THE RUSSIAN ARMY was commanded by Kutuzov and his staff and by the Tsar from Petersburg. Before the news of the abandonment of Moscow had reached Petersburg a detailed1 plan of the whole campaign had been drawn2 up and sent to Kutuzov for his guidance. In spite of the fact that this plan had been made on the supposition that Moscow was still in our hands, it was approved by the staff, and accepted as the plan to be carried out. Kutuzov simply wrote that directions from a distance were always difficult to carry out. And to solve any difficulties that might arise, fresh instructions were sent, together with newer persons, whose duty it was to be to keep a watch on his movements, and to report upon them.
Apart from these new authorities, the whole staff of generals in the Russian army was now transferred. The places of Bagration, who had been killed, and Barclay, who had taken offence and retired3, had to be filled. The question was deliberated with the greatest seriousness: whether A should be put in B's place, and B in the place of D, or whether, on the other hand, D in A's place, and so on, as though the matter affected4 anything whatever except the satisfaction of A and B and D.
In consequence of Kutuzov's hostility5 to the head officer of his staff, Bennigsen, and the presence of confidential6 advisers7 of the Tsar, and these various new appointments, the struggle of parties at headquarters was even more complicated than usual. A was trying to undermine B's position, D to undermine C's position, and so on, in all the possible combinations and permutations. In all these conflicting currents the object of intrigue8 was for the most part the management of the war, which all these men supposed they were controlling, though it did, in fact, follow its inevitable9 course quite apart from their action, a course that never corresponded with their schemes, but was the outcome of the forces interacting in the masses. All these schemes, thwarting11 and stultifying12 one another, were simply accepted in the higher spheres as the correct reflection of what was bound to come to pass.
“Prince Mihail Ilarionovitch!” the Tsar wrote on the 2nd of October, a letter received by Kutuzov after the battle of Tarutino. “From the 2nd of September Moscow has been in the hands of the enemy. Your last reports were dated the 20th; and in the course of all this time since, no attempt has been made to act against the enemy, and to relieve the ancient capital, and you have even, from your last reports, retreated further. Serpuhov is by now occupied by a detachment of the enemy, and Tula, with its famous arsenal13, of such importance to the army, is in danger. From the reports received from General Wintzengerode, I see that a corps14 of the enemy, ten thousand strong, is marching along the Petersburg road. Another, numbering some thousands, is already close upon Dmitrov. A third is advancing along the Vladimir road. A fourth force of considerable strength is stationed between Ruza and Mozhaisk. Napoleon himself was in Moscow on the 25th. In face of these facts, with the enemy's forces split up into these detached bodies, and Napoleon himself with his guards in Moscow, is it possible that the enemy's forces confronting you are too strong to permit of your acting10 on the offensive? One may, with far more probability, assume that you are being pursued by detachments, or at most a corps by far inferior to the army under your command. It would seem that taking advantage of these circumstances, you might with advantage have attacked forces inferior in strength to your army, and have destroyed them, or at least have forced them to retreat, and have kept in our hands a considerable part of the province now occupied by the enemy, and thereby15 have averted16 all danger from Tula and the other towns of the interior. You will be responsible, if the enemy is able to send a considerable body of men to Petersburg, to menace that capital, in which it has been impossible to keep any great number of troops; for with the army under your command, acting with energy and decision, you have ample means at your disposal for averting17 such a calamity18. Recollect19 that you have still to answer to your humiliated20 country for the loss of Moscow. You have had experience of my readiness to reward you. That readiness is no less now, but Russia and I have the right to expect from you all the energy, decision, and success, which your intellect, your military talents, and the valour of the troops under your command should guarantee us.”
But while this letter, proving that the change in the relative strength of the armies was by now reflected in opinion at Petersburg, was on its road, Kutuzov had been unable to hold the army back, and a battle had already been fought.
