How the most absurd argument, replied CLEANTHES, in the hands of a man of ingenuity1 and invention, may acquire an air of probability! Are you not aware, PHILO, that it became necessary for Copernicus and his first disciples2 to prove the similarity of the terrestrial and celestial3 matter; because several philosophers, blinded by old systems, and supported by some sensible appearances, had denied this similarity? but that it is by no means necessary, that Theists should prove the similarity of the works of Nature to those of Art; because this similarity is self-evident and undeniable? The same matter, a like form; what more is requisite4 to show an analogy between their causes, and to ascertain5 the origin of all things from a divine purpose and intention? Your objections, I must freely tell you, are no better than the abstruse6 cavils7 of those philosophers who denied motion; and ought to be refuted in the same manner, by illustrations, examples, and instances, rather than by serious argument and philosophy.
Suppose, therefore, that an articulate voice were heard in the clouds, much louder and more melodious8 than any which human art could ever reach: Suppose, that this voice were extended in the same instant over all nations, and spoke9 to each nation in its own language and dialect: Suppose, that the words delivered not only contain a just sense and meaning, but convey some instruction altogether worthy10 of a benevolent11 Being, superior to mankind: Could you possibly hesitate a moment concerning the cause of this voice? and must you not instantly ascribe it to some design or purpose? Yet I cannot see but all the same objections (if they merit that appellation) which lie against the system of Theism, may also be produced against this inference.
Might you not say, that all conclusions concerning fact were founded on experience: that when we hear an articulate voice in the dark, and thence infer a man, it is only the resemblance of the effects which leads us to conclude that there is a like resemblance in the cause: but that this extraordinary voice, by its loudness, extent, and flexibility12 to all languages, bears so little analogy to any human voice, that we have no reason to suppose any analogy in their causes: and consequently, that a rational, wise, coherent speech proceeded, you know not whence, from some accidental whistling of the winds, not from any divine reason or intelligence? You see clearly your own objections in these cavils, and I hope too you see clearly, that they cannot possibly have more force in the one case than in the other.
But to bring the case still nearer the present one of the universe, I shall make two suppositions, which imply not any absurdity13 or impossibility. Suppose that there is a natural, universal, invariable language, common to every individual of human race; and that books are natural productions, which perpetuate14 themselves in the same manner with animals and vegetables, by descent and propagation. Several expressions of our passions contain a universal language: all brute15 animals have a natural speech, which, however limited, is very intelligible16 to their own species. And as there are infinitely17 fewer parts and less contrivance in the finest composition of eloquence18, than in the coarsest organised body, the propagation of an Iliad or Aeneid is an easier supposition than that of any plant or animal.
Suppose, therefore, that you enter into your library, thus peopled by natural volumes, containing the most refined reason and most exquisite19 beauty; could you possibly open one of them, and doubt, that its original cause bore the strongest analogy to mind and intelligence? When it reasons and discourses21; when it expostulates, argues, and enforces its views and topics; when it applies sometimes to the pure intellect, sometimes to the affections; when it collects, disposes, and adorns22 every consideration suited to the subject; could you persist in asserting, that all this, at the bottom, had really no meaning; and that the first formation of this volume in the loins of its original parent proceeded not from thought and design? Your obstinacy23, I know, reaches not that degree of firmness: even your sceptical play and wantonness would be abashed24 at so glaring an absurdity.
But if there be any difference, PHILO, between this supposed case and the real one of the universe, it is all to the advantage of the latter. The anatomy25 of an animal affords many stronger instances of design than the perusal26 of LIVY or TACITUS; and any objection which you start in the former case, by carrying me back to so unusual and extraordinary a scene as the first formation of worlds, the same objection has place on the supposition of our vegetating27 library. Choose, then, your party, PHILO, without ambiguity28 or evasion29; assert either that a rational volume is no proof of a rational cause, or admit of a similar cause to all the works of nature.
Let me here observe too, continued CLEANTHES, that this religious argument, instead of being weakened by that scepticism so much affected30 by you, rather acquires force from it, and becomes more firm and undisputed. To exclude all argument or reasoning of every kind, is either affectation or madness. The declared profession of every reasonable sceptic is only to reject abstruse, remote, and refined arguments; to adhere to common sense and the plain instincts of nature; and to assent31, wherever any reasons strike him with so full a force that he cannot, without the greatest violence, prevent it. Now the arguments for Natural Religion are plainly of this kind; and nothing but the most perverse32, obstinate33 metaphysics can reject them. Consider, anatomise the eye; survey its structure and contrivance; and tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver34 does not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of sensation. The most obvious conclusion, surely, is in favour of design; and it requires time, reflection, and study, to summon up those frivolous36, though abstruse objections, which can support Infidelity. Who can behold37 the male and female of each species, the correspondence of their parts and instincts, their passions, and whole course of life before and after generation, but must be sensible, that the propagation of the species is intended by Nature? Millions and millions of such instances present themselves through every part of the universe; and no language can convey a more intelligible irresistible38 meaning, than the curious adjustment of final causes. To what degree, therefore, of blind dogmatism must one have attained39, to reject such natural and such convincing arguments?
