That Acquisitions in Republics not well Organized and that do not proceed according to Roman Virtu, are the ruin and not the Exaltation of them
This opinion contrary to the truth, founded upon those bad examples that have been introduced by these corrupt1 centuries of ours, causes men not to think of deviating2 from their accustomed habits. Would it have been possible to persuade an Italian of thirty years ago that ten thousand infantry3 could have attacked, in an open plain, ten thousand cavalry4 and as many more infantry, and with these not only to fight them, but to defeat them, as is seen in the example at Novara given by us many times? And although histories are full [of such examples], yet they would not have believed it; and if they had believed it, they would have said that in these times one is better armed, and that a squadron of men at arms would be more adept5 at charging a rock than a body of infantry: and thus with these erroneous arguments their judgment6 was corrupted7, nor have they considered that Lucullus with few infantry routed one hundred and fifty thousand cavalry of [King] Tigranes, and that among those horsemen was a kind of cavalry entirely8 similar to our men at arms. And thus that fallacy was uncovered by the example of the Ultramontane forces: And as that which is narrated9 in histories is seen to be true in regard to infantry, so also ought all the other ancient institutions to be believed to be true and useful. And if this were believed, the Republics and Princes would have erred10 less, would have been stronger in opposing the attack that might come upon them, they would not have put their hope in flight, and those who had the government in their hands would have known better how to direct the manner of aggrandizement11 or the manner of preservation12; and they would have believed that for the city to increase its inhabitants, to make associations for themselves and not subjects, to send colonies to guard the acquired countries, to make capital of the plunder13, to subdue14 the enemy by incursions and engagements, and by sieges, to keep the public rich, the private citizen poor, to maintain military exercises with the greatest zeal15, these are the ways to make a Republic great and to acquire Empire. And if these means of expanding did not please them, they would consider that acquisitions by any other means are the ruin of a Republic; and they would place a restraint to all ambition, regulating the internal affairs of the City well with laws and other customs, prohibiting conquests, and thinking only of defending themselves, and to keep the defenses well organized; as do the Republics of Germany, who, in this manner, live and have lived for a long time.
None the less (as I have said another time when discussing the difference that existed between being organized for conquest and being organized for preservation) it is impossible that a Republic succeeds in remaining quiet and enjoy its liberty and her limited confines; for even if she does not molest16 others, she will be molested17: and from being molested there will arise the will and desire for conquest: and even if she should not have any outside enemies, she would find some at home, as it appears necessary to occur to all great Cities. And if the Republics of Germany could live in this fashion, and have been able to endure a long time, it arises from certain conditions that exist in that country which are not found elsewhere, without which they could not have maintained such a manner of living. That part of Germany of which I speak was subject to the Roman Empire, as was France and Spain: but when the decline of the Empire came afterwards, and the rule of that Empire reduced in that Province, the more powerful Cities begun (according to the weakness or necessity of the Emperors) to make themselves free, ransoming18 themselves from the Empire by reserving a small annual rent to it: so that little by little all those Cities which were held directly by the Emperor, and were not subject to any Prince, ransomed19 themselves in similar fashion. There occurred in these same times when these Cities were ransoming themselves, that certain Communities subject to the Duke of Austria rebelled against him, among which were Fribourg, the Swiss, and other like, which prospering20 from the beginning, gradually expanded little by little, that they did not return under the yoke21 of Austria, and became feared by their neighbors; and these are those whom we call Swiss. And therefore this Province is divided between the Swiss, Republics which they call Free Towns, Princes, and the Emperor. And the reason that among such a diversity of forms of government wars do not arise, or if they do arise they do not last long, is that this shadow of an Emperor, who, although he has no power, none the less he has so much reputation among them that he is their conciliator, and with his authority by interposing himself as a mediator22, quickly extinguishes all trouble. And the major and longer wars that have occurred have been those that took place between the Swiss and the Duke of Austria: and although for many years past the Emperor and the Duke of Austria have been the same person, yet he has never been able to overcome the audacity23 of the Swiss, where there has never been a means of accord except by force: Nor has the rest of Germany given him much help, as much because the Communities do not want to injure those who want to live free as they do, as because those Princes [are unable to aid him] part of whom cannot because they are poor, part do not want to because they envy his power. These Communities therefore can live contentedly24 with their small dominions25 because they have no reason (in respect to the Imperial authority) of desiring a greater one: They can live united within their walls because they have an enemy nearby and who would take the opportunity to occupy them whenever they should have a discord26. If this Province was constituted otherwise, it would behoove27 them to seek to expand and break their quiet existence.
