THE FAMOUS OBLIQUE1 MOVEMENT consisted simply in this. The Russian troops, which had been retreating directly back from the French, as soon as the French attack ceased, turned off from that direction, and seeing they were not pursued, moved naturally in the direction where they were drawn2 by the abundance of supplies.
If we imagine, instead of generals of genius at the head of the Russian army, an army acting3 alone, without leadership of any kind, such an army could have done nothing else but move back again towards Moscow, describing a semicircle through the country that was best provided with necessaries, and where supplies were most plentiful4.
So natural was this oblique movement from the Nizhni to the Ryazan, Tula, and Kaluga road, that that direction was the one taken by the flying bands of marauders from the Russian army, and the one which the authorities in Petersburg insisted upon Kutuzov's taking. At Tarutino Kutuzov received what was almost a reprimand from the Tsar for moving the army to the Ryazan road, and he was directed to take up the very position facing Kaluga, in which he was encamped at the time when the Tsar's letter reached him.
After recoiling5 in the direction of the shock received during the whole campaign, and at the battle of Borodino, the ball of the Russian army, as the force of that blow spent itself, and no new blow came, took the direction that was natural for it.
Kutuzov's merit lay in no sort of military genius, as it is called, in no strategic man?uvre, but in the fact that he alone grasped the significance of what had taken place. He alone grasped even then the significance of the inactivity of the French army; he alone persisted in maintaining that the battle of Borodino was a victory; he alone—the man who from his position as commander-in-chief might have been expected to be the first to be eager for battle—he alone did everything in his power to hold the Russian army back from useless fighting.
The wild beast wounded at Borodino lay where the fleeing hunter had left him; but whether alive and strong, or only feigning6, the hunter knew not. All at once a moan was heard from the creature. The moan of that wounded creature, the French army, that betrayed its hopeless plight7, was the despatch8 of Lauriston to the camp of Kutuzov with overtures9 for peace.
Napoleon, with his conviction that not what was right was right, but whatever came into his head was right, wrote to Kutuzov the first words that occurred to his mind, words that had no meaning at all.
“M. LE PRINCE KOUTOUZOFF,” he wrote, “I am sending you one of my aides-de-camp to converse10 with you on various interesting subjects. I desire that your highness will put faith in what he says, especially when he expresses the sentiments of esteem11 and particular consideration that I have long entertained for your person. This letter having no other object, I pray God to have you in His holy and powerful keeping.
(Signed) NAPOLEON.
“Moscow, October 30, 1812.”
“I should be cursed by posterity12 if I were regarded as the first instigator13 of any sort of settlement. Tel est l'esprit actuel de ma nation,” answered Kutuzov, and went on doing everything in his power to hold the army back from advance.
A month spent by the French army in pillaging14 Moscow, and by the Russian army quietly encamped at Tarutino, brought about a change in the relative strength of the two armies, a change both in spirit and in numbers, which was all to the advantage of the Russians. Although the position of the French army and its numbers were unknown to the Russians, as soon as their relative strength had changed, a great number of signs began to show that an attack would be inevitable15. Among the causes that contributed to bring about this result were Lauriston's mission, and the abundance of provisions at Tarutino, and the reports that were continually coming in from all sides of the inactivity and lack of discipline in the French army, and the filling up of our regiments16 by recruits, and the fine weather, and the long rest enjoyed by the Russian soldiers, and the impatience17 to do the work for which they have been brought together, that always arises in troops after repose18, and curiosity to know what was going on in the French army, of which they had so long seen nothing, and the daring with which the Russian outposts dashed in among the French encamped at Tarutino, and the news of the easy victories gained by bands of peasants and free-lances over the French, and the envy aroused by them, and the desire of revenge, that every man cherished at heart so long as the French were in Moscow; and—stronger than all—the vague sense growing up in every soldier's heart that the relative strength of the armies had changed, and the preponderance was now on our side. The relative strength of the armies had really changed, and advance had become inevitable. And at once, as surely as the chimes in a clock begin to beat and play when the hand has made the full round of the dial, was this change reflected in the increased activity, and bustle19 and stir of wheels within wheels in the higher spheres.
