And it does not appear proper to me to omit the discussion of Conspiracies, being a matter of so much danger to Princes and Private Citizens. For it is seen that many more Princes have lost their lives and States through them, than by open war. For it is conceded only to a few to be able to make open war against a Prince, but the ability to conspire2 against them is conceded to everyone. On the other hand, private citizens do not enter in an enterprise more perilous4 nor more foolhardy than this, as it is difficult and most dangerous in all of its parts. Whence it happens that many are attempted, and very few have the desired ending. So that, therefore, Princes may learn to guard themselves from these dangers, and that Private Citizens may less rashly engage in them, and rather may learn to live contentedly6 under the Rule that has been assigned to them by chance and by their state, I shall speak widely, not omitting any notable case, in documenting the one and the other. And truly that sentence of Cornelius Tacitus is golden, which says that men have to honor things past but obey the present, and ought to desire good Princes, but tolerate the ones they have. And truly, whoever does otherwise, most of the time will ruin himself and his country.
We ought, therefore, (in entering on this matter) to consider first against whom conspiracies are made, and we will find them to be made either against a country or against a Prince. It is of these two that I want us to discuss at present; for those which are made to give a town over to the enemy who besiege7 it, or that have some reason similar to this, have been talked about above sufficiently8. And in this first part we shall treat of that against a Prince, and first we will examine the reasons for it, which are many, but there is one which is more important than all the others: and this is his being hated by the general public; for in the case of that Prince who has aroused this universal hatred9, it is reasonable [to suppose] that there are some particular individuals who have been injured by him more [then others] and who desire to avenge10 themselves. This desire of theirs is increased by that universal ill disposition11 that they see is aroused against him. A Prince ought therefore to avoid these public charges, but I do not want to talk here (having treated of this elsewhere) of what he should do to avoid them. For by guarding himself against this [hatred], the simple offenses13 against particular individuals will make less war against him: One, because rarely is a man met who thinks so much of an injury that he will put himself in so much danger to avenge it: The other, even if they should be of a mind and power to do so, they are held back by that universal benevolence14 that they see the Prince to have. Injuries that happen to an individual are of Possessions [taking them from him], of Blood [physical injury], or of Honor. Of those of Blood, threats are most dangerous, and there is no peril3 in the execution, because he who is dead cannot think of vengeance15, and those who remain alive most of the time leave such thoughts to the dead: but he who is threatened, and sees himself constrained16 by necessity either to act or to suffer, becomes a most dangerous man for the Prince, as we shall relate in detail in its place. Outside of this necessity, those [injuries] of Possession and Honor, are matters that harm men more than any other offense12, and against which the Prince ought to guard himself, for he can never despoil17 one so much that he does not leave a mind obstinate18 to vengeance. And of [injuries] of honor, that are inflicted20 on men, that against their women is most important, and after that, insult to their person. This [kind of injury] armed Pausanias against Phillip of Macedonia: this has armed many others against many other Princes: and in our times, Julio Belanti would not have set in motion a conspiracy21 against Pandolfo, Tyrant22 of Siena, except that the latter had given him a daughter for his wife, and then took her away, as we will relate in its place. The major cause that made the Pazzi conspire against the Medici, was the inheritance of Giovanni Borromei, which was taken from the former by the latter.
There is another reason, and a very great one, which makes men conspire against a Prince, [and] that is the desire to liberate23 the country which has been occupied by him. This reason moved Brutus and Cassius against Caesar: this moved many others against the Falari, the Dionysii, and other occupiers of their countries. Nor can any Tyrant guard himself from this disposition, except by giving up the Tyrancy. And because none are found who will do this, few are found who do not come to an evil end; whence there arose this verse of Juvenal’s:
Few kings descend24 to the family place of Ceres
Without wounds and slaughter25, and in this way tyrants26 die.
The dangers incurred27 in Conspiracies (as I said above) are great, being incurred at all times: for in such cases there is danger run in plotting it, in its execution, and after it has been executed. Those who conspire may be alone, or may be more than one. The one cannot be said to be a Conspiracy, but is a firm disposition rising in a man to kill the Prince. This alone, of the three dangers that Conspiracies run, lacks the first, because it does not carry any danger before the execution; since no others have his secret, there is no danger that his design will be carried to the ears of the Prince. Such a decision [plot] can be made by any man, of whatever sort, small or great, noble or ignoble28, familiar or not, familiar with the Prince: for it is permitted to everyone at some time to talk to him, and to him who is permitted to talk it is allowed to give vent29 to his feelings. Pausanias, of whom was spoken at another place, killed Phillip of Macedonia who was going to the Temple surrounded by a thousand armed men, and between his son and son-in-law: but that man was a Noble and known to the Prince. A poor and abject31 Spaniard stabbed King Ferrando of Spain in the neck: the wound was not mortal, but from this it is seen that that man had the courage and opportunity to do it. A Turkish Dervish priest drew a scimitar on Bajazet, the father of the present Grand Turk: he did not wound him, but he too had the courage and the opportunity to have done it, if he wanted to. Of these spirits thusly constituted, I believe many could be found who would do such a thing (as there is no danger or punishment in wanting to do so) but few who do it. But of those who do, there are none or very few who are not killed in the deed.
