, or any other article of food that might be named; for under favourable138 conditions they will combine to form it. Once actualised as such, they are possible blood-cells; these are possible tissues; these, again, possible organs, and lastly we come to the consensus139 of vital functions, which is a man. What the raw material is to the finished product, that are the parts to the entire organism, the elements to the compound, the genus to the species, and such in its very widest sense is potency140 to realisation, δ?ναμι? to ?ντελ?χεια, throughout the universe of growth and decay.246
It will be observed that, so far, this famous theory does not add one single jot141 to our knowledge. Under the guise142 of an explanation, it is a description of the very facts needing to be explained. We did not want an Aristotle to tell us that before a thing exists it must be possible. We want to know how it is possible, what are the real conditions of its existence, and why they combine at a particular moment to347 produce it. The Atomists showed in what direction the solution should be sought, and all subsequent progress has been due to a development of their method. Future ages will perhaps consider our own continued distinction between force and motion as a survival of the Peripatetic143 philosophy. Just as sensible aggregates144 of matter arise not out of potential matter, but out of matter in an extremely fine state of diffusion145, so also sensible motion will be universally traced back, not to potential motion, which is all that force means, but to molecular146 or ethereal vibrations147, like those known to constitute heat and light.
We have said, in comparing him with his predecessors148, that the Stagirite unrolled Greek thought from a solid into a continuous surface. We have now to add that he gave his surface the false appearance of a solid by the use of shadows, and of a?rial perspective. In other words, he made the indication of his own ignorance and confusion do duty for depth and distance. For to say that a thing is developed out of its possibility, merely means that it is developed out of something, the nature of which we do not know. And to speak about such possibilities as imperfect existences, or matter, or whatever else Aristotle may be pleased to call them, is simply constructing the universe, not out of our ideas, but out of our absolute want of ideas.
We have seen how, for the antithesis between Form and Matter, was substituted the wider antithesis between Actuality and Possibility. Even in this latter the opposition is more apparent than real. A permanent possibility is only intelligible through the idea of its realisation, and sooner or later is certain to be realised. Aristotle still further bridges over the interval149 between them by a new conception—that of motion. Motion, he tells us, is the process of realisation, the transformation129 of power into act. Nearly the whole of his Physics is occupied with an enquiry into its nature and origin. As first conceived, it is equivalent to what we call change rather than348 to mechanical movement. The table of categories supplies an exhaustive enumeration150 of its varieties. These are, as we have already mentioned, alteration of quality or transformation, increase or decrease of quantity, equivalent to growth and decay, and transport from place to place. Sometimes a fourth variety is added, derived from the first category, substance. He calls it generation and destruction, the coming into existence or passing out of it again. A careful analysis shows that motion in space is the primordial151 change on which all others depend for their accomplishment152. To account for it is the most vitally important problem in philosophy.
III.
Before entering on the chain of reasoning which led Aristotle to postulate153 the existence of a personal First Cause, we must explain the difference between his scientific standpoint, and that which is now accepted by all educated minds. To him the eternity154 not only of Matter, but also of what he called Form,—that is to say, the collection of attributes giving definiteness to natural aggregates, more especially those known as organic species—was an axiomatic155 certainty. Every type, capable of self-propagation, that could exist at all, had existed, and would continue to exist for ever. For this, no explanation beyond the generative power of Nature was required. But when he had to account for the machinery156 by which the perpetual alternation of birth and death below, and the changeless revolutions of the celestial spheres above the moon were preserved, difficulties arose. He had reduced every other change to transport through space; and with regard to this his conceptions were entirely mistaken. He believed that moving matter tended to stop unless it was sustained by some external force; and whatever their advantages over him in other respects, we cannot say that the Atomists were in a position to correct him here: for their349 theory, that every particle of matter gravitated downward through infinite space, was quite incompatible157 with the latest astronomical158 discoveries. Aristotle triumphantly159 showed that the tendency of heavy bodies was not to move indefinitely downwards160 in parallel lines, but to move in converging161 lines to the centre of the earth, which he, in common with most Greek astronomers162, supposed to be also the centre of the universe; and seeing light bodies move up, he credited them with an equal and opposite tendency to the circumference163 of the universe, which, like Parmenides and Plato, he believed to be of finite extent. Thus each kind of matter has its appropriate place, motion to which ends in rest, while motion away from it, being constrained164, cannot last. Accordingly, the constant periodicity of terrestrial phenomena necessitates165 as constant a transformation of dry and wet, and of hot and cold bodies into one another. This is explained with perfect accuracy by the diurnal166 and annual revolutions of the sun. Here, however, we are introduced to a new kind of motion, which, instead of being rectilinear and finite, is circular and eternal. To account for it, Aristotle assumes a fifth element entirely different in character from the four terrestrial elements. Unlike them, it is absolutely simple, and has a correspondingly simple mode of motion, which, as our philosopher erroneously supposes, can be no other than circular rotation167.
Out of this eternal unchanging divine substance, which he calls aether, are formed the heavenly bodies and the transparent168 spheres containing them. But there is something beyond it of an even higher and purer nature. Aristotle proves, with great subtlety169, from his fundamental assumptions, that the movement of an extended substance cannot be self-caused. He also proves that motion must be absolutely continuous and without a beginning. We have, therefore, no choice but to accept the existence of an unextended, immaterial, eternal, and infinite Power on which the whole cosmos170 depends.
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So much only is established in the Physics. Further particulars are given in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics. There we learn that, all movement being from possibility to actuality, the source of movement must be a completely realised actuality—pure form without any admixture of matter. But the highest form known to us in the ascending171 scale of organic life is the human soul, and the highest function of soul is reason. Reason then must be that which moves without being moved itself, drawing all things upwards172 and onwards by the love which its perfection inspires. The eternal, infinite, absolute actuality existing beyond the outermost173 starry174 sphere is God. Aristotle describes God as the thought which thinks itself and finds in the simple act of self-consciousness an everlasting175 happiness, wonderful if it always equals the best moments of our mortal life, more wonderful still if it surpasses them. There is only one supreme176 God, for plurality is due to an admixture of matter, and He is pure form. The rule of many is not good, as Homer says. Let there be one Lord.
Such are the closing words of what was possibly Aristotle’s last work, the clear confession177 of his monotheistic creed178. A monotheistic creed, we have said, but one so unlike all other religions, that its nature has been continually misunderstood. While some have found in it a theology like that of the Jews or of Plato or of modern Europe, others have resolved it into a vague pantheism. Among the latter we are surprised to find Sir A. Grant, a writer to whom the Aristotelian texts must be perfectly179 familiar both in spirit and in letter. Yet nothing can possibly be more clear and emphatic180 than the declarations they contain. Pantheism identifies God with the world; Aristotle separates them as pure form from form more or less alloyed with matter. Pantheism denies personality to God; Aristotle gives him unity, spirituality, self-consciousness, and happiness. If these qualities do not collectively involve personality, we should like to know what does. Need we351 remind the accomplished181 editor of the Nicomachean Ethics182 how great a place is given in that work to human self-consciousness, to waking active thought as distinguished from mere slumbering183 faculties184 or unrealised possibilities of action? And what Aristotle regarded as essential to human perfection, he would regard as still more essential to divine perfection. Finally, the God of pantheism is a general idea; the God of Aristotle is an individual. Sir A. Grant says that he (or it) is the idea of Good.247 We doubt very much whether there is a single passage in the Metaphysics to sanction such an expression. Did it occur, however, that would be no warrant for approximating the Aristotelian to the Platonic theology, in presence of such a distinct declaration as that the First Mover is both conceptually and numerically one,248 coming after repeated repudiations of the Platonic attempt to isolate185 ideas from the particulars in which they are immersed. Then Sir A. Grant goes on to speak of the desire felt by Nature for God as being itself God,249 and therefore involving a belief in pantheism. Such a notion is not generally called pantheism, but hylozoism, the attribution of life to matter. We have no desire, however, to quarrel about words. The philosopher who believes in the existence of a vague consciousness, a spiritual effort towards something higher diffused186 through nature, may, if you will, be called a pantheist, but not unless this be the only divinity he recognises. The term is altogether misleading when applied to one who also proclaims the existence of something in his opinion far higher, better and more real—a living God, who transcends187 Nature, and is independent of her, although she is not independent of him.
We must also observe that the parallel drawn by Sir A. Grant between the theology of Aristotle and that of John Stuart Mill is singularly unfortunate. It is in the first place incorrect to say that Mill represented God as benevolent188 but352 not omnipotent189. He only suggested the idea as less inconsistent with facts than other forms of theism.250 In the next place, Aristotle’s God was almost exactly the reverse of this. He possesses infinite power, but no benevolence190 at all. He has nothing to do with the internal arrangements of the world, either as creator or as providence. He is, in fact, an egoist of the most transcendent kind, who does nothing but think about himself and his own perfections. Nothing could be more characteristic of the unpractical Aristotelian philosophy; nothing more repugnant to the eager English reformer, the pupil of Bentham and of Plato. And, thirdly, Sir A. Grant takes what is not the God of Aristotle’s system at all, but a mere abstraction, the immanent reason of Nature, the Form which can never quite conquer Matter, and places it on the same line with a God who, however hypothetical, is nothing if not a person distinct from the world; while, as if to bewilder the unfortunate ‘English reader’ still further, he adds, in the very next sentence, that ‘the great defect in Aristotle’s conception of God is’ the denial ‘that God can be a moral Being.’251
The words last quoted, which in a Christian191 sense are true enough, lead us over to the contrasting view of Aristotle’s theology, to the false theory of it held by critics like Prof. St. George Mivart. The Stagirite agrees with Catholic theism in accepting a personal God, and he agrees with the First Article of the English Church, though not with the Pentateuch, in saying that God is without parts or passions; but there his agreement ceases. Excluding such a thing as divine interference with nature, his theology of course excludes the possibility of revelation, inspiration, miracles, and grace. Nor is this a mere omission192; it is a necessity of the system. If there can353 be no existence without time, no time without motion, no motion without unrealised desire, no desire without an ideal, no ideal but eternally self-thinking thought—then it logically follows that God, in the sense of such a thought, must not interest himself in the affairs of men. Again, Aristotelianism equally excludes the arguments by which modern theologians have sought to prove the existence of God. Here also the system is true to its contemporaneous, statical, superficial character. The First Mover is not separated from us by a chain of causes extending through past ages, but by an intervening breadth of space and the wheels within wheels of a cosmic machine. Aristotle had no difficulty in conceiving what some have since declared to be inconceivable, a series of antecedents without any beginning in time; it was rather the beginning of such a series that he could not make intelligible to himself. Nor, as we have seen, did he think that the adaptation in living organisms of each part to every other required an external explanation. Far less did it occur to him that the production of impressions on our senses was due to the agency of a supernatural power. It is absolutely certain that he would have rejected the Cartesian argument, according to which a perfect being must exist if it be only conceivable—existence being necessarily involved in the idea of perfection.252 Finally, not recognising such a faculty193 as conscience, he would not have admitted it to be the voice of God speaking in the soul.
On the other hand, Aristotle’s own theistic arguments cannot stand for a moment in the face of modern science. We know by the law of inertia194 that it is not the continuance, but the arrest or the beginning of motion which requires to be accounted for. We know by the Copernican system that there is no solid sidereal195 sphere governing the revolutions of all Nature. And we know by the Newtonian physics that354 gravitation is not dependent on fixed points in space for its operation. The Philosophy of the Philosopher Aristotle is as inconsistent with the demonstrations196 of modern astronomy as it is with the faith of mediaeval Catholicism.
It remains to be seen whether the system which we are examining is consistent with itself. It is not. The Prime Mover, being unextended, cannot be located outside the sidereal sphere; nor can he be brought into immediate contact with it more than with any other part of the cosmos. If the aether has a motion proper to itself, then no spiritual agency is required to keep it in perpetual rotation. If the crystalline spheres fit accurately198 together, as they must, to avoid leaving a vacuum anywhere, there can be no friction199, no production of heat, and consequently no effect produced on the sublunary sphere. Finally, no rotatory or other movement can, taken alone, have any conceivable connexion with the realisation of a possibility, in the sense of progress from a lower to a higher state of being. It is merely the perpetual exchange of one indifferent position for another.
We have now to consider what were the speculative motives200 that led Aristotle to overlook these contradictions, and to find rest in a theory even less satisfactory than the earlier systems which he is always attacking with relentless202 animosity. The first motive201, we believe, was the train of reasoning, already laid before the reader, by which universal essences, the objects of knowledge, gradually came to be identified with particular objects, the sole existing realities. For the arguments against such an identification, as put forward by our philosopher himself, still remained unanswered. The individuals comprising a species were still too transient for certainty and too numerous for comprehension. But when for the antithesis between Form and Matter was substituted the antithesis between Actuality and Possibility, two modes of evasion203 presented themselves. The first was to distinguish between actual knowledge and potential knowledge.355 The former corresponded to existing particulars, the latter to general ideas.253 This, however, besides breaking up the unity of knowledge, was inconsistent with the whole tenor204 of Aristotle’s previous teaching. What can be more actual than demonstration197, and how can there be any demonstration of transient particulars? The other mode of reconciliation205 was perhaps suggested by the need of an external cause to raise Possibility into Actuality. Such a cause might be conceived with all the advantages and without the drawbacks of a Platonic Idea. It would be at once the moving agent and the model of perfection; it could reconcile the general and the particular by the simple fact of being eternal in time, comprehensive in space, and unique in kind. Aristotle found such a cause, or rather a whole series of such causes, in the celestial spheres. In his system, these bear just the same relation to terrestrial phenomena that Plato’s Ideas bear to the world of sense. They are, in fact, the Ideas made sensible and superficial, placed alongside of, instead of beneath or behind, the transient particulars which they irradiate and sustain.
