After I joined the company, whom I found sitting in CLEANTHES's library, DEMEA paid CLEANTHES some compliments on the great care which he took of my education, and on his unwearied perseverance1 and constancy in all his friendships. The father of PAMPHILUS, said he, was your intimate friend: The son is your pupil; and may indeed be regarded as your adopted son, were we to judge by the pains which you bestow2 in conveying to him every useful branch of literature and science. You are no more wanting, I am persuaded, in prudence3, than in industry. I shall, therefore, communicate to you a maxim4, which I have observed with regard to my own children, that I may learn how far it agrees with your practice. The method I follow in their education is founded on the saying of an ancient, "That students of philosophy ought first to learn logics5, then ethics6, next physics, last of all the nature of the gods." [Chrysippus apud Plut: de repug: Stoicorum] This science of natural theology, according to him, being the most profound and abstruse7 of any, required the maturest judgement in its students; and none but a mind enriched with all the other sciences, can safely be entrusted8 with it.
Are you so late, says PHILO, in teaching your children the principles of religion? Is there no danger of their neglecting, or rejecting altogether those opinions of which they have heard so little during the whole course of their education? It is only as a science, replied DEMEA, subjected to human reasoning and disputation, that I postpone9 the study of Natural Theology. To season their minds with early piety10, is my chief care; and by continual precept11 and instruction, and I hope too by example, I imprint12 deeply on their tender minds an habitual13 reverence14 for all the principles of religion. While they pass through every other science, I still remark the uncertainty15 of each part; the eternal disputations of men; the obscurity of all philosophy; and the strange, ridiculous conclusions, which some of the greatest geniuses have derived16 from the principles of mere17 human reason. Having thus tamed their mind to a proper submission18 and self-diffidence, I have no longer any scruple19 of opening to them the greatest mysteries of religion; nor apprehend20 any danger from that assuming arrogance21 of philosophy, which may lead them to reject the most established doctrines22 and opinions.
Your precaution, says PHILO, of seasoning24 your children's minds early with piety, is certainly very reasonable; and no more than is requisite25 in this profane26 and irreligious age. But what I chiefly admire in your plan of education, is your method of drawing advantage from the very principles of philosophy and learning, which, by inspiring pride and self-sufficiency, have commonly, in all ages, been found so destructive to the principles of religion. The vulgar, indeed, we may remark, who are unacquainted with science and profound inquiry27, observing the endless disputes of the learned, have commonly a thorough contempt for philosophy; and rivet28 themselves the faster, by that means, in the great points of theology which have been taught them. Those who enter a little into study and study and inquiry, finding many appearances of evidence in doctrines the newest and most extraordinary, think nothing too difficult for human reason; and, presumptuously29 breaking through all fences, profane the inmost sanctuaries31 of the temple. But CLEANTHES will, I hope, agree with me, that, after we have abandoned ignorance, the surest remedy, there is still one expedient32 left to prevent this profane liberty. Let DEMEA's principles be improved and cultivated: Let us become thoroughly33 sensible of the weakness, blindness, and narrow limits of human reason: Let us duly consider its uncertainty and endless contrarieties, even in subjects of common life and practice: Let the errors and deceits of our very senses be set before us; the insuperable difficulties which attend first principles in all systems; the contradictions which adhere to the very ideas of matter, cause and effect, extension, space, time, motion; and in a word, quantity of all kinds, the object of the only science that can fairly pretend to any certainty or evidence. When these topics are displayed in their full light, as they are by some philosophers and almost all divines; who can retain such confidence in this frail34 faculty35 of reason as to pay any regard to its determinations in points so sublime36, so abstruse, so remote from common life and experience? When the coherence37 of the parts of a stone, or even that composition of parts which renders it extended; when these familiar objects, I say, are so inexplicable38, and contain circumstances so repugnant and contradictory39; with what assurance can we decide concerning the origin of worlds, or trace their history from eternity40 to eternity?
While PHILO pronounced these words, I could observe a smile in the countenance41 both of DEMEA and CLEANTHES. That of DEMEA seemed to imply an unreserved satisfaction in the doctrines delivered: But, in CLEANTHES's features, I could distinguish an air of finesse42; as if he perceived some raillery or artificial malice43 in the reasonings of PHILO.
