(1) Now we descend1 to that part which concerneth the illustration of tradition, comprehended in that science which we call rhetoric2, or art of eloquence3, a science excellent, and excellently well laboured. For although in true value it is inferior to wisdom (as it is said by God to Moses, when he disabled himself for want of this faculty4, “Aaron shall be thy speaker, and thou shalt be to him as God”), yet with people it is the more mighty5; for so Solomon saith, Sapiens corde appellabitur prudens, sed dulcis eloquio majora reperiet, signifying that profoundness of wisdom will help a man to a name or admiration7, but that it is eloquence that prevaileth in an active life. And as to the labouring of it, the emulation8 of Aristotle with the rhetoricians of his time, and the experience of Cicero, hath made them in their works of rhetoric exceed themselves. Again, the excellency of examples of eloquence in the orations9 of Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection of the precepts10 of eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this art; and therefore the deficiences which I shall note will rather be in some collections, which may as handmaids attend the art, than in the rules or use of the art itself.
(2) Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the roots of this science, as we have done of the rest, the duty and office of rhetoric is to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will. For we see reason is disturbed in the administration thereof by three means — by illaqueation or sophism11, which pertains12 to logic13; by imagination or impression, which pertains to rhetoric; and by passion or affection, which pertains to morality. And as in negotiation14 with others, men are wrought15 by cunning, by importunity16, and by vehemency; so in this negotiation within ourselves, men are undermined by inconsequences, solicited17 and importuned18 by impressions or observations, and transported by passions. Neither is the nature of man so unfortunately built, as that those powers and arts should have force to disturb reason, and not to establish and advance it. For the end of logic is to teach a form of argument to secure reason, and not to entrap19 it; the end of morality is to procure20 the affections to obey reason, and not to invade it; the end of rhetoric is to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to oppress it; for these abuses of arts come in but ex oblique21, for caution.
(3) And therefore it was great injustice22 in Plato, though springing out of a just hatred23 to the rhetoricians of his time, to esteem24 of rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery, that did mar25 wholesome26 meats, and help unwholesome by variety of sauces to the pleasure of the taste. For we see that speech is much more conversant27 in adorning28 that which is good than in colouring that which is evil; for there is no man but speaketh more honestly than he can do or think; and it was excellently noted29 by Thucydides, in Cleon, that because he used to hold on the bad side in causes of estate, therefore he was ever inveighing30 against eloquence and good speech, knowing that no man can speak fair of courses sordid31 and base. And therefore, as Plato said elegantly, “That virtue32, if she could be seen, would move great love and affection;” so seeing that she cannot be showed to the sense by corporal shape, the next degree is to show her to the imagination in lively representation; for to show her to reason only in subtlety33 of argument was a thing ever derided34 in Chrysippus and many of the Stoics35, who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp disputations and conclusions, which have no sympathy with the will of man.
(4) Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant36 and obedient to reason, it were true there should be no great use of persuasions37 and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and proofs; but in regard of the continual mutinies and seditious of the affections —
“Video meliora, proboque,
Deteriora sequor,”
reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions did not practise and win the imagination from the affections’ part, and contract a confederacy between the reason and imagination against the affections; for the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good, as reason doth. The difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely the present; reason beholdeth the future and sum of time. And, therefore, the present filling the imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished39; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion38 hath made things future and remote appear as present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth.
(5) We conclude, therefore, that rhetoric can be no more charged with the colouring of the worst part, than logic with sophistry40, or morality with vice41; for we know the doctrines42 of contraries are the same, though the use be opposite. It appeareth also that logic differeth from rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm — the one close, the other at large — but much more in this, that logic handleth reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. And therefore Aristotle doth wisely place rhetoric as between logic on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on the other, as participating of both; for the proofs and demonstrations43 of logic are toward all men indifferent and the same, but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric ought to differ according to the auditors:—
“Orpheus in sylvis, inter44 delphinas Arion.”
Which application in perfection of idea ought to extend so far that if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons, he should speak to them all respectively and several ways; though this politic45 part of eloquence in private speech it is easy for the greatest orators46 to want: whilst, by the observing their well-graced forms of speech, they leese the volubility of application; and therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend this to better inquiry47, not being curious whether we place it here or in that part which concerneth policy.
(6) Now therefore will I descend to the deficiences, which, as I said, are but attendances; and first, I do not find the wisdom and diligence of Aristotle well pursued, who began to make a collection of the popular signs and colours of good and evil, both simple and comparative, which are as the sophisms of rhetoric (as I touched before). For example —
“Sophisma.
Quod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum.
Redargutio.
Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.”
Malum est, malum est (inquit emptor): sed cum recesserit, tum gloriabitur! The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three — one, that there be but a few of many; another, that there elenches are not annexed48; and the third, that he conceived but a part of the use of them: for their use is not only in probation49, but much more in impression. For many forms are equal in signification which are differing in impression, as the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharp and that which is flat, though the strength of the percussion50 be the same. For there is no man but will be a little more raised by hearing it said, “Your enemies will be glad of this” —
“Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridae.”
than by hearing it said only, “This is evil for you.”
