(1) Invention is of two kinds much differing — the one of arts and sciences, and the other of speech and arguments. The former of these I do report deficient1; which seemeth to me to be such a deficience as if, in the making of an inventory2 touching3 the state of a defunct4, it should be set down that there is no ready money. For as money will fetch all other commodities, so this knowledge is that which should purchase all the rest. And like as the West Indies had never been discovered if the use of the mariner’s needle had not been first discovered, though the one be vast regions, and the other a small motion; so it cannot be found strange if sciences be no further discovered, if the art itself of invention and discovery hath been passed over.
(2) That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment5 standeth plainly confessed; for first, logic6 doth not pretend to invent sciences, or the axioms of sciences, but passeth it over with a cuique in sua arte credendum. And Celsus acknowledgeth it gravely, speaking of the empirical and dogmatical sects8 of physicians, “That medicines and cures were first found out, and then after the reasons and causes were discoursed9; and not the causes first found out, and by light from them the medicines and cures discovered.” And Plato in his “Theaetetus” noteth well, “That particulars are infinite, and the higher generalities give no sufficient direction; and that the pith of all sciences, which maketh the artsman differ from the inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in every particular knowledge are taken from tradition and experience.” And therefore we see, that they which discourse10 of the inventions and originals of things refer them rather to chance than to art, and rather to beasts, birds, fishes, serpents, than to men.
“Dictamnum genetrix Cretaea carpit ab Ida, Puberibus caulem foliis et flore camantem Purpureo; non illa feris incognita capris Gramina, cum tergo volucres haesere sagittae.”
So that it was no marvel11 (the manner of antiquity12 being to consecrate13 inventors) that the Egyptians had so few human idols14 in their temples, but almost all brute15:—
“Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator Anubis, Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam, &c.”
And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and ascribe the first inventions to men, yet you will rather believe that Prometheus first stroke the flints, and marvelled16 at the spark, than that when he first stroke the flints he expected the spark; and therefore we see the West Indian Prometheus had no intelligence with the European, because of the rareness with them of flint, that gave the first occasion. So as it should seem, that hitherto men are rather beholden to a wild goat for surgery, or to a nightingale for music, or to the ibis for some part of physic, or to the pot-lid that flew open for artillery17, or generally to chance or anything else than to logic for the invention of arts and sciences. Neither is the form of invention which Virgil describeth much other:—
“Ut varias usus meditande extunderet artes Paulatim.”
For if you observe the words well, it is no other method than that which brute beasts are capable of, and do put in ure; which is a perpetual intending or practising some one thing, urged and imposed by an absolute necessity of conservation of being. For so Cicero saith very truly, Usus uni rei deditus et naturam et artem saepe vincit. And therefore if it be said of men,
“Labor omnia vincit
Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus18 egestas,”
it is likewise said of beasts, Quis psittaco docuit suum?a??e? Who taught the raven19 in a drought to throw pebbles20 into a hollow tree, where she spied water, that the water might rise so as she might come to it? Who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea or air, and to find the way from a field in a flower a great way off to her hive? Who taught the ant to bite every grain of corn that she burieth in her hill, lest it should take root and grow? Add then the word extundere, which importeth the extreme difficulty, and the word paulatim, which importeth the extreme slowness, and we are where we were, even amongst the Egyptians’ gods; there being little left to the faculty21 of reason, and nothing to the duty or art, for matter of invention.
