I must own, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, that nothing can more surprise me, than the light in which you have all along put this argument. By the whole tenor1 of your discourse2, one would imagine that you were maintaining the Being of a God, against the cavils3 of Atheists and Infidels; and were necessitated4 to become a champion for that fundamental principle of all religion. But this, I hope, is not by any means a question among us. No man, no man at least of common sense, I am persuaded, ever entertained a serious doubt with regard to a truth so certain and self-evident. The question is not concerning the being, but the nature of God. This, I affirm, from the infirmities of human understanding, to be altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us. The essence of that supreme5 Mind, his attributes, the manner of his existence, the very nature of his duration; these, and every particular which regards so divine a Being, are mysterious to men. Finite, weak, and blind creatures, we ought to humble6 ourselves in his august presence; and, conscious of our frailties7, adore in silence his infinite perfections, which eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. They are covered in a deep cloud from human curiosity. It is profaneness8 to attempt penetrating9 through these sacred obscurities. And, next to the impiety10 of denying his existence, is the temerity12 of prying13 into his nature and essence, decrees and attributes.
But lest you should think that my piety11 has here got the better of my philosophy, I shall support my opinion, if it needs any support, by a very great authority. I might cite all the divines, almost, from the foundation of Christianity, who have ever treated of this or any other theological subject: But I shall confine myself, at present, to one equally celebrated14 for piety and philosophy. It is Father MALEBRANCHE, who, I remember, thus expresses himself [Recherche de la Verite. Liv. 3. Chap.9]. "One ought not so much," says he, "to call God a spirit, in order to express positively15 what he is, as in order to signify that he is not matter. He is a Being infinitely16 perfect: Of this we cannot doubt. But in the same manner as we ought not to imagine, even supposing him corporeal17, that he is clothed with a human body, as the ANTHROPOMORPHITES asserted, under colour that that figure was the most perfect of any; so, neither ought we to imagine that the spirit of God has human ideas, or bears any resemblance to our spirit, under colour that we know nothing more perfect than a human mind. We ought rather to believe, that as he comprehends the perfections of matter without being material. . . . he comprehends also the perfections of created spirits without being spirit, in the manner we conceive spirit: That his true name is, He that is; or, in other words, Being without restriction18, All Being, the Being infinite and universal."
After so great an authority, DEMEA, replied PHILO, as that which you have produced, and a thousand more which you might produce, it would appear ridiculous in me to add my sentiment, or express my approbation19 of your doctrine20. But surely, where reasonable men treat these subjects, the question can never be concerning the Being, but only the Nature, of the Deity21. The former truth, as you well observe, is unquestionable and self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause; and the original cause of this universe (whatever it be) we call God; and piously22 ascribe to him every species of perfection. Whoever scruples24 this fundamental truth, deserves every punishment which can be inflicted26 among philosophers, to wit, the greatest ridicule27, contempt, and disapprobation. But as all perfection is entirely28 relative, we ought never to imagine that we comprehend the attributes of this divine Being, or to suppose that his perfections have any analogy or likeness29 to the perfections of a human creature. Wisdom, Thought, Design, Knowledge; these we justly ascribe to him; because these words are honourable30 among men, and we have no other language or other conceptions by which we can express our adoration31 of him. But let us beware, lest we think that our ideas anywise correspond to his perfections, or that his attributes have any resemblance to these qualities among men. He is infinitely superior to our limited view and comprehension; and is more the object of worship in the temple, than of disputation in the schools.
In reality, CLEANTHES, continued he, there is no need of having recourse to that affected32 scepticism so displeasing33 to you, in order to come at this determination. Our ideas reach no further than our experience. We have no experience of divine attributes and operations. I need not conclude my syllogism34. You can draw the inference yourself. And it is a pleasure to me (and I hope to you too) that just reasoning and sound piety here concur35 in the same conclusion, and both of them establish the adorably mysterious and incomprehensible nature of the Supreme Being.
Not to lose any time in circumlocutions, said CLEANTHES, addressing himself to DEMEA, much less in replying to the pious23 declamations of PHILO; I shall briefly36 explain how I conceive this matter. Look round the world: contemplate37 the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided38 into an infinite number of lesser39 machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties40 can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration41 all men who have ever contemplated42 them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed43 of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur44 of the work which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.
I shall be so free, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, as to tell you, that from the beginning, I could not approve of your conclusion concerning the similarity of the Deity to men; still less can I approve of the mediums by which you endeavour to establish it. What! No demonstration45 of the Being of God! No abstract arguments! No proofs a priori! Are these, which have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy, all sophism46? Can we reach no further in this subject than experience and probability? I will not say that this is betraying the cause of a Deity: But surely, by this affected candour, you give advantages to Atheists, which they never could obtain by the mere47 dint48 of argument and reasoning.