著名的侧翼进军只是: 俄国军队在敌人进攻下一直往后退却,在法国人停止进攻之后,离开当初采取的径直路线,见到后面没有追击,就自然而然地转向给养充足的地区。
假如俄国军队不是在英明的统帅领导下,而只是一支没有指挥官的军队,那么,除了从粮草较多、物产较富的地区,沿着一条弧线朝莫斯科迂回之外,不会做出任何别的抉择。
从下城大路向梁赞、图拉和卡卢日斯卡雅大路转移,是那么自然而然的事,就连俄国的逃兵都向那个方向跑,而且彼得堡方面也要求库图佐夫朝那个方向转移。在塔鲁丁诺库图佐夫接到皇帝的近乎申斥的信,责备他走梁赞大路,要他占领卡卢加对面的阵地,其实在接到皇帝的信时,他已经站在那个阵地上了。
俄国军队这个球,在所有战役和波罗底诺会战的推动下,沿着推力的方向滚动,在推力已经消失,又没有获得新的推力的时候,它就在那个理所当然该停的位置上停住了。
库图佐夫的功绩不在于什么天才,通常称为战略机动,而在于只有他一个人懂得所发生的事件的意义,只有他一个人在当时就懂得法国军队已失去作战能力的意义,只有他一个人坚信波罗底诺战役是一次胜利;只有他一个人——以他处在总司令的地位,理应倾向于进攻的,——竭尽全力阻止俄国军队去作无益的战斗。
在波罗底诺受了伤的那头野兽躺在逃走的猎人把它扔下的某个地方,它是否还活着,是否还有力量,或者它只是暂时躲藏起来了,这一些猎人都不知道。突然听到了那头野兽的呻吟声。
法国军队这只受伤的野兽的呻吟,是派洛里斯顿到库图佐夫营地求和,这是它行将灭亡的暴露。
拿破仑自信,无所谓好和坏,只要是他想到的就是好的,他就这样灵机一动给库图佐夫写了几句毫无意义的话:
“MonsieurleprinceKoutouzov,j'envoieprèsdevousundemesaidesdecampsgènerauxpourvousenB
tretenirdeplusieursobjetsinteressants.Jedésirequevotrealtesseajoutefoiàcequ'illuidira,surtoutlorsqu'ilexprimeralessentimentsd'estimeetde
particulièreconsidérationquej'aidepuislongtempspoursapersonne…Céttelettren'étantàautrefin,jeprieDieu,monsieurleprinceKoutozov,qu'ilvousaitensa sainteetdignegarde.
Moscou,le30Octobre,1812Signé:
Napoléon”①
“jeseraismauditparlapastéritésil'onmeregardaitcommelepremiermoteurd'unaccommodementquelB
conque.Telestl'es-pritactueldemanation.”②库图佐夫回答说,但是他仍然不遗余力地阻止他的军队进攻。
①法语:“库图佐夫公爵,我派一名参谋将军同您谈判许多重要的问题。我请求阁下相信他对您说的话,特别是他向您表示我久已对您怀有的尊敬和景仰。 并此祈祷上帝给您以神圣的庇护。 莫斯科 一八一二年十月三十日 拿破仑”
②法语:如果把我看作干任何和谈勾当的主谋。我就会受到咒骂。我国人民的意志就是这样。
法国军队在莫斯科抢劫了一个月,俄国军队在塔鲁丁诺附近驻扎了一个月,双方军队力量对比(士气和数量)发生了变化,俄国人方面占据了优势。对比迅速的改变,虽然俄国人还不知道法国军队的位置和人数,无数的迹象都表现出必须立刻发起进攻。这些迹象是:洛里斯顿的派遣,塔鲁丁塔的粮草充裕,来自各方关于法国人的无所事事和混乱的消息,我军各团队都补充了新兵,晴朗的天气,俄国士兵长期的休整以及休整后的士兵通常对公务自发产生跃跃欲试的心情,对于久已消失踪迹的法国军队的情况的好奇心,俄国哨兵现在竟敢有在塔鲁丁诺法国驻军附近放哨的勇气,关于农民和游击队轻易就战胜法国人的消息,由此而产生的羡慕心情,只要法国人还占领着莫斯科,人人都抱有复仇的决心,还有更主要的,每个士兵虽然不十分清楚,但是都意识到力量的对比现在已经起了变化,优势在我们方面。实际力量对比既然起了变化。进攻就势在必行了。正如分钟转完一圈之后,塔钟就自动鸣响一样地准确,随着力量的重大变化,军队上层的活动加强了,有如塔钟咝咝作响和敲打起来。
1 oblique | |
adj.斜的,倾斜的,无诚意的,不坦率的 | |
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2 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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3 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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4 plentiful | |
adj.富裕的,丰富的 | |
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5 recoiling | |
v.畏缩( recoil的现在分词 );退缩;报应;返回 | |
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6 feigning | |
假装,伪装( feign的现在分词 ); 捏造(借口、理由等) | |
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7 plight | |
n.困境,境况,誓约,艰难;vt.宣誓,保证,约定 | |
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8 despatch | |
n./v.(dispatch)派遣;发送;n.急件;新闻报道 | |
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9 overtures | |
n.主动的表示,提议;(向某人做出的)友好表示、姿态或提议( overture的名词复数 );(歌剧、芭蕾舞、音乐剧等的)序曲,前奏曲 | |
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10 converse | |
vi.谈话,谈天,闲聊;adv.相反的,相反 | |
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11 esteem | |
n.尊敬,尊重;vt.尊重,敬重;把…看作 | |
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12 posterity | |
n.后裔,子孙,后代 | |
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13 instigator | |
n.煽动者 | |
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14 pillaging | |
v.抢劫,掠夺( pillage的现在分词 ) | |
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15 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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16 regiments | |
(军队的)团( regiment的名词复数 ); 大量的人或物 | |
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17 impatience | |
n.不耐烦,急躁 | |
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18 repose | |
v.(使)休息;n.安息 | |
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19 bustle | |
v.喧扰地忙乱,匆忙,奔忙;n.忙碌;喧闹 | |
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