(3) Secondly22, the induction23 which the logicians speak of, and which seemeth familiar with Plato, whereby the principles of sciences may be pretended to be invented, and so the middle propositions by derivation from the principles; their form of induction, I say, is utterly24 vicious and incompetent25; wherein their error is the fouler26, because it is the duty of art to perfect and exalt27 nature; but they contrariwise have wronged, abused, and traduced28 nature. For he that shall attentively29 observe how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of knowledge, like unto that which the poet speaketh of, Aerei mellis caelestia dona, distilling30 and contriving31 it out of particulars natural and artificial, as the flowers of the field and garden, shall find that the mind of herself by nature doth manage and act an induction much better than they describe it. For to conclude upon an enumeration32 of particulars, without instance contradictory33, is no conclusion, but a conjecture34; for who can assure (in many subjects) upon those particulars which appear of a side, that there are not other on the contrary side which appear not? As if Samuel should have rested upon those sons of Jesse which were brought before him, and failed of David which was in the field. And this form (to say truth), is so gross, as it had not been possible for wits so subtle as have managed these things to have offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful toward particulars; which their manner was to use but as lictores and viatores, for sergeants35 and whifflers, ad summovendam turbam, to make way and make room for their opinions, rather than in their true use and service. Certainly it is a thing may touch a man with a religious wonder, to see how the footsteps of seducement are the very same in divine and human truth; for, as in divine truth man cannot endure to become as a child, so in human, they reputed the attending the inductions36 (whereof we speak), as if it were a second infancy37 or childhood.
(4) Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly induced, yet, nevertheless, certain it is that middle propositions cannot be deduced from them in subject of nature by syllogism38 — that is, by touch and reduction of them to principles in a middle term. It is true that in sciences popular, as moralities, laws, and the like, yea, and divinity (because it pleaseth God to apply Himself to the capacity of the simplest), that form may have use; and in natural philosophy likewise, by way of argument or satisfactory reason, Quae assensum parit operis effaeta est; but the subtlety39 of nature and operations will not be enchained in those bonds. For arguments consist of propositions, and propositions of words, and words are but the current tokens or marks of popular notions of things; which notions, if they be grossly and variably collected out of particulars, it is not the laborious40 examination either of consequences of arguments, or of the truth of propositions, that can ever correct that error, being (as the physicians speak) in the first digestion41. And, therefore, it was not without cause, that so many excellent philosophers became sceptics and academics, and denied any certainty of knowledge or comprehension; and held opinion that the knowledge of man extended only to appearances and probabilities. It is true that in Socrates it was supposed to be but a form of irony42, Scientiam dissimulando simulavit; for he used to disable his knowledge, to the end to enhance his knowledge; like the humour of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would reign43, but would not acknowledge so much. And in the later academy, which Cicero embraced, this opinion also of acatalepsia (I doubt) was not held sincerely; for that all those which excelled in copy of speech seem to have chosen that sect7, as that which was fittest to give glory to their eloquence44 and variable discourses45; being rather like progresses of pleasure than journeys to an end. But assuredly many scattered46 in both academies did hold it in subtlety and integrity. But here was their chief error: they charged the deceit upon the senses; which in my judgment (notwithstanding all their cavillations) are very sufficient to certify47 and report truth, though not always immediately, yet by comparison, by help of instrument, and by producing and urging such things as are too subtle for the sense to some effect comprehensible by the sense, and other like assistance. But they ought to have charged the deceit upon the weakness of the intellectual powers, and upon the manner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of the senses. This I speak, not to disable the mind of man, but to stir it up to seek help; for no man, be he never so cunning or practised, can make a straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which may be easily done by help of a ruler or compass.
(5) This part of invention, concerning the invention of sciences, I purpose (if God give me leave) hereafter to propound48, having digested it into two parts: whereof the one I term experientia literata, and the other interpretatio naturae; the former being but a degree and rudiment49 of the latter. But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great upon a promise.
(6) The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention; for to invent is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummon that which we already know; and the use of this invention is no other but, out of the knowledge whereof our mind is already possessed50 to draw forth51 or call before us that which may be pertinent52 to the purpose which we take into our consideration. So as to speak truly, it is no invention, but a remembrance or suggestion, with an application; which is the cause why the schools do place it after judgment, as subsequent and not precedent53. Nevertheless, because we do account it a chase as well of deer in an enclosed park as in a forest at large, and that it hath already obtained the name, let it be called invention; so as it be perceived and discerned, that the scope and end of this invention is readiness and present use of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification54 thereof.