What I chiefly scruple25 in this subject, said PHILO, is not so much that all religious arguments are by CLEANTHES reduced to experience, as that they appear not to be even the most certain and irrefragable of that inferior kind. That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the earth has solidity, we have observed a thousand and a thousand times; and when any new instance of this nature is presented, we draw without hesitation49 the accustomed inference. The exact similarity of the cases gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event; and a stronger evidence is never desired nor sought after. But wherever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty50. After having experienced the circulation of the blood in human creatures, we make no doubt that it takes place in TITIUS and MAEVIUS. But from its circulation in frogs and fishes, it is only a presumption51, though a strong one, from analogy, that it takes place in men and other animals. The analogical reasoning is much weaker, when we infer the circulation of the sap in vegetables from our experience that the blood circulates in animals; and those, who hastily followed that imperfect analogy, are found, by more accurate experiments, to have been mistaken.
If we see a house, CLEANTHES, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder; because this is precisely52 that species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture53, a presumption concerning a similar cause; and how that pretension54 will be received in the world, I leave you to consider.
It would surely be very ill received, replied CLEANTHES; and I should be deservedly blamed and detested55, did I allow, that the proofs of a Deity amounted to no more than a guess or conjecture. But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a resemblance? The economy of final causes? The order, proportion, and arrangement of every part? Steps of a stair are plainly contrived56, that human legs may use them in mounting; and this inference is certain and infallible. Human legs are also contrived for walking and mounting; and this inference, I allow, is not altogether so certain, because of the dissimilarity which you remark; but does it, therefore, deserve the name only of presumption or conjecture?
Good God! cried DEMEA, interrupting him, where are we? Zealous57 defenders58 of religion allow, that the proofs of a Deity fall short of perfect evidence! And you, PHILO, on whose assistance I depended in proving the adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, do you assent59 to all these extravagant60 opinions of CLEANTHES? For what other name can I give them? or, why spare my censure61, when such principles are advanced, supported by such an authority, before so young a man as PAMPHILUS?
You seem not to apprehend62, replied PHILO, that I argue with CLEANTHES in his own way; and, by showing him the dangerous consequences of his tenets, hope at last to reduce him to our opinion. But what sticks most with you, I observe, is the representation which CLEANTHES has made of the argument a posteriori; and finding that that argument is likely to escape your hold and vanish into air, you think it so disguised, that you can scarcely believe it to be set in its true light. Now, however much I may dissent63, in other respects, from the dangerous principles of CLEANTHES, I must allow that he has fairly represented that argument; and I shall endeavour so to state the matter to you, that you will entertain no further scruples with regard to it.
Were a man to abstract from every thing which he knows or has seen, he would be altogether incapable64, merely from his own ideas, to determine what kind of scene the universe must be, or to give the preference to one state or situation of things above another. For as nothing which he clearly conceives could be esteemed65 impossible or implying a contradiction, every chimera66 of his fancy would be upon an equal footing; nor could he assign any just reason why he adheres to one idea or system, and rejects the others which are equally possible.
Again; after he opens his eyes, and contemplates67 the world as it really is, it would be impossible for him at first to assign the cause of any one event, much less of the whole of things, or of the universe. He might set his fancy a rambling68; and she might bring him in an infinite variety of reports and representations. These would all be possible; but being all equally possible, he would never of himself give a satisfactory account for his preferring one of them to the rest. Experience alone can point out to him the true cause of any phenomenon.
Now, according to this method of reasoning, DEMEA, it follows, (and is, indeed, tacitly allowed by CLEANTHES himself,) that order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final causes, is not of itself any proof of design; but only so far as it has been experienced to proceed from that principle. For aught we can know a priori, matter may contain the source or spring of order originally within itself, as well as mind does; and there is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements, from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite69 arrangement, than to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal mind, from a like internal unknown cause, fall into that arrangement. The equal possibility of both these suppositions is allowed. But, by experience, we find, (according to CLEANTHES), that there is a difference between them. Throw several pieces of steel together, without shape or form; they will never arrange themselves so as to compose a watch. Stone, and mortar70, and wood, without an architect, never erect71 a house. But the ideas in a human mind, we see, by an unknown, inexplicable72 economy, arrange themselves so as to form the plan of a watch or house. Experience, therefore, proves, that there is an original principle of order in mind, not in matter. From similar effects we infer similar causes. The adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe, as in a machine of human contrivance. The causes, therefore, must be resembling.
