The systems of Plato and Aristotle were splendid digressions from the main line of ancient speculation1 rather than stages in its regular development. The philosophers who came after them went back to an earlier tradition, and the influence of the two greatest Hellenic masters, when it was felt at all, was felt almost entirely2 as a disturbing or deflecting3 force. The extraordinary reach of their principles could not, in truth, be appreciated until the organised experience of mankind had accumulated to an extent requiring the application of new rules for its comprehension and utilisation; and to make such an accumulation possible, nothing less was needed than the combined efforts of the whole western world. Such religious, educational, social, and political reforms as those contemplated4 in Plato’s Republic, though originally designed for a single city-community, could not be realised, even approximately, within a narrower field than that offered by the mediaeval church and the feudal6 state. The ideal theory first gained practical significance in connexion with the metaphysics of Christian7 theology. The place given by Plato to mathematics has only been fully8 justified9 by the develop2ment of modern science. So also, Aristotle’s criticism became of practical importance only when the dreams against which it was directed had embodied10 themselves in a fabric11 of oppressive superstition12. Only the vast extension of reasoned knowledge has enabled us to disentangle the vitally important elements of Aristotle’s logic13 from the mass of useless refinements14 in which they are imbedded; his fourfold division of causes could not be estimated rightly even by Bacon, Descartes, or Spinoza; while his arrangement of the sciences, his remarks on classification, and his contributions to comparative biology bring us up to the very verge16 of theories whose first promulgation17 is still fresh in the memories of men.
Again, the spiritualism taught by Plato and Aristotle alike—by the disciple18, indeed, with even more distinctness than by the master—was so entirely inconsistent with the common belief of antiquity19 as to remain a dead letter for nearly six centuries—that is, until the time of Plotinus. The difference between body and mind was recognised by every school, but only as the difference between solid and gaseous20 matter is recognised by us; while the antithesis21 between conscious and unconscious existence, with all its momentous22 consequences, was recognised by none. The old hypothesis had to be thoroughly23 thought out before its insufficiency could be completely and irrevocably confessed.
Nor was this the only reason why the spiritualists lost touch of their age. If in some respects they were far in advance of early Greek thought, in other respects they were far behind it. Their systems were pervaded24 by an unphilosophical dualism which tended to undo27 much that had been achieved by their less prejudiced predecessors29. For this we have partly to blame their environment. The opposition31 of God and the world, heaven and earth, mind and matter, necessity in Nature and free-will in man, was a concession32—though of course an unconscious concession—to the stupid3 bigotry33 of Athens. Yet at the same time they had failed to solve those psychological problems which had most interest for an Athenian public. Instead of following up the attempt made by the Sophists and Socrates to place morality on a scientific foundation, they busied themselves with the construction of a new machinery35 for diminishing the efficacy of temptation or for strengthening the efficacy of law. To the question, What is the highest good? Plato gave an answer which nobody could understand, and Aristotle an answer which was almost absolutely useless to anybody but himself. The other great problem, What is the ultimate foundation of knowledge? was left in an equally unsatisfactory state. Plato never answered it at all; Aristotle merely pointed37 out the negative conditions which must be fulfilled by its solution.
It is not, then, surprising that the Academic and Peripatetic38 schools utterly39 failed to carry on the great movement inaugurated by their respective founders40. The successors of Plato first lost themselves in a labyrinth42 of Pythagorean mysticism, and then sank into the position of mere36 moral instructors44. The history of that remarkable45 revolution by which the Academy regained46 a foremost place in Greek thought, will form the subject of a future chapter: here we may anticipate so far as to observe that it was effected by taking up and presenting in its original purity a tradition of older date than Platonism, though presented under a new aspect and mixed with other elements by Plato. The heirs of Aristotle, after staggering on a few paces under the immense burden of his encyclopaedic bequest48, came to a dead halt, and contented49 themselves with keeping the treasure safe until the time should arrive for its appropriation50 and reinvestment by a stronger speculative52 race.
No sooner did the two imperial systems lose their ascendency than the germs which they had temporarily overshadowed sprang up into vigorous vitality53, and for more than4 five centuries dominated the whole course not only of Greek but of European thought. Of these by far the most important was the naturalistic idea, the belief that physical science might be substituted for religious superstitions54 and local conventions as an impregnable basis of conduct. In a former chapter1 we endeavoured to show that, while there are traces of this idea in the philosophy of Heracleitus, and while its roots stretch far back into the literature and popular faith of Greece, it was formulated55 for the first time by the two great Sophists, Prodicus and Hippias, who, in the momentous division between Nature and Law, placed themselves—Hippias more particularly—on the side of Nature. Two causes led to the temporary discredit56 of their teaching. One was the perversion57 by which natural right became the watchword of those who, like Plato’s Callicles, held that nothing should stand between the strong man and the gratification of his desire for pleasure or for power. The other was the keen criticism of the Humanists, the friends of social convention, who held with Protagoras that Nature was unknowable, or with Gorgias that she did not exist, or with Socrates that her laws were the secret of the gods. It was in particular the overwhelming personal influence of Socrates which triumphed. He drew away from the Sophists their strongest disciple, Antisthenes, and convinced him that philosophy was valuable only in so far as it became a life-renovating power, and that, viewed in this light, it had no relation to anything outside ourselves. But just as Socrates had discarded the physical speculations58 of former teachers, so also did Antisthenes discard the dialectic which Socrates had substituted for them, even to the extent of denying that definition was possible.2 Yet he seems to have kept a firm hold on the two great ideas that were the net result of all previous philosophy, the idea of a cosmos59, the common citizenship60 of which made all men5 potentially equal,3 and the idea of reason as the essential prerogative61 of man.4
Antisthenes pushed to its extreme consequences a movement begun by the naturalistic Sophists. His doctrine62 was what would now be called anarchic collectivism. The State, marriage, private property, and the then accepted forms of religion, were to be abolished, and all mankind were to herd63 promiscuously64 together.5 Either he or his followers65, alone among the ancients, declared that slavery was wrong; and, like Socrates, he held that the virtue66 of men and women was the same.6 But what he meant by this broad human virtue, which according to him was identical with happiness, is not clear. We only know that he dissociated it in the strongest manner from pleasure. ‘I had rather be mad than delighted,’ is one of his characteristic sayings.7 It would appear, however, that what he really objected to was self-indulgence—the pursuit of sensual gratification for its own sake—and that he was ready to welcome the enjoyments67 naturally accompanying the healthy discharge of vital function.8
Antisthenes and his school, of which Diogenes is the most popular and characteristic type, were afterwards known as Cynics; but the name is never mentioned by Plato and Aristotle, nor do they allude69 to the scurrility70 and systematic71 indecency afterwards associated with it. The anecdotes72 relating to this unsavoury subject should be received with extreme suspicion. There has always been a tendency to believe that philosophers carry out in practice what are vulgarly believed to be the logical consequences of their theories. Thus it is related of Pyrrho the Sceptic that when6 out walking he never turned aside to avoid any obstacle or danger, and was only saved from destruction by the vigilance of his friends.9 This is of course a silly fable73; and we have Aristotle’s word for it that the Sceptics took as good care of their lives as other people.10 In like manner we may conjecture74 that the Cynics, advocating as they did a return to Nature and defiance75 of prejudice, were falsely credited with what was falsely supposed to be the practical exemplification of their precepts76. It is at any rate remarkable that Epictêtus, a man not disposed to undervalue the obligations of decorum, constantly refers to Diogenes as a kind of philosophical26 saint, and that he describes the ideal Cynic in words which would apply without alteration77 to the character of a Christian apostle.11
Cynicism, if we understand it rightly, was only the mutilated form of an older philosophy having for its object to set morality free from convention, and to found it anew on a scientific knowledge of natural law. The need of such a system was not felt so long as Plato and Aristotle were unfolding their wonderful schemes for a reorganisation of action and belief. With the temporary collapse78 of those schemes it came once more to the front. The result was a new school which so thoroughly satisfied the demands of the age, that for five centuries the noblest spirits of Greece and Rome, with few exceptions, adhered to its doctrines80; that in dying it bequeathed some of their most vital elements to the metaphysics and the theology by which it was succeeded; that with their decay it reappeared as an important factor in modern thought; and that its name has become imperishably associated in our own language with the proud endurance of suffering, the self-sufficingness of conscious rectitude, and the renunciation of all sympathy, except what may be derived81 from contemplation of the immortal82 dead, whose heroism83 is7 recorded in history, or of the eternal cosmic forces performing their glorious offices with unimpassioned energy and imperturbable84 repose85.
II.
One day, some few years after the death of Aristotle, a short, lean, swarthy young man, of weak build, with clumsily shaped limbs, and head inclined to one side, was standing86 in an Athenian bookshop, intently studying a roll of manuscript. His name was Zeno, and he was a native of Citium, a Greek colony in Cyprus, where the Hellenic element had become adulterated with a considerable Phoenician infusion87. According to some accounts, Zeno had come to the great centre of intellectual activity to study, according to others for the sale of Tyrian purple. At any rate the volume which he held in his hand decided88 his vocation89. It was the second book of Xenophon’s Memoirs90 of Socrates. Zeno eagerly asked where such men as he whose sayings stood recorded there were to be found. At that moment the Cynic Crates34 happened to pass by. ‘There is one of them,’ said the bookseller, ‘follow him.’12
The history of this Crates was distinguished91 by the one solitary92 romance of Greek philosophy. A young lady of noble family, named Hipparchia, fell desperately93 in love with him, refused several most eligible94 suitors, and threatened to kill herself unless she was given to him in marriage. Her parents in despair sent for Crates. Marriage, for a philosopher, was against the principles of his sect95, and he at first joined them in endeavouring to dissuade96 her. Finding his remonstrances97 unavailing, he at last flung at her feet the staff and wallet which constituted his whole worldly possessions, exclaiming,8 ‘Here is the bridegroom, and that is the dower. Think of this matter well, for you cannot be my partner unless you follow the same calling with me.’ Hipparchia consented, and thenceforth, heedless of taunts98, conformed her life in every respect to the Cynic pattern.13
Zeno had more delicacy99 or less fortitude100 than Hipparchia; and the very meagre intellectual fare provided by Crates must have left his inquisitive101 mind unsatisfied. Accordingly we find him leaving this rather disappointing substitute for Socrates, to study philosophy under Stilpo the Megarian dialectician and Polemo the head of the Academy;14 while we know that he must have gone back to Heracleitus for the physical basis from which contemporary speculation had by this time cut itself completely free. At length, about the beginning of the third century B.C., Zeno, after having been a learner for twenty years, opened a school on his own account. As if to mark the practical bearing of his doctrine he chose one of the most frequented resorts in the city for its promulgation. There was at Athens a portico102 called the Poecile Stoa, adorned103 with frescoes104 by Polygn?tus, the greatest painter of the Cimonian period. It was among the monuments of that wonderful city, at once what the Loggia dei Lanzi is to Florence, and what Raphael’s Stanze are to Rome; while, like the Place de la Concorde in Paris, it was darkened by the terrible associations of a revolutionary epoch106. A century before Zeno’s time fourteen hundred Athenian citizens had been slaughtered107 under its colonnades108 by order of the Thirty. ‘I will purify the Stoa,’ said the Cypriote stranger;15 and the feelings still associated with the word Stoicism prove how nobly his promise was fulfilled.
How much of the complete system known in later times under this name was due to Zeno himself, we do not know; for nothing but a few fragments of his and of his immediate110 successors’ writings is left. The idea of combining Antisthenes with Heracleitus, and both with Socrates, probably belongs9 to the founder41 of the school. His successor, Cleanthes, a man of character rather than of intellect, was content to hand on what the master had taught. Then came another Cypriote, Chrysippus, of whom we are told that without him the Stoa would not have existed;16 so thoroughly did he work out the system in all its details, and so strongly did he fortify111 its positions against hostile criticism by a framework of elaborate dialectic. ‘Give me the propositions, and I will find the proofs!’ he used to say to Cleanthes.17 After him, nothing of importance was added to the doctrines of the school; although the spirit by which they were animated112 seems to have undergone profound modifications113 in the lapse79 of ages.