But let us go from these plots by single individuals, and let us come to the Conspiracies formed by the many. I say that in history it is to be found that all the conspiracies were made by great men, or those most familiar with the Prince: for others, unless they are completely mad, are not able to conspire, that men of weak condition and not familiar with the Prince lack all that hope and opportunities that are needed for the execution of a conspiracy: First, weak men cannot be sure of the faith of accomplices32, as no one will enter into their plot without having those hopes which cause men to expose themselves to great dangers, so that as [the conspirators33] are increased to two or three persons, they find an accuser and ruin them: but even if they were so lucky that such an accuser would not be found, they are surrounded by such difficulties in the execution (from not having an easy access to the Prince) that it is impossible that they are not ruined in its execution. For if great men and those who have easy access are oppressed by those difficulties that will be described below, it will happen that to the others those difficulties will increase without end. Men, therefore, (because where life and property are at stake, they are not all insane) when they see themselves weak guard themselves from them; and when they have cause for harming a Prince, attend to vilifying35 him, and wait for those who are more powerful than they who will avenge them. And if it should ever be found that any such as these should have attempted such an undertaking36, they should be lauded37 for their intentions and not their prudence38.
It will be seen, therefore, that those who have conspired39 are all great men, or familiars of the Prince. Of the many who have conspired, as many were moved thusly by too many benefits as by too many injuries; as was that of Perennius against Commodus, Plautianus against Severus, and of Sejanus against Tiberius. All of these men were loaded by their Emperors with so many riches, honors, and dignities, that it seemed nothing was wanting to them for the perfection of their power other than the Empire, and not wanting to be lacking this, they set themselves to conspire against the Prince, but their conspiracies all had that ending which their ingratitude40 merited. Although one of these was seen in recent times to have had a good ending, that of Giacopo D’Appiano against Messer Piero Gambacorti, Prince of Pisa, this Giacopo had been raised and nourished and given reputation by him, afterwards took away his State. Of this kind, in our times, was that of Coppola against King Ferrando of Aragon; this Coppola had come to such greatness that it seemed he lacked nothing except the Kingdom, [and] in wanting this, however, he lost his life. And truly if any conspiracy made by great men against a Prince ought to have succeeded, it should have been this, as it was made by another King, so to speak, and one who had so great an opportunity to fulfil his desire: but that cupidity41 for domination which blinds them, also blinds them in the managing of their enterprise, for if they should know how to accomplish this evil with prudence, it would be impossible for them not to succeed. A Prince, therefore, who wants to guard himself from Conspiracies ought to fear more those men to whom he has given too many benefits, than those to whom he had caused too many injuries. For these latter lack the opportunity, the former abound42 in them; and the desire is the same, because the desire of dominating is as great or greater than is that of vengeance. They ought never, therefore, give so much authority to their friends, but that a distance should exist between them and the Principate, and that there should be something left [in the middle] for them to desire; otherwise it will be a rare occasion if it will not happen to them as to the above mentioned Princes.
But let us return to our subject. I say that they who conspire having to be great men and have easy access to the Prince, it remains43 to be discussed what successes there have been of their enterprises, and to see what were the causes which made them happy or unhappy. And (as I have said above) in all these conspiracies, there are to be found three dangerous periods of time; before, during, and after the fact. Few are found, however, which have had good endings, that it is almost impossible that all should have passed through [the first period] happily. And in beginning to discuss the dangers of the first period, which are the most important, I say that there is need to be very prudent44 and have great good fortune, that in conducting a conspiracy, it not be discovered [at this stage]. And they are discovered either by [someone] telling or by conjecture45. The telling results from finding little faith or little prudence in the men to whom you have communicated it: the little faith [treachery] is so commonly found, that you cannot communicate it [the conspiracy] except to your trusted ones who, for love of you, risk their own deaths, or to those men who are discontent with the Prince. Of such trusted ones, one or two may be found, but as you extend this, it is impossible that many will be found. Moreover, there is good need that the good will they bear you is so great that the plot does not appear to them greater than the danger and fear greater than the punishment: also most of the times men are deceived by the love they judge others have for them, nor can they ever be sure of this except from experience; and to have such experience in this is most dangerous: and even if you should have had experience in some other dangerous occasion, where they had been faithful to you, you can not by that faith measure this one, as this one surpasses by far all other kinds of danger. If you measure this faith from the discontent which a man has toward the Prince, you can be easily deceived in this: because as soon as you have opened your mind to that malcontent46, you give him material to content himself, and to keep him faithful, his hate [for the Prince] must be very great or your authority [over him] must be greater. From this, it has followed that many [conspiracies] have been revealed and crushed in their very beginning, and that if one has been kept secret among many men for along time, it is held to be a miraculous47 thing; as was that of Piso against Nero, and in our times, that of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano De’Medici, of which more than fifty thousand were cognizant, and which waited until its execution to be discovered.
