Among the most interesting of Plutarch’s religious writings is one entitled On the Delays in the Divine Vengeance1. As might be expected from the name, it deals with a problem closely akin2 to that which ages before had been made the subject of such sublime3 imagery and such inconclusive reasoning by the author of the Book of Job. What troubled the Hebrew poet was the apparently4 undeserved suffering of the just. What the Greek moralist feels himself called on to explain is the apparent prosperity and impunity5 of the wicked. He will not for a moment admit that crime remains7 unavengeful; his object is to show why the retribution does not follow directly on the deed. And, in order to account for this, he adduces a number of very ingenious reasons. By acting8 deliberately9 rather than in blind anger, the gods wish to read us a useful lesson in patience and forbearance. Sometimes their object is to give the sinner an opportunity for repentance10 and amendment11; or else they may be holding him in reserve for the performance of some beneficial work. At other times, their justice is delayed only that it may be manifested by some signal and striking form of retribution. In many cases, the final stroke has been preceded by long years of secret torment12; and even where no suffering seems to be inflicted13, the pangs14 of remorse15 may furnish a sufficient expiation16. Or again, vengeance may be reserved for a future generation. Some persons hold that to267 visit the sins of the fathers on the children is unjust, but in this they are profoundly mistaken. Members of the same family and citizens of the same state are connected as parts of one organic whole; sharing in the benefits which accrue17 from the good deeds of their predecessors18, it is right that they should also share in the responsibility for their crimes. Moreover, the posterity19 of the wicked inherit a sinful disposition20 which, as the gods can clearly foresee, would betray itself in overt21 acts were they not cut off in their youth. And it is equally an error to suppose that the original wrongdoers remain unaffected by the retribution which befalls their descendants. On the contrary, they witness it from the next world, where it adds poignancy24 to their remorse, and entails25 on them fresh penalties over and above those which they have already been doomed26 to suffer.
Thus with Plutarch, as with his master Plato, a future world is the grand court of appeal from the anomalies and inequalities of this world; and, following the example of the Gorgias and the Republic, he reserves to the last a terrible picture of the torments27 held in store for those who have not expiated28 their transgressions29 on earth, describing them as they are supposed to have been witnessed by a human soul temporarily separated from the body for the purpose of viewing and reporting on this final manifestation30 of divine justice. It would appear, however, from the narrative31 in question that future punishments are not eternal. After a more or less protracted32 period of expiation, the immortal33 soul is restored to the upper world, under whatever embodiment seems most appropriate to its former career. Among those whose turn has arrived for entering on a new existence at the moment when Plutarch’s visitor makes his descent to hell, is the soul of Nero. The wicked Emperor has just been condemned34 to assume the form of a viper35, when a great light shines forth36, and from the midst of the light a voice is heard crying:268 ‘Let him reappear under the guise37 of a song-bird haunting the neighbourhood of marshes38 and meres40; for he has already paid the penalty of his guilt42, and the gods owe him some kindness for having liberated43 Greece, the best and most beloved by them of all the nations that he ruled.’
It would seem from this singular and touching44 expression of gratitude45 that the deathless idealism of Hellas found in Nero’s gift of a nominal46 liberty ample compensation for the very real and precious works of art of which she was despoiled47 on the occasion of his visit to her shores. At first sight, that visit looks like nothing better than a display of triumphant48 buffoonery on the one side and of servile adulation on the other. But, in reality, it was a turning-point in the history of civilisation49, the awakening50 to new glories of a race in whom life had become, to all outward appearance, extinct. For more than a whole century the seat of intellectual supremacy51 had been established in Rome; and during the same period Rome herself had turned to the West rather than to the East for renovation52 and support. Caesar’s conquests were like the revelation of a new world; and three times over, when the two halves of the divided empire came into collision, the champion who commanded the resources of that world had won. Henceforth it was to her western provinces and to her western frontiers that Rome looked for danger, for aggrandisement, or for renown53. In Horace’s time, men asked each other what the warlike Cantabrians were planning; and the personal presence of Augustus himself was needed before those unruly Iberians could be subdued54. His adopted sons earned their first laurels55 at the expense of Alpine56 mountaineers. His later years are filled with German campaigns; and the great disaster of Varus must have riveted57 attention more closely than any victory to what was passing between the Rhine and the Elbe. Under Claudius, the conquest of Britain opened a new source of interest in the West, and, like Germany before, supplied a new title of triumph to the imperial family. Half the literary talent in Rome, the two Senecas, Lucan, and at a269 later period Martial58 and Quintilian, came from Spain, as also did Trajan, whose youth fall in this period.
With Nero’s visit to Greece in 66 the reaction begins. When, a few years later, the empire was disputed between a general from Gaul and a general from Syria, it was the candidate of the Eastern legions who prevailed; the revolt of Judaea drew attention to Eastern affairs; and the great campaigns of Trajan must have definitely turned the tide of public interest in that direction, notwithstanding the far-sighted protest of Tacitus. On more peaceful ground, Hadrian’s Asiatic tours and his protracted residence in Athens completed the work inaugurated by Nero. In his reign59, the intellectual centre of gravity is definitely transferred to Greece; and Roman literature, after its last blaze of splendour under Trajan, becomes extinct, or survives only in forms borrowed from the sophistical rhetoric60 of the East.
Plutarch, who was twenty-one when Nero declared his country free, was the first leader in the great Hellenist revival61, without, at the same time, entirely62 belonging to it. He cared more for the matter than for the form of antiquity64, for the great deeds and greater thoughts of the past than for the words in which they were related and explained. Hence, by the awkwardness and heaviness of his style, he is more akin to the writers of the Alexandrian period than to his immediate65 successors. On the one side, he opens the era of classical idealism; on the other, he closes that of encyclopaedic erudition. The next generation bore much the same relation to Plutarch that the first Sophists bore to Hecataeus and Herodotus. Addressing themselves to popular audiences, they were obliged to study perspicuity66 and elegance67 of expression, at the risk, it is true, of verbosity68 and platitude69. Such men were Dion Chrysostom, Her?des Atticus, Maximus Tyrius, and Aristeides. But the old models were imitated with more success by writers who lived more entirely in the past. Arrian reproduced the graceful71 simplicity270 of Xenophon in his narrative of the campaigns of Alexander and his reports of the lectures of Epictêtus. Lucian composed dialogues ranking with the greatest masterpieces of lighter74 Attic70 literature. The felicity of his style and his complete emancipation75 from superstition76 may probably be traced to the same source—a diligent77 study of the ancient classics. It is certain that neither as a writer nor as a critic does he represent the average educated taste of his own times. So far from giving polytheism its deathblow, as he was formerly78 imagined to have done, he only protested unavailingly against its restoration.
Not only oratory79 and literature, but philosophy and science were cultivated with renewed vigour80. The line between philosophy and sophisticism was not, indeed, very distinctly drawn81. Epictêtus severely82 censures83 the moral teachers of his time for ornamenting84 their lectures with claptrap rhetoric about the battle of Thermopylae or flowery descriptions of Pan and the Nymphs.406 And the professed85 declaimers similarly drew on a store of philosophical86 commonplaces. This sort of popular treatment led to the cultivation88 of ethics89 and theology in preference to logic90 and metaphysics, and to an eclectic blending of the chief systems with one another. A severer method was inculcated in the schools of Athens, especially after the endowment of their professors by Marcus Aurelius; but, in practice, this came to mean what it means in modern universities, the substitution of philology91 for independent enquiry. The question was not so much what is true as what did Plato or Aristotle really think. Alexandrian science showed something of the same learned and traditional character in the works of Ptolemy; but the great name of Galen marks a real progress in physiology92, as well as a return to the principles of Hippocrates.
Thus, so far as was possible in such altered circumstances, did the Renaissance93 of the second century reproduce the271 intellectual environment from which Plato’s philosophy had sprung. In literature, there was the same attention to words rather than to things; sometimes taking the form of exact scholarship, after the manner of Prodicus; sometimes of loose and superficial declamation94, after the manner of Gorgias. There was the naturalism of Hippias, elaborated into a system by the Stoics95, and practised as a life by the new Cynics. There was the hedonism of Aristippus, inculcated under a diluted97 form by the Epicureans. There was the old Ionian materialism98, professed by Stoics and Epicureans alike. There was the scepticism of Protagoras, revived by Aenesidêmus and his followers99. There was the mathematical mysticism of the Pythagoreans, flourishing in Egypt instead of in southern Italy. There was the purer geometry of the Alexandrian Museum, corresponding to the school of Cyrênê. On all sides, there was a mass of vague moral preaching, without any attempt to exhibit the moral truths which we empirically know as part of a comprehensive metaphysical philosophy. And, lastly, there was an immense undefined religious movement, ranging from theologies which taught the spirituality of God and of the human soul, down to the most irrational100 and abject101 superstition. We saw in the last chapter how, corresponding to this environment, there was a revived Platonism, that Platonism was in fact the fashionable philosophy of that age, just as it afterwards became the fashionable philosophy of another Renaissance thirteen centuries later. But it was a Platonism with the backbone103 of the system taken out. Plato’s thoughts all centred in a carefully considered scheme for the moral and political regeneration of society. Now, with the destruction of Greek independence, and the absorption everywhere of free city-states into a vast military empire, it might seem as if the realisation of such a scheme had become altogether impracticable. The Republic was, indeed, at that moment realising itself under a form adapted to the altered exigencies106 of the time; but no Platonist could as yet recognise272 in the Christian107 Church even an approximate fulfilment of his master’s dream. Failing any practical issue, there remained the speculative108 side of Plato’s teaching. His writings did not embody109 a complete system, but they offered the materials whence a system could be framed. Here the choice lay between two possible lines of construction; and each had, in fact, been already attempted by his own immediate disciples111. One was the Pythagorean method of the Old Academy, what Aristotle contemptuously called the conversion112 of philosophy into mathematics. We saw in the last chapter how the revived Platonism of the first and second centuries entered once more on the same perilous113 path, a path which led farther and farther away from the true principles of Greek thought, and of Plato himself when his intellect stood at its highest point of splendour. Neo-Pythagorean mysticism meant an unreconciled dualism of spirit and matter; and as the ultimate consequence of that dualism, it meant the substitution of magical incantations and ceremonial observances for the study of reason and virtue114. Moreover, it readily allied115 itself with Oriental beliefs, which meant a negation116 of natural law that the Greeks could hardly tolerate, and, under the form of Gnostic pessimism117, a belief in the inherent depravity of Nature that they could not tolerate at all.
The other alternative was to combine the dialectical idealism of Plato with the cosmology of early Greek thought, interpreting the two worlds of spirit and Nature as gradations of a single series and manifestations118 of a single principle. This was what Aristotle had attempted to do, but had not done so thoroughly119 as to satisfy the moral wants of his own age, or the religious wants of the age when a revived Platonism was seeking to organise120 itself into a system which should be the reconciliation121 of reason and faith. Yet the better sort of Platonists felt that this work could not be accomplished122 without the assistance of Aristotle, whose essential agreement with their master, as against Stoicism, they fully104 recognised. Their273 mistake was to assume that this agreement extended to every point of his teaching. Taken in this sense, their attempted harmonies were speedily demolished123 by scholars whose professional familiarity with the original sources showed them how strongly Aristotle himself had insisted on the differences which separated him from the Academy and its founder125.407 To identify the two great spiritualist philosophers being impossible, it remained to show how they could be combined. The solution of such a problem demanded more genius than was likely to be developed in the schools of Athens. An intenser intellectual life prevailed in Alexandria, where the materials of erudition were more abundantly supplied, and where contact with the Oriental religions gave Hellenism a fuller consciousness of its distinction from and superiority to every other form of speculative activity. And here, accordingly, the fundamental idea of Neo-Platonism was conceived.
II.
Plotinus is not only the greatest and most celebrated126 of the Neo-Platonists, he is also the first respecting whose opinions we have any authentic127 information, and therefore the one who for all practical purposes must be regarded as the founder of the school. What we know about his life is derived128 from a biography written by his disciple110 Porphyry. This is a rather foolish performance; but it possesses considerable interest, both on account of the information which it was intended to supply, and also as affording indirect evidence of the height to which superstition had risen during the third century of our era. Plotinus gave his friends to understand that he was born in Egypt about 205 A.D.; but so reluctant was he to mention any circumstance connected with his physical existence, that his race and parentage always remained a mystery. He showed somewhat more communicativeness in speaking of his274 mental history, and used to relate in after-life that at the age of twenty-eight he had felt strongly attracted to the study of philosophy, but remained utterly129 dissatisfied with what the most famous teachers of Alexandria had to tell him on the subject. At last he found in Ammonius Saccas the ideal sage130 for whom he had been seeking, and continued to attend his lectures for eleven years. At the end of that period, he joined an eastern expedition under the Emperor Gordian, for the purpose of making himself acquainted with the wisdom of the Persians and Indians, concerning which his curiosity seems to have been excited by Ammonius. But his hopes of further enlightenment in that quarter were not fulfilled. The campaign terminated disastrously132; the emperor himself fell at the head of his troops in Mesopotamia, and Plotinus had great difficulty in escaping with his life to Antioch. Soon afterwards he settled in Rome, and remained there until near the end of his life, when ill-health obliged him to retire to a country seat in Campania, the property of a deceased friend, Zêthus. Here the philosopher died, in the sixty-sixth year of his age.
Plotinus seems to have begun his career as a public teacher soon after taking up his residence in Rome. His lectures at first assumed the form of conversations with his private friends. Apparently by way of reviving the traditions of Socrates and Plato, he encouraged them to take an active part in the discussion: but either he did not possess the authority of his great exemplars, or the rules of Greek dialogue were not very strictly133 observed in Rome; for we learn from the report of an eye-witness that interruptions were far too frequent, and that a vast amount of nonsense was talked.408 Afterwards a more regular system of lecturing was established, and papers were read aloud by those who had any observations to offer, as in our own philosophical societies.
The new teacher gathered round him a distinguished275 society, comprising not only professional philosophers, but also physicians, rhetors, senators, and statesmen. Among the last-mentioned class, Rogatianus, who filled the office of praetor, showed the sincerity135 of his conversion by renouncing136 the dignities of his position, surrendering his worldly possessions, limiting himself to the barest necessaries of life, and allowing himself to be dependent even for these on the hospitality of his friends. Thanks to this asceticism138, he recovered the use of his hands and feet, which had before been completely crippled with gout.409
The fascination139 exercised by Plotinus was not only intellectual, but personal. Singularly affable, obliging, and patient, he was always ready to answer the questions of his friends, even laying aside his work in order to discuss the difficulties which they brought to him for solution. His lectures were given in Greek; and although this always remained to him a foreign language, the pronunciation and grammar of which he never completely mastered, his expressions frequently won admiration140 by their felicity and force; and the effect of his eloquence141 was still further heightened by the glowing enthusiasm which irradiated his whole countenance142, naturally a very pleasing one, during the delivery of the more impressive passages.410
As might be expected, the circle of admirers which surrounded Plotinus included several women, beginning with his hostess Gemina and her daughter. He also stood high in the favour of the Emperor Galienus and his consort143 Salonina; so much so, indeed, that they were nearly persuaded to let him try the experiment of restoring a ruined city in Campania, and governing it according to Plato’s laws.411 Porphyry attributes the failure of this project to the envy of the courtiers;276 Hegel, with probably quite as much reason, to the sound judgment144 of the imperial ministers.412
Our philosopher had, however, abundant opportunity for showing on a more modest scale that he was not destitute145 of practical ability. So high did his character stand, that many persons of distinction, when they felt their end approaching, brought their children to him to be taken care of, and entrusted146 their property to his keeping. As a result of the confidence thus reposed147 in him, his house was always filled with young people of both sexes, to whose education and material interests he paid the most scrupulous148 attention, observing that as long as his wards102 did not make a profession of philosophy, their estates and incomes ought to be preserved unimpaired. It is also mentioned that, although frequently chosen to arbitrate in disputes, he never made a single enemy among the Roman citizens—a piece of good fortune which is more than one could safely promise to anyone similarly circumstanced in an Italian city at the present day.413
Plotinus possessed149 a remarkable150 power of reading the characters and even the thoughts of those about him. It is said, probably with some exaggeration, that he predicted the future fate of all the boys placed under his care. Thus he foretold151 that a certain Polemo, in whom he took particular interest, would devote himself to love and die young; which proved only too true, and may well have been anticipated by a good observer without the exercise of any supernatural prescience. As another instance of his penetration152, we are told that a valuable necklace having been stolen from a widow named Chione, who lived in his house with her family, the slaves were all led into the presence of Plotinus that he might single out the thief. After a careful scrutiny153, the philosopher put his finger on the guilty individual. The man at first protested his innocence154, but was soon induced by277 an application of the whip to confess, and, what was a much more valuable verification of his accuser’s insight, to restore the missing article. Porphyry himself could testify from personal experience to his friend’s remarkable power of penetration. Being once about to commit suicide, Plotinus divined his intention, and told him that it proceeded, not from a rational resolution, but from a fit of the blues155, as a remedy for which he prescribed change of scene, and this did in fact have the desired effect.414
Previous to his forty-ninth year, Plotinus wrote nothing. At that age he began to compose short essays on subjects which suggested themselves in the course of his oral teaching. During the next ten years, he produced twenty-one such278 papers, some of them only a page or two in length. At the end of that period, he made the acquaintance of his future editor and biographer, Porphyry, a young student of Semitic extraction, whose original name was Malchus. The two soon became fast friends; and whatever speculative differences at first divided them were quickly removed by an amicable156 controversy157 between Porphyry and another disciple named Amelius, which resulted in the unreserved adhesion of the former to the doctrine158 of their common master.415 The literary activity of Plotinus seems to have been powerfully stimulated159 by association with the more methodical mind of Porphyry. During the five years416 of their personal intercourse160 he produced nineteen essays, amounting altogether to three times the bulk of the former series. Eight shorter pieces followed during the period of failing health which preceded his death, Porphyry being at that time absent in Sicily, whither he had retired161 when suffering from the fit of depression already mentioned.
Porphyry observes that the first series of essays show the immaturity162 of youth—a period which he extends to what is generally considered the sufficiently163 ripe age of fifty-nine;—the second series the full-grown power of manhood; and the last the weakness of declining years. The truth is that his method of criticism, at least in this instance, was to judge of compositions as if their merit depended on their length, and perhaps also with reference to the circumstance whether their subject had or had not been previously164 talked over with himself. In point of fact, the earlier pieces include some of the very best things that Plotinus ever wrote; and, taking them in the order of their composition, they form a connected279 exposition of Neo-Platonic165 principles, to which nothing of importance was ever added. This we shall attempt to show in the most effectual manner possible by basing our own account of Neo-Platonism on an analysis of their contents; and we strongly recommend them to the attention of all Greek scholars who wish to make themselves acquainted with Plotinus at first hand, but have not leisure to wade166 through the whole of his works. It may also be mentioned that the last series of essays are distinguished134 by the popular character of their subjects rather than by any evidence of failing powers, one of them, that on Providence167,417 being remarkable for the vigour and eloquence of its style.
By cutting up some of the longer essays into parts, Porphyry succeeded, much to his delight, in bringing the whole number up to fifty-four, which is a product of the two perfect numbers six and nine. He then divided them into six volumes, each containing nine books—the famous Enneads of Plotinus. His principle of arrangement was to bring together the books in which similar subjects were discussed, placing the easier disquisitions first. This disposition has been adhered to by subsequent editors, with the single exception of Kirchhoff, who has printed the works of Plotinus according to the order in which they were written.418 Porphyry’s scrupulous information has saved modern scholars an incalculable amount of trouble, but has not, apparently, earned all the gratitude it deserved, to judge by Zeller’s intimation that the chronological168 order of the separate pieces cannot even now be precisely169 determined170.419 Unfortunately, what could have been of priceless value in the case of Plato and Aristotle, is of comparatively small value in the case of Plotinus. His280 system must have been fully formed when he began to write, and the dates in our possession give no clue to the manner in which its leading principles were evolved.420
Such, so far as they can be ascertained172, are the most important facts in the life of Plotinus. Interwoven with these, we find some legendary173 details which vividly174 illustrate175 the superstition and credulity of the age. It is evident from his childish talk about the numbers six and nine that Porphyry was imbued176 with Pythagorean ideas. Accordingly, his whole account of Plotinus is dominated by the wish to represent that philosopher under the guise of a Pythagorean saint. We have already alluded177 to the manner in which he exalts180 his hero’s remarkable sagacity into a power of supernatural prescience and divination181. He also tells us, with the most unsuspecting good faith, how a certain Alexandrian philosopher whose jealousy182 had been excited by the success of his illustrious countryman, endeavoured to draw down the malignant183 influences of the stars on the head of Plotinus, but was obliged to desist on finding that the attack recoiled184 on himself.421 On another occasion, an Egyptian priest, by way of exhibiting his skill in magic, offered to conjure185 up the daemon or guardian186 spirit of Plotinus. The latter readily consented, and the Temple of Isis was chosen for the scene of the operations, as, according to the Egyptian, no other spot sufficiently pure for the purpose could be found in Rome. The incantations were duly pronounced, when, much to the admiration of those present, a god made his appearance instead of the expected daemon. By what particular marks the divinity of the apparition187 was determined, Porphyry omits to mention. The philosopher was congratulated by his countryman on the possession of such a distinguished patron, but the celestial188 visitor vanished before any questions could be put to him. This mishap189 was attributed to a friend281 ‘who, either from envy or fear, choked the birds which had been given him to hold,’ and which seem to have played a very important part in the incantation, though what it was, we do not find more particularly specified190.422
Another distinguished compliment was paid to Plotinus after his death by no less an authority than the Pythian Apollo, who at this period had fully recovered the use of his voice. On being consulted respecting the fate of the philosopher’s soul, the god replied by a flood of bombastic191 twaddle, in which the glorified192 spirit of Plotinus is described as released from the chain of human necessity and the surging uproar193 of the body, swimming stoutly194 to the storm-beaten shore, and mounting the heaven-illumined path, not unknown to him even in life, that leads to the blissful abodes196 of the immortals197.423
In view of such tendencies, one hardly knows how much confidence is to be placed in Porphyry’s well-known picture of his master as one who lived so entirely for spiritual interests that he seemed ashamed of having a body at all. We are told that, as a consequence of this feeling, he avoided the subject of his past life, refused to let his portrait be painted, neglected the care of his health, and rigorously abstained198 from animal food, even when it was prescribed for him under the form of medicine.424 All this may be true, but it is not very consistent with the special doctrines199 of Plotinus as recorded in his writings, nor should it be allowed to influence our interpretation200 of them. In his personal character and conduct he may have allowed himself to be carried away by the prevalent asceticism and superstition of the age; in his philosophy he is guided by the healthier traditions of Plato and Aristotle, and stands in declared opposition201 to the mysticism which was a negation of Nature and of life.
How far Plotinus was indebted to Ammonius Saccas for his speculative ideas is another question with respect to which the Pythagoreanising tendencies of his biographer may282 possibly have contributed to the diffusion202 of a serious misconception. What Porphyry tells us is this. Before leaving Alexandria, Plotinus had bound himself by a mutual203 agreement with two of his fellow-pupils, Herennius and Origines (not the Christian Father, but a pagan philosopher of the same age and name), to keep secret what they had learned by listening to the lectures of Ammonius. Herennius, however, soon broke the compact, and Origines followed his example. Plotinus then considered that the engagement was at an end, and used the results of his studies under Ammonius as the basis of his conversational204 lectures in Rome, the substance of which, we are left to suppose, was subsequently embodied205 in his published writings. But, as Zeller has pointed206 out, this whole story bears a suspicious resemblance to what is related of the early Pythagorean school. There also the doctrines of the master were regarded by his disciples as a mystery which they pledged themselves to keep secret, and were only divulged207 through the infidelity of one among their number, Philolaus. And the same critic proves by a careful examination of what are known to have been the opinions of Origines and Longinus, both fellow-pupils of Plotinus, that they differed from him on some points of essential importance to his system. We cannot, therefore, suppose that these points were included in the teaching of their common master, Ammonius.425 But if this be so, it follows that Plotinus was the real founder of the Neo-Platonic school; and, in all cases, his writings remain the great source whence our knowledge of its first principles is derived.