In reality, Stoicism was not, like the older Greek philosophies, a creation of individual genius. It bears the character of a compilation114 both on its first exposition and on its final completion. Polemo, who had been a fine gentleman before he became a philosopher, taunted115 Zeno with filching116 his opinions from every quarter, like the cunning little Phoenician trader that he was.18 And it was said that the seven hundred treatises117 of Chrysippus would be reduced to a blank if everything that he had borrowed from others were to be erased119. He seems, indeed, to have been the father of review-writers, and to have used the reviewer’s right of transcription with more than modern license120. Nearly a whole tragedy of Euripides reappeared in one of his ‘articles,’ and a wit on being asked what he was reading, replied, ‘the Medea of Chrysippus.’19
In this respect Stoicism betrays its descent from the encyclopaedic lectures of the earlier Sophists, particularly Hippias. While professedly subordinating every other study to the art of virtuous122 living, its expositors seem to have either put a very wide interpretation123 on virtue, or else to have raised its foundation to a most unnecessary height. They protested against Aristotle’s glorification124 of knowledge as the supreme125 end, and declared its exclusive pursuit to be merely a more10 refined form of self-indulgence;20 but, being Greeks, they shared the speculative passion with him, and seized on any pretext126 that enabled them to gratify it. And this inquisitiveness127 was apparently128 much stronger in Asiatic Hellas, whence the Stoics129 were almost entirely recruited, than in the old country, where centuries of intellectual activity had issued in a scepticism from which their fresher minds revolted.21 It is mentioned by Zeller as a proof of exhaustion130 and comparative indifference131 to such enquiries, that the Stoics should have fallen back on the Heracleitean philosophy for their physics.22 But all the ideas respecting the constitution of Nature that were then possible had already been put forward. The Greek capacity for discovery was perhaps greater in the third century than at any former time; but from the very progress of science it was necessarily confined to specialists, such as Aristarchus of Samos or Archimedes. And if the Stoics made no original contributions to physical science, they at least accepted what seemed at that time to be its established results; here, as in other respects, offering a marked contrast to the Epicurean school. If a Cleanthes assailed132 the heliocentric hypothesis of Aristarchus on religious grounds, he was treading in the footsteps of Aristotle. It is far more important that he or his successors should have taught the true theory of the earth’s shape, of the moon’s phases, of eclipses, and of the relative size and distance of the heavenly bodies.23 On this last subject, indeed, one of the later Stoics, Posidonius, arrived at or accepted conclusions which, although falling far short of the reality, approximated to it in a very remarkable manner, when we consider what imperfect means of measurement the Greek astronomers133 had at their disposition134.24
11
In returning to one of the older cosmologies, the Stoics placed themselves in opposition to the system of Aristotle as a whole, although on questions of detail they frequently adopted his conclusions. The object of Heracleitus, as against the Pythagoreans, had been to dissolve away every antithesis in a pervading135 unity5 of contradictories136; and, as against the Eleatics, to substitute an eternal series of transformations137 for the changeless unity of absolute existence. The Stoics now applied139 the same method on a scale proportionate to the subsequent development of thought. Aristotle had carefully distinguished God from the world, even to the extent of isolating140 him from all share in its creation and interest in its affairs. The Stoics declared that God and the world were one. So far, it is allowable to call them pantheists. Yet their pantheism was very different from what we are accustomed to denote by that name; from the system of Spinoza, for example. Their strong faith in final causes and in Providence—a faith in which they closely followed Socrates—would be hardly consistent with anything but the ascription of a distinct and individual consciousness to the Supreme Being, which is just what modern pantheists refuse to admit. Their God was sometimes described as the soul of the world, the fiery141 element surrounding and penetrating142 every other kind of matter. What remained was the body of God; but it was a body which he had originally created out of his own substance, and would, in the fulness of time, absorb into that substance again.25 Thus they kept the future conflagration143 foretold144 by Heracleitus, but gave it a more religious colouring. The process of creation was then to begin over again, and all things were to run the same12 course as before down to the minutest particulars, human history repeating itself, and the same persons returning to live the same lives once more.26 Such a belief evidently involved the most rigid145 fatalism: and here again their doctrine offers a pointed contrast to that of Aristotle. The Stagirite, differing, as it would seem, in this respect from all the older physicists146, maintained that there was an element of chance and spontaneity in the sublunary sphere; and without going very deeply into the mechanism147 of motives148 or the theory of moral responsibility, he had claimed a similar indeterminateness for the human will. Stoicism would hear of neither; with it, as with modern science, the chain of causation is unbroken from first to last, and extends to all phenomena150 alike. The old theological notion of an omnipotent151 divine will, or of a destiny superior even to that will, was at once confirmed and continued by the new theory of natural law; just as the predestination of the Reformers reappeared in the metaphysical rationalism of Spinoza.27
This dogma of universal determinism was combined in the Stoical system with an equally outspoken152 materialism154. The capacity for either acting155 or being acted on was, according to Plato, the one convincing evidence of real existence; and he had endeavoured to prove that there is such a thing as mind apart from matter by its possession of this characteristic mark.28 The Stoics simply reversed his argument. Whatever acts or is acted on, they said, must be corporeal156; therefore the soul is a kind of body.29 Here they only followed the common opinion of all philosophers who13 believed in an external world, except Plato and Aristotle, while to a certain extent anticipating the scientific automatism first taught in modern times by Spinoza, and simultaneously157 revived by various thinkers in our own day. To a certain extent only; for they did not recognise the independent reality of a consciousness in which the mechanical processes are either reflected, or represented under a different aspect. And they further gave their theory a somewhat grotesque158 expression by interpreting those qualities and attributes of things, which other materialists have been content to consider as belonging to matter, as themselves actual bodies. For instance, the virtues159 and vices160 were, according to them, so many gaseous currents by which the soul is penetrated162 and shaped—a materialistic163 rendering164 of Plato’s theory that qualities are distinct and independent substances.30
We must mention as an additional point of contrast between the Stoics and the subsequent schools which they most resembled, that while these look on the soul as inseparable from the body, and sharing its fortunes from first to last, although perfectly165 distinct from it in idea, they emphasised the antithesis between the two just as strongly as Plato, giving the soul an absolutely infinite power of self-assertion during our mortal life, and allowing it a continued, though not an immortal, existence after death.31
What has been said of the human soul applies equally to God, who is the soul of the world. He also is conceived under the form of a material but very subtle and all-penetrating element to which our souls are much more closely akin47 than to the coarse clay with which they are temporarily associated. And it was natural that the heavenly bodies, in whose composition the ethereal element seemed so visibly to predominate, should pass with the Stoics, as with Plato and Aristotle, for conscious beings inferior only in sacredness and14 majesty166 to the Supreme Ruler of all.32 Thus, the philosophy which we are studying helps to prove the strength and endurance of the religious reaction to which Socrates first gave an argumentative expression, and by which he was ultimately hurried to his doom167. We may even trace its increasing ascendency through the successive stages of the Naturalistic school. Prodicus simply identified the gods of polytheism with unconscious physical forces;33 Antisthenes, while discarding local worship, believed, like Rousseau, in the existence of a single deity;34 Zeno, or his successors, revived the whole pantheon, but associated it with a pure morality, and explained away its more offensive features by an elaborate system of allegorical interpretation.35
It was not, however, by its legendary168 beliefs that the living power of ancient religion was displayed, but by the study and practice of divination169. This was to the Greeks and Romans what priestly direction is to a Catholic, or the interpretation of Scripture170 texts to a Protestant believer. And the Stoics, in their anxiety to uphold religion as a bulwark171 of morality, went entirely along with the popular superstition; while at the same time they endeavoured to reconcile it with the universality of natural law by the same clumsily rationalistic methods that have found favour with some modern scientific defenders172 of the miraculous173. The signs by which we are enabled to predict an event entered, they said, equally with the event itself, into the order of Nature, being either connected with it by direct causation, as is the configuration174 of the heavenly bodies at a man’s birth with his after fortunes, or determined175 from the beginning of the world to precede it according to an invariable rule, as with the indications derived from inspecting the entrails of sacrificial victims. And when sceptics asked of what use was15 the premonitory sign when everything was predestined, they replied that our behaviour in view of the warning was predestined as well.36
To us the religion of the Stoics is interesting chiefly as a part of the machinery by which they attempted to make good the connexion between natural and moral law, assumed rather than proved by their Sophistic and Cynic precursors176. But before proceeding178 to this branch of the subject we must glance at their mode of conceiving another side of the fundamental relationship between man and the universe. This is logic in its widest sense, so understood as to include the theory of the process by which we get our knowledge and of the ultimate evidence on which it rests, no less than the theory of formal ratiocination179.
III.
In their theory of cognition the Stoics chiefly followed Aristotle; only with them the doctrine of empiricism is enunciated180 so distinctly as to be placed beyond the reach of misinterpretation. The mind is at first a tabula rasa, and all our ideas are derived exclusively from the senses.37 But while knowledge as a whole rests on sense, the validity of each particular sense-perception must be determined by an appeal to reason, in other words, to the totality of our acquired experience.38 So also the first principles of reasoning are not to be postulated181, with Aristotle, as immediately and unconditionally182 certain; they are to be assumed as hypothetically true and gradually tested by the consequences deducible from them.39 Both principles well illustrate184 the synthetic185 method of the Stoics—their habit of bringing into close16 connexion whatever Aristotle had studiously held apart. And we must maintain, in opposition to the German critics, that their method marks a real advance on his. It ought at any rate to find more favour with the experiential school of modern science, with those who hold that the highest mathematical and physical laws are proved, not by the impossibility of conceiving their contradictories, but by their close agreement with all the facts accessible to our observation.
It was a consequence of the principle just stated that in formal logic the Stoics should give precedence to the hypothetical over the categorical syllogism186.40 From one point of view their preference for this mode of stating an argument was an advance on the method of Aristotle, whose reasonings, if explicitly187 set out, would have assumed the form of disjunctive syllogisms. From another point of view it was a return to the older dialectics of Socrates and Plato, who always looked on their major premises188 as possessing only a conditional183 validity—conditional, that is to say, on the consent of their interlocutor. We have further to note that both the disjunctive and the hypothetical syllogism were first recognised as such by the Stoics; a discovery connected with the feature which most profoundly distinguishes their logic from Aristotle’s logic. We showed, in dealing189 with the latter, that it is based on an analysis of the concept, and that all its imperfections are due to that single circumstance. It was the Stoics who first brought judgment190, so fatally neglected by the author of the Analytics, into proper prominence191. Having once grasped propositions as the beginning and end of reasoning, they naturally and under the guidance of common language, passed from simple to complex assertions, and immediately detected the arguments to which these latter serve as a foundation. And if we proceed to ask why they were more interested in judgment than in conception, we shall probably find the explanation to be that their17 philosophy had its root in the ethical192 and practical interests which involve a continual process of injunction and belief, that is to say, a continual association of such disparate notions as an impression and an action; while the Aristotelian philosophy, being ultimately derived from early Greek thought, had for its leading principle the circumscription193 of external objects and their representation under the form of a classified series. Thus the naturalistic system, starting with the application of scientific ideas to human life, ultimately carried back into science the vital idea of Law; that is, of fixed194 relations subsisting195 between disparate phenomena. And this in turn led to the reinterpretation196 of knowledge as the subsumption of less general under more general relations.
Under the guidance of a somewhat similar principle the Stoic109 logicians attempted a reform of Aristotle’s categories. These they reduced to four: Substance, Quality, Disposition, and Relation (τ? ?ποκε?μενον, τ? ποι?ν, τ? π?? ?χον, and τ? πρ?? τι π?? ?χον41); and the change was an improvement in so far as it introduced a certain method and subordination where none existed before; for each category implies, and is contained in, its predecessor28; whereas the only order traceable in Aristotle’s categories refers to the comparative frequency of the questions to which they correspond.
