It is a miserable1 state of mind, to have few things to desire, and many things to fear; and yet that commonly is the case of kings; who, being at the highest, want matter of desire, which makes their minds more languishing2; and have many representations of perils3 and shadows, which makes their minds the less clear. And this is one reason also, of that effect which the Scripture4 speaketh of, That the king’s heart is inscrutable. For multitude of jealousies5, and lack of some predominant desire, that should marshal and put in order all the rest, maketh any man’s heart, hard to find or sound. Hence it comes likewise, that princes many times make themselves desires, and set their hearts upon toys; sometimes upon a building; sometimes upon erecting6 of an order; sometimes upon the advancing of a person; sometimes upon obtaining excellency in some art, or feat7 of the hand; as Nero for playing on the harp8, Domitian for certainty of the hand with the arrow, Commodus for playing at fence, Caracalla for driving chariots, and the like. This seemeth incredible, unto those that know not the principle, that the mind of man, is more cheered and refreshed by profiting in small things, than by standing9 at a stay, in great. We see also that kings that have been fortunate conquerors10, in their first years, it being not possible for them to go forward infinitely11, but that they must have some check, or arrest in their fortunes, turn in their latter years to be superstitious13, and melancholy14; as did Alexander the Great; Diocletian; and in our memory, Charles the Fifth; and others: for he that is used to go forward, and findeth a stop, falleth out of his own favor, and is not the thing he was.
To speak now of the true temper of empire, it is a thing rare and hard to keep; for both temper, and distemper, consist of contraries. But it is one thing, to mingle15 contraries, another to interchange them. The answer of Apollonius to Vespasian, is full of excellent instruction. Vespasian asked him, What was Nero’s overthrow17? He answered, Nero could touch and tune12 the harp well; but in government, sometimes he used to wind the pins too high, sometimes to let them down too low. And certain it is, that nothing destroyeth authority so much, as the unequal and untimely interchange of power pressed too far, and relaxed too much.
This is true, that the wisdom of all these latter times, in princes’ affairs, is rather fine deliveries, and shiftings of dangers and mischiefs18, when they are near, than solid and grounded courses to keep them aloof19. But this is but to try masteries with fortune. And let men beware, how they neglect and suffer matter of trouble to be prepared for no man can forbid the spark, nor tell whence it may come. The difficulties in princes’ business are many and great; but the greatest difficulty, is often in their own mind. For it is common with princes (saith Tacitus) to will contradictories20, Sunt plerumque regum voluntates vehementes, et inter16 se contrariae. For it is the solecism of power, to think to command the end, and yet not to endure the mean.
Kings have to deal with their neighbors, their wives, their children, their prelates or clergy21, their nobles, their second-nobles or gentlemen, their merchants, their commons, and their men of war; and from all these arise dangers, if care and circumspection22 be not used.
First for their neighbors; there can no general rule be given (for occasions are so variable), save one, which ever holdeth, which is, that princes do keep due sentinel, that none of their neighbors do ever grow so (by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches, or the like), as they become more able to annoy them, than they were. And this is generally the work of standing counsels, to foresee and to hinder it. During that triumvirate of kings, King Henry the Eighth of England, Francis the First King of France, and Charles the Fifth Emperor, there was such a watch kept, that none of the three could win a palm of ground, but the other two would straightways balance it, either by confederation, or, if need were, by a war; and would not in any wise take up peace at interest. And the like was done by that league (which Guicciardini saith was the security of Italy) made between Ferdinando King of Naples, Lorenzius Medici, and Ludovicus Sforza, potentates24, the one of Florence, the other of Milan. Neither is the opinion of some of the Schoolmen, to be received, that a war cannot justly be made, but upon a precedent25 injury, or provocation26. For there is no question, but a just fear of an imminent27 danger, though there be no blow given, is a lawful28 cause of a war.
For their wives; there are cruel examples of them. Livia is infamed, for the poisoning of her husband; Roxalana, Solyman’s wife, was the destruction of that renowned29 prince, Sultan Mustapha, and otherwise troubled his house and succession; Edward the Second of England, his queen, had the principal hand in the deposing30 and murder of her husband. This kind of danger, is then to be feared chiefly, when the wives have plots, for the raising of their own children; or else that they be advoutresses.
For their children; the tragedies likewise of dangers from them, have been many. And generally, the entering of fathers into suspicion of their children, hath been ever unfortunate. The destruction of Mustapha (that we named before) was so fatal to Solyman’s line, as the succession of the Turks, from Solyman until this day, is suspected to be untrue, and of strange blood; for that Selymus the Second, was thought to be suppositious. The destruction of Crispus, a young prince of rare towardness, by Constantinus the Great, his father, was in like manner fatal to his house; for both Constantinus and Constance, his sons, died violent deaths; and Constantius, his other son, did little better; who died indeed of sickness, but after that Julianus had taken arms against him. The destruction of Demetrius, son to Philip the Second of Macedon, turned upon the father, who died of repentance31. And many like examples there are; but few or none, where the fathers had good by such distrust; except it were, where the sons were up in open arms against them; as was Selymus the First against Bajazet; and the three sons of Henry the Second, King of England.
For their prelates; when they are proud and great, there is also danger from them; as it was in the times of Anselmus, and Thomas Becket, Archbishops of Canterbury; who, with their croziers, did almost try it with the king’s sword; and yet they had to deal with stout32 and haughty33 kings, William Rufus, Henry the First, and Henry the Second. The danger is not from that state, but where it hath a dependence34 of foreign authority; or where the churchmen come in and are elected, not by the collation35 of the king, or particular patrons, but by the people.