You propose then, PHILO, said CLEANTHES, to erect44 religious faith on philosophical45 scepticism; and you think, that if certainty or evidence be expelled from every other subject of inquiry, it will all retire to these theological doctrines, and there acquire a superior force and authority. Whether your scepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend, we shall learn by and by, when the company breaks up: We shall then see, whether you go out at the door or the window; and whether you really doubt if your body has gravity, or can be injured by its fall; according to popular opinion, derived from our fallacious senses, and more fallacious experience. And this consideration, DEMEA, may, I think, fairly serve to abate46 our ill-will to this humorous sect47 of the sceptics. If they be thoroughly in earnest, they will not long trouble the world with their doubts, cavils48, and disputes: If they be only in jest, they are, perhaps, bad raillers; but can never be very dangerous, either to the state, to philosophy, or to religion.
In reality, PHILO, continued he, it seems certain, that though a man, in a flush of humour, after intense reflection on the many contradictions and imperfections of human reason, may entirely49 renounce50 all belief and opinion, it is impossible for him to persevere51 in this total scepticism, or make it appear in his conduct for a few hours. External objects press in upon him; passions solicit52 him; his philosophical melancholy53 dissipates; and even the utmost violence upon his own temper will not be able, during any time, to preserve the poor appearance of scepticism. And for what reason impose on himself such a violence? This is a point in which it will be impossible for him ever to satisfy himself, consistently with his sceptical principles. So that, upon the whole, nothing could be more ridiculous than the principles of the ancient PYRRHONIANS; if in reality they endeavoured, as is pretended, to extend, throughout, the same scepticism which they had learned from the declamations of their schools, and which they ought to have confined to them.
In this view, there appears a great resemblance between the sects55 of the STOICS56 and PYRRHONIANS, though perpetual antagonists57; and both of them seem founded on this erroneous maxim, That what a man can perform sometimes, and in some dispositions58, he can perform always, and in every disposition59. When the mind, by Stoical reflections, is elevated into a sublime enthusiasm of virtue60, and strongly smit with any species of honour or public good, the utmost bodily pain and sufferings will not prevail over such a high sense of duty; and it is possible, perhaps, by its means, even to smile and exult61 in the midst of tortures. If this sometimes may be the case in fact and reality, much more may a philosopher, in his school, or even in his closet, work himself up to such an enthusiasm, and support in imagination the acutest pain or most calamitous62 event which he can possibly conceive. But how shall he support this enthusiasm itself? The bent63 of his mind relaxes, and cannot be recalled at pleasure; avocations64 lead him astray; misfortunes attack him unawares; and the philosopher sinks by degrees into the plebeian65.
I allow of your comparison between the STOICS and SKEPTICS, replied PHILO. But you may observe, at the same time, that though the mind cannot, in Stoicism, support the highest flights of philosophy, yet, even when it sinks lower, it still retains somewhat of its former disposition; and the effects of the Stoic's reasoning will appear in his conduct in common life, and through the whole tenor66 of his actions. The ancient schools, particularly that of ZENO, produced examples of virtue and constancy which seem astonishing to present times.
Vain Wisdom all and false Philosophy.
Yet with a pleasing sorcery could charm
Pain, for a while, or anguish67; and excite
Fallacious Hope, or arm the obdurate68 breast
With stubborn Patience, as with triple steel.
In like manner, if a man has accustomed himself to sceptical considerations on the uncertainty and narrow limits of reason, he will not entirely forget them when he turns his reflection on other subjects; but in all his philosophical principles and reasoning, I dare not say in his common conduct, he will be found different from those, who either never formed any opinions in the case, or have entertained sentiments more favourable69 to human reason.
To whatever length any one may push his speculative70 principles of scepticism, he must act, I own, and live, and converse71, like other men; and for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other reason, than the absolute necessity he lies under of so doing. If he ever carries his speculations72 further than this necessity constrains73 him, and philosophises either on natural or moral subjects, he is allured74 by a certain pleasure and satisfaction which he finds in employing himself after that manner. He considers besides, that every one, even in common life, is constrained75 to have more or less of this philosophy; that from our earliest infancy76 we make continual advances in forming more general principles of conduct and reasoning; that the larger experience we acquire, and the stronger reason we are endued77 with, we always render our principles the more general and comprehensive; and that what we call philosophy is nothing but a more regular and methodical operation of the same kind. To philosophise on such subjects, is nothing essentially78 different from reasoning on common life; and we may only expect greater stability, if not greater truth, from our philosophy, on account of its exacter and more scrupulous79 method of proceeding80.