The analogy may be carried even farther. If Plato regarded the things of sense as not merely a veil, but an imperfect imitation of the only true realities; so also did Aristotle represent the sublunary elements as copying the disposition109 and activities of the ethereal spheres. They too have their concentric arrangements—first fire, then air, then water, and lastly earth in the centre; while their perpetual transformation into one another presents an image in time of the spatial206 rotation which those sublime207 beings perform. And although we think that Sir A. Grant is quite mistaken in identifying Aristotle’s Supreme Mind with the Idea of Good, there can be no doubt of its having been suggested by that Idea. It is, in fact, the translation of Plato’s abstraction into concrete reality, and the completion of a process which Plato356 had himself begun. From another point of view we may say that both master and disciple were working, each in his own way, at the solution of a problem which entirely dominates Greek philosophy from Empedocles on—the reconciliation of Parmenides and Heracleitus, Being and Becoming, the eternal and the changeful, the one and the many. Aristotle adopts the superficial, external method of placing the two principles side by side in space; and for a long time the world accepted his solution for the same reason that had commended it to his own acceptance, its apparent agreement with popular tradition and with the facts of experience. It must be confessed, however, that here also he was following the lines laid down by Plato. The Timaeus and the Laws are marked by a similar tendency to substitute astronomy for dialectics, to study the celestial movements with religious veneration208, to rebuild on a scientific basis that ancient star-worship which, even among the Greeks, enjoyed a much higher authority and prestige than the humanised mythology209 of the poets. But for Christianity this star-worship would probably have become the official faith of the Roman world. As it is, Dante’s great poem presents us with a singular compromise between the two creeds210. The crystalline spheres are retained, only they have become the abode211 of glorified212 spirits instead of being the embodiment of eternal gods. We often hear it said that the Copernican system was rejected as offensive to human pride, because it removed the earth from the centre of the universe. This is a profound mistake. Its offence was to degrade the heavenly bodies by assimilating them to the earth.254 Among several planets, all revolving213 round the sun, there could not be any marked qualitative difference. In the theological sense there was no longer any heaven; and with the disappearance214 of the solid357 sidereal sphere there was no longer any necessity for a Prime Mover.
There is, perhaps, no passage in Aristotle’s writings—there is certainly none in his scientific writings—more eloquent215 than that which describes the glory of his imaginary heavens. The following translation may give some faint idea of its solemnity and splendour:—
We believe, then, that the whole heaven is one and everlasting, without beginning or end through all eternity, but holding infinite time within its orb55; not, as some say, created or capable of being destroyed. We believe it on account of the grounds already stated, and also on account of the consequences resulting from a different hypothesis. For, it must add great weight to our assurance of its immortality216 and everlasting duration that this opinion may, while the contrary opinion cannot possibly, be true. Wherefore, we may trust the traditions of old time, and especially of our own race, when they tell us that there is something deathless and divine about the things which, although moving, have a movement that is not bounded, but is itself the universal bound, a perfect circle enclosing in its revolutions the imperfect motions that are subject to restraint and arrest; while this, being without beginning or end or rest through infinite time, is the one from which all others originate, and into which they disappear. That heaven which antiquity218 assigned to the gods as an immortal217 abode, is shown by the present argument to be uncreated and indestructible, exempt219 alike from mortal weakness and from the weariness of subjection to a force acting220 in opposition to its natural inclination221; for in proportion to its everlasting continuance such a compulsion would be laborious222, and unparticipant in the highest perfection of design. We must not, then, believe with the old mythologists that an Atlas223 is needed to uphold it; for they, like some in more recent times, fancied that the heavens were made of heavy earthy matter, and so fabled224 an animated225 necessity for their support; nor yet that, as Empedocles says, they will last only so long as their own proper momentum226 is exceeded by the whirling motion of which they partake.255 Nor, again, is it likely that their everlasting revolution can be kept up by the exercise of a conscious will;358 for no soul could lead a happy and blessed existence that was engaged in such a task, necessitating227, as it would, an unceasing struggle with their native tendency to move in a different direction, without even the mental relaxation228 and bodily rest which mortals gain by sleep, but doomed229 to the eternal torment230 of an Ixion’s wheel. Our explanation, on the other hand, is, as we say, not only more consistent with the eternity of the heavens, but also can alone be reconciled with the acknowledged vaticinations of religious faith.256
It will be seen from the foregoing passage how strong a hold the old Greek notion of an encircling limit had on the mind of Aristotle, and how he transformed it back from the high intellectual significance given to it by Plato into its original sense of a mere space-enclosing figure. And it will also be seen how he credits his spheres with a full measure of that moving power which, according to his rather unfair criticism, the Platonic Ideas did not possess. His astronomy also supplied him with that series of graduated transitions between two extremes in which Greek thought so much delighted. The heavenly bodies mediate6 between God and the earth; partly active and partly passive, they both receive and communicate the moving creative impulse. The four terrestrial elements are moved in the various categories of substance, quantity, quality, and place; the aether moves in place only. God remains ‘without variableness or shadow of a change.’ Finally, by its absolute simplicity and purity, the aether mediates231 between the coarse matter perceived by our senses and the absolutely immaterial Nous, and is itself supposed to be pervaded232 by a similar gradation of fineness from top to bottom. Furthermore, the upper fire, which must not be confounded with flame, furnishes a connecting link between the aether and the other elements, being related to them as Form to Matter, or as agent to patient; and, when the elements are decomposed233 into their constituent119 qualities, hot and cold occupy a similar position with regard to wet and dry.
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IV.
In mastering Aristotle’s cosmology, we have gained the key to his entire method of systematisation. Henceforth, the Stagirite has no secrets from us. Where we were formerly234 content to show that he erred3, we can now show why he erred; by generalising his principles of arrangement, we can exhibit them still more clearly in their conflict with modern thought. The method, then, pursued by Aristotle is to divide his subject into two more or less unequal masses, one of which is supposed to be governed by necessary principles, admitting of certain demonstration; while the other is irregular, and can only be studied according to the rules of probable evidence. The parts of the one are homogeneous and concentrically disposed, the movements of each being controlled by that immediately outside and above it. The parts of the other are heterogeneous and distributed among a number of antithetical pairs, between whose members there is, or ought to be, a general equilibrium235 preserved, the whole system having a common centre which either oscillates from one extreme to another, or holds the balance between them. The second system is enclosed within the first, and is altogether dependent on it for the impulses determining its processes of metamorphosis and equilibration. Where the internal adjustments of a system to itself or of one system to the other are not consciously made, Aristotle calls them Nature. They are always adapted to secure its everlasting continuance either in an individual or a specific form. Actuality belongs more particularly to the first sphere, and possibility to the second, but both are, to a certain extent, represented in each.
We have already seen how this fundamental division is applied to the universe as a whole. But our philosopher is not content with classifying the phenomena as he finds360 them; he attempts to demonstrate the necessity of their dual17 existence; and in so doing is guilty of something very like a vicious circle. For, after proving from the terrestrial movements that there must be an eternal movement to keep them going, he now assumes the revolving aether, and argues that there must be a motionless solid centre for it to revolve236 round, although a geometrical axis237 would have served the purpose equally well. By a still more palpable fallacy, he proceeds to show that a body whose tendency is towards the centre, must, in the nature of things, be opposed by another body whose tendency is towards the circumference. In order to fill up the interval created by this opposition, two intermediate bodies are required, and thus we get the four elements—earth, water, air, and fire. These, again, are resolved into the antithetical couples, dry and wet, hot and cold, the possible combinations of which, by twos, give us the four elements once more. Earth is dry and cold, water cold and wet, air wet and hot, fire hot and dry; each adjacent pair having a quality in common, and each element being characterized by the excess of a particular quality; earth is especially dry, water cold, air wet, and fire hot. The common centre of each antithesis is what Aristotle calls the First Matter, the mere abstract unformed possibility of existence. This matter always combines two qualities, and has the power of oscillating from one quality to another, but it cannot, as a rule, simultaneously exchange both for their opposites. Earth may pass into water, exchanging dry for wet, but not so readily into air, which would necessitate a double exchange at the same moment.
Those who will may see in all this an anticipation238 of chemical substitution and double decomposition239. We can assure them that it will be by no means the most absurd parallel discovered between ancient and modern ideas. It is possible, however, to trace a more real connexion between the Aristotelian physics and mediaeval thought. We do not of361 course mean the scholastic240 philosophy, for there never was the slightest doubt as to its derivation; we allude241 to the alchemy and astrology which did duty for positive science during so many centuries, and even overlapped242 it down to the time of Newton, himself an ardent244 alchemist. The superstitions246 of astrology originated independently of the peripatetic system, and probably long before it, but they were likely to be encouraged by it instead of being repressed, as they would have been by a less anthropomorphic philosophy. Aristotle himself, as we have seen, limited the action of the heavens on the sublunary sphere to their heating power; but, by crediting them with an immortal reason and the pursuit of ends unknown to us, he opened a wide field for conjecture247 as to what those ends were, and how they could be ascertained248. That the stars and planets were always thinking and acting, but never about our affairs, was not a notion likely to be permanently249 accepted. Neither was it easy to believe that their various configurations250, movements, and names (the last probably revealed by themselves) were entirely without significance. From such considerations to the casting of horoscopes is not a far remove. The Aristotelian chemistry would still more readily lend itself to the purposes of alchemy. If Nature is one vast process of transmutation, then particular bodies, such as the metals, not only may, but must be convertible251 into one another. And even those who rejected Aristotle’s logic with scorn still clung to his natural philosophy when it flattered their hopes of gain. Bacon kept the theory of substantial forms. His originality252 consisted in looking for a method by which any form, or assemblage of forms might be superinduced at pleasure on the underlying253 matter. The real development of knowledge pursued a far different course. The great discoverers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries achieved their success by absolutely reversing the method of Aristotle, by bringing into fruitful contact principles which he had condemned to barren isolation254.362 They carried terrestrial physics into the heavens; they brought down the absoluteness and eternity of celestial law to earth; they showed that Aristotle’s antithetical qualities were merely quantitative distinctions. These they resolved into modes of motion; and they also resolved all motions into one, which was both rectilinear and perpetual. But they and their successors put an end to all dreams of transmutation, when they showed by another synthesis that all matter, at least within the limits of our experience, has the changeless consistency98 once attributed exclusively to the stellar spheres.
When Aristotle passes from the whole cosmos to the philosophy of life, his method of systematic255 division is less distinctly illustrated256, but still it may be traced. The fundamental separation is between body and soul. The latter has a wider meaning than what we associate with it at present. It covers the psychic258 functions and the whole life of the organism, which, again, is not what we mean by life. For life with us is both individual and collective; it resides in each speck259 of protoplasm, and also in the consensus of the whole organism. With Aristotle it is more exclusively a central principle, the final cause of the organism, the power which holds it together, and by which it was originally shaped. Biology begins by determining the idea of the whole, and then considers the means by which it is realised. The psychic functions are arranged according to a system of teleological260 subordination. The lower precedes the higher in time, but is logically necessitated261 by it. Thus nutrition, or the vegetative life in general, must be studied in close connexion with sensation and impulse, or animal life; and this, again, with thought or pure reasoning. On the other hand, anatomy262 and physiology263 are considered from a purely chemical and mechanical point of view. A vital purpose is, indeed, assigned to every organ, but with no more reference to its specifically vital properties than if it formed part of a steam engine. Here, as always with Aristotle, the idea of moderation determines the point of view363 whence the inferior or material system is to be studied. Organic tissue is made up of the four elemental principles—hot, cold, wet, and dry—mixed together in proper proportions; and the object of organic function is to maintain them in due equilibrium, an end effected by the regulating power of the soul, which, accordingly, has its seat in the heart or centre of the body. It has been already shown how, in endeavouring to work out this chimerical264 theory, Aristotle went much further astray from the truth than sundry265 other Greek physiologists266 less biassed267 by the requirements of a symmetrical method.
After the formal and material elements of life have been separately discussed, there comes an account of the process by which they are first brought into connexion, for this is how Aristotle views generation. With him it is the information of matter by psychic force; and his notions about the part which each parent plays in the production of a new being are vitiated throughout by this mistaken assumption. Nevertheless his treatise268 on the subject is, for its time, one of the most wonderful works ever written, and, as we are told on good authority,257 is now less antiquated269 than the corresponding researches of Harvey. The philosopher’s peculiar270 genius for observation, analysis, and comparison will partly account for his success; but, if we mistake not, there is another and less obvious reason. Here the fatal separation of form and matter was, except at first starting, precluded271 by the very idea of generation; and the teleological principle of spontaneous efforts to realise a predetermined end was, as it happened, perfectly in accordance with the facts themselves.
And now, looking back on his cosmology, we can see that Aristotle was never so near the truth as when he tried to bridge over the gulf272 between his two spheres, the one corruptible273 and the other eternal, by the idea of motion considered as a specific property of all matter, and persisting through all364 time; as a link between the celestial revolutions and the changes occurring on or near the earth’s surface; and, finally, as the direct cause of heat, the great agent acting in opposition to gravity—which last view may have suggested Bacon’s capital discovery, that heat is itself a mode of motion.
Another method by which Aristotle strove to overcome the antithesis between life as a mechanical arrangement and life as a metaphysical conception, was the newly created study of comparative anatomy. The variations in structure and function which accompany variations in the environment, though statically and not dynamically conceived, bring us very near to the truth that biological phenomena are subject to the same general laws of causation as all other phenomena; and it is this truth which, in the science of life, corresponds to the identification of terrestrial with celestial physics in the science of general mechanics. Vitality274 is not an individualised principle stationed in the heart and serving only to balance opposite forces against one another; but it is diffused through all the tissues, and bestows275 on them that extraordinary plasticity which responds to the actions of the environment by spontaneous variations capable of being summed up in any direction, and so creating entirely new organic forms without the intervention276 of any supernatural agency.
V.
We have now to consider how Aristotle treats psychology, not in connexion with biology, but as a distinct science—a separation not quite consistent with his own definition of soul, but forced on him by the traditions of Greek philosophy and by the nature of things. Here the fundamental antithesis assumes a three-fold form. First the theoretical activity of mind is distinguished from its practical activity; the one being exercised on things which cannot, the other on things which365 can, be changed. Again, a similar distinction prevails within the special province of each. Where truth is the object, knowledge stands opposed to sense; where good is sought, reason rises superior to passion. The one antithesis had been introduced into philosophy by the early physicists, the other by Socrates. They were confounded in the psychology of Plato, and Aristotle had the merit of separating them once more. Yet even he preserves a certain artificial parallelism between them by using the common name Nous, or reason, to denote the controlling member in each. To make his anthropology277 still more complex, there is a third antithesis to be taken into account, that between the individual and the community, which also sometimes slides into a partial coincidence with the other two.
