Is it better, fearing to Be Assaulted, to carry out or await War
I have heard from men much practiced in the things of war some time discuss whether, if there are two Princes of almost equal strength, if one more stalwart has declared war against the other, what would be the better proceeding1 for the other, either to await the enemy within his own boundaries, or to go out to meet him in his house and assault him. And I have heard reasons cited on every side. And those who defend the going out to assault the other, cite the counsel that Croesus gave to Cyrus when, having arrived at the confines of the Messagates to make war against them, their Queen Tamiri sent to say that they should select which of the two proceedings2 they wanted, either to enter her Kingdom where she would await him, or that he want her to come out to meet him: And the matter coming under discussion, Croesus, against the opinion of the others, said that he would go to meet her, saying that if he should vanquish3 her at a distance from her kingdom, he would not be able to take away her kingdom because she would have time to recover; but if he should vanquish her within her confines he could follow her in flight and, by not giving her time to recover, could take away her State from her. He also cites the counsel that Hannibal gave Antiochus when that king planned to make war against the Romans, where he showed that the Romans could not be beaten except in Italy, for there the others could avail themselves of the arms and the wealth of their friends; but whoever would combat them outside Italy and would leave Italy free to them, he would leave them that font which would never lack life in supplying strength where it was needed: and he concluded that Rome could be taken from the Romans easier than the Empire, and Italy before the other provinces. He also cites Agatocles, who, not being able to sustain the war at home, assaulted the Carthaginians who were waging it against him, and reduced them to ask for peace. He cites Scipio, who, to lift the war from Italy, assaulted Africa.
Those who speak to the contrary say that he who wants to inflict4 an evil on the enemy will draw him away from home. They cite the Athenians, who, as long as they made war convenient to their home, remained superior, but that when they went a distance with their armies into Sicily, lost their liberty. They cite the poetic5 fables7 where it is shown that Anteus, King of Libya, being assaulted by Hercules the Egyptian, was insuperable as long as he awaited him within the confines of his own kingdom, but as soon as he went off a distance, through the astuteness8 of Hercules, lost the State and his life. Whence a place is given to the fable6 of Anteus who, when [thrown] on the ground, recovered his strength from his mother which was the earth, and that Hercules, becoming aware of this, lifted him high [and] off the ground. They also cite modern judges. Everyone knows that Ferrando, King of Naples, was held to be a most wise Prince in his time, and when two years before his death, news came that the King of France, Charles VIII, wanted to come to assault him, after he had made preparations, but fell sick, and as he was approaching death, among other advices he left to his son Alfonso, was that he should await the enemy inside the Kingdom, and for nothing in thy world to withdraw his forces outside of his State, but should await him entirely9 within all his borders. Which [advice] was not observed by him, but sending an army into the Romagna, without a fight, lost it and the State. In addition to the instances described, the reasons that are cited in favor of every [both] side are: That he who assaults comes with more spirit than he who awaits, which makes the army more confident. In addition to this, many advantages are taken away from the enemy to be able to avail himself of his resources, [and] he will not be able to avail himself of those from his subjects who have been plundered10; and as the enemy is in his house, the Lord is constrained11 to have more regard in extracting money from them and in overworking them, so that that font comes to dry up, as Hannibal says, which makes him able to sustain the war. In addition to this, his solders12, because they find themselves in the countries of others, are more necessitated13 to fight, and that necessity makes virtu, as we have several times said.
On the other hand, it is said that in awaiting the enemy one waits with many advantages, for without any inconvenience you can cause great inconveniences of provisions and of every other thing which an army needs: You can better impede14 his designs because of the greater knowledge of the country you have than he: You can meet him with more strength because of being able to unite [concentrate] [your forces] easily, while he cannot take his all away from home: You can (if defeated) recover easily, as much because much can be saved of your army having places of refuge near, as well as reinforcements do not have to come from a distance, so that you come to risk all your forces but not all your fortune; but taking yourself to a distance you risk all your fortune but not all your strength. And there have been some who, in order better to weaken their enemy, have allowed him to enter several days [march] into their country and to take many Towns, so that by leaving garrisons15 everywhere his army is weakened, and then they are able to combat him the more easily.