As to being discovered because of little prudence, this occurs when a conspiracy is talked about with little caution, so that a servant or other third person learns of it, as happened to the sons of Brutus, who in arranging the plot with the legates of Tarquin were overheard by a slave who accused them; or when from thoughtlessness it comes to be communicated to a woman or a child whom you love, or to some similar indiscreet person, as did Dinnus, one of the conspirators with Philotas against Alexander the Great, who communicated the conspiracy to Nicomachus, a young boy loved by him, who quickly told it to his brother Ciballinus, and Ciballinus to the King. As to being discovered by conjecture, there is for an example the conspiracy of Piso against Nero, in which Scevinus, one of the conspirators, the day before he was to kill Nero, made his testament48, ordered that Melichus his freedman should sharpen an old rusty49 dagger50 of his, freed all his slaves and gave them money, and caused bandages to be ordered for tying up wounds: by means of which conjectures51, Melichus ascertained52 the plot, and accused him to Nero. Scevinus was taken, and with him Natales, another conspirator34, with whom he had been seen talking the day before in secret and for a long time; and the reasons given [by each] not being in accord, they were forced to confess the truth, so that the Conspiracy was discovered to the ruin of all the conspirators. It is impossible to guard oneself from this cause of discovery of Conspiracies, as it will be discovered by the accomplices through malice53, through imprudence, or through thoughtlessness, whenever they exceed three or four in number. And as soon as more than one is taken, it is impossible for it not to be discovered, for two cannot agree together in all their statements. If only one of them is taken who is a strong man, he can with his courage and firmness remain silent on [the names of] the conspirators; but then it behooves54 the other conspirators not to have less firmness and courage, and not to discover it by their flight, for if courage be wanting on any side, either by he who is arrested or he who is free, the conspiracy is discovered. And a rare example is cited by Titus Livius in the conspiracy formed against Hieronymus, King of Syracuse, where Theodorus, one of the conspirators taken, concealed56 with great virtu all the conspirators, and accused the friends of the King; and on the other hand, all the conspirators placed so much confidence in the virtu of Theodorus, that no one left Syracuse or gave any sign of fear. The conduct of a Conspiracy, therefore, passes through all these dangers before it comes to its execution; and in wanting to avoid these, there exist these remedies. The first and most certain, rather to say it better, the only one, is not to give the conspirators time to accuse you, and therefore to communicate the plot to them just at the time you are to do it, and not sooner: those who do thusly are likely to avoid the dangers that exist in the beginning, and most of the time, the others also; actually they have all had happy endings: and any prudent man will have the opportunity of governing himself in this manner.
It should suffice for me to cite two examples. Nelematus, not being able to endure the tyranny of Aristotimus, Tyrant of Epirus, assembled in his house many relatives and friends, and exhorted57 them to liberate their country; several of them requested time to discuss and arrange it, whereupon Nelematus made his slaves lock the house, and to those whom he had called he said, either you swear to go now and carry out the execution of this [plot], or I will give you all as prisoners to Aristotimus: moved by these words they swore, and going out without any [further] intermission of time, successfully carried out the plot of Nelematus. A Magian having by deceit occupied the kingdom of the Persians, and when Ortanus, one of the great men of the kingdom, had learned and discovered the fraud, he conferred with six other Princes of that State seeking how they were to avenge the kingdom from the Tyranny of that Magian. And when one of them asked as to the time, Darius, one of the six called by Ortanus, arose and said: Either we go now to carry out the execution of this, or I will go and accuse you all; and so by accord, without giving time to anyone to repent58 of it, they arose and easily executed their designs. Similar to these two examples also is the manner that the Aetolians employed in killing59 Nabis, the Spartan60 Tyrant; they sent Alexemenes, and enjoined61 the others that they should obey him in every and any thing, under pain of exile. This man went to Sparta, and did not communicate his commission until he wanted to discharge it, whence he succeeded in killing him. In this manner, therefore, these men avoided those dangers that are associated with the carrying out of conspiracies, and whoever imitates them will always escape them. And that anyone can do as they did, I want to cite the example of Piso referred to above. Piso was a very great and reputed man, and a familiar of Nero who confided62 in him much. Nero used to go often to his garden to dine with him. Piso could then have made friends for himself some men of mind, heart, and of disposition to undertake the execution of [such a plot], which is very easy for a great man to do; and when Nero should be in his garden, to communicate the matter to them, and with appropriate words animated63 them to do that which they would not have had time to refuse, and which would have been impossible not to succeed.
And thus, if all the other instances are examined, few will be found in which they [the conspirators] could not have been able to proceed in the same manner. But men, ordinarily little learned in the ways of the world, often make very great errors, and so much greater in those that are extraordinary, as is this [conspiracies]. The matter ought, therefore, never to be communicated except under necessity and at its execution; and even then, if you have to communicate it, to communicate it to one man only with whom you have had a very long experience [of trust], or who is motivated by the same reason as you. To find one such is much more easy than to find many, and because of this, there is less danger: and then, even if he should deceive you, there is some remedy of defending yourself, than where there are many conspirators: for I have heard many prudent men say that it is possible to talk of everything with one man, for (if you do not let yourself be led to write in your hand) the yes of one man is worth as much as the no of another: and everyone ought to guard himself against writing as from a shoal, because there is nothing that will convict you more easily than your handwriting. Plautanias, wanting to have the Emperor Severus and his son Antoninus killed, committed the matter of the Tribune Saturninus; who wanting to accuse him and not obey him, and apprehensive64 that coming to the accusation65, he [Plautanius] would be more believed than he [Saturninus], requested a copy in his handwriting so that he should have faith in this commission, which Plautanias, blinded by ambition, gave him: whence it ensued that he was accused by the Tribune and convicted; and without that copy and certain other countersigns66, Plautanias would have won out, so boldly did he deny it. From the accusation of a single one, some remedy will be found, unless you are convicted by some writing or other countersigns, from which one ought to guard himself. In the Pisonian conspiracy there was a woman called Epicaris, who in the past had been a friend of Nero, who judged it to be advisable to place among the conspirators a Captain of some triremes whom Nero had as his guard; she committed the conspiracy to him, but not [the names of] the conspirators. Whence that the Captain breaking his faith and accusing her to Nero, but so great was the audacity67 of Epicaris in denying it, that Nero, remaining confused, did not condemn68 her.
There are two dangers, therefore, in communicating a plot to only one individual: the first, that he does not accuse you as a test: the other, that he does not accuse you, he being convicted and constrained by the punishment to do so: he being arrested because of some suspicion or some other indication on his part. But there is some remedy for both of these dangers; the first, being able to deny it, alleging69 the hate that the man had for you; and the other to deny it, alleging the force that had constrained him to tell lies. It is prudent, therefore, not to communicate the plot to anyone, but act according to those above mentioned examples; and even if you must communicate it, not to more than one, for while there is some danger in that, it is much less than in communicating it to many.