For their nobles; to keep them at a distance, it is not amiss; but to depress them, may make a king more absolute, but less safe; and less able to perform, any thing that he desires. I have noted36 it, in my History of King Henry the Seventh of England, who depressed37 his nobility; whereupon it came to pass, that his times were full of difficidties and troubles; for the nobility, though they continued loyal unto him, yet did they not co-operate with him in his business. So that in effect, he was fain to do all things himself.
For their second-nobles; there is not much danger from them, being a body dispersed38. They may sometimes discourse39 high, but that doth little hurt; besides, they are a counterpoise to the higher nobility, that they grow not too potent23; and, lastly, being the most immediate40 in authority, with the common people, they do best temper popular commotions41.
For their merchants; they are vena porta; and if they flourish not, a kingdom may have good limbs, but will have empty veins42, and nourish little. Taxes and imposts upon them, do seldom good to the king’s revenue; for that that wins in the hundred, he leeseth in the shire; the particular rates being increased, but the total bulk of trading, rather decreased.
For their commons; there is little danger from them, except it be, where they have great and potent heads; or where you meddle43 with the point of religion, or their customs, or means of life.
For their men of war; it is a dangerous state, where they live and remain in a body, and are used to donatives; whereof we see examples in the janizaries, and pretorian bands of Rome; but trainings of men, and arming them in several places, and under several commanders, and without donatives, are things of defence, and no danger.
Princes are like to heavenly bodies, which cause good or evil times; and which have much veneration44, but no rest. All precepts45 concerning kings, are in effect comprehended in those two remembrances: memento46 quod es homo; and memento quod es Deus, or vice47 Dei; the one bridleth their power, and the other their will.
1 miserable | |
adj.悲惨的,痛苦的;可怜的,糟糕的 | |
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2 languishing | |
a. 衰弱下去的 | |
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3 perils | |
极大危险( peril的名词复数 ); 危险的事(或环境) | |
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4 scripture | |
n.经文,圣书,手稿;Scripture:(常用复数)《圣经》,《圣经》中的一段 | |
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5 jealousies | |
n.妒忌( jealousy的名词复数 );妒羡 | |
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6 erecting | |
v.使直立,竖起( erect的现在分词 );建立 | |
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7 feat | |
n.功绩;武艺,技艺;adj.灵巧的,漂亮的,合适的 | |
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8 harp | |
n.竖琴;天琴座 | |
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9 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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10 conquerors | |
征服者,占领者( conqueror的名词复数 ) | |
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11 infinitely | |
adv.无限地,无穷地 | |
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12 tune | |
n.调子;和谐,协调;v.调音,调节,调整 | |
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13 superstitious | |
adj.迷信的 | |
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14 melancholy | |
n.忧郁,愁思;adj.令人感伤(沮丧)的,忧郁的 | |
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15 mingle | |
vt.使混合,使相混;vi.混合起来;相交往 | |
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16 inter | |
v.埋葬 | |
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17 overthrow | |
v.推翻,打倒,颠覆;n.推翻,瓦解,颠覆 | |
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18 mischiefs | |
损害( mischief的名词复数 ); 危害; 胡闹; 调皮捣蛋的人 | |
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19 aloof | |
adj.远离的;冷淡的,漠不关心的 | |
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20 contradictories | |
n.矛盾的,抵触的( contradictory的名词复数 ) | |
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21 clergy | |
n.[总称]牧师,神职人员 | |
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22 circumspection | |
n.细心,慎重 | |
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23 potent | |
adj.强有力的,有权势的;有效力的 | |
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24 potentates | |
n.君主,统治者( potentate的名词复数 );有权势的人 | |
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25 precedent | |
n.先例,前例;惯例;adj.在前的,在先的 | |
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26 provocation | |
n.激怒,刺激,挑拨,挑衅的事物,激怒的原因 | |
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27 imminent | |
adj.即将发生的,临近的,逼近的 | |
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28 lawful | |
adj.法律许可的,守法的,合法的 | |
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29 renowned | |
adj.著名的,有名望的,声誉鹊起的 | |
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30 deposing | |
v.罢免( depose的现在分词 );(在法庭上)宣誓作证 | |
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31 repentance | |
n.懊悔 | |
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33 haughty | |
adj.傲慢的,高傲的 | |
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34 dependence | |
n.依靠,依赖;信任,信赖;隶属 | |
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35 collation | |
n.便餐;整理 | |
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36 noted | |
adj.著名的,知名的 | |
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37 depressed | |
adj.沮丧的,抑郁的,不景气的,萧条的 | |
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38 dispersed | |
adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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39 discourse | |
n.论文,演说;谈话;话语;vi.讲述,著述 | |
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40 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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41 commotions | |
n.混乱,喧闹,骚动( commotion的名词复数 ) | |
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42 veins | |
n.纹理;矿脉( vein的名词复数 );静脉;叶脉;纹理 | |
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43 meddle | |
v.干预,干涉,插手 | |
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44 veneration | |
n.尊敬,崇拜 | |
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45 precepts | |
n.规诫,戒律,箴言( precept的名词复数 ) | |
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46 memento | |
n.纪念品,令人回忆的东西 | |
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47 vice | |
n.坏事;恶习;[pl.]台钳,老虎钳;adj.副的 | |
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