(7) Secondly51, I do resume also that which I mentioned before, touching52 provision or preparatory store for the furniture of speech and readiness of invention, which appeareth to be of two sorts: the one in resemblance to a shop of pieces unmade up, the other to a shop of things ready made up; both to be applied53 to that which is frequent and most in request. The former of these I will call antitheta, and the latter formulae.
(8) Antitheta are theses argued pro6 et contra, wherein men may be more large and laborious54; but (in such as are able to do it) to avoid prolixity55 of entry, I wish the seeds of the several arguments to be cast up into some brief and acute sentences, not to be cited, but to be as skeins or bottoms of thread, to be unwinded at large when they come to be used; supplying authorities and examples by reference.
“Pro verbis legis.
Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quae recedit a litera:—
Cum receditur a litera, judex transit56 in legislatorem.
Pro sententia legis.
Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur singula.”
(9) Formulae are but decent and apt passages or conveyances57 of speech, which may serve indifferently for differing subjects; as of preface, conclusion, digression, transition, excusation, &c. For as in buildings there is great pleasure and use in the well casting of the staircases, entries, doors, windows, and the like; so in speech, the conveyances and passages are of special ornament58 and effect.
“A conclusion in a deliberative. So may we redeem59 the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences future.”
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descend
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| vt./vi.传下来，下来，下降 | |
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rhetoric
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| n.修辞学，浮夸之言语 | |
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eloquence
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| n.雄辩；口才，修辞 | |
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faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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pro
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| n.赞成，赞成的意见，赞成者 | |
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admiration
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| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
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emulation
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| n.竞争；仿效 | |
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orations
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| n.（正式仪式中的）演说，演讲( oration的名词复数 ) | |
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precepts
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| n.规诫，戒律，箴言( precept的名词复数 ) | |
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sophism
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| n.诡辩 | |
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pertains
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| 关于( pertain的第三人称单数 )； 有关； 存在； 适用 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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wrought
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| v.引起；以…原料制作；运转；adj.制造的 | |
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importunity
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| n.硬要，强求 | |
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solicited
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| v.恳求( solicit的过去式和过去分词 )；（指娼妇）拉客；索求；征求 | |
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importuned
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| v.纠缠，向（某人）不断要求( importune的过去式和过去分词 )；（妓女）拉（客） | |
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entrap
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| v.以网或陷阱捕捉，使陷入圈套 | |
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procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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oblique
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| adj.斜的，倾斜的，无诚意的，不坦率的 | |
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injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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esteem
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| n.尊敬，尊重；vt.尊重，敬重；把…看作 | |
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mar
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| vt.破坏，毁坏，弄糟 | |
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wholesome
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| adj.适合；卫生的；有益健康的；显示身心健康的 | |
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conversant
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| adj.亲近的，有交情的，熟悉的 | |
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adorning
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| 修饰，装饰物 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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inveighing
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| v.猛烈抨击，痛骂，谩骂( inveigh的现在分词 ) | |
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31
sordid
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| adj.肮脏的，不干净的，卑鄙的，暗淡的 | |
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32
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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subtlety
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| n.微妙，敏锐，精巧；微妙之处，细微的区别 | |
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derided
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| v.取笑，嘲笑( deride的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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stoics
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| 禁欲主义者，恬淡寡欲的人，不以苦乐为意的人( stoic的名词复数 ) | |
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pliant
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| adj.顺从的；可弯曲的 | |
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persuasions
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| n.劝说，说服（力）( persuasion的名词复数 )；信仰 | |
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persuasion
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| n.劝说；说服；持有某种信仰的宗派 | |
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vanquished
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| v.征服( vanquish的过去式和过去分词 )；战胜；克服；抑制 | |
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40
sophistry
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| n.诡辩 | |
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41
vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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42
doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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43
demonstrations
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| 证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威 | |
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inter
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| v.埋葬 | |
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politic
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| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
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orators
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| n.演说者，演讲家( orator的名词复数 ) | |
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47
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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48
annexed
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| [法] 附加的，附属的 | |
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49
probation
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| n.缓刑(期)，(以观后效的)察看；试用(期) | |
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percussion
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| n.打击乐器；冲突，撞击；震动，音响 | |
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51
secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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touching
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| adj.动人的，使人感伤的 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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laborious
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| adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅 | |
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prolixity
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| n.冗长，罗嗦 | |
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transit
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| n.经过，运输；vt.穿越，旋转；vi.越过 | |
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conveyances
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| n.传送( conveyance的名词复数 )；运送；表达；运输工具 | |
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ornament
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| v.装饰，美化；n.装饰，装饰物 | |
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redeem
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| v.买回，赎回，挽回，恢复，履行（诺言等） | |
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