On the 2nd of October, a Cossack, Shapovalov, out scouting21, shot one hare and wounded a second. Shapovalov was led on in pursuit of the game far into the forest, and came across the left flank of Murat's army, which was encamped and quite off guard. The Cossack told his comrades with laughter the tale of how he had all but fallen into the hands of the French. The ensign, who heard the story, repeated it to his superior officer. The Cossack was sent for and questioned. The officers of the Cossacks wanted to take advantage of this to carry off some horses from the French, but one of them, who was intimate with some of the higher authorities in the army, mentioned the incident to a general on the staff. On the staff the position of late had been strained to the utmost. A few days previously22, Yermolov had gone to Bennigsen and besought23 him to use his influence with the commander-in-chief to bring about an attack.
“If I did not know you, I should suppose you did not desire that result. I have only to advise one course for his highness to be sure to adopt the opposite one,” answered Bennigsen.
The news brought by the Cossack, confirmed by scouts24, proved conclusively25 that the time was ripe. The strained string broke, and the wheels of the clock whirred, and the chimes began to strike. In spite of all his supposed power, his intellect, his experience, and his knowledge of men, Kutuzov, taking into consideration the note from Bennigsen, who was sending a personal report on the subject to the Tsar, the desire expressed by all the generals alike, the desire assumed by them to be the Tsar's wish, and the news brought by the Cossack, could hold back the inevitable movement no longer, and gave orders for what he regarded as useless and mischievous—gave his assent26, in fact, to the accomplished27 fact.
俄国军队受库图佐夫及其参谋部和彼得堡的皇帝指挥。在彼得堡尚未获悉莫斯科已失守的消息之前，就拟定好一个详细的全面作战计划并送交库图佐夫作为作战方针。虽然这个计划是假定莫斯科尚在我方手中时拟定的，但是仍然得到参谋部的赞同并准备付诸执行。库图佐夫只写下了，远方的作战指令总是难以执行的。为了解决所碰到的困难，彼得堡又发出了新的指示，并且派来了监视和报告库图佐夫行动的人员。
除此之外，俄国军队改组了整个参谋部，增补了巴格拉季翁阵亡后空缺的位置和拂袖而去的巴克莱的职位。还十分慎重地考虑怎样才更好些：把甲放到乙的位置上，把乙放到丙的位置上。或者相反，把丙放到甲的位置上，等等，除了使甲和乙满意之外，似乎还有什么事情能与此相关。
在参谋部里，由于库图佐夫与他的参谋长贝尼格森为敌，还由于皇帝派来的心腹在场和人员的变动，复杂的派系斗争比平时更加激烈了。甲暗算乙，乙暗算丙，等等，在整个的调动和改组过程中都是如此。在所有这些相互暗算中，其主要目标是军事，所有这些人都想争夺军事领导权，但是，军事却不以他们的意志为转移，它按照理所应当的那样进行着，这就是说，它总是与他们的设想不相符合，而是顺应人民群众的意愿，发展、变化。所有这些错综复杂、纷乱如麻的阴谋诡计，只不过是在高级将领之间必然会发生的事情，现在真实地反映出来。
“米哈伊尔·伊拉里奥诺维奇公爵！”在塔鲁丁诺战役之后接到的皇帝在十月二日的信中写道。“莫斯科于九月二日落入敌人手中，您上一次的报告是二十日写的；在此期间，不但没有对敌人采取行动和解放古都，据您上一次的报告，您甚至仍然在继续往后撤退。谢尔普霍夫已经被敌人的一支部队占领，图拉及其著名的、我军不可缺少的兵工厂也处在危险之中。我从温岑格罗德将军的报告中得知，敌人的一支上万人的兵团正在向彼得堡大路运动。另一支几千人的军队正向德米特罗夫运动。第三支法国军队正沿着弗拉基米尔大路向前运动。第四支是一支相当庞大的兵团，驻扎在鲁查和莫扎伊斯克之间。拿破仑本人直至二十五日仍然在莫斯科。根据所有这些情报，敌人已经把军队分成若干大支队，拿破仑本人及其近卫军仍然在莫斯科，在这种情况下，要说您所面对的敌人的力量很强大，使您难以发起攻击，那会是可能的吗？正相反，可以推测，他可能用比您所率领的军队软弱得多的分队或者至多用一个兵团追击您。看来，利用这些条件，您可以有利地去进攻比您软弱的敌人，消灭他，或者至少迫使他退却，把现在仍被敌人占领的各省的重要部份夺回我们自己手中，从而使图拉和其他内地城市避免危险。如果敌人派出火兵团进攻彼得堡，威胁到这个未能保留很多军队的首都，那要由您负这个责任，因为你掌有托付给您的军队，只要采取坚决的有力的行动，您有一切办法免除这一新的灾难。您要记住，为了莫斯科的失守，您要对我们受辱的祖国负责。我会嘉奖您，对这一点您是有经验的，我的决心不会有丝毫动摇，不过我和俄罗斯有权利要求您全力以赴、坚决，获得成功，您的智力、军事才能和您所统率的军队的骁勇善战，都告诉我们，您不会辜负我们的期望。”