Aristotle’s treatise on the soul is mainly devoted278 to a description of the theoretical faculties—sense, and thought or reason. By sense we become acquainted with the material qualities of things; by thought with their forms or ideas. It has been already mentioned that, according to our philosopher, the organism is a system of contrary forces held in equilibrium by the soul, whose seat he supposes to be in the heart. We now learn that every sensation is a disturbance279 of this equilibrium. In other words, the sensorium being virtually any and every mode of matter, is raised from possibility to actuality by the presence of some one force, such as heat or cold, in sufficient strength to incline the balance that way. Here we have, quite in Aristotle’s usual style, a description instead of an explanation. The atomic notion of thin films thrown off from the object of sense, and falling on the organs of sight or touch, was but a crude guess; still it has more affinity280 with the discoveries of a Young or a Helmholtz than scholastic phrases about potentiality and actuality. That sensation implies a disturbance of equilibrium is, indeed, an important truth; only, the equilibrium must be conceived as a balance, not of possible sensations, but of molecular states; that is to say, it must be interpreted according to the atomic theory.
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Aristotle is more successful when he proceeds to discuss the imagination. He explains it to be a continuance of the movement originally communicated by the felt object to the organ of sense, kept up in the absence of the object itself;—as near an approach to the truth as could be made in his time. And he is also right in saying that the operations of reason are only made possible by the help of what he calls phantasms—that is, faint reproductions of sensations. In addition to this, he points out the connexion between memory and imagination, and enumerates281 the laws of association briefly282, but with great accuracy. He is, however, altogether unaware283 of their scope. So far from using them to explain all the mental processes, he does not even see that they account for involuntary reminiscence, and limits them to the voluntary operation by which we recall a missing name or other image to consciousness.
So far, Aristotle regards the soul as a function, or energy, or perfection of the body, from which it can no more be separated than vision from the eye. It is otherwise with the part of mind which he calls Nous, or Reason—the faculty which takes cognisance of abstract ideas or the pure forms of things. This corresponds, in the microcosm, to the eternal Nous of the macrocosm, and, like it, is absolutely immaterial, not depending for its activity on the exercise of any bodily organ. There is, however, a general analogy between sensation and thought considered as processes of cognition. Previous to experience, the Nous is no thought in particular, but merely a possibility of thinking, like a smooth wax tablet waiting to be written on. It is determined to some particular idea by contact with the objective forms of things, and in this determination is raised from power to actuality. The law of moderation, however, does not apply to thought. Excessive stimulation284 is first injurious and then destructive to the organs of sense, but we cannot have too much of an idea; the more intense it is the better are we able to conceive all the367 ideas that come under it, just because ideation is an incorporeal process. And there seems to be this further distinction between sensation and thought, that the latter is much more completely identified with its object than the former; it is in the very act of imprinting285 themselves on the Nous that the forms of things become perfectly detached from matter, and so attain44 their final realisation. It is only in our consciousness that the eternal ideas of transient phenomena become conscious of themselves. Such, we take it, is the true interpretation286 of Aristotle’s famous distinction between an active and a passive Nous. The one, he tells us, makes whatever the other is made. The active Nous is like light raising colours from possibility to actuality. It is eternal, but we have no remembrance of its past existence, because the passive Nous, without which it can think nothing, is perishable287.
It will be seen that we do not consider the two kinds of Nous to differ from each other as a higher and a lower faculty. This, in our opinion, has been the great mistake of the commentators288, of those, at least, who do not identify the active Nous with God, or with some agency emanating289 from God—a hypothesis utterly290 inconsistent with Aristotle’s theology. They describe it as a faculty, and as concerned with some higher kind of knowledge than what lies within the reach of the passive Nous.258 But with Aristotle faculty is always a potentiality and a passive recipient291, whereas the creative reason is expressly declared to be an actuality, which, in this connexion, can mean nothing but an individual idea. The difficulty is to understand why the objective forms of things should suddenly be spoken of as existing within the mind, and denominated by a term carrying with it such subjective associations as Nous; a difficulty not diminished by the mysterious comparison with light in its relation to colour, an illus368tration which, in this instance, has only made the darkness visible. We believe that Aristotle was led to express himself as he did by the following considerations. He began by simply conceiving that, just as the senses were raised from potency to actuality through contact with the corresponding qualities in external objects, so also was the reasoning faculty moulded into particular thoughts through contact with the particular things embodying292 them; thus, for instance, it was led to conceive the general idea of straightness by actual experience of straight lines. It then, perhaps, occurred to him that one and the same object could not produce two such profoundly different impressions as a sensation and a thought; that mind was opposed to external realities by the attribute of self-consciousness; and that a form inherent in matter could not directly impress itself on an immaterial substance. The idea of a creative Nous was, we think, devised in order to escape from these perplexities. The ideal forms of things are carried into the mind, together with the sensations, and in passing through the imagination, become purified from the matter previously293 associated with them. Thus they may be conceived as part of the mind—in, though not yet of it—and as acting on its highest faculty, the passive Nous. And, by a kind of anticipation, they are called by the name of what they become completely identified with in cognition. As forms of things they are eternal; as thoughts they are self-conscious; while, in both capacities, they are creative, and their creative activity is an essentially immaterial process. Here we have the old confusion between form and function; the old inability to reconcile the claims of the universal and the particular in knowledge and existence. After all, Aristotle is obliged to extract an actuality from the meeting of two possibilities, instead of from the meeting of an actuality and a possibility. Probably the weakness of his own theory did not escape him, for he never subsequently recurs50 to it.259
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Aristotle’s work on reproduction is supposed by many to contain a reference to his distinction between the two Reasons, but we are convinced that this is a mistake. What we are told is that at the very first formation of a new being, the vegetative soul, being an exclusively corporeal25 function, is precontained in the elements furnished by the female; that the sensitive soul is contributed by the male (being, apparently, engendered294 in the semen by the vital heat of the parent organism); and, finally, that the rational soul, although entirely immaterial, is also carried in with the semen, into which it has first been introduced from without, but where, or when, or how is not more particularly specified295.260 But even were the genetic theory in question perfectly cleared up, it would still throw no light on the distinction between active and passive reason, as the latter alone can be understood by the rational soul to which it refers. For we are expressly informed—what indeed hardly required to be stated—that the embryonic296 souls exist not in act but in potency.261 It seems, therefore, that Mr. Edwin Wallace is doubly mistaken when he quotes a sentence from this passage in justification of his statement, that ‘Aristotle would seem almost to identify’ the creative reason ‘with God as the eternal and omnipresent thinker;’262 first, because it does not refer to the creative Nous at all; and, secondly297, because, if it did, the words would not stand the meaning which he puts upon them.263
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But if even so little as this remains unproved, what are we to think of the astounding298 assertion, that ‘Aristotle’s theory of a creative reason, fragmentary as that theory is left, is the answer to all materialistic299 theories of the universe. To Aristotle, as to a subtle Scottish preacher,264 “the real pre-supposition of all knowledge, or the thought which is the prius of all things, is not the individual’s consciousness of himself as individual, but a thought or self-consciousness which is beyond all individual selves, which is the unity of all individual selves, and their objects, of all thinkers and all objects of thought.”’265 How can materialism or anything else be possibly refuted by a theory which is so obscurely set forth that no two interpreters are able to agree in their explanation of it? And even were it stated with perfect clearness and fulness, how can any hypothesis be refuted by a mere dogmatic declaration of Aristotle? Are we back in the Middle Ages that his ipse dixit is to decide questions now raised with far ampler means of discussion than he could possess? As to Principal Caird’s metaphysics, we have no wish to dispute their theoretic accuracy, and can only admire the liberality of a Church in which propositions so utterly destructive of traditional orthodoxy are allowed to be preached. But one thing we are certain of, and that is, that whether or not they are consistent with Christian theism, they are utterly inconsistent with Aristotelian principles. Which is the ‘thought or self-consciousness’ referred to, a possibility or an actuality? If the former, it is not a prius, nor is it the creative reason. If the latter, it cannot transcend82 all or any individual selves, for, with Aristotle, individuals are the sole reality, and the supreme being of his system is pre-eminently individual; neither can it unify301 them, for, according to Aristotle, two things which are two in actuality cannot be one in actuality.266
We now turn to Sir A. Grant, who, as was mentioned at371 the beginning of the last chapter, makes Aristotle a supporter of the late Prof. Ferrier. We will state the learned Principal’s view in his own words:—
‘His utterances302 on this subject [the existence of an external world] are perhaps chiefly to be found in the third book of his treatise “On the Soul,” beginning with the fourth chapter. On turning to them we see that he never separates existence from knowledge. “A thing in actual existence,” he says, “is identical with the knowledge of that thing.” Again, “The possible existence of a thing is identical with the possibility in us of perceiving or knowing it.” Thus, until a thing is perceived or known, it can only be said to have a potential or possible existence. And from this a doctrine very similar to that of Ferrier might be deduced, that “nothing exists except plus me,”—that is to say, in relation to some mind perceiving it.‘ (Aristotle, p. 165.)
After much searching, we have not been able to find the originals of the two passages quoted by Sir A. Grant. We have, however, found others setting forth the doctrine of Natural Realism with a clearness which leaves nothing to be desired. Aristotle tells us that former naturalists303 were wrong when they said that there could be no black or white without vision, and no taste without tasting; that is, they were right about the actuality, and wrong about the possibility; for, as he explains, our sensations are produced by the action of external bodies on the appropriate organs, the activity being the same while the existence is different. A sonorous304 body produces a sound in our hearing; the sound perceived and the action of the body are identical, but not their existence; for, he adds, the hearer need not be always listening, nor the sonorous body sounding; and so with all the other senses.267
This is not making the percipi of objects their esse. Again, in the eighth chapter he tells us that the soul is ‘in a certain way’ (π??) all things, since all things are either sensible or cogitable; and then he proceeds to explain what is meant by372 ‘in a certain way.’ Sense and knowledge are distributed over things in such wise that their possibility is the possibility, and their actuality the actuality, of the things. They must, then, be either the things themselves or their forms. ‘But the things themselves they are surely not, for the stone is not in the soul, but its form.’ In the Metaphysics, Aristotle expresses himself to the same effect, but even more explicitly305. Criticising the Protagorean doctrine, he reduces it to an absurdity by urging that if there were nothing but sensibles, then nothing at all could exist in the absence of animated beings, for without them there would be no sensation. He admits that in the case supposed there would be neither feelings nor felt objects, since these presuppose a sentient307 subject; but adds, that for the substances (τ? ?ποκε?μενα) which produce the feeling not to exist is impossible; ‘for there is something else besides the feeling which must necessarily exist before it.’268 And immediately afterwards he clinches308 the argument by observing that if appearances were the only truth, there would be no independent existences, and everything would be relative, since appearances exist only in relation to some one to whom they appear. Now we need hardly say that this universal relativity was precisely309 what Ferrier contended for.
Sir A. Grant is on stronger, or rather on more inaccessible310 ground, when he uses the distinction between the two reasons as involving a sort of idealistic theory, because here Aristotle’s meaning is much less clearly expressed. Yet, if our interpretation be the correct one, if the creative Nous simply means the forms of things acting through the imagination on the possibilities of subjective conception, Aristotle’s view will be exactly the reverse of that contended for by Sir Alexander; thought, instead of moulding, will itself be moulded by external reality. In no case have we a right to set an obscure and disputed passage against Aristotle’s distinct, emphatic, and reiterated311 declarations, that sensation and ideation are373 substantially analogous processes, taken together with his equally distinct declaration, that the objects of sensation are independent of our feelings. We think, indeed, that Sir A. Grant will find, on reconsideration, that he is proving too much. For, if the things which reason creates were external to the mind, then Aristotle would go at least as far as those ‘extreme German idealists’ from whom his expositor is anxious to separate him. Finally, we would observe that to set up Aristotle’s distinction between form and matter in opposition to the materialistic theories of the present day, shows a profound misconception of its meaning. Form and matter are nowhere distinguished from one another as subject and object. Form simply means the attributes of a thing, the entire aggregate of its differential characteristics. But that this does not of itself amount to conscious reason we are told by Aristotle himself.269 On the other hand, the ‘matter’ to which ‘some philosophers’ attribute ‘an independent existence,’ is not his ‘matter’ at all, but just the sum of things minus consciousness. The Stagirite did not, it is true, believe in the possibility of such a universe, but only (as we have shown) because he was not acquainted with the highest laws of motion. Yet, even taking ‘matter’ in his own technical sense, Aristotle would have agreed with Prof. Tyndall, that it contained the promise and the potency of all future life, reason alone excepted. He tells us very clearly that the sensitive soul is a somatic function, something which, although not body, belongs to body; and this we conceive is all that any materialist22 would now contend for.270 And having gone so far, there really was nothing to prevent him from going a step farther, had he only been acquainted with the dependence of all intelligence on nervous action. At any rate, the tendency is now to obliterate312 the distinction where he drew it, and to substitute for it another distinction which he neglected. While all functions of consciousness, from the most elementary374 sensation to the most complex reasoning, seem to pass into one another by imperceptible gradations, consciousness in general is still separated from objective existence by an impassable chasm313; and if there is any hope of reconciling them it lies in the absolute idealism which he so summarily rejected. What we have had occasion repeatedly to point out in other departments of his system, is verified once more in his psychology. The progress of thought has resulted from a reunion of the principles between which he drew a rigid314 demarcation. We have found that perception can only be understood as a process essentially homogeneous with the highest thought, and neither more nor less immaterial than it is. On the objective side, both may be resolved into sensori-motor actions; on the subjective side, into groups of related feelings. And here, also, we have to note that when Aristotle anticipates modern thought, it is through his one great mediating315, synthetic316 conception. He observes incidentally that our knowledge of size and shape is acquired, not through the special senses, but by motion—an aper?u much in advance of Locke.271
If there are any who value Aristotle as a champion of spiritualism, they must take him with his encumbrances317. If his philosophy proves that one part of the soul is immaterial, it proves equally that the soul, taking it altogether, is perishable. Not only does he reject Plato’s metempsychosis as inconsistent with physiology, but he declares that affection, memory, and reasoning are functions not of the eternal Nous, but of the whole man, and come to an end with his dissolution. As to the active Nous, he tells us that it cannot think without the assistance of the passive Nous, which is mortal. And there are various passages in the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ showing that he had faced this negation of a future life, and was perfectly resigned to its consequences.272 At one period of his life, probably when under the immediate influence of Plato, he had indulged375 in dreams of immortality; but a profounder acquaintance with natural science sufficed to dissipate them. Perhaps a lingering veneration for his teacher made him purposely use ambiguous language in reference to the eternity of that creative reason which he had so closely associated with self-consciousness. It may remind us of Spinoza’s celebrated318 proposition, Sentimus experimurque nos aeternos esse, words absolutely disconnected with the hope of a continued existence of the individual after death, but apparently intended to enlist319 some of the sentiment associated with that belief on the side of the writer’s own philosophy.