(7) To procure55 this ready use of knowledge there are two courses, preparation and suggestion. The former of these seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge, consisting rather of diligence than of any artificial erudition. And herein Aristotle wittily56, but hurtfully, doth deride57 the sophists near his time, saying, “They did as if one that professed58 the art of shoemaking should not teach how to make up a shoe, but only exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes.” But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken59, he should be weakly customed. But our Saviour60, speaking of divine knowledge, saith, “That the kingdom of heaven is like a good householder, that bringeth forth both new and old store;” and we see the ancient writers of rhetoric61 do give it in precept62, that pleaders should have the places, whereof they have most continual use, ready handled in all the variety that may be; as that, to speak for the literal interpretation63 of the law against equity64, and contrary; and to speak for presumptions65 and inferences against testimony66, and contrary. And Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great experience, delivereth it plainly, that whatsoever67 a man shall have occasion to speak of (if he will take the pains), he may have it in effect premeditate and handled in thesi. So that when he cometh to a particular he shall have nothing to do, but to put to names, and times, and places, and such other circumstances of individuals. We see likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes; who, in regard of the great force that the entrance and access into causes hath to make a good impression, had ready framed a number of prefaces for orations68 and speeches. All which authorities and precedents69 may overweigh Aristotle’s opinion, that would have us change a rich wardrobe for a pair of shears70.
(8) But the nature of the collection of this provision or preparatory store, though it be common both to logic and rhetoric, yet having made an entry of it here, where it came first to be spoken of, I think fit to refer over the further handling of it to rhetoric.
(9) The other part of invention, which I term suggestion, doth assign and direct us to certain marks, or places, which may excite our mind to return and produce such knowledge as it hath formerly71 collected, to the end we may make use thereof. Neither is this use (truly taken) only to furnish argument to dispute, probably with others, but likewise to minister unto our judgment to conclude aright within ourselves. Neither may these places serve only to apprompt our invention, but also to direct our inquiry72. For a faculty of wise interrogating73 is half a knowledge. For as Plato saith, “Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for in a general notion; else how shall he know it when he hath found it?” And, therefore, the larger your anticipation74 is, the more direct and compendious75 is your search. But the same places which will help us what to produce of that which we know already, will also help us, if a man of experience were before us, what questions to ask; or, if we have books and authors to instruct us, what points to search and revolve76; so as I cannot report that this part of invention, which is that which the schools call topics, is deficient.
(10) Nevertheless, topics are of two sorts, general and special. The general we have spoken to; but the particular hath been touched by some, but rejected generally as inartificial and variable. But leaving the humour which hath reigned77 too much in the schools (which is, to be vainly subtle in a few things which are within their command, and to reject the rest), I do receive particular topics; that is, places or directions of invention and inquiry in every particular knowledge, as things of great use, being mixtures of logic with the matter of sciences. For in these it holdeth ars inveniendi adolescit cum inventis; for as in going of a way, we do not only gain that part of the way which is passed, but we gain the better sight of that part of the way which remaineth, so every degree of proceeding78 in a science giveth a light to that which followeth; which light, if we strengthen by drawing it forth into questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance our pursuit.