But when we look beyond human affairs and the properties of the surrounding bodies: when we carry our speculations into the two eternities, before and after the present state of things; into the creation and formation of the universe; the existence and properties of spirits; the powers and operations of one universal Spirit existing without beginning and without end; omnipotent81, omniscient82, immutable83, infinite, and incomprehensible: We must be far removed from the smallest tendency to scepticism not to be apprehensive84, that we have here got quite beyond the reach of our faculties85. So long as we confine our speculations to trade, or morals, or politics, or criticism, we make appeals, every moment, to common sense and experience, which strengthen our philosophical conclusions, and remove, at least in part, the suspicion which we so justly entertain with regard to every reasoning that is very subtle and refined. But, in theological reasonings, we have not this advantage; while, at the same time, we are employed upon objects, which, we must be sensible, are too large for our grasp, and of all others, require most to be familiarised to our apprehension86. We are like foreigners in a strange country, to whom every thing must seem suspicious, and who are in danger every moment of transgressing87 against the laws and customs of the people with whom they live and converse. We know not how far we ought to trust our vulgar methods of reasoning in such a subject; since, even in common life, and in that province which is peculiarly appropriated to them, we cannot account for them, and are entirely guided by a kind of instinct or necessity in employing them.
All sceptics pretend, that, if reason be considered in an abstract view, it furnishes invincible88 arguments against itself; and that we could never retain any conviction or assurance, on any subject, were not the sceptical reasonings so refined and subtle, that they are not able to counterpoise the more solid and more natural arguments derived from the senses and experience. But it is evident, whenever our arguments lose this advantage, and run wide of common life, that the most refined scepticism comes to be upon a footing with them, and is able to oppose and counterbalance them. The one has no more weight than the other. The mind must remain in suspense89 between them; and it is that very suspense or balance, which is the triumph of scepticism.
But I observe, says CLEANTHES, with regard to you, PHILO, and all speculative sceptics, that your doctrine23 and practice are as much at variance90 in the most abstruse points of theory as in the conduct of common life. Wherever evidence discovers itself, you adhere to it, notwithstanding your pretended scepticism; and I can observe, too, some of your sect to be as decisive as those who make greater professions of certainty and assurance. In reality, would not a man be ridiculous, who pretended to reject NEWTON's explication of the wonderful phenomenon of the rainbow, because that explication gives a minute anatomy91 of the rays of light; a subject, forsooth, too refined for human comprehension? And what would you say to one, who, having nothing particular to object to the arguments of COPERNICUS and GALILEO for the motion of the earth, should withhold92 his assent93, on that general principle, that these subjects were too magnificent and remote to be explained by the narrow and fallacious reason of mankind?
There is indeed a kind of brutish and ignorant scepticism, as you well observed, which gives the vulgar a general prejudice against what they do not easily understand, and makes them reject every principle which requires elaborate reasoning to prove and establish it. This species of scepticism is fatal to knowledge, not to religion; since we find, that those who make greatest profession of it, give often their assent, not only to the great truths of Theism and natural theology, but even to the most absurd tenets which a traditional superstition94 has recommended to them. They firmly believe in witches, though they will not believe nor attend to the most simple proposition of Euclid. But the refined and philosophical sceptics fall into an inconsistence of an opposite nature. They push their researches into the most abstruse corners of science; and their assent attends them in every step, proportioned to the evidence which they meet with. They are even obliged to acknowledge, that the most abstruse and remote objects are those which are best explained by philosophy. Light is in reality anatomised. The true system of the heavenly bodies is discovered and ascertained95. But the nourishment96 of bodies by food is still an inexplicable mystery. The cohesion97 of the parts of matter is still incomprehensible. These sceptics, therefore, are obliged, in every question, to consider each particular evidence apart, and proportion their assent to the precise degree of evidence which occurs. This is their practice in all natural, mathematical, moral, and political science. And why not the same, I ask, in the theological and religious? Why must conclusions of this nature be alone rejected on the general presumption98 of the insufficiency of human reason, without any particular discussion of the evidence? Is not such an unequal conduct a plain proof of prejudice and passion?