On the other hand, the spirit of Plato’s religion survived in the teaching of his disciple under a new form. The idea of an eternal personality was, as it were, unified320 and made objective by being transferred from the human to the divine; and so each philosopher developes an aspect of religious faith which is wanting in the other, thereby321 illustrating322 the tendencies, to some extent mutually exclusive; which divide all theology between them. It remains to observe that if even Aristotle’s theism is inconsistent with the Catholic faith, much more must his psychology be its direct negation. The Philosophy of the Philosopher is as fatal to the Church’s doctrine of future rewards and punishments as it is to her doctrine of divine interference with the usual order of nature.
VI.
We now pass to the consideration of Aristotle’s most important achievement—his system of logic. And as, here also, we shall find much to criticise323, it is as well to begin by saying that, in our opinion, his contributions to the science are the most valuable ever made, and perhaps have done more to advance it than all other writings on the same subject put together.
The principal business of reason is, as we have seen, to376 form abstract ideas or concepts of things. But before the time of Aristotle it had already been discovered that concepts, or rather the terms expressing them, were capable of being united in propositions which might be either true or false, and whose truth might be a matter either of certainty or of simple opinion. Now, in modern psychology, down to the most recent times, it has always been assumed that, just as there is an intellectual faculty or operation called abstraction corresponding to the terms of which a proposition is composed, so also there is a faculty or operation called judgment324 corresponding to the entire proposition. Sometimes, again, the third operation, which consists in linking propositions together to form syllogisms, is assigned to a distinct faculty called reason; sometimes all three are regarded as ascending steps in a single fundamental process. Neither Plato nor Aristotle, however, had thought out the subject so scientifically. To both the framing, or rather the discovery, of concepts was by far the most important business of a philosopher, judgment and reasoning being merely subsidiary to it. Hence, while in one part of their logic they were realists and conceptualists, in other parts they were nominalists. Abstract names and the definitions unfolding their connotation corresponded to actual entities in Nature—the eternal Ideas of the one and the substantial forms of the other—as well as to mental representations about whose existence they were agreed, while ascribing to them a different origin. But they did not in like manner treat propositions as the expression of natural laws without, or of judgments326 within, the mind; while reasoning they regarded much more as an art of thinking, a method for the discovery of ideas, than as the Systematisation of a process spontaneously performed by every human being without knowing it; and, even as such, their tendency is to connect it with the theory of definition rather than with the theory of synthetic propositions. Some approach to a realistic view is, indeed, made by both. The377 restless and penetrating327 thought of Plato had, probably towards the close of his career, led him to enquire328 into the mutual relations of those Ideas which he had at first been inclined to regard as absolutely distinct. He shows us in the Sophist how the most abstract notions, such as Being, Identity, and so forth, must, to a certain extent, partake of each other’s nature; and when their relationship does not lie on the surface, he seeks to establish it by the interposition of a third idea obviously connected with both. In the later books of the Republic he also points to a scheme for arranging his Ideas according to a fixed hierarchy329 resembling the concatenation of mathematical proofs, by ascending and descending330 whose successive gradations the mind is to become familiarised with absolute truth; and we shall presently see how Aristotle, following in the same track, sought for a counterpart to his syllogistic331 method in the objective order of things. Nevertheless, with him, as well as with his master, science was not what it is with us, a study of laws, a perpetually growing body of truth, but a process of definition and classification, a systematisation of what had already been perceived and thought.
It was from the initiative of Socrates that logic received this direction. By insisting on the supreme importance of definition, he drew away attention from the propositions which add to our knowledge, and concentrated it on those which only fix with precision the meaning of words. Yet, in so doing he was influenced quite as much by the spirit of the older physical philosophy, which he denounced, as by the necessities of the new humanistic culture, which he helped to introduce. His definitions were, in truth, the reproduction, on a very minute scale, of those attempts to formulate332 the whole universe which busied the earliest Ionian speculation. Following the natural tendency of Greek thought, and the powerful attraction of cosmic philosophy, an effort was speedily made to generalise and connect these partial defini378tions until they grew into a system of universal classification. It was when, under the influence of a new analysis, this system threatened to fall to pieces, that a rudimentary doctrine of judgment first made its appearance. The structure of a grammatical sentence was used to explain how objective ideas could, in a manner, overlap243 and adhere to one another. Hence propositions, which, as the expression of general truths, were destined333 to become the beginning and end of thought, remained at first strictly334 subordinated to the individual concepts that they linked and reconciled.
With Aristotle propositions assumed a new importance. He looked on them as mediating, not only between concepts, but also between conception and reasoning. Still, neither as a psychologist nor as a logician96 did he appreciate them at their real value. A very brief consideration is given to judgment in his work on the soul, and we are left in doubt whether it is a function of Nous alone or of Nous combined with some other faculty. Setting aside the treatise on Interpretation, which is probably spurious, and, at any rate, throws no new light on the subject, we may gather from his logical writings half a dozen different suggestions towards a classification of propositions, based partly on their form and partly on their import. In all we find an evident tendency to apply, here also, his grand fundamental distinction between the sphere of uniformity and the sphere of change and opposition. All propositions are either universal or particular; either positive or negative; either necessary or actual or contingent335; either reciprocating336 or not reciprocating; either essential or accidental; either answering to the first question in the categories, or to one of the other nine.273 But nowhere is any attempt made to combine and systematise these various points of view.
In the theory of reasoning the simple proposition is taken as a starting-point; but instead of deducing the syllogism379 from the synthesis of two premises337, Aristotle reaches the premises through the conclusion. He tells us, indeed, that reasoning is a way of discovering from what we know, something that we did not know before. With him, however, it is really a process not of discovery but of proof. He starts with the conclusion, analyses it into predicate and subject or major and minor339, and then, by a further analysis, introduces a middle term connecting the two. Thus, we begin with the proposition, ‘Caius is mortal,’ and prove it by interpolating the notion humanity between its two extremes. From this point of view the premises are merely a temporary scaffolding for bringing the major and minor into connexion with the middle term; and this is also the reason why Aristotle recognises three syllogistic figures only, instead of the four admitted by later logicians. For, the middle may either be contained in one extreme and contain the other, which gives us the first figure; or it may contain both, which gives the second figure; or be contained in both, which gives the third; and this is an exhaustive enumeration of the possible combinations.274
We have here, also, the secret of that elaborate machinery devised for the very unnecessary purpose of converting syllogisms of the second and third figure into syllogisms of the first, which is one of the Stagirite’s principal contributions to logic. For it is only in the first figure that the notion by which the extremes are either united or held apart is really a middle term, that is to say, really comes between the others. The distinction between perfect and imperfect syllogisms also serves to illustrate257 Aristotle’s systematic division between the necessary and the contingent. The method of proof by inclusion corresponds in its unconditioned and independent validity to the concentric arrangement of the supernal341 spheres; the second and third figures, with their conversions342 and reductions, to the sublunary sphere in its helpless dependence on380 the celestial revolutions, and its transformations of the elements into one another.
The rules which Aristotle gives us for the conversion of propositions are no doubt highly instructive, and throw great light on their meaning; but one cannot help observing that such a process as conversion ought, on his own principles, to have been inadmissible. With Plato, the copulation of subject and predicate corresponded to an almost mechanical juxtaposition343 of two self-existent ideas. It was, therefore, a matter of indifference344 in what order they were placed. Aristotle, on the other hand, after insisting on the restoration of the concrete object, and reducing general notions to an analysis of its particular aspects, could not but make the predicate subordinate to, and dependent on, the subject—a relation which altogether excludes the logical possibility of making them interchangeable with one another.275
The antithetical structure of the whole system is reproduced even in the first syllogistic figure, where there is a similar opposition between the first mood, by which alone universal affirmatives can be obtained, and the remaining three, whose conclusions are either negative or particular, or both. And the complicated rules for testing the validity of those syllogisms in which the premises are distinguished as necessary, actual, and possible, are still more obviously based on Aristotle’s false metaphysical distinctions; so that with the overthrow345 of those distinctions large portions of the Analytics lose their entire value for modern students.
On the other hand, a theory of reasoning based on the relations of concepts, instead of on the relations of judgments, necessarily leaves out of account the whole doctrine of hypothetical and disjunctive propositions, together with that of the syllogisms based on them; since the elements of which they are composed are themselves propositions. And this inevitable346 omission is the more remarkable because alterna381tive and, to a less extent, hypothetical arguments form the staple347 of Aristotle’s own dialectic; while categorical reasoning never occurs in it at all. His constant method is to enumerate53 all possible views of a subject, and examine them one after the other, rejecting those which are untenable, and resting content with the remainder. In other words, he reaches his positive conclusions through a series of negative premises representing a process of gradual elimination348. The First Analytics is itself an admirable instance of his favourite method. Every possible combination of terms is discussed, and the valid340 moods are sifted349 out from a much greater number of illegitimate syllogisms. The dialectic of Socrates and Plato followed the same procedure. It was essentially experimental—a method of trial, elimination, and selection. On going back still further, we find that when there is any reasoning at all in Homer, it is conducted after the same fashion. Hector, in his soliloquy before the Scaean Gate, imagines three alternative courses, together exhausting the possibilities of the situation. He may either retreat within the walls, or offer terms of peace to Achilles, or fight. The first two alternatives being rejected, nothing remains but the third. This is the most elaborate example; but on many other occasions Homer’s actors are represented as hesitating between two courses, and finally deciding on one of them.
Disjunction is, in truth, the primordial form of all reasoning, out of which the other forms are successively evolved; and, as such, it is common to man with the lower animals. You are taking a walk in the country with your dog. You come to a stream and jump over it. On measuring the distance with his eye, the animal is afraid to follow you. After waiting a little, he first runs up stream in search of a crossing, and, finding none, returns to look for one in the opposite direction. Failing there also, he comes back once more, and either ventures on the leap or makes his way home by some other route. Now, on considering the matter a little more382 closely, we shall find that hypothetical reasoning takes its rise from the examination of each separate alternative presented by a disjunctive premise338. A plurality of courses being open to us, we consider what will ensue on the acceptance or rejection351 of each. The dog in our illustration thinks (after a canine352 fashion) that if he jumps he may fall in; if he does not, he will be left behind. Hector will not take refuge within the walls, because, if he does, Polydamas will triumph over him; nor will he offer terms of peace, because, if he does, Achilles will refuse them. Once more, categorical reasoning is developed out of hypothetical reasoning by the necessity of deducing consequences from a general rule. Hector must have argued from the known characters of Polydamas and Achilles, that in certain circumstances they would act after a certain manner. We may add, that this progress of conscious reasoning is a reproduction of the unconscious logic according to which life itself is evolved. All sorts of combinations are spontaneously produced, which, in consequence of the struggle for existence, cannot all survive. Those adapted to the conditions of life are selected, on trial, at the expense of the rest; and their adaptation or non-adaptation is determined in accordance with categorical laws. Furthermore, the framing of a disjunctive proposition necessitates the systematic distribution of possibilities under mutually exclusive heads, thus involving the logical processes of definition, division, and classification. Dialectic, as Plato understood it, consisted almost entirely in the joint353 performance of these operations;—a process which Aristotle regards as the immediate but very imperfect precursor48 of his own syllogistic method.276 You cannot, he says, prove anything by dividing, for instance, all living things into the two classes, mortal and immortal; unless, indeed, you assume the very point under discussion—to which class a particular species belongs. Yet this is how he constantly reasons himself; and even demonstrative reason383ing, as he interprets it, implies the possession of a ready-made classification. For, according to him, it consists exclusively of propositions which predicate some essential attribute of a thing—in other words, some attribute already included in the definition of the subject; and a continuous series of such definitions can only be given by a fixed classification of things.
VII.
We have endeavoured to show that Aristotle’s account of the syllogism325 is redundant354 on the one side and defective355 on the other, both errors being due to a false analysis of the reasoning process itself, combined with a false metaphysical philosophy. The same evil influences tell with much greater effect on his theory of applied reasoning. Here the fundamental division, corresponding to that between heaven and earth in the cosmos, is between demonstration and dialectic or experimental reasoning. The one starts with first principles of unquestionable validity, the other with principles the validity of which is to be tested by their consequences. Stated in its most abstract form, the distinction is sound, and very nearly prefigures the modern division between deduction357 and induction358, the process by which general laws are applied, and the process by which they are established. Aristotle, however, committed two great mistakes; he thought that each method corresponded to an entirely different order of phenomena: and he thought that both were concerned for the most part with definitions. The Posterior Analytics, which contains his theory of demonstration, answers to the astronomical portion of his physics; it is the doctrine of eternal and necessary truth. And just as his ontology distinguishes between the Prime Mover himself unmoved and the eternal movement produced by his influence, so also his logic distinguishes between infallible first principles and the truths derived from them, the latter being, in his opinion, of inferior384 value. Now, according to Aristotle, these first principles are definitions, and it is to this fact that their self-evident certainty is due. At the same time they are not verbal but real definitions—that is to say, the universal forms of things in themselves as made manifest to the eye of reason, or rather, stamped upon it like the impression of a signet-ring on wax. And, by a further refinement359, he seems to distinguish between the concept as a whole and the separate marks which make it up, these last being the ultimate elements of all existence, and as much beyond its complex forms as Nous is beyond reasoned truth.