Next to this, there may be a necessity which constrains70 you to do to that Prince what you see the Prince would want to do to you, [and] which is so great that it does not give you time to think of your own safety. This necessity almost always brings the matter to the desired ending, and to prove it, I have two examples which should suffice. The Emperor Commodus had among his best friends and familiars Letus and Electus, Heads of the Praetorian soldiers, and had Marcia among his favorite concubines and friends: and as he was sometimes reproached by these [three] for the way he stained his personal [dignity] and that of the Empire, decided71 to have them killed, and wrote the names of Marcia, Letus and Electus, and several others on a list of those whom he wanted killed the following night, and he placed this list under the pillow of his bed: and having gone to bathe, a favorite child of his playing in the room and on the bed found this list, and going out with it in his hand met Marcia who took it from him; and when she read it and saw its contents, she quickly sent for Letus and Electus, and when all three recognized the danger they were in, they decided to forestall72 it, and without losing time, the following night they killed Commodus. The Emperor Antoninus Caracalla was with his armies in Mesopotamia, and had for his prefect Macrinus, a man more fit for civil than military matters: and as it happens that bad Princes always fear that others will inflict19 on them that [punishment] which it appears to them they merit, Antoninus wrote to Maternianus his friend in Rome that he learn from the Astrologers if there was anyone who was aspiring73 to the Empire and to advise him of it. Whence Maternianus wrote back to him that Macrinus was he who aspired75 to it, and the letter came first into the hands of Macrinus than of the Emperor; and because of this the necessity was recognized either to kill him before a new letter should arrive from Rome, or to die, he committed to his trusted friend, the Centurion76 Martialis, whose brother had been killed by Antoninus a few days before, that he should kill him, which was executed by him successfully. It is seen therefore, that this necessity which does not give time produces almost the same effect as the means employed by Nelematus of Epirus described by me above. That of which I spoke30 of almost at the beginning of this discourse77 is also seen, that threats injure a Prince more, and are the cause of more efficacious Conspiracies than the injury itself; from which a Prince ought to guard himself; for men have to be either caressed78 or made sure of, and never reduced to conditions in which they believe they need either to kill others or be killed themselves.
As to the dangers that are run in its execution, these result either from changing the orders, or from the lack of courage of those who should execute it, or from an error that the executor makes from little prudence, or from not perfecting the plot leaving some of them alive who had been planned to be killed. I say, therefore, that there is nothing that causes disturbance79 or impediment to all the actions of men as much as when in an instant and without having time, to have to change an order, and to change it from the one that had been ordered first: and if this change causes disorder80 in anything, it does so especially in matters of war and matter similar to those of which we are speaking; for in such actions there is nothing so necessary to do as much as firming the minds of men to execute the part assigned to them: and if men have their minds turned for many days to a certain matter and certain order, and that be quickly changed, it is impossible that all be not disturbed, and everything not ruined; so that it is much better to execute a plot according to the order given (even though some inconvenience is to be seen) than to want to cancel it to enter into a thousand inconveniences. This happens when one has no time to reorganize oneself, for when there is time, men can govern themselves in their own way.
The Conspiracy of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano De’Medici is well known. The arrangement made was that they were to dine at the Cardinal81 of San Giorgio’s, and at that dinner to kill them [the Medici]: in which place there were distributed those who were to seize the palace, and those who were to overrun the City and call the people to liberty. It happened that while the Pazzi, the Medici, and the Cardinal were at the solemn office in the Cathedral Church in Florence, it was learned that Giuliano was not dining that morning, which caused the conspirators to gather together, and that which they had to do in the house of Medici, they decided to do in the Church: which caused the disturbance of all the arrangements, as Giovanbattista da Montesecco did not want to consent to the homicide, saying he did not want to do it in the Church: so that they had to change to new members for every action who, not having time to firm up their minds, made such errors, that they were crushed in the execution.
The spirit is sometimes lacking to those who should execute [a plot] either from reverence82 of from the innate83 goodwill84 of the executor. So great is the majesty85 and reverence which surrounds the presence of a Prince, that it is an easy matter for it either to mitigate86 [the will of] or terrify an executor. To Marius (having been taken by the Minturnians) was sent a slave who was to kill him, [but] who was so terrified by the presence of that man and by the memory of his fame, that he became cowardly, and lost all courage to kill him. And if this power exists in a man bound and a prisoner, and overwhelmed by bad fortune, how much more is it to be feared from a Prince free, with the majesty of ornaments87, of pomp, and of his court: so that this pomp can terrify you, and that grateful welcome can humiliate88 you.
Some subjects conspired against Sitalces, King of Thracia; they fixed89 the day of its execution, they came to the appointed place where the Prince was, but none of them would move to attack him, so that they departed without having attempted anything, and without knowing what had impeded90 them, and they blamed one another. They fell into this error several times, so that the conspiracy was discovered, and they suffered the punishment for that evil which they could have committed, but would not.
Two brothers of Alfonso, Duke of Ferrara, conspired against him, and they employed as the executioner [of their plot] Giannes, Priest and Cantor of the Duke, who several times at their request had brought the Duke to them, so that they would have occasion to kill him: None the less, none of them ever dared to do it, so that it was discovered, and they bore the penalty of their wickedness and little prudence. This neglect of taking advantage of the opportunity resulted either from his presence dismaying them or from some humane91 act by the Prince humbling92 them. The failures that arise in such executions arise either from the error of little prudence or little courage; for when one or the other of these things invades you, and carried by that confusion of the brain, you are made to say and do that which you ought not.