Our senses, you say, are fallacious; our understanding erroneous; our ideas, even of the most familiar objects, extension, duration, motion, full of absurdities99 and contradictions. You defy me to solve the difficulties, or reconcile the repugnancies which you discover in them. I have not capacity for so great an undertaking100: I have not leisure for it: I perceive it to be superfluous101. Your own conduct, in every circumstance, refutes your principles, and shows the firmest reliance on all the received maxims102 of science, morals, prudence, and behaviour.
I shall never assent to so harsh an opinion as that of a celebrated103 writer [L'Arte de penser], who says, that the Sceptics are not a sect of philosophers: They are only a sect of liars104. I may, however, affirm (I hope without offence), that they are a sect of jesters or raillers. But for my part, whenever I find myself disposed to mirth and amusement, I shall certainly choose my entertainment of a less perplexing and abstruse nature. A comedy, a novel, or at most a history, seems a more natural recreation than such metaphysical subtleties105 and abstractions.
In vain would the sceptic make a distinction between science and common life, or between one science and another. The arguments employed in all, if just, are of a similar nature, and contain the same force and evidence. Or if there be any difference among them, the advantage lies entirely on the side of theology and natural religion. Many principles of mechanics are founded on very abstruse reasoning; yet no man who has any pretensions106 to science, even no speculative sceptic, pretends to entertain the least doubt with regard to them. The COPERNICAN system contains the most surprising paradox107, and the most contrary to our natural conceptions, to appearances, and to our very senses: yet even monks108 and inquisitors are now constrained to withdraw their opposition109 to it. And shall PHILO, a man of so liberal a genius and extensive knowledge, entertain any general undistinguished scruples110 with regard to the religious hypothesis, which is founded on the simplest and most obvious arguments, and, unless it meets with artificial obstacles, has such easy access and admission into the mind of man?
And here we may observe, continued he, turning himself towards DEMEA, a pretty curious circumstance in the history of the sciences. After the union of philosophy with the popular religion, upon the first establishment of Christianity, nothing was more usual, among all religious teachers, than declamations against reason, against the senses, against every principle derived merely from human research and inquiry. All the topics of the ancient academics were adopted by the fathers; and thence propagated for several ages in every school and pulpit throughout Christendom. The Reformers embraced the same principles of reasoning, or rather declamation54; and all panegyrics112 on the excellency of faith, were sure to be interlarded with some severe strokes of satire113 against natural reason. A celebrated prelate [Monsr. Huet] too, of the Romish communion, a man of the most extensive learning, who wrote a demonstration114 of Christianity, has also composed a treatise115, which contains all the cavils of the boldest and most determined116 PYRRHONISM. LOCKE seems to have been the first Christian111 who ventured openly to assert, that faith was nothing but a species of reason; that religion was only a branch of philosophy; and that a chain of arguments, similar to that which established any truth in morals, politics, or physics, was always employed in discovering all the principles of theology, natural and revealed. The ill use which BAYLE and other libertines117 made of the philosophical scepticism of the fathers and first reformers, still further propagated the judicious118 sentiment of Mr. LOCKE: And it is now in a manner avowed119, by all pretenders to reasoning and philosophy, that Atheist120 and Sceptic are almost synonymous. And as it is certain that no man is in earnest when he professes121 the latter principle, I would fain hope that there are as few who seriously maintain the former.
Don't you remember, said PHILO, the excellent saying of LORD BACON on this head? That a little philosophy, replied CLEANTHES, makes a man an Atheist: A great deal converts him to religion. That is a very judicious remark too, said PHILO. But what I have in my eye is another passage, where, having mentioned DAVID's fool, who said in his heart there is no God, this great philosopher observes, that the Atheists nowadays have a double share of folly122; for they are not contented123 to say in their hearts there is no God, but they also utter that impiety124 with their lips, and are thereby125 guilty of multiplied indiscretion and imprudence. Such people, though they were ever so much in earnest, cannot, methinks, be very formidable.