And because elsewhere such conditions do not exist, this way of living cannot be adopted, and it is necessary either to expand by means of leagues, or to expand as the Romans did: And whoever governs otherwise seeks not his life, but his death and ruin, for in a thousand ways and for many reasons, the acquisitions are harmful; for he may very well extend his Empire, but not power; and whoever acquires Empire and not power together, comes to ruin. Whoever impoverishes28 himself in war cannot acquire power, even though he is victorious29, for he puts in more than he draws out of the acquisitions; as the Venetians and Florentines have done, who have been much weaker when the one had Lombardy and the other Tuscany, than they were when the one was content with the [dominion of the] sea, and the other with six miles of boundaries. For all of this resulted from their having wanted to acquire but not to have known the means to do so: and they merit so much more blame as they had less excuse, having seen the methods which the Romans employed, and having been able to follow their example, while the Romans, without any example, through their prudence30, knew how to find it by themselves. In addition to this, acquisitions sometimes do no little damage to any well ordered Republic when they acquire a City or a Province full of luxury, where those [indolent] habits can be picked up through intercourse31 they have with them, as happened to Rome first in the acquisition of Capua, and afterwards also to Hannibal. And if Capua had been further distant from the City [of Rome], and if the errors of the soldiers had not have prompt remedy, or if Rome had been in any part corrupted, that acquisition without doubt would have been the ruin of the Roman Republic: And Titus Livius bears witness of this with these words; Capua the instrument of all pleasures, the least conducive32 to military discipline, turned the spirit of the military away from the memory of their country. And truly similar Cities or Provinces avenge33 themselves against their conquerors34 without a fight and without bloodshed; for by transferring to them their own bad habits they expose them to being conquered by whoever assaults them. And Juvenal in his Satires35 could not have better understood this part, when he says that, because of the acquisitions of foreign lands, foreign customs had entered the breasts of the Romans, and in exchange for parsimony36 and other very excellent virtus, gluttony and luxury dwell there, and will avenge the conquered world. If, therefore, the conquest was to be pernicious to the Romans in the times when they proceeded with so much prudence and so much virtu, what then would it be to those who deviate37 from their methods? And what would it be, if in addition to the other errors they make (which have been discussed at length above), they avail themselves of mercenary or auxiliary38 soldiers? Whence often those injuries result which will be mentioned in the following chapter.
1 corrupt | |
v.贿赂,收买;adj.腐败的,贪污的 | |
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2 deviating | |
v.偏离,越轨( deviate的现在分词 ) | |
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3 infantry | |
n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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4 cavalry | |
n.骑兵;轻装甲部队 | |
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5 adept | |
adj.老练的,精通的 | |
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6 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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7 corrupted | |
(使)败坏( corrupt的过去式和过去分词 ); (使)腐化; 引起(计算机文件等的)错误; 破坏 | |
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8 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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9 narrated | |
v.故事( narrate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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10 erred | |
犯错误,做错事( err的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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11 aggrandizement | |
n.增大,强化,扩大 | |
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12 preservation | |
n.保护,维护,保存,保留,保持 | |
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13 plunder | |
vt.劫掠财物,掠夺;n.劫掠物,赃物;劫掠 | |
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14 subdue | |
vt.制服,使顺从,征服;抑制,克制 | |
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15 zeal | |
n.热心,热情,热忱 | |
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16 molest | |
vt.骚扰,干扰,调戏 | |
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17 molested | |
v.骚扰( molest的过去式和过去分词 );干扰;调戏;猥亵 | |
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18 ransoming | |
付赎金救人,赎金( ransom的现在分词 ) | |
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19 ransomed | |
付赎金救人,赎金( ransom的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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20 prospering | |
成功,兴旺( prosper的现在分词 ) | |
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21 yoke | |
n.轭;支配;v.给...上轭,连接,使成配偶 | |
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22 mediator | |
n.调解人,中介人 | |
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23 audacity | |
n.大胆,卤莽,无礼 | |
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24 contentedly | |
adv.心满意足地 | |
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25 dominions | |
统治权( dominion的名词复数 ); 领土; 疆土; 版图 | |
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26 discord | |
n.不和,意见不合,争论,(音乐)不和谐 | |
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27 behoove | |
v.理应;有益于 | |
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28 impoverishes | |
v.使(某人)贫穷( impoverish的第三人称单数 );使(某物)贫瘠或恶化 | |
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29 victorious | |
adj.胜利的,得胜的 | |
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30 prudence | |
n.谨慎,精明,节俭 | |
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31 intercourse | |
n.性交;交流,交往,交际 | |
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32 conducive | |
adj.有益的,有助的 | |
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33 avenge | |
v.为...复仇,为...报仇 | |
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34 conquerors | |
征服者,占领者( conqueror的名词复数 ) | |
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35 satires | |
讽刺,讥讽( satire的名词复数 ); 讽刺作品 | |
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36 parsimony | |
n.过度节俭,吝啬 | |
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37 deviate | |
v.(from)背离,偏离 | |
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38 auxiliary | |
adj.辅助的,备用的 | |
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