And that men’s minds are thus invaded and confounded, Titus Livius cannot demonstrate better then when he writes of Alexemenes, the Aetolian, who (when he wanted to kill Nabis, the Spartan, of which we talked about above), when the time came for the execution [of his design], discovered to his men what had to be done, Titus Livius speaks these words: He collected his own spirits, which were confused seeing the greatness of the undertakings93. For it is impossible that anyone (even though he be of firm spirit and accustomed to the use of the sword and the killing of men) be not confused. Hence only men experienced in such affairs ought to be selected, and none other be trusted, even though he held to be most courageous94. For the certainty of anyone’s courage cannot be promised without having had experience. Such confusion, therefore, can either make the arms fall from your hand, or make you say things that will have the same result.
Lucilla, the sister of Commodus, ordered Quintianus to kill him. This man awaited Commodus at the entrance of the amphitheatre, and encountering him, with drawn95 dagger, shouted, The Senate sends you this: which words caused him to be seized before he had lowered his arm to wound him. Messer Antonio Da Volterra deputed (as is mentioned above) to kill Lorenzo De’Medici, in meeting him said, Ah traitor96!, which word was the saving of Lorenzo and the ruin of the Conspiracy.
When the conspiracy is against only one Head, success of the affair cannot be obtained, for the reasons mentioned: but success is obtained even less easily when the conspiracy is against two Heads; actually, it is so difficult that it is almost impossible that it succeed: for to undertake the same action at the same time in different places is almost impossible, as it cannot be done at different times without one spoiling the other: so that conspiring97 against one Prince is a doubtful, dangerous and little prudent thing; to conspire against two is entirely98 vain and foolhardy. And if it were not for the respect I have of history, I would never believe that that would be possible which Herodianus says to Plautianus, when he commissioned Saturninus, the Certurian, that he alone should kill Severus and Antoninus [Caracalla] living in different places; for it is so far from reasonableness, that other than this authority would not have me believe it. Certain young Athenians conspired against Diodes and Hippias, Tyrants of Athens. They killed Diodes, but Hippias who remained avenged99 him. Chion and Leonidas, of Heraclea, and disciples100 of Plato, conspired against the Tyrants Clearchus and Satirus: they killed Clearchus, but Satirus who remained alive avenged him. The Pazzi, mentioned by us many times, did not succeed in killing anyone except Giuliano; so that everyone ought to abstain101 from such Conspiracies against several Heads, for they do no good to yourself, nor the country, nor anyone: rather those [tyrants] who remain become more harsh and unendurable, as Florence, Athens, and Heraclea know, as I have stated above. It is true that the conspiracy that Pelopidas made to deliver his country, Thebes, [from the Tyrants] faced all the difficulties: none the less it had a most happy ending; for Pelopidas not only conspired against two Tyrants, but against ten: not only was he not a confidant and did not have easy access to the Tyrants, but he was also a rebel: none the less he was able to come to Thebes, kill the Tyrants, and free the country. Yet, none the less, he did all with the aid of one Charon, counsellor or the Tyrants, through whom he had an easy access to the execution of his [plot]. Let no one, none the less, take this as an example; for, as that enterprise was almost impossible, and a marvelous thing to succeed, [and] so regarded by the writers, who commemorate102 it as something rare and unprecedented103. Such execution can be interrupted by a false alarm or by an unforeseen accident that arises in its doing.
The morning that Brutus and the other conspirators wanted to kill Caesar, it happened that he [Caesar] talked at length with Gn. Popilius Lena, one of the conspirators, and the others seeing this long talk were apprehensive that the said Popilius might reveal the conspiracy to Caesar. They were tempted5 to kill Caesar here, and not wait until he should be in the Senate: and they would have done so except that the discussion ended, and as it was seen that Caesar did not do anything extraordinary, they were reassured104. These false alarms are to be regarded and considered with prudence, and so much more as they come about easily, for he who had his conscience blemished105, readily believes that [everyone] talks of him. It is possible to hear a word spoken by another so that it will make your mind disturbed, and to believe that it has reference to you, and causes you either to discover the Conspiracy by flight, or to confuse the action by accelerating it before its time. And this will happen much more readily, when there are many who know of the Conspiracy.
As to accidents (because they are unforeseen) they cannot be demonstrated except by examples which should serve to make men cautious. Julio Belanti of Siena (of whom we have made mention above), because of the anger he had against Pandolfo, who had taken his daughter from him before he had given her to him as a wife, decided to kill him, and chose the time. Almost every day Pandolfo went to visit an infirm relative, and on his way passed by the house of Julio. That man, therefore, having observed this, arranged to have his conspirators in the house so arranged as to kill Pandolfo when he passed; and putting them, armed, behind the door, and kept one at the window who should give a sign when Pandolfo was near the door. It happened that Pandolfo came, that man gave the sign, but he [Pandolfo] met a friend who stopped him, while some who were with him went on ahead, and seeing and hearing the noise of arms discovered the ambush106, so that Pandolfo was saved, and Julio with his companions had to flee from Sienna. That accident of that meeting impeded that action and caused Julio’s enterprise to be ruined. Against which accidents (as they are rare) no remedy can be made. It is very necessary to examine all those things that can happen and remedy them.
