How the Harshness of Manlius Torquatus and the Humanity of Valerius Corvinus Acquired the Same Glory for Each
There were in Rome at the same time two excellent Captains, Manlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus, who, of equal virtu and of equal triumphs and glory, were living in Rome; and each of them, as far as pertained1 to the enemy, acquired them by equal virtu, but, as far as pertained to the armies and their treatment of soldiers, they proceeded most differently; for Manlius commanded his with every kind of severity, [subjecting them] without intermission to hard work and punishment; Valerius, on the other hand, treated them with every kind and degree of humanity, and full of affability. Thus it is seen that in order to obtain the obedience2 of his soldiers, one put to death even his own son, and the other never harmed anyone. None the less, in such difference of procedure, each reaped the same fruit, both against the enemy and in favor of the Republic, as well as in their own interests. For no soldier refused to fight, or rebelled against them, or was in any way opposed to their will; although the commands of Manlius were so harsh that all other decrees which exceeded the ordinary were called Manlian Decrees. Here it is to be considered, first, whence it came that Manlius was constrained3 to proceed so rigidly4; next, whence it happened that Valerius was able to proceed so humanely5; another, what was the reason that these different methods obtain the same result; and lastly, which of them is it better and more useful to imitate.
If anyone well considers the nature of Manlius, from when T. Livius began to make mention of him, he will see him a very strong man, gentle toward his father and his country, and most respectful to his elders. These things we know from the defense6 of his father against a Tribune, and from the slaying7 of that Gaul, and how before he went to fight the Gaul he went to the Consul8 with these words: I will never fight the enemy without your order, not even if certain victory is in view. When a man thus constituted comes to the rank of command, he desires to find all men like himself, and his strong spirit makes his commands as strong, and these same (once they are commanded) he wants observed. And it is a true ruler, that when harsh things are commanded, they must be made to be observed with harshness, otherwise you will find yourself deceived. Here it is to be noted9 that in wanting to be obeyed, it is necessary to know how to command, and those who know how to command are those who make a comparison of their strength with that of those who have to obey; and when they are seen to be in proper proportion, then they command, when out of proper proportion, they abstain10. And, therefore, it was said by a prudent11 man, that to hold a Republic by violence it must be necessary that there be a proper proportion between he who forces and he who is forced. And anytime this proportion exists, it can be believed that that violent [regime] will endure. But when the oppressed is stronger than the oppressor, it can be feared that the violent [regime] should cease any day.
But returning to our discussion, I say that to give vigorous orders, one must be strong, and he who is of this strength and commands them, cannot then make them to be observed by gentle means: But he who is not of this strength of mind ought to guard himself from extraordinary decrees; but in the ordinary ones he can use his humanity, for ordinary punishments are not imputed12 to a Prince, but to laws and institutions. It ought therefore, to be believed that Manlius was constrained to proceed so rigorously by the extraordinary decrees of his, to which his nature inclined him, and which are useful in a Republic as it brings her back to her ancient virtu. And if one Republic should be so fortunate as to have often (as we said above) men who by their example restore the laws, and not only retain those which should not incur13 her ruin, but carry her in the opposite direction and perpetuate14 her existence. So that Manlius was one of those who by the harshness of his decrees retained the military discipline in Rome, constrained first by his nature, then by the desire he had for the observance of those [orders] which his natural temperament15 had made ordinary for him. On the other hand, Valerius was able to proceed humanely, as one to whom it sufficed that those things be observed which customarily were observed in the Roman armies. Which custom (because it was good) was enough to have him honored, and was not hard to be observed, and did not necessitate16 Valerius punishing the transgressors, as much because there weren’t any, as also, if there were any, they imputed (as was said) their punishment to the ordinances17 and not to the cruelty of the Prince. So that Valerius was able to arouse in himself every humaneness18, from which he acquired the good will of his soldiers and their contentment. Whence it happens that both obtaining the same obedience, they were able to act differently and obtain the same results. Those who may want to imitate these men can be exposed to those vices19 of contempt and hatred20, which as I have said above of Scipio and Hannibal, can be avoided by an excessive virtu which is in you, and not otherwise.
It remains21 now to be considered which of these methods of proceeding22 is more laudable, and this I believe is disputable, as writers praise both methods. None the less, those who write about how a Prince has to govern approach more toward Valerius than to Manlius, and Xenophon whom I have quoted before, in giving many examples of the humaneness of Cyrus, greatly conforms to what T. Livius says of Valerius. For when he was made Consul against the Samnites, and the day arriving when he was to do battle, he spoke23 to his soldiers with that humanity with which he governed them, and after relating this speech T. Livius says these words. No other leader was so familiar with his soldiers, sharing all burdens cheerfully, amongst even the lowest soldiers. In military exercises, he contested equally with his men, in tests of speed, and whether he won or was defeated, it was the same to him; nor did he ever object to any one who offered; in his actions he was benign24 in all things; in speech, he was no less concerned with the liberty of others, as of his own dignity; and in the arts of the magistrate25, he acted as if he was their petitioner26 (even though not of the people). T. Livius similarly speaks honorably of Manlius, showing that the severity in putting his son to death made the army so obey the Consul, that it was the cause of the Roman people obtaining the victory over the Latins; and in fact he goes on to praise him, that after such a victory, he describes all the orders of battle and shows all the dangers to which the Roman people were exposed, and the difficulties that were encountered in the winning, and makes this conclusion, that only the virtu of Manlius gave the victory to the Romans: And making a comparison of the strengths of both armies, he affirms that the portion which had Manlius as Consul had gained the victory. So that considering everything that the writers have said, it is difficult to judge. None the less, so as not to leave this part undecided, I say, that in a citizen who lives under the laws of a Republic, I believe the procedure of Manlius is more praiseworthy and less dangerous, because this method is all in favor of the public, and does not regard in any part private ambitions; for by such a method, partisans27 cannot be acquired; showing himself harsh to everyone and loving only the common good, a [commander] does not acquire particular friends (as we said above), such as we call partisans, So that such methods of procedure cannot be more useful or of more value in a Republic, as it does not lack usefulness to the public, and there not being able to be any suspicion of private power. But in the method of procedure of Valerius the contrary is the case; for although the same effects are produced as far as the public is concerned, none the less, many apprehensions29 spring up because of the particular [individual] good will which he acquires with the soldiers having, in a long rule, had effects against [public] liberty. And if these bad effects did not happen with [Valerius] Publicola, the reason was that the minds of the Romans were not yet corrupt30, and he had not been long and continuously governing them.