I was from the beginning scandalised, I must own, with this resemblance, which is asserted, between the Deity and human creatures; and must conceive it to imply such a degradation73 of the Supreme Being as no sound Theist could endure. With your assistance, therefore, DEMEA, I shall endeavour to defend what you justly call the adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, and shall refute this reasoning of CLEANTHES, provided he allows that I have made a fair representation of it.
When CLEANTHES had assented74, PHILO, after a short pause, proceeded in the following manner.
That all inferences, CLEANTHES, concerning fact, are founded on experience; and that all experimental reasonings are founded on the supposition that similar causes prove similar effects, and similar effects similar causes; I shall not at present much dispute with you. But observe, I entreat75 you, with what extreme caution all just reasoners proceed in the transferring of experiments to similar cases. Unless the cases be exactly similar, they repose76 no perfect confidence in applying their past observation to any particular phenomenon. Every alteration77 of circumstances occasions a doubt concerning the event; and it requires new experiments to prove certainly, that the new circumstances are of no moment or importance. A change in bulk, situation, arrangement, age, disposition78 of the air, or surrounding bodies; any of these particulars may be attended with the most unexpected consequences: And unless the objects be quite familiar to us, it is the highest temerity to expect with assurance, after any of these changes, an event similar to that which before fell under our observation. The slow and deliberate steps of philosophers here, if any where, are distinguished79 from the precipitate80 march of the vulgar, who, hurried on by the smallest similitude, are incapable of all discernment or consideration.
But can you think, CLEANTHES, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have been preserved in so wide a step as you have taken, when you compared to the universe houses, ships, furniture, machines, and, from their similarity in some circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes? Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred others, which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause, by which some particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations81 on other parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety82, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn any thing concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blowing, even though perfectly83 known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree?
But, allowing that we were to take the operations of one part of nature upon another, for the foundation of our judgement concerning the origin of the whole, (which never can be admitted,) yet why select so minute, so weak, so bounded a principle, as the reason and design of animals is found to be upon this planet? What peculiar84 privilege has this little agitation85 of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe? Our partiality in our own favour does indeed present it on all occasions; but sound philosophy ought carefully to guard against so natural an illusion.
So far from admitting, continued PHILO, that the operations of a part can afford us any just conclusion concerning the origin of the whole, I will not allow any one part to form a rule for another part, if the latter be very remote from the former. Is there any reasonable ground to conclude, that the inhabitants of other planets possess thought, intelligence, reason, or any thing similar to these faculties in men? When nature has so extremely diversified86 her manner of operation in this small globe, can we imagine that she incessantly87 copies herself throughout so immense a universe? And if thought, as we may well suppose, be confined merely to this narrow corner, and has even there so limited a sphere of action, with what propriety can we assign it for the original cause of all things? The narrow views of a peasant, who makes his domestic economy the rule for the government of kingdoms, is in comparison a pardonable sophism.
But were we ever so much assured, that a thought and reason, resembling the human, were to be found throughout the whole universe, and were its activity elsewhere vastly greater and more commanding than it appears in this globe; yet I cannot see, why the operations of a world constituted, arranged, adjusted, can with any propriety be extended to a world which is in its embryo88 state, and is advancing towards that constitution and arrangement. By observation, we know somewhat of the economy, action, and nourishment89 of a finished animal; but we must transfer with great caution that observation to the growth of a foetus in the womb, and still more to the formation of an animalcule in the loins of its male parent. Nature, we find, even from our limited experience, possesses an infinite number of springs and principles, which incessantly discover themselves on every change of her position and situation. And what new and unknown principles would actuate her in so new and unknown a situation as that of the formation of a universe, we cannot, without the utmost temerity, pretend to determine.
A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very imperfectly discovered to us; and do we thence pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole?
Admirable conclusion! Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass90, have not, at this time, in this minute globe of earth, an order or arrangement without human art and contrivance; therefore the universe could not originally attain91 its order and arrangement, without something similar to human art. But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former? Is it a rule for the whole? Is a very small part a rule for the universe? Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another situation vastly different from the former?
And can you blame me, CLEANTHES, if I here imitate the prudent92 reserve of SIMONIDES, who, according to the noted93 story, being asked by HIERO, What God was? desired a day to think of it, and then two days more; and after that manner continually prolonged the term, without ever bringing in his definition or description? Could you even blame me, if I had answered at first, that I did not know, and was sensible that this subject lay vastly beyond the reach of my faculties? You might cry out sceptic and railler, as much as you pleased: but having found, in so many other subjects much more familiar, the imperfections and even contradictions of human reason, I never should expect any success from its feeble conjectures94, in a subject so sublime95, and so remote from the sphere of our observation. When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see the existence of the other; and this I call an argument from experience. But how this argument can have place, where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will any man tell me with a serious countenance96, that an orderly universe must arise from some thought and art like the human, because we have experience of it? To ascertain97 this reasoning, it were requisite98 that we had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance . . .