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deficient
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| adj.不足的，不充份的，有缺陷的 | |
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inventory
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| n.详细目录，存货清单 | |
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touching
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| adj.动人的，使人感伤的 | |
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defunct
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| adj.死亡的；已倒闭的 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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sect
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| n.派别，宗教，学派，派系 | |
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sects
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| n.宗派，教派( sect的名词复数 ) | |
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discoursed
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| 演说（discourse的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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discourse
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| n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述 | |
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marvel
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| vi.(at)惊叹vt.感到惊异；n.令人惊异的事 | |
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antiquity
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| n.古老；高龄；古物，古迹 | |
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consecrate
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| v.使圣化，奉…为神圣；尊崇；奉献 | |
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idols
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| 偶像( idol的名词复数 )； 受崇拜的人或物； 受到热爱和崇拜的人或物； 神像 | |
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brute
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| n.野兽，兽性 | |
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marvelled
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| v.惊奇，对…感到惊奇( marvel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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rebus
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| n.谜,画谜 | |
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raven
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| n.渡鸟，乌鸦；adj.乌亮的 | |
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pebbles
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| [复数]鹅卵石； 沙砾； 卵石，小圆石( pebble的名词复数 ) | |
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faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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induction
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| n.感应，感应现象 | |
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utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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incompetent
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| adj.无能力的，不能胜任的 | |
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fouler
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| adj.恶劣的( foul的比较级 )；邪恶的；难闻的；下流的 | |
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exalt
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| v.赞扬，歌颂，晋升，提升 | |
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traduced
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| v.诋毁( traduce的过去式和过去分词 )；诽谤；违反；背叛 | |
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attentively
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| adv.聚精会神地；周到地；谛；凝神 | |
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distilling
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| n.蒸馏（作用）v.蒸馏( distil的过去式和过去分词 )( distilled的过去分词 )；从…提取精华 | |
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contriving
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| （不顾困难地）促成某事( contrive的现在分词 )； 巧妙地策划，精巧地制造（如机器）； 设法做到 | |
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enumeration
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| n.计数，列举；细目；详表；点查 | |
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contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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conjecture
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| n./v.推测，猜测 | |
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35
sergeants
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| 警官( sergeant的名词复数 )； （美国警察）警佐； （英国警察）巡佐； 陆军（或空军）中士 | |
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inductions
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| 归纳（法）( induction的名词复数 )； （电或磁的）感应； 就职； 吸入 | |
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infancy
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| n.婴儿期；幼年期；初期 | |
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syllogism
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| n.演绎法，三段论法 | |
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subtlety
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| n.微妙，敏锐，精巧；微妙之处，细微的区别 | |
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laborious
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| adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅 | |
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digestion
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| n.消化，吸收 | |
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irony
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| n.反语，冷嘲；具有讽刺意味的事，嘲弄 | |
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reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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eloquence
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| n.雄辩；口才，修辞 | |
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discourses
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| 论文( discourse的名词复数 )； 演说； 讲道； 话语 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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certify
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| vt.证明，证实；发证书(或执照)给 | |
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48
propound
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| v.提出 | |
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rudiment
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| n.初步；初级；基本原理 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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pertinent
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| adj.恰当的；贴切的；中肯的；有关的；相干的 | |
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precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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amplification
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| n.扩大，发挥 | |
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procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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wittily
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| 机智地，机敏地 | |
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deride
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| v.嘲弄，愚弄 | |
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professed
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| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
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bespoken
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| v.预定( bespeak的过去分词 )；订（货）；证明；预先请求 | |
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saviour
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| n.拯救者，救星 | |
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rhetoric
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| n.修辞学，浮夸之言语 | |
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precept
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| n.戒律；格言 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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equity
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| n.公正，公平，（无固定利息的）股票 | |
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presumptions
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| n.假定( presumption的名词复数 )；认定；推定；放肆 | |
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testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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whatsoever
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| adv.（用于否定句中以加强语气）任何；pron.无论什么 | |
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orations
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| n.（正式仪式中的）演说，演讲( oration的名词复数 ) | |
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precedents
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| 引用单元； 范例( precedent的名词复数 )； 先前出现的事例； 前例； 先例 | |
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shears
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| n.大剪刀 | |
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formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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interrogating
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| n.询问技术v.询问( interrogate的现在分词 )；审问；（在计算机或其他机器上）查询 | |
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anticipation
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| n.预期，预料，期望 | |
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compendious
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| adj.简要的，精简的 | |
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revolve
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| vi.(使)旋转；循环出现 | |
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77
reigned
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| vi.当政，统治（reign的过去式形式） | |
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78
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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