Whether Virtu or Fortune was the Greater Cause for the Empire which the Romans Acquired
Many [authors], among whom is that most serious writer Plutarch, have had the opinion that the Roman people in acquiring the Empire were favored more by Fortune than by Virtu. And among other reasons which he cities, he says that, by the admission of that people, it can be shown that they ascribed all their victories to Fortune, as they had built more temples to Fortune than to any other God. And it seems that Livius joined in this opinion, for he rarely makes any Roman speak where he recounts [of] Virtu, without adding Fortune. Which thing I do not in any way agree with, nor do I believe also that it can be sustained. For if no other Republic will ever be found which has made the progress that Rome had, then I note that no Republic will ever be found which has been organized to be able to make such conquests as Rome. For it was the virtu of the armies that enabled her to acquire that Empire; and the order of proceeding1 and her own institutions founded by her first Legislator that enabled her to maintain the acquisitions, as will be narrated2 below in further discussion.
These [authors] also say that the fact of not ever engaging in two most important wars at the same time was due to the fortune and not the virtu of the Roman people; for they did riot engage in war with the Latins until they had so beaten the Samnites that the Romans had to engage in a war in defense3 of them: They did not combat with the Tuscans until they first subjugated4 the Latins, and had by frequent defeats almost completely enervated5 the Samnites: So that if these two powers had joined together (while they were fresh), without doubt it can easily be conjectured6 that the ruin of the Roman Republic would have ensued.
But however this thing may have been, it never did happen that they engaged in two most powerful wars at the same time; rather it appeared always that at the beginning of one the other would be extinguished, or in extinguishing one another would arise. Which is easily seen from the succession of wars engaged in by them; for, leaving aside the one they were engaged in before Rome was taken by the French [Gauls], it is seen that while they fought against the Equii and the Volscians, no other people (while these people were powerful) rose up against them. When these were subdued7 there arose the war against the Samnites, and although before that war was ended the Latin people rebelled against the Romans with their armies in subduing8 the insolence9 of the Latins. When these were subdued, the war against the Samnites sprung up again. When the Samnites were beaten through the many defeats inflicted10 on their forces, there arose the war against the Tuscans; which being composed, the Samnites again rose up when Pyrrhus crossed over into Italy, and as soon as he was beaten and driven back to Greece, the first war with the Carthaginians was kindled11: and that war was hardly finished when all the Gauls from all sides of the Alps conspired12 against the Romans, but they were defeated with the greatest massacre13 between Popolonia and Pisa where the tower of San Vincenti stands today. After this war was finished, they did not have any war of much importance for a space of twenty years, for they did not fight with any others except the Ligurians and the remnants of the Gauls who were in Lombardy. And thus they remained until there arose the second Carthaginian war, which kept Italy occupied for sixteen years. When this war ended with the greatest glory, there arose the Macedonian war; [and] after this was finished there came that of Antiochus and Asia. After this victory, there did not remain in all the world either a Prince or a Republic that could, by itself or all together, oppose the Roman forces.
But whoever examines the succession of these wars, prior to that last victory, and the manner in which they were conducted, will see mixed with Fortune a very great Virtu and Prudence14. So that if one should examine the cause of that [good] fortune, he will easily find it, for it is a most certain thing that as a Prince or a People arrives at so great a reputation, that any neighboring Princes or Peoples by themselves are afraid to assault him, and he has no fear of them, it will always happen that none of them will ever assault him except from necessity; so that it will almost be at the election of that powerful one to make war upon any of those neighbors as appears [advantageous] to him, and to quiet the others by his industry. These are quieted easily in part because they have respect for his power, and in part because they are deceived by those means which he used to put them to sleep: and other powerful ones who are distant and have no commerce with him, will look upon this as a remote thing which does not pertain15 to them. In which error they remain until the conflagration16 arrives next to them, for which, when it comes, they have no remedy to extinguish it except with their own forces, which then will not be enough as he has become most powerful.