PHILO was proceeding99 in this vehement100 manner, somewhat between jest and earnest, as it appeared to me, when he observed some signs of impatience101 in CLEANTHES, and then immediately stopped short. What I had to suggest, said CLEANTHES, is only that you would not abuse terms, or make use of popular expressions to subvert102 philosophical103 reasonings. You know, that the vulgar often distinguish reason from experience, even where the question relates only to matter of fact and existence; though it is found, where that reason is properly analysed, that it is nothing but a species of experience. To prove by experience the origin of the universe from mind, is not more contrary to common speech, than to prove the motion of the earth from the same principle. And a caviller104 might raise all the same objections to the Copernican system, which you have urged against my reasonings. Have you other earths, might he say, which you have seen to move? Have . . .
Yes! cried PHILO, interrupting him, we have other earths. Is not the moon another earth, which we see to turn round its centre? Is not Venus another earth, where we observe the same phenomenon? Are not the revolutions of the sun also a confirmation105, from analogy, of the same theory? All the planets, are they not earths, which revolve106 about the sun? Are not the satellites moons, which move round Jupiter and Saturn107, and along with these primary planets round the sun? These analogies and resemblances, with others which I have not mentioned, are the sole proofs of the COPERNICAN system; and to you it belongs to consider, whether you have any analogies of the same kind to support your theory.
In reality, CLEANTHES, continued he, the modern system of astronomy is now so much received by all inquirers, and has become so essential a part even of our earliest education, that we are not commonly very scrupulous108 in examining the reasons upon which it is founded. It is now become a matter of mere curiosity to study the first writers on that subject, who had the full force of prejudice to encounter, and were obliged to turn their arguments on every side in order to render them popular and convincing. But if we peruse109 GALILEO's famous Dialogues concerning the system of the world, we shall find, that that great genius, one of the sublimest110 that ever existed, first bent111 all his endeavours to prove, that there was no foundation for the distinction commonly made between elementary and celestial112 substances. The schools, proceeding from the illusions of sense, had carried this distinction very far; and had established the latter substances to be ingenerable, incorruptible, unalterable, impassable; and had assigned all the opposite qualities to the former. But GALILEO, beginning with the moon, proved its similarity in every particular to the earth; its convex figure, its natural darkness when not illuminated113, its density114, its distinction into solid and liquid, the variations of its phases, the mutual115 illuminations of the earth and moon, their mutual eclipses, the inequalities of the lunar surface, &c. After many instances of this kind, with regard to all the planets, men plainly saw that these bodies became proper objects of experience; and that the similarity of their nature enabled us to extend the same arguments and phenomena116 from one to the other.
In this cautious proceeding of the astronomers117, you may read your own condemnation118, CLEANTHES; or rather may see, that the subject in which you are engaged exceeds all human reason and inquiry119. Can you pretend to show any such similarity between the fabric120 of a house, and the generation of a universe? Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever been formed under your eye; and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the phenomenon, from the first appearance of order to its final consummation? If you have, then cite your experience, and deliver your theory.