III.
In point of style, Plotinus is much the most difficult of the ancient philosophers, and, in this respect, is only surpassed by a very few of the moderns. Even Longinus, who was one of the most intelligent critics then living, and who, besides,283 had been educated in the same school with our philosopher, could not make head or tail of his books when copies of them were sent to him by Porphyry, and supposed, after the manner of philologists208, that the text must be corrupt209, much to the disgust of Porphyry, who assures us that its accuracy was unimpeachable210.426 Probably politeness prevented Longinus from saying, what he must have seen at a glance, that Plotinus was a total stranger to the art of literary composition. We are told that he wrote as fast as if he were copying from a book; but he had never mastered even the elements of the Greek language; and the weakness of his eyesight prevented him from reading over what he had written. The mistakes in spelling and grammar Porphyry corrected, but it is evident that he has made no alterations211 in the general style of the Enneads; and this is nearly as bad as bad can be—disjointed, elliptical, redundant213, and awkward. Chapter follows chapter and paragraph succeeds to paragraph without any fixed214 principle of arrangement; the connexion of the sentences is by no means clear; some sentences are almost unintelligible215 from their extreme brevity, others from their inordinate217 length and complexity218. The unpractised hand of a foreigner constantly reveals itself in the choice and collocation of words and grammatical inflections. Predicates and subjects are huddled219 together without any regard to the harmonies of number and gender220, so that even if false concords221 do not occur, we are continually annoyed by the suggestion of their presence.427
But even the most perfect mastery of Greek would not284 have made Plotinus a successful writer. We are told that before taking up the pen he had thoroughly thought out his whole subject; but this is not the impression produced by a perusal222 of the Enneads. On the contrary, he seems to be thinking as he goes along, and to be continually beset223 by difficulties which he has not foreseen. The frequent and disorderly interruptions by which his lectures were at one time disturbed seem to have made their way into his solitary224 meditations225, breaking or tangling226 the thread of systematic227 exposition at every turn. Irrelevant228 questions are constantly intruding229 themselves, to be met by equally irrelevant answers. The first mode of expressing an idea is frequently withdrawn230, and another put in its place, which is, in most cases, the less intelligible216 of the two; while, as a general rule, when we want to know what a thing is, Plotinus informs us with indefatigable231 prolixity232 what it is not.
Nevertheless, by dint233 of pertinacious234 repetition, the founder of Neo-Platonism has succeeded in making the main outlines, and to a great extent the details, of his system so perfectly235 clear that probably no philosophy is now better understood than his. In this respect, Plotinus offers a remarkable contrast to the two great thinkers from whom his ideas are principally derived. While Plato and Aristotle construct each particular sentence with masterly clearness, the general drift of their speculations237 is by no means easy to ascertain171; and, even now, critics take diametrically opposite views of the interpretation which is to be put on their teaching with regard to several most important points. The expositors of Neo-Platonism, on the contrary, show a rare unanimity238 in their accounts of its constitutive principles. What they differ about is its origin and its historical significance. And these are points on which we too shall have to enter, since all the ancient systems are interesting to us chiefly as historical phenomena239, and Neo-Platonism more so than any other. Plotinus285 effected a vast revolution in speculative opinion, but he effected it by seizing on the thoughts of others rather than by any new thoughts or even new developments or applications of his own.
Whether Plotinus was or was not the disciple of Ammonius, it is beyond all doubt that he considered himself the disciple of Plato. There are more than a hundred references to that philosopher in the Enneads, against less than thirty references to all the other ancient thinkers put together;428 and, what is more remarkable, in only about half of them is he mentioned by name. The reader is expected to know that ‘he’ always means Plato. And it is an article of faith with Plotinus that his master cannot be mistaken; when the words of oracular wisdom seem to contradict one another, there must be some way of harmonising them. When they contradict what he teaches himself, the difficulty must be removed by skilful240 interpretation; or, better still, it must be discreetly241 ignored.429 On the other hand, when a principle is palpably borrowed from Aristotle, not only is its derivation unacknowledged, but we are given to understand by implication that it belongs to the system which Aristotle was at most pains to controvert242.430
But numerous as are the obligations, whether real or imaginary, of the Alexandrian to the Athenian teacher, they range over a comparatively limited field. What most interests a modern student in Platonism—its critical preparation, its conversational dialectic, its personal episodes, its moral enthusiasm, its political superstructure—had apparently no interest for Plotinus as a writer. He goes straight to the metaphysical core of the system, and occupies himself with re-thinking it in its minutest details. Now this was just the part which had either not been286 discussed at all, or had been very insufficiently243 discussed by his predecessors. It would seem that the revival of Platonic studies had followed an order somewhat similar to the order in which Plato’s own ideas were evolved. The scepticism of the Apologia had been taken up and worked out to its last consequences by the New Academy. The theory of intuitive knowledge, the ethical244 antithesis245 between reason and passion, and the doctrine of immortality246 under its more popular form, had been resumed by the Greek and Roman Eclectics. Plutarch busied himself with the erotic philosophy of the Phaedrus and the Symposium247, as also did his successor, Maximus Tyrius. In addition to this, he and the other Platonists of the second century paid great attention to the theology adumbrated248 in those dialogues, and in the earlier books of the Republic. But meanwhile Neo-Pythagoreanism had intervened to break the normal line of development, and, under its influence, Plutarch passed at once to the mathematical puzzles of the Timaeus. With Plato himself the next step had been to found a state for the application of his new principles; and such was the logic of his system, that the whole stress of adverse249 circumstances could not prevent the realisation of a similar scheme from being mooted250 in the third century; while, as we have seen, something more remotely analogous251 to it was at that very time being carried out by the Christian Church. Plato’s own disappointed hopes had found relief in the profoundest metaphysical speculations; and now the time has come when his labours in this direction were to engage the attention hitherto absorbed by the more popular or literary aspects of his teaching.
Now it was by this side of Platonism that Aristotle also had been most deeply fascinated. While constantly criticising the ideal theory, he had, in truth, accepted it under a modified form. His universal classification is derived from the dialectic method. His psychology252 and theology are constructed on287 the spiritualistic basis of the Academy, and out of materials which the founder of the Academy had supplied. It was therefore natural that Plotinus should avail himself largely of the Stagirite’s help in endeavouring to reproduce what a tradition of six centuries had obscured or confused. To reconcile the two Attic masters was, as we know, a common school exercise. Learned commentators253 had, indeed, placed their disagreement beyond all dispute. But there remained the simpler course of bringing their common standpoint into greater prominence255, and combining their theories where this seemed possible without too openly renouncing the respect due to what almost all considered the superior authority of Plato. To which of the two masters Neo-Platonism really owed most is a question that must be postponed256 until we have made ourselves acquainted with the outlines of the system as they appear in the works of Plotinus.
IV.
It has been already mentioned how large a place was given to erotic questions by the literary Platonists of the second century. Even in the school of Plotinus, Platonic love continued to be discussed, sometimes with a freedom which pained and disgusted the master beyond measure.431 His first essay was apparently suggested by a question put to him in the course of some such debate.432 The subject is beauty. In his treatment of it, we find our philosopher at once rising superior to the indecorous frivolities of his predecessors. Physical beauty he declares to be the ideal element in objects, that which they have received from the creative soul, and which the perceptive257 soul recognises as akin to her own essence. Love is nothing but the excitement and joy occasioned by this discovery. But to understand the truer and higher forms of beauty, we must turn away288 from sensible perceptions, and study it as manifested in wise institutions, virtuous258 habits, and scientific theories. The passionate259 enthusiasm excited by the contemplation of such qualities as magnanimity, or justice, or wisdom, or valour can only be explained by assuming that they reveal our inmost nature, showing us what we were destined260 for, what we originally were, and what we have ceased to be. For we need only enumerate261 the vices263 which make a soul hideous—injustice, sensuality, cowardice264, and the like—to perceive that they are foreign to her real nature, and are imposed on her by contamination with the principle of all evil, which is matter. To be brave means not to dread265 death, because death is the separation of the soul from the body. Magnanimity means the neglect of earthly interests. Wisdom means the elevation266 of our thoughts to a higher world. The soul that virtue has thus released becomes pure reason, and reason is just what constitutes her intrinsic beauty. It is also what alone really exists; without it all the rest of Nature is nothing. Thus foul267 is opposed to fair, as evil to good and false to true. Once more, as the soul is beautiful by participation268 in reason, so reason in its turn depends on a still higher principle, the absolute good to which all things aspire269, and from which they are derived—the one source of life, of reason, and of existence. Behind all other loves is the longing63 for this ultimate good; and in proportion to its superiority over their objects is the intensity270 of the passion which it inspires, the happiness which its attainment271 and fruition must bestow272. He who would behold273 this supreme274 beauty must not seek for it in the fair forms of the external world, for these are but the images and shadows of its glory. It can only be seen with the inward eye, only found in the recesses275 of our own soul. To comprehend the good we must be good ourselves; or, what is the same thing, we must be ourselves and nothing else. In this process of abstraction, we first arrive at pure reason, and then we say that the ideas289 of reason are what constitutes beauty. But beyond reason is that highest good of which beauty is merely the outward vesture, the source and principle from which beauty springs.
It is evident that what Plotinus says about beauty and love was suggested by the well-known passages on the same subject in the Phaedrus and the Symposium. His analysis of aesthetic276 emotion has, however, a much more abstract and metaphysical character than that of his great model. The whole fiction of an antenatal existence is quietly let drop. What the sight of sensible beauty awakens277 in a philosophic87 soul is not the memory of an ideal beauty beheld278 in some other world, but the consciousness of its own idealising activity, the dominion279 which it exercises over unformed and fluctuating matter. And, in all probability, Plato meant no more than this—in fact he hints as much elsewhere,433—but he was not able or did not choose to express himself with such unmistakable clearness.
Again, this preference for mythological280 imagery on the part of the more original and poetical281 thinker seems to be closely connected with a more vivid interest in the practical duties of life. With Plotinus, the primal282 beauty or supreme good is something that can be isolated283 from all other beauty and goodness, something to be perceived and enjoyed in absolute seclusion285 from one’s fellow-men. God is, indeed, described as the source and cause of all other good. But neither here nor elsewhere is there a hint that we should strive to resemble him by becoming, in our turn, the cause of good to others. Platonic love, on the contrary, first finds its reality and truth in unremitting efforts for the enlightenment and elevation of others, being related to the transmission of spiritual life just as the love inspired by visible beauty is related to the perpetuation286 and physical ennoblement of the race.
This preference of pure abstract speculation236 to beneficent290 action may be traced to the influence of Aristotle. Some of the most enthusiastic expressions used by Plotinus in speaking of his supreme principle seem to have been suggested by the Metaphysics and the last book of the Nicomachean Ethics. The self-thinking thought of the Stagirite does not, indeed, take the highest rank with him. But it is retained in his system, and is only relegated288 to a secondary place because, for reasons which we shall explain hereafter, it does not fulfil equally well with Plato’s Idea of Good, the condition of absolute and indivisible unity6, without which a first principle could not be conceived by any Greek philosopher. But this apparent return to the standpoint of the Republic really involves a still wider departure from its animating289 spirit. In other words, Plotinus differs from Aristotle as Aristotle himself had differed from Plato; he shares the same speculative tendency, and carries it to a greater extreme.
We have also to note that Plotinus arrives at his Absolute by a method apparently very different from that pursued by either of his teachers. Plato’s primal beauty is, on the face of it, an abstraction and generalisation from all the scattered290 and imperfect manifestations of beauty to be met with in our objective experience. And Aristotle is led to his conception of an eternal immaterial thought by two lines of analysis, both starting from the phenomena of external Nature. The problem of his Physics is to account for the perpetuity of motion. The problem of his Metaphysics is to explain the transformation291 of potential into actual existence. Plotinus, on the other hand, is always bidding us look within. What we admire in the objective world is but a reflex of ourselves. Mind is the sole reality; and to grasp this reality under its highest form, we must become like it. Thus the more we isolate284 our own personality and self-identity from the other interests and experiences of life, the more nearly do we approach to consciousness of and coalescence293 with the supreme identity wherein all things have their source.
291
But on looking at the matter a little more closely, we shall find that Plotinus only set in a clearer light what had all along been the leading motive294 of his predecessors. We have already observed that Plato’s whole mythological machinery295 is only a fanciful way of expressing that independent experience which the mind derives296 from the study of its own spontaneous activity. And the process of generalisation described in the Symposium is really limited to moral phenomena. Plato’s standpoint is less individualistic than that of Plotinus in so far as it involves a continual reference to the beliefs, experiences, and wants of other men; but it is equally subjective297, in the sense of interpreting all Nature by the analogies of human life. There are even occasions when his spiritualism goes the length of inculcating complete withdrawal298 from the world of common life into an ideal sphere, when he seems to identify evil with matter, when he reduces all virtue to contempt for the interests of the body, in language which his Alexandrian successor could adopt without any modification299 of its obvious meaning.434
So also with Aristotle. As a naturalist300, he is, indeed, purely301 objective; but when he offers a general explanation of the world, the subjective element introduced by Protagoras and Socrates at once reappears. Simple absolute self-consciousness is for him the highest good, the animating principle of Nature, the most complete reality, and the only one that would remain, were the element of nonentity302 to disappear from this world. The utter misconception of dynamic phenomena which marks his physics and astronomy can only be accounted for by his desire to give life the priority over mechanical motion, and reason the priority over life. Thus his metaphysical method is essentially303 identical with the introspective method recommended by Plotinus, and, if fully worked out, might have led to the same results.
We cannot, then, agree with Zeller, when he groups the292 Neo-Platonists together with the other post-Aristotelian schools, on the ground that they are all alike distinguished from Plato and Aristotle by the exclusive attention which they pay to subjective and practical, as opposed to scientific and theoretical interests. It seems to us that such distinctions are out of relation to the historical order in which the different systems of Greek philosophy were evolved. It is not in the substance of their teaching, but in their diminished power of original speculation, that the thinkers who came after Aristotle offer the strongest contrast to their predecessors. In so far as they are exclusively practical and subjective, they follow the Humanists and Socrates. In so far as they combine Socratic tendencies with physical studies, they imitate the method of Plato and Aristotle. Their cosmopolitan304 naturalism is inherited from the Cynics in the first instance, more remotely from the physiocratic Sophists, and, perhaps, in the last resort, from Heracleitus. Their religion is traceable either to Pythagoras, to Socrates, or to Plato. Their scepticism is only a little more developed than that of Protagoras and the Cyrenaics. But if we seek for some one principle held in common by all these later schools, and held by none of the earlier schools, we shall seek for it in vain. The imitative systems are separated from one another by the same fundamental differences as those which divide the original systems. Now, in both periods, the deepest of all differences is that which divides the spiritualists from the materialists. In both periods, also, it is materialism that comes first. And in both, the transition from one doctrine to the other is marked by the exclusive prominence given to subjective, practical, sceptical, or theological interests in philosophy; by the enthusiastic culture of rhetoric in general education; and by a strong religious reaction in the upper ranks of society.
Thus we can quite agree with Zeller when he observes435293 that Neo-Platonism only carried out a tendency towards spiritualism which had been already manifesting itself among the later Stoics, and had been still further developed by the Neo-Pythagoreans. But what does this prove? Not what Zeller contends for, which is that Neo-Platonism stands on the same ground with the other post-Aristotelian systems, but simply that a recurrence305 of the same intellectual conditions was being followed by a recurrence of the same results. Now, as before, materialism was proving its inadequacy307 to account for the facts of mental experience. Now, as before, morality, after being cut off from physical laws, was seeking a basis in religious or metaphysical ideas. Now, as before, the study of thoughts was succeeding to the study of words, and the methods of popular persuasion308 were giving place to the methods of dialectical demonstration309. Of course, the age of Plotinus was far inferior to the age of Plato in vitality310, in genius, and in general enlightenment, notwithstanding the enormous extension which Roman conquest had given to the superficial area of civilisation, as the difference between the Enneads and the Dialogues would alone suffice to prove. But this does not alter the fact that the general direction of their movement proceeds in parallel lines.
In saying that the post-Aristotelian philosophers were not original thinkers, we must guard against the supposition that they contributed nothing of value to thought. On the contrary, while not putting forward any new theories, they generalised some of the principles borrowed from their predecessors, worked out others in minute detail, and stated the arguments on both sides of every controverted311 point with superior dialectic precision. Thus, while materialism had been assumed as self-evidently true by the pre-Socratic schools, it was maintained by the Stoics and Epicureans on what seemed to be grounds of experience and reason. And, similarly, we find that Plotinus, having arrived at the consciousness that spiritualism is the common ground on which294 Plato and Aristotle stand, the connecting trait which most completely distinguishes them from their successors, proceeds in his second essay436 to argue the case against materialism more powerfully than it had ever been argued before, and with nearly as much effect as it has ever been argued since.
V.
Our personality, says the Alexandrian philosopher, cannot be a property of the body, for this is composed of parts, and is in a state of perpetual flux312. A man’s self, then, is his soul; and the soul cannot be material, for the ultimate elements of matter are inanimate, and it is inconceivable that animation313 and reason should result from the aggregation314 of particles which, taken singly, are destitute of both; while, even were it possible, their disposition in a certain order would argue the presence of an intelligence controlling them from without. The Stoics themselves admit the force of these considerations, when they attribute reason to the fiery315 element or vital breath by which, according to them, all things are shaped. They do, indeed, talk about a certain elementary disposition as the principle of animation, but this disposition is either identical with the matter possessing it, in which case the difficulties already mentioned recur306, or distinct from it, in which case the animating principle still remains to be accounted for.
Again, to suppose that the soul shares in the changes of the body is incompatible316 with the self-identity which memory reveals. To suppose that it is an extended substance is incompatible with its simultaneous presence, as an indivisible whole, at every point to which its activity reaches; as well as with the circumstance that all our sensations, though received through different organs, are referred to a common centre of consciousness. If the sensorium is a fluid body it will have no more power of retaining impressions than water;295 while, if it is a solid, new impressions will either not be received at all, or only when the old impressions are effaced317.
Passing from sensation to thought, it is admitted that abstract conceptions are incorporeal318: how, then, can they be received and entertained by a corporeal319 substance? Or what possible connexion can there be between different arrangements of material particles and such notions as temperance and justice? This is already a sufficiently near approach to the language of modern philosophy. In another essay, which according to the original arrangement stands third, and must have been composed immediately after that whence the foregoing arguments are transcribed320, there is more than an approach, there is complete coincidence.437 To deduce mind from atoms is, says Plotinus, if we may so speak, still more impossible than to deduce it from the elementary bodies. Granting that the atoms have a natural movement downwards321, granting that they suffer a lateral322 deflection and so impinge on one another, still this could do no more than produce a disturbance323 in the bodies against which they strike. But to what atomic movement can one attribute psychic324 energies and affections? What sort of collision in the vertical325 line of descent, or in the oblique326 line of deflection, or in any direction you please, will account for the appearance of a particular kind of reasoning or mental impulse or thought, or how can it account for the existence of such processes at all? Here, of course, Plotinus is alluding327 to the Epicureans; but it is with the Stoic96 and other schools that he is principally concerned, and we return to his attack on their psychology.
The activities of the soul are thought, sensation, reasoning, desire, attention, and so forth: the activities of body are heat, cold, impact, and gravitation; if to these we add the characteristics of mind, the latter will have no special properties by296 which it can be known. And even in body we distinguish between quantity and quality; the former, at most, being corporeal, and the latter not corporeal at all. Here Plotinus just touches the idealistic method of modern spiritualism, but fails to follow it any further. He seems to have adopted Aristotle’s natural realism as a sufficient theory of external perception, and to have remained uninfluenced by Plato’s distrust of sensible appearances.
After disposing of the Stoic materialism, according to which the soul, though distinct from the body, is, equally with it, an extended and resisting substance, our philosopher proceeds to discuss the theories which make it a property or function of the body. The Pythagorean notion of the soul as a harmony of the body is met by a reproduction of the well-known arguments used against it in Plato’s Phaedo. Then comes the Aristotelian doctrine that the soul is the entelechy—that is to say, the realised purpose and perfection—of the physical organism to which it belongs. This is an idea which Aristotle himself had failed to make very clear, and the inadequacy of which he had virtually acknowledged by ascribing a different origin to reason, although this is counted as one of the psychic faculties328. Plotinus, at any rate, could not appreciate an explanation which, whatever else it implied, certainly involved a considerable departure from his own dualistic interpretation of the difference between spirit and matter. He could not enter into Aristotle’s view of the one as a lower and less concentrated form of the other. The same arguments which had already been employed against Stoicism are now turned against the Peripatetic329 psychology. The soul as a principle, not only of memory and desire, but even of nutrition, is declared to be independent of and separable from the body. And, finally, as a result of the whole controversy, its immortality is affirmed. But how far this immortality involves the belief in a prolongation of personal existence after death, is a point297 which still remains uncertain. We shall return to the question in dealing330 with the religious opinions of Plotinus.
Closely connected with the materialism of the Stoics, and equally adverse to the principles of Plato and Aristotle, was their fatalism. In opposition to this, Plotinus proceeds to develop the spiritualistic doctrine of free-will.438 In the previous discussion, we had to notice how closely his arguments resemble those employed by more modern controversialists. We have here to point out no less wide a difference between the two. Instead of presenting free-will as a fact of consciousness which is itself irreconcilable331 with the dependence105 of mental on material changes, our philosopher, conversely, infers that the soul must be free both from the conditions of mechanical causation and from the general interdependence of natural forces, because it is an individual substance.439 In truth, the phenomena of volition332 were handled by the ancient philosophers with a vagueness and a feebleness offering the most singular contrast to their powerful and discriminating333 grasp of other psychological problems. Of necessarianism, in the modern sense, they had no idea. Aristotle failed to see that, quite apart from external restraints, our choice may conceivably be determined with the utmost rigour by an internal motive; nor could he understand that the circumstances which make a man responsible for his actions do not amount to a release of his conduct from the law of universal causation. In this respect, Plato saw somewhat deeper than his disciple, but created298 fresh confusion by identifying freedom with the supremacy of reason over irrational desire.440 Plotinus generally adopts the Platonist point of view. According to this, the soul is free when she is extricated334 from the bonds of matter, and determined solely335 by the conditions of her spiritual existence. Thus virtue is not so much free as identical with freedom; while, contrariwise, vice262 means enslavement to the affections of the body, and therefore comes under the domain336 of material causation.441 Yet, again, in criticising the fatalistic theories which represent human actions as entirely predetermined by divine providence, he protests against the ascription of so much that is evil to so good a source, and insists that at least the bad actions of men are due to their own free choice.442
In vindicating337 human freedom, Plotinus had to encounter a difficulty exceedingly characteristic of his age. This was the astrological superstition that everything depended on the stars, and that the future fate of every person might be predicted by observing their movements and configurations338 at the time of his birth. Philosophers found it much easier to demolish124 the pretensions339 of astrology by an abstract demonstration of their absurdity340, than to get rid of the supposed facts which were currently quoted in their favour. That fortunes could be foretold on the strength of astronomical341 calculations with as much certainty as eclipses, seems to have been an accepted article of belief in the time of Plotinus, and one which he does not venture to dispute. He is therefore obliged to satisfy himself with maintaining that the stars do not cause, but merely foreshow the future, in the same manner as the flight of birds, to the prophetic virtue of which299 he also attaches implicit73 credence342. All parts of Nature are connected by such an intimate sympathy, that each serves as a clue to the rest; and, on this principle, the stars may be regarded as the letters of a scripture343 in which the secrets of futurity are revealed.443
How much originality344 there may be in the anti-materialistic345 arguments of Plotinus we cannot tell. He certainly marks a great advance on Plato and Aristotle, approximating, in this respect, much more closely than they do to the modern standpoint. The indivisibility and permanence of mind had, no doubt, been strongly insisted on by those teachers, in contrast with the extended and fluctuating nature of body. But they did not, like him, deduce these characteristics from a direct analysis of consciousness as such. Plato inferred the simplicity72 and self-identity of mind from the simplicity and self-identity of the ideas which it contemplates346. Aristotle went a step further, or perhaps only expressed the same meaning more clearly, when he associated immateriality with the identity of subject and object in thought.444 Moreover, both Plato and Aristotle seem to have rested the whole spiritualistic case on objective rather than on subjective considerations; although, as we have seen, the subjective interest was what dominated all the while in their thoughts. Starting with the analogy of a living body, Plato argues, both in the Phaedrus and in the Laws, that soul must everywhere be the first cause of motion, and therefore must exist prior to body.445 The elaborate scientific analysis of Aristotle’s Physics leads up to a similar conclusion; and the ontological analysis of the Metaphysics starts with the distinction between Form and Matter in bodies, to end with the question of their relative priority, and of the objective machinery by which they are united. Plotinus, too, sometimes refers to mind as the source300 of physical order; but this is rather in deference347 to his authorities than because the necessity of such an explanation seemed to him, as it did to them, the deepest ground of a spiritualistic philosophy. On the other hand, his psychological arguments for the immateriality of the soul are drawn from a wider area of experience than theirs, feeling being taken into account no less than thought; instead of restricting himself to one particular kind of cognition for evidence of spiritual power, he looks for it in every manifestation of living personality.
