(1) Now we pass unto the arts of judgment1, which handle the natures of proofs and demonstrations3, which as to induction4 hath a coincidence with invention; for all inductions5, whether in good or vicious form, the same action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth — all one as in the sense. But otherwise it is in proof by syllogism6, for the proof being not immediate7, but by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing, and the judgment of the consequence is another; the one exciting only, the other examining. Therefore, for the real and exact form of judgment, we refer ourselves to that which we have spoken of interpretation8 of Nature.
(2) For the other judgment by syllogism, as it is a thing most agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently9 end excellently laboured. For the nature of man doth extremely covet10 to have somewhat in his understanding fixed11 and unmovable, and as a rest and support of the mind. And, therefore, as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all motion there is some point quiescent12; and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable13 of Atlas14 (that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling) to be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conversion15 is accomplished16, so assuredly men have a desire to have an Atlas or axle-tree within to keep them from fluctuation17, which is like to a perpetual peril18 of falling. Therefore men did hasten to set down some principles about which the variety of their disputatious might turn.
(3) So, then, this art of judgment is but the reduction of propositions to principles in a middle term. The principles to be agreed by all and exempted19 from argument; the middle term to be elected at the liberty of every man’s invention; the reduction to be of two kinds, direct and inverted20: the one when the proposition is reduced to the principle, which they term a probation21 ostensive; the other, when the contradictory22 of the proposition is reduced to the contradictory of the principle, which is that which they call per incommodum, or pressing an absurdity23; the number of middle terms to be as the proposition standeth degrees more or less removed from the principle.
(4) But this art hath two several methods of doctrine24, the one by way of direction, the other by way of caution: the former frameth and setteth down a true form of consequence, by the variations and deflections from which errors and inconsequences may be exactly judged. Toward the composition and structure of which form it is incident to handle the parts thereof, which are propositions, and the parts of propositions, which are simple words. And this is that part of logic25 which is comprehended in the Analytics.
(5) The second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite use and assurance sake, discovering the more subtle forms of sophisms and illaqueations with their redargutions, which is that which is termed elenches. For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth (as Seneca maketh the comparison well) as in juggling27 feats28, which, though we know not how they are done, yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to be; yet the more subtle sort of them doth not only put a man besides his answer, but doth many times abuse his judgment.
(6) This part concerning elenches is excellently handled by Aristotle in precept29, but more excellently by Plato in example; not only in the persons of the sophists, but even in Socrates himself, who, professing30 to affirm nothing, but to infirm that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the forms of objection, fallace, and redargution. And although we have said that the use of this doctrine is for redargution, yet it is manifest the degenerate31 and corrupt32 use is for caption33 and contradiction, which passeth for a great faculty34, and no doubt is of very great advantage, though the difference be good which was made between orators35 and sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound, which hath his advantage in the race, and the other as the hare, which hath her advantage in the turn, so as it is the advantage of the weaker creature.
(7) But yet further, this doctrine of elenches hath a more ample latitude36 and extent than is perceived; namely, unto divers37 parts of knowledge, whereof some are laboured and other omitted. For first, I conceive (though it may seem at first somewhat strange) that that part which is variably referred, sometimes to logic, sometimes to metaphysic, touching38 the common adjuncts of essences, is but an elenche; for the great sophism26 of all sophisms being equivocation39 or ambiguity40 of words and phrase, specially41 of such words as are most general and intervene in every inquiry42, it seemeth to me that the true and fruitful use (leaving vain subtleties43 and speculations) of the inquiry of majority, minority, priority, posteriority, identity, diversity, possibility, act, totality, parts, existence, privation, and the like, are but wise cautions against ambiguities44 of speech. So, again, the distribution of things into certain tribes, which we call categories or predicaments, are but cautions against the confusion of definitions and divisions.
(8) Secondly45, there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of the impression, and not by the subtlety46 of the illaqueation — not so much perplexing the reason, as overruling it by power of the imagination. But this part I think more proper to handle when I shall speak of rhetoric47.