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tenor
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| n.男高音（歌手），次中音（乐器），要旨，大意 | |
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discourse
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| n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述 | |
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cavils
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| v.挑剔，吹毛求疵( cavil的第三人称单数 ) | |
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necessitated
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| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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humble
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| adj.谦卑的，恭顺的；地位低下的；v.降低，贬低 | |
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frailties
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| n.脆弱( frailty的名词复数 )；虚弱；（性格或行为上的）弱点；缺点 | |
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profaneness
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| n.渎神，污秽 | |
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penetrating
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| adj.（声音）响亮的，尖锐的adj.（气味）刺激的adj.（思想）敏锐的，有洞察力的 | |
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impiety
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| n.不敬；不孝 | |
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piety
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| n.虔诚，虔敬 | |
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temerity
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| n.鲁莽，冒失 | |
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prying
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| adj.爱打听的v.打听，刺探（他人的私事）( pry的现在分词 )；撬开 | |
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celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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positively
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| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
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infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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corporeal
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| adj.肉体的，身体的；物质的 | |
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restriction
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| n.限制，约束 | |
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approbation
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| n.称赞；认可 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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deity
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| n.神，神性；被奉若神明的人(或物) | |
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piously
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| adv.虔诚地 | |
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pious
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| adj.虔诚的；道貌岸然的 | |
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scruples
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| n.良心上的不安( scruple的名词复数 )；顾虑，顾忌v.感到于心不安，有顾忌( scruple的第三人称单数 ) | |
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scruple
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| n./v.顾忌，迟疑 | |
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inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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ridicule
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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likeness
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| n.相像，相似（之处） | |
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honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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adoration
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| n.爱慕，崇拜 | |
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affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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displeasing
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| 不愉快的，令人发火的 | |
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syllogism
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| n.演绎法，三段论法 | |
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concur
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| v.同意，意见一致，互助，同时发生 | |
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briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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contemplate
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| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
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subdivided
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| 再分，细分( subdivide的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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admiration
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| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
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contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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grandeur
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| n.伟大，崇高，宏伟，庄严，豪华 | |
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demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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46
sophism
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| n.诡辩 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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48
dint
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| n.由于，靠；凹坑 | |
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49
hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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50
uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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51
presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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52
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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53
conjecture
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| n./v.推测，猜测 | |
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54
pretension
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| n.要求；自命，自称；自负 | |
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detested
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| v.憎恶，嫌恶，痛恨( detest的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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57
zealous
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| adj.狂热的，热心的 | |
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58
defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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60
extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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censure
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| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
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apprehend
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| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
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dissent
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| n./v.不同意，持异议 | |
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incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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esteemed
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| adj.受人尊敬的v.尊敬( esteem的过去式和过去分词 )；敬重；认为；以为 | |
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chimera
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| n.神话怪物；梦幻 | |
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contemplates
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| 深思，细想，仔细考虑( contemplate的第三人称单数 )； 注视，凝视； 考虑接受（发生某事的可能性）； 深思熟虑，沉思，苦思冥想 | |
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rambling
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| adj.[建]凌乱的，杂乱的 | |
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exquisite
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| adj.精美的；敏锐的；剧烈的，感觉强烈的 | |
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mortar
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| n.灰浆，灰泥；迫击炮；v.把…用灰浆涂接合 | |
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erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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inexplicable
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| adj.无法解释的，难理解的 | |
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degradation
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| n.降级；低落；退化；陵削；降解；衰变 | |
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assented
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| 同意，赞成( assent的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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entreat
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| v.恳求，恳请 | |
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repose
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| v.(使)休息；n.安息 | |
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alteration
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| n.变更，改变；蚀变 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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precipitate
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| adj.突如其来的；vt.使突然发生；n.沉淀物 | |
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alterations
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| n.改动( alteration的名词复数 )；更改；变化；改变 | |
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propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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84
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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agitation
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| n.搅动；搅拌；鼓动，煽动 | |
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86
diversified
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| adj.多样化的，多种经营的v.使多样化，多样化( diversify的过去式和过去分词 )；进入新的商业领域 | |
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incessantly
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| ad.不停地 | |
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88
embryo
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| n.胚胎，萌芽的事物 | |
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89
nourishment
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| n.食物，营养品；营养情况 | |
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90
brass
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| n.黄铜；黄铜器，铜管乐器 | |
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attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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conjectures
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| 推测，猜想( conjecture的名词复数 ) | |
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sublime
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| adj.崇高的，伟大的；极度的，不顾后果的 | |
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96
countenance
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| n.脸色，面容；面部表情；vt.支持，赞同 | |
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97
ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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98
requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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99
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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100
vehement
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| adj.感情强烈的；热烈的；(人)有强烈感情的 | |
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101
impatience
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| n.不耐烦，急躁 | |
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102
subvert
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| v.推翻；暗中破坏；搅乱 | |
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103
philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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104
caviller
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| n.提出令人为难的问题的人 | |
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105
confirmation
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| n.证实，确认，批准 | |
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106
revolve
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| vi.(使)旋转；循环出现 | |
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107
Saturn
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| n.农神，土星 | |
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108
scrupulous
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| adj.审慎的，小心翼翼的，完全的，纯粹的 | |
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109
peruse
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| v.细读，精读 | |
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110
sublimest
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| 伟大的( sublime的最高级 )； 令人赞叹的； 极端的； 不顾后果的 | |
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111
bent
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| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
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112
celestial
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| adj.天体的；天上的 | |
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113
illuminated
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| adj.被照明的；受启迪的 | |
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114
density
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| n.密集，密度，浓度 | |
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115
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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116
phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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117
astronomers
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| n.天文学者，天文学家( astronomer的名词复数 ) | |
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118
condemnation
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| n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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119
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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120
fabric
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| n.织物，织品，布；构造，结构，组织 | |
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