With the idea of subsumption and subordination to law, we pass at once to the Stoic ethics197. For Zeno, the end of life was self-consistency198; for Cleanthes, consistency with Nature; for Chrysippus, both the one and the other.42 The still surviving individualism of the Cynics is represented in the first of these principles; the religious inspiration of the Stoa in the second; and the comprehensiveness of its great systematising intellect in the last. On the other hand, there18 is a vagueness about the idea of self-consistency which seems to date from a time when Stoicism was less a new and exclusive school than an endeavour to appropriate whatever was best in the older schools. For to be consistent is the common ideal of all philosophy, and is just what distinguishes it from the uncalculating impulsiveness199 of ordinary life, the chance inspirations of ordinary thought. But the Peripatetic who chose knowledge as his highest good differed widely from the Hedonist who made pleasure or painlessness his end; and even if they agreed in thinking that the highest pleasure is yielded by knowledge, the Stoic himself would assert that the object of their common pursuit was with both alike essentially200 unmoral. He would, no doubt, maintain that the self-consistency of any theory but his own was a delusion201, and that all false moralities would, if consistently acted out, inevitably202 land their professors in a contradiction.43 Yet the absence of contradiction, although a valuable verification, is too negative a mark to serve for the sole test of rightness; and thus we are led on to the more specific standard of conformability to Nature, whether our own or that of the universe as a whole. Here again a difficulty presents itself. The idea of Nature had taken such a powerful hold on the Greek mind that it was employed by every school in turn—except perhaps by the extreme sceptics, still faithful to the traditions of Protagoras and Gorgias—and was confidently appealed to in support of the most divergent ethical systems. We find it occupying a prominent place both in Plato’s Laws and in Aristotle’s Politics; while the maxim203, Follow Nature, was borrowed by Zeno himself from Polemo, the head of the Academy, or perhaps from Polemo’s predecessor, Xenocrates. And Epicurus, the great opponent of Stoicism, maintained, not without plausibility204, that every19 animal is led by Nature to pursue its own pleasure in preference to any other end.44 Thus, when Cleanthes declared that pleasure was unnatural205,45 he and the Epicureans could not have been talking about the same thing. They must have meant something different by pleasure or by nature or by both.
The last alternative seems the most probable. Nature with the Stoics was a fixed objective order whereby all things work together as co-operant parts of a single system. Each has a certain office to perform, and the perfect performance of it is the creature’s virtue, or reason, or highest good: these three expressions being always used as strictly206 synonymous terms. Here we have the teleology207, the dialectics, and the utilitarianism of Socrates, so worked out and assimilated that they differ only as various aspects of a single truth. The three lines of Socratic teaching had also been drawn209 to a single point by Plato; but his idealism had necessitated210 the creation of a new world for their development and concentration. The idea of Nature as it had grown up under the hands of Heracleitus, the Sophists, and Antisthenes, supplied Zeno with a ready-made mould into which his reforming aspirations212 could be run. The true Republic was not a pattern laid up in heaven, nor was it restricted to the narrow dimensions of a single Hellenic state. It was the whole real universe, in every part of which except in the works of wicked men a divine law was recognised and obeyed.46 Nay213, according to Cleanthes, God’s law is obeyed even by the wicked, and the essence of morality consists only in its voluntary fulfilment. As others20 very vividly214 put it, we are like a dog tied under a cart; if we do not choose to run we shall be dragged along.47
It will now be better understood whence arose the hostility215 of the Stoics to pleasure, and how they could speak of it in what seems such a paradoxical style. It was subjective217 feeling as opposed to objective law; it was relative, particular, and individual, as opposed to their formal standard of right; and it was continually drawing men away from their true nature by acting as a temptation to vice161. Thus, probably for the last reason, Cleanthes could speak of pleasure as contrary to Nature; while less rigorous authorities regarded it as absolutely indifferent, being a consequence of natural actions, not an essential element in their performance. And when their opponents pointed to the universal desire for pleasure as a proof that it was the natural end of animated beings, the Stoics answered that what Nature had in view was not pleasure at all, but the preservation218 of life itself.48
Such an interpretation of instinct introduces us to a new principle—self-interest; and this was, in fact, recognised on all hands as the foundation of right conduct; it was about the question, What is our interest? that the ancient moralists were disagreed. The Cynics apparently held that, for every being, simple existence is the only good, and therefore with them virtue meant limiting oneself to the bare necessaries of life; while by following Nature they meant reducing existence to its lowest terms, and assimilating our actions, so far as possible, to those of the lower animals, plants, or even stones, all of which require no more than to maintain the integrity of their proper nature.
Where the Cynics left off the Stoics began. Recognising simple self-preservation as the earliest interest and duty of man, they held that his ultimate and highest good was complete self-realisation, the development of that rational, social, and beneficent nature which distinguishes him from the lower21 animals.49 Here their teleological219 religion came in as a valuable sanction for their ethics. Epictêtus, probably following older authorities, argues that self-love has purposely been made identical with sociability220. ‘The nature of an animal is to do all things for its own sake. Accordingly God has so ordered the nature of the rational animal that it cannot obtain any particular good without at the same time contributing to the common good. Because it is self-seeking it is not therefore unsocial.’50 But if our happiness depends on external goods, then we shall begin to fight with one another for their possession:51 friends, father, country, the gods themselves, everything will, with good reason, be sacrificed to their attainment221. And, regarding this as a self-evident absurdity222, Epictêtus concludes that our happiness must consist solely223 in a righteous will, which we know to have been the doctrine of his whole school.
We have now reached the great point on which the Stoic ethics differed from that of Plato and Aristotle. The two latter, while upholding virtue as the highest good, allowed external advantages like pleasure and exemption224 from pain to enter into their definition of perfect happiness; nor did they demand the entire suppression of passion, but, on the contrary, assigned it to a certain part in the formation of character. We must add, although it was not a point insisted on by the ancient critics, that they did not bring out the socially beneficent character of virtue with anything like the distinctness of their successors. The Stoics, on the other hand, refused to admit that there was any good but a virtuous will, or that any useful purpose could be served by irrational225 feeling. If the passions agree with virtue they are superfluous226, if they are opposed to it they are mischievous227; and once we give them the rein51 they are more likely to disagree with than to obey it.5222 The severer school had more reason on their side than is commonly admitted. Either there is no such thing as duty at all, or duty must be paramount228 over every other motive149—that is to say, a perfect man will discharge his obligations at the sacrifice of every personal advantage. There is no pleasure that he will not renounce229, no pain that he will not endure, rather than leave them unfulfilled. But to assume this supremacy230 over his will, duty must be incommensurable with any other motive; if it is a good at all, it must be the only good. To identify virtue with happiness seems to us absurd, because we are accustomed to associate it exclusively with those dispositions231 which are the cause of happiness in others, or altruism232; and happiness itself with pleasure or the absence of pain, which are states of feeling necessarily conceived as egoistic. But neither the Stoics nor any other ancient moralists recognised such a distinction. All agreed that public and private interest must somehow be identified; the only question being, should one be merged233 in the other, and if so, which? or should there be an illogical compromise between the two. The alternative chosen by Zeno was incomparably nobler than the method of Epicurus, while it was more consistent than the methods of Plato and Aristotle. He regarded right conduct exclusively in the light of those universal interests with which alone it is properly concerned; and if he appealed to the motives supplied by personal happiness, this was a confusion of phraseology rather than of thought.
The treatment of the passions by the Stoic school presents greater difficulties, due partly to their own vacillation234, partly to the very indefinite nature of the feelings in question. It will be admitted that here also the claims of duty are supreme. To follow the promptings of fear or of anger, of pity or of love, without considering the ulterior consequences of our action, is, of course, wrong. For even if, in any particular instance, no harm comes of the concession, we cannot be sure that such will always be the case; and meanwhile the passion is23 strengthened by indulgence. And we have also to consider the bad effect produced on the character of those who, finding themselves the object of passion, learn to address themselves to it instead of to reason. Difficulties arise when we begin to consider how far education should aim at the systematic discouragement of strong emotion. Here the Stoics seem to have taken up a position not very consistent either with their appeals to Nature or with their teleological assumptions. Nothing strikes one as more unnatural than the complete absence of human feeling; and a believer in design might plausibly235 maintain that every emotion conduced to the preservation either of the individual or of the race. We find, however, that the Stoics, here as elsewhere reversing the Aristotelian method, would not admit the existence of a psychological distinction between reason and passion. According to their analysis, the emotions are so many different forms of judgment. Joy and sorrow are false opinions respecting good and evil in the present: desire and fear, false opinions respecting good and evil in the future.53 But, granting a righteous will to be the only good, and its absence the only evil, there can be no room for any of these feelings in the mind of a truly virtuous man, since his opinions on the subject of good are correct, and its possession depends entirely on himself. Everything else arises from an external necessity, to strive with which would be useless because it is inevitable236, foolish because it is beneficent, and impious because it is supremely237 wise.
It will be seen that the Stoics condemned238 passion not as the cause of immoral239 actions but as intrinsically vicious in itself. Hence their censure240 extended to the rapturous delight and passionate241 grief which seem entirely out of relation to conduct properly so called. This was equivalent to saying that the will has complete control over emotion; a doctrine which our philosophers did not shrink from maintaining. It24 might have been supposed that a position which the most extreme supporters of free-will would hardly accept, would find still less favour with an avowedly242 necessarian school. And to regard the emotions as either themselves beliefs, or as inevitably caused by beliefs, would seem to remove them even farther from the sphere of moral responsibility. The Stoics, however, having arrived at the perfectly true doctrine that judgment is a form of volition243, seem to have immediately invested it as such with the old associations of free choice which they were at the same time busily engaged in stripping off from other exercises of the same faculty244. They took up the Socratic paradox216 that virtue is knowledge; but they would not agree with Socrates that it could be instilled245 by force of argument. To them vice was not so much ignorance as the obstinate246 refusal to be convinced.54
The Stoic arguments are, indeed, when we come to analyse them, appeal to authority rather than to the logical understanding. We are told again and again that the common objects of desire and dread247 cannot really be good or evil, because they are not altogether under our control.55 And if we ask why this necessarily excludes them from the class of things to be pursued or avoided, the answer is that man, having been created for perfect happiness, must also have been created with the power to secure it by his own unaided exertions248. But, even granting the very doubtful thesis that there is any ascertainable249 purpose in creation at all, it is hard to see how the Stoics could have answered any one who chose to maintain that man is created for enjoyment68; since, judging by experience, he has secured a larger share of it than of virtue, and is just as capable of gaining it by a mere exercise of volition. For the professors of the Porch fully admitted that their ideal sage250 had never been realised; which, with their opinions about the indivisibility of virtue, was equivalent to saying that there never had been such a thing as a good25 man at all. Or, putting the same paradox into other words, since the two classes of wise and foolish divide humanity between them, and since the former class has only an ideal existence, they were obliged to admit that mankind are not merely most of them fools, but all fools. And this, as Plutarch has pointed out in his very clever attack on Stoicism, is equivalent to saying that the scheme of creation is a complete failure.56
IV.
The inconsistencies of a great philosophical system are best explained by examining its historical antecedents. We have already attempted to disentangle the roots from which Stoicism was nourished, but one of the most important has not yet been taken into account. This was the still continued influence of Parmenides, derived, if not from his original teaching, then from some one or more of the altered shapes through which it had passed. It has been shown how Zeno used the Heracleitean method to break down all the demarcations laboriously251 built up by Plato and Aristotle. Spirit was identified with matter; ideas with aerial currents; God with the world; rational with sensible evidence; volition with judgment; and emotion with thought. But the idea of a fundamental antithesis, expelled from every other department of enquiry, took hold with all the more energy on what, to Stoicism, was the most vital of all distinctions—that between right and wrong.57 Once grasp this transformation138 of a metaphysical into a moral principle, and every paradox of the system will be seen to follow from it with logical necessity. What the supreme Idea had been to Plato and self-thinking thought to Aristotle, that virtue became to the new school, simple, unchangeable, and self-sufficient. It must not only be independent of pleasure and pain, but absolutely 26incommensurable with them; therefore there can be no happiness except what it gives. As an indivisible unity, it must be possessed252 entirely or not at all; and being eternal, once possessed it can never be lost. Further, since the same action may be either right or wrong, according to the motive of its performance, virtue is nothing external, but a subjective disposition, a state of the will and the affections; or, if these are to be considered as judgments253, a state of the reason. Finally, since the universe is organised reason, virtue must be natural, and especially consonant254 to the nature of man as a rational animal; while, at the same time, its existence in absolute purity being inconsistent with experience, it must remain an unattainable ideal.
It has been shown in former parts of this work how Greek philosophy, after straining an antithesis to the utmost, was driven by the very law of its being to close or bridge over the chasm255 by a series of accommodations and transitions. To this rule Stoicism was no exception; and perhaps its extraordinary vitality may have been partly due to the necessity imposed on its professors of continually revising their ethics, with a view to softening256 down its most repellent features. We proceed to sketch257 in rapid outline the chief artifices258 employed for this purpose.