Some beauties in writing we may meet with, which seem contrary to rules, and which gain the affections, and animate40 the imagination, in opposition41 to all the precepts42 of criticism, and to the authority of the established masters of art. And if the argument for Theism be, as you pretend, contradictory43 to the principles of logic44; its universal, its irresistible influence proves clearly, that there may be arguments of a like irregular nature. Whatever cavils may be urged, an orderly world, as well as a coherent, articulate speech, will still be received as an incontestable proof of design and intention.
It sometimes happens, I own, that the religious arguments have not their due influence on an ignorant savage45 and barbarian46; not because they are obscure and difficult, but because he never asks himself any question with regard to them. Whence arises the curious structure of an animal? From the copulation of its parents. And these whence? From their parents? A few removes set the objects at such a distance, that to him they are lost in darkness and confusion; nor is he actuated by any curiosity to trace them further. But this is neither dogmatism nor scepticism, but stupidity: a state of mind very different from your sifting47, inquisitive48 disposition49, my ingenious friend. You can trace causes from effects: You can compare the most distant and remote objects: and your greatest errors proceed not from barrenness of thought and invention, but from too luxuriant a fertility, which suppresses your natural good sense, by a profusion50 of unnecessary scruples51 and objections.
Here I could observe, HERMIPPUS, that PHILO was a little embarrassed and confounded: But while he hesitated in delivering an answer, luckily for him, DEMEA broke in upon the discourse20, and saved his countenance52.
Your instance, CLEANTHES, said he, drawn53 from books and language, being familiar, has, I confess, so much more force on that account: but is there not some danger too in this very circumstance; and may it not render us presumptuous54, by making us imagine we comprehend the Deity55, and have some adequate idea of his nature and attributes? When I read a volume, I enter into the mind and intention of the author: I become him, in a manner, for the instant; and have an immediate35 feeling and conception of those ideas which revolved56 in his imagination while employed in that composition. But so near an approach we never surely can make to the Deity. His ways are not our ways. His attributes are perfect, but incomprehensible. And this volume of nature contains a great and inexplicable57 riddle58, more than any intelligible discourse or reasoning.
The ancient PLATONISTS, you know, were the most religious and devout59 of all the Pagan philosophers; yet many of them, particularly PLOTINUS, expressly declare, that intellect or understanding is not to be ascribed to the Deity; and that our most perfect worship of him consists, not in acts of veneration60, reverence61, gratitude62, or love; but in a certain mysterious self-annihilation, or total extinction63 of all our faculties64. These ideas are, perhaps, too far stretched; but still it must be acknowledged, that, by representing the Deity as so intelligible and comprehensible, and so similar to a human mind, we are guilty of the grossest and most narrow partiality, and make ourselves the model of the whole universe.
All the sentiments of the human mind, gratitude, resentment65, love, friendship, approbation66, blame, pity, emulation67, envy, have a plain reference to the state and situation of man, and are calculated for preserving the existence and promoting the activity of such a being in such circumstances. It seems, therefore, unreasonable68 to transfer such sentiments to a supreme69 existence, or to suppose him actuated by them; and the phenomena70 besides of the universe will not support us in such a theory. All our ideas, derived71 from the senses, are confessedly false and illusive72; and cannot therefore be supposed to have place in a supreme intelligence: And as the ideas of internal sentiment, added to those of the external senses, compose the whole furniture of human understanding, we may conclude, that none of the materials of thought are in any respect similar in the human and in the divine intelligence. Now, as to the manner of thinking; how can we make any comparison between them, or suppose them any wise resembling? Our thought is fluctuating, uncertain, fleeting73, successive, and compounded; and were we to remove these circumstances, we absolutely annihilate74 its essence, and it would in such a case be an abuse of terms to apply to it the name of thought or reason. At least if it appear more pious75 and respectful (as it really is) still to retain these terms, when we mention the Supreme Being, we ought to acknowledge, that their meaning, in that case, is totally incomprehensible; and that the infirmities of our nature do not permit us to reach any ideas which in the least correspond to the ineffable76 sublimity77 of the Divine attributes.