Such a view was essentially unfavourable to the progress of science, assigning, as it did, a higher dignity to meagre and very questionable356 abstractions than to the far-reaching combinations by which alone we are enabled to unravel360 the inmost texture361 of visible phenomena. Instead of using reason to supplement sense, Aristotle turned it into a more subtle and universal kind of sense; and if this disastrous362 assimilation was to a certain extent imposed upon him by the traditions of Athenian thought, it harmonised admirably with the descriptive and superficial character of his own intelligence. Much was also due to the method of geometry, which in his time had already assumed the form made familiar to us by Euclid’s Elements. The employment of axioms side by side with definitions, might, indeed, have drawn his attention to the existence and importance of judgments which, in Kantian terminology363, are not analytic72 but synthetic—that is, which add to the content of a notion instead of simply analysing it. But although he mentions axioms, and states that mathematical theorems are deduced from them, no suspicion of their essential difference from definitions, or of the typical significance which they were destined to assume in the theory of reasoning, seems ever to have crossed his mind; otherwise he could hardly have failed to ask how we come by our knowledge of them, and to what they correspond in Nature. On the whole,385 it seems likely that he looked on them as an analysis of our ideas, differing only from definition proper by the generality of its application; for he names the law of contradiction as the most important of all axioms, and that from which the others proceed;277 next to it he places the law of excluded middle, which is also analytical364; and his only other example is, that if equals be taken from equals the remainders are equal, a judgment the synthetic character of which is by no means clear, and has occasionally been disputed.278
We cannot, then, agree with those critics who attribute to Aristotle a recognition of such things as ‘laws of nature,’ in the sense of uniform co-existences and sequences.279 Such an idea implies a certain balance and equality between subject and predicate which he would never have admitted. It would, in his own language, be making relation, instead of substance, the leading category. It must be remembered also that he did not acknowledge the existence of those constant conjunctions in Nature which we call laws. He did not admit that all matter was heavy, or that fluidity implied the presence of heat. The possession of constant properties, or rather of a single constant property—circular rotation—is reserved for the aether. Nor is this a common property of different and indefinitely multipliable phenomena; it characterises a single body, measurable in extent and unique in kind. Moreover,386 we have something better than indirect evidence on this point; we have the plain statement of Aristotle himself, that all science depends on first principles, about which it is impossible to be mistaken, precisely because they are universal abstractions not presented to the mind by any combination,280—a view quite inconsistent with the priority now given to general laws.
Answering to the first principles of demonstration in logic, if not absolutely identical with them, are what Aristotle calls causes in the nature of things. We have seen what an important part the middle term plays in Aristotle’s theory of the syllogism. It is the vital principle of demonstration, the connecting link by which the two extreme terms are attached to one another. In the theory of applied logic, whose object is to bring the order of thought into complete parallelism with the order of things, the middle term through which a fact is demonstrated answers to the cause through which it exists. According to our notions, only two terms, antecedent and consequent, are involved in the idea of causation; and causation only becomes a matter for reasoning when we perceive that the sequence is repeated in a uniform manner. But Aristotle was very far from having reached, or even suspected, this point of view. A cause is with him not a determining antecedent, but a secret nexus365 by which the co-existence of two phenomena is explained. Instead of preceding it intercedes366; and this is why he finds its subjective counterpart in the middle term of the syllogism. Some of his own examples will make the matter clearer. Why is the moon eclipsed? Because the earth intervenes between her and the sun. Why is the bright side of the moon always turned towards the sun? Because she shines by his reflected light (here light is the middle term). Why is that person talking to the rich man? Because he wants to borrow money of him. Why are those two men friends? Because they have the same enemy.281
387
Aristotle even goes so far as to eliminate the notion of sequence from causation altogether. He tells us that the causes of events are contemporary with the events themselves; those of past events being past; of present events, present; and of future events, future. ‘This thing will not be because that other thing has happened, for the middle term must be homogeneous with the extremes.’282 It is obvious that such a limitation abolishes the power of scientific prediction, which, if not the only test of knowledge, is at any rate its most valuable verification. The Stagirite has been charged with trusting too much to deductive reasoning; it now appears that, on the contrary, he had no conception of its most important function. Here, as everywhere, he follows not the synthetic method of the mathematician, but the analytic method of the naturalist. Finally, instead of combining the notions of cause and kind, he systematically367 confuses them. It will be remembered how his excellent division of causes into material, formal, efficient, and final, was rendered nugatory368 by the continued influence of Plato’s ideas. The formal cause always tended to absorb the other three; and it is by their complete assimilation that he attempts to harmonise the order of demonstration with the order of existence. For the formal cause of a phenomenon simply meant those properties which it shared with others of the same kind, and it was by virtue369 of those properties that it became a subject for general reasoning, which was interpreted as a methodical arrangement of concepts one within another, answering to the concentric disposition of the cosmic spheres.
Owing to the slight importance which Aristotle attaches to judgments as compared with concepts, he does not go very deeply into the question, how do we obtain our premises? He says, in remarkably370 emphatic language, that all knowledge is acquired either by demonstration or by induction; or rather, we may add, in the last resort by the latter only, since demon388stration rests on generals which are discovered inductively; but his generals mean definitions and abstract predicates or subjects, rather than synthetic propositions. If, however, his attention had been called to the distinction, we cannot suppose that he would, on his own principles, have adopted conclusions essentially different from those of the modern experiential school. Mr. Wallace does, indeed, claim him as a supporter of the theory that no inference can be made from particulars to particulars without the aid of a general proposition, and as having refuted, by anticipation, Mill’s assertion to the contrary. We quote the analysis which is supposed to prove this in Mr. Wallace’s own words:—
We reason that because the war between Thebes and Phocis was a war between neighbours and an evil, therefore the war between Athens and Thebes, being also a war between neighbours, will in all probability be also an evil. Thus, out of the one parallel case—the war between Thebes and Phocis—we form the general proposition, All wars between neighbours are evils; to this we add the minor, the war between Athens and Thebes is a war between neighbours—and thence arrive at the conclusion that the war between Athens and Thebes will be likewise an evil.283
On the strength of this Mr. Wallace elsewhere observes:—
His [Aristotle’s] theory of syllogism is simply an explicit306 statement of the fact that all knowledge, all thought, rests on universal truths or general propositions—that all knowledge, whether ‘deductive’ or ‘inductive,’ is arrived at by the aid, the indispensable aid, of general propositions. We in England have been almost charmed into the belief that reasoning is perpetually from particular to particular, and a ‘village matron’ and her ‘Lucy’ have been used to express the truth for us in the concrete form adapted to our weaker comprehension (Mill’s Logic, bk. ii. ch. 3). We shall next be told, forsooth, that oxygen and hydrogen do not enter into the composition of water, because our village matron ‘perpetually’ drinks it without ‘passing through’ either element, and the analysis of the chemist will be proved as great a fiction as the analysis of the logician. Aristotle has supplied the links which at once upset all such superficial389 analysis. He has shown that even in analogy or example, which apparently proceeds in this way from one particular instance to another particular instance, we are only justified371 in so proceeding in so far as we have transformed the particular instance into a general proposition.284
Now, there is this great difference between Aristotle and Mill, that the former is only showing how reasoning from examples can be set forth in syllogistic form, while the latter is investigating the psychological process which underlies372 all reasoning, and the real foundation on which a valid inference rests—questions which had never presented themselves clearly to the mind of the Greek philosopher at all. Mill argues, in the first instance, that when any particular proposition is deduced from a general proposition, it is proved by the same evidence as that on which the general itself rests, namely, on other particulars; and, so far, he is in perfect agreement with Aristotle. He then argues that inferences from particulars to particulars are perpetually made without passing through a general proposition: and, to illustrate his meaning, he quotes the example of a ‘village matron and her Lucy,’ to which Mr. Wallace refers with a very gratuitous373 sneer374.285
However, as we have seen, he is not above turning it against Mill. The drift of his own illustration is not very clear, but we suppose it implies that the matron unconsciously frames the general proposition: My remedy is good for all children suffering from the same disease as Lucy; and with equal unconsciousness reasons down from this to the case of her neighbour’s child. Now, it is quite unjustifiable to call Mill’s analysis superficial because it leaves out of account a hypothesis incompatible with the nominalism which Mill professed375. It is still more unjustifiable to quote against it390 the authority of a philosopher who perfectly agreed with those who disbelieve in the possibility of unconscious knowledge,286 and contemptuously rejected Plato’s opinion to the contrary. Nor is this all. The doctrine that reasoning is from particulars to particulars, even when it passes through general propositions, may be rigorously deduced from Aristotle’s own admissions. If nothing exists but particulars, and if knowledge is of what exists, then all knowledge is of particulars. Therefore, if the propositions entering into a chain of reasoning are knowledge, they must deal with particulars exclusively. And, quite apart from the later developments of Aristotle’s philosophy, we have his express assertion, that all generals are derived from particulars, which is absolutely incompatible with the alleged376 fact, that ‘all knowledge, all thought, rests on universal truths, on general propositions; that all knowledge, whether “deductive” or “inductive,” is arrived at by the aid, the indispensable aid, of general propositions.’ To Aristotle the basis of knowledge was not ‘truths’ of any kind, but concepts; and in the last chapter of the Posterior Analytics he has explained how these concepts are derived from sense-perceptions without the aid of any ‘propositions’ whatever.
We are here confronted with an important and much disputed question, Was Aristotle an empiricist? We hold most decidedly that he was, if by empiricist is meant, what alone should be meant—one who believes that the mind neither anticipates anything in the content, nor contributes anything to the form of experience; in other words, who believes knowledge to be the agreement of thought with things imposed by things on thought. We have already shown, when discussing Sir A. Grant’s view to the contrary, that Aristotle was in no sense a transcendental idealist. The other half of our position is proved by the chapter in the Posterior Analytics already referred to, the language of which is prima facie so much in favour of our view that the burden of proof391 rests on those who give it another interpretation. Among these, the latest with whom we are acquainted is Zeller. The eminent300 German historian, after asserting in former editions of his work that Aristotle derived his first principles from the self-contemplation of the Nous, has now, probably in deference377 to the unanswerable arguments of Kampe, abandoned this position. He still, however, assumes the existence of a rather indefinable à priori element in the Aristotelian noology, on the strength of the following considerations:—In the first place, according to Aristotle, even sense-perception is not a purely passive process, and therefore intellectual cognition can still less be so (p. 190). But the passages quoted only amount to this, that the passivity of a thing which is raised from possibility to actuality differs from the passivity implied in the destruction of its proper nature; and that the objects of abstract thought come from within, not from without, in the sense that they are presented by the imagination to the reason. The pure empiricist need not deny either position. He would freely admit that to lose one’s reason through drunkenness or disease is a quite different sort of operation from being impressed with a new truth; and he would also admit that we generalise not directly from outward experience, but from that highly-abridged and representative experience which memory supplies. Neither process, however, constitutes an anticipation of outward experience or an addition to it. It is from the materialist, not from the empiricist, that Aristotle differs. He believes that the forms under which matter appears are separable from every particular portion of matter, though not from all matter, in the external world; and he believes that a complete separation between them is effected in the single instance of self-conscious reason, which again, in cognising any particular thing is identified with that thing minus its matter. Zeller’s next argument is that the cognition of ideas by the Nous is immediate, whereas the process of generalisation from experience described by Aristotle392 is extremely indirect. Here Zeller seems to misunderstand the word ?μεσο?. Aristotle never applies it to knowledge, but only to the objective relations of ideas with one another. Two terms constitute an ‘immediate’ premise when they are not connected by another term, quite irrespective of the steps by which we come to recognise their conjunction. So with the terms themselves. They are ‘immediate’ when they cannot be derived from any ulterior principle; when, in short, they are simple and uncaused. Finally, the objection that first principles, being the most certain and necessary of any, cannot be derived from sensible experience, which, dealing only with material objects, must inherit the uncertainty378 and contingency379 of matter,—is an objection, not to the empiricist interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy, but to empiricism itself; and it is not allowable to explain away the plain words of an ancient writer in order to reconcile them with assumptions which he nowhere admits. That universality and necessity involve an à priori cognition or an intellectual intuition, is a modern theory unsupported by a single sentence in Aristotle.287 We quite agree with Zeller when he goes on to say that in Aristotle’s psychology ‘certain thoughts and notions arise through the action of the object thought about on the thinking mind, just as perception arises through the action of the perceived object on the percipient’ (p. 195); but how this differs from the purest empiricism is more than we are able to understand.
It is remarkable that Aristotle, after repeatedly speaking of induction as an ascent380 from particulars to generals, when he comes to trace the process by which we arrive at the most general notions of any, does not admit the possibility of such a movement in one direction only. The universal and the individual are, according to him, combined in our most elementary sense-impressions, and the business of scientific393 experience is to separate them. Starting from a middle point, we work up to indivisible predicates on the one hand and down to indivisible subjects on the other, the final apprehension381 of both extremes being the office, not of science, but of Nous. This theory is equally true and acute. The perception of individual facts is just as difficult and just as slowly acquired as the conception of ultimate abstractions. Moreover, the two processes are carried on pari passu, each being only made possible by and through the other. No true notion can be framed without a firm grasp of the particulars from which it is abstracted; no individual object can be studied without analysing it into a group of common predicates, the idiosyncrasy of which—that is, their special combination—differentiates it from every other object. What, however, we wish to remark is the illustration incidentally afforded by this striking aper?u of Aristotle’s analytical method, which is also the essentially Greek method of thought. We saw that, for our philosopher, syllogism was not the subsumption of a particular case under a general law, but the interpolation of a mean between two extremes; we now see that his induction is not the finding of a law for the particular phenomenon, but its analysis into two elements—one universal and the other individual—a solution of the mean into the extremes. And the distinctive382 originality of his whole system was to fix two such extremes for the universe—a self-thinking thought in absolute self-identity at one end of the scale, and an absolutely indeterminate matter at the other; by combining which in various proportions he then re-constructed the whole intermediate phenomenal reality. In studying each particular class of facts, he follows the same method. The genus is marked by some characteristic attribute which one species—the prerogative383 species, so to speak—exhibits in its greatest purity, while the others form a graduated scale by variously combining this attribute with its opposite or privation. Hence his theory, since revived by Goethe, that394 the colours are so many different mixtures of light and darkness.