The doctrine, in its very earliest form, had left a large neutral ground between good and evil, comprehending almost all the common objects of desire and avoidance. These the Stoics now proceeded to divide according to a similar principle of arrangement. Whatever, without being morally good in the strictest sense, was either conducive259 to morality, or conformable to human nature, or both, they called preferable. Under this head came personal advantages, such as mental accomplishments260, beauty, health, strength, and life itself; together with external advantages, such as wealth, honour, and high connexions. The opposite to preferable things they called objectionable; and what lay between the two, such as27 the particular coin selected to make a payment with, absolutely indifferent.58
The thorough-going condemnation262 of passion was explained away to a certain extent by allowing the sage himself to feel a slight touch of the feelings which fail to shake his determination, like a scar remaining after the wound is healed; and by admitting the desirability of sundry263 emotions, which, though carefully distinguished from the passions, seem to have differed from them in degree rather than in kind.59
In like manner, the peremptory264 alternative between consummate265 wisdom and utter folly266 was softened267 down by admitting the possibility of a gradual progress from one to the other, itself subdivided268 into a number of more or less advanced grades, recalling Aristotle’s idea of motion as a link between Privation and Form.60
If there be a class of persons who although not perfectly virtuous are on the road to virtue, it follows that there are moral actions which they are capable of performing. These the Stoics called intermediate or imperfect duties; and, in accordance with their intellectual view of conduct, they defined them as actions for which a probable reason might be given; apparently in contradistinction to those which were deduced from a single principle with the extreme rigour of scientific demonstration269. Such intermediate duties would have for their appropriate object the ends which, without being absolutely good, were still relatively270 worth seeking, or the avoidance of what, without being an absolute evil, was allowed to be relatively objectionable. They stood midway between virtue and vice, just as the progressive characters stood between the wise and the foolish, and preferable objects between what was really good and what was really evil.
The idea of such a provisional code seems to have originated with Zeno;61 but the form under which we now know it is28 the result of at least two successive revisions. The first and most important is due to Panaetius, a Stoic philosopher of the second century B.C., on whose views the study of Plato and Aristotle exercised a considerable influence. A work of this teacher on the Duties of Man furnished Cicero with the materials for his celebrated271 De Officiis, under which form its lessons have passed into the educational literature of modern Europe. The Latin treatise118 is written in a somewhat frigid272 and uninteresting style, whether through the fault of Cicero or of his guide we cannot tell. The principles laid down are excellent, but there is no vital bond of union holding them together. We can hardly imagine that the author’s son, for whom the work was originally designed, or anyone else since his time, felt himself much benefited by its perusal273. Taken, however, as a register of the height reached by ordinary educated sentiment under the influence of speculative ideas, and of the limits imposed by it in turn on their vagaries274, after four centuries of continual interaction, the De Officiis presents us with very satisfactory results. The old quadripartite division of the virtues is reproduced; but each is treated in a large and liberal spirit, marking an immense advance on Aristotle’s definitions, wherever the two can be compared. Wisdom is identified with the investigation275 of truth; and there is a caution against believing on insufficient276 evidence, which advantageously contrasts with what were soon to be the lessons of theology on the same subject. The other great intellectual duty inculcated is to refrain from wasting our energies on difficult and useless enquiries.62 This injunction has been taken up and very impressively repeated by some philosophers in our own time; but in the mouth of Cicero it probably involved much greater restrictions277 on the study of science than they would be disposed to admit. And the limits now prescribed to speculation by Positivism will perhaps seem not less injudicious,29 when viewed in the light of future discoveries, than those fixed by the ancient moralists seem to us who know what would have been lost had they always been treated with respect.
The obligations of justice come next. They are summed up in two precepts that leave nothing to be desired: the first is to do no harm except in self-defence; the second, to bear our share in a perpetual exchange of good offices. And the foundation of justice is rightly placed in the faithful fulfilment of contracts—an idea perhaps suggested by Epicurus.63 The virtue of fortitude is treated with similar breadth, and so interpreted as to cover the whole field of conduct, being identified not only with fearlessness in the face of danger, but with the energetic performance of every duty. In a word, it is opposed quite as much to slothfulness and irresolution278 as to physical timidity.64 Temperance preserves its old meaning of a reasonable restraint exercised over the animal passions and desires; and furthermore, it receives a very rich significance as the quality by which we are enabled to discern and act up to the part assigned to us in life by natural endowment, social position, and individual choice. But this, as one of the most important ideas contributed by Stoicism to subsequent thought, must be reserved for separate discussion in the following section.
In addition to its system of intermediate duties, the Stoic ethics included a code of casuistry which, to judge by some recorded specimens279, allowed a very startling latitude280 both to the ideal sage and to the ordinary citizen. Thus, if Sextus Empiricus is to be believed, the Stoics saw nothing objectionable about the trade of a courtesan.65 Chrysippus, like Socrates and Plato, denied that there was any harm in falsehoods if they were told with a good intention. Diogenes of Seleucia thought it permissible281 to pass bad money,66 and to30 sell defective282 articles without mentioning their faults;67 he was, however, contradicted on both points by another Stoic, Antipater. Still more discreditable were the opinions of Hecato, a disciple of Panaetius. He discussed the question whether a good man need or need not feed his slaves in a time of great scarcity283, with an evident leaning towards the latter alternative; and also made it a matter of deliberation whether in case part of a ship’s cargo284 had to be thrown overboard, a valuable horse or a worthless slave should be the more readily sacrificed. His answer is not given; but that the point should ever have been mooted285 does not say much for the rigour of his principles or for the benevolence286 of his disposition.68 Most outrageous287 of all, from the Stoic point of view, is the declaration of Chrysippus that Heracleitus and Pherecydes would have done well to give up their wisdom, had they been able by so doing to get rid of their bodily infirmities at the same time.69 That overstrained theoretical severity should be accompanied by a corresponding laxity in practice is a phenomenon of frequent occurrence; but that this laxity should be exhibited so undisguisedly in the details of the theory itself, goes beyond anything quoted against the Jesuits by Pascal, and bears witness, after a fashion, to the extraordinary sincerity288 of Greek thought.70
It was not, however, in any of these concessions289 that the Stoics found from first to last their most efficient solution for the difficulties of practical experience, but in the countenance290 they extended to an act which, more than any other, might have seemed fatally inconsistent both in spirit and in letter with their whole system, whether we choose to call it a defiance of divine law, a reversal of natural instinct, a selfish abandonment of duty, or a cowardly shrinking from pain. We allude, of course, to their habitual291 recommendation of suicide. ‘If you are not satisfied with life,’ they said,31 ‘you have only got to rise and depart; the door is always open.’ Various circumstances were specified292 in which the sage would exercise the privilege of ‘taking himself off,’ as they euphemistically expressed it. Severe pain, mutilation, incurable293 disease, advanced old age, the hopelessness of escaping from tyranny, and in general any hindrance294 to leading a ‘natural’ life, were held to be a sufficient justification295 for such a step.71 The first founders of the school set an example afterwards frequently followed. Zeno is said to have hanged himself for no better reason than that he fell and broke his finger through the weakness of old age; and Cleanthes, having been ordered to abstain296 temporarily from food, resolved, as he expressed it, not to turn back after going half-way to death.72 This side of the Stoic doctrine found particular favour in Rome, and the voluntary death of Cato was always spoken of as his chief title to fame. Many noble spirits were sustained in their defiance of the imperial despotism by the thought that there was one last liberty of which not even Caesar could deprive them. Objections were silenced by the argument that, life not being an absolute good, its loss might fairly be preferred to some relatively greater inconvenience.73 But why the sage should renounce an existence where perfect happiness depends entirely on his own will, neither was, nor could it be, explained.
V.
If now, abandoning all technicalities, we endeavour to estimate the significance and value of the most general ideas contributed by Stoicism to ethical speculation, we shall find that they may be most conveniently considered under the following heads. First of all, the Stoics made morality completely inward. They declared that the intention was equivalent to the deed, and that the wish was equivalent to the32 intention—a view which has been made familiar to all by the teaching of the Gospel, but the origin of which in Greek philosophy has been strangely ignored even by rationalistic writers.74 From the inaccessibility297 of motives and feelings to direct external observation, it follows that each man must be, in the last resort, his own judge. Hence the notion of conscience is equally a Stoic creation. That we have a mystical intuition informing us, prior to experience, of the difference between right and wrong is, indeed, a theory quite alien to their empirical derivation of knowledge. But that the educated wrong-doer carries in his bosom298 a perpetual witness and avenger299 of his guilt300, they most distinctly asserted.75 The difference between ancient and modern tragedy is alone sufficient to prove the novelty and power of this idea; for that the Eumenides do not represent even the germ of a conscience is as certain as anything in mythology301 can be.7633 On the other hand, the fallibility of conscience and the extent to which it may be sophisticated were topics not embraced within the limits of Stoicism, and perhaps never adequately illustrated302 by any writer, even in modern times, except the great English novelist whose loss we still deplore303.
The second Stoic idea to which we would invite attention is that, in the economy of life, every one has a certain function to fulfil, a certain part to play, which is marked out for him by circumstances beyond his control, but in the adequate performance of which his duty and dignity are peculiarly involved. It is true that this idea finds no assignable place in the teaching of the earliest Stoics, or rather in the few fragments of their teaching which alone have been preserved; but it is touched upon by Cicero under the head of Temperance, in the adaptation from Panaetius already referred to; it frequently recurs177 in the lectures of Epictêtus; and it is enunciated with energetic concision304 in the solitary meditations305 of Marcus Aurelius.77 The belief spoken of is, indeed, closely connected with the Stoic teleology, and only applies to the sphere of free intelligence a principle like that supposed to regulate the activity of inanimate or irrational34 beings. If every mineral, every plant, and every animal has its special use and office, so also must we, according to the capacity of our individual and determinate existence. By accomplishing the work thus imposed on us, we fulfil the purpose of our vocation, we have done all that the highest morality demands, and may with a clear conscience leave the rest to fate. To put the same idea into somewhat different terms: we are born into certain relationships, domestic, social, and political, by which the lines of our daily duties are prescribed with little latitude for personal choice. What does depend upon ourselves is to make the most of these conditions and to perform the tasks arising out of them in as thorough a manner as possible. ‘It was not only out of ivory,’ says Seneca, ‘that Pheidias could make statues, but out of bronze as well; had you offered him marble or some cheaper material still, he would have carved the best that could be made out of that. So the sage will exhibit his virtue in wealth, if he be permitted; if not, in poverty; if possible, in his own country; if not, in exile; if possible, as a general; if not, as a soldier; if possible, in bodily vigour306; if not, in weakness. Whatever fortune be granted him, he will make it the means for some memorable307 achievement.’ Or, to take the more homely308 comparisons of Epictêtus: ‘The weaver309 does not manufacture his wool, but works up what is given him.’ ‘Remember that you are to act in whatever drama the manager may choose, a long or short one according to his pleasure. Should he give you the part of a beggar, take care to act that becomingly; and the same should it be a lame30 man, or a magistrate310, or a private citizen. For your business is to act well the character that is given to you, but to choose it is the business of another.‘So spoke153 the humble311 freedman; but the master of the world had also to recognise what fateful limits were imposed on his beneficent activity. ‘Why wait, O man!’ exclaims Marcus Aurelius.35 ‘Do what Nature now demands; make haste and look not round to see if any know it; nor hope for Plato’s Republic, but be content with the smallest progress, and consider that the result even of this will be no little thing.’78 Carlyle was not a Stoic; but in this respect his teaching breathes the best spirit of Stoicism; and, to the same extent also, through his whole life he practised what he taught.