But to say now what I think, I believe that this distinction ought to be made: either I have my country armed like the Romans and as the Swiss have, or I have it disarmed16 like the Carthaginians, and as have the Kings of France and the Italians. In this [latter] case the enemy ought to be kept distant from home, for your virtu being in money and not in men, whenever that [money] may be impeded17 to you, you are lost, and nothing will impede it to you as war at home. As an example, there are the Carthaginians, who, as long as they were undisturbed at home with their revenues, could make war against the Romans, but when they were assaulted [in their own country] they were unable to resist [even] Agathocles. The Florentines did not have any remedy against Castruccio, Lord of Lucca, because he waged war against them at home, so that they were obliged to give themselves (in order to be defended) to King Robert of Naples. But after the death of Castruccio, those same Florentines had the courage to assault the Duke of Milan in his home [territory] and work to take away his Kingdom. As much virtu as they showed in distant wars, just so much baseness [did they show] in nearby ones. But when Kingdoms are armed as Rome was armed and as the Swiss are, the more difficult are they to overcome the nearer you are to them. For these bodies [states] can unite more forces to resist an attack [impetus] than they are able to assault others. Nor am I moved in this case by the authority of Hannibal, because his passion and his interests make him say thusly to Antiochus. For if the Romans had experienced in Gaul three such defeats in so great a space of time as they had in Italy from Hannibal, without doubt they would have been beaten; for they would not have availed themselves of the remnants of the armies as they did in Italy, [and] could not have reorganized them with the same ease, nor could they have resisted the enemy with that same strength as they were able to. It has never been found that they ever sent outside armies of more than fifty thousand men in order to assault a province: but to defend themselves at home against the Gauls after the first Punic war, they put eighteen hundred thousand men under arms. Nor could they have put to rout18 those [Gauls] in Lombardy as they routed them in Tuscany, for they could not have led so great a force against so great a number of enemies at so great a distance, nor fight them with such advantage. The Cimbrians routed a Roman army in Germany; nor did the Romans have a remedy. But when they [Cimbrians] came into Italy and they [Romans] were able to put all their forces together, they destroyed them [Cimbrians]. The Swiss are. easily beaten when away from home where they cannot send more than thirty or forty thousand men, but it is very difficult to beat them at home where they are able to gather together a hundred thousand.
I conclude again, therefore, that that Prince who has his people armed and organized for war should always await a powerful and dangerous war [enemy] at home and not go out to meet it. But that [Prince] who has his subjects unarmed and the country unaccustomed to war, should always keep it as distant as he can. And thus one and the other (each in his own manner) will defend himself better.
1 proceeding | |
n.行动,进行,(pl.)会议录,学报 | |
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2 proceedings | |
n.进程,过程,议程;诉讼(程序);公报 | |
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3 vanquish | |
v.征服,战胜;克服;抑制 | |
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4 inflict | |
vt.(on)把…强加给,使遭受,使承担 | |
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5 poetic | |
adj.富有诗意的,有诗人气质的,善于抒情的 | |
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6 fable | |
n.寓言;童话;神话 | |
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7 fables | |
n.寓言( fable的名词复数 );神话,传说 | |
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8 astuteness | |
n.敏锐;精明;机敏 | |
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9 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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10 plundered | |
掠夺,抢劫( plunder的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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11 constrained | |
adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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12 solders | |
n.焊料,焊锡( solder的名词复数 )v.(使)焊接,焊合( solder的第三人称单数 ) | |
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13 necessitated | |
使…成为必要,需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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14 impede | |
v.妨碍,阻碍,阻止 | |
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15 garrisons | |
守备部队,卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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16 disarmed | |
v.裁军( disarm的过去式和过去分词 );使息怒 | |
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17 impeded | |
阻碍,妨碍,阻止( impede的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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18 rout | |
n.溃退,溃败;v.击溃,打垮 | |
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