It has, until lately, been customary to speak as if all that Aristotle knew about induction was contained in a few scattered384 passages where it is mentioned under that name in the Analytics. This, no doubt, is true, if by induction we mean simple generalisation. But if we understand by it the philosophy of experimental evidence—the analysis of those means by which, in the absence of direct observation, we decide between two conflicting hypotheses—then the Topics must be pronounced as good a discussion on the subject as was compatible with his general theory of knowledge. For he supposes that there are large classes of phenomena, including, among other things, the whole range of human life, which, not being bound by any fixed order, lie outside the scope of scientific demonstration, although capable of being determined with various degrees of probability; and here also what he has in view is not the discovery of laws, but the construction of definitions. These being a matter of opinion, could always be attacked as well as maintained. Thus the constant conflict and balancing of opposite forces, which we have learned to associate with the sublunary sphere, has its logical representative no less than the kindred ideas of uncertainty and vicissitude385. And, in connexion with this side of applied logic, Aristotle has also to consider the requirements of those who took part in the public debates on disputed questions, then very common among educated Athenians, and frequently turning on verbal definitions. Hence, while we find many varieties of reasoning suggested, such as Reasoning by Analogy, Disjunctive Reasoning, Hypothetical Reasoning (though without a generalised expression for all its varieties), and, what is most remarkable, three out of Mill’s four Experimental Methods,288 we do not find that any interesting or395 useful application is made of them. Even considered as a handbook for debaters, the Topics is not successful. With the practical incompetence386 of a mere naturalist, Aristotle has supplied heads for arguments in such profusion387 and such utter carelessness of their relative importance that no memory could sustain the burden, except in the probably rare instances when a lifetime was devoted to their study.
VIII.
We have now concluded our survey of the first great mental antithesis, that between reason on the one hand, and sense and opinion on the other. The next antithesis, that between reason and passion, will occupy us a much shorter time. With it we pass from theory to practice, from metaphysics and logic to moral philosophy. But, as we saw in the preceding chapter, Aristotle is not a practical genius; for him the supreme interest of life is still the acquisition of knowledge. Theorising activity corresponds to the celestial world, in which there can be neither opposition nor excess; while passion corresponds to the sublunary sphere, where order is only preserved by the balancing of antithetical forces; and the moderating influence of reason, to the control exercised by the higher over the lower system.
The passions themselves, and the means by which they can be either excited or controlled, are described in Aristotle’s Rhetoric388 with wonderful knowledge of human nature in the abstract, but with almost no reference to the art for whose purposes the information is ostensibly systematised; while in the Ethics they are studied, so to speak, statically, in their condition of permanent equilibration or disequilibration; the virtues389 and vices390 being represented as so many different396 aspects of those conditions. It is obvious that such an extremely artificial parallelism could not be carried out without a considerable strain and distortion of the facts involved. The only virtue that can, with truth, be described as a form of moderation is temperance; and even in temperance this is accidental rather than essential. Elsewhere Aristotle deduces the extremes from the mean rather than the mean from the extremes; and sometimes one of the extremes is invented for the occasion. To fit justice, confessedly the most important virtue, into such a scheme, was obviously impracticable without reinterpreting the idea of moderation. Instead of an equilibrium between opposing impulses in the same person, we have equality in the treatment of different persons; which again resolves itself into giving them their own, without any definite determination of what their own may be.289 It cannot even be said that Aristotle represented either the best ethical391 thought of his own age, or an indispensable stage in the evolution of all thought. The extreme insufficiency of his ethical theory is due to the fancied necessity of squaring it with the requirements of his cosmological system. For no sooner does he place himself at the popular point of view than he deduces the particular virtues from regard to the welfare of others, and treats them all as so many different forms of justice.290
Aristotle has sometimes been represented as an advocate of free-will against necessity. But the question had not really been opened in his time. He rejected fatalism; but it had not occurred to him that internal motives might exercise a constraining392 power over action. Nor has his freedom anything to do with the self-assertion of mind, its extrication393 from the chain of physical antecedents. It is simply the element of397 arbitrariness and uncertainty supposed to characterise the region of change and opposition, as distinguished from the higher region of undeviating regularity.
It is only in this higher region that perfect virtue can be realised. The maintenance of a settled balance between rival solicitations, or between the excess and defect of those impulses which lead us to seek pleasure and avoid pain, is good indeed, but neither the only nor the chief good. The law of moderation does not extend to that supremely394 happy life which is related to our emotional existence as the aether to the terrestrial elements, as soul to body, as reason to sense, as science to opinion. Here it is the steady subordination of means to ends which imitates the insphering of the heavenly orbs395, the hierarchy of psychic faculties, and the chain of syllogistic arguments. Of theoretic activity we cannot have too much, and all other activities, whether public or private, should be regarded as so much machinery for ensuring its peaceful prosecution396. Wisdom and temperance had been absolutely identified by Socrates; they are as absolutely held apart by Aristotle. And what we have had occasion to observe in the other departments of thought is verified here once more. The method of analysis and opposition, apparently so prudent397, proved, in the end, unfruitful. Notwithstanding his paradoxes398, Socrates was substantially right. The moral regeneration of the world was destined to be brought about, not by Dorian discipline, but by free Athenian thought, working on practical conceptions—by the discovery of new moral truth, or rather by the dialectic development of old truth. And, conversely, the highest development of theoretic activity was not attained399 by isolating400 it in egoistic self-contemplation from the world of human needs, but by consecrating401 it to their service, informing it with their vitality, and subjecting it, in common with them, to that law of moderation from which no energy, however godlike, is exempt.
The final antithesis of conscious life is that between the398 individual and the state. In this sense, Aristotle’s Politics is the completion of his Ethics. It is only in a well-ordered community that moral habits can be acquired; and it is only in such a community that the best or intellectual life can be attained, although, properly speaking, it is not a social life. Nevertheless, the Politics, like every other portion of Aristotle’s system, reproduces within itself the elements of an independent whole. To understand its internal organisation402, we must begin by disregarding Aristotle’s abortive403 classification (chiefly adapted from Plato) of constitutions into three legitimate350—Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Republic; and three illegitimate—Democracy, Oligarchy404, and Tyranny. Aristotle distinguishes them by saying that the legitimate forms are governed with a view to the general good; the illegitimate with a view to the interests of particular classes or persons. But, in point of fact, as Zeller shows,291 he cannot keep up this distinction; and we shall better understand his true idea by substituting for it another—that between the intellectual and the material state. The object of the one is to secure the highest culture for a ruling caste, who are to abstain405 from industrial occupations, and to be supported by the labour of a dependent population. Such a government may be either monarchical406 or aristocratic; but it must necessarily be in the hands of a few. The object of the other is to maintain a stable equilibrium between the opposing interests of rich and poor—two classes practically distinguished as the few and the many. This end is best attained where supreme power belongs to the middle class. The deviations are represented by oligarchy and tyranny on the one side, and by extreme democracy on the other. Where such constitutions exist, the best mode of preserving them is to moderate their characteristic excess by borrowing certain institutions from the opposite form of government, or by modifying their own institutions in a conciliatory sense.
399
In the last chapter we dealt at length with the theories of art, and especially of tragic407 poetry, propounded408 in Aristotle’s Poetics. For the sake of formal completeness, it may be mentioned here that those theories are adapted to the general scheme of his systematic philosophy. The plot or plan of a work answers to the formal or rational element in Nature, and this is why Aristotle so immensely over-estimates its importance. And, just as in his moral philosophy, the ethical element, represented by character-drawing, is strictly subordinated to it. The centre of equilibrium is, however, not supplied by virtue, but by exact imitation of Nature, so that the characters must not deviate409 very far from mediocrity in the direction either of heroism410 or of wickedness.
IX.
Notwithstanding the radical411 error of Aristotle’s philosophy—the false abstraction and isolation of the intellectual from the material sphere in Nature and in human life—it may furnish a useful corrective to the much falser philosophy insinuated412, if not inculcated, by some moralists of our own age and country. Taken altogether, the teaching of these writers seems to be that the industry which addresses itself to the satisfaction of our material wants is much more meritorious413 than the artistic414 work which gives us direct aesthetic415 enjoyment416, or the literary work which stimulates417 and gratifies our intellectual cravings; while within the artistic sphere fidelity418 of portraiture419 is preferred to the creation of ideal beauty; and within the intellectual sphere, mere observation of facts is set above the theorising power by which facts are unified and explained. Some of the school to whom we allude are great enemies of materialism; but teaching like theirs is materialism of the worst description. Consistently carried400 out, it would first reduce Europe to the level of China, and then reduce the whole human race to the level of bees or beavers420. They forget that when we were all comfortably clothed, housed, and fed, our true lives would have only just begun. The choice would then remain between some new refinement of animal appetite and the theorising activity which, according to Aristotle, is the absolute end, every other activity being only a means for its attainment. There is not, indeed, such a fundamental distinction as he supposed, for activities of every order are connected by a continual reciprocity of services; but this only amounts to saying that the highest knowledge is a means to every other end no less than an end in itself. Aristotle is also fully421 justified in urging the necessity of leisure as a condition of intellectual progress. We may add that it is a leisure which is amply earned, for without it industrial production could not be maintained at its present height. Nor should the same standard of perfection be imposed on spiritual as on material labour. The latter could not be carried on at all unless success, and not failure, were the rule. It is otherwise in the ideal sphere. There the proportions are necessarily reversed. We must be content if out of a thousand guesses and trials one should contribute something to the immortal heritage of truth. Yet we may hope that this will not always be so, that the great discoveries and creations wrought422 out through the waste of innumerable lives are not only the expiation423 of all error and suffering in the past, but are also the pledge of a future when such sacrifices shall no longer be required.
The two elements of error and achievement are so intimately blended and mutually conditioned in the philosophy which we have been reviewing, that to decide on their respective importance is impossible without first deciding on a still larger question—the value of systematic thought as such, and apart from its actual content. For Aristotle was perhaps the greatest master of systematisation that ever lived. The401 framework and language of science are still, to a great extent, what he made them; and it remains to be seen whether they will ever be completely remodelled424. Yet even this gift has not been an unmixed benefit, for it was long used in the service of false doctrines, and it still induces critics to read into the Aristotelian forms truths which they do not really contain. Let us conclude by observing that of all the ancients, or even of all thinkers before the eighteenth century, there is none to whom the methods and results of modern science could so easily be explained. While finding that they reversed his own most cherished convictions on every point, he would still be prepared by his logical studies to appreciate the evidence on which they rest, and by his ardent love of truth to accept them without reserve. Most of all would he welcome our astronomy and our biology with wonder and delight, while viewing the development of modern machinery with much more qualified425 admiration426, and the progress of democracy perhaps with suspicious fear. He who thought that the mind and body of an artisan were alike debased by the exercise of some simple handicraft under the pure bright sky of Greece, what would he have said to the effect wrought on human beings by the noisome427, grinding, sunless, soulless drudgery428 of our factories and mines! How profoundly unfitted would he have deemed its victims to influence those political issues with which the interests of science are every day becoming more vitally connected! Yet slowly, perhaps, and unwillingly429, he might be brought to perceive that our industry has been the indispensable basis of our knowledge, as supplying both the material means and the moral ends of its cultivation430. He might also learn that there is an even closer relationship between the two: that while the supporters of privilege are leagued for the maintenance of superstition245, the workers, and those who advocate their claims to political equality, are leagued for its restraint and overthrow. And if402 he still shrank back from the heat and smoke and turmoil431 amid which the genius of our age stands, like another Heracleitus, in feverish432 excitement, by the steam-furnace whence its powers of revolutionary transmutation are derived, we too might reapply the words of the old Ephesian prophet, bidding him enter boldly, for here also there are gods.
END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.