(9) But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or inquired at all, and think good to place here, as that which of all others appertaineth most to rectify48 judgment, the force whereof is such as it doth not dazzle or snare49 the understanding in some particulars, but doth more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true incidence; nay50, it is rather like an enchanted51 glass, full of superstition52 and imposture53, if it be not delivered and reduced. For this purpose, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature of the mind, beholding55 them in an example or two; as first, in that instance which is the root of all superstition, namely, that to the nature of the mind of all men it is consonant57 for the affirmative or active to affect more than the negative or privative. So that a few times hitting or presence countervails ofttimes failing or absence, as was well answered by Diagoras to him that showed him in Neptune58’s temple the great number of pictures of such as had escaped shipwreck59, and had paid their vows60 to Neptune, saying, “Advise now, you that think it folly61 to invocate Neptune in tempest.” “Yea, but,” saith Diagoras, “where are they painted that are drowned?” Let us behold56 it in another instance, namely, that the spirit of man, being of an equal and uniform substance, doth usually suppose and feign62 in nature a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth. Hence it cometh that the mathematicians63 cannot satisfy themselves except they reduce the motions of the celestial64 bodies to perfect circles, rejecting spiral lines, and labouring to be discharged of eccentrics. Hence it cometh that whereas there are many things in Nature as it were monodica, sui juris, yet the cogitations of man do feign unto them relatives, parallels, and conjugates65, whereas no such thing is; as they have feigned66 an element of fire to keep square with earth, water, and air, and the like. Nay, it is not credible67, till it be opened, what a number of fictions and fantasies the similitude of human actions and arts, together with the making of man communis mensura, have brought into natural philosophy; not much better than the heresy68 of the Anthropomorphites, bred in the cells of gross and solitary69 monks70, and the opinion of Epicurus, answerable to the same in heathenism, who supposed the gods to be of human shape. And, therefore, Velleius the Epicurean needed not to have asked why God should have adorned71 the heavens with stars, as if He had been an aedilis, one that should have set forth72 some magnificent shows or plays. For if that great Work-master had been of a human disposition73, He would have cast the stars into some pleasant and beautiful works and orders like the frets74 in the roofs of houses; whereas one can scarce find a posture54 in square, or triangle, or straight line, amongst such an infinite number, so differing a harmony there is between the spirit of man and the spirit of Nature.
(10) Let us consider again the false appearances imposed upon us by every man’s own individual nature and custom in that feigned supposition that Plato maketh of the cave; for certainly if a child were continued in a grot or cave under the earth until maturity75 of age, and came suddenly abroad, he would have strange and absurd imaginations. So, in like manner, although our persons live in the view of heaven, yet our spirits are included in the caves of our own complexions76 and customs, which minister unto us infinite errors and vain opinions if they be not recalled to examination. But hereof we have given many examples in one of the errors, or peccant humours, which we ran briefly77 over in our first book.
(11) And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied78 according to the conceit79 and capacities of the vulgar sort; and although we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well loquendum ut vulgus sentiendum ut sapientes, yet certain it is that words, as a Tartar’s bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily80 entangle81 and pervert82 the judgment. So as it is almost necessary in all controversies83 and disputations to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms, that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they concur84 with us or no. For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we are sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is, in questions and differences about words. To conclude, therefore, it must be confessed that it is not possible to divorce ourselves from these fallacies and false appearances because they are inseparable from our nature and condition of life; so yet, nevertheless, the caution of them (for all elenches, as was said, are but cautions) doth extremely import the true conduct of human judgment. The particular elenches or cautions against these three false appearances I find altogether deficient85.
(12) There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency which to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report that also deficient; which is the application of the differing kinds of proofs to the differing kinds of subjects. For there being but four kinds of demonstrations, that is, by the immediate consent of the mind or sense, by induction, by syllogism, and by congruity86, which is that which Aristotle calleth demonstration2 in orb87 or circle, and not a notioribus, every of these hath certain subjects in the matter of sciences, in which respectively they have chiefest use; and certain others, from which respectively they ought to be excluded; and the rigour and curiosity in requiring the more severe proofs in some things, and chiefly the facility in contenting ourselves with the more remiss88 proofs in others, hath been amongst the greatest causes of detriment89 and hindrance90 to knowledge. The distributions and assignations of demonstrations according to the analogy of sciences I note as deficient.
1 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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2 demonstration | |
n.表明,示范,论证,示威 | |
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3 demonstrations | |
证明( demonstration的名词复数 ); 表明; 表达; 游行示威 | |
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4 induction | |
n.感应,感应现象 | |
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5 inductions | |
归纳(法)( induction的名词复数 ); (电或磁的)感应; 就职; 吸入 | |
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6 syllogism | |
n.演绎法,三段论法 | |
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7 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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8 interpretation | |
n.解释,说明,描述;艺术处理 | |
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9 vehemently | |
adv. 热烈地 | |
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10 covet | |
vt.垂涎;贪图(尤指属于他人的东西) | |
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11 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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12 quiescent | |
adj.静止的,不活动的,寂静的 | |
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13 fable | |
n.寓言;童话;神话 | |
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14 atlas | |
n.地图册,图表集 | |