But if we have to consider a Prince, as Xenophon considers it, we must come near to Valerius in everything, and leave Manlius; for a Prince ought to seek obedience and love in his soldiers and subjects. Obedience will obtain for him their observance of the ordinances, and his being held a man of virtu: love will give him that affability, humanity, mercy, and all those other qualities which existed in Valerius, and which Xenophon writes also existed in Cyrus. For, a Prince being individually greatly desired, and having the army as his partisan28, conforms with the other interests of the State. But in a citizen who has the army as his partisan, this part does not conform to the other institutions, which cause him to live under the laws and obey the Magistrates31. Among the other ancient history of the Venetian Republic, it is to be read that when the Venetian galleys32 returned to Venice, a certain difference arose between the men of the galleys and the people, whereupon it came to tumults33 and arms; and the matter not being able to be quelled34, either by the power of the ministers, or by the respect for the [principal] citizens, or by fear of the Magistrates, but as soon as a Gentleman who had been their captain the previous year appeared before the sailors, because of their love for him, they departed and left the fight. Which obedience excited the suspicions of the Senate so much, that soon afterwards the Venetians assured themselves of him by imprisonment35 and putting him to death.
I conclude, therefore, that the procedure of Valerius is useful in a Prince, but pernicious in a citizen, not only towards the country, but towards himself: to the country because these methods prepare the way for Tyranny: to himself, because his city becoming suspicious of the method of his proceeding, is constrained to assure itself with injury to him. And, on the other hand, I affirm the procedure of Manlius to be harmful in a Prince, but useful in a citizen and especially to the country; and although it rarely harms him, unless this hatred which it engenders36 be made more severe by the suspicions which your other virtues37 and great reputation inspire, as we will discuss below [speaking] of Camillus.
1 pertained | |
关于( pertain的过去式和过去分词 ); 有关; 存在; 适用 | |
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2 obedience | |
n.服从,顺从 | |
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3 constrained | |
adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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4 rigidly | |
adv.刻板地,僵化地 | |
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5 humanely | |
adv.仁慈地;人道地;富人情地;慈悲地 | |
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6 defense | |
n.防御,保卫;[pl.]防务工事;辩护,答辩 | |
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7 slaying | |
杀戮。 | |
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8 consul | |
n.领事;执政官 | |
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9 noted | |
adj.著名的,知名的 | |
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10 abstain | |
v.自制,戒绝,弃权,避免 | |
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11 prudent | |
adj.谨慎的,有远见的,精打细算的 | |
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12 imputed | |
v.把(错误等)归咎于( impute的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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13 incur | |
vt.招致,蒙受,遭遇 | |
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14 perpetuate | |
v.使永存,使永记不忘 | |
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15 temperament | |
n.气质,性格,性情 | |
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16 necessitate | |
v.使成为必要,需要 | |
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17 ordinances | |
n.条例,法令( ordinance的名词复数 ) | |
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18 humaneness | |
n.深情,慈悲 | |
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19 vices | |
缺陷( vice的名词复数 ); 恶习; 不道德行为; 台钳 | |
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20 hatred | |
n.憎恶,憎恨,仇恨 | |
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21 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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22 proceeding | |
n.行动,进行,(pl.)会议录,学报 | |
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23 spoke | |
n.(车轮的)辐条;轮辐;破坏某人的计划;阻挠某人的行动 v.讲,谈(speak的过去式);说;演说;从某种观点来说 | |
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24 benign | |
adj.善良的,慈祥的;良性的,无危险的 | |
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25 magistrate | |
n.地方行政官,地方法官,治安官 | |
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26 petitioner | |
n.请愿人 | |
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27 partisans | |
游击队员( partisan的名词复数 ); 党人; 党羽; 帮伙 | |
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28 partisan | |
adj.党派性的;游击队的;n.游击队员;党徒 | |
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29 apprehensions | |
疑惧 | |
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30 corrupt | |
v.贿赂,收买;adj.腐败的,贪污的 | |
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31 magistrates | |
地方法官,治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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32 galleys | |
n.平底大船,战舰( galley的名词复数 );(船上或航空器上的)厨房 | |
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33 tumults | |
吵闹( tumult的名词复数 ); 喧哗; 激动的吵闹声; 心烦意乱 | |
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34 quelled | |
v.(用武力)制止,结束,镇压( quell的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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35 imprisonment | |
n.关押,监禁,坐牢 | |
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36 engenders | |
v.产生(某形势或状况),造成,引起( engender的第三人称单数 ) | |
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37 virtues | |
美德( virtue的名词复数 ); 德行; 优点; 长处 | |
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