In criticising the Stoic system as a whole, the New Academy and the later Sceptics had incidentally dwelt on sundry348 absurdities349 which followed from the materialistic interpretation of knowledge; and Plotinus evidently derived some of his most forcible objections from their writings; but no previous philosopher that we know of had set forth the whole case for spiritualism and against materialism with such telling effect. And what is, perhaps, more important than any originality in detail, is the profound insight shown in choosing this whole question of spiritualism versus350 materialism for the ground whereon the combined forces of Plato and Aristotle were to fight their first battle against the naturalistic system which had triumphed over them five centuries before. It was on dialectical and ethical grounds that the controversy between Porch and Academy, on ethical and religious grounds that the controversy between Epicureanism and all other schools of philosophy, had hitherto been conducted. Cicero and Plutarch never allude178 to their opponents as materialists. Only once, in his polemic351 against Col?tes, does Plutarch observe that neither a soul nor anything else could be made out of atoms, but this is because they are discrete352, not because they are extended.446 For the rest, his method is to trip up his opponents by pointing out their inconsistencies, rather than to cut the ground from under their feet by proving that their theory of the universe is wrong.
301
Under such guidance as this. Platonism had made but little way. We saw, in the concluding sections of the last chapter and in the opening section of the present chapter, that it profited by the religious and literary revival of the second century, just as it was to profit long afterwards by the greater revival of the fifteenth century, so much so as to become the fashionable philosophy of the age. Yet, even in that period of its renewed splendour, the noblest of contemporary thinkers was not a Platonist but a Stoic; and although it would be unfair to measure the moral distance between the Porch and the Academy by the interval353 which separates an Aurelius from an Apuleius, still it would seem as if naturalism continued to be the chosen creed354 of strenuous355 and dutiful endeavour, while spiritualism was drifting into an alliance with hysterical356 and sensuous357 superstition. If we may judge by the points which Sextus Empiricus selects for controversial treatment, Stoicism was still the reigning358 system in his time, that is to say, about the beginning of the third century; and if, a generation later, it had sunk into neglect, every rival school, except that of Epicurus, was in exactly the same condition. Thus the only advance made was to substitute one form of materialism for another, until Neo-Platonism came and put an end to their disputes by destroying the common foundation on which they stood; while, at the same time, it supplied a completely organised doctrine round which the nobler elements of the Hellenic revival could rally for a last stand against the foes359 that were threatening it from every side.
VI.
We have seen how Plotinus establishes the spiritualistic basis of his philosophy. We have now to see how he works out from it in all directions, developing the results of his previous enquiries into a complete metaphysical system. It will have been observed that the whole method of reasoning by302 which materialism was overthrown360, rested on the antithesis between the unity of consciousness and the divisibility of corporeal substance. Very much the same method was afterwards employed by Cartesianism to demonstrate the same conclusion. But with Descartes and his followers, the opposition between soul and body was absolute, the former being defined as pure thought, the latter as pure extension. Hence the extreme difficulty which they experienced in accounting361 for the evident connexion between the two. The spiritualism of Plotinus did not involve any such impassable chasm362 between consciousness and its object. According to him, although the soul is contained in or depends on an absolutely self-identical unity, she is not herself that unity, but in some degree shares the characters of divisibility and extension.447 If we conceive all existence as bounded at either extremity363 by two principles, the one extended and the other inextended, then soul will still stand midway between them; not divided in herself, but divided in respect to the bodies which she animates364. Plotinus holds that such an assumption is necessitated366 by the facts of sensation. A feeling of pain, for example, is located in a particular point of the body, and is, at the same time, apprehended368 as my feeling, not as some one else’s. A similar synthesis obtains through the whole of Nature. The visible universe consists of many heterogeneous369 parts, held together by a single animating principle. And we can trace the same qualities and figures through a multitude of concrete individuals, their essential unity remaining unbroken, notwithstanding the dispersion of the objects in which they inhere.
Here Plotinus avowedly370 follows the teaching of Plato, who, in the Timaeus, describes Being or Substance as composed by mingling371 the indivisible and unchanging with the divisible and corporeal principle.448 And, although there is no express reference, we know that in placing soul between the two, he303 was equally following Plato. It is otherwise in the next essay, which undertakes to give a more explicit372 analysis of psychical373 phenomena.449 The soul, we are told, consists, like external objects, of two elements related to one another as Form and Matter. These are reason and sense. The office of the former is, primarily, to enlighten and control the latter. Plato had already pointed to such a distinction; but Aristotle was the first to work it out clearly, and to make it the hinge of his whole system. It is, accordingly, under the guidance of Aristotle that Plotinus proceeds in what he has next to say. Just as there is a soul of the world corresponding to our soul, so also, he argues, there must be a universal objective Reason outside and above the world. In speaking of this Reason, we shall, for clearness’ sake, in general call it by its Greek name, Nous. Nous, according to Aristotle, is the faculty374 by which we apprehend367 abstract ideas; it is self-thinking thought; and, as such, it is the prime mover of Nature. Plotinus adopts the first two positions unreservedly, and the third to a certain extent; while he brings all three into combination with the Platonic theory of ideas. It had always been an insuperable difficulty in the way of Plato’s teaching that it necessitated, or seemed to necessitate365, the unintelligible notion of ideas existing without any mind to think them. For a disciple of Aristotle, the difficulty ceases to exist if the archetypal essences assumed by Plato are conceived as residing in an eternal Nous. But, on the other hand, how are we to reconcile such an accommodation with Aristotle’s principle, that the Supreme Intelligence can think nothing but itself? Simply by generalising from the same master’s doctrine that the human Nous is identical with the ideas which it contemplates. Thought and its object are everywhere one. Thus, according to Plotinus, the absolute Nous embraces the totality of archetypes or forms which we see reflected and embodied in the material universe. In thinking them, it thinks itself,304 not passing from one to the other as in discursive375 reasoning, nor bringing them into existence by the act of thought, but apprehending376 them as simultaneously377 present realities.
To explain how the Nous could be identical with a number of distinct ideas was a difficult problem. We shall have to show at a more advanced stage of our exposition how Plotinus endeavoured to solve it with the help of Plato’s Sophist. In the essay where his theory is first put forward, he cuts the knot by asserting that each idea virtually contains every other, while each in its actual and separate existence is, so to speak, an independent Nous. But correlation378 is not identity; and to say that each idea thinks itself is not to explain how the same subject can think, and in thinking be identical with all. The personal identity of the thinking subject still stands in unreconciled opposition to the multitude of thoughts which it entertains, whether successively or in a single intuition. Of two things one: either the unity of the Nous or the diversity of its ideas must be sacrificed. Plotinus evades the alternative by a kind of three-card trick. Sometimes his ideal unity is to be found under the notion of convergence to a common centre, sometimes under the notion of participation in a common property, sometimes under the notion of mutual equivalence.
The confusion was partly inherited from Aristotle. When discussing the psychology of that philosopher, we showed that his active Nous is no other than the idea of which we are at any moment actually conscious. Our own reason is the passive Nous, whose identity is lost in the multiplicity of objects with which it becomes identified in turn. But Aristotle was careful not to let the personality of God, or the supreme Nous, be endangered by resolving it into the totality of substantial forms which constitute Nature. God is self-conscious in the strictest sense. He thinks nothing but himself. Again, the subjective starting-point of305 Plotinus may have affected22 his conception of the universal Nous. A single individual may isolate himself from his fellows in so far as he is a sentient382 being; he cannot do so in so far as he is a rational being. His reason always addresses itself to the reason of some one else—a fact nowhere brought out so clearly as in the dialectic philosophy of Socrates and Plato. Then, when an agreement has been established, their minds, before so sharply divided, seem to be, after all, only different personifications of the same universal spirit. Hence reason, no less than its objects, comes to be conceived as both many and one. And this synthesis of contradictories383 meets us in modern German as well as in ancient Greek philosophy.
After his preliminary analysis of Nous, we find Plotinus working out in two directions from the conception so obtained.450 He begins by explaining in what relation the human soul stands to the universal reason. To him, personally, it seemed as if the world of thought into which he penetrated384 by reflecting on his own inmost essence, was so much the real home of his soul that her presence in a bodily habitation presented itself as a difficulty requiring to be cleared up. In this connexion, he refers to the opinions of the Pythagoreans, who looked on our earthly life as an unmixed evil, a punishment for some sin committed in a former stage of existence. Their views seem to have been partly shared by Plato. Sometimes he calls the body a prison and a tomb into which the soul has fallen from her original abode195. Yet, in his Timaeus, he glorifies385 the visible world, and tells us that the universal soul was divinely appointed to give it life and reason; while our individual souls have also their part to play in perfecting the same providential scheme.
It is to the second theory that Plotinus evidently leans. However closely his life may have been conformed to the Pythagorean model—a point with respect to which we have306 nothing better than the very prejudiced statements of Porphyry to rely on—there is no trace of Pythagorean asceticism in his writings. Hereafter we shall see how hostile he was to Gnostic pessimism. In the preceding essay, he had already specified admiration for physical beauty as a first and necessary step in the soul’s ascent386 to a contemplation of spiritual realities;451 and now it is under the guidance of Plato’s later speculations that he proceeds to account for her descent from that higher world to the restraints of matter and of sense.
With regard to the universal soul of Nature, there is, indeed, no difficulty at all. In giving a sensible realisation to the noetic ideas, she suffers no degradation387 or pollution by contact with the lower elements of matter. Enthroned on the outer verge381 of the cosmos388, she governs the whole course of Nature by a simple exercise of volition, and in the enjoyment389 of a felicity which remains undisturbed by passion or desire. But just as we have seen the supreme Nous resolving itself into a multitude of individual intelligences, so also does the cosmic soul produce many lesser390 or partial souls of which our own is one. Now these derivative391 souls cannot all be equal, for that would be to defeat the purpose of creation, which is to realise all the possibilities of creation from the highest to the lowest. Thus each has an office corresponding to her place in the scale of perfection.452 We may say of the human soul that she stoops to conquer. Her mission is to cope with the more recalcitrant392 forms of matter. It is to the struggle with their impurities393 that the troubles and passions of our life are due. By yielding to earthly temptations, we suffer a second fall, and one much more real than the first; by overcoming them, as is perfectly in our power to do, we give scope and exercise to faculties which would otherwise307 have remained dormant394 and unknown. Moreover, our soul retains the privilege of returning to her former abode, enriched by the experience acquired in this world, and with that clearer perception of good which the knowledge of its opposite alone can supply. Nay395, paradoxical as the assertion may seem, she has not entirely descended396 to earth, but remains in partial communication with the noetic world by virtue of her reasoning faculty; that is to say, when its intuitions are not darkened and disturbed by the triumph of sensuous impressions over the lower soul. On this and on many other occasions, Plotinus betrays a glimmering397 consciousness that his philosophy is purely subjective, and that its attempted transcendentalism is, in truth, a projection399 of psychological distinctions into the external world. Starting with the familiar division of human nature into body, soul, and spirit (or reason), he endeavours to find an objective counterpart for each. Body is represented by the material universe, soul by the animating principle of Nature, reason by the extramundane Nous. Under these three heads is comprised the totality of real existence; but existence itself has to be accounted for by a principle lying above and beyond it, which has still to be obtained by an effort of abstraction from the data that self-consciousness supplies.453
In his very first essay, Plotinus had hinted at a principle higher and more primordial401 than the absolute Nous, something with which the soul is connected by the mediation402 of Nous, just as she herself mediates403 between Nous and the material world. The notion of such a supreme principle was derived from Plato. In the sixth and seventh books of the Republic, we are told that at the summit of the dialectic series stands an idea to grasp which is the ultimate object of308 all reasoning. Plato calls this the Idea of Good, and describes it as holding a place in the intellectual world analogous to that held by the sun in the physical world. For, just as the sun brings all visible things into being, and also gives the light by which they are seen, so also the Good is not only that by which the objects of knowledge are known, but also that whence their existence is derived, while at the same time itself transcending404 existence in dignity and power.454
In a former part of this work455 we found reason to believe that Plato’s supreme good is no other than the Idea of Sameness which occurs in the Sophist and in the Timaeus, where it is correlated with the Idea of Difference; and we also concluded that the divine creator of the last-named dialogue is intended to represent it under a more concrete and popular form.456 We may, perhaps, also discover it in the Limit of the Philêbus; and if we are to believe what Aristotle tells us about the later teaching of Plato, it seems to have finally coalesced405 with the Pythagorean One, which combines with the unlimited406 Dyad to form first number, and then everything else, just as the Same combines with the Different to form existence in the Timaeus.457
For the Platonic Idea of Good, Aristotle had substituted his own conception of self-thinking thought, as the absolute on which all Nature hangs: and we have seen how Plotinus follows him to the extent of admitting that this visible universe is under the immediate control of an incorporeal Reason, which also serves as a receptacle for the Platonic Ideas. But what satisfied Aristotle does not fully satisfy him. The first principle must be one, and Nous fails to answer the conditions of absolute unity, Even self-thinking thought involves the elementary dualism of object and subject. Again, as Plotinus somewhat inconsistently argues, Nous, being knowledge, must cognise something simpler than309 itself.458 Or, perhaps, what he means is that in Nous, which is its product, the first principle becomes self-conscious. Consciousness means a check on the outflow of energy due to the restraining action of the One, a return to and reflection on itself of the creative power.459
If the necessity of the One is proved by the inward differentiation407 of what seemed most simple, it is also proved by the integration408 of what seems most divided. In his next essay, our philosopher wanders off from the investigation409 of what he has just begun, by abruptly410 starting the question whether all souls are one.460 This question is, however, most intimately connected with his main theme. He answers it in the affirmative. Strictly personal as our feelings seem, we are, in reality, one with each other, through our joint212 participation in the world-soul. Love and sympathy among human beings are solely due to this connexion. Plotinus mentions, as another evidence of its reality, the secret affinities411 called into play even at a great distance by magical spells—an allusion412 very characteristic of his age.461 What prevents us from more fully perceiving the unity of all souls is the separateness of the bodies with which they are associated. Matter is the principle of individuation. But even within the soul there is a division between the rational and the irrational part, concentration being the characteristic of the one and dispersion of the other. The latter is fitted by its divided nature for presiding over the bodily functions of sensation and nutrition; and with the dissolution of the body it returns to the unity of the higher soul. There are two ways in which we can account for this pervading413 unity. It is either as products or as portions of the universal soul that all particular souls are one. Plotinus combines both explanations. The world-soul first gives birth to an image of itself, and then this310 is subdivided414 into as many partial souls as there are bodies requiring animation.
On extending our survey still wider, we find that the existence of a thing everywhere depends on its unity.462 All bodies perish by dissolution, and dissolution means the loss of unity. Health, beauty, and virtue are merely so many different kinds of harmony and unison415. Shall we then say that soul, as the great unifying417 power in Nature, is the One of which we are in search? Not so; for preceding investigations418 have taught us that soul is only an agent for transmitting ideas received from a higher power; and the psychic faculties themselves are held together by a unifying principle for which we have to account. Neither is the whole sum of existence the One, for its very name implies a plurality of parts. And the claims of the Nous to that distinction have been already disproved. In short, nothing that exists can be the One, for, as we have seen, unity is the cause of existence and must therefore precede it.
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‘What then,’ asks Plotinus, ‘is the One? No easy question to answer for us whose knowledge is based on ideas, and who can hardly tell what ideas are, or what is existence itself. The farther the soul advances in this formless region, where there is nothing for her to grasp, nothing whose impress she can receive, the more does her footing fail her, the more helpless and desolate419 does she feel. Oftentimes she wearies of such searching and is glad to leave it all and to descend23 into the world of sense until she finds rest on the solid earth, as the eyes are relieved in turning from small objects to large. For she does not know that to be one herself is to have gained the object of her search, for then she is no other than that which she knows. Nevertheless it is only by this method that we can master the philosophy of the One. Since, then, what we seek is one, and since we are considering the first principle of all things and the Good, he who enters on this quest must not place himself afar from the things that are first by descending420 to the things that are last, but he must leave the objects of sense, and, freed from all evil, ascend421 to the first principle of his own nature, that by becoming one, instead of many, he may behold the beginning and the One. Therefore he must become Reason, trusting his soul to Reason for guidance and support, that she may wakefully receive what it sees, and with this he must behold the One, not admitting any element of sense, but gazing on the purest with pure Reason and with that which in Reason is first. Should he who addresses himself to this enterprise imagine that the object of his vision possesses magnitude or form or bulk, then Reason is not his guide, for such perceptions do not belong to its nature but to sense and to the opinion which follows on sense. No; we must only pledge Reason to perform what it can do. Reason sees what precedes, or what contains, or what is derived from itself. Pure are the things in it, purer still those which precede, or rather, that which precedes it. This is neither reason nor anything that is; for whatever is has the form of existence, whereas this has none, not even an ideal form. For the One, whose nature is to generate all things, cannot be any of those things itself. Therefore it is neither substance, nor quality, nor reason, nor soul; neither moving nor at rest, not in place, not in time, but unique of its kind, or rather kindless, being before all kind, before motion and before rest, for these belong to being, and are that to which its multiplicity is due. Why, then, if it does not move, is it not at rest? Because while one or both of these must be attributed to being, the very act of attribution involves a distinction between subject and predicate, which is impossible in the case of what is absolutely simple.’463
The One cannot, properly speaking, be an object of knowledge, but is apprehended by something higher than knowledge. This is why Plato calls it ineffable422 and indescribable. What we can describe is the way to the view, not the view itself. The soul which has never been irradiated with the light of that supreme splendour, nor filled with the passionate joy of a lover finding rest in the contemplation of his beloved, cannot be given that experience in words. But the beatific423 vision is open to all. He from whom it is hidden has only himself to blame. Let him break away from the restraints of sense and place himself under the guidance of philosophy, that philosophy which leads from matter to spirit, from soul to Nous, from Nous to the One.
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Plotinus himself, we are told, reached the climax424 of complete unification several times in his life, Porphyry only once, in the sixty-eighth year of his age. Probably the condition so denominated was a species of hypnotic trance. Its importance in the Neo-Platonic system has been considerably425 exaggerated, and on the strength of this single point some critics have summarily disposed of Plotinus and his whole school as unreasoning mystics. Mysticism is a vague word capable of very various applications. In the present instance, we presume that it is used to express a belief in the existence of some method for the discovery of truth apart from tradition; observation, and reasoning. And, taken in this sense, the Neo-Platonic method of arriving at a full apprehension426 of the One would be considered an extreme instance of mysticism. We must bear in mind, however, that Plotinus arrives at an intellectual conception of absolute unity by the most strictly logical process. It makes no difference that his reasoning is unsound, for the same criticism applies to other philosophers who have never been accused of mysticism. It may be said that after leading us up to a certain point, reason is replaced by intuition. Rather, what the ultimate intuition does is not to take the place of logic, but to substitute a living realisation for an abstract and negative conception. Moreover, the intuition is won not by forsaking427 logic, but by straining its resources to the very utmost. Again, one great characteristic of mysticism, as ordinarily understood, is to deny the truth of common observation and reasoning. Now Plotinus never goes this length. As we have already remarked, he does not even share Plato’s distrust of sensible impressions, but rather follows the example of Aristotle in recognising their validity within a certain sphere. Nor does he mention having received any revelations of divine truth during his intercourse with the absolute One. This alone marks an immense difference between his ecstasies—if such they can be called—and313 those of the Christian mystics with whom he is associated by M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire.464
It may be said that the One is itself a mystical conception, involving a reversal of all our ordinary beliefs. The universe is a vast multiplicity of objects, held together, if you will, by some secret bond of union possibly related to the personal unity of consciousness, but still neither lost nor confused in its identity. Precisely; but Plotinus himself fully admits as much. His One is the cause of existence, not existence itself. He knows just as well as we do, that the abstract idea of unity has no reality apart from the mind. But if so, why should he associate it, in the true mystical style, with the transports of amorous428 passion? The question is pertinent429, but it might be addressed to other Greek systems as well. We must remember that Plotinus is only commenting and enlarging on Plato. In the Republic also, the Idea of Good is described as transcending the existence and the knowledge which it produces,465 and in the Symposium, the absolute self beautiful, which seems to be the Good under another name, is spoken of in terms not less passionately431 enthusiastic than any applied432 by Plotinus to the vision of the One.466 Doubtless the practical sense of the great Attic master did not desert him even here: the object of all thought, in its widest sweep and in its highest flight, is to find room for every possible expansion of knowledge, for every possible elevation of life. Plotinus was a stranger to such broad views; but in departing from Plato, as usual he follows Aristotle. The absolute self-thinking thought of the Stagirite is, when we examine it closely, only one degree less chimerical433 than the Neo-Platonic unification. For it means consciousness of self without the314 correlative consciousness of a not-self, and as such, according to Aristotle, it affords an eternal felicity equal or superior to the best and happiest moments of our sensitive human life. What Plotinus does is to isolate personal identity from reason and, as such, to make it at once the cause and the supreme ideal of existence. This involves two errors: first a false abstraction of one subjective phenomenon from the sum total of conscious life; and, secondly434, an illegitimate generalisation of this abstraction into an objective law of things. But in both errors, Aristotle had preceded him, by dissociating reason from all other mental functions, and by then attributing the whole cosmic movement to the love which this isolated faculty of reason, in its absolute self-existence, for ever inspires. And he also set the example of associating happiness, which is an emotional state, with an intellectual abstraction from which emotion is necessarily excluded.