But though you should rank me in this class of fools, I cannot forbear communicating a remark that occurs to me, from the history of the religious and irreligious scepticism with which you have entertained us. It appears to me, that there are strong symptoms of priestcraft in the whole progress of this affair. During ignorant ages, such as those which followed the dissolution of the ancient schools, the priests perceived, that Atheism126, Deism, or heresy127 of any kind, could only proceed from the presumptuous30 questioning of received opinions, and from a belief that human reason was equal to every thing. Education had then a mighty128 influence over the minds of men, and was almost equal in force to those suggestions of the senses and common understanding, by which the most determined sceptic must allow himself to be governed. But at present, when the influence of education is much diminished, and men, from a more open commerce of the world, have learned to compare the popular principles of different nations and ages, our sagacious divines have changed their whole system of philosophy, and talk the language of STOICS, PLATONISTS, and PERIPATETICS, not that of PYRRHONIANS and ACADEMICS. If we distrust human reason, we have now no other principle to lead us into religion. Thus, sceptics in one age, dogmatists in another; whichever system best suits the purpose of these reverend gentlemen, in giving them an ascendant over mankind, they are sure to make it their favourite principle, and established tenet.
It is very natural, said CLEANTHES, for men to embrace those principles, by which they find they can best defend their doctrines; nor need we have any recourse to priestcraft to account for so reasonable an expedient. And, surely nothing can afford a stronger presumption, that any set of principles are true, and ought to be embraced, than to observe that they tend to the confirmation129 of true religion, and serve to confound the cavils of Atheists, Libertines, and Freethinkers of all denominations130.
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1
perseverance
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| n.坚持不懈，不屈不挠 | |
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2
bestow
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| v.把…赠与，把…授予；花费 | |
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prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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logics
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| n.逻辑（学）( logic的名词复数 )；逻辑学；（做某事的）道理；推理方法 | |
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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abstruse
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| adj.深奥的，难解的 | |
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entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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9
postpone
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| v.延期，推迟 | |
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10
piety
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| n.虔诚，虔敬 | |
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11
precept
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| n.戒律；格言 | |
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imprint
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| n.印痕，痕迹；深刻的印象；vt.压印，牢记 | |
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13
habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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14
reverence
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| n.敬畏，尊敬，尊严；Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称；v.尊敬，敬畏，崇敬 | |
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uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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18
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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scruple
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| n./v.顾忌，迟疑 | |
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apprehend
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| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
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arrogance
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| n.傲慢，自大 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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seasoning
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| n.调味；调味料；增添趣味之物 | |
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requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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profane
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| adj.亵神的，亵渎的；vt.亵渎，玷污 | |
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27
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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rivet
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| n.铆钉；vt.铆接，铆牢；集中(目光或注意力) | |
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29
presumptuously
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| adv.自以为是地，专横地，冒失地 | |
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presumptuous
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| adj.胆大妄为的，放肆的，冒昧的，冒失的 | |
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sanctuaries
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| n.避难所( sanctuary的名词复数 )；庇护；圣所；庇护所 | |
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expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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frail
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| adj.身体虚弱的；易损坏的 | |
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faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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sublime
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| adj.崇高的，伟大的；极度的，不顾后果的 | |
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coherence
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| n.紧凑；连贯；一致性 | |
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inexplicable
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| adj.无法解释的，难理解的 | |
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contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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40
eternity
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| n.不朽，来世；永恒，无穷 | |
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countenance
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| n.脸色，面容；面部表情；vt.支持，赞同 | |
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finesse
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| n.精密技巧，灵巧，手腕 | |
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malice
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| n.恶意，怨恨，蓄意；[律]预谋 | |
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erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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abate
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| vi.(风势，疼痛等)减弱，减轻，减退 | |
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sect
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| n.派别，宗教，学派，派系 | |
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cavils
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| v.挑剔，吹毛求疵( cavil的第三人称单数 ) | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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renounce
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| v.放弃；拒绝承认，宣布与…断绝关系 | |
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51
persevere
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| v.坚持，坚忍，不屈不挠 | |
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52
solicit
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| vi.勾引；乞求；vt.请求，乞求；招揽(生意) | |
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53
melancholy
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| n.忧郁，愁思；adj.令人感伤（沮丧）的，忧郁的 | |
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declamation
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| n. 雄辩，高调 | |
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55
sects
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| n.宗派，教派( sect的名词复数 ) | |
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stoics
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| 禁欲主义者，恬淡寡欲的人，不以苦乐为意的人( stoic的名词复数 ) | |
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antagonists
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| 对立[对抗] 者，对手，敌手( antagonist的名词复数 )； 对抗肌； 对抗药 | |
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dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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exult
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| v.狂喜，欢腾；欢欣鼓舞 | |
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calamitous
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| adj.灾难的，悲惨的；多灾多难；惨重 | |