It remains now only to discuss the dangers that occur after the execution [of a plot]; of which there is only one, and this is when someone is left who will avenge the slain107 Prince. There may remain, then, his brothers, or his sons, or other adherents108 who expect [to inherit] the Principality; and they can be left either because of your negligence109, or for the reasons mentioned above, and who would undertake this vengeance; as happened to Giovan Andrea Da Lampognano, who, together with his conspirators, had killed the Duke of Milan, who left a son and two brothers, who in time avenged the dead man. And truly in these cases, the conspirators are to be excused, for they had no remedy: but when some are left alive because of little prudence or from negligence, they [the conspirators] do not merit to be excused. Some conspirators from Furli killed the Count Girolamo, their Lord, and took his wife and children, who were little: and as it appeared to them they could not live securely unless they had made themselves lords of the fortress110; but as the castellan did not want to give it up to them, Madonna Caterina (as the Countess was called) promised the conspirators that, if they allowed her to enter it, she would have it consigned111 to them, and that they might retain her children with them as hostages. Under this pledge, these men allowed her to enter, but she, as soon as she was inside the walls, reproached them for the death of her husband, and threatened them with every kind of vengeance: and to show that she did not care for her children, she showed them her genital member, saying that she had the means of making more. Thus those men [conspirators], short of counsel and having too late seen their error, suffered the penalty of their too little prudence by a perpetual exile. But of all the perils112 that can happen after the execution [of a plot], there is none more certain and which is to be feared more than when the people are friends of the Prince whom you have killed; for against this the conspirators do not have any remedy and against which they can never be secure. As an example, there is Caesar, who, by having the people or Rome friendly, was avenged by them; for having driven the conspirators out of Rome, they were the cause that they were all killed at various times and in various places.
Conspiracies that are made against the Country are less perilous for those who plan them, than are those made against Princes; for in plotting them there are less dangers than in the other, in the execution of them they [dangers] are the same, and after the execution there is none. In plotting it there are not many dangers, for a citizen can aspire74 to power without manifesting his mind and designs to anyone: and if those aspirations113 of his are not interfered114 with, his enterprise will turn out happily; or if they are interfered with by some law, he can wait a time and attempt it by another way. This is understood in a Republic which is partly corrupted115; for in an uncorrupted one (there not being any bad principles there) these thoughts cannot occur in its citizens. The citizens, therefore, through many ways and means can aspire to the Principality where they do not run the dangers of being crushed: as much because Republics are slower than a Prince, and are less apprehensive, and because of this are less cautious; as well as because they have more respect for their Great citizens, and because of this are more audacious and courageous in conspiracy against them.
Everyone has read of the Conspiracy of Cataline written by Sallust, and knows that after the Conspiracy was discovered Cataline not only stayed in Rome, but came into the Senate, and mouthed villainies at the Senate and the Consul116, so great was the respect which that City had for its citizens. And when he had departed from Rome, and was already with the army, Lentulus and the others would not have been taken, except that they had letters in their handwriting which accused them manifestly. Hanno, a very great citizen in Carthage, aspiring to the Tyrancy, had arranged to poison all the Senate during the nuptials117 of a daughter, and afterwards make himself Prince. When this was learned, nothing was done in the Senate than to pass a law which placed a limit to the expenses of banquets and nuptials, so great was the respect they had for his kind.
It is indeed true that in the execution of a Conspiracy against one’s Country there are more difficulties and greater perils; for it is rare that your own forces of the conspiracy are sufficient against so many, and not everyone is Prince of an army, as were Caesar, or Agathocies, or Cleomenes, and the like, who, through force, quickly occupied their Country; for to such men the way is sure and easy, but others who do not have the support of force must accomplish their purpose either through deceit and cunning, or by foreign forces.
As to deceit and cunning, Pisistratus, the Athenian, having overcome the Megarians and, because of this, had acquired good will among the people [of Athens]; one morning he went outside wounded, saying that the Nobility had injured him from envy, and demanded that he be able to keep armed men with him as his guard. From this authority, he easily rose to such power, that he became Tyrant of Athens. Pandolfo Petrucci returned with other exiles to Sienna, and he was assigned the guard of the government plaza118, as a mechanical [secondary] matter and which others had refused: none the less those armed men in time gave him such reputation, that in a little time he became Prince. Many others have employed other means and perseverance119, and in a [short] space of time and without peril have succeeded. Those who have conspired to occupy their country with their own forces or with foreign armies, have had various success, according to their fortune. Cataline, mentioned before above, was ruined. Hanno (of whom we made mention above) not having succeeded with poison, armed many thousand [persons] of his partisans120, and both he and they were killed. Some of the first citizens of Thebes, in order to make themselves Tyrants, called a Spartan army to their aid, and seized the Tyrancy of that City. So that examining all the Conspiracies against the Country, none or few will be found, which were crushed in their plotting; but all either met with success or failure in their execution. Once they are executed, they do not bring other dangers than those which the nature of the Principality in itself bring: for once one has become a Tyrant, he has his natural and ordinary perils which befall a Tyranny, against which there are no other remedies than those which have been discussed above.
This is as much as has occurred to me to write of Conspiracies, and if I have discussed those only where the sword was used and not poison, it is because both result in the same effect. It is true that those using poison are more dangerous because they are more uncertain; for everyone does not have the opportunity [of employing this means], and it must be reserved for the one who does have, and this necessity of reserving it for some makes it dangerous. Further, for many reasons, a drink of poison need not be fatal, as happened with those who killed Commodus; here, he having thrown up the poison which they had given him, they were forced to strangle him in order to kill him.