Again, the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics all pass for being absolute rationalists. Yet their common ideal of impassive self-possession, when worked out to its logical consequences, becomes nearly indistinguishable from the self-simplification of Plotinus. All alike exhibit the Greek tendency towards endless abstraction—what we have called the analytical435 moment of Greek thought, working together with the moments of antithesis and circumscription436. The sceptical isolation437 of man from Nature, the Epicurean isolation of the individual from the community, the Stoic isolation of will from feeling, reached their highest and most abstract expression in the Neo-Platonic isolation of pure self-identity from all other modes of consciousness and existence combined.
In estimating the intellectual character of Plotinus, we must also remember that the theory of the absolute One occupies a relatively438 small place in his speculations; while, at a rough computation, the purely mystical portions of his writings—by which we understand those in which allusion is made to personal and incommunicable experiences of his own315—do not amount to more than one per cent. of the whole. If these have attracted more attention than all the rest put together, the reason probably is that they offer an agreeable relief to the arid439 scholasticism which fills so much of the Enneads, and that they are the only very original contribution made by Plotinus to Greek literature. But the significance of a writer must not always be measured by his most original passages, and this is eminently441 true of our philosopher. His great merit was to make the spiritualism of Plato and Aristotle more intelligible and interesting than it had been before, and to furnish reason with a rallying-point when it was threatened with utter destruction by the religious revival of the empire.
VII.
So far our investigation has been analytical. We have seen Plotinus acquire, one after another, the elements out of which his system has still to be constructed. The first step was to separate spirit from matter. They are respectively distinguished as principles of union and of division. The bodies given to us in experience are a combination of the two, a dispersion of form over an infinitely442 extended, infinitely divisible, infinitely changeful substratum. Our own souls, which at first seemed so absolutely self-identical, present, on examination, a similarly composite character. A fresh analysis results in the separation of Nous or Reason from the lower functions of conscious life. And we infer by analogy that the soul in Nature bears the same relation to a transcendent objective Nous. Nous is essentially pure self-consciousness, and from this self-consciousness the world of Ideas is developed. Properly speaking, Ideas are the sole reality: sensible forms are an image of them impressed on matter through the agency of the world-soul. But Nous, or the totality of Ideas, though high, is not the highest. All that has hitherto occupied us, Nature, Soul, and Reason, is316 pervaded443 by a fundamental unity, without which nothing could exist. But Soul is not herself this unity, nor is Reason. Self-consciousness, even in its purest expression, involves a duality of object and subject. The notion of Being is distinct from the notion of oneness. The principle represented by the latter, as the cause of all things, must itself transcend398 existence. At the same time, it is revealed to us by the fact of our own personal identity. To be united with oneself is to be united with the One.
Thus we have, in all, five gradations: the One, Nous, Soul, the sensible world, and, lastly, unformed Matter. Taken together, the first three constitute a triad of spiritual principles, and, as such, are associated in a single group by Plotinus.467 Sometimes they are spoken of as the Alexandrian Trinity. But the implied comparison with the Trinity of Catholicism is misleading. With Neo-Platonism, the supreme unity is, properly speaking, alone God and alone One. Nous is vastly inferior to the first principle, and Soul, again, to Nous. Possibly the second and third principles are personal; the first most certainly is not, since self-consciousness is expressly denied to it by Plotinus. Nor is it likely that the idea of a supernatural triad was suggested to Neo-Platonism by Christianity. Each of the three principles may be traced to its source in Greek philosophy. This has been already shown in the case of the One and of the Nous. The universal soul is to be found in Plato’s Timaeus; it is analogous, at least in its lower, divided part, to Aristotle’s Nature; and it is nearly identical with the informing spirit of Stoicism. As to the number three, it was held in high esteem444 long before the Christian era, and was likely to be independently employed for the construction of different systems at a time when belief in the magical virtue of particular numbers was more widely diffused445 than at any former period of civilised history.
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From another point of view, as we have already observed with Kirchner, the fundamental triad assumed by Plotinus is body, soul, and spirit. Under their objective aspect of the sensible universe, the world-soul, and the Nous, these three principles constitute the sum of all reality. Take away plurality from Nous and there remains the One. Take away soul from body and there remains unformed matter. These are the two transcendent principles between which the others extend, and by whose combination in various proportions they are explained. It is true that Plotinus himself does not allude to the possibility of such an analysis, but it exhibits, better than any other, the natural order of his dialectic.
Plotinus passes by an almost insensible transition from the more elementary and analytical to the more constructive446 portion of his philosophy. This naturally falls into two great divisions, the one speculative and the other practical. It has to be shown by what necessity and in what order the great cosmic principles are evolved from their supreme source; and it has also to be shown in what way this knowledge is connected with the supreme interests of the human soul. The moral aspect of Neo-Platonism is not at first very clearly distinguished from its metaphysical aspect; and both find their most general solution in the same line of thought that has led us up to a contemplation of the ultimate One. For the successive gradations of our ascent represent, in an inverted447 order, the steps of creative energy by which all things are evolved from their primal source; while they directly correspond to the process of purification through which every soul must pass in returning from the exile of her separate and material existence to the happiness of identification with God. And here we at once come on the fundamental contradiction of the system. What we were so carefully taught to consider as one and nothing more, must now be conceived as the first cause and the supreme good. Plotinus does, indeed, try to evade379 the difficulty by saying that his absolute is only318 a cause in relation to other things, that it is not so much good as the giver of good, that it is only one in the sense of not being many.468 But after making these reservations, he continues to use the old terms as confidently as if they stood for the ideas usually associated with them. His fundamental error was to identify three distinct methods of connecting phenomena, in thought, with each other or with ourselves. We may view things in relation to their generating antecedents, in relation to other things with which they are associated by resemblance or juxtaposition448, or in relation to the satisfaction of our own wants. These three modes of reference correspond to Aristotle’s efficient, formal, and final causes; but the word causation should be applied only to the first. Whether their unfortunate confusion both by Aristotle and by his successors was in any appreciable449 degree due to their having been associated by him under a common denomination450, may reasonably be doubted. It is rather more probable that the same name was given to these different conceptions in consequence of their having first become partially451 identified in thought. Social arrangements, which have a great deal to do with primitive452 speculation, would naturally lead to such an identification. The king or other chief magistrate453 stands at the head of the social hierarchy454 and forms the bond of union among its members; he is the source of all authority; and his position, or, failing that, his favour, is regarded as the supreme good. Religion extends the same combination of attributes to her chief God; and philosophy, following on the lines of religion, employs it to unify416 the methods of science and morality.
All existence, according to Plotinus, proceeds from the One, which he also calls God. But God does not create the world by a conscious exercise of power; for, as we have seen, every form of consciousness is excluded from his definition.319 Neither does it proceed from him by emanation, for this would imply a diminution455 of his substance.469 It is produced by an overflow456 of his infinite power.470 Our philosopher tries to explain and defend this rather unintelligible mode of derivation by the analogy of physical substances and their actions. Light is constantly coming from the sun without any loss to the luminary457 itself.471 And all things are, in like manner, constantly communicating their proper virtue to others while remaining unaltered themselves. Here we have a good example of the close connexion between science and abstract speculation. People often talk as if metaphysics was something beyond the reach of verification. But some metaphysical theories admit, at any rate, of disproof, in so far as they are founded on false physical theories. Had Plotinus known that neither the sun nor anything else in Nature can produce force out of nothing, he would, very probably, have hesitated to credit the One with such a power.
In reasoning up from the world to its first cause, we were given to understand that the two were related to one another as contradictory458 opposites. The multiple must proceed from the simple, and existence from that which does not exist. But the analogies of material production now suggest a somewhat different view. What every power calls into existence is an image of itself, but the effect is never more than a weakened and imperfect copy of its original. Thus the universe appears as a series of diminishing energies descending in a graduated scale from the highest to the lowest. Here, again, bad science makes bad philosophy. Effects are never inferior to their causes, but always exactly equal, the effect being nothing else than the cause in another place or under another form. This would be obvious enough, did not superficial observation habitually459 confound the real320 cause with the sum of its concomitants. What we are accustomed to think of as a single cause is, in truth, a whole bundle of causes, which do not always converge380 to a single point, and each of which, taken singly, is, of course, inferior to the whole sum taken together. Thus when we say that the sun heats the earth, this is only a conventional way of speaking. What really does the work is a relatively infinitesimal part of the solar heat separately transmitted to us through space. Once neglect this truth, and there is no reason why effects should not exceed as well as fall short of their causes in any assignable proportion. Such an illusion is, in fact, produced when different energies converge to a point. Here it is the consequent and not the antecedent which is confounded with the sum of its concomitants, as when an explosion is said to be the effect of a spark.
Of course we are speaking of causation as exercised under the conditions of time, space, matter, and motion. It is then identical with the transmission of energy and obeys the laws of energy. And to talk about causation under any other conditions than these is utter nonsense. But Plotinus and other philosophers exclude the most essential of the conditions specified from their enquiries into the ultimate origin of things. We are expressly informed that the genesis of Nous from the One, and of Soul from Nous, must not be conceived as taking place in time but in eternity460.472 Unfortunately those who make such reservations are not consistent. They continue to talk about power, causation, priority, and so forth, as if these conceptions were separable from time. Hence they have to choose between making statements which are absolutely unintelligible and making statements which are absolutely untrue.
Perhaps the processes of logic and mathematics may be adduced as an exception. It may be contended that the genus is prior to the species, the premise461 to the conclusion,321 the unit to the multiple, the line to the figure, in reason though not in time. And Plotinus avails himself to the fullest extent of mathematical and logical analogies in his transcendental constructions. His One is the starting-point of numeration, the centre of a circle, the identity involved in difference; and under each relation it claims an absolute priority, of which causal power is only the most general expression. We have already seen how a multitude of archetypal Ideas spring from the supreme Nous as from their fountain-head. Their production is explained, on the lines of Plato’s Sophist, as a process of dialectical derivation. By logically analysing the conception of self-consciousness, we obtain, first of all, Nous itself, or Reason, as the subject, and Existence as the object of thought. Subject and object, considered as the same with one another, give us Identity; considered as distinct, they give us Difference. The passage from one to the other gives Motion; the limitation of thought to itself gives Rest. The plurality of determinations so obtained gives number and quantity, their specific difference gives quality, and from these principles everything else is derived.473 It might seem as if, here at least, we had something which could be called a process of eternal generation—a causal order independent of time. But, in reality, the assumed sequence exists only in our minds, and there it takes place under the form of time, not less inevitably462 than do the external re-arrangements of matter and motion. Thus in logic and mathematics, such terms as priority, antecedence463, and evolution can only be used to signify the order in which our knowledge is acquired; they do not answer to causal relations existing among things in themselves. And apart from these two orders—the objective order of dynamical production in space and time, and the subjective order of intelligibility464 in thought—there is no kind of succession that we can conceive. Eternal relations, if they exist at all, must322 be relations of co-existence, of resemblance, or of difference, continued through infinite time. Wherever there is antecedence, the consequent can only have existed for a finite time.
Some may think that we have pushed this point at unnecessary length. But the Neo-Platonic method is not quite so obsolete465 as they, perhaps, suppose. Whenever we repeat the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds466, we are expressing our religious belief in the language of the Alexandrian schools, thus pledging ourselves to metaphysical dogmas which we can neither explain nor defend. Such terms as sonship and procession have no meaning except when applied to relations conceived under the form of time; and to predicate eternity of them is to reduce them to so much unintelligible jargon467.
An energy continually advancing through successive gradations, and diminishing as it advances—such, as we have seen, is the conception of existence offered by Plotinus. We have seen, also, how to explain the genesis of one principle from another without the aid of supernatural volition or of mechanical causation, he is compelled to press into the service every sort of relationship by which two objects can be connected, and to invest it with a dynamical significance which only the phenomena of matter and motion can possess. But what he chiefly relies on for guidance in this tortuous468 labyrinth469 of timeless evolution, is the old Greek principle that contraries are generated from one another. And with him, as with the earlier thinkers, all contraries reduce themselves, in the last analysis, to the four great antitheses470 of the One and the Many, Being and not-Being, the Same and the Other, Rest and Motion. It matters nothing that he should have followed Plato to the extent of co-ordinating five of these terms as supreme archetypal Ideas, immediately resulting from the self-consciousness of Nous, and themselves producing all other forms of existence. They are used, quite independently of that derivation, to explain the connexion of the various323 creative principles with one another. Nous is deduced from its first cause as Being from not-Being, as the Many from the One, as Difference from Identity, and as Motion from Rest.474 To explain the generation of Soul from Nous is a more difficult problem. The One had originally been defined as the antithetical cause of Nous, and therefore the latter could easily be accounted for by simply reversing the analytical process; whereas Nous had not been defined as the cause of Soul, but as the model whence her creative Ideas are derived. Soul, in fact, is not opposed to anything; she is the connecting link between sense and spirit. In this strait, Plotinus seems to think that the antithesis between Rest and Motion is the best fitted to express the nature of her descent from the higher principle; and on one occasion he illustrates471 the relation of his three divine substances to one another by the famous figure of a central point representing the One, a fixed circle round that point representing the Nous, and outside that, again, a revolving472 circle representing the Soul.475 Still, the different parts of the system are very awkwardly pieced together at this juncture473; for the creative energy of the Nous has already been invoked474 to account for the Ideas or partial intelligences into which it spontaneously divides; and one does not understand how it can be simultaneously applied to the production of something that is not an Idea at all.
Fresh difficulties arise in explaining the activity which the Soul, in her turn, exerts. As originally conceived, her function was sufficiently clear. Mediating475 between two worlds, she transforms the lower one into a likeness476 of the higher, stamping on material objects a visible image of the eternal Ideas revealed to her by a contemplation of the Nous. And, as a further elaboration of this scheme, we were told that the primary soul generates an inferior soul, which, again, subdivides477 itself into the multitude of partial souls required324 for the animation of different bodily organisms. But now that our philosopher has entered on a synthetic478 construction of the elements furnished by his preliminary analysis, he finds himself confronted by an entirely new problem. For his implied principle is that each hypostasis must generate the grade which comes next after it in the descending series of manifestations, until the possibilities of existence have been exhausted479. But in developing and applying the noetic Ideas, the Soul, apparently, finds a pre-existing Matter ready to hand. Thus she has to deal with something lower than herself, which she did not create, and which is not created by the Forms combined with it in sensible experience. We hear of a descent from thought to feeling, and from feeling to simple vitality,476 but in each instance the depth of the Soul’s fall is measured by the extent to which she penetrates480 into the recesses of a substance not clearly related to her nor to anything above her.
Plotinus is driven by this perplexity to reconsider the whole theory of Matter.477 He takes Aristotle’s doctrine as the groundwork of his investigation. According to this, all existence is divided into Matter and Form. What we know of things—in other words, the sum of their differential characteristics—is their Form. Take away this, and the unknowable residuum is their Matter. Again, Matter is the vague indeterminate something out of which particular Forms are developed. The two are related as Possibility to Actuality, as the more generic481 to the more specific substance through every grade of classification and composition. Thus there are two Matters, the one sensible and the other intelligible. The former constitutes the common substratum of bodies, the other the common element of ideas.478 The general distinction between Matter and Form was originally suggested to Aristotle by Plato’s remarks on the same subject; but he differs325 from his master in two important particulars. Plato, in his Timaeus, seems to identify Matter with space.479 So far, it is a much more positive conception than the ?λη of the Metaphysics. On the other hand, he constantly opposes it to reality as something non-existent; and he at least implies that it is opposed to absolute good as a principle of absolute evil.480 Thus while the Aristotelian world is formed by the development of Power into Actuality, the Platonic world is composed by the union of Being and not-Being, of the Same and the Different, of the One and the Many, of the Limit and the Unlimited, of Good and Evil, in varying proportions with each other.
Plotinus, as we have said, starts with the Aristotelian account of Matter; but by a process of dialectical manipulation, he gradually brings it into almost complete agreement with Plato’s conception; thus, as usual, mediating between and combining the views of his two great authorities. In the first place, he takes advantage of Aristotle’s distinction between intelligible and sensible Matter, to strip the latter of that positive and vital significance with which it had been clothed in the Peripatetic system. In the world of Ideas, there is an element common to all specific forms, a fundamental unity in which they meet and inhere, which may without impropriety be called their Matter. But this Matter is an eternal and divine substance, inseparably united with the fixed forms which it supports, and, therefore, something which, equally with them, receives light and life and thought from the central source of being. It is otherwise with sensible Matter, the common substance of the corporeal elements. This is, to use the energetic expression of our philosopher, a decorated corpse482.481 It does not remain constantly combined with any form, but is for ever passing from one to another, without manifesting a particular preference for any. As such, it is the absolute negation of Form, and can only be conceived, if at all, by326 thinking away every sensible quality. Neither has it any quantity, for quantity means magnitude, and magnitude implies definite figure. Aristotle opposed to each particular form a corresponding privation, and placed Matter midway between them. Plotinus, on the other hand, identifies Matter with the general privation of all forms. It is at this point that he begins to work his way back to the Platonic notion of Matter as simple extension. There must, after all, be something about Matter which enables it to receive every kind of quality and figure,—it must have some sort of mass or bulk, not, indeed, in any definite sense, but with an equal capacity for expansion and for contraction483. Now, says Plotinus, the very indeterminateness of Matter is precisely the capacity for extension in all directions that we require. ‘Having no principle of stability, but being borne towards every form, and easily led about in all directions, it acquires the nature of a mass.’482
Henceforth, whatever our philosopher says about Matter will apply to extension and to extension alone. It cannot be apprehended by sight, nor by hearing, nor by smell, nor by taste, for it is neither colour, nor sound, nor odour, nor juice. Neither can it be touched, for it is not a body, but it becomes corporeal on being blended with sensible qualities. And, in a later essay, he describes it as receiving all things and letting them depart again without retaining the slightest trace of their presence.483 Why then, it may be asked, if Plotinus meant extension, could he not say so at once, and save us all this trouble in hunting out his meaning? There were very good reasons why he should not. In the first place, he wished to express himself, so far as possible, in Aristotelian phraseology, and this was incompatible with the reduction of Matter to extension. In the next place, the idea of an infinite void had been already appropriated by the Epicureans, to whose system he was bitterly opposed. And, finally, the extension of ordinary327 experience had not the absolute generality which was needed in order to bring Matter into relation with that ultimate abstraction whence, like everything else, it has now to be derived.
As a result of the preceding analysis, Plotinus at last identifies Matter with the Infinite—not an infinite something, but the Infinite pure and simple, apart from any subject of which it can be predicated. We started with what seemed a broad distinction between intelligible and sensible Matter. That distinction now disappears in a new and more comprehensive conception; and, at the same time, Plotinus begins to see his way towards a restatement of his whole system in clearer terms. ‘The Infinite is generated from the infinity484 or power or eternity of the One; not that there is infinity in the One, but that it is created by the One.’484 With the first outrush of energy from the primal fount of things, Matter begins to exist. But no sooner do movement and difference start into life, than they are restrained and bent485 back by the presence of the One; and this reflection of power or being on itself constitutes the supreme self-consciousness of Nous.485 Whether the subsequent creation of Soul involves a fresh production of energy, or whether a portion of the original stream, which was called into existence by the One, escapes from the restraining self-consciousness of Nous and continues its onward486 flow—this Plotinus does not say. What he does say is that Soul stands to Nous in the relation of Matter to Form, and is raised to perfection by gazing back on the Ideas contained in Nous, just as Nous itself had been perfected by returning to the One.486 But while the two higher principles remain stationary487, the Soul, besides giving birth to a fresh stream of energy, turns towards her own creation and away from the fountain of her life. And, apparently, it is only by328 this condescension488 on her part that the visible world could have been formed.487 We can explain this by supposing that as the stream of Matter departs more and more from the One, its power of self-reflection continually diminishes, and at length ceases altogether. It is thus that the substratum of sensible objects must, as we have seen, be conceived under the aspect of a passive recipient489 for the forms imposed on it by the Soul; and just as those forms are a mere41 image of the noetic Ideas, so also, Plotinus tells us, is their Matter an image of the intelligible Matter which exists in the Nous itself; only the image realises the conception of a material principle more completely than the archetype, because of its more negative and indeterminate nature, a diminution of good being equivalent to an increase of evil.488
Still Plotinus gives no clear answer to the question whence comes this last and lowest Matter. He will not say that it is an emanation from the Soul, nor yet will he say that it is a formless residue490 of the element out of which she was shaped by a return to the Nous. In truth, he could not make up his mind as to whether the Matter of sensible objects was created at all. He oscillates between unwillingness492 to admit that absolute evil can come from good, and unwillingness to admit that the two are co-ordinate principles of existence. And, as usual, where ideas fail him, he helps himself out of the difficulty with metaphors493. The Soul must advance, and in order to advance she must make a place for herself, and that there may be a place there must be body. Or, again, while remaining fixed in herself, she sends out a great light, and by the light she sees that there is darkness beyond its extreme verge, and moulds its formless substance into shape.489
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The ambiguities494 and uncertainties495 which Plotinus exhibits in theorising on the origin of Matter, are due not only to the conflicting influences of Plato and Aristotle, but also to another influence quite distinct from theirs. This is the Stoic cosmology. While utterly repudiating496 the materialism of the Stoics, Plotinus evidently felt attracted by their severe monism, and by the consistent manner in which they derived every form of existence from the divine substance. They too recognised a distinction between Form and Matter, the active and the passive principle in Nature, but they supposed that the one, besides being penetrated and moulded by the other, had also been originally produced by it. Such a theory was well suited to the energetic and practical character of Stoic morality, with its aversion from mere contemplation, its immediate bearing on the concrete interests of life. Man was conceived as an intelligent force, having for his proper function to bring order out of chaos497, ‘to make reason and the will of God prevail,’ and this ideal appeared to be reflected in the dynamic constitution of Nature. With Plotinus, on the other hand, as with Aristotle, theory and not practice was the end of life, or rather, as he himself expressed it, practice was an inferior kind of theorising, an endeavour to set before oneself in outward form what should properly be sought in the noetic world where subject and object are one.490 Accordingly, while accepting the Stoic monism, he strove to bring it into close agreement with Aristotle’s cosmology, by substituting contemplation for will as the creative principle in all existence, no less than as the ideal of happiness for man.
We have seen how, in accordance with this view, each principle is perfected by looking back on its source.491 Thus330 the activity of the world-soul, so far as it is exercised for the benefit of what comes after and falls beneath her, is an anomaly only to be accounted for by her inferior place in the system of graduated descent; or else by the utter impotence of Matter, which is incapable498 of raising itself into Form by a spontaneous act of reflection, and can only passively receive the images transmitted to it from above, without being able to retain even these for any time. Nay, here also, what looks like creative energy admits of being assimilated more or less closely to an exercise of idealising thought. It is really for her own sake that the Soul fills what lies beyond her with life and light, not, like Plato’s Soul, from pure disinterested499 joy in the communication and diffusion of good. It is because she recoils500 with horror from darkness and nonentity that she shapes the formless substance into a residence for herself, on the model of the imperial palace whence she came. Thus the functions of sensation, nutrition, and reproduction are to be regarded as so many modes of contemplation. In the first, the Soul dwells on the material images which already exist; in the second and third, she strives to perpetuate501 and multiply them still further. And the danger is that she may become so enthralled502 by her own creation as to forget the divine original after which it is formed.492 Should she yield to the snare503, successive transmigrations will sink her lower and lower into the depths of animalism and material darkness. To avoid this degradation, to energise with the better part of our nature, is to be good. And with the distinction between good and evil, we pass from the metaphysical to the ethical portion of the system.
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VIII.