The implications of such an ethical standard are, on the whole, conservative; it is assumed that social institutions are, taking them altogether, nearly the best possible at any moment; and that our truest wisdom is to make the most of them, instead of sighing for some other sphere where our grand aspirations or volcanic312 passions might find a readier outlet313 for their feverish314 activity. And if the teaching of the first Stoics did not take the direction here indicated, it was because they, with the communistic theories inherited from their Cynic predecessors, began by condemning315 all existing social distinctions as irrational. They wished to abolish local religion, property, the family, and the State, as a substitute for which the whole human race was to be united under a single government, without private possessions or slaves, and with a complete community of women and children.79 It must, however, have gradually dawned on them that such a radical316 subversion317 of the present system was hardly compatible with their belief in the providential origin of all things; and that, besides this, the virtues which they made it so much their object to recommend, would be, for the most part, superfluous in a communistic society. At the same time, the old notion of S?phrosynê as a virtue which consisted in minding one’s own business, or, stated more generally, in discerning and doing whatever work one is best fitted for, would continue to influence ethical teaching, with the effect of giving more and more individuality to the definition of duty. And the36 Stoic idea of a perfect sage, including as it did the possession of every accomplishment261 and an exclusive fitness for discharging every honourable318 function, would seem much less chimerical319 if interpreted to mean that a noble character, while everywhere intrinsically the same, might be realised under as many divergent forms as there are opportunities for continuous usefulness in life.80
We can understand, then, why the philosophy which, when first promulgated321, had tended to withdraw its adherents322 from participation323 in public life, should, when transplanted to Roman soil, have become associated with an energetic interest in politics; why it was so eagerly embraced by those noble statesmen who fought to the death in defence of their ancient liberties; how it could become the cement of a senatorial opposition under the worst Caesars; how it could be the inspiration and support of Rome’s Prime Minister during that quinquennium Neronis which was the one bright episode in more than half a century of shame and terror; how, finally, it could mount the throne with Marcus Aurelius, and prove, through his example, that the world’s work might be most faithfully performed by one in whose meditations mere worldly interests occupied the smallest space. Nor can we agree with Zeller in thinking that it was the nationality, and not the philosophy, of these disciples324 which made them such efficient statesmen.81 On the contrary, it seems to us that the ‘Romanism’ of these men was inseparable from their philosophy, and that they were all the more Roman because they were Stoics as well.
The third great idea of Stoicism was its doctrine of humanity. Men are all children of one Father, and citizens37 of one State; the highest moral law is, Follow Nature, and Nature has made them to be social and to love one another; the private interest of each is, or should be, identified with the universal interest; we should live for others that we may live for ourselves; even to our enemies we should show love and not anger; the unnaturalness325 of passion is proved by nothing more clearly than by its anti-social and destructive tendencies. Here, also, the three great Stoics of the Roman empire—Seneca, Epictêtus, and Marcus Aurelius—rather than the founders of the school, must be our authorities;82 whether it be because their lessons correspond to a more developed state of thought, or simply because they have been more perfectly preserved. The former explanation is, perhaps, the more generally accepted. There seems, however, good reason for believing that the idea of universal love—the highest of all philosophical ideas next to that of the universe itself—dates further back than is commonly supposed. It can hardly be due to Seneca, who had evidently far more capacity for popularising and applying the thoughts of others than for original speculation, and who on this subject expresses himself with a rhetorical fluency326 not usually characterising the exposition of new discoveries. The same remark applies to his illustrious successors, who, while agreeing with him in tone, do not seem to have drawn on his writings for their philosophy. It is also clear that the idea in question springs from two essentially Stoic conceptions: the objective conception of a unified327 world, a cosmos to which all men belong;38 and the subjective conception of a rational nature common to them all. These, again, are rooted in early Greek thought, and were already emerging into distinctness at the time of Socrates. Accordingly we find that Plato, having to compose a characteristic speech for the Sophist Hippias, makes him say that like-minded men are by nature kinsmen328 and friends to one another.83 Nature, however, soon came to be viewed under a different aspect, and it was maintained, just as by some living philosophers, that her true law is the universal oppression of the weak by the strong. Then the idea of mind came in as a salutary corrective. It had supplied a basis for the ethics of Protagoras, and still more for the ethics of Socrates; it was now combined with its old rival by the Stoics, and from their union arose the conception of human nature as something allied329 with and illustrated by all other forms of animal life, yet capable, if fully developed, of rising infinitely330 above them. Nevertheless, the individual and the universal element were never quite reconciled in the Stoic ethics. The altruistic331 quality of justice was clearly perceived; but no attempt was made to show that all virtue is essentially social, and has come to be recognised as obligatory332 on the individual mainly because it conduces to the safety of the whole community. The learner was told to conquer his passions for his own sake rather than for the sake of others; and indulgence in violent anger, though more energetically denounced, was, in theory, placed on a par15 with immoderate delight or uncontrollable distress333. So also, vices of impurity334 were classed with comparatively harmless forms of sensuality, and considered in reference, not to the social degradation335 of their victims, but to the spiritual defilement336 of their perpetrators.
Yet, while the Stoics were far from anticipating the methods of modern Utilitarianism, they were, in a certain sense, strict Utilitarians—that is to say, they measured the goodness or badness of actions by their consequences; in other words, by39 their bearing on the supposed interest of the individual or of the community. They did not, it is true, identify interest with pleasure or the absence of pain; but although, in our time, Hedonism and Utilitarianism are, for convenience, treated as interchangeable terms, they need not necessarily be so. If any one choose to regard bodily strength, health, wealth, beauty, intellect, knowledge, or even simple existence, as the highest good and the end conduciveness to which determines the morality of actions, he is a Utilitarian208; and, even if it could be shown that a maximum of happiness would be ensured by the attainment of his end, he would not on that account become a Hedonist. Now it is certain that the early Stoics, at least, regarded the preservation of the human race as an end which rightfully took precedence of every other consideration; and, like Charles Austin, they sometimes pushed their principles to paradoxical or offensive extremes, apparently for no other purpose than that of affronting337 the common feelings of mankind,84 without remembering that such feelings were likely to represent embodied experiences of utility. Thus—apart from their communistic theories—they were fond of specifying338 the circumstances in which incest would become legitimate339; and they are said not only to have sanctioned cannibalism340 in cases of extreme necessity, but even to have recommended its introduction as a substitute for burial or cremation341; although this, we may hope, was rather a grim illustration of what they meant by moral indifference than a serious practical suggestion.85
Besides the encouragement which it gave to kind offices between friends and neighbours, the Stoic doctrine of humanity and mutual342 love was honourably343 exemplified in Seneca’s emphatic344 condemnation of the gladiatorial games and of the40 horrible abuses connected with domestic slavery in Rome.86 But we miss a clear perception that such abuses are always and everywhere the consequences of slavery; and the outspoken abolitionism of the naturalists346 alluded347 to by Aristotle does not seem to have been imitated by their successors in later ages.87 The most one can say is that the fiction of original liberty was imported into Roman jurisprudence through the agency of Stoic lawyers, and helped to familiarise men’s minds with the idea of universal emancipation348 before political and economical conditions permitted it to be made a reality.
VI.
It is probable that the philanthropic tendencies of the Stoics were, to a great extent, neutralised by the extreme individualism which formed the reverse side of their philosophical character; and also by what may be called the subjective idealism of their ethics. According to their principles, no one can really do good to any one else, since what does not depend on my will is not a good to me. The altruistic virtues are valuable, not as sources of beneficent action, but as manifestations349 of benevolent350 sentiment. Thus, to set on foot comprehensive schemes for the relief of human suffering seemed no part of the Stoic’s business. And the abolition345 of slavery, even had it been practicable, would have seemed rather superfluous to one who held that true freedom is a mental condition within the reach of all who desire it,88 while the richest and most powerful may be, and for the most part actually are, without it. Moreover, at the time when41 philosophy gained its greatest ascendency, the one paramount object of practical statesmen must have been to save civilisation351 from the barbarians352, a work to which Marcus Aurelius devoted353 his life. Hence we learn without surprise that the legislative354 efforts of the imperial Stoic were directed to the strengthening, rather than to the renovation355, of ancient institutions.89 Certain enactments356 were, indeed, framed for the protection of those who took part in the public games. It was provided, with a humanity from which even our own age might learn something, that performers on the high rope should be ensured against the consequences of an accidental fall by having the ground beneath them covered with feather beds; and the gladiators were only allowed to fight with blunted weapons.90 It must, however, be noted357 that in speaking of the combats with wild beasts which were still allowed to continue under his reign358, Marcus Aurelius dwells only on the monotonous359 character which made them exceedingly wearisome to a cultivated mind; just as a philosophic25 sportsman may sometimes be heard to observe that shooting one grouse360 is very like shooting another; while elsewhere he refers with simple contempt to the poor wretches361 who, when already half-devoured by the wild beasts, begged to be spared for another day’s amusement.91 Whether he knew the whole extent of the judicial362 atrocities363 practised on his Christian subjects may well be doubted; but it maybe equally doubted whether, had he known it, he would have interfered364 to save them. Pain and death were no evils; but it was an evil that the law should be defied.92
42
Those manifestations of sympathy which are often so much more precious than material assistance were also repugnant to Stoic principles. On this subject, Epictêtus expresses himself with singular harshness. ‘Do not,’ he says, ‘let yourself be put out by the sufferings of your friends. If they are unhappy, it is their own fault. God made them for happiness, not for misery365. They are grieved at parting from you, are they? Why, then, did they set their affections on things outside themselves? If they suffer for their folly it serves them right.’93
On the other hand, if Stoicism did not make men pitiful, it made them infinitely forgiving. Various causes conspired366 to bring about this result. If all are sinners, and if all sins are equal, no one has a right, under pretence367 of superior virtue, to cast a stone at his fellows. Such is the point of view insisted on with especial emphasis by Seneca, who, more perhaps than other philosophers, had reason to be conscious how far his practice fell short of his professions.94 But, speaking generally, pride was the very last fault with which the Stoics could be charged. Both in ancient and modern times, satirists have been prone368 to assume that every disciple of the Porch, in describing his ideal of a wise man, was actually describing himself. No misconception could be more complete. It is like supposing that, because Christ commanded his followers to be perfect even as their heavenly Father is perfect, every Christian for that reason thinks himself equal43 to God. The wise man of the Stoics had, by their own acknowledgment, never been realised at all; he had only been approached by three characters, Socrates, Antisthenes, and Diogenes.95 ‘May the sage fall in love?’ asked a young man of Panaetius. ‘What the sage may do,’ replied the master, ‘is a question to be considered at some future time. Meanwhile, you and I, who are very far from being sages369, had better take care not to let ourselves become the slaves of a degrading passion.’96
In the next place, if it is not in the power of others to injure us, we have no right to resent anything that they can do to us. So argues Epictêtus, who began to learn philosophy when still a slave, and was carefully prepared by his instructor43, Musonius, to bear without repining whatever outrages370 his master might choose to inflict371 on him. Finally, to those who urged that they might justly blame the evil intentions of their assailants, Marcus Aurelius could reply that even this was too presumptuous372, that all men did what they thought right, and that the motives of none could be adequately judged except by himself.97 And all the Stoics found a common ground for patience in their optimistic fatalism, in the doctrine that whatever happens is both necessarily determined, and determined by absolute goodness combined with infallible wisdom.98
Doctrines like these, if consistently carried out, would have utterly destroyed so much of morality as depends on the social sanction; while, by inculcating the absolute indifference of44 external actions, they might ultimately have paralysed the individual conscience itself. But the Stoics were not consistent. Unlike some modern moralists, who are ready to forgive every injury so long as they are not themselves the victims, our philosophers were unsparing in their denunciations of wrong-doing; and it is very largely to their indignant protests that we are indebted for our knowledge of the corruption373 prevalent in Roman society under the Empire. It may even be contended that, in this respect, our judgment has been unfairly biassed374. The picture drawn by the Stoics, or by writers trained under their influence, seems to have been too heavily charged with shadow; and but for the archaeological evidence we should not have known how much genuine human affection lay concealed375 in those lower social strata376 whose records can only be studied on their tombs.99 It was among these classes that Christianity found the readiest acceptance, simply because it gave a supernatural sanction to habits and sentiments already made familiar by the spontaneous tendencies of an unwarlike régime.
VII.