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1 psychology | |
n.心理,心理学,心理状态 | |
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2 logic | |
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
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3 erred | |
犯错误,做错事( err的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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4 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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5 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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6 mediate | |
vi.调解,斡旋;vt.经调解解决;经斡旋促成 | |
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7 intelligible | |
adj.可理解的,明白易懂的,清楚的 | |
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8 demur | |
v.表示异议,反对 | |
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9 proceeding | |
n.行动,进行,(pl.)会议录,学报 | |
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10 authoritative | |
adj.有权威的,可相信的;命令式的;官方的 | |
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11 unity | |
n.团结,联合,统一;和睦,协调 | |
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12 excellences | |
n.卓越( excellence的名词复数 );(只用于所修饰的名词后)杰出的;卓越的;出类拔萃的 | |
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13 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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14 gratitude | |
adj.感激,感谢 | |
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15 genetic | |
adj.遗传的,遗传学的 | |
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16 investigation | |
n.调查,调查研究 | |
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17 dual | |
adj.双的;二重的,二元的 | |
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18 platonic | |
adj.精神的;柏拉图(哲学)的 | |
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19 speculation | |
n.思索,沉思;猜测;投机 | |
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20 actively | |
adv.积极地,勤奋地 | |
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21 canvassed | |
v.(在政治方面)游说( canvass的过去式和过去分词 );调查(如选举前选民的)意见;为讨论而提出(意见等);详细检查 | |
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22 materialist | |
n. 唯物主义者 | |
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23 physicists | |
物理学家( physicist的名词复数 ) | |
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24 incorporeal | |
adj.非物质的,精神的 | |
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25 corporeal | |
adj.肉体的,身体的;物质的 | |
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26 fluctuations | |
波动,涨落,起伏( fluctuation的名词复数 ) | |
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27 phenomena | |
n.现象 | |
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28 subjective | |
a.主观(上)的,个人的 | |
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29 teleology | |
n.目的论 | |
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30 providence | |
n.深谋远虑,天道,天意;远见;节约;上帝 | |
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31 essentially | |
adv.本质上,实质上,基本上 | |
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32 mere | |
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33 mastication | |
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34 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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35 absurdity | |
n.荒谬,愚蠢;谬论 | |
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36 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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37 justification | |
n.正当的理由;辩解的理由 | |
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38 inorganic | |
adj.无生物的;无机的 | |
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39 analogous | |
adj.相似的;类似的 | |
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40 regularity | |
n.规律性,规则性;匀称,整齐 | |
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41 celestial | |
adj.天体的;天上的 | |
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42 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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43 deviations | |
背离,偏离( deviation的名词复数 ); 离经叛道的行为 | |
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44 attain | |
vt.达到,获得,完成 | |
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45 attainment | |
n.达到,到达;[常pl.]成就,造诣 | |
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46 consummate | |
adj.完美的;v.成婚;使完美 [反]baffle | |
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47 dealing | |
n.经商方法,待人态度 | |
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48 precursor | |
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49 precursors | |
n.先驱( precursor的名词复数 );先行者;先兆;初期形式 | |
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50 recurs | |
再发生,复发( recur的第三人称单数 ) | |
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51 vindicate | |
v.为…辩护或辩解,辩明;证明…正确 | |
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52 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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53 enumerate | |
v.列举,计算,枚举,数 | |
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54 enumerated | |
v.列举,枚举,数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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55 orb | |
n.太阳;星球;v.弄圆;成球形 | |
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56 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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57 corpse | |
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58 aggregate | |
adj.总计的,集合的;n.总数;v.合计;集合 | |
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59 manifestation | |
n.表现形式;表明;现象 | |
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60 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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61 vehemence | |
n.热切;激烈;愤怒 | |
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62 absurdities | |
n.极端无理性( absurdity的名词复数 );荒谬;谬论;荒谬的行为 | |
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63 disciple | |
n.信徒,门徒,追随者 | |
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64 testimony | |
n.证词;见证,证明 | |
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65 controversy | |
n.争论,辩论,争吵 | |
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66 fascination | |
n.令人着迷的事物,魅力,迷恋 | |
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67 promulgation | |
n.颁布 | |
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68 triumphant | |
adj.胜利的,成功的;狂欢的,喜悦的 | |
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69 necessitate | |
v.使成为必要,需要 | |
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70 innate | |
adj.天生的,固有的,天赋的 | |
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71 sarcastic | |
adj.讥讽的,讽刺的,嘲弄的 | |
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72 analytic | |
adj.分析的,用分析方法的 | |
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73 avowedly | |
adv.公然地 | |
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74 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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75 arsenal | |
n.兵工厂,军械库 | |
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76 primitive | |
adj.原始的;简单的;n.原(始)人,原始事物 | |
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77 likeness | |
n.相像,相似(之处) | |
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78 metaphor | |
n.隐喻,暗喻 | |
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79 infinity | |
n.无限,无穷,大量 | |
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80 qualitative | |
adj.性质上的,质的,定性的 | |
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81 quantitative | |
adj.数量的,定量的 | |
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82 transcend | |
vt.超出,超越(理性等)的范围 | |
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83 apprehended | |
逮捕,拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 ); 理解 | |
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84 perpetuation | |
n.永存,不朽 | |
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85 relegate | |
v.使降级,流放,移交,委任 | |
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86 antithesis | |
n.对立;相对 | |
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87 sterile | |
adj.不毛的,不孕的,无菌的,枯燥的,贫瘠的 | |
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88 mutual | |
adj.相互的,彼此的;共同的,共有的 | |
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89 shred | |
v.撕成碎片,变成碎片;n.碎布条,细片,些少 | |
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90 pervading | |
v.遍及,弥漫( pervade的现在分词 ) | |
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91 perplexed | |
adj.不知所措的 | |
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92 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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93 speculative | |
adj.思索性的,暝想性的,推理的 | |
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94 mathematician | |
n.数学家 | |
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95 naturalist | |
n.博物学家(尤指直接观察动植物者) | |
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96 logician | |
n.逻辑学家 | |
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97 doctrines | |
n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 );教义;学说;(政府政策的)正式声明 | |
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98 consistency | |
n.一贯性,前后一致,稳定性;(液体的)浓度 | |
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99 simultaneously | |
adv.同时发生地,同时进行地 | |
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100 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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101 contradictory | |
adj.反驳的,反对的,抗辩的;n.正反对,矛盾对立 | |
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102 modifications | |
n.缓和( modification的名词复数 );限制;更改;改变 | |
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103 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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104 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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105 ascertain | |
vt.发现,确定,查明,弄清 | |
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106 inquiry | |
n.打听,询问,调查,查问 | |
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107 embodied | |
v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 );象征;包括;包含 | |
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108 investigations | |
(正式的)调查( investigation的名词复数 ); 侦查; 科学研究; 学术研究 | |
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109 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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110 dispositions | |
安排( disposition的名词复数 ); 倾向; (财产、金钱的)处置; 气质 | |
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111 apparently | |
adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
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112 conspicuousness | |
显著,卓越,突出; 显著性 | |
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113 dependence | |
n.依靠,依赖;信任,信赖;隶属 | |
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114 diminution | |
n.减少;变小 | |
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115 alteration | |
n.变更,改变;蚀变 | |
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116 vice | |
n.坏事;恶习;[pl.]台钳,老虎钳;adj.副的 | |
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117 simplicity | |
n.简单,简易;朴素;直率,单纯 | |
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118 condemned | |
adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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119 constituent | |
n.选民;成分,组分;adj.组成的,构成的 | |
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120 constituents | |
n.选民( constituent的名词复数 );成分;构成部分;要素 | |
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121 materialism | |
n.[哲]唯物主义,唯物论;物质至上 | |
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122 dreaded | |
adj.令人畏惧的;害怕的v.害怕,恐惧,担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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123 sentimental | |
adj.多愁善感的,感伤的 | |
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124 negation | |
n.否定;否认 | |
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125 entities | |
实体对像; 实体,独立存在体,实际存在物( entity的名词复数 ) | |
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126 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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127 specification | |
n.详述;[常pl.]规格,说明书,规范 | |
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128 integration | |
n.一体化,联合,结合 | |
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129 transformation | |
n.变化;改造;转变 | |
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130 transformations | |
n.变化( transformation的名词复数 );转换;转换;变换 | |
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131 vein | |
n.血管,静脉;叶脉,纹理;情绪;vt.使成脉络 | |
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132 heterogeneous | |
adj.庞杂的;异类的 | |
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133 conversion | |
n.转化,转换,转变 | |
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134 obsolete | |
adj.已废弃的,过时的 | |
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135 invertebrate | |
n.无脊椎动物 | |
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136 molecules | |
分子( molecule的名词复数 ) | |
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137 starch | |
n.淀粉;vt.给...上浆 | |
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138 favourable | |
adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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139 consensus | |
n.(意见等的)一致,一致同意,共识 | |
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140 potency | |
n. 效力,潜能 | |
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141 jot | |
n.少量;vi.草草记下;vt.匆匆写下 | |
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142 guise | |
n.外表,伪装的姿态 | |
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143 peripatetic | |
adj.漫游的,逍遥派的,巡回的 | |
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144 aggregates | |
数( aggregate的名词复数 ); 总计; 骨料; 集料(可成混凝土或修路等用的) | |
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145 diffusion | |
n.流布;普及;散漫 | |
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146 molecular | |
adj.分子的;克分子的 | |
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147 vibrations | |
n.摆动( vibration的名词复数 );震动;感受;(偏离平衡位置的)一次性往复振动 | |
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148 predecessors | |
n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 );前辈;(被取代的)原有事物;前身 | |
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149 interval | |
n.间隔,间距;幕间休息,中场休息 | |
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150 enumeration | |
n.计数,列举;细目;详表;点查 | |
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151 primordial | |
adj.原始的;最初的 | |
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152 accomplishment | |
n.完成,成就,(pl.)造诣,技能 | |
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153 postulate | |
n.假定,基本条件;vt.要求,假定 | |
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154 eternity | |
n.不朽,来世;永恒,无穷 | |
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155 axiomatic | |
adj.不需证明的,不言自明的 | |
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156 machinery | |
n.(总称)机械,机器;机构 | |
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157 incompatible | |
adj.不相容的,不协调的,不相配的 | |
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158 astronomical | |
adj.天文学的,(数字)极大的 | |
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159 triumphantly | |
ad.得意洋洋地;得胜地;成功地 | |
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160 downwards | |
adj./adv.向下的(地),下行的(地) | |
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161 converging | |
adj.收敛[缩]的,会聚的,趋同的v.(线条、运动的物体等)会于一点( converge的现在分词 );(趋于)相似或相同;人或车辆汇集;聚集 | |
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162 astronomers | |
n.天文学者,天文学家( astronomer的名词复数 ) | |
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163 circumference | |
n.圆周,周长,圆周线 | |
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164 constrained | |
adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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165 necessitates | |
使…成为必要,需要( necessitate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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166 diurnal | |
adj.白天的,每日的 | |
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167 rotation | |
n.旋转;循环,轮流 | |
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168 transparent | |
adj.明显的,无疑的;透明的 | |
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169 subtlety | |
n.微妙,敏锐,精巧;微妙之处,细微的区别 | |
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170 cosmos | |
n.宇宙;秩序,和谐 | |
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171 ascending | |
adj.上升的,向上的 | |
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172 upwards | |
adv.向上,在更高处...以上 | |
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173 outermost | |
adj.最外面的,远离中心的 | |
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174 starry | |
adj.星光照耀的, 闪亮的 | |
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175 everlasting | |
adj.永恒的,持久的,无止境的 | |
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176 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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177 confession | |
n.自白,供认,承认 | |
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178 creed | |
n.信条;信念,纲领 | |
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179 perfectly | |
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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180 emphatic | |
adj.强调的,着重的;无可置疑的,明显的 | |
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181 accomplished | |
adj.有才艺的;有造诣的;达到了的 | |
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182 ethics | |
n.伦理学;伦理观,道德标准 | |
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183 slumbering | |
微睡,睡眠(slumber的现在分词形式) | |
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184 faculties | |
n.能力( faculty的名词复数 );全体教职员;技巧;院 | |
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185 isolate | |
vt.使孤立,隔离 | |
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186 diffused | |
散布的,普及的,扩散的 | |
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187 transcends | |
超出或超越(经验、信念、描写能力等)的范围( transcend的第三人称单数 ); 优于或胜过… | |
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188 benevolent | |
adj.仁慈的,乐善好施的 | |
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189 omnipotent | |
adj.全能的,万能的 | |
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190 benevolence | |
n.慈悲,捐助 | |
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191 Christian | |
adj.基督教徒的;n.基督教徒 | |
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192 omission | |
n.省略,删节;遗漏或省略的事物,冗长 | |
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193 faculty | |
n.才能;学院,系;(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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194 inertia | |
adj.惰性,惯性,懒惰,迟钝 | |
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195 sidereal | |
adj.恒星的 | |
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196 demonstrations | |
证明( demonstration的名词复数 ); 表明; 表达; 游行示威 | |
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197 demonstration | |
n.表明,示范,论证,示威 | |
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198 accurately | |
adv.准确地,精确地 | |
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199 friction | |
n.摩擦,摩擦力 | |
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200 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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201 motive | |
n.动机,目的;adv.发动的,运动的 | |
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202 relentless | |
adj.残酷的,不留情的,无怜悯心的 | |
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203 evasion | |
n.逃避,偷漏(税) | |
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204 tenor | |
n.男高音(歌手),次中音(乐器),要旨,大意 | |
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205 reconciliation | |
n.和解,和谐,一致 | |
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206 spatial | |
adj.空间的,占据空间的 | |
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207 sublime | |
adj.崇高的,伟大的;极度的,不顾后果的 | |
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208 veneration | |
n.尊敬,崇拜 | |
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209 mythology | |
n.神话,神话学,神话集 | |
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210 creeds | |
(尤指宗教)信条,教条( creed的名词复数 ) | |
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211 abode | |
n.住处,住所 | |
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212 glorified | |
美其名的,变荣耀的 | |
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213 revolving | |
adj.旋转的,轮转式的;循环的v.(使)旋转( revolve的现在分词 );细想 | |
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214 disappearance | |
n.消失,消散,失踪 | |
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215 eloquent | |
adj.雄辩的,口才流利的;明白显示出的 | |
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216 immortality | |
n.不死,不朽 | |
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217 immortal | |
adj.不朽的;永生的,不死的;神的 | |
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218 antiquity | |
n.古老;高龄;古物,古迹 | |
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219 exempt | |