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bent
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| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
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avocations
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| n.业余爱好，嗜好( avocation的名词复数 )；职业 | |
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65
plebeian
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| adj.粗俗的；平民的；n.平民；庶民 | |
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66
tenor
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| n.男高音（歌手），次中音（乐器），要旨，大意 | |
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anguish
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| n.(尤指心灵上的)极度痛苦，烦恼 | |
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obdurate
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| adj.固执的，顽固的 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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converse
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| vi.谈话，谈天，闲聊；adv.相反的，相反 | |
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speculations
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| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
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73
constrains
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| 强迫( constrain的第三人称单数 )； 强使； 限制； 约束 | |
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allured
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| 诱引，吸引( allure的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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constrained
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| adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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infancy
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| n.婴儿期；幼年期；初期 | |
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endued
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| v.授予，赋予（特性、才能等）( endue的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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scrupulous
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| adj.审慎的，小心翼翼的，完全的，纯粹的 | |
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proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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omnipotent
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| adj.全能的，万能的 | |
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omniscient
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| adj.无所不知的；博识的 | |
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immutable
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| adj.不可改变的，永恒的 | |
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apprehensive
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| adj.担心的，恐惧的，善于领会的 | |
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faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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transgressing
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| v.超越( transgress的现在分词 )；越过；违反；违背 | |
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invincible
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| adj.不可征服的，难以制服的 | |
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suspense
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| n.（对可能发生的事）紧张感，担心，挂虑 | |
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variance
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| n.矛盾，不同 | |
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anatomy
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| n.解剖学，解剖；功能，结构，组织 | |
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withhold
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| v.拒绝，不给；使停止，阻挡 | |
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assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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superstition
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| n.迷信，迷信行为 | |
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ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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nourishment
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| n.食物，营养品；营养情况 | |
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cohesion
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| n.团结，凝结力 | |
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98
presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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absurdities
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| n.极端无理性( absurdity的名词复数 )；荒谬；谬论；荒谬的行为 | |
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100
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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101
superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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102
maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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103
celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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104
liars
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| 说谎者( liar的名词复数 ) | |
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subtleties
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| 细微( subtlety的名词复数 )； 精细； 巧妙； 细微的差别等 | |
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pretensions
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| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
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107
paradox
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| n.似乎矛盾却正确的说法；自相矛盾的人(物) | |
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108
monks
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| n.修道士，僧侣( monk的名词复数 ) | |
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109
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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110
scruples
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| n.良心上的不安( scruple的名词复数 )；顾虑，顾忌v.感到于心不安，有顾忌( scruple的第三人称单数 ) | |
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111
Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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112
panegyrics
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| n.赞美( panegyric的名词复数 )；称颂；颂词；颂扬的演讲或文章 | |
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113
satire
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| n.讽刺，讽刺文学，讽刺作品 | |
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114
demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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115
treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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116
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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117
libertines
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| n.放荡不羁的人，淫荡的人( libertine的名词复数 ) | |
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118
judicious
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| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
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119
avowed
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| adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
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120
atheist
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| n.无神论者 | |
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121
professes
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| 声称( profess的第三人称单数 )； 宣称； 公开表明； 信奉 | |
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122
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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123
contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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124
impiety
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| n.不敬；不孝 | |
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125
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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126
atheism
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| n.无神论，不信神 | |
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127
heresy
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| n.异端邪说；异教 | |
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128
mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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129
confirmation
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| n.证实，确认，批准 | |
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130
denominations
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| n.宗派( denomination的名词复数 )；教派；面额；名称 | |
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