Before parting with Stoicism we have to say a few words on the metaphysical foundation of the whole system—the theory of Nature considered as a moral guide and support. It has been shown that the ultimate object of this, as of many other ethical theories, both ancient and modern, was to reconcile the instincts of individual self-preservation with virtue, which is the instinct of self-preservation in an entire community. The Stoics identified both impulses by declaring that virtue is the sole good of the individual no less than the supreme interest of the whole; thus involving themselves in an insoluble contradiction. For, from their nominalistic point of view, the good of the whole can be nothing but an aggre45gate of particular goods, or else a means for their attainment; and in either case the happiness of the individual has to be accounted for apart from his duty. And an analysis of the special virtues and vices would equally have forced them back on the assumption, which they persistently377 repudiated378, that individual existence and pleasure are intrinsically good, and their opposites intrinsically evil. To prove their fundamental paradox—the non-existence of individual as distinguished from social interest—the Stoics employed the analogy of an organised body where the good of the parts unquestionably subserves the good of the whole;100 and the object of their teleology was to show that the universe and, by implication, the human race, were properly to be viewed in that light. The acknowledged adaptation of life to its environment furnished some plausible379 arguments in support of their thesis; and the deficiencies were made good by a revival380 of the Heracleitean theory in which the unity of Nature was conceived partly as a necessary interdependence of opposing forces, partly as a perpetual transformation of every substance into every other. Universal history also tended to confirm the same principle in its application to the human race. The Macedonian, and still more the Roman empire, brought the idea of a world-wide community living under the same laws ever nearer to its realisation; the decay of the old religion and the old civic382 patriotism383 set free a vast fund of altruism which now took the form of simple philanthropy; while a rank growth of immorality384 offered ever new opportunities for an indignant protest against senseless luxury and inhuman385 vice. This last circumstance, however, was not allowed to prejudice the optimism of the system; for the fertile physics of Heracleitus suggested a method by which moral evil could be interpreted as a necessary concomitant of good, a material for the perpetual exercise and illustration of virtuous deeds.101
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Yet, if the conception of unity was gaining ground, the conceptions of purpose and vitality must have been growing weaker as the triumph of brute386 force prolonged itself without limit or hope of redress387. Hence Stoicism in its later form shows a tendency to dissociate the dynamism of Heracleitus from the teleology of Socrates, and to lean on the former rather than on the latter for support. One symptom of this changed attitude is a blind worship of power for its own sake. We find the renunciation of pleasure and the defiance of pain appreciated more from an aesthetic388 than from an ethical point of view; they are exalted389 almost in the spirit of a Red Indian, not as means to higher ends, but as manifestations of unconquerable strength; and sometimes the highest sanction of duty takes the form of a morbid390 craving391 for applause, as if the universe were an amphitheatre and life a gladiatorial game.102
The noble spirit of Marcus Aurelius was, indeed, proof against such temptations: and he had far more to dread than to hope from the unlightened voice of public opinion; but to him also, ‘standing between two eternities,’ Nature presented herself chiefly under the aspect of an overwhelming and absorbing Power. Pleasure is not so much dangerous as worthless, weak, and evanescent. Selfishness, pride, anger, and discontent will soon be swept into abysmal392 gulfs of oblivion by the roaring cataract393 of change. Universal history is one long monotonous procession of phantasms passing over the scene into death and utter night. In one short life we may see all that ever was, or is, or is to be; the same pageant394 has already been and shall be repeated an infinite number of times. Nothing endures but the process of unending renovation: we must die that the world may be ever young. Death itself only reunites us with the absolute All whence we come, in which we move, and whither we return.103 But the imperial47 sage makes no attempt to explain why we should ever have separated ourselves from it in thought; or why one life should be better worth living than another in the universal vanity of things.
The physics of Stoicism was, in truth, the scaffolding rather than the foundation of its ethical superstructure. The real foundation was the necessity of social existence, formulated under the influence of a logical exclusiveness first introduced by Parmenides, and inherited from his teaching by every system of philosophy in turn. Yet there is no doubt that Stoic morality was considerably395 strengthened and steadied by the support it found in conceptions derived from a different order of speculations; so much so that at last it grew to conscious independence of that support.
Marcus Aurelius, a constant student of Lucretius, seems to have had occasional misgivings396 with respect to the certainty of his own creed397; but they never extended to his practical beliefs. He was determined that, whatever might be the origin of this world, his relation to it should be still the same. ‘Though things be purposeless, act not thou without a purpose.’ ‘If the universe is an ungoverned chaos398, be content that in that wild torrent399 thou hast a governing reason within thyself.’104
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There seems, then, good reason for believing that the law of duty, after being divorced from mythology, and seriously compromised by its association, even among the Stoics themselves, with our egoistic instincts, gained an entirely new authority when placed, at least in appearance, under the sanction of a power whose commands did not even admit of being disobeyed. And the question spontaneously presents itself whether we, after getting rid of the old errors and confusions, may profitably employ the same method in defence of the same convictions, whether the ancient alliance between fact and right can be reorganised on a basis of scientific proof.
A great reformer of the last generation, finding that the idea of Nature was constantly put forward to thwart400 his most cherished schemes, prepared a mine for its destruction which was only exploded after his death. Seldom has so powerful a charge of logical dynamite401 been collected within so small a space as in Mill’s famous Essay on Nature. But the immediate effect was less than might have been anticipated, because the attack was supposed to be directed against religion, whereas it was only aimed at an abstract metaphysical dogma, not necessarily connected with any theological beliefs, and held by many who have discarded all such beliefs. A stronger impression was, perhaps, produced by the nearly simultaneous declaration of Sir W. Gull—in reference to the supposed vis medicatrix naturae—that, in cases of disease, ‘what Nature wants is to put the man in his coffin402.’ The new school of political economists403 have also done much to show that legislative interference with the ‘natural laws’ of wealth need by no means be so generally mischievous as was once supposed. And the doctrine of Evolution, besides breaking down the old distinctions between Nature and Man, has represented the former as essentially variable, and therefore, to that extent, incapable404 of affording a fixed standard for moral action. It is, however, from this school that a new49 attempt to rehabilitate405 the old physical ethics has lately proceeded. The object of Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Data of Ethics is, among other points, to prove that a true morality represents the ultimate stage of evolution, and reproduces in social life that permanent equilibration towards which every form of evolution constantly tends. And Mr. Spencer also shows how evolution is bringing about a state of things in which the self-regarding shall be finally harmonised with the social impulses. Now, it will be readily admitted that morality is a product of evolution in this sense that it is a gradual formation, that it is the product of many converging406 conditions, and that it progresses according to a certain method. But that the same method is observed through all orders of evolution seems less evident. For instance, in the formation, first of the solar system, and then of the earth’s crust, there is a continual loss of force, while in the development of organic life there is as continual a gain; and on arriving at subjective phenomena, we are met by facts which, in the present state of our knowledge, cannot advantageously be expressed in terms of force and matter at all. Even if we do not agree with George Sand in thinking that self-sacrifice is the only virtue, we must admit that the possibility, at least, of its being sometimes demanded is inseparable from the idea of duty. But self-sacrifice cannot be conceived without consciousness; which is equivalent to saying that it involves other than mechanical notions. Thus we are confronted by the standing difficulty of all evolutionary105 theories, and on a point where that difficulty is peculiarly sensible. Nor is this an objection to be got rid of by the argument that it applies to all philosophical systems alike. To an idealist, the dependence381 of morality on consciousness is a practical confirmation407 of his professed121 principles. Holding that the universal forms of experience are the conditions under which an object is apprehended408, rather than modifications imposed by an unknowable object on an unknowable subject, and that these50 forms are common to all intelligent beings, he holds also that the perception of duty is the widening of our individual selves into that universal self which is the subjective side of all experience.
Again, whatever harmony evolution may introduce into our conceptions, whatever hopes it may encourage with regard to the future of our race, one does not see precisely409 what sanction it gives to morality at present—that is to say, how it makes self-sacrifice easier than before. Because certain forces have been unconsciously working towards a certain end through ages past, why should I consciously work towards the same end? If the perfection of humanity is predetermined, my conduct cannot prevent its consummation; if it in any way depends on me, the question returns, why should my particular interests be sacrificed to it? The man who does not already love his contemporaries whom he has seen is unlikely to love them the more for the sake of a remote posterity410 whom he will never see at all. Finally, it must be remembered that evolution is only half the cosmic process; it is partially411 conditioned at every stage by dissolution, to which in the long run it must entirely give way; and if, as Mr. Spencer observes, evolution is the more interesting of the two,105 this preference is itself due to the lifeward tendency of our thoughts; in other words, to those moral sentiments which it is sought to base on what, abstractedly considered, has all along been a creation of their own.
The idea of Nature, or of the universe, or of human history as a whole—but for its evil associations with fanaticism412 and superstition, we should gladly say the belief in God—is one the ethical value of which can be more easily felt than analysed. We do not agree with the most brilliant of the English Positivists in restricting its influence to the aesthetic emotions.106 The elevating influence of these should be fully51 recognised; but the place due to more severely413 intellectual pursuits in moral training is greater far. Whatever studies tend to withdraw us from the petty circle of our personal interests and pleasures, are indirectly414 favourable415 to the preponderance of social over selfish impulses; and the service thus rendered is amply repaid, since these very studies necessitate211 for their continuance a large expenditure416 of moral energy. It might even be contended that the influence of speculation on practice is determined by the previous influence of practice on speculation. Physical laws act as an armature to the law of duty, extending and perpetuating417 its grasp on the minds of men; but it was through the magnetism418 of duty that their confused currents were first drawn into parallelism and harmony with its attraction. We have just seen how, from this point of view, the interpretation of evolution by conscience might be substituted for the interpretation of conscience by evolution. Yet those who base morality on religion, or give faith precedence over works, have discerned with a sure though dim instinct the dependence of noble and far-sighted action on some paramount intellectual initiative and control; in other words, the highest ethical ideals are conditioned by the highest philosophical generalisations. Before the Greeks could think of each man as a citizen of the world, and as bound to all other rational beings by virtue of a common origin and a common abode419, it was first necessary that they should think of the world itself as an orderly and comprehensive whole. And what was once a creative, still continues to work as an educating force. Our aspirations towards agreement with ourselves and with humanity as a whole are strengthened by the contemplation of that supreme unity which, even if it be but the glorified420 reflection of our individual or generic421 identity, still remains422 the idea in and through which those lesser423 unities320 were first completely realised—the idea which has originated all man’s most fruitful faiths, and will at last absorb them all. Meanwhile our highest devotion can hardly find more fitting52 utterance424 than in the prayer which once rose to a Stoic’s lips:—
But Jove all-bounteous! who, in clouds
enwrapt, the lightning wieldest;
May’st Thou from baneful425 Ignorance
the race of men deliver!
This, Father! scatter426 from the soul,
and grant that we the wisdom
May reach, in confidence of which,
Thou justly guidest all things;
That we, by Thee in honour set,
with honour may repay Thee,
Raising to all thy works a hymn427
perpetual; as beseemeth
A mortal soul: since neither man
nor god has higher glory
Than rightfully to celebrate
Eternal Law all-ruling.