1 ingenuity | |
n.别出心裁;善于发明创造 | |
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2 disciples | |
n.信徒( disciple的名词复数 );门徒;耶稣的信徒;(尤指)耶稣十二门徒之一 | |
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3 celestial | |
adj.天体的;天上的 | |
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4 requisite | |
adj.需要的,必不可少的;n.必需品 | |
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5 ascertain | |
vt.发现,确定,查明,弄清 | |
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6 abstruse | |
adj.深奥的,难解的 | |
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7 cavils | |
v.挑剔,吹毛求疵( cavil的第三人称单数 ) | |
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8 melodious | |
adj.旋律美妙的,调子优美的,音乐性的 | |
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9 spoke | |
n.(车轮的)辐条;轮辐;破坏某人的计划;阻挠某人的行动 v.讲,谈(speak的过去式);说;演说;从某种观点来说 | |
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10 worthy | |
adj.(of)值得的,配得上的;有价值的 | |
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11 benevolent | |
adj.仁慈的,乐善好施的 | |
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12 flexibility | |
n.柔韧性,弹性,(光的)折射性,灵活性 | |
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13 absurdity | |
n.荒谬,愚蠢;谬论 | |
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14 perpetuate | |
v.使永存,使永记不忘 | |
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15 brute | |
n.野兽,兽性 | |
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16 intelligible | |
adj.可理解的,明白易懂的,清楚的 | |
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17 infinitely | |
adv.无限地,无穷地 | |
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18 eloquence | |
n.雄辩;口才,修辞 | |
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19 exquisite | |
adj.精美的;敏锐的;剧烈的,感觉强烈的 | |
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20 discourse | |
n.论文,演说;谈话;话语;vi.讲述,著述 | |
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21 discourses | |
论文( discourse的名词复数 ); 演说; 讲道; 话语 | |
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22 adorns | |
装饰,佩带( adorn的第三人称单数 ) | |
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23 obstinacy | |
n.顽固;(病痛等)难治 | |
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24 abashed | |
adj.窘迫的,尴尬的v.使羞愧,使局促,使窘迫( abash的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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25 anatomy | |
n.解剖学,解剖;功能,结构,组织 | |
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26 perusal | |
n.细读,熟读;目测 | |
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27 vegetating | |
v.过单调呆板的生活( vegetate的现在分词 );植物似地生长;(瘤、疣等)长大 | |
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28 ambiguity | |
n.模棱两可;意义不明确 | |
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29 evasion | |
n.逃避,偷漏(税) | |
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30 affected | |
adj.不自然的,假装的 | |
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31 assent | |
v.批准,认可;n.批准,认可 | |
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32 perverse | |
adj.刚愎的;坚持错误的,行为反常的 | |
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33 obstinate | |
adj.顽固的,倔强的,不易屈服的,较难治愈的 | |
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34 contriver | |
发明者,创制者,筹划者 | |
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35 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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36 frivolous | |
adj.轻薄的;轻率的 | |
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37 behold | |
v.看,注视,看到 | |
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38 irresistible | |
adj.非常诱人的,无法拒绝的,无法抗拒的 | |
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39 attained | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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40 animate | |
v.赋于生命,鼓励;adj.有生命的,有生气的 | |
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41 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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42 precepts | |
n.规诫,戒律,箴言( precept的名词复数 ) | |
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43 contradictory | |
adj.反驳的,反对的,抗辩的;n.正反对,矛盾对立 | |
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44 logic | |
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
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45 savage | |
adj.野蛮的;凶恶的,残暴的;n.未开化的人 | |
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46 barbarian | |
n.野蛮人;adj.野蛮(人)的;未开化的 | |
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47 sifting | |
n.筛,过滤v.筛( sift的现在分词 );筛滤;细查;详审 | |
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48 inquisitive | |
adj.求知欲强的,好奇的,好寻根究底的 | |
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49 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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50 profusion | |
n.挥霍;丰富 | |
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51 scruples | |
n.良心上的不安( scruple的名词复数 );顾虑,顾忌v.感到于心不安,有顾忌( scruple的第三人称单数 ) | |
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52 countenance | |
n.脸色,面容;面部表情;vt.支持,赞同 | |
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53 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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54 presumptuous | |
adj.胆大妄为的,放肆的,冒昧的,冒失的 | |
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55 deity | |
n.神,神性;被奉若神明的人(或物) | |
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56 revolved | |
v.(使)旋转( revolve的过去式和过去分词 );细想 | |
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57 inexplicable | |
adj.无法解释的,难理解的 | |
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58 riddle | |
n.谜,谜语,粗筛;vt.解谜,给…出谜,筛,检查,鉴定,非难,充满于;vi.出谜 | |
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59 devout | |
adj.虔诚的,虔敬的,衷心的 (n.devoutness) | |
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60 veneration | |
n.尊敬,崇拜 | |
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61 reverence | |
n.敬畏,尊敬,尊严;Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称;v.尊敬,敬畏,崇敬 | |
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62 gratitude | |
adj.感激,感谢 | |
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63 extinction | |
n.熄灭,消亡,消灭,灭绝,绝种 | |
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64 faculties | |
n.能力( faculty的名词复数 );全体教职员;技巧;院 | |
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65 resentment | |
n.怨愤,忿恨 | |
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66 approbation | |
n.称赞;认可 | |
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67 emulation | |
n.竞争;仿效 | |
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68 unreasonable | |
adj.不讲道理的,不合情理的,过度的 | |
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69 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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70 phenomena | |
n.现象 | |
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71 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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72 illusive | |
adj.迷惑人的,错觉的 | |
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73 fleeting | |
adj.短暂的,飞逝的 | |
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74 annihilate | |
v.使无效;毁灭;取消 | |
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75 pious | |
adj.虔诚的;道貌岸然的 | |
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76 ineffable | |
adj.无法表达的,不可言喻的 | |
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77 sublimity | |
崇高,庄严,气质高尚 | |
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