Princes, therefore, have no greater enemy than a conspiracy; for, once a conspiracy is made against him, it either kills or defames him. For if the conspiracy succeeds, he dies; if it is discovered and he kills the conspirators, it will always be believed that it was an invention of that Prince to give vent to his cruelty and avarice121 against the blood and possessions of those whom he has killed. I do not want, therefore, to omit advising that Prince or that Republic against whom there had been conspiracies, that, when they have knowledge that there is a conspiracy manifest against them, before they engage in an enterprise to avenge it, to seek to learn very well its nature, and to measure well the conditions of both themselves and the conspirators; and if they find it [the conspiracy] to be big and powerful, they must never discover it until they are prepared with sufficient force to crush it, otherwise by doing so they will discover their own ruin: therefore they ought with every industry conceal55 it, for the conspirators, seeing themselves discovered, driven by necessity, will act without consideration. As an example, there are the Romans, who had left two legions of soldiers to guard the Capuans from the Samnites (as we said elsewhere); the Heads of those legions conspired together to oppress the Capuans: when this was learned at Rome, they commissioned Rutilius, the new Consul, that this be prevented; who, to lull122 the conspirators to sleep, had published that the Senate had reaffirmed the quartering of the legions in Capua. Which, being believed by those soldiers, and it appearing to them to have time to execute their design, did not seek to accelerate the matter, and thus they remained until they begun to see that the Consul was separating them from each other; which thing generating suspicion in them, caused them to be discovered and to go on with their desire to execute the plot. Nor could there be a better example for both parties; for through this, it is seen how much men are dilatory123 in things when they believe they have time, and how ready they are when necessity drives them. Nor can a Prince or a Republic who want, for their own advantage, to defer124 the discovery [of a conspiracy] use better means than to hold out another opportunity to the conspirators through slyness, so that they expecting it, or it appearing to them to have time, the [Prince] or [Republic] will have time to castigate125 them. Whoever has done otherwise has accelerated his ruin, as did the Duke of Athens and Guglieimo De Pazzi. The Duke, having become Tyrant of Florence, and learning that he was being conspired against, caused (without otherwise examining the matter) one of the conspirators to be taken, which quickly made the others take up arms, and take the State away from him. Guglieimo being commissioner126 in the Val Di Chiano in MDI [1501], and having learned that there was a conspiracy in Arezzo in favor of the Vitelli, to take that town away from the Florentines, quickly went to that City, and without taking into consideration the strength of the conspirators, or of his own, and without preparing any force for himself, by the counsel of his son, the Bishop127, caused one of the conspirators to be taken; after which seizure128 the others took up arms and took the town away from the Florentines and Guglieimo from being Commissioner became a prisoner.
But when Conspiracies are weak they can and ought to be crushed without regard. However, the two methods used, although almost the contrary of each other, are not in any way to be imitated: The one is that of the above named Duke of Athens, who, to show his belief in having the good will of the Citizens of Florence, put to death one who had discovered the Conspiracy to him: the other is that of Dion, the Syracusan, who, to test the loyalty129 of anyone of whom he had suspicion, ordered Callipus in whom he confided, that he should pretend to make a Conspiracy against him, and both of these fared badly: for the one took away courage from the accusers and gave it to whoever wanted to conspire; the other made the way easy for his own death, but actually was his own Head of a Conspiracy against himself, as was proved by experience, for Callipus (being able to plot against Dion without regard) plotted so well, that he took away from him the State and his life.
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conspiracies
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| n.阴谋，密谋( conspiracy的名词复数 ) | |
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conspire
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| v.密谋，（事件等）巧合，共同导致 | |
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peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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contentedly
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| adv.心满意足地 | |
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besiege
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| vt.包围，围攻，拥在...周围 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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avenge
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| v.为...复仇，为...报仇 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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offense
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| n.犯规，违法行为；冒犯，得罪 | |
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offenses
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| n.进攻( offense的名词复数 )；（球队的）前锋；进攻方法；攻势 | |
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benevolence
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| n.慈悲，捐助 | |
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vengeance
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| n.报复，报仇，复仇 | |
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constrained
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| adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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despoil
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| v.夺取，抢夺 | |
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obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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conspiracy
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| n.阴谋，密谋，共谋 | |
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tyrant
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| n.暴君，专制的君主，残暴的人 | |
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liberate
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| v.解放，使获得自由，释出，放出；vt.解放，使获自由 | |
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descend
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| vt./vi.传下来，下来，下降 | |
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slaughter
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| n.屠杀，屠宰；vt.屠杀，宰杀 | |
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tyrants
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| 专制统治者( tyrant的名词复数 )； 暴君似的人； （古希腊的）僭主； 严酷的事物 | |
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incurred
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| [医]招致的，遭受的； incur的过去式 | |
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ignoble
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| adj.不光彩的，卑鄙的；可耻的 | |
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vent
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| n.通风口，排放口；开衩；vt.表达，发泄 | |
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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abject
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| adj.极可怜的，卑屈的 | |
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accomplices
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| 从犯，帮凶，同谋( accomplice的名词复数 ) | |
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conspirators
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| n.共谋者，阴谋家( conspirator的名词复数 ) | |
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conspirator
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| n.阴谋者，谋叛者 | |
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vilifying
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| v.中伤，诽谤( vilify的现在分词 ) | |
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undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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lauded
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| v.称赞，赞美( laud的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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conspired
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| 密谋( conspire的过去式和过去分词 )； 搞阴谋； （事件等）巧合； 共同导致 | |
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ingratitude
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| n.忘恩负义 | |
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cupidity
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| n.贪心，贪财 | |
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abound
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| vi.大量存在；(in，with)充满，富于 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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conjecture
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| n./v.推测，猜测 | |
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malcontent
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| n.不满者，不平者；adj.抱不平的，不满的 | |
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miraculous
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| adj.像奇迹一样的，不可思议的 | |
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testament
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| n.遗嘱；证明 | |
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rusty
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| adj.生锈的；锈色的；荒废了的 | |
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dagger
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| n.匕首，短剑，剑号 | |
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conjectures
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| 推测，猜想( conjecture的名词复数 ) | |
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ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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malice
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| n.恶意，怨恨，蓄意；[律]预谋 | |
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behooves
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| n.利益，好处( behoof的名词复数 )v.适宜( behoove的第三人称单数 ) | |