I will leave to one side how the Samnites remained to see the Volscians and the Equii conquered by the Romans, and so as not to be too prolix17 I will make use of the Carthaginians who were of great power and of great reputation when the Romans were fighting with the Samnites and Tuscans; for they already held all Africa, Sardinia and Sicily, and had dominion18 in part of Spain. Which power of theirs, together with their being distant from the confines of the Roman people, caused them never to think of assaulting them, nor of succoring19 the Samnites and Tuscans; rather it made them do as is done in any power that grows, allying themselves with them [the Romans] in their favor and seeking their friendship. Nor did they see before this error was made, that the Romans having subdued all the peoples [placed] between them and the Carthaginians, begun to combat them for the Empire of Sicily and Spain. The same thing happened to the Gauls as to the Carthaginians, and also to Philip King of Macedonia and to Antiochus; and everyone of them believed (while the Roman people were occupied with others) that the others would overcome them, and then it would be time either by peace or war to defend themselves from [the Romans]. So that I believe that the [good] Fortune which the Romans had in these parts would be had by all those Princes who would proceed as the Romans and who would have that same Virtu as they had.
It would be well here in connection with this subject to show the course held by Roman people in entering the Provinces of others, of which we have talked about at length in our treatment of Principalities [Treatise on the Prince], for there we have debated this matter widely. I will only say this briefly20, that they have always endeavored to have some friend in these new provinces who should be as a ladder or door to let them climb in, both to let them enter and as a means of keeping it; as was seen, that by means of the Capuans they entered Samnium, by means of the Camertines into Tuscany, by the Mamertines into Sicily, by the Saguntines into Spain, by Massinissa into Africa, by the Aetolians into Greece, by Eumences and other Princes into Asia, and by the Massilians and the Aeduans into Gaul. And thus they never lacked similar supports, both in order to be able to facilitate their enterprises of their acquiring provinces and in holding them. Which those people who observed them saw that they had less need of Fortune, than those people who do not make good observers. And so as to enable everyone to know better how much more Virtu enabled them to acquire that Empire than did Fortune, in the following chapter we will discuss the kind of people they had to combat and how obstinate21 they were in defending their liberty.
1 proceeding | |
n.行动,进行,(pl.)会议录,学报 | |
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2 narrated | |
v.故事( narrate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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3 defense | |
n.防御,保卫;[pl.]防务工事;辩护,答辩 | |
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4 subjugated | |
v.征服,降伏( subjugate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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5 enervated | |
adj.衰弱的,无力的v.使衰弱,使失去活力( enervate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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6 conjectured | |
推测,猜测,猜想( conjecture的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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7 subdued | |
adj. 屈服的,柔和的,减弱的 动词subdue的过去式和过去分词 | |
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8 subduing | |
征服( subdue的现在分词 ); 克制; 制服; 色变暗 | |
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9 insolence | |
n.傲慢;无礼;厚颜;傲慢的态度 | |
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10 inflicted | |
把…强加给,使承受,遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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11 kindled | |
(使某物)燃烧,着火( kindle的过去式和过去分词 ); 激起(感情等); 发亮,放光 | |
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12 conspired | |
密谋( conspire的过去式和过去分词 ); 搞阴谋; (事件等)巧合; 共同导致 | |
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13 massacre | |
n.残杀,大屠杀;v.残杀,集体屠杀 | |
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14 prudence | |
n.谨慎,精明,节俭 | |
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15 pertain | |
v.(to)附属,从属;关于;有关;适合,相称 | |
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16 conflagration | |
n.建筑物或森林大火 | |
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17 prolix | |
adj.罗嗦的;冗长的 | |
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18 dominion | |
n.统治,管辖,支配权;领土,版图 | |
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19 succoring | |
v.给予帮助( succor的现在分词 ) | |
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20 briefly | |
adv.简单地,简短地 | |
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21 obstinate | |
adj.顽固的,倔强的,不易屈服的,较难治愈的 | |
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