It seems strange to me, said CLEANTHES, that you, DEMEA, who are so sincere in the cause of religion, should still maintain the mysterious, incomprehensible nature of the Deity1, and should insist so strenuously2 that he has no manner of likeness3 or resemblance to human creatures. The Deity, I can readily allow, possesses many powers and attributes of which we can have no comprehension: But if our ideas, so far as they go, be not just, and adequate, and correspondent to his real nature, I know not what there is in this subject worth insisting on. Is the name, without any meaning, of such mighty4 importance? Or how do you mystics, who maintain the absolute incomprehensibility of the Deity, differ from Sceptics or Atheists, who assert, that the first cause of all is unknown and unintelligible6? Their temerity8 must be very great, if, after rejecting the production by a mind, I mean a mind resembling the human, (for I know of no other,) they pretend to assign, with certainty, any other specific intelligible7 cause: And their conscience must be very scrupulous9 indeed, if they refuse to call the universal unknown cause a God or Deity; and to bestow10 on him as many sublime11 eulogies12 and unmeaning epithets14 as you shall please to require of them.
Who could imagine, replied DEMEA, that CLEANTHES, the calm philosophical15 CLEANTHES, would attempt to refute his antagonists16 by affixing17 a nickname to them; and, like the common bigots and inquisitors of the age, have recourse to invective18 and declamation19, instead of reasoning? Or does he not perceive, that these topics are easily retorted, and that Anthropomorphite is an appellation20 as invidious, and implies as dangerous consequences, as the epithet13 of Mystic, with which he has honoured us? In reality, CLEANTHES, consider what it is you assert when you represent the Deity as similar to a human mind and understanding. What is the soul of man? A composition of various faculties21, passions, sentiments, ideas; united, indeed, into one self or person, but still distinct from each other. When it reasons, the ideas, which are the parts of its discourse22, arrange themselves in a certain form or order; which is not preserved entire for a moment, but immediately gives place to another arrangement. New opinions, new passions, new affections, new feelings arise, which continually diversify23 the mental scene, and produce in it the greatest variety and most rapid succession imaginable. How is this compatible with that perfect immutability24 and simplicity25 which all true Theists ascribe to the Deity? By the same act, say they, he sees past, present, and future: His love and hatred26, his mercy and justice, are one individual operation: He is entire in every point of space; and complete in every instant of duration. No succession, no change, no acquisition, no diminution27. What he is implies not in it any shadow of distinction or diversity. And what he is this moment he ever has been, and ever will be, without any new judgement, sentiment, or operation. He stands fixed28 in one simple, perfect state: nor can you ever say, with any propriety29, that this act of his is different from that other; or that this judgement or idea has been lately formed, and will give place, by succession, to any different judgement or idea.
I can readily allow, said CLEANTHES, that those who maintain the perfect simplicity of the Supreme30 Being, to the extent in which you have explained it, are complete Mystics, and chargeable with all the consequences which I have drawn31 from their opinion. They are, in a word, Atheists, without knowing it. For though it be allowed, that the Deity possesses attributes of which we have no comprehension, yet ought we never to ascribe to him any attributes which are absolutely incompatible32 with that intelligent nature essential to him. A mind, whose acts and sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive; one, that is wholly simple, and totally immutable33, is a mind which has no thought, no reason, no will, no sentiment, no love, no hatred; or, in a word, is no mind at all. It is an abuse of terms to give it that appellation; and we may as well speak of limited extension without figure, or of number without composition.
Pray consider, said PHILO, whom you are at present inveighing34 against. You are honouring with the appellation of Atheist5 all the sound, orthodox divines, almost, who have treated of this subject; and you will at last be, yourself, found, according to your reckoning, the only sound Theist in the world. But if idolaters be Atheists, as, I think, may justly be asserted, and Christian35 Theologians the same, what becomes of the argument, so much celebrated36, derived37 from the universal consent of mankind?
But because I know you are not much swayed by names and authorities, I shall endeavour to show you, a little more distinctly, the inconveniences of that Anthropomorphism, which you have embraced; and shall prove, that there is no ground to suppose a plan of the world to be formed in the Divine mind, consisting of distinct ideas, differently arranged, in the same manner as an architect forms in his head the plan of a house which he intends to execute.
It is not easy, I own, to see what is gained by this supposition, whether we judge of the matter by Reason or by Experience. We are still obliged to mount higher, in order to find the cause of this cause, which you had assigned as satisfactory and conclusive38.