但是，就在这封表明彼得堡已觉察出这种真实力量对比的信还在路上的时候，库图佐夫已经无法制止他所指挥的军队发动进攻了，战斗已经开始了。
十月二日，外出侦察的哥萨克沙波瓦洛夫用步枪打死了一只兔子，打伤了另外一只，他在追逐打伤的那只兔子时，追到了树林中，碰到了没有设任何警戒的缪拉的左翼部队。后来这个哥萨克笑着对他的伙伴们讲述他几乎落入法国人手中的情形。一名少尉听到这个故事后，就报告了他的指挥官。
那个哥萨克被叫去询问；哥萨克的军官们想利用这个机会夺回一些马匹，但是一个与高级将领认识的指挥官把这件事报告了参谋部的一位将军。近来参谋部里的情形非常紧张。耶尔莫洛夫在几天前去见贝尼格森，请求他运用他对总司令的影响，劝总司令发动进攻。
“假如我不认识您，我还以为您不愿意去做您所请求的事了。我一劝告什么，他阁下一定做相反的事情。”贝尼格森回答。
派出的侦察骑兵证实了那个哥萨克的报告，这足以证明，时机已经成熟。盘紧的发条松开了，时钟在咝咝作响，要鸣响了。库图佐夫虽然有他那徒有虚名的权力，有他的聪明才智、丰富的经验和对人的识别能力，但是他不能不注意到贝尼格森亲自向皇帝呈交的报告、全体将军们的一致愿望，他意料到的皇帝的愿望，以及哥萨克们的报告，他再也不能制止那不可避免的行动了，于是他不得不违心地下达命令干他认为无益而且有害的事情，——他对既成事实加以认可。
收听单词发音 |
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detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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confidential
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| adj.秘（机）密的，表示信任的，担任机密工作的 | |
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advisers
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| 顾问，劝告者( adviser的名词复数 )； （指导大学新生学科问题等的）指导教授 | |
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intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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thwarting
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| 阻挠( thwart的现在分词 )； 使受挫折； 挫败； 横过 | |
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stultifying
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| v.使成为徒劳，使变得无用( stultify的现在分词 ) | |
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arsenal
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| n.兵工厂，军械库 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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averted
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| 防止，避免( avert的过去式和过去分词 )； 转移 | |
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averting
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| 防止，避免( avert的现在分词 )； 转移 | |
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calamity
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| n.灾害，祸患，不幸事件 | |
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recollect
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| v.回忆，想起，记起，忆起，记得 | |
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humiliated
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| 感到羞愧的 | |
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scouting
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| 守候活动，童子军的活动 | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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besought
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| v.恳求，乞求（某事物）( beseech的过去式和过去分词 )；(beseech的过去式与过去分词) | |
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scouts
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| 侦察员[机，舰]( scout的名词复数 )； 童子军； 搜索； 童子军成员 | |
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conclusively
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| adv.令人信服地，确凿地 | |
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assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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