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1 speculation | |
n.思索,沉思;猜测;投机 | |
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ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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(使)偏斜, (使)偏离, (使)转向( deflect的现在分词 ) | |
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4 contemplated | |
adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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5 unity | |
n.团结,联合,统一;和睦,协调 | |
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6 feudal | |
adj.封建的,封地的,领地的 | |
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7 Christian | |
adj.基督教徒的;n.基督教徒 | |
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8 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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9 justified | |
a.正当的,有理的 | |
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10 embodied | |
v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 );象征;包括;包含 | |
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11 fabric | |
n.织物,织品,布;构造,结构,组织 | |
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12 superstition | |
n.迷信,迷信行为 | |
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13 logic | |
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
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14 refinements | |
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22 momentous | |
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54 superstitions | |
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56 discredit | |
vt.使不可置信;n.丧失信义;不信,怀疑 | |
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57 perversion | |
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59 cosmos | |
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n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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n.寓言;童话;神话 | |
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75 defiance | |
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76 precepts | |
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n.过失,流逝,失效,抛弃信仰,间隔;vi.堕落,停止,失效,流逝;vt.使失效 | |
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81 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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82 immortal | |
adj.不朽的;永生的,不死的;神的 | |
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83 heroism | |
n.大无畏精神,英勇 | |
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84 imperturbable | |
adj.镇静的 | |
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85 repose | |
v.(使)休息;n.安息 | |
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86 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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87 infusion | |
n.灌输 | |
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88 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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89 vocation | |
n.职业,行业 | |
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90 memoirs | |
n.回忆录;回忆录传( mem,自oir的名词复数) | |
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91 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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92 solitary | |
adj.孤独的,独立的,荒凉的;n.隐士 | |
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93 desperately | |
adv.极度渴望地,绝望地,孤注一掷地 | |
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94 eligible | |
adj.有条件被选中的;(尤指婚姻等)合适(意)的 | |
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95 sect | |
n.派别,宗教,学派,派系 | |
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96 dissuade | |
v.劝阻,阻止 | |
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97 remonstrances | |
n.抱怨,抗议( remonstrance的名词复数 ) | |
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98 taunts | |
嘲弄的言语,嘲笑,奚落( taunt的名词复数 ) | |
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99 delicacy | |
n.精致,细微,微妙,精良;美味,佳肴 | |
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100 fortitude | |
n.坚忍不拔;刚毅 | |
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101 inquisitive | |
adj.求知欲强的,好奇的,好寻根究底的 | |
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102 portico | |
n.柱廊,门廊 | |
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103 adorned | |
[计]被修饰的 | |
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104 frescoes | |
n.壁画( fresco的名词复数 );温壁画技法,湿壁画 | |
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105 evolutionary | |
adj.进化的;演化的,演变的;[生]进化论的 | |
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106 epoch | |
n.(新)时代;历元 | |
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107 slaughtered | |
v.屠杀,杀戮,屠宰( slaughter的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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108 colonnades | |
n.石柱廊( colonnade的名词复数 ) | |
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109 stoic | |
n.坚忍克己之人,禁欲主义者 | |
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110 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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111 fortify | |
v.强化防御,为…设防;加强,强化 | |
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112 animated | |
adj.生气勃勃的,活跃的,愉快的 | |
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113 modifications | |
n.缓和( modification的名词复数 );限制;更改;改变 | |
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114 compilation | |
n.编译,编辑 | |
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115 taunted | |
嘲讽( taunt的过去式和过去分词 ); 嘲弄; 辱骂; 奚落 | |
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116 filching | |
v.偷(尤指小的或不贵重的物品)( filch的现在分词 ) | |
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117 treatises | |
n.专题著作,专题论文,专著( treatise的名词复数 ) | |
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118 treatise | |
n.专著;(专题)论文 | |
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119 erased | |
v.擦掉( erase的过去式和过去分词 );抹去;清除 | |
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120 license | |
n.执照,许可证,特许;v.许可,特许 | |
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121 professed | |
公开声称的,伪称的,已立誓信教的 | |
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122 virtuous | |
adj.有品德的,善良的,贞洁的,有效力的 | |
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123 interpretation | |
n.解释,说明,描述;艺术处理 | |
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124 glorification | |
n.赞颂 | |
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125 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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126 pretext | |
n.借口,托词 | |
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127 inquisitiveness | |
好奇,求知欲 | |
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128 apparently | |
adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
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129 stoics | |
禁欲主义者,恬淡寡欲的人,不以苦乐为意的人( stoic的名词复数 ) | |
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130 exhaustion | |
n.耗尽枯竭,疲惫,筋疲力尽,竭尽,详尽无遗的论述 | |
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131 indifference | |
n.不感兴趣,不关心,冷淡,不在乎 | |
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132 assailed | |
v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 );困扰;质问;毅然应对 | |
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133 astronomers | |
n.天文学者,天文学家( astronomer的名词复数 ) | |
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134 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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135 pervading | |
v.遍及,弥漫( pervade的现在分词 ) | |
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136 contradictories | |
n.矛盾的,抵触的( contradictory的名词复数 ) | |
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137 transformations | |
n.变化( transformation的名词复数 );转换;转换;变换 | |
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138 transformation | |
n.变化;改造;转变 | |
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139 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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140 isolating | |
adj.孤立的,绝缘的v.使隔离( isolate的现在分词 );将…剔出(以便看清和单独处理);使(某物质、细胞等)分离;使离析 | |
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141 fiery | |
adj.燃烧着的,火红的;暴躁的;激烈的 | |
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142 penetrating | |
adj.(声音)响亮的,尖锐的adj.(气味)刺激的adj.(思想)敏锐的,有洞察力的 | |
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143 conflagration | |
n.建筑物或森林大火 | |
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144 foretold | |
v.预言,预示( foretell的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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145 rigid | |
adj.严格的,死板的;刚硬的,僵硬的 | |
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146 physicists | |
物理学家( physicist的名词复数 ) | |
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147 mechanism | |
n.机械装置;机构,结构 | |
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148 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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149 motive | |
n.动机,目的;adv.发动的,运动的 | |
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150 phenomena | |
n.现象 | |
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151 omnipotent | |
adj.全能的,万能的 | |
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152 outspoken | |
adj.直言无讳的,坦率的,坦白无隐的 | |
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153 spoke | |
n.(车轮的)辐条;轮辐;破坏某人的计划;阻挠某人的行动 v.讲,谈(speak的过去式);说;演说;从某种观点来说 | |
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154 materialism | |
n.[哲]唯物主义,唯物论;物质至上 | |
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155 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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156 corporeal | |
adj.肉体的,身体的;物质的 | |
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157 simultaneously | |
adv.同时发生地,同时进行地 | |
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158 grotesque | |
adj.怪诞的,丑陋的;n.怪诞的图案,怪人(物) | |
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159 virtues | |
美德( virtue的名词复数 ); 德行; 优点; 长处 | |
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160 vices | |
缺陷( vice的名词复数 ); 恶习; 不道德行为; 台钳 | |
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161 vice | |
n.坏事;恶习;[pl.]台钳,老虎钳;adj.副的 | |
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162 penetrated | |
adj. 击穿的,鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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163 materialistic | |
a.唯物主义的,物质享乐主义的 | |
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164 rendering | |
n.表现,描写 | |
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165 perfectly | |
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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166 majesty | |
n.雄伟,壮丽,庄严,威严;最高权威,王权 | |
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167 doom | |
n.厄运,劫数;v.注定,命定 | |
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168 legendary | |
adj.传奇(中)的,闻名遐迩的;n.传奇(文学) | |
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169 divination | |
n.占卜,预测 | |
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170 scripture | |
n.经文,圣书,手稿;Scripture:(常用复数)《圣经》,《圣经》中的一段 | |
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171 bulwark | |
n.堡垒,保障,防御 | |
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172 defenders | |
n.防御者( defender的名词复数 );守卫者;保护者;辩护者 | |
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173 miraculous | |
adj.像奇迹一样的,不可思议的 | |
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174 configuration | |
n.结构,布局,形态,(计算机)配置 | |
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175 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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176 precursors | |
n.先驱( precursor的名词复数 );先行者;先兆;初期形式 | |
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177 recurs | |
再发生,复发( recur的第三人称单数 ) | |
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178 proceeding | |
n.行动,进行,(pl.)会议录,学报 | |
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179 ratiocination | |
n.推理;推断 | |
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180 enunciated | |
v.(清晰地)发音( enunciate的过去式和过去分词 );确切地说明 | |
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181 postulated | |
v.假定,假设( postulate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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182 unconditionally | |
adv.无条件地 | |
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183 conditional | |
adj.条件的,带有条件的 | |
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184 illustrate | |
v.举例说明,阐明;图解,加插图 | |
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185 synthetic | |
adj.合成的,人工的;综合的;n.人工制品 | |
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186 syllogism | |
n.演绎法,三段论法 | |
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187 explicitly | |
ad.明确地,显然地 | |
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188 premises | |
n.建筑物,房屋 | |
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189 dealing | |
n.经商方法,待人态度 | |
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190 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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191 prominence | |
n.突出;显著;杰出;重要 | |
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192 ethical | |
adj.伦理的,道德的,合乎道德的 | |
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193 circumscription | |
n.界限;限界 | |
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194 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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195 subsisting | |
v.(靠很少的钱或食物)维持生活,生存下去( subsist的现在分词 ) | |
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196 reinterpretation | |
n.重新解释,纠正性说明 | |
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197 ethics | |
n.伦理学;伦理观,道德标准 | |
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198 consistency | |
n.一贯性,前后一致,稳定性;(液体的)浓度 | |
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199 impulsiveness | |
n.冲动 | |
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200 essentially | |
adv.本质上,实质上,基本上 | |
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201 delusion | |
n.谬见,欺骗,幻觉,迷惑 | |
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202 inevitably | |
adv.不可避免地;必然发生地 | |
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203 maxim | |
n.格言,箴言 | |
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204 plausibility | |
n. 似有道理, 能言善辩 | |
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205 unnatural | |
adj.不自然的;反常的 | |
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206 strictly | |
adv.严厉地,严格地;严密地 | |
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207 teleology | |
n.目的论 | |
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208 utilitarian | |
adj.实用的,功利的 | |
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209 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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210 necessitated | |
使…成为必要,需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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211 necessitate | |
v.使成为必要,需要 | |
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212 aspirations | |
强烈的愿望( aspiration的名词复数 ); 志向; 发送气音; 发 h 音 | |
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213 nay | |
adv.不;n.反对票,投反对票者 | |
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214 vividly | |
adv.清楚地,鲜明地,生动地 | |
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215 hostility | |
n.敌对,敌意;抵制[pl.]交战,战争 | |
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216 paradox | |
n.似乎矛盾却正确的说法;自相矛盾的人(物) | |
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217 subjective | |
a.主观(上)的,个人的 | |
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218 preservation | |
n.保护,维护,保存,保留,保持 | |
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219 teleological | |
adj.目的论的 | |
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220 sociability | |
n.好交际,社交性,善于交际 | |
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221 attainment | |
n.达到,到达;[常pl.]成就,造诣 | |
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222 absurdity | |
n.荒谬,愚蠢;谬论 | |
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223 solely | |
adv.仅仅,唯一地 | |
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224 exemption | |
n.豁免,免税额,免除 | |
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225 irrational | |
adj.无理性的,失去理性的 | |
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226 superfluous | |
adj.过多的,过剩的,多余的 | |
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227 mischievous | |
adj.调皮的,恶作剧的,有害的,伤人的 | |
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228 paramount | |
a.最重要的,最高权力的 | |
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229 renounce | |
v.放弃;拒绝承认,宣布与…断绝关系 | |
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230 supremacy | |
n.至上;至高权力 | |
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231 dispositions | |
安排( disposition的名词复数 ); 倾向; (财产、金钱的)处置; 气质 | |
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232 altruism | |
n.利他主义,不自私 | |
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233 merged | |
(使)混合( merge的过去式和过去分词 ); 相融; 融入; 渐渐消失在某物中 | |
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234 vacillation | |
n.动摇;忧柔寡断 | |
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235 plausibly | |
似真地 | |
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236 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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237 supremely | |
adv.无上地,崇高地 | |
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238 condemned | |
adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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239 immoral | |
adj.不道德的,淫荡的,荒淫的,有伤风化的 | |
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240 censure | |
v./n.责备;非难;责难 | |
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241 passionate | |
adj.热情的,热烈的,激昂的,易动情的,易怒的,性情暴躁的 | |
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242 avowedly | |
adv.公然地 | |
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243 volition | |
n.意志;决意 | |