All virtue, with Plotinus, rests on the superiority of the soul to the body. So far, he follows the common doctrine of Plato and Aristotle. But in working out the distinction, he is influenced by the individualising and theoretic philosophy of the latter rather than by the social and practical philosophy of the former. Or, again, we may say that with him the intellectualism of Aristotle is heightened and warmed by the religious aspirations505 of Plato, strengthened and purified by the Stoic passionlessness, the Stoic independence of external goods. In his ethical system, the virtues506 are arranged in an ascending507 scale. Each grade reproduces the old quadripartite division into Wisdom, Courage, Temperance and Justice, but in each their respective significance receives a new interpretation. As civic508 virtues, they continue to bear the meaning assigned to them in Plato’s Republic. Wisdom belongs to reason, Courage to passionate spirit, Temperance to desire, while Justice implies the fulfilment of its appropriate function by each.493 But all this only amounts to the restriction509 of what would otherwise be unregulated impulse, the imposition of Form on Matter, the supremacy of the soul over the body; whereas what we want is to get rid of matter altogether. Here also, Plato sets us on the right track when he calls the virtues purifications. From this point of view, for the soul to energise alone without any interference, is Wisdom; not to be moved by the passions of the body is Temperance; not to dread separation from the body is Courage; and to obey the guidance of reason is Justice.494 Such a disposition of the soul is what Plato means by flying from the world and becoming like God. Is this enough? No, it is not. We have, so far, been dealing only with the negative conditions of good, not with good itself. The essential thing is not purification, but what remains behind when the work of purification is332 accomplished. So we come to the third and highest grade of virtue, the truly divine life, which is a complete conversion to reason. Our philosopher endeavours to fit this also into the framework of the cardinal510 virtues, but not without imposing511 a serious strain on the ordinary meaning of words. Of Wisdom nothing need be said, for it is the same as rationality. Justice is the self-possession of mind, Temperance the inward direction towards reason, Courage the impassivity arising from resemblance to that which is by nature impassive.495
Plotinus is careful to make us understand that his morality has neither an ascetic137 nor a suicidal tendency. Pleasures are to be tolerated under the form of a necessary relief and relaxation512; pains are to be removed, but if incurable513, they are to be patiently borne; anger is, if possible, to be suppressed, and, at any rate, not allowed to exceed the limits of an involuntary movement; fear will not be felt except as a salutary warning. The bodily appetites will be restricted to natural wants, and will not be felt by the soul, except, perhaps, as a transient excitement of the imagination.496 Whatever abstinences our philosopher may have practised on his own account, we find no trace of a tendency towards self-mortification in his writings, nothing that is not consistent with the healthiest traditions of Greek spiritualism as originally constituted by the great Athenian school.
While not absolutely condemning514 suicide, Plotinus restricts the right of leaving this world within much narrower limits than were assigned to it by the Stoics. In violently separating herself from the body, the soul, he tells us, is acting under the influence of some evil passion, and he intimates that the mischievous515 effects of this passion will prolong themselves into the new life on which she is destined to enter.497 Translated into more abstract language, his meaning probably is that the feelings which ordinarily prompt to suicide, are such as would not exist in a well-regulated mind. It is333 remarkable that Schopenhauer, whose views of life were, on other points, the very reverse of those held by Plotinus, should have used very much the same argument against self-destruction. According to his theory, the will to life, which it should be our principal business to conquer, asserts itself strongly in the wish to escape from suffering, and only delays the final moment of peaceful extinction516 by rushing from one phase of existence to another. And in order to prove the possibility of such a revival, Schopenhauer was obliged to graft517 on his philosophy a theory of metempsychosis, which, but for this necessity, would certainly never have found a place in it at all. In this, as in many other instances, an ethical doctrine is apparently deduced from a metaphysical doctrine which has, in reality, been manufactured for its support. All systems do but present under different formulas a common fund of social sentiment. A constantly growing body of public opinion teaches us that we do not belong to ourselves, but to those about us, and that, in ordinary circumstances, it is no less weak and selfish to run away from life than to run away from death.
Plotinus follows up his essay on the Virtues by an essay on Dialectic.498 As a method for attaining518 perfection, he places dialectic above ethics; and, granting that the apprehension of abstract ideas ranks higher than the performance of social duties, he is quite consistent in so doing. Not much, however, can be made of his few remarks on the subject. They seem to be partly meant for a protest against the Stoic idea that logic is an instrument for acquiring truth rather than truth itself, and also against the Stoic use or abuse of the syllogistic519 method. In modern phraseology, Plotinus seems to view dialectic as the immanent and eternal process of life itself, rather than as a collection of rules for drawing correct inferences from true propositions, or from propositions assumed to be true. We have seen how he regarded existence in the334 highest sense as identical with the self-thinking of the absolute Nous, and how he attempted to evolve the whole series of archetypal Ideas contained therein from the simple fact of self-consciousness. Thus he would naturally identify dialectic with the subjective reproduction of this objective evolution; and here he would always have before his eyes the splendid programme sketched520 in Plato’s Republic.499 His preference of intuitive to discursive reasoning has been quoted by Ritter as a symptom of mysticism. But here, as in so many instances, he follows Aristotle, who also held that simple abstraction is a higher operation, and represents a higher order of real existence than complex ratiocination521.500
The ultimate stage of perfection is, of course, the identification of subject and object, the ascent from the Nous to the One. But, on this point, Plotinus never added anything essential to what has already been quoted from the analytical portion of his enquiry, and the essay containing that passage is accordingly placed last in Porphyry’s arrangement of his works.
Our account of Neo-Platonism has, with the exception of a few illustrations, been derived exclusively from the earlier essays of Plotinus. His subsequent writings are exceedingly obscure and tedious, and they add little by way either of development or defence to the outlines which he had sketched with a master’s hand. Whatever materials they may supply for a better appreciation522, whether of his philosophy or of his general character as a thinker, will most profitably find their place in the final survey of both which we shall now attempt to give.
IX.
Every great system of philosophy may be considered from four distinct points of view. We may ask what is its value as a theory of the world and of human life, measured335 either by the number of new truths which it contains, or by the stimulus523 to new thought which it affords. Or we may consider it from the aesthetic side, as a monumental structure interesting us not by its utility, but by its beauty and grandeur524. Under this aspect, a system may be admirable for its completeness, coherence525, and symmetry, or for the great intellectual qualities exhibited by its architect, although it may be open to fatal objections as a habitation for human beings, and may fail to reproduce the plan on which we now know that the universe is built. Or, again, our interest in the work may be purely historical and psychological; we may look on it as the product of a particular age and a particular mind, as summing up for us under their most abstract form the ideas and aspirations which at any given moment had gained possession of educated opinion. Or, finally, we may study it as a link in the evolution of thought, as a result of earlier tendencies, and an antecedent of later developments. We propose to make a few remarks on the philosophy of Plotinus, or, what is the same thing, on Neo-Platonism in general, from each of these four points of view.
In absolute value, Neo-Platonism stands lowest as well as last among the ancient schools of thought. No reader who has followed us thus far will need to be reminded how many valuable ideas were first brought to light, or reinforced with new arguments and illustrations by the early Greek thinkers, by the Sophists and Socrates, by Plato and Aristotle, by the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, and by the moralists of the Roman empire. On every subject of speculation that can be started, we continue to ask, like Plotinus himself, what the ‘blessed ancients’ had to say about it;501 not, of course, because they lived a long time ago, but because they came first, because they said what they had to say with the unique charm of original discovery, because they were in more direct contact than we are, not, indeed, with the facts, but with the336 phenomena of Nature and life and thought. It is true that we have nothing more to learn from them, for whatever was sound in their teaching has been entirely absorbed into modern thought, and combined with ideas of which they did not dream. But until we come to Hume and his successors, there is nothing in philosophical literature that can be compared to their writings for emancipating526 and stimulating527 power; and, perhaps, when the thinkers of the last and present centuries have become as obsolete as Bacon and Descartes are now, those writings will continue to be studied with unabating zeal528. Neo-Platonism, on the other hand, is dead, and every attempt made to galvanise it into new life has proved a disastrous131 failure. The world, that is to say the world of culture, will not read Plotinus and his successors, will not even read the books that are written about them by scholars of brilliant literary ability like MM. Vacherot and Jules Simon in France, Steinhart and Kirchner in Germany.502
We have not far to seek for the cause of this fatal condemnation529. Neo-Platonism is nothing if not a system, and as a system it is false, and not only false but out of relation to every accepted belief. In combining the dialectic of Plato with the metaphysics of Aristotle and the physics of Stoicism, Plotinus has contrived530 to rob each of whatever plausibility531 it once possessed. The Platonic doctrine of Ideas was an attempt to express something very real and important, the distinction between laws and facts in Nature, between general principles and particular observations in science, between ethical standards and everyday practice in life. The eternal Nous of Aristotle represented the upward struggle of Nature through mechanical, chemical, and vital337 movements to self-conscious thought. The world-soul of Stoicism represented a return to monism, a protest against the unphilosophical antithesis between God and the world, spirit and matter, necessity and free-will. Plotinus attempts to rationalise the Ideas by shutting them up in the Aristotelian Nous, with the effect of severing532 them still more hopelessly from the real world, and, at the same time, making their subjective origin still more flagrantly apparent than before. And along with the Stoic conception of a world-soul, he preserves all those superstitious533 fancies about secret spiritual sympathies and affinities connecting the different parts of Nature with one another which the conception of a transcendent Nous, as originally understood by Aristotle, had at least the merit of excluding. Finally, by a tremendous wrench534 of abstraction, the unity of existence is torn away from existence itself, and the most relative of all conceptions is put out of relation to the thought which, in the very same breath, it is declared to condition, and to the things which it is declared to create.
Again, on the practical side, by combining Plato with Aristotle and both with Stoicism, Plotinus contrives535 to eliminate what is most valuable in each. If, in the Republic, the Good was placed above all existence, this was only that we might transform existence into its image. If Aristotle placed the theoretical above the ethical virtues, he assigned no limits but those of observation and reasoning to the energising of theoretic power. If the Stoics rested morality on the absolute isolation of the human will, they deduced from this principle not only the inwardness of virtue, but also the individualisation of duty, the obligation of beneficence, and the forgiveness of sin. But with Plotinus, Reason has no true object of contemplation outside its own abstract ideas, and the self-realisation of Stoicism means a barren consciousness of personal identity, from which every variety of interest and sympathy is excluded: it is not an expansion of our own338 soul into coincidence with the absolute All, but a concentration of both into a single point, a flight of the alone to the alone;503 and only in this utter solitude536 does he suppose that the Platonic Good is finally and wholly possessed.
Nor, with a single exception, is the fundamental untruth of the system redeemed537 by any just and original observations on points of detail such as lie so thickly scattered over the pages of other metaphysicians, both in ancient and modern literature. The single exception is the refutation of materialism to which attention has been already directed. Apart from this, the Enneads do not contain one single felicitous538 or suggestive idea, nothing that can enlarge the horizon of our thoughts, nothing that can exalt179 the purpose of our lives.
If, however, we pass to the second point of view, and judge Neo-Platonism according to the requirements, not of truth or of usefulness, but of beauty, our first verdict of utter condemnation will be succeeded by a much more favourable539 opinion. Plotinus has used the materials inherited from his predecessors with unquestionable boldness and skill; and the constructive power exhibited in the general plan of his vast system is fully equalled by the close reasoning with which every detail is elaborated and fitted into its proper place. Nothing can be imagined more imposing than this wondrous540 procession of forms defiling541 from the unknown to the unknown—from the self-developing consciousness of Reason as it breaks and flames and multiplies into a whole universe of being and life and thought, ever returning, by the very law of their production, to the source whence they have sprung—onward and outward on the wings of the cosmic Soul, through this visible world, where they reappear as images of intellectual beauty in the eternal revolutions of the starry542 spheres above, in the everlasting543 reproduction of organic species below, in the loveliest thoughts and actions of the loveliest human souls—till339 the utmost limits of their propagation and dispersion have been reached, till the last faint rays of existence die out in the dark and void region that extends to infinity beyond. Nothing in the realm of abstractions can be more moving than this Odyssey544 of the human soul, wakened by visions of earthly loveliness to a consciousness of her true destiny, a remembrance of her lost and forgotten home; then abandoning these for the possession of a more spiritual beauty, ascending by the steps of dialectic to a contemplation of the archetypal Ideas that lie folded and mutually interpenetrated in the bosom545 of the eternal Reason where thought and being are but the double aspect of a single absolute reality; seeking farther and higher, beyond the limits of existence itself, for a still purer unity, and finding in the awful solitude of that supreme elevation that the central source of all things does not lie without but within, that only in returning to self-identity does she return to the One; or, again, descending to the last confines of light and life that she may prolong their radiation into the formless depths of matter, projecting on its darkness an image of the glory whose remembrance still attends her in her fall.
Still more impressive, if we consider the writings of Plotinus on their personal side, and as a revelation of their author’s mind, is the high and sustained purity, the absolute detachment and disinterestedness546 by which they are characterised throughout. No trace of angry passion, no dallying547 with images of evil, interferes548 to mar39 their exalted549 spirituality from first to last. While the western world was passing through a period of horror and degradation such as had never been known before, the philosopher took refuge in an ideal sphere, and looked down on it all with no more disturbance to his serenity550 than if he had been the spectator of a mimic551 performance on the stage.504 This, indeed, is one of340 the reasons why the Enneads are so much less interesting, from a literary point of view, than the works of the Roman Stoics. It is not only that we fail to find in them any allusions552 even of the faintest kind to contemporary events or to contemporary life and manners, such as abound553 in Seneca and Epictêtus, but there is not the slightest reference to the existence of such a thing as the Roman empire at all. One or two political illustrations occur, but they are drawn from old Greek city life, and were probably suggested by Plato or Aristotle.505 But this tremendous blank is so perfectly in keeping with the whole spirit of Neo-Platonism as to heighten instead of lowering its aesthetic effect. In studying the philosophy of the preceding centuries, to whatever school it may belong, we have the image of death always before our eyes; and to fortify554 us against its terrors, we are continually called upon to remember the vanity of life. This is the protest of thought against the world, just as in Lucian and Sextus we hear the protest of the world against thought. At last the whole bitter strife555 comes to an end, the vision of sense passes away,
And leaves us with Plotinus and pure souls.
Here we need no deliverance from troubles and indignities556 which are not felt; nor do we need to be prepared for death, knowing that we can never die. The world will no longer look askance at us, for we have ceased to concern ourselves about its reformation. No scepticism can shake our convictions, for we have discovered the secret of all knowledge through the consciousness of that which is eternal in ourselves. Thus the world of outward experience has dropped out of our thoughts, because thought has orbed into a world of its own.
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X.
In the foregoing remarks we have already passed from the purely aesthetic to the historical or psychological view of Neo-Platonism—that is, the view which considers a philosophy in reference to the circumstances of its origin. Every speculative system reflects, more or less fully, the spirit of the age in which it was born; and the absence of all allusion to contemporary events does not prove that the system of Plotinus was an exception to this rule. It only proves that the tendency of the age was to carry away men’s thoughts from practical to theoretical interests. We have already characterised the first centuries of Roman imperialism557 as a period of ever-increasing religious reaction; and in this reaction we attempted to distinguish between the development of supernaturalist beliefs which were native to Greece and Italy, and the importation of beliefs which had originated in the East. We saw also how philosophy shared in the general tendency, how it became theological and spiritualistic instead of ethical and naturalistic, how its professors were converted from opponents into upholders of the popular belief. Now, according to some critics, Neo-Platonism marks another stage in the gradual substitution of faith for reason, of authority for independent thought; the only question being whether we should interpret it as a product of Oriental mysticism, or as a simple sequence of the same movement which had previously led from Cicero to Seneca, from Seneca to Epictêtus, from Epictêtus to Marcus Aurelius.
Of these views, the first is taken by Ritter, and adopted with some modifications558 by M. Vacherot in his Histoire de l’école d’Alexandrie. It is also unreservedly accepted by Donaldson in his continuation of Müller’s History of Greek Literature, and is probably held at this moment by most Englishmen who take any interest in the subject at all. The second view—according to which Neo-Platonism is, at least in342 its main features, a characteristic although degenerate559 product of Greek thought—is that maintained by Zeller. As against the Orientalising theory, it seems to us that Zeller has thoroughly proved his case.506 It may be doubted whether there is a single idea in Plotinus which can be shown to have its exact counterpart in any of the Hindoo or other Asiatic systems whence he is supposed to have drawn; and, as our own analysis has abundantly shown, he says nothing that cannot be derived, either directly or by a simple and easy process of evolution, from Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. On the other hand, has not Zeller gone much too far in treating Neo-Platonism as a product of the great religious reaction which unquestionably preceded and accompanied its appearance? Has he not altogether underrated its importance as a purely speculative system, an effort towards the attainment of absolute truth by the simple exercise of human reason? It seems to us that he has, and we shall offer some grounds for venturing to differ from his opinion.
To appreciate the labours of Plotinus, we must, first of all, compare his whole philosophic method with that of his predecessors. Now, Zeller himself has shown quite clearly that in reach of thought, in power of synthesis, in accuracy of reasoning, not one of these can be compared to the founder of Neo-Platonism for a single moment.507 We may go still further and declare with confidence that no philosopher of equal speculative genius had appeared in Hellas since Chrysippus, or, very possibly, since Aristotle. The only ground for disputing his claims to take rank with the great masters of Hellenic thought seems to be that his system culminates560 on the objective side in something which lies beyond existence, and on the subjective side in a mystical ecstasy561 which is the negation of reason. We have shown, however, that if the One is represented as transcending reality, so also is the Idea of Good which corresponds to it in Plato’s scheme; and that343 the One is reached if not grasped by a process of reasoning which, although unsound, still offers itself as reasoning alone, and moves in complete independence of any revelation or intuition such as those to which the genuine systems of mysticism so freely resort.
It cannot be too often repeated that the One in no way conflicts with the world of real existence, but, on the contrary, creates and completes it. Now, within that world, with which alone reason is properly concerned, Plotinus never betrays any want of confidence in its power to discover truth; nor, contrary to what Zeller assumes, does he seem to have been in the least affected by the efforts of the later Sceptics to invalidate its pretensions in this respect.508 Their criticism was, in fact, chiefly directed against Stoicism, and did not touch the spiritualistic position at all. That there can be no certain knowledge afforded by sensation, or, speaking more generally, by the action of an outward object on an inward subject, Plotinus himself fully admits or rather contends.509 But while distrusting the ability of external perception, taken alone, to establish the existence of an external object by which it is caused, he expressly claims such a power for reason or understanding.510 For him, as for Aristotle, and probably for Plato also, the mind is one with its real object; in every act of cognition the idea becomes conscious of itself. We do not say that Scepticism is powerless against such a theory as this, but, in point of fact, it was a theory which the ancient Sceptics had not attacked, and their arguments no more led Plotinus to despair of reason, than the similar arguments of Protagoras and Gorgias had led Plato and Aristotle to despair of it six centuries before. If Sextus and his school contributed anything to the great philosophical revolution of the succeeding age, it was by so344 weakening the materialistic systems as to render them less capable of opposing the spiritualistic revival when it came.
Unquestionably Plotinus was influenced by the supernaturalistic movement of his age, but only as Plato had been influenced by the similar reaction of his time; and just as the Athenian philosopher had protested against the superstitions562 which he saw gaining ground, so also did the Alexandrian philosopher protest, with far less vigour it is true, but still to some extent, against the worse extravagances universally entertained by his contemporaries. Among these, to judge by numerous allusions in his writings, astrology and magic held the foremost place. That there was something in both, he did not venture to deny, but he constantly endeavours to extenuate563 their practical significance and to give a more philosophical interpretation to the alleged564 phenomena on which they were based. Towards the old polytheism, his attitude, without being hostile, is perfectly independent. We can see this even in his life, notwithstanding the religious colouring thrown over it by Porphyry. When invited by his disciple Amelius to join in the public worship of the gods, he proudly answered, ‘It is their business to come to me, not mine to go to them.’511 In allegorising the old myths, he handles them with as much freedom as Bacon, and evidently with no more belief in their historical character.512 In giving the name of God to his supreme principle, he is careful to exclude nearly every attribute associated with divinity even in the purest forms of contemporary theology. Personality, intelligence, will, and even existence, are expressly denied to the One. Although the first cause and highest good of all things, it is so not in a religious but in an abstract, metaphysical sense. The Nous with its ideal offspring and the world-soul are also spoken of as gods; but their personality, if they have any, is of the most shadowy description, and there is no reason for thinking that Plotinus ever wor345shipped them himself or intended them to be worshipped by his disciples. Like Aristotle, he attributes animation and divinity to the heavenly bodies, but with such careful provisions against an anthropomorphic conception of their nature, that not much devotional feeling is likely to have mingled565 with the contemplation of their splendour. Finally, we arrive at the daemons, those intermediate spirits which play so great a part in the religion of Plutarch and the other Platonists of the second century. With regard to these, Plotinus repeats many of the current opinions as if he shared them; but his adhesion is of an extremely tepid566 character; and it may be doubted whether the daemons meant much more for him than for Plato.513
The immortality of the soul is a subject on which idealistic philosophers habitually express themselves in terms of apparently studied ambiguity567, and this is especially true of Plotinus. Here, as elsewhere, he repeats the opinions and arguments of Plato, but with certain developments which make his adhesion to the popular belief in a personal duration after death considerably more doubtful than was that of his master. One great difficulty in the way of Plato’s doctrine, as commonly understood, is that it attributes a permanence to individuals, which, on the principles of his system, should belong only to general ideas. Now, at first sight, Plotinus seems to evade this difficulty by admitting everlasting ideas of individuals no less than of generic types.514 A closer examination, however, shows that this view is even more unfavourable than Plato’s to the hope of personal immortality. For either our real self is independent of our empirical consciousness, which is just what we wish to have preserved, or, as seems more probable, the eternal existence which it enjoys is of an altogether ideal character, like that which Spinoza also attributed to the346 human soul, and which, in his philosophy, certainly had nothing to do with a prolongation of individual consciousness beyond the grave. As Madame de Sta?l observes of a similar view held at one time by Schelling, ‘cette immortalité-là ressemble terriblement à la mort.’ And when, in addition to his own theory of individual ideas, we find Plotinus adopting the theory of the Stoics, that the whole course of mundane400 affairs periodically returns to its starting-point and is repeated in the same order as before,515 we cannot help concluding that human immortality in the popular sense must have seemed as impossible to him as it did to them. We must, therefore, suppose that the doctrine of metempsychosis and future retributions which he unquestionably professes568, applies only to certain determinate cycles of psychic life; or that it was to him, what it had probably been to Plato, only a figurative way of expressing the essential unity of all souls, and the transcendent character of ethical distinctions.516
In this connexion we may deal with the question whether the philosophy of Plotinus is properly described as a pantheistic system. Plotinus was certainly not a pantheist in the same sense as Spinoza and Hegel. With him, the One and the All are not identical; although impersonal569 and unconscious, his supreme principle is not immanent in the universe, but transcends570 and creates it: the totality of things are dependent on it, but it is independent of them. Even were we to assume that the One is only ideally distinct from the existence which it causes, still the Nous would remain separate from the world-soul, the higher Soul from Nature, and, within the sphere of Nature herself, Matter would continue to be perpetually breaking away from Form, free-will would be left in unreconciled hostility571 to fate. Once, and once only, if we remember rightly, does our philosopher rise to the modern conception of the universe as an absolute whole whose parts347 are not caused but constituted by their fundamental unity, and are not really separated from one another in Nature, but only ideally distinguished in our thoughts. And he adds that we cannot keep up this effort of abstraction for long at a time; things escape from us, and return to their original unity.517 With Plotinus himself, however, the contrary was true: what he could not keep up was his grasp on the synthetic unity of things. And he himself supplies us with a ready explanation why it should be so, when he points to the dividing tendency of thought as opposed to the uniting tendency of Nature. What he and the other Hellenic thinkers wanted above all, was to make the world clear to themselves and to their pupils, and this they accomplished by their method of serial572 classification, by bringing into play what we have often spoken of as the moments of antithesis, mediation, and circumscription, Stoicism also had just touched the pantheistic idea, only to let it go again. After being nominally573 identified with the world, the Stoic God was represented as a designing intelligence, like the Socratic God—an idea wholly alien from real pantheism.
