That a Captain Cannot Avoid an Engagement If the Adversary1 Wants to Do So in Every Way
Gneius Sulpitius, appointed Dictator in the war against the Gauls, not wanting to commit his fortunes against the host, whose [position] was daily deteriorating2 from the disadvantage of the place. When an error is followed in which all or a greater part of men deceive themselves, I do not believe it is bad sometimes to refute it. Therefore, although I have many times before shown how much the actions concerning great things are different from those of ancient times, none the less, it does not appear to me superfluous3 at present to repeat it. For, if we deviate4 in any part from the institutions of the ancients, we deviate especially in military actions, where at present none of those things greatly esteemed5 by the ancients are observed. And this defect arises because Republics and Princes have imposed this charge on others, and to avoid the dangers have far removed themselves from this practice: and even if a King of our times is sometimes seen to go in person, it is not to be believed therefore that methods meriting greater praise will arise; for even if he does follow that practice, he does it for pomp only, and not from any other laudable reason. Yet these make less error in showing themselves with their armies while retaining for themselves the title of Commander, than do the Republics; and especially the Italian ones, which, trusting in others, do not understand anything of what pertains6 to war, and on the other hand wanting (in order to appear as a Prince to them) to decide things, make a thousand errors in such decisions. And although I have elsewhere discussed some, I do not now want to be silent on one of the most important.
When these indolent Princes, or effeminate Republics, sent out their Captain, the wisest commission that it appears to them to give him is this, when they impose on him that he does not come to an engagement under any circumstance, but rather above everything to guard against coming to battle: and in this, they appear to imitate the prudence7 of Fabius Maximus, who be delaying the fighting saved the state for the Romans; but they did not understand that the greater part of the time such a commission is null or harmful; for this conclusion ought to be made, that a Captain who wants to stay in the field, cannot avoid an engagement any time the enemy wants to do so in any way. And this commission is nothing else, but to say — make the engagement at the convenience of the enemy, and not at your own. For to want to stay in the field and not undertake an engagement, there is no more secure remedy than to keep oneself and at least fifty thousand men a good distance from the enemy and then to keep good spies who, when they see him coming toward you, give you time to distance yourself. Another procedure is this, to shut yourself up in a City; and both of these proceedings8 are harmful. In the first, one leaves his country prey10 to the enemy, and a valiant11 Prince would rather try the fortune of battle than to lengthen12 the war with so much harm to his subjects. In the second proceeding9 defeat is manifest; for it will happen if you bring yourself with the army into a City, you will come to be besieged13, and in a short time suffer hunger and you will come to surrender. So that to avoid an engagement by these two methods ins most injurious. The method employed by Fabius Maximus of staying in a strong place is good when you have an army of so much virtu that the enemy does not dare to come to meet you inside your advantageous14 position. Nor can it be said that Fabius avoided an engagement, but rather that he wanted to do it at his advantage. For, if Hannibal had gone to meet him, Fabius would have awaited him and fought an engagement with him: but Hannibal never dared to combat with him in the manner of his [Fabius]. So that an engagement was avoided as much by Hannibal as by Fabius: but if one of them had wanted to in any way, the other would have had three remedies, that is, the two mentioned above, or flight.
That what I say is true is clearly seen from a thousand examples, and especially in the war the Romans carried on with Philip of Macedonia, father of Perseus; for Philip being assaulted by the Romans, decided15 not to come to battle, and in order not to wanted to do first as Fabius Maximus had done in Italy, posting himself with his army on the summit of a mountain, where he greatly fortified16 himself, judging that the Romans would not dare to go to meet him. But they did go and combat him, and drove him from the mountain, and no longer being able to resist, fled with the greater part of his forces. And what saved him from being entirely17 destroyed was the irregularity of the country, which prevented the Romans from pursuing him. Philip, therefore, not wanting to come to battle, but being posted with his camp adjacent to the Romans, was forced to flee; and having learned from this experience that keeping on the mountains was not enough in wanting to avoid a battle, and not wanting to shut himself up in towns, decided to take the other method of staying many miles distant from the Roman camp. Whence, if the Romans were in one province, he would go into another: and thus whenever the Romans left one place, he would enter it. And seeing in the end that in prolonging the war by this means only worsened his condition, and that his subjects were oppressed now by him, now by the enemy, he decided to try the fortune of battle, and thus came to a regular engagement with the Romans.