adj.免除的;v.使免除;n.免税者,被免除义务者 | |
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220 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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221 inclination | |
n.倾斜;点头;弯腰;斜坡;倾度;倾向;爱好 | |
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222 laborious | |
adj.吃力的,努力的,不流畅 | |
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223 atlas | |
n.地图册,图表集 | |
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224 fabled | |
adj.寓言中的,虚构的 | |
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225 animated | |
adj.生气勃勃的,活跃的,愉快的 | |
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226 momentum | |
n.动力,冲力,势头;动量 | |
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227 necessitating | |
使…成为必要,需要( necessitate的现在分词 ) | |
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228 relaxation | |
n.松弛,放松;休息;消遣;娱乐 | |
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229 doomed | |
命定的 | |
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230 torment | |
n.折磨;令人痛苦的东西(人);vt.折磨;纠缠 | |
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231 mediates | |
调停,调解,斡旋( mediate的第三人称单数 ); 居间促成; 影响…的发生; 使…可能发生 | |
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232 pervaded | |
v.遍及,弥漫( pervade的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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233 decomposed | |
已分解的,已腐烂的 | |
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234 formerly | |
adv.从前,以前 | |
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235 equilibrium | |
n.平衡,均衡,相称,均势,平静 | |
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236 revolve | |
vi.(使)旋转;循环出现 | |
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237 axis | |
n.轴,轴线,中心线;坐标轴,基准线 | |
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238 anticipation | |
n.预期,预料,期望 | |
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239 decomposition | |
n. 分解, 腐烂, 崩溃 | |
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240 scholastic | |
adj.学校的,学院的,学术上的 | |
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241 allude | |
v.提及,暗指 | |
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242 overlapped | |
_adj.重叠的v.部分重叠( overlap的过去式和过去分词 );(物体)部份重叠;交叠;(时间上)部份重叠 | |
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243 overlap | |
v.重叠,与…交叠;n.重叠 | |
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244 ardent | |
adj.热情的,热烈的,强烈的,烈性的 | |
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245 superstition | |
n.迷信,迷信行为 | |
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246 superstitions | |
迷信,迷信行为( superstition的名词复数 ) | |
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247 conjecture | |
n./v.推测,猜测 | |
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248 ascertained | |
v.弄清,确定,查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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249 permanently | |
adv.永恒地,永久地,固定不变地 | |
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250 configurations | |
n.[化学]结构( configuration的名词复数 );构造;(计算机的)配置;构形(原子在分子中的相对空间位置) | |
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251 convertible | |
adj.可改变的,可交换,同意义的;n.有活动摺篷的汽车 | |
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252 originality | |
n.创造力,独创性;新颖 | |
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253 underlying | |
adj.在下面的,含蓄的,潜在的 | |
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254 isolation | |
n.隔离,孤立,分解,分离 | |
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255 systematic | |
adj.有系统的,有计划的,有方法的 | |
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256 illustrated | |
adj. 有插图的,列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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257 illustrate | |
v.举例说明,阐明;图解,加插图 | |
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258 psychic | |
n.对超自然力敏感的人;adj.有超自然力的 | |
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259 speck | |
n.微粒,小污点,小斑点 | |
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260 teleological | |
adj.目的论的 | |
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261 necessitated | |
使…成为必要,需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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262 anatomy | |
n.解剖学,解剖;功能,结构,组织 | |
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263 physiology | |
n.生理学,生理机能 | |
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264 chimerical | |
adj.荒诞不经的,梦幻的 | |
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265 sundry | |
adj.各式各样的,种种的 | |
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266 physiologists | |
n.生理学者( physiologist的名词复数 );生理学( physiology的名词复数 );生理机能 | |
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267 biassed | |
(统计试验中)结果偏倚的,有偏的 | |
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268 treatise | |
n.专著;(专题)论文 | |
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269 antiquated | |
adj.陈旧的,过时的 | |
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270 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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271 precluded | |
v.阻止( preclude的过去式和过去分词 );排除;妨碍;使…行不通 | |
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272 gulf | |
n.海湾;深渊,鸿沟;分歧,隔阂 | |
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273 corruptible | |
易腐败的,可以贿赂的 | |
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274 vitality | |
n.活力,生命力,效力 | |
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275 bestows | |
赠给,授予( bestow的第三人称单数 ) | |
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276 intervention | |
n.介入,干涉,干预 | |
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277 anthropology | |
n.人类学 | |
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278 devoted | |
adj.忠诚的,忠实的,热心的,献身于...的 | |
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279 disturbance | |
n.动乱,骚动;打扰,干扰;(身心)失调 | |
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280 affinity | |
n.亲和力,密切关系 | |
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281 enumerates | |
v.列举,枚举,数( enumerate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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282 briefly | |
adv.简单地,简短地 | |
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283 unaware | |
a.不知道的,未意识到的 | |
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284 stimulation | |
n.刺激,激励,鼓舞 | |
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285 imprinting | |
n.胚教,铭记(动物生命早期即起作用的一种学习机能);印记 | |
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286 interpretation | |
n.解释,说明,描述;艺术处理 | |
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287 perishable | |
adj.(尤指食物)易腐的,易坏的 | |
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288 commentators | |
n.评论员( commentator的名词复数 );时事评论员;注释者;实况广播员 | |
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289 emanating | |
v.从…处传出,传出( emanate的现在分词 );产生,表现,显示 | |
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290 utterly | |
adv.完全地,绝对地 | |
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291 recipient | |
a.接受的,感受性强的 n.接受者,感受者,容器 | |
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292 embodying | |
v.表现( embody的现在分词 );象征;包括;包含 | |
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293 previously | |
adv.以前,先前(地) | |
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294 engendered | |
v.产生(某形势或状况),造成,引起( engender的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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295 specified | |
adj.特定的 | |
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296 embryonic | |
adj.胚胎的 | |
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297 secondly | |
adv.第二,其次 | |
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298 astounding | |
adj.使人震惊的vt.使震惊,使大吃一惊astound的现在分词) | |
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299 materialistic | |
a.唯物主义的,物质享乐主义的 | |
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300 eminent | |
adj.显赫的,杰出的,有名的,优良的 | |
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301 unify | |
vt.使联合,统一;使相同,使一致 | |
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302 utterances | |
n.发声( utterance的名词复数 );说话方式;语调;言论 | |
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303 naturalists | |
n.博物学家( naturalist的名词复数 );(文学艺术的)自然主义者 | |
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304 sonorous | |
adj.响亮的,回响的;adv.圆润低沉地;感人地;n.感人,堂皇 | |
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305 explicitly | |
ad.明确地,显然地 | |
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306 explicit | |
adj.详述的,明确的;坦率的;显然的 | |
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307 sentient | |
adj.有知觉的,知悉的;adv.有感觉能力地 | |
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308 clinches | |
n.(尤指两人)互相紧紧抱[扭]住( clinch的名词复数 );解决(争端、交易),达成(协议)v.(尤指两人)互相紧紧抱[扭]住( clinch的第三人称单数 );解决(争端、交易),达成(协议) | |
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309 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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310 inaccessible | |
adj.达不到的,难接近的 | |
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311 reiterated | |
反复地说,重申( reiterate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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312 obliterate | |
v.擦去,涂抹,去掉...痕迹,消失,除去 | |
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313 chasm | |
n.深坑,断层,裂口,大分岐,利害冲突 | |
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314 rigid | |
adj.严格的,死板的;刚硬的,僵硬的 | |
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315 mediating | |
调停,调解,斡旋( mediate的现在分词 ); 居间促成; 影响…的发生; 使…可能发生 | |
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316 synthetic | |
adj.合成的,人工的;综合的;n.人工制品 | |
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317 encumbrances | |
n.负担( encumbrance的名词复数 );累赘;妨碍;阻碍 | |
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318 celebrated | |
adj.有名的,声誉卓著的 | |
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319 enlist | |
vt.谋取(支持等),赢得;征募;vi.入伍 | |
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320 unified | |
(unify 的过去式和过去分词); 统一的; 统一标准的; 一元化的 | |
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321 thereby | |
adv.因此,从而 | |
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322 illustrating | |
给…加插图( illustrate的现在分词 ); 说明; 表明; (用示例、图画等)说明 | |
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323 criticise | |
v.批评,评论;非难 | |
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324 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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325 syllogism | |
n.演绎法,三段论法 | |
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326 judgments | |
判断( judgment的名词复数 ); 鉴定; 评价; 审判 | |
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327 penetrating | |
adj.(声音)响亮的,尖锐的adj.(气味)刺激的adj.(思想)敏锐的,有洞察力的 | |
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328 enquire | |
v.打听,询问;调查,查问 | |
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329 hierarchy | |
n.等级制度;统治集团,领导层 | |
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330 descending | |
n. 下行 adj. 下降的 | |
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331 syllogistic | |
adj.三段论法的,演绎的,演绎性的 | |
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332 formulate | |
v.用公式表示;规划;设计;系统地阐述 | |
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333 destined | |
adj.命中注定的;(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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334 strictly | |
adv.严厉地,严格地;严密地 | |
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335 contingent | |
adj.视条件而定的;n.一组,代表团,分遣队 | |
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336 reciprocating | |
adj.往复的;来回的;交替的;摆动的v.报答,酬答( reciprocate的现在分词 );(机器的部件)直线往复运动 | |
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337 premises | |
n.建筑物,房屋 | |
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338 premise | |
n.前提;v.提论,预述 | |
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339 minor | |
adj.较小(少)的,较次要的;n.辅修学科;vi.辅修 | |
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340 valid | |
adj.有确实根据的;有效的;正当的,合法的 | |
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341 supernal | |
adj.天堂的,天上的;崇高的 | |
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342 conversions | |
变换( conversion的名词复数 ); (宗教、信仰等)彻底改变; (尤指为居住而)改建的房屋; 橄榄球(触地得分后再把球射中球门的)附加得分 | |
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343 juxtaposition | |
n.毗邻,并置,并列 | |
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344 indifference | |
n.不感兴趣,不关心,冷淡,不在乎 | |
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345 overthrow | |
v.推翻,打倒,颠覆;n.推翻,瓦解,颠覆 | |
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346 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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347 staple | |
n.主要产物,常用品,主要要素,原料,订书钉,钩环;adj.主要的,重要的;vt.分类 | |
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348 elimination | |
n.排除,消除,消灭 | |
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349 sifted | |
v.筛( sift的过去式和过去分词 );筛滤;细查;详审 | |
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350 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
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351 rejection | |
n.拒绝,被拒,抛弃,被弃 | |
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352 canine | |
adj.犬的,犬科的 | |
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353 joint | |
adj.联合的,共同的;n.关节,接合处;v.连接,贴合 | |
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354 redundant | |
adj.多余的,过剩的;(食物)丰富的;被解雇的 | |
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355 defective | |
adj.有毛病的,有问题的,有瑕疵的 | |
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356 questionable | |
adj.可疑的,有问题的 | |
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357 deduction | |
n.减除,扣除,减除额;推论,推理,演绎 | |
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358 induction | |
n.感应,感应现象 | |
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359 refinement | |
n.文雅;高尚;精美;精制;精炼 | |
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360 unravel | |
v.弄清楚(秘密);拆开,解开,松开 | |
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361 texture | |
n.(织物)质地;(材料)构造;结构;肌理 | |
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362 disastrous | |
adj.灾难性的,造成灾害的;极坏的,很糟的 | |
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363 terminology | |
n.术语;专有名词 | |
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364 analytical | |
adj.分析的;用分析法的 | |
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365 nexus | |
n.联系;关系 | |
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366 intercedes | |
v.斡旋,调解( intercede的第三人称单数 );说情 | |
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367 systematically | |
adv.有系统地 | |
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368 nugatory | |
adj.琐碎的,无价值的 | |
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369 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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370 remarkably | |
ad.不同寻常地,相当地 | |
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371 justified | |
a.正当的,有理的 | |
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372 underlies | |
v.位于或存在于(某物)之下( underlie的第三人称单数 );构成…的基础(或起因),引起 | |
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373 gratuitous | |
adj.无偿的,免费的;无缘无故的,不必要的 | |
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374 sneer | |
v.轻蔑;嘲笑;n.嘲笑,讥讽的言语 | |
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375 professed | |
公开声称的,伪称的,已立誓信教的 | |
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376 alleged | |
a.被指控的,嫌疑的 | |
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377 deference | |
n.尊重,顺从;敬意 | |
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378 uncertainty | |
n.易变,靠不住,不确知,不确定的事物 | |
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379 contingency | |
n.意外事件,可能性 | |
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380 ascent | |
n.(声望或地位)提高;上升,升高;登高 | |
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381 apprehension | |
n.理解,领悟;逮捕,拘捕;忧虑 | |
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382 distinctive | |
adj.特别的,有特色的,与众不同的 | |
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383 prerogative | |
n.特权 | |
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384 scattered | |
adj.分散的,稀疏的;散步的;疏疏落落的 | |
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385 vicissitude | |
n.变化,变迁,荣枯,盛衰 | |
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386 incompetence | |
n.不胜任,不称职 | |
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387 profusion | |
n.挥霍;丰富 | |
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388 rhetoric | |
n.修辞学,浮夸之言语 | |
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389 virtues | |
美德( virtue的名词复数 ); 德行; 优点; 长处 | |
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390 vices | |
缺陷( vice的名词复数 ); 恶习; 不道德行为; 台钳 | |
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391 ethical | |
adj.伦理的,道德的,合乎道德的 | |
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392 constraining | |
强迫( constrain的现在分词 ); 强使; 限制; 约束 | |
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393 extrication | |
n.解脱;救出,解脱 | |
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394 supremely | |
adv.无上地,崇高地 | |
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395 orbs | |
abbr.off-reservation boarding school 在校寄宿学校n.球,天体,圆形物( orb的名词复数 ) | |
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396 prosecution | |
n.起诉,告发,检举,执行,经营 | |
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397 prudent | |
adj.谨慎的,有远见的,精打细算的 | |
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398 paradoxes | |
n.似非而是的隽语,看似矛盾而实际却可能正确的说法( paradox的名词复数 );用于语言文学中的上述隽语;有矛盾特点的人[事物,情况] | |
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399 attained | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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400 isolating | |
adj.孤立的,绝缘的v.使隔离( isolate的现在分词 );将…剔出(以便看清和单独处理);使(某物质、细胞等)分离;使离析 | |
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401 consecrating | |
v.把…奉为神圣,给…祝圣( consecrate的现在分词 );奉献 | |
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402 organisation | |
n.组织,安排,团体,有机休 | |
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403 abortive | |
adj.不成功的,发育不全的 | |
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404 oligarchy | |
n.寡头政治 | |
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405 abstain | |
v.自制,戒绝,弃权,避免 | |
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406 monarchical | |
adj. 国王的,帝王的,君主的,拥护君主制的 =monarchic | |
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407 tragic | |
adj.悲剧的,悲剧性的,悲惨的 | |
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408 propounded | |
v.提出(问题、计划等)供考虑[讨论],提议( propound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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409 deviate | |
v.(from)背离,偏离 | |
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410 heroism | |
n.大无畏精神,英勇 | |
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411 radical | |
n.激进份子,原子团,根号;adj.根本的,激进的,彻底的 | |
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412 insinuated | |
v.暗示( insinuate的过去式和过去分词 );巧妙或迂回地潜入;(使)缓慢进入;慢慢伸入 | |
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413 meritorious | |
adj.值得赞赏的 | |
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414 artistic | |
adj.艺术(家)的,美术(家)的;善于艺术创作的 | |
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415 aesthetic | |
adj.美学的,审美的,有美感 | |
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416 enjoyment | |
n.乐趣;享有;享用 | |
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417 stimulates | |
v.刺激( stimulate的第三人称单数 );激励;使兴奋;起兴奋作用,起刺激作用,起促进作用 | |
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418 fidelity | |
n.忠诚,忠实;精确 | |
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419 portraiture | |
n.肖像画法 | |
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420 beavers | |
海狸( beaver的名词复数 ); 海狸皮毛; 棕灰色; 拼命工作的人 | |
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421 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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422 wrought | |
v.引起;以…原料制作;运转;adj.制造的 | |
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423 expiation | |
n.赎罪,补偿 | |
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424 remodelled | |
v.改变…的结构[形状]( remodel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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425 qualified | |
adj.合格的,有资格的,胜任的,有限制的 | |
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426 admiration | |
n.钦佩,赞美,羡慕 | |
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427 noisome | |
adj.有害的,可厌的 | |
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428 drudgery | |
n.苦工,重活,单调乏味的工作 | |
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429 unwillingly | |
adv.不情愿地 | |
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430 cultivation | |
n.耕作,培养,栽培(法),养成 | |
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431 turmoil | |
n.骚乱,混乱,动乱 | |
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432 feverish | |
adj.发烧的,狂热的,兴奋的 | |
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