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conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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exhorted
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| v.劝告，劝说( exhort的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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repent
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| v.悔悟，悔改，忏悔，后悔 | |
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killing
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| n.巨额利润；突然赚大钱，发大财 | |
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spartan
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| adj.简朴的，刻苦的；n.斯巴达；斯巴达式的人 | |
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enjoined
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| v.命令( enjoin的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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confided
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| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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animated
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| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
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apprehensive
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| adj.担心的，恐惧的，善于领会的 | |
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accusation
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| n.控告，指责，谴责 | |
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countersigns
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| v.连署，副署，会签 （文件）( countersign的第三人称单数 ) | |
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audacity
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| n.大胆，卤莽，无礼 | |
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condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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alleging
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| 断言，宣称，辩解( allege的现在分词 ) | |
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constrains
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| 强迫( constrain的第三人称单数 )； 强使； 限制； 约束 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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forestall
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| vt.抢在…之前采取行动；预先阻止 | |
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aspiring
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| adj.有志气的；有抱负的；高耸的v.渴望；追求 | |
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aspire
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| vi.(to，after)渴望，追求，有志于 | |
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aspired
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| v.渴望，追求( aspire的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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centurion
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| n.古罗马的百人队长 | |
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discourse
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| n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述 | |
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caressed
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| 爱抚或抚摸…( caress的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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81
cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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82
reverence
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| n.敬畏，尊敬，尊严；Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称；v.尊敬，敬畏，崇敬 | |
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83
innate
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| adj.天生的，固有的，天赋的 | |
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84
goodwill
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| n.善意，亲善，信誉，声誉 | |
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85
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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86
mitigate
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| vt.（使）减轻，（使）缓和 | |
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87
ornaments
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| n.装饰( ornament的名词复数 )；点缀；装饰品；首饰v.装饰，点缀，美化( ornament的第三人称单数 ) | |
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88
humiliate
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| v.使羞辱，使丢脸[同]disgrace | |
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89
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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90
impeded
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| 阻碍，妨碍，阻止( impede的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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91
humane
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| adj.人道的，富有同情心的 | |
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92
humbling
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| adj.令人羞辱的v.使谦恭( humble的现在分词 )；轻松打败（尤指强大的对手）；低声下气 | |
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93
undertakings
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| 企业( undertaking的名词复数 )； 保证； 殡仪业； 任务 | |
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94
courageous
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| adj.勇敢的，有胆量的 | |
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95
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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96
traitor
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| n.叛徒，卖国贼 | |
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97
conspiring
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| 密谋( conspire的现在分词 )； 搞阴谋； （事件等）巧合； 共同导致 | |
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98
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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99
avenged
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| v.为…复仇，报…之仇( avenge的过去式和过去分词 )；为…报复 | |
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100
disciples
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| n.信徒( disciple的名词复数 )；门徒；耶稣的信徒；（尤指）耶稣十二门徒之一 | |
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101
abstain
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| v.自制，戒绝，弃权，避免 | |
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102
commemorate
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| vt.纪念，庆祝 | |
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103
unprecedented
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| adj.无前例的，新奇的 | |
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104
reassured
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| adj.使消除疑虑的；使放心的v.再保证，恢复信心( reassure的过去式和过去分词) | |
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105
blemished
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| v.有损…的完美，玷污( blemish的过去式 ) | |
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106
ambush
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| n.埋伏(地点)；伏兵；v.埋伏；伏击 | |
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107
slain
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| 杀死，宰杀，杀戮( slay的过去分词 )； (slay的过去分词) | |
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108
adherents
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| n.支持者，拥护者( adherent的名词复数 )；党羽；徒子徒孙 | |
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109
negligence
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| n.疏忽，玩忽，粗心大意 | |
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110
fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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111
consigned
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| v.把…置于（令人不快的境地）( consign的过去式和过去分词 )；把…托付给；把…托人代售；丟弃 | |
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112
perils
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| 极大危险( peril的名词复数 )； 危险的事（或环境） | |
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113
aspirations
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| 强烈的愿望( aspiration的名词复数 )； 志向； 发送气音； 发 h 音 | |
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114
interfered
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| v.干预( interfere的过去式和过去分词 )；调停；妨碍；干涉 | |
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115
corrupted
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| （使）败坏( corrupt的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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116
consul
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| n.领事；执政官 | |
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117
nuptials
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| n.婚礼；婚礼( nuptial的名词复数 ) | |
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118
plaza
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| n.广场，市场 | |
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119
perseverance
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| n.坚持不懈，不屈不挠 | |
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120
partisans
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| 游击队员( partisan的名词复数 )； 党人； 党羽； 帮伙 | |
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121
avarice
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| n.贪婪；贪心 | |
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122
lull
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| v.使安静，使入睡，缓和，哄骗；n.暂停，间歇 | |
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123
dilatory
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| adj.迟缓的，不慌不忙的 | |
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124
defer
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| vt.推迟，拖延；vi.(to)遵从，听从，服从 | |
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125
castigate
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| v.谴责；惩治 | |
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126
commissioner
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| n.（政府厅、局、处等部门）专员，长官，委员 | |
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127
bishop
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| n.主教，（国际象棋）象 | |
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128
seizure
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| n.没收；占有；抵押 | |
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129
loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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