It is useful, therefore, not to combat when the armies have such conditions as the army of Fabius had, and which that of C. Sulpicius did not have, that is, to have an army so good that the enemy will not dare to come to meet you within your strongholds; or that he is in your territory without having taken many footholds, so that he suffers from lack of supplies. And in this case the procedure is useful, for the reasons that Titus Livius says; No one should commit his fortune against a host, which time and the disadvantage of the place makes to deteriorate18 daily. But in any other case, the engagement cannot be avoided without danger and dishonor to you. For to flee (as Philip did) is as being routed, and with more disgrace when less proof is given of your virtu. And if he [Philip] had succeeded in saving himself, another would not have succeeded who was not aided by the country, as he was. No one will ever say that Hannibal was not a master of war; and if, when he was at the encounter with Scipio in Africa, he should have seen advantage in prolonging the war, he would have done so: and for the future (he being a good Captain and having a good army) he would have been able to do as Fabius did in Italy, but not having done so, it ought to be believed that some important reason had persuaded him. For a Prince who has an army put together, and sees that from a want of money or of friends he cannot maintain such an army for any length of time, is completely mad if he does not try the fortune [of battle] before such an army would be dissolved, because by waiting he loses for certain, but by trying he may be able to win. There is something else to be esteemed greatly, which is, that in losing one ought also to want to acquire glory: and there is more glory in being overcome by force, than by some other evil which causes you to lose. So must Hannibal also have been constrained19 by this necessity. And on the other hand Scipio, when Hannibal had delayed the engagement and lacked sufficient courage to go to meet him in his strongholds, did not suffer, for he had already defeated Syphax and acquired so much territory in Africa that he was able to remain there as secure and with convenience as in Italy. This did not happen to Hannibal when he was encountering Fabius, nor to those Gauls who were at the encounter with Sulpicius. So much less also can that man avoid an engagement who with the army assaults the country of others; for if he wants to enter the country of the enemy, he must (if the enemy comes to an encounter with him) come to battle with him; and if he besieges20 a town, he is so much more obliged to come to battle; as happened in our times to Duke Charles of Burgundy, who being in camp before Moratto, a town of the Swiss, was assaulted and routed by them; and as happened to the French army, while encamping before Novara, was routed by the Swiss in the same way.
1 adversary | |
adj.敌手,对手 | |
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2 deteriorating | |
恶化,变坏( deteriorate的现在分词 ) | |
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3 superfluous | |
adj.过多的,过剩的,多余的 | |
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4 deviate | |
v.(from)背离,偏离 | |
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5 esteemed | |
adj.受人尊敬的v.尊敬( esteem的过去式和过去分词 );敬重;认为;以为 | |
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6 pertains | |
关于( pertain的第三人称单数 ); 有关; 存在; 适用 | |
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7 prudence | |
n.谨慎,精明,节俭 | |
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8 proceedings | |
n.进程,过程,议程;诉讼(程序);公报 | |
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9 proceeding | |
n.行动,进行,(pl.)会议录,学报 | |
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10 prey | |
n.被掠食者,牺牲者,掠食;v.捕食,掠夺,折磨 | |
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11 valiant | |
adj.勇敢的,英勇的;n.勇士,勇敢的人 | |
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12 lengthen | |
vt.使伸长,延长 | |
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13 besieged | |
包围,围困,围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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14 advantageous | |
adj.有利的;有帮助的 | |
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15 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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16 fortified | |
adj. 加强的 | |
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17 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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18 deteriorate | |
v.变坏;恶化;退化 | |
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19 constrained | |
adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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20 besieges | |
包围,围困,围攻( besiege的第三人称单数 ) | |
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