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244 faculty | |
n.才能;学院,系;(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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245 instilled | |
v.逐渐使某人获得(某种可取的品质),逐步灌输( instill的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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246 obstinate | |
adj.顽固的,倔强的,不易屈服的,较难治愈的 | |
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247 dread | |
vt.担忧,忧虑;惧怕,不敢;n.担忧,畏惧 | |
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248 exertions | |
n.努力( exertion的名词复数 );费力;(能力、权力等的)运用;行使 | |
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249 ascertainable | |
adj.可确定(探知),可发现的 | |
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250 sage | |
n.圣人,哲人;adj.贤明的,明智的 | |
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251 laboriously | |
adv.艰苦地;费力地;辛勤地;(文体等)佶屈聱牙地 | |
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252 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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253 judgments | |
判断( judgment的名词复数 ); 鉴定; 评价; 审判 | |
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254 consonant | |
n.辅音;adj.[音]符合的 | |
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255 chasm | |
n.深坑,断层,裂口,大分岐,利害冲突 | |
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256 softening | |
变软,软化 | |
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257 sketch | |
n.草图;梗概;素描;v.素描;概述 | |
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258 artifices | |
n.灵巧( artifice的名词复数 );诡计;巧妙办法;虚伪行为 | |
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259 conducive | |
adj.有益的,有助的 | |
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260 accomplishments | |
n.造诣;完成( accomplishment的名词复数 );技能;成绩;成就 | |
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261 accomplishment | |
n.完成,成就,(pl.)造诣,技能 | |
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262 condemnation | |
n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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263 sundry | |
adj.各式各样的,种种的 | |
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264 peremptory | |
adj.紧急的,专横的,断然的 | |
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265 consummate | |
adj.完美的;v.成婚;使完美 [反]baffle | |
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266 folly | |
n.愚笨,愚蠢,蠢事,蠢行,傻话 | |
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267 softened | |
(使)变软( soften的过去式和过去分词 ); 缓解打击; 缓和; 安慰 | |
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268 subdivided | |
再分,细分( subdivide的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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269 demonstration | |
n.表明,示范,论证,示威 | |
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270 relatively | |
adv.比较...地,相对地 | |
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271 celebrated | |
adj.有名的,声誉卓著的 | |
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272 frigid | |
adj.寒冷的,凛冽的;冷淡的;拘禁的 | |
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273 perusal | |
n.细读,熟读;目测 | |
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274 vagaries | |
n.奇想( vagary的名词复数 );异想天开;异常行为;难以预测的情况 | |
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275 investigation | |
n.调查,调查研究 | |
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276 insufficient | |
adj.(for,of)不足的,不够的 | |
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277 restrictions | |
约束( restriction的名词复数 ); 管制; 制约因素; 带限制性的条件(或规则) | |
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278 irresolution | |
n.不决断,优柔寡断,犹豫不定 | |
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279 specimens | |
n.样品( specimen的名词复数 );范例;(化验的)抽样;某种类型的人 | |
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280 latitude | |
n.纬度,行动或言论的自由(范围),(pl.)地区 | |
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281 permissible | |
adj.可允许的,许可的 | |
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282 defective | |
adj.有毛病的,有问题的,有瑕疵的 | |
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283 scarcity | |
n.缺乏,不足,萧条 | |
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284 cargo | |
n.(一只船或一架飞机运载的)货物 | |
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285 mooted | |
adj.未决定的,有争议的,有疑问的v.提出…供讨论( moot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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286 benevolence | |
n.慈悲,捐助 | |
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287 outrageous | |
adj.无理的,令人不能容忍的 | |
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288 sincerity | |
n.真诚,诚意;真实 | |
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289 concessions | |
n.(尤指由政府或雇主给予的)特许权( concession的名词复数 );承认;减价;(在某地的)特许经营权 | |
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290 countenance | |
n.脸色,面容;面部表情;vt.支持,赞同 | |
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291 habitual | |
adj.习惯性的;通常的,惯常的 | |
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292 specified | |
adj.特定的 | |
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293 incurable | |
adj.不能医治的,不能矫正的,无救的;n.不治的病人,无救的人 | |
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294 hindrance | |
n.妨碍,障碍 | |
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295 justification | |
n.正当的理由;辩解的理由 | |
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296 abstain | |
v.自制,戒绝,弃权,避免 | |
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297 inaccessibility | |
n. 难接近, 难达到, 难达成 | |
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298 bosom | |
n.胸,胸部;胸怀;内心;adj.亲密的 | |
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299 avenger | |
n. 复仇者 | |
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300 guilt | |
n.犯罪;内疚;过失,罪责 | |
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301 mythology | |
n.神话,神话学,神话集 | |
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302 illustrated | |
adj. 有插图的,列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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303 deplore | |
vt.哀叹,对...深感遗憾 | |
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304 concision | |
n.简明,简洁 | |
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305 meditations | |
默想( meditation的名词复数 ); 默念; 沉思; 冥想 | |
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306 vigour | |
(=vigor)n.智力,体力,精力 | |
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307 memorable | |
adj.值得回忆的,难忘的,特别的,显著的 | |
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308 homely | |
adj.家常的,简朴的;不漂亮的 | |
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309 weaver | |
n.织布工;编织者 | |
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310 magistrate | |
n.地方行政官,地方法官,治安官 | |
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311 humble | |
adj.谦卑的,恭顺的;地位低下的;v.降低,贬低 | |
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312 volcanic | |
adj.火山的;象火山的;由火山引起的 | |
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313 outlet | |
n.出口/路;销路;批发商店;通风口;发泄 | |
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314 feverish | |
adj.发烧的,狂热的,兴奋的 | |
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315 condemning | |
v.(通常因道义上的原因而)谴责( condemn的现在分词 );宣判;宣布…不能使用;迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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316 radical | |
n.激进份子,原子团,根号;adj.根本的,激进的,彻底的 | |
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317 subversion | |
n.颠覆,破坏 | |
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318 honourable | |
adj.可敬的;荣誉的,光荣的 | |
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319 chimerical | |
adj.荒诞不经的,梦幻的 | |
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320 unities | |
n.统一体( unity的名词复数 );(艺术等) 完整;(文学、戏剧) (情节、时间和地点的)统一性;团结一致 | |
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321 promulgated | |
v.宣扬(某事物)( promulgate的过去式和过去分词 );传播;公布;颁布(法令、新法律等) | |
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322 adherents | |
n.支持者,拥护者( adherent的名词复数 );党羽;徒子徒孙 | |
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323 participation | |
n.参与,参加,分享 | |
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324 disciples | |
n.信徒( disciple的名词复数 );门徒;耶稣的信徒;(尤指)耶稣十二门徒之一 | |
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325 unnaturalness | |
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326 fluency | |
n.流畅,雄辩,善辩 | |
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327 unified | |
(unify 的过去式和过去分词); 统一的; 统一标准的; 一元化的 | |
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328 kinsmen | |
n.家属,亲属( kinsman的名词复数 ) | |
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329 allied | |
adj.协约国的;同盟国的 | |
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330 infinitely | |
adv.无限地,无穷地 | |
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331 altruistic | |
adj.无私的,为他人着想的 | |
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332 obligatory | |
adj.强制性的,义务的,必须的 | |
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333 distress | |
n.苦恼,痛苦,不舒适;不幸;vt.使悲痛 | |
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334 impurity | |
n.不洁,不纯,杂质 | |
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335 degradation | |
n.降级;低落;退化;陵削;降解;衰变 | |
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336 defilement | |
n.弄脏,污辱,污秽 | |
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337 affronting | |
v.勇敢地面对( affront的现在分词 );相遇 | |
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338 specifying | |
v.指定( specify的现在分词 );详述;提出…的条件;使具有特性 | |
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339 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
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340 cannibalism | |
n.同类相食;吃人肉 | |
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341 cremation | |
n.火葬,火化 | |
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342 mutual | |
adj.相互的,彼此的;共同的,共有的 | |
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343 honourably | |
adv.可尊敬地,光荣地,体面地 | |
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344 emphatic | |
adj.强调的,着重的;无可置疑的,明显的 | |
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345 abolition | |
n.废除,取消 | |
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346 naturalists | |
n.博物学家( naturalist的名词复数 );(文学艺术的)自然主义者 | |
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347 alluded | |
提及,暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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348 emancipation | |
n.(从束缚、支配下)解放 | |
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349 manifestations | |
n.表示,显示(manifestation的复数形式) | |
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350 benevolent | |
adj.仁慈的,乐善好施的 | |
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351 civilisation | |
n.文明,文化,开化,教化 | |
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352 barbarians | |
n.野蛮人( barbarian的名词复数 );外国人;粗野的人;无教养的人 | |
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353 devoted | |
adj.忠诚的,忠实的,热心的,献身于...的 | |
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354 legislative | |
n.立法机构,立法权;adj.立法的,有立法权的 | |
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355 renovation | |
n.革新,整修 | |
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356 enactments | |
n.演出( enactment的名词复数 );展现;规定;通过 | |
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357 noted | |
adj.著名的,知名的 | |
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358 reign | |
n.统治时期,统治,支配,盛行;v.占优势 | |
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359 monotonous | |
adj.单调的,一成不变的,使人厌倦的 | |
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360 grouse | |
n.松鸡;v.牢骚,诉苦 | |
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361 wretches | |
n.不幸的人( wretch的名词复数 );可怜的人;恶棍;坏蛋 | |
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362 judicial | |
adj.司法的,法庭的,审判的,明断的,公正的 | |
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363 atrocities | |
n.邪恶,暴行( atrocity的名词复数 );滔天大罪 | |
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364 interfered | |
v.干预( interfere的过去式和过去分词 );调停;妨碍;干涉 | |
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365 misery | |
n.痛苦,苦恼,苦难;悲惨的境遇,贫苦 | |
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366 conspired | |
密谋( conspire的过去式和过去分词 ); 搞阴谋; (事件等)巧合; 共同导致 | |
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367 pretence | |
n.假装,作假;借口,口实;虚伪;虚饰 | |
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368 prone | |
adj.(to)易于…的,很可能…的;俯卧的 | |
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369 sages | |
n.圣人( sage的名词复数 );智者;哲人;鼠尾草(可用作调料) | |
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370 outrages | |
引起…的义愤,激怒( outrage的第三人称单数 ) | |
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371 inflict | |
vt.(on)把…强加给,使遭受,使承担 | |
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372 presumptuous | |
adj.胆大妄为的,放肆的,冒昧的,冒失的 | |
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373 corruption | |
n.腐败,堕落,贪污 | |
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374 biassed | |
(统计试验中)结果偏倚的,有偏的 | |
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375 concealed | |
a.隐藏的,隐蔽的 | |
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376 strata | |
n.地层(复数);社会阶层 | |
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377 persistently | |
ad.坚持地;固执地 | |
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378 repudiated | |
v.(正式地)否认( repudiate的过去式和过去分词 );拒绝接受;拒绝与…往来;拒不履行(法律义务) | |
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379 plausible | |
adj.似真实的,似乎有理的,似乎可信的 | |
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380 revival | |
n.复兴,复苏,(精力、活力等的)重振 | |
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381 dependence | |
n.依靠,依赖;信任,信赖;隶属 | |
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382 civic | |
adj.城市的,都市的,市民的,公民的 | |
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383 patriotism | |
n.爱国精神,爱国心,爱国主义 | |
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384 immorality | |
n. 不道德, 无道义 | |
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385 inhuman | |
adj.残忍的,不人道的,无人性的 | |
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386 brute | |
n.野兽,兽性 | |
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387 redress | |
n.赔偿,救济,矫正;v.纠正,匡正,革除 | |
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388 aesthetic | |
adj.美学的,审美的,有美感 | |
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389 exalted | |
adj.(地位等)高的,崇高的;尊贵的,高尚的 | |
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390 morbid | |
adj.病的;致病的;病态的;可怕的 | |
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391 craving | |
n.渴望,热望 | |
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392 abysmal | |
adj.无底的,深不可测的,极深的;糟透的,极坏的;完全的 | |
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393 cataract | |
n.大瀑布,奔流,洪水,白内障 | |
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394 pageant | |
n.壮观的游行;露天历史剧 | |
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395 considerably | |
adv.极大地;相当大地;在很大程度上 | |
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396 misgivings | |
n.疑虑,担忧,害怕;疑虑,担心,恐惧( misgiving的名词复数 );疑惧 | |
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397 creed | |
n.信条;信念,纲领 | |
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398 chaos | |
n.混乱,无秩序 | |
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399 torrent | |
n.激流,洪流;爆发,(话语等的)连发 | |
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400 thwart | |
v.阻挠,妨碍,反对;adj.横(断的) | |
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401 dynamite | |
n./vt.(用)炸药(爆破) | |
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402 coffin | |
n.棺材,灵柩 | |
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403 economists | |
n.经济学家,经济专家( economist的名词复数 ) | |
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404 incapable | |
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
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405 rehabilitate | |
vt.改造(罪犯),修复;vi.复兴,(罪犯)经受改造 | |
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406 converging | |
adj.收敛[缩]的,会聚的,趋同的v.(线条、运动的物体等)会于一点( converge的现在分词 );(趋于)相似或相同;人或车辆汇集;聚集 | |
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407 confirmation | |
n.证实,确认,批准 | |
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408 apprehended | |
逮捕,拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 ); 理解 | |
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409 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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410 posterity | |
n.后裔,子孙,后代 | |
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411 partially | |
adv.部分地,从某些方面讲 | |
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412 fanaticism | |
n.狂热,盲信 | |
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413 severely | |
adv.严格地;严厉地;非常恶劣地 | |
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414 indirectly | |
adv.间接地,不直接了当地 | |
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415 favourable | |
adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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416 expenditure | |
n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出;使用,消耗 | |
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417 perpetuating | |
perpetuate的现在进行式 | |
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418 magnetism | |
n.磁性,吸引力,磁学 | |
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419 abode | |
n.住处,住所 | |
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420 glorified | |
美其名的,变荣耀的 | |
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421 generic | |
adj.一般的,普通的,共有的 | |
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422 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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423 lesser | |
adj.次要的,较小的;adv.较小地,较少地 | |
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424 utterance | |
n.用言语表达,话语,言语 | |
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425 baneful | |
adj.有害的 | |
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426 scatter | |
vt.撒,驱散,散开;散布/播;vi.分散,消散 | |
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427 hymn | |
n.赞美诗,圣歌,颂歌 | |
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