If Plotinus rose above the vulgar superstitions of the West, while, at the same time, using their language for the easier expression of his philosophical ideas, there was one more refined superstition of mixed Greek and Oriental origin which he denounced with the most uncompromising vigour. This was Gnosticism, as taught by Valentinus and his school. Towards the close of our last chapter, we gave some account of the theory in question. It was principally as enemies of the world and maligners of its perfection that the Gnostics made themselves offensive to the founder of Neo-Platonism. To him, the antithesis of good and evil was represented, not by the opposition of spirit and Nature, but by the opposition between his ideal principle through all degrees of its perfection, and unformed Matter. Like Plato, he looked on the348 existing world as a consummate574 work of art, an embodiment of the archetypal Ideas, a visible presentation of reason. But in the course of his attack on the Gnostics,518 other points of great interest are raised, showing how profoundly his philosophy differed from theirs, how entirely he takes his stand on the fixed principles of Hellenic thought. Thus he particularly reproaches his opponents for their systematic disparagement575 of Plato, to whom, after all, they owe whatever is true and valuable in their metaphysics.519 He ridicules576 their belief in demoniacal possession, with its wholly gratuitous577 and clumsy employment of supernatural agencies to account for what can be sufficiently explained by the operation of natural causes.520 And, more than anything else, he severely censures their detachment of religion from morality. On this last point, some of his remarks are so striking and pertinent that they deserve to be quoted.
Above all, he exclaims, we must not fail to notice what effect this doctrine has on the minds of those whom they have persuaded to despise the world and all that it contains. Of the two chief methods for attaining the supreme good, one has sensual pleasure for its end, the other virtue, the effort after which begins and ends with God. Epicurus, by his denial of providence, leaves us no choice but to pursue the former. But this doctrine [Gnosticism], involving as it does a still more insolent578 denial of divine order and human law, laughs to scorn what has always been the accepted ideal of conduct, and, in its rage against beauty, abolishes temperance and justice—the justice that is associated with natural feeling and perpetuated579 by discipline and reason—along with every other ennobling virtue. So, in the absence of true morality, they are given over to pleasure and utility and selfish isolation from other men—unless, indeed, their nature is better than their principles. They have an ideal that nothing here below can satisfy, and so they put off the effort for its attainment to a future life, whereas they should begin at once, and prove that they are of divine race by fulfilling the duties of their present state. For virtue is the condition of every higher aspiration504, and only to those who disdain580 sensual enjoyment is it given to understand the divine. How far our opponents are from realising this is proved by their349 total neglect of ethical science. They neither know what virtue is, nor how many virtues there are, nor what ancient philosophy has to teach us on the subject, nor what are the methods of moral training, nor how the soul is to be tended and cleansed581. They tell us to look to God; but merely saying this is useless unless they can tell us what the manner of the looking is to be. For it might be asked, what is to prevent us from looking to God, while at the same time freely indulging our sensual appetites and angry passions. Virtue perfected, enlightened, and rooted in the soul, will reveal God to us, but without it he will remain an empty name.521
Even M. Vacherot, with all his anxiety to discover an Oriental origin for Neo-Platonism, cannot help seeing that this attack on the Gnostics was inspired by an indignant reaction of Greek philosophy against the inroads of Oriental superstition, and that the same character belongs more or less to the whole system of its author. But, so far as we are aware, Kirchner is the only critic who has fully worked out this idea, and exhibited the philosophy of Plotinus in its true character as a part of the great classical revival, which after producing the literature of the second century reached its consummation in a return to the idealism of Plato and Aristotle.522
Neo-Platonism may itself furnish us with no inapt image of the age in which it arose. Like the unformed Matter about which we have been hearing so much, the consciousness of that period was in itself dark, indeterminate and unsteady, uncreative, unspontaneous, unoriginating, but with a receptive capacity which enabled it to seize, reflect, and transmit the power of living Reason, the splendour of eternal thought.
XI.
In fixing the relation of Plotinus to his own age, we have gone far towards fixing his relation to all ages, the place which350 he occupies in the development of philosophy as a connected whole. We have seen that as an attempt to discover the truth of things, his speculations are worthless and worse than worthless, since their method no less than their teaching is false. Nevertheless, Wisdom is justified582 of all her children. Without adding anything to the sum of positive knowledge, Plotinus produced an effect on men’s thoughts not unworthy of the great intellect and pure life which he devoted583 to the service of philosophy. No other thinker has ever accomplished a revolution so immediate, so comprehensive, and of such prolonged duration. He was the creator of Neo-Platonism, and Neo-Platonism simply annihilated584 every school of philosophy to which it was opposed. For thirteen centuries or more, the three great systems which had so long divided the suffrages585 of educated minds—Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Scepticism—ceased to exist, and were allowed to lapse586 into such complete oblivion that only a few fragments of the works in which they were originally embodied have been preserved. And Plotinus was enabled to do this by the profound insight which led him to strike less at any particular doctrine held by his opponents than at the common foundation on which they all stood, the materialism openly professed by the Stoics and Epicureans, and assumed by the Sceptics as the necessary presupposition of every dogmatic philosophy. It is true that the principle which he opposed to theirs was not of his own origination, although he stated it more powerfully than it had ever been stated before. But to have revived the spiritualism of Plato and Aristotle in such a way as to win for it universal acceptance, was precisely his greatest merit. It is also the only one that he would have claimed for himself. As we have already mentioned, he professed to be nothing more than the disciple of Plato. And although Aristotelian ideas abound in his writings, still not only are they overbalanced by the Platonic element, but Plotinus might justly have contended that they also belong, in a sense, to Plato,351 having been originally acquired by a simple development from his teaching.
We have said that the founder of Neo-Platonism contrived to blend the systems of his two great authorities in such a manner as to eliminate much of the relative truth which is contained in each of them taken by itself. It has been reserved for modern thought to accomplish the profounder synthesis which has eliminated their errors in combining their truths. Yet, perhaps, no other system would have satisfied the want of the time so well as that constructed by Plotinus out of the materials at his disposal. Such as it was, that system held its ground as the reigning philosophy until all independent thinking was suppressed by Justinian, somewhat more than two and a half centuries after its author’s death. Even then it did not become extinct, but reappeared in Christian literature, in the writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, and again in the daring speculations of Erigena, the father of mediaeval philosophy, to pass under more diluted forms into the teaching of the later Schoolmen, until the time arrived for its renewed study in the original sources as an element of the Platonic revival in the fifteenth century. All this popularity proves, as we say, that Plotinus suited his own age and other ages which reproduced the same general intellectual tendencies. But the important thing was that he made Plato and Aristotle more interesting, and thus led men to study their writings more eagerly than before. The true reign of those philosophers does not begin until we reach the Middle Ages, and the commanding position which they then enjoyed was due, in great measure, to the revolution effected by Plotinus.
But when Neo-Platonism, as a literature and a system, had given way to the original authorities from which it was derived, its influence did not, on that account, cease to be felt. In particular, Plotinus gave currency to a certain interpretation of Plato’s teaching which has been universally352 accepted until a comparatively recent period, perhaps one may say until the time of Schleiermacher. We have seen how many elements of Platonism he left out of sight; and, thanks to his example, followed as it naturally was by Catholic theologians, the world was content to leave them out of sight as well. The charming disciple of Socrates whom we all know and love—the literary and dramatic artist, the brilliant parodist587, the sceptical railleur from the shafts588 of whose irony589 even his own theories are not safe, the penetrating590 observer of human life, the far-seeing critic and reformer of social institutions—is a discovery of modern scholarship. Not as such did the master of idealism appear to Marsilio Ficino and Michael Angelo, to Lady Jane Grey and Cudworth and Henry More, to Berkeley and Hume and Thomas Taylor, to all the great English poets from Spenser to Shelley; not as such does he now appear to popular imagination; but as a mystical enthusiast287, a dreamer of dreams which, whether they be realised or not in some far-off sphere, are, at any rate, out of relation to the world of sensuous experience and everyday life. So absolute, indeed, is the reaction from this view that we are in danger of rushing to the contrary extreme, of forgetting what elements of truth the Plotinian interpretation contained, and substituting for it an interpretation still more one-sided, still more inadequate591 to express the scope and splendour of Plato’s thoughts. Plato believed in truth and right and purity, believed in them still more profoundly than Plotinus; and his was a more effectual faith precisely because he did not share the sterile592 optimism of his Alexandrian disciple, but worked and watched for the realisation of what, as yet, had never been realised.523
353
Finally, by the form which he gave to Platonism, Plotinus has had a large share in determining the direction of modern metaphysics. Although, as we have seen, not, properly speaking, a pantheist himself, he showed how the ideal theory could be transformed into a pantheistic system, and pantheism it immediately became when the peculiar593 limitations and subtleties594 of Greek thought had ceased to dominate over the western mind, and when the restraints of Catholic orthodoxy had been removed or relaxed. The stream of tendency in this direction runs all through the Middle Ages, and acquires new volume and momentum595 at the Renaissance, until, by a process which will be analysed in the next chapter, it reaches its supreme expansion in the philosophy of Spinoza. Then, after a long pause, it is taken up by Kant’s successors, and combined with the subjective idealism of modern psychology, finally passing, through the intervention596 of Victor Cousin and Sir William Hamilton, into the philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer.
The last-named thinker would, no doubt, repudiate597 the title of pantheist; and it is certain that, under his treatment, pantheism has reverted598, by a curious sort of atavism, to something much more nearly resembling the original doctrine of the Neo-Platonic school. Mr. Spencer tells us that the world is the manifestation of an unknowable Power. Plotinus said nearly the same, although not in such absolutely self-contradictory terms.524 Mr. Spencer constantly assumes, by speaking of354 it in the singular number, that the creative Power of which we know nothing is one; having, apparently, convinced himself of its unity by two methods of reasoning. First, he identifies the transcendent cause of phenomena with the absolute, which is involved in our consciousness of relation; leaving it to be inferred that as relativity implies plurality, absoluteness must imply unity. And, secondly, from the mutual convertibility599 of the physical forces, he infers the unity of that which underlies600 force. Plotinus also arrives at the same result by two lines of argument, one à posteriori, and derived from the unity pervading all Nature; the other à priori, and derived from the fancied dependence of the Many on the One. Even in his use of the predicate Unknowable without a subject, Mr. Spencer has been anticipated by Damascius, one of the last Neo-Platonists, who speaks of the supreme principle as τ? ?γνωστον.525 And the same philosopher anticipates the late Father Dalgairns in suggesting the very pertinent question, how, if we know nothing about the Unknowable, we know that it is unknowable.
Nor is this all. Besides the arguments from relativity and causation, Mr. Spencer has a third method for arriving at his absolute. He thinks away all the determinations imposed by consciousness on its objects, and identifies the residual601 substance with the ultimate reality of things. Now, this residue, as we have seen, exactly corresponds to the Matter, whether intelligible or sensible, of Aristotle and Plotinus. As such, it stands in extreme antithesis to the One, and yet there is a near kinship between them. Probably, according to Plotinus, and certainly according to Proclus,526 Matter is a direct product of the One, whose infinite power it reflects.355 All existence is formed by the union, in varying proportions, of these two principles. Above all, both are unknowable. Thus it was natural that in the hands of less subtle analysts602 than the Greeks they should coalesce292 into a single substance. And, as a matter of fact, they have so coalesced in the systems of Giordano Bruno, of Spinoza, and finally of Mr. Spencer.
Here we imagine an impatient reader exclaiming, ‘How can Mr. Herbert Spencer, who knows, if possible, even less of Greek philosophy than of his own Unknowable, have derived that principle from the Greeks?’ Well, we have already traced the genealogy603 by which the two systems of agnosticism are connected. And some additional light will be thrown on the question if we consider that the form of Neo-Platonism was largely determined by the manner in which Plotinus brought the spiritualistic conceptualism of Plato and Aristotle into contact with the dynamic materialism of the Stoics; and that the form of Mr. Spencer’s philosophy has been similarly determined by bringing the idealism of modern German thought into contact with the mechanical evolutionism of modern science. Thus, under the influence of old associations, has pantheism been metamorphosed into a crude agnosticism, which faithfully reproduces the likeness of its original ancestors, the Plotinian Matter and the Plotinian One.
XII.527
The history of Neo-Platonism, subsequently to the death of Plotinus, decomposes604 itself into several distinct tendencies, pursuing more or less divergent lines of direction. First of all, it was drawn into the supernaturalist movement against which it had originally been, in part at least, a reaction and a protest. One sees from the life of its founder how far his two favourite disciples, Amelius and Porphyry, were from sharing356 his superiority to the superstitions of the age. Both had been educated under Pythagorean influences, which were fostered rather than repressed by the new philosophy. With Porphyry, theoretical interests are, to a great extent, superseded605 by practical interests; and, in practice, the religious and ascetic predominates over the purely ethical element. Still, however great may have been his aberrations606, they never went beyond the limits of Hellenic tradition. Although of Syrian extraction, his attitude towards Oriental superstition was one of uncompromising hostility; and in writing against Christianity, his criticism of the Old Testament607 seems to have closely resembled that of modern rationalism. But with Porphyry’s disciple, Iamblichus, every restraint is thrown aside, the wildest Oriental fancies are accepted as articles of belief, and the most senseless devotional practices are inculcated as means towards the attainment of a truly spiritual life.
Besides the general religious movement which had long been in action, and was daily gaining strength from the increasing barbarisation of the empire, there was, at this juncture, a particular cause tending to bring Greek philosophy into close alliance with the mythology608 which it had formerly rejected and denounced. This was the rapid rise and spread of Christianity. St Augustine has said that of all heathen philosophers none came nearer to the Christian faith than the Neo-Platonists.528 Nevertheless, it was in them that the old religion found its only apologists and the new religion its most active assailants. We have already alluded to the elaborate polemic of Porphyry. Half a century later, the same principles could boast of a still more illustrious champion. The emperor Julian was imbued with the doctrines of Neo-Platonism, and was won back to the ancient faith by the teaching of its professors.
What seems to us the reactionary609 attitude of the spiritu357alist school was dictated610 by the circumstances of its origin. A product of the great classical revival, its cause was necessarily linked with the civilisation of ancient Greece, and of that civilisation the worship of the old gods seemed to form an integral element. One need only think of the Italian Renaissance, with its predilection611 for the old mythology, to understand how much stronger and more passionate this feeling must have been among those to whom Greek literature still spoke430 in a living language, whose eyes, wherever they turned, still rested on the monuments, unrivalled, undesecrated, unfallen, unfaded, of Greek religious art. Nor was polytheism what some have imagined it to have been at this period, merely a tradition, an association, a dream, drawing shadowy sustenance612 from the human works and human thoughts which it had once inspired. To Plotinus and Proclus, as formerly to Socrates and Plato and Aristotle, the luminaries613 of day and night blazed down from heaven as animated614 and immortal witnesses of its truth. It was not simply that the heavens declared the glory of God; to the pious615 beholder616, they were visibly inhabited by glorious gods, and their constellated fires were, as Plotinus said, a scripture in which the secrets of destiny might be read. The same philosopher scornfully asks the Gnostics, who, in this respect, were indistinguishable from the Christians617, whether they were so infatuated as to call the worst men their brothers, while refusing that title to the sun; and at a much later period, notwithstanding the heavy penalties attached to it, the worship of the heavenly bodies continued to be practised by the profoundest thinkers and scholars of the Neo-Platonic school.529 Moreover, polytheism, by the very weakness and unfixity of its dogmas, gave a much wider scope to independent speculation than could be permitted within the limits of the358 Catholic Church, just because Catholicism itself constituted a philosophical system in which all the great problems of existence were provided with definite and authoritative618 solutions.
The final defeat of polytheism proved, in some respects, an advantage to Neo-Platonism, by compelling it to exchange theological controversy for studies which could be prosecuted619, at least for a time, without giving umbrage620 to the dominant621 religion. At Alexandria the new spiritualism was associated, on genuinely Platonic principles, with the teaching of geometry by the noble and ill-fated Hypatia. In all the Neo-Platonic schools, whether at Rome, at Alexandria, at Constantinople, or at Athens, the writings of Plato and Aristotle were attentively622 studied, and made the subject of numerous commentaries, many of which are still extant. This return to the two great masters of idealism was, as we have already said, the most valuable result of the metaphysical revival, and probably contributed more than any other cause to the preservation623 of their works amidst the general wreck624 of ancient philosophical literature. Finally, efforts were made to present the doctrine of Plotinus under a more popular or a more scientific form, and to develope it into systematic completeness.
Driven by Christian intolerance from every other centre of civilisation, Greek philosophy found a last refuge in Athens, where it continued to be taught through the whole of the fifth century and the first quarter of the sixth. During that period, all the tendencies already indicated as characteristic of Neo-Platonism exhibited themselves once more, and contributed in about equal degrees to the versatile625 activity of its last original representative, Proclus (410-485). This remarkable man offers one of the most melancholy626 examples of wasted power to be found in the history of thought. Endowed with an enormous faculty for acquiring knowledge, a rare subtlety627 in the analysis of ideas, and an unsurpassed genius for their systematic arrangement, he might, under more favourable359 auspices628, have been the Laplace or Cuvier of his age. As it was, his immense energies were devoted to the task of bringing a series of lifeless abstractions into harmony with a series of equally lifeless superstitions. A commentator254 both on Euclid and on Plato, he aspired629 to present transcendental dialectic under the form of mathematical demonstration. In his Institutes of Theology, he offers proofs equally elaborate and futile630 of much that had been taken for granted in the philosophy of Plotinus. Again, where there seems to be a gap in the system of his master, he fills it up by inserting new figments of his own. Thus, between the super-essential One and the absolute Nous, he interposes a series of henads or unities631, answering to the multiplicity of intelligences or self-conscious Ideas which Plotinus had placed within the supreme Reason, or to the partial souls which he had placed after the world-soul. In this manner, Proclus, following the usual method of Greek thought, supplies a transition from the creative One to the Being which had hitherto been regarded as its immediate product; while, at the same time, providing a counterpart to the many lesser gods with which polytheism had surrounded its supreme divinity. Finally, as Plotinus had arranged all things on the threefold scheme of a first principle, a departure from that principle, and a subsequent reunion with it, Proclus divides the whole series of created substances into a succession of triads, each reproducing, on a small scale, the fundamental system of an origin, a departure, and a return. And he even multiplies the triads still further by decomposing632 each separate moment into a secondary process of the same description. For example, Intelligence as a whole is divided into Being, Life, and Thought, and the first of these, again, into the Limit, the Unlimited, and the absolute Existence (ο?σ?α), which is the synthesis of both. The Hegelian system is, as is well known, constructed on a similar plan; but while with Hegel the logical evolution is a progress from lower to higher and360 richer life, with Proclus, as with the whole Neo-Platonic school, and, indeed, with almost every school of Greek thought, each step forward is also a step downward, involving a proportionate loss of reality and power.
Thus Proclus was to Plotinus what Plotinus himself had been to Plato and Aristotle: that is to say, he stood one degree further removed from the actual truth of things and from the spontaneity of original reflection. And what we have said about the philosophic position of the master may be applied, with some modification, to the claims of his most eminent440 disciple. From a scientific point of view, the system, of Proclus is a mere mass of wearisome rubbish; from an aesthetic point of view it merits our admiration as the most comprehensive, the most coherent, and the most symmetrical work of the kind that antiquity has to show. It would seem that just as the architectural skill of the Romans survived all their other great gifts, and even continued to improve until the very last—the so-called temple of Minerva Medica being the most technically633 perfect of all their monuments—so also did the Greek power of concatenating634 ideas go on developing itself as long as Greece was permitted to have any ideas of her own.
The time arrived when this last liberty was to be taken away. In the year 529, Justinian issued his famous decree prohibiting the public teaching of philosophy in Athens, and confiscating635 the endowments devoted to the maintenance of its professors. It is probable that this measure formed part of a comprehensive scheme for completing the extirpation636 of paganism throughout the empire. For some two centuries past, the triumph of Christianity had been secured by an unsparing exercise of the imperial authority, as the triumph of Catholicism over heresy637 was next to be secured with the aid of the Frankish sword. A few years afterwards, the principal representatives of the Neo-Platonic school, including the Damascius of whom we have already spoken, and Simplicius,361 the famous Aristotelian commentator, repaired to the court of Khosru Nuschirvan, the King of Persia, with the intention of settling in his country for the rest of their lives. They were soon heartily638 sick of their adopted home. Khosru was unquestionably an enlightened monarch639, greatly interested in Hellenic culture, and sincerely desirous of diffusing640 it among his people. It is also certain that Agathias, our only authority on this subject, was violently prejudiced against him. But it may very well be, as stated by that historian530 that Khosru by no means came up to the exaggerated expectations formed of him by the exiled professors. He had been described to them as the ideal of a Platonic ruler, and, like inexperienced bookmen, they accepted the report in good faith. They found that he cared a great deal more for scientific questions about the cause of the tides and the modifications superinduced on plants and animals by transference to a new environment, than about the metaphysics of the One.531 Moreover, the immorality641 of Oriental society and the corruption642 of Oriental government were something for which they were totally unprepared. Better, they thought, to die at once, so that it were but on Roman soil, than to live on any conditions in such a country as Persia. Khosru was most unwilling491 to lose his guests, but on finding that they were determined to leave him, he permitted them to depart, and even made it a matter of express stipulation643 with the imperial government that they should be allowed to live in their old homes without suffering any molestation644 on account of their religious opinions.532
Simplicius continued to write commentaries on Aristotle362 after his return, and was even succeeded by a younger generation of Platonic expositors; but before the end of the sixth century paganism was extinct, and Neo-Platonism, as a separate school of philosophy, shared its fate. It will be the object of our next and concluding chapter to show that the disappearance645 of the old religion and the old methods of teaching did not involve any real break in the continuity of thought, and that modern speculation has been, through the greater part of its history, a reproduction of Greek ideas in new combinations and under altered names.
