Part 1 Chapter 11 Of natural affection

When he was visited by one of the magistrates¹, Epictetus inquired of him about several particulars, and asked if he had children and a wife. The man replied that he had; and Epictetus inquired further, how he felt under the circumstances. “Miserable,” the man said. Then Epictetus asked, “In what respect,” for men do not marry and beget² children in order to be wretched, but rather to be happy. “But I,” the man replied, “am so wretched about my children that lately, when my little daughter was sick and was supposed to be in danger, I could not endure to stay with her, but I left home till a person sent me news that she had recovered.” Well then, said Epictetus, do you think that you acted right? “I acted naturally,” the man replied. But convince me of this that you acted naturally, and I will convince you that everything which takes place according to nature takes place rightly. “This is the case,” said the man, “with all or at least most fathers.” I do not deny that: but the matter about which we are inquiring is whether such behavior is right; for in respect to this matter we must say that tumours³ also come for the good of the body, because they do come; and generally we must say that to do wrong is natural, because nearly all or at least most of us do wrong. Do you show me then how your behavior is natural. “I cannot,” he said; “but do you rather show me how it is not according to nature and is not rightly done.

Well, said Epictetus, if we were inquiring about white and black, what criterion should we employ for distinguishing between them? “The sight,” he said. And if about hot and cold, and hard and soft, what criterion? “The touch.” Well then, since we are inquiring about things which are according to nature, and those which are done rightly or not rightly, what kind of criterion do you think that we should employ? “I do not know,” he said. And yet not to know the criterion of colors and smells, and also of tastes, is perhaps no great harm; but if a man do not know the criterion of good and bad, and of things according to nature and contrary to nature, does this seem to you a small harm? “The greatest harm.” Come tell me, do all things which seem to some persons to be good and becoming rightly appear such; and at present as to Jews and Syrians and Egyptians and Romans, is it possible that the opinions of all of them in respect to food are right? “How is it possible?” he said. Well, I suppose it is absolutely necessary that, if the opinions of the Egyptians are right, the opinions of the rest must be wrong: if the opinions of the Jews are right, those of the rest cannot be right. “Certainly.” But where there is ignorance, there also there is want of learning and training in things which are necessary. He assented⁴ to this. You then, said Epictetus, since you know this, for the future will employ yourself seriously about nothing else, and will apply your mind to nothing else than to learn the criterion of things which are according to nature, and by using it also to determine each several thing. But in the present matter I have so much as this to aid you toward what you wish. Does affection to those of your family appear to you to be according to nature and to be good? “Certainly.” Well, is such affection natural and good, and is a thing consistent with reason not good? “By no means.” Is then that which is consistent with reason in contradiction with affection? “I think not.” You are right, for if it is otherwise, it is necessary that one of the contradictions being according to nature, the other must be contrary to nature. Is it not so? “It is,” he said. Whatever, then, we shall discover to be at the same time affectionate and also consistent with reason, this we confidently declare to be right and good. “Agreed.” Well then to leave your sick child and to go away is not reasonable, and I suppose that you will not say that it is; but it remains⁵ for us to inquire if it is consistent with affection. “Yes, let us consider.” Did you, then, since you had an affectionate disposition⁶ to your child, do right when you ran off and left her; and has the mother no affection for the child? “Certainly, she has.” Ought, then, the mother also to have left her, or ought she not? “She ought not.” And the nurse, does she love her? “She does.” Ought, then, she also to have left her? “By no means.” And the pedagogue⁷, does he not love her? “He does love her.” Ought, then, he also to have deserted⁸ her? and so should the child have been left alone and without help on account of the great affection of you, the parents, and of those about her, or should she have died in the hands of those who neither loved her nor cared for her? “Certainly not.” Now this is unfair and unreasonable⁹, not to allow those who have equal affection with yourself to do what you think to be proper for yourself to do because you have affection. It is absurd. Come then, if you were sick, would you wish your relations to be so affectionate, and all the rest, children and wife, as to leave you alone and deserted? “By no means.” And would you wish to be so loved by your own that through their excessive affection you would always be left alone in sickness? or for this reason would you rather pray, if it were possible, to be loved by your enemies and deserted by them? But if this is so, it results that your behavior was not at all an affectionate act.

Well then, was it nothing which moved you and induced you to desert your child? and how is that possible? But it might be something of the kind which moved a man at Rome to wrap up his head while a horse was running which he favoured; and when contrary to expectation the horse won, he required sponges to recover from his fainting fit. What then is the thing which moved? The exact discussion of this does not belong to the present occasion perhaps; but it is enough to be convinced of this, if what the philosophers say is true, that we must not look for it anywhere without, but in all cases it is one and the same thing which is the cause of our doing or not doing something, of saying or not saying something, of being elated or depressed¹⁰, of avoiding anything or pursuing: the very thing which is now the cause to me and to you, to you of coming to me and sitting and hearing, and to me of saying what I do say. And what is this? Is it any other than our will to do so? “No other.” But if we had willed otherwise, what else should we have been doing than that which we willed to do? This, then, was the cause of Achilles’ lamentation¹¹, not the death of Patroclus; for another man does not behave thus on the death of his companion; but it was because he chose to do so. And to you this was the very cause of your then running away, that you chose to do so; and on the other side, if you should stay with her, the reason will be the same. And now you are going to Rome because you choose; and if you should change your mind, you will not go thither¹². And in a word, neither death nor exile nor pain nor anything of the kind is the cause of our doing anything or not doing; but our own opinions and our wills.