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15 conversion | |
n.转化,转换,转变 | |
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16 accomplished | |
adj.有才艺的;有造诣的;达到了的 | |
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17 fluctuation | |
n.(物价的)波动,涨落;周期性变动;脉动 | |
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18 peril | |
n.(严重的)危险;危险的事物 | |
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19 exempted | |
使免除[豁免]( exempt的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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20 inverted | |
adj.反向的,倒转的v.使倒置,使反转( invert的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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21 probation | |
n.缓刑(期),(以观后效的)察看;试用(期) | |
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22 contradictory | |
adj.反驳的,反对的,抗辩的;n.正反对,矛盾对立 | |
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23 absurdity | |
n.荒谬,愚蠢;谬论 | |
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24 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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25 logic | |
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
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26 sophism | |
n.诡辩 | |
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27 juggling | |
n. 欺骗, 杂耍(=jugglery) adj. 欺骗的, 欺诈的 动词juggle的现在分词 | |
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28 feats | |
功绩,伟业,技艺( feat的名词复数 ) | |
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29 precept | |
n.戒律;格言 | |
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30 professing | |
声称( profess的现在分词 ); 宣称; 公开表明; 信奉 | |
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31 degenerate | |
v.退步,堕落;adj.退步的,堕落的;n.堕落者 | |
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32 corrupt | |
v.贿赂,收买;adj.腐败的,贪污的 | |
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33 caption | |
n.说明,字幕,标题;v.加上标题,加上说明 | |
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34 faculty | |
n.才能;学院,系;(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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35 orators | |
n.演说者,演讲家( orator的名词复数 ) | |
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36 latitude | |
n.纬度,行动或言论的自由(范围),(pl.)地区 | |
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37 divers | |
adj.不同的;种种的 | |
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38 touching | |
adj.动人的,使人感伤的 | |
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39 equivocation | |
n.模棱两可的话,含糊话 | |
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40 ambiguity | |
n.模棱两可;意义不明确 | |
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41 specially | |
adv.特定地;特殊地;明确地 | |
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42 inquiry | |
n.打听,询问,调查,查问 | |
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43 subtleties | |
细微( subtlety的名词复数 ); 精细; 巧妙; 细微的差别等 | |
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44 ambiguities | |
n.歧义( ambiguity的名词复数 );意义不明确;模棱两可的意思;模棱两可的话 | |
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45 secondly | |
adv.第二,其次 | |
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46 subtlety | |
n.微妙,敏锐,精巧;微妙之处,细微的区别 | |
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47 rhetoric | |
n.修辞学,浮夸之言语 | |
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48 rectify | |
v.订正,矫正,改正 | |
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49 snare | |
n.陷阱,诱惑,圈套;(去除息肉或者肿瘤的)勒除器;响弦,小军鼓;vt.以陷阱捕获,诱惑 | |
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50 nay | |
adv.不;n.反对票,投反对票者 | |
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51 enchanted | |
adj. 被施魔法的,陶醉的,入迷的 动词enchant的过去式和过去分词 | |
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52 superstition | |
n.迷信,迷信行为 | |
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53 imposture | |
n.冒名顶替,欺骗 | |
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54 posture | |
n.姿势,姿态,心态,态度;v.作出某种姿势 | |
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55 beholding | |
v.看,注视( behold的现在分词 );瞧;看呀;(叙述中用于引出某人意外的出现)哎哟 | |
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56 behold | |
v.看,注视,看到 | |
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57 consonant | |
n.辅音;adj.[音]符合的 | |
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58 Neptune | |
n.海王星 | |
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59 shipwreck | |
n.船舶失事,海难 | |
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60 vows | |
誓言( vow的名词复数 ); 郑重宣布,许愿 | |
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61 folly | |
n.愚笨,愚蠢,蠢事,蠢行,傻话 | |
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62 feign | |
vt.假装,佯作 | |
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63 mathematicians | |
数学家( mathematician的名词复数 ) | |
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64 celestial | |
adj.天体的;天上的 | |
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65 conjugates | |
v.列出(动词的)变化形式( conjugate的第三人称单数 );结合,联合,熔化 | |
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66 feigned | |
a.假装的,不真诚的 | |
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67 credible | |
adj.可信任的,可靠的 | |
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68 heresy | |
n.异端邪说;异教 | |
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69 solitary | |
adj.孤独的,独立的,荒凉的;n.隐士 | |
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70 monks | |
n.修道士,僧侣( monk的名词复数 ) | |
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71 adorned | |
[计]被修饰的 | |
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72 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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73 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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74 frets | |
基质间片; 品丝(吉他等指板上定音的)( fret的名词复数 ) | |
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75 maturity | |
n.成熟;完成;(支票、债券等)到期 | |
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76 complexions | |
肤色( complexion的名词复数 ); 面色; 局面; 性质 | |
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77 briefly | |
adv.简单地,简短地 | |
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78 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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79 conceit | |
n.自负,自高自大 | |
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80 mightily | |
ad.强烈地;非常地 | |
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81 entangle | |
vt.缠住,套住;卷入,连累 | |
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82 pervert | |
n.堕落者,反常者;vt.误用,滥用;使人堕落,使入邪路 | |
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83 controversies | |
争论 | |
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84 concur | |
v.同意,意见一致,互助,同时发生 | |
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85 deficient | |
adj.不足的,不充份的,有缺陷的 | |
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86 congruity | |
n.全等,一致 | |
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87 orb | |
n.太阳;星球;v.弄圆;成球形 | |
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88 remiss | |
adj.不小心的,马虎 | |
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89 detriment | |
n.损害;损害物,造成损害的根源 | |
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90 hindrance | |
n.妨碍,障碍 | |
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