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1 vengeance | |
n.报复,报仇,复仇 | |
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2 akin | |
adj.同族的,类似的 | |
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3 sublime | |
adj.崇高的,伟大的;极度的,不顾后果的 | |
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4 apparently | |
adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
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5 impunity | |
n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
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6 unity | |
n.团结,联合,统一;和睦,协调 | |
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7 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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8 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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9 deliberately | |
adv.审慎地;蓄意地;故意地 | |
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10 repentance | |
n.懊悔 | |
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11 amendment | |
n.改正,修正,改善,修正案 | |
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12 torment | |
n.折磨;令人痛苦的东西(人);vt.折磨;纠缠 | |
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13 inflicted | |
把…强加给,使承受,遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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14 pangs | |
突然的剧痛( pang的名词复数 ); 悲痛 | |
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15 remorse | |
n.痛恨,悔恨,自责 | |
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16 expiation | |
n.赎罪,补偿 | |
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17 accrue | |
v.(利息等)增大,增多 | |
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18 predecessors | |
n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 );前辈;(被取代的)原有事物;前身 | |
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19 posterity | |
n.后裔,子孙,后代 | |
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20 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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21 overt | |
adj.公开的,明显的,公然的 | |
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22 affected | |
adj.不自然的,假装的 | |
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23 descend | |
vt./vi.传下来,下来,下降 | |
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24 poignancy | |
n.辛酸事,尖锐 | |
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25 entails | |
使…成为必要( entail的第三人称单数 ); 需要; 限定继承; 使必需 | |
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26 doomed | |
命定的 | |
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27 torments | |
(肉体或精神上的)折磨,痛苦( torment的名词复数 ); 造成痛苦的事物[人] | |
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28 expiated | |
v.为(所犯罪过)接受惩罚,赎(罪)( expiate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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29 transgressions | |
n.违反,违法,罪过( transgression的名词复数 ) | |
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30 manifestation | |
n.表现形式;表明;现象 | |
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31 narrative | |
n.叙述,故事;adj.叙事的,故事体的 | |
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32 protracted | |
adj.拖延的;延长的v.拖延“protract”的过去式和过去分词 | |
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33 immortal | |
adj.不朽的;永生的,不死的;神的 | |
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34 condemned | |
adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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35 viper | |
n.毒蛇;危险的人 | |
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36 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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37 guise | |
n.外表,伪装的姿态 | |
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38 marshes | |
n.沼泽,湿地( marsh的名词复数 ) | |
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39 mar | |
vt.破坏,毁坏,弄糟 | |
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40 meres | |
abbr.matrix of environmental residuals for energy systems 能源系统环境残留矩阵 | |
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41 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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42 guilt | |
n.犯罪;内疚;过失,罪责 | |
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43 liberated | |
a.无拘束的,放纵的 | |
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44 touching | |
adj.动人的,使人感伤的 | |
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45 gratitude | |
adj.感激,感谢 | |
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46 nominal | |
adj.名义上的;(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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47 despoiled | |
v.掠夺,抢劫( despoil的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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48 triumphant | |
adj.胜利的,成功的;狂欢的,喜悦的 | |
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49 civilisation | |
n.文明,文化,开化,教化 | |
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50 awakening | |
n.觉醒,醒悟 adj.觉醒中的;唤醒的 | |
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51 supremacy | |
n.至上;至高权力 | |
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52 renovation | |
n.革新,整修 | |
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53 renown | |
n.声誉,名望 | |
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54 subdued | |
adj. 屈服的,柔和的,减弱的 动词subdue的过去式和过去分词 | |
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55 laurels | |
n.桂冠,荣誉 | |
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56 alpine | |
adj.高山的;n.高山植物 | |
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57 riveted | |
铆接( rivet的过去式和过去分词 ); 把…固定住; 吸引; 引起某人的注意 | |
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58 martial | |
adj.战争的,军事的,尚武的,威武的 | |
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59 reign | |
n.统治时期,统治,支配,盛行;v.占优势 | |
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60 rhetoric | |
n.修辞学,浮夸之言语 | |
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61 revival | |
n.复兴,复苏,(精力、活力等的)重振 | |
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62 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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63 longing | |
n.(for)渴望 | |
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64 antiquity | |
n.古老;高龄;古物,古迹 | |
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65 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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66 perspicuity | |
n.(文体的)明晰 | |
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67 elegance | |
n.优雅;优美,雅致;精致,巧妙 | |
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68 verbosity | |
n.冗长,赘言 | |
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69 platitude | |
n.老生常谈,陈词滥调 | |
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70 attic | |
n.顶楼,屋顶室 | |
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71 graceful | |
adj.优美的,优雅的;得体的 | |
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72 simplicity | |
n.简单,简易;朴素;直率,单纯 | |
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73 implicit | |
a.暗示的,含蓄的,不明晰的,绝对的 | |
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74 lighter | |
n.打火机,点火器;驳船;v.用驳船运送;light的比较级 | |
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75 emancipation | |
n.(从束缚、支配下)解放 | |
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76 superstition | |
n.迷信,迷信行为 | |
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77 diligent | |
adj.勤勉的,勤奋的 | |
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78 formerly | |
adv.从前,以前 | |
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79 oratory | |
n.演讲术;词藻华丽的言辞 | |
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80 vigour | |
(=vigor)n.智力,体力,精力 | |
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81 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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82 severely | |
adv.严格地;严厉地;非常恶劣地 | |
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83 censures | |
v.指责,非难,谴责( censure的第三人称单数 ) | |
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84 ornamenting | |
v.装饰,点缀,美化( ornament的现在分词 ) | |
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85 professed | |
公开声称的,伪称的,已立誓信教的 | |
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86 philosophical | |
adj.哲学家的,哲学上的,达观的 | |
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87 philosophic | |
adj.哲学的,贤明的 | |
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88 cultivation | |
n.耕作,培养,栽培(法),养成 | |
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89 ethics | |
n.伦理学;伦理观,道德标准 | |
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90 logic | |
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
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91 philology | |
n.语言学;语文学 | |
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92 physiology | |
n.生理学,生理机能 | |
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93 renaissance | |
n.复活,复兴,文艺复兴 | |
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94 declamation | |
n. 雄辩,高调 | |
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95 stoics | |
禁欲主义者,恬淡寡欲的人,不以苦乐为意的人( stoic的名词复数 ) | |
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96 stoic | |
n.坚忍克己之人,禁欲主义者 | |
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97 diluted | |
无力的,冲淡的 | |
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98 materialism | |
n.[哲]唯物主义,唯物论;物质至上 | |
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99 followers | |
追随者( follower的名词复数 ); 用户; 契据的附面; 从动件 | |
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100 irrational | |
adj.无理性的,失去理性的 | |
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101 abject | |
adj.极可怜的,卑屈的 | |
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102 wards | |
区( ward的名词复数 ); 病房; 受监护的未成年者; 被人照顾或控制的状态 | |
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103 backbone | |
n.脊骨,脊柱,骨干;刚毅,骨气 | |
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104 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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105 dependence | |
n.依靠,依赖;信任,信赖;隶属 | |
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106 exigencies | |
n.急切需要 | |
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107 Christian | |
adj.基督教徒的;n.基督教徒 | |
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108 speculative | |
adj.思索性的,暝想性的,推理的 | |
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109 embody | |
vt.具体表达,使具体化;包含,收录 | |
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110 disciple | |
n.信徒,门徒,追随者 | |
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111 disciples | |
n.信徒( disciple的名词复数 );门徒;耶稣的信徒;(尤指)耶稣十二门徒之一 | |
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112 conversion | |
n.转化,转换,转变 | |
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113 perilous | |
adj.危险的,冒险的 | |
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114 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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115 allied | |
adj.协约国的;同盟国的 | |
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116 negation | |
n.否定;否认 | |
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117 pessimism | |
n.悲观者,悲观主义者,厌世者 | |
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118 manifestations | |
n.表示,显示(manifestation的复数形式) | |
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119 thoroughly | |
adv.完全地,彻底地,十足地 | |
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120 organise | |
vt.组织,安排,筹办 | |
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121 reconciliation | |
n.和解,和谐,一致 | |
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122 accomplished | |
adj.有才艺的;有造诣的;达到了的 | |
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123 demolished | |
v.摧毁( demolish的过去式和过去分词 );推翻;拆毁(尤指大建筑物);吃光 | |
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124 demolish | |
v.拆毁(建筑物等),推翻(计划、制度等) | |
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125 Founder | |
n.创始者,缔造者 | |
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126 celebrated | |
adj.有名的,声誉卓著的 | |
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127 authentic | |
a.真的,真正的;可靠的,可信的,有根据的 | |
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128 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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129 utterly | |
adv.完全地,绝对地 | |
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130 sage | |
n.圣人,哲人;adj.贤明的,明智的 | |
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131 disastrous | |
adj.灾难性的,造成灾害的;极坏的,很糟的 | |
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132 disastrously | |
ad.灾难性地 | |
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133 strictly | |
adv.严厉地,严格地;严密地 | |
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134 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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135 sincerity | |
n.真诚,诚意;真实 | |
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136 renouncing | |
v.声明放弃( renounce的现在分词 );宣布放弃;宣布与…决裂;宣布摒弃 | |
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137 ascetic | |
adj.禁欲的;严肃的 | |
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138 asceticism | |
n.禁欲主义 | |
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139 fascination | |
n.令人着迷的事物,魅力,迷恋 | |
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140 admiration | |
n.钦佩,赞美,羡慕 | |
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141 eloquence | |
n.雄辩;口才,修辞 | |
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142 countenance | |
n.脸色,面容;面部表情;vt.支持,赞同 | |
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143 consort | |
v.相伴;结交 | |
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144 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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145 destitute | |
adj.缺乏的;穷困的 | |
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146 entrusted | |
v.委托,托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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147 reposed | |
v.将(手臂等)靠在某人(某物)上( repose的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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148 scrupulous | |
adj.审慎的,小心翼翼的,完全的,纯粹的 | |
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149 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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150 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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151 foretold | |
v.预言,预示( foretell的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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152 penetration | |
n.穿透,穿人,渗透 | |
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153 scrutiny | |
n.详细检查,仔细观察 | |
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154 innocence | |
n.无罪;天真;无害 | |
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155 blues | |
n.抑郁,沮丧;布鲁斯音乐 | |
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156 amicable | |
adj.和平的,友好的;友善的 | |
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157 controversy | |
n.争论,辩论,争吵 | |
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158 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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159 stimulated | |
a.刺激的 | |
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160 intercourse | |
n.性交;交流,交往,交际 | |
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161 retired | |
adj.隐退的,退休的,退役的 | |
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162 immaturity | |
n.不成熟;未充分成长;未成熟;粗糙 | |
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163 sufficiently | |
adv.足够地,充分地 | |
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164 previously | |
adv.以前,先前(地) | |
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165 platonic | |
adj.精神的;柏拉图(哲学)的 | |
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166 wade | |
v.跋涉,涉水;n.跋涉 | |
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167 providence | |
n.深谋远虑,天道,天意;远见;节约;上帝 | |
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168 chronological | |
adj.按年月顺序排列的,年代学的 | |
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169 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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170 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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171 ascertain | |
vt.发现,确定,查明,弄清 | |
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172 ascertained | |
v.弄清,确定,查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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173 legendary | |
adj.传奇(中)的,闻名遐迩的;n.传奇(文学) | |
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174 vividly | |
adv.清楚地,鲜明地,生动地 | |
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175 illustrate | |
v.举例说明,阐明;图解,加插图 | |
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176 imbued | |
v.使(某人/某事)充满或激起(感情等)( imbue的过去式和过去分词 );使充满;灌输;激发(强烈感情或品质等) | |
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177 alluded | |
提及,暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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178 allude | |
v.提及,暗指 | |
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179 exalt | |
v.赞扬,歌颂,晋升,提升 | |
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180 exalts | |
赞扬( exalt的第三人称单数 ); 歌颂; 提升; 提拔 | |
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181 divination | |
n.占卜,预测 | |
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182 jealousy | |
n.妒忌,嫉妒,猜忌 | |
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183 malignant | |
adj.恶性的,致命的;恶意的,恶毒的 | |
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184 recoiled | |
v.畏缩( recoil的过去式和过去分词 );退缩;报应;返回 | |
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185 conjure | |
v.恳求,祈求;变魔术,变戏法 | |
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186 guardian | |
n.监护人;守卫者,保护者 | |
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187 apparition | |
n.幽灵,神奇的现象 | |
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188 celestial | |
adj.天体的;天上的 | |
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189 mishap | |
n.不幸的事,不幸;灾祸 | |
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190 specified | |
adj.特定的 | |
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191 bombastic | |
adj.夸夸其谈的,言过其实的 | |
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192 glorified | |
美其名的,变荣耀的 | |
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193 uproar | |
n.骚动,喧嚣,鼎沸 | |
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194 stoutly | |
adv.牢固地,粗壮的 | |
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195 abode | |
n.住处,住所 | |
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196 abodes | |
住所( abode的名词复数 ); 公寓; (在某地的)暂住; 逗留 | |
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197 immortals | |
不朽的人物( immortal的名词复数 ); 永生不朽者 | |
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198 abstained | |
v.戒(尤指酒),戒除( abstain的过去式和过去分词 );弃权(不投票) | |
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199 doctrines | |
n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 );教义;学说;(政府政策的)正式声明 | |
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200 interpretation | |
n.解释,说明,描述;艺术处理 | |
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201 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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202 diffusion | |
n.流布;普及;散漫 | |
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203 mutual | |
adj.相互的,彼此的;共同的,共有的 | |
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204 conversational | |
adj.对话的,会话的 | |
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205 embodied | |
v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 );象征;包括;包含 | |
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206 pointed | |
adj.尖的,直截了当的 | |
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207 divulged | |
v.吐露,泄露( divulge的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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208 philologists | |
n.语文学( philology的名词复数 ) | |
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209 corrupt | |
v.贿赂,收买;adj.腐败的,贪污的 | |
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210 unimpeachable | |
adj.无可指责的;adv.无可怀疑地 | |
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211 alterations | |
n.改动( alteration的名词复数 );更改;变化;改变 | |
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212 joint | |
adj.联合的,共同的;n.关节,接合处;v.连接,贴合 | |
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213 redundant | |
adj.多余的,过剩的;(食物)丰富的;被解雇的 | |
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214 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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215 unintelligible | |
adj.无法了解的,难解的,莫明其妙的 | |
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216 intelligible | |
adj.可理解的,明白易懂的,清楚的 | |
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217 inordinate | |
adj.无节制的;过度的 | |
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218 complexity | |
n.复杂(性),复杂的事物 | |
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219 huddled | |
挤在一起(huddle的过去式与过去分词形式) | |
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220 gender | |
n.(生理上的)性,(名词、代词等的)性 | |
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221 concords | |
n.和谐,一致,和睦( concord的名词复数 ) | |
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222 perusal | |
n.细读,熟读;目测 | |
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223 beset | |
v.镶嵌;困扰,包围 | |
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224 solitary | |
adj.孤独的,独立的,荒凉的;n.隐士 | |
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225 meditations | |
默想( meditation的名词复数 ); 默念; 沉思; 冥想 | |
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226 tangling | |
(使)缠结, (使)乱作一团( tangle的现在分词 ) | |
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227 systematic | |
adj.有系统的,有计划的,有方法的 | |
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228 irrelevant | |
adj.不恰当的,无关系的,不相干的 | |
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229 intruding | |
v.侵入,侵扰,打扰( intrude的现在分词);把…强加于 | |
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230 withdrawn | |
vt.收回;使退出;vi.撤退,退出 | |
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231 indefatigable | |
adj.不知疲倦的,不屈不挠的 | |
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232 prolixity | |
n.冗长,罗嗦 | |
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233 dint | |
n.由于,靠;凹坑 | |
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234 pertinacious | |
adj.顽固的 | |
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235 perfectly | |
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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236 speculation | |
n.思索,沉思;猜测;投机 | |
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237 speculations | |
n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 );思考;投机活动;推断 | |
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238 unanimity | |
n.全体一致,一致同意 | |
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239 phenomena | |
n.现象 | |
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240 skilful | |
(=skillful)adj.灵巧的,熟练的 | |
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241 discreetly | |
ad.(言行)审慎地,慎重地 | |
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242 controvert | |
v.否定;否认 | |
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243 insufficiently | |
adv.不够地,不能胜任地 | |
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244 ethical | |
adj.伦理的,道德的,合乎道德的 | |
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245 antithesis | |
n.对立;相对 | |
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246 immortality | |
n.不死,不朽 | |
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247 symposium | |
n.讨论会,专题报告会;专题论文集 | |
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248 adumbrated | |
v.约略显示,勾画出…的轮廓( adumbrate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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249 adverse | |
adj.不利的;有害的;敌对的,不友好的 | |
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250 mooted | |
adj.未决定的,有争议的,有疑问的v.提出…供讨论( moot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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251 analogous | |
adj.相似的;类似的 | |
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252 psychology | |
n.心理,心理学,心理状态 | |
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253 commentators | |
n.评论员( commentator的名词复数 );时事评论员;注释者;实况广播员 | |
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254 commentator | |
n.注释者,解说者;实况广播评论员 | |
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255 prominence | |
n.突出;显著;杰出;重要 | |
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256 postponed | |
vt.& vi.延期,缓办,(使)延迟vt.把…放在次要地位;[语]把…放在后面(或句尾)vi.(疟疾等)延缓发作(或复发) | |
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257 perceptive | |
adj.知觉的,有洞察力的,感知的 | |
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258 virtuous | |
adj.有品德的,善良的,贞洁的,有效力的 | |
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259 passionate | |
adj.热情的,热烈的,激昂的,易动情的,易怒的,性情暴躁的 | |
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260 destined | |
adj.命中注定的;(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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261 enumerate | |
v.列举,计算,枚举,数 | |
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262 vice | |
n.坏事;恶习;[pl.]台钳,老虎钳;adj.副的 | |
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263 vices | |
缺陷( vice的名词复数 ); 恶习; 不道德行为; 台钳 | |
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264 cowardice | |
n.胆小,怯懦 | |
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265 dread | |
vt.担忧,忧虑;惧怕,不敢;n.担忧,畏惧 | |
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266 elevation | |
n.高度;海拔;高地;上升;提高 | |
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267 foul | |
adj.污秽的;邪恶的;v.弄脏;妨害;犯规;n.犯规 | |
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268 participation | |
n.参与,参加,分享 | |
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269 aspire | |
vi.(to,after)渴望,追求,有志于 | |
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270 intensity | |
n.强烈,剧烈;强度;烈度 | |
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271 attainment | |
n.达到,到达;[常pl.]成就,造诣 | |
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272 bestow | |
v.把…赠与,把…授予;花费 | |
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273 behold | |
v.看,注视,看到 | |
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274 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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275 recesses | |
n.壁凹( recess的名词复数 );(工作或业务活动的)中止或暂停期间;学校的课间休息;某物内部的凹形空间v.把某物放在墙壁的凹处( recess的第三人称单数 );将(墙)做成凹形,在(墙)上做壁龛;休息,休会,休庭 | |
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276 aesthetic | |
adj.美学的,审美的,有美感 | |
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277 awakens | |
v.(使)醒( awaken的第三人称单数 );(使)觉醒;弄醒;(使)意识到 | |
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278 beheld | |
v.看,注视( behold的过去式和过去分词 );瞧;看呀;(叙述中用于引出某人意外的出现)哎哟 | |
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279 dominion | |
n.统治,管辖,支配权;领土,版图 | |
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280 mythological | |
adj.神话的 | |
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281 poetical | |
adj.似诗人的;诗一般的;韵文的;富有诗意的 | |
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282 primal | |
adj.原始的;最重要的 | |
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283 isolated | |
adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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284 isolate | |
vt.使孤立,隔离 | |
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285 seclusion | |
n.隐遁,隔离 | |
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286 perpetuation | |
n.永存,不朽 | |
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287 enthusiast | |
n.热心人,热衷者 | |
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288 relegated | |
v.使降级( relegate的过去式和过去分词 );使降职;转移;把…归类 | |
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289 animating | |
v.使有生气( animate的现在分词 );驱动;使栩栩如生地动作;赋予…以生命 | |
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290 scattered | |
adj.分散的,稀疏的;散步的;疏疏落落的 | |
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291 transformation | |
n.变化;改造;转变 | |
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292 coalesce | |
v.联合,结合,合并 | |
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293 coalescence | |
n.合并,联合 | |
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294 motive | |
n.动机,目的;adv.发动的,运动的 | |
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295 machinery | |
n.(总称)机械,机器;机构 | |
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296 derives | |
v.得到( derive的第三人称单数 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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297 subjective | |
a.主观(上)的,个人的 | |
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298 withdrawal | |
n.取回,提款;撤退,撤军;收回,撤销 | |
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299 modification | |
n.修改,改进,缓和,减轻 | |
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300 naturalist | |
n.博物学家(尤指直接观察动植物者) | |
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301 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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302 nonentity | |
n.无足轻重的人 | |
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303 essentially | |
adv.本质上,实质上,基本上 | |
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304 cosmopolitan | |
adj.世界性的,全世界的,四海为家的,全球的 | |
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305 recurrence | |
n.复发,反复,重现 | |
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306 recur | |
vi.复发,重现,再发生 | |
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307 inadequacy | |
n.无法胜任,信心不足 | |
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308 persuasion | |
n.劝说;说服;持有某种信仰的宗派 | |
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309 demonstration | |
n.表明,示范,论证,示威 | |
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310 vitality | |
n.活力,生命力,效力 | |
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311 controverted | |
v.争论,反驳,否定( controvert的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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312 flux | |
n.流动;不断的改变 | |
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313 animation | |
n.活泼,兴奋,卡通片/动画片的制作 | |
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314 aggregation | |
n.聚合,组合;凝聚 | |
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315 fiery | |
adj.燃烧着的,火红的;暴躁的;激烈的 | |
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316 incompatible | |
adj.不相容的,不协调的,不相配的 | |
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317 effaced | |
v.擦掉( efface的过去式和过去分词 );抹去;超越;使黯然失色 | |
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318 incorporeal | |
adj.非物质的,精神的 | |
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319 corporeal | |
adj.肉体的,身体的;物质的 | |
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320 transcribed | |
(用不同的录音手段)转录( transcribe的过去式和过去分词 ); 改编(乐曲)(以适应他种乐器或声部); 抄写; 用音标标出(声音) | |
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321 downwards | |
adj./adv.向下的(地),下行的(地) | |
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322 lateral | |
adj.侧面的,旁边的 | |
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323 disturbance | |
n.动乱,骚动;打扰,干扰;(身心)失调 | |
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324 psychic | |
n.对超自然力敏感的人;adj.有超自然力的 | |
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325 vertical | |
adj.垂直的,顶点的,纵向的;n.垂直物,垂直的位置 | |
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326 oblique | |
adj.斜的,倾斜的,无诚意的,不坦率的 | |
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327 alluding | |
提及,暗指( allude的现在分词 ) | |