Do I convince you of this or not? “You do convince me.” Such, then, as the causes are in each case, such also are the effects. When, then, we are doing anything not rightly, from this day we shall impute¹³ it to nothing else than to the will from which we have done it: and it is that which we shall endeavour to take away and to extirpate¹⁴ more than the tumours and abscesses out of the body. And in like manner we shall give the same account of the cause of the things which we do right; and we shall no longer allege¹⁵ as causes of any evil to us, either slave or neighbour, or wife or children, being persuaded that, if we do not think things to he what we do think them to be, we do not the acts which follow from such opinions; and as to thinking or not thinking, that is in our power and not in externals. “It is so,” he said. From this day then we shall inquire into and examine nothing else, what its quality is, or its state, neither land nor slaves nor horses nor dogs, nothing else than opinions. “I hope so.” You see, then, that you must become a Scholasticus, an animal whom all ridicule¹⁶, if you really intend to make an examination of your own opinions: and that this is not the work of one hour or day, you know yourself.

1 magistrates   

地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• to come up before the magistrates 在地方法院出庭
• He was summoned to appear before the magistrates. 他被传唤在地方法院出庭。

2 beget   

v.引起；产生

参考例句：

• Dragons beget dragons,phoenixes beget phoenixes.龙生龙，凤生凤。
• Economic tensions beget political ones.经济紧张导致政治紧张。

3 tumours   

肿瘤( tumour的名词复数 )

参考例句：

• Blood vessels develop abnormally in cancer tumours. 在癌肿瘤中血管出现不正常。
• This apparatus scans patients' brains for tumours. 这台仪器扫描检查病人的脑瘤。

4 assented   

同意，赞成( assent的过去式和过去分词 )

参考例句：

• The judge assented to allow the prisoner to speak. 法官同意允许犯人申辩。
• "No," assented Tom, "they don't kill the women -- they're too noble. “对，”汤姆表示赞同地说，“他们不杀女人——真伟大！

5 remains   

n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹

参考例句：

• He ate the remains of food hungrily.他狼吞虎咽地吃剩余的食物。
• The remains of the meal were fed to the dog.残羹剩饭喂狗了。

6 disposition   

n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署

参考例句：

• He has made a good disposition of his property.他已对财产作了妥善处理。
• He has a cheerful disposition.他性情开朗。

7 pedagogue   

n.教师

参考例句：

• The pedagogue is correcting the paper with a new pen.这位教师正用一支新笔批改论文。
• Misfortune is a good pedagogue.不幸是良好的教师。

8 deserted   

adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的

参考例句：

• The deserted village was filled with a deathly silence.这个荒废的村庄死一般的寂静。
• The enemy chieftain was opposed and deserted by his followers.敌人头目众叛亲离。

9 unreasonable   

adj.不讲道理的，不合情理的，过度的

参考例句：

• I know that they made the most unreasonable demands on you.我知道他们对你提出了最不合理的要求。
• They spend an unreasonable amount of money on clothes.他们花在衣服上的钱太多了。

10 depressed   

adj.沮丧的，抑郁的，不景气的，萧条的

参考例句：

• When he was depressed,he felt utterly divorced from reality.他心情沮丧时就感到完全脱离了现实。
• His mother was depressed by the sad news.这个坏消息使他的母亲意志消沉。

11 lamentation   

n.悲叹，哀悼

参考例句：

• This ingredient does not invite or generally produce lugubrious lamentation. 这一要素并不引起，或者说通常不产生故作悲伤的叹息。 来自哲学部分
• Much lamentation followed the death of the old king. 老国王晏驾，人们悲恸不已。 来自辞典例句

12 thither   

adv.向那里；adj.在那边的，对岸的

参考例句：

• He wandered hither and thither looking for a playmate.他逛来逛去找玩伴。
• He tramped hither and thither.他到处流浪。

13 impute   

v.归咎于

参考例句：

• I impute his failure to laziness.我把他的失败归咎于他的懒惰。
• It is grossly unfair to impute blame to the United Nations.把责任归咎于联合国极其不公。

14 extirpate   

v.除尽，灭绝

参考例句：

• The country must extirpate the evils of drug abuse.这个国家必须根除毒品泛滥的罪恶。
• St. augustine knew how to use severity to extirpate the heresy.圣奥古斯丁知道如何使用的严重性消灭的异端邪说。

15 allege   

vt.宣称，申述，主张，断言

参考例句：

• The newspaper reporters allege that the man was murdered but they have given no proof.新闻记者们宣称这个男人是被谋杀的，但他们没提出证据。
• Students occasionally allege illness as the reason for absence.学生时不时会称病缺课。

16 ridicule   

v.讥讽，挖苦；n.嘲弄

参考例句：

• You mustn't ridicule unfortunate people.你不该嘲笑不幸的人。
• Silly mistakes and queer clothes often arouse ridicule.荒谬的错误和古怪的服装常会引起人们的讪笑。