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328 faculties | |
n.能力( faculty的名词复数 );全体教职员;技巧;院 | |
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329 peripatetic | |
adj.漫游的,逍遥派的,巡回的 | |
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330 dealing | |
n.经商方法,待人态度 | |
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331 irreconcilable | |
adj.(指人)难和解的,势不两立的 | |
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332 volition | |
n.意志;决意 | |
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333 discriminating | |
a.有辨别能力的 | |
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334 extricated | |
v.使摆脱困难,脱身( extricate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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335 solely | |
adv.仅仅,唯一地 | |
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336 domain | |
n.(活动等)领域,范围;领地,势力范围 | |
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337 vindicating | |
v.澄清(某人/某事物)受到的责难或嫌疑( vindicate的现在分词 );表明或证明(所争辩的事物)属实、正当、有效等;维护 | |
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338 configurations | |
n.[化学]结构( configuration的名词复数 );构造;(计算机的)配置;构形(原子在分子中的相对空间位置) | |
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339 pretensions | |
自称( pretension的名词复数 ); 自命不凡; 要求; 权力 | |
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340 absurdity | |
n.荒谬,愚蠢;谬论 | |
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341 astronomical | |
adj.天文学的,(数字)极大的 | |
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342 credence | |
n.信用,祭器台,供桌,凭证 | |
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343 scripture | |
n.经文,圣书,手稿;Scripture:(常用复数)《圣经》,《圣经》中的一段 | |
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344 originality | |
n.创造力,独创性;新颖 | |
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345 materialistic | |
a.唯物主义的,物质享乐主义的 | |
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346 contemplates | |
深思,细想,仔细考虑( contemplate的第三人称单数 ); 注视,凝视; 考虑接受(发生某事的可能性); 深思熟虑,沉思,苦思冥想 | |
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347 deference | |
n.尊重,顺从;敬意 | |
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348 sundry | |
adj.各式各样的,种种的 | |
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349 absurdities | |
n.极端无理性( absurdity的名词复数 );荒谬;谬论;荒谬的行为 | |
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350 versus | |
prep.以…为对手,对;与…相比之下 | |
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351 polemic | |
n.争论,论战 | |
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352 discrete | |
adj.个别的,分离的,不连续的 | |
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353 interval | |
n.间隔,间距;幕间休息,中场休息 | |
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354 creed | |
n.信条;信念,纲领 | |
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355 strenuous | |
adj.奋发的,使劲的;紧张的;热烈的,狂热的 | |
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356 hysterical | |
adj.情绪异常激动的,歇斯底里般的 | |
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357 sensuous | |
adj.激发美感的;感官的,感觉上的 | |
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358 reigning | |
adj.统治的,起支配作用的 | |
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359 foes | |
敌人,仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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360 overthrown | |
adj. 打翻的,推倒的,倾覆的 动词overthrow的过去分词 | |
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361 accounting | |
n.会计,会计学,借贷对照表 | |
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362 chasm | |
n.深坑,断层,裂口,大分岐,利害冲突 | |
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363 extremity | |
n.末端,尽头;尽力;终极;极度 | |
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364 animates | |
v.使有生气( animate的第三人称单数 );驱动;使栩栩如生地动作;赋予…以生命 | |
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365 necessitate | |
v.使成为必要,需要 | |
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366 necessitated | |
使…成为必要,需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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367 apprehend | |
vt.理解,领悟,逮捕,拘捕,忧虑 | |
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368 apprehended | |
逮捕,拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 ); 理解 | |
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369 heterogeneous | |
adj.庞杂的;异类的 | |
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370 avowedly | |
adv.公然地 | |
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371 mingling | |
adj.混合的 | |
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372 explicit | |
adj.详述的,明确的;坦率的;显然的 | |
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373 psychical | |
adj.有关特异功能现象的;有关特异功能官能的;灵魂的;心灵的 | |
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374 faculty | |
n.才能;学院,系;(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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375 discursive | |
adj.离题的,无层次的 | |
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376 apprehending | |
逮捕,拘押( apprehend的现在分词 ); 理解 | |
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377 simultaneously | |
adv.同时发生地,同时进行地 | |
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378 correlation | |
n.相互关系,相关,关连 | |
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379 evade | |
vt.逃避,回避;避开,躲避 | |
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380 converge | |
vi.会合;聚集,集中;(思想、观点等)趋近 | |
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381 verge | |
n.边,边缘;v.接近,濒临 | |
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382 sentient | |
adj.有知觉的,知悉的;adv.有感觉能力地 | |
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383 contradictories | |
n.矛盾的,抵触的( contradictory的名词复数 ) | |
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384 penetrated | |
adj. 击穿的,鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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385 glorifies | |
赞美( glorify的第三人称单数 ); 颂扬; 美化; 使光荣 | |
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386 ascent | |
n.(声望或地位)提高;上升,升高;登高 | |
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387 degradation | |
n.降级;低落;退化;陵削;降解;衰变 | |
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388 cosmos | |
n.宇宙;秩序,和谐 | |
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389 enjoyment | |
n.乐趣;享有;享用 | |
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390 lesser | |
adj.次要的,较小的;adv.较小地,较少地 | |
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391 derivative | |
n.派(衍)生物;adj.非独创性的,模仿他人的 | |
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392 recalcitrant | |
adj.倔强的 | |
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393 impurities | |
不纯( impurity的名词复数 ); 不洁; 淫秽; 杂质 | |
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394 dormant | |
adj.暂停活动的;休眠的;潜伏的 | |
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395 nay | |
adv.不;n.反对票,投反对票者 | |
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396 descended | |
a.为...后裔的,出身于...的 | |
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397 glimmering | |
n.微光,隐约的一瞥adj.薄弱地发光的v.发闪光,发微光( glimmer的现在分词 ) | |
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398 transcend | |
vt.超出,超越(理性等)的范围 | |
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399 projection | |
n.发射,计划,突出部分 | |
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400 mundane | |
adj.平凡的;尘世的;宇宙的 | |
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401 primordial | |
adj.原始的;最初的 | |
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402 mediation | |
n.调解 | |
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403 mediates | |
调停,调解,斡旋( mediate的第三人称单数 ); 居间促成; 影响…的发生; 使…可能发生 | |
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404 transcending | |
超出或超越(经验、信念、描写能力等)的范围( transcend的现在分词 ); 优于或胜过… | |
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405 coalesced | |
v.联合,合并( coalesce的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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406 unlimited | |
adj.无限的,不受控制的,无条件的 | |
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407 differentiation | |
n.区别,区分 | |
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408 integration | |
n.一体化,联合,结合 | |
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409 investigation | |
n.调查,调查研究 | |
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410 abruptly | |
adv.突然地,出其不意地 | |
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411 affinities | |
n.密切关系( affinity的名词复数 );亲近;(生性)喜爱;类同 | |
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412 allusion | |
n.暗示,间接提示 | |
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413 pervading | |
v.遍及,弥漫( pervade的现在分词 ) | |
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414 subdivided | |
再分,细分( subdivide的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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415 unison | |
n.步调一致,行动一致 | |
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416 unify | |
vt.使联合,统一;使相同,使一致 | |
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417 unifying | |
使联合( unify的现在分词 ); 使相同; 使一致; 统一 | |
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418 investigations | |
(正式的)调查( investigation的名词复数 ); 侦查; 科学研究; 学术研究 | |
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419 desolate | |
adj.荒凉的,荒芜的;孤独的,凄凉的;v.使荒芜,使孤寂 | |
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420 descending | |
n. 下行 adj. 下降的 | |
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421 ascend | |
vi.渐渐上升,升高;vt.攀登,登上 | |
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422 ineffable | |
adj.无法表达的,不可言喻的 | |
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423 beatific | |
adj.快乐的,有福的 | |
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424 climax | |
n.顶点;高潮;v.(使)达到顶点 | |
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425 considerably | |
adv.极大地;相当大地;在很大程度上 | |
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426 apprehension | |
n.理解,领悟;逮捕,拘捕;忧虑 | |
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427 forsaking | |
放弃( forsake的现在分词 ); 弃绝; 抛弃; 摒弃 | |
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428 amorous | |
adj.多情的;有关爱情的 | |
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429 pertinent | |
adj.恰当的;贴切的;中肯的;有关的;相干的 | |
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430 spoke | |
n.(车轮的)辐条;轮辐;破坏某人的计划;阻挠某人的行动 v.讲,谈(speak的过去式);说;演说;从某种观点来说 | |
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431 passionately | |
ad.热烈地,激烈地 | |
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432 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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433 chimerical | |
adj.荒诞不经的,梦幻的 | |
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434 secondly | |
adv.第二,其次 | |
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435 analytical | |
adj.分析的;用分析法的 | |
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436 circumscription | |
n.界限;限界 | |
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437 isolation | |
n.隔离,孤立,分解,分离 | |
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438 relatively | |
adv.比较...地,相对地 | |
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439 arid | |
adj.干旱的;(土地)贫瘠的 | |
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440 eminent | |
adj.显赫的,杰出的,有名的,优良的 | |
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441 eminently | |
adv.突出地;显著地;不寻常地 | |
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442 infinitely | |
adv.无限地,无穷地 | |
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443 pervaded | |
v.遍及,弥漫( pervade的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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444 esteem | |
n.尊敬,尊重;vt.尊重,敬重;把…看作 | |
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445 diffused | |
散布的,普及的,扩散的 | |
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446 constructive | |
adj.建设的,建设性的 | |
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447 inverted | |
adj.反向的,倒转的v.使倒置,使反转( invert的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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448 juxtaposition | |
n.毗邻,并置,并列 | |
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449 appreciable | |
adj.明显的,可见的,可估量的,可觉察的 | |
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450 denomination | |
n.命名,取名,(度量衡、货币等的)单位 | |
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451 partially | |
adv.部分地,从某些方面讲 | |
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452 primitive | |
adj.原始的;简单的;n.原(始)人,原始事物 | |
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453 magistrate | |
n.地方行政官,地方法官,治安官 | |
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454 hierarchy | |
n.等级制度;统治集团,领导层 | |
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455 diminution | |
n.减少;变小 | |
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456 overflow | |
v.(使)外溢,(使)溢出;溢出,流出,漫出 | |
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457 luminary | |
n.名人,天体 | |
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458 contradictory | |
adj.反驳的,反对的,抗辩的;n.正反对,矛盾对立 | |
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459 habitually | |
ad.习惯地,通常地 | |
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460 eternity | |
n.不朽,来世;永恒,无穷 | |
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461 premise | |
n.前提;v.提论,预述 | |
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462 inevitably | |
adv.不可避免地;必然发生地 | |
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463 antecedence | |
n.居先,优先 | |
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464 intelligibility | |
n.可理解性,可理解的事物 | |
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465 obsolete | |
adj.已废弃的,过时的 | |
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466 creeds | |
(尤指宗教)信条,教条( creed的名词复数 ) | |
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467 jargon | |
n.术语,行话 | |
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468 tortuous | |
adj.弯弯曲曲的,蜿蜒的 | |
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469 labyrinth | |
n.迷宫;难解的事物;迷路 | |
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470 antitheses | |
n.对照,对立的,对比法;对立( antithesis的名词复数 );对立面;对照;对偶 | |
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471 illustrates | |
给…加插图( illustrate的第三人称单数 ); 说明; 表明; (用示例、图画等)说明 | |
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472 revolving | |
adj.旋转的,轮转式的;循环的v.(使)旋转( revolve的现在分词 );细想 | |
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473 juncture | |
n.时刻,关键时刻,紧要关头 | |
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474 invoked | |
v.援引( invoke的过去式和过去分词 );行使(权利等);祈求救助;恳求 | |
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475 mediating | |
调停,调解,斡旋( mediate的现在分词 ); 居间促成; 影响…的发生; 使…可能发生 | |
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476 likeness | |
n.相像,相似(之处) | |
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477 subdivides | |
再分,细分( subdivide的第三人称单数 ) | |
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478 synthetic | |
adj.合成的,人工的;综合的;n.人工制品 | |
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479 exhausted | |
adj.极其疲惫的,精疲力尽的 | |
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480 penetrates | |
v.穿过( penetrate的第三人称单数 );刺入;了解;渗透 | |
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481 generic | |
adj.一般的,普通的,共有的 | |
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482 corpse | |
n.尸体,死尸 | |
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483 contraction | |
n.缩略词,缩写式,害病 | |
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484 infinity | |
n.无限,无穷,大量 | |
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485 bent | |
n.爱好,癖好;adj.弯的;决心的,一心的 | |
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486 onward | |
adj.向前的,前进的;adv.向前,前进,在先 | |
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487 stationary | |
adj.固定的,静止不动的 | |
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488 condescension | |
n.自以为高人一等,贬低(别人) | |
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489 recipient | |
a.接受的,感受性强的 n.接受者,感受者,容器 | |
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490 residue | |
n.残余,剩余,残渣 | |
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491 unwilling | |
adj.不情愿的 | |
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492 unwillingness | |
n. 不愿意,不情愿 | |
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493 metaphors | |
隐喻( metaphor的名词复数 ) | |
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494 ambiguities | |
n.歧义( ambiguity的名词复数 );意义不明确;模棱两可的意思;模棱两可的话 | |
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495 uncertainties | |
无把握( uncertainty的名词复数 ); 不确定; 变化不定; 无把握、不确定的事物 | |
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496 repudiating | |
v.(正式地)否认( repudiate的现在分词 );拒绝接受;拒绝与…往来;拒不履行(法律义务) | |
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497 chaos | |
n.混乱,无秩序 | |
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498 incapable | |
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
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499 disinterested | |
adj.不关心的,不感兴趣的 | |
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500 recoils | |
n.(尤指枪炮的)反冲,后坐力( recoil的名词复数 )v.畏缩( recoil的第三人称单数 );退缩;报应;返回 | |
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501 perpetuate | |
v.使永存,使永记不忘 | |
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502 enthralled | |
迷住,吸引住( enthrall的过去式和过去分词 ); 使感到非常愉快 | |
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503 snare | |
n.陷阱,诱惑,圈套;(去除息肉或者肿瘤的)勒除器;响弦,小军鼓;vt.以陷阱捕获,诱惑 | |
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504 aspiration | |
n.志向,志趣抱负;渴望;(语)送气音;吸出 | |
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505 aspirations | |
强烈的愿望( aspiration的名词复数 ); 志向; 发送气音; 发 h 音 | |
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506 virtues | |
美德( virtue的名词复数 ); 德行; 优点; 长处 | |
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507 ascending | |
adj.上升的,向上的 | |
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508 civic | |
adj.城市的,都市的,市民的,公民的 | |
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509 restriction | |
n.限制,约束 | |
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510 cardinal | |
n.(天主教的)红衣主教;adj.首要的,基本的 | |
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511 imposing | |
adj.使人难忘的,壮丽的,堂皇的,雄伟的 | |
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512 relaxation | |
n.松弛,放松;休息;消遣;娱乐 | |
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513 incurable | |
adj.不能医治的,不能矫正的,无救的;n.不治的病人,无救的人 | |
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514 condemning | |
v.(通常因道义上的原因而)谴责( condemn的现在分词 );宣判;宣布…不能使用;迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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515 mischievous | |
adj.调皮的,恶作剧的,有害的,伤人的 | |
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516 extinction | |
n.熄灭,消亡,消灭,灭绝,绝种 | |
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517 graft | |
n.移植,嫁接,艰苦工作,贪污;v.移植,嫁接 | |
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518 attaining | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的现在分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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519 syllogistic | |
adj.三段论法的,演绎的,演绎性的 | |
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520 sketched | |
v.草拟(sketch的过去式与过去分词形式) | |
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521 ratiocination | |
n.推理;推断 | |
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522 appreciation | |
n.评价;欣赏;感谢;领会,理解;价格上涨 | |
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523 stimulus | |
n.刺激,刺激物,促进因素,引起兴奋的事物 | |
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524 grandeur | |
n.伟大,崇高,宏伟,庄严,豪华 | |
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525 coherence | |
n.紧凑;连贯;一致性 | |
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526 emancipating | |
v.解放某人(尤指摆脱政治、法律或社会的束缚)( emancipate的现在分词 ) | |
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527 stimulating | |
adj.有启发性的,能激发人思考的 | |
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528 zeal | |
n.热心,热情,热忱 | |
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529 condemnation | |
n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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530 contrived | |
adj.不自然的,做作的;虚构的 | |
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531 plausibility | |
n. 似有道理, 能言善辩 | |
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532 severing | |
v.切断,断绝( sever的现在分词 );断,裂 | |
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533 superstitious | |
adj.迷信的 | |
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534 wrench | |
v.猛拧;挣脱;使扭伤;n.扳手;痛苦,难受 | |
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535 contrives | |
(不顾困难地)促成某事( contrive的第三人称单数 ); 巧妙地策划,精巧地制造(如机器); 设法做到 | |
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536 solitude | |
n. 孤独; 独居,荒僻之地,幽静的地方 | |
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537 redeemed | |
adj. 可赎回的,可救赎的 动词redeem的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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538 felicitous | |
adj.恰当的,巧妙的;n.恰当,贴切 | |
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539 favourable | |
adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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540 wondrous | |
adj.令人惊奇的,奇妙的;adv.惊人地;异乎寻常地;令人惊叹地 | |
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|
541 defiling | |
v.玷污( defile的现在分词 );污染;弄脏;纵列行进 | |
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542 starry | |
adj.星光照耀的, 闪亮的 | |
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543 everlasting | |
adj.永恒的,持久的,无止境的 | |
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544 odyssey | |
n.长途冒险旅行;一连串的冒险 | |
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545 bosom | |
n.胸,胸部;胸怀;内心;adj.亲密的 | |
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546 disinterestedness | |
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547 dallying | |
v.随随便便地对待( dally的现在分词 );不很认真地考虑;浪费时间;调情 | |
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548 interferes | |
vi. 妨碍,冲突,干涉 | |
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549 exalted | |
adj.(地位等)高的,崇高的;尊贵的,高尚的 | |
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550 serenity | |
n.宁静,沉着,晴朗 | |
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551 mimic | |
v.模仿,戏弄;n.模仿他人言行的人 | |
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552 allusions | |
暗指,间接提到( allusion的名词复数 ) | |
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553 abound | |
vi.大量存在;(in,with)充满,富于 | |
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554 fortify | |
v.强化防御,为…设防;加强,强化 | |
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555 strife | |
n.争吵,冲突,倾轧,竞争 | |
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556 indignities | |
n.侮辱,轻蔑( indignity的名词复数 ) | |
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557 imperialism | |
n.帝国主义,帝国主义政策 | |
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558 modifications | |
n.缓和( modification的名词复数 );限制;更改;改变 | |
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559 degenerate | |
v.退步,堕落;adj.退步的,堕落的;n.堕落者 | |
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560 culminates | |
v.达到极点( culminate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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561 ecstasy | |
n.狂喜,心醉神怡,入迷 | |
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562 superstitions | |
迷信,迷信行为( superstition的名词复数 ) | |
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563 extenuate | |
v.减轻,使人原谅 | |
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564 alleged | |
a.被指控的,嫌疑的 | |
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565 mingled | |
混合,混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 ); 混进,与…交往[联系] | |
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566 tepid | |
adj.微温的,温热的,不太热心的 | |
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567 ambiguity | |
n.模棱两可;意义不明确 | |
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568 professes | |
声称( profess的第三人称单数 ); 宣称; 公开表明; 信奉 | |
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569 impersonal | |
adj.无个人感情的,与个人无关的,非人称的 | |
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570 transcends | |
超出或超越(经验、信念、描写能力等)的范围( transcend的第三人称单数 ); 优于或胜过… | |
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571 hostility | |
n.敌对,敌意;抵制[pl.]交战,战争 | |
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572 serial | |
n.连本影片,连本电视节目;adj.连续的 | |
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573 nominally | |
在名义上,表面地; 应名儿 | |
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574 consummate | |
adj.完美的;v.成婚;使完美 [反]baffle | |
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575 disparagement | |
n.轻视,轻蔑 | |
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576 ridicules | |
n.嘲笑( ridicule的名词复数 );奚落;嘲弄;戏弄v.嘲笑,嘲弄,奚落( ridicule的第三人称单数 ) | |
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577 gratuitous | |
adj.无偿的,免费的;无缘无故的,不必要的 | |
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578 insolent | |
adj.傲慢的,无理的 | |
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579 perpetuated | |
vt.使永存(perpetuate的过去式与过去分词形式) | |
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580 disdain | |
n.鄙视,轻视;v.轻视,鄙视,不屑 | |
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581 cleansed | |
弄干净,清洗( cleanse的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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582 justified | |
a.正当的,有理的 | |
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583 devoted | |
adj.忠诚的,忠实的,热心的,献身于...的 | |
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584 annihilated | |
v.(彻底)消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 );使无效;废止;彻底击溃 | |
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585 suffrages | |
(政治性选举的)选举权,投票权( suffrage的名词复数 ) | |
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586 lapse | |
n.过失,流逝,失效,抛弃信仰,间隔;vi.堕落,停止,失效,流逝;vt.使失效 | |
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587 parodist | |
n.打油诗作者,诙谐文作者 | |
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588 shafts | |
n.轴( shaft的名词复数 );(箭、高尔夫球棒等的)杆;通风井;一阵(疼痛、害怕等) | |
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589 irony | |
n.反语,冷嘲;具有讽刺意味的事,嘲弄 | |
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590 penetrating | |
adj.(声音)响亮的,尖锐的adj.(气味)刺激的adj.(思想)敏锐的,有洞察力的 | |
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591 inadequate | |
adj.(for,to)不充足的,不适当的 | |
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592 sterile | |
adj.不毛的,不孕的,无菌的,枯燥的,贫瘠的 | |
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593 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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594 subtleties | |
细微( subtlety的名词复数 ); 精细; 巧妙; 细微的差别等 | |
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595 momentum | |
n.动力,冲力,势头;动量 | |
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596 intervention | |
n.介入,干涉,干预 | |
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597 repudiate | |
v.拒绝,拒付,拒绝履行 | |
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598 reverted | |
恢复( revert的过去式和过去分词 ); 重提; 回到…上; 归还 | |
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599 convertibility | |
n.可改变性,可变化性;兑换 | |
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600 underlies | |
v.位于或存在于(某物)之下( underlie的第三人称单数 );构成…的基础(或起因),引起 | |
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601 residual | |
adj.复播复映追加时间;存留下来的,剩余的 | |
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602 analysts | |
分析家,化验员( analyst的名词复数 ) | |
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603 genealogy | |
n.家系,宗谱 | |
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604 decomposes | |
腐烂( decompose的第三人称单数 ); (使)分解; 分解(某物质、光线等) | |
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605 superseded | |
[医]被代替的,废弃的 | |
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606 aberrations | |
n.偏差( aberration的名词复数 );差错;脱离常规;心理失常 | |
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607 testament | |
n.遗嘱;证明 | |
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608 mythology | |
n.神话,神话学,神话集 | |
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609 reactionary | |
n.反动者,反动主义者;adj.反动的,反动主义的,反对改革的 | |
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610 dictated | |
v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 );口授;支配;摆布 | |
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611 predilection | |
n.偏好 | |
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612 sustenance | |
n.食物,粮食;生活资料;生计 | |
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613 luminaries | |
n.杰出人物,名人(luminary的复数形式) | |
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614 animated | |
adj.生气勃勃的,活跃的,愉快的 | |
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615 pious | |
adj.虔诚的;道貌岸然的 | |
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616 beholder | |
n.观看者,旁观者 | |
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617 Christians | |
n.基督教徒( Christian的名词复数 ) | |
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618 authoritative | |
adj.有权威的,可相信的;命令式的;官方的 | |
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619 prosecuted | |
a.被起诉的 | |
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620 umbrage | |
n.不快;树荫 | |
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621 dominant | |
adj.支配的,统治的;占优势的;显性的;n.主因,要素,主要的人(或物);显性基因 | |
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622 attentively | |
adv.聚精会神地;周到地;谛;凝神 | |
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623 preservation | |
n.保护,维护,保存,保留,保持 | |
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624 wreck | |
n.失事,遇难;沉船;vt.(船等)失事,遇难 | |
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625 versatile | |
adj.通用的,万用的;多才多艺的,多方面的 | |
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626 melancholy | |
n.忧郁,愁思;adj.令人感伤(沮丧)的,忧郁的 | |
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627 subtlety | |
n.微妙,敏锐,精巧;微妙之处,细微的区别 | |
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628 auspices | |
n.资助,赞助 | |
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629 aspired | |
v.渴望,追求( aspire的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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630 futile | |
adj.无效的,无用的,无希望的 | |
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631 unities | |
n.统一体( unity的名词复数 );(艺术等) 完整;(文学、戏剧) (情节、时间和地点的)统一性;团结一致 | |
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632 decomposing | |
腐烂( decompose的现在分词 ); (使)分解; 分解(某物质、光线等) | |
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|
633 technically | |
adv.专门地,技术上地 | |
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634 concatenating | |
v.把 (一系列事件、事情等)联系起来( concatenate的现在分词 ) | |
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635 confiscating | |
没收(confiscate的现在分词形式) | |
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636 extirpation | |
n.消灭,根除,毁灭;摘除 | |
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637 heresy | |
n.异端邪说;异教 | |
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638 heartily | |
adv.衷心地,诚恳地,十分,很 | |
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639 monarch | |
n.帝王,君主,最高统治者 | |
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640 diffusing | |
(使光)模糊,漫射,漫散( diffuse的现在分词 ); (使)扩散; (使)弥漫; (使)传播 | |
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641 immorality | |
n. 不道德, 无道义 | |
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642 corruption | |
n.腐败,堕落,贪污 | |
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643 stipulation | |
n.契约,规定,条文;条款说明 | |
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644 molestation | |
n.骚扰,干扰,调戏;折磨 | |
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645 disappearance | |
n.消失,消散,失踪 | |
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