If Reason (I mean abstract reason, derived from inquiries39 a priori) be not alike mute with regard to all questions concerning cause and effect, this sentence at least it will venture to pronounce, That a mental world, or universe of ideas, requires a cause as much, as does a material world, or universe of objects; and, if similar in its arrangement, must require a similar cause. For what is there in this subject, which should occasion a different conclusion or inference? In an abstract view, they are entirely40 alike; and no difficulty attends the one supposition, which is not common to both of them.
Again, when we will needs force Experience to pronounce some sentence, even on these subjects which lie beyond her sphere, neither can she perceive any material difference in this particular, between these two kinds of worlds; but finds them to be governed by similar principles, and to depend upon an equal variety of causes in their operations. We have specimens41 in miniature of both of them. Our own mind resembles the one; a vegetable or animal body the other. Let experience, therefore, judge from these samples. Nothing seems more delicate, with regard to its causes, than thought; and as these causes never operate in two persons after the same manner, so we never find two persons who think exactly alike. Nor indeed does the same person think exactly alike at any two different periods of time. A difference of age, of the disposition42 of his body, of weather, of food, of company, of books, of passions; any of these particulars, or others more minute, are sufficient to alter the curious machinery43 of thought, and communicate to it very different movements and operations. As far as we can judge, vegetables and animal bodies are not more delicate in their motions, nor depend upon a greater variety or more curious adjustment of springs and principles.
How, therefore, shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of that Being whom you suppose the Author of Nature, or, according to your system of Anthropomorphism, the ideal world, into which you trace the material? Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle? But if we stop, and go no further; why go so far? why not stop at the material world? How can we satisfy ourselves without going on in infinitum? And, after all, what satisfaction is there in that infinite progression? Let us remember the story of the Indian philosopher and his elephant. It was never more applicable than to the present subject. If the material world rests upon a similar ideal world, this ideal world must rest upon some other; and so on, without end. It were better, therefore, never to look beyond the present material world. By supposing it to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the sooner we arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. When you go one step beyond the mundane44 system, you only excite an inquisitive45 humour which it is impossible ever to satisfy.
To say, that the different ideas which compose the reason of the Supreme Being, fall into order of themselves, and by their own nature, is really to talk without any precise meaning. If it has a meaning, I would fain know, why it is not as good sense to say, that the parts of the material world fall into order of themselves and by their own nature. Can the one opinion be intelligible, while the other is not so?
We have, indeed, experience of ideas which fall into order of themselves, and without any known cause. But, I am sure, we have a much larger experience of matter which does the same; as, in all instances of generation and vegetation, where the accurate analysis of the cause exceeds all human comprehension. We have also experience of particular systems of thought and of matter which have no order; of the first in madness, of the second in corruption46. Why, then, should we think, that order is more essential to one than the other? And if it requires a cause in both, what do we gain by your system, in tracing the universe of objects into a similar universe of ideas? The first step which we make leads us on for ever. It were, therefore, wise in us to limit all our inquiries to the present world, without looking further. No satisfaction can ever be attained47 by these speculations48, which so far exceed the narrow bounds of human understanding.
It was usual with the PERIPATETICS, you know, CLEANTHES, when the cause of any phenomenon was demanded, to have recourse to their faculties or occult qualities; and to say, for instance, that bread nourished by its nutritive faculty49, and senna purged50 by its purgative51. But it has been discovered, that this subterfuge52 was nothing but the disguise of ignorance; and that these philosophers, though less ingenuous53, really said the same thing with the sceptics or the vulgar, who fairly confessed that they knew not the cause of these phenomena54. In like manner, when it is asked, what cause produces order in the ideas of the Supreme Being; can any other reason be assigned by you, Anthropomorphites, than that it is a rational faculty, and that such is the nature of the Deity? But why a similar answer will not be equally satisfactory in accounting55 for the order of the world, without having recourse to any such intelligent creator as you insist on, may be difficult to determine. It is only to say, that such is the nature of material objects, and that they are all originally possessed56 of a faculty of order and proportion. These are only more learned and elaborate ways of confessing our ignorance; nor has the one hypothesis any real advantage above the other, except in its greater conformity57 to vulgar prejudices.
You have displayed this argument with great emphasis, replied CLEANTHES: You seem not sensible how easy it is to answer it. Even in common life, if I assign a cause for any event, is it any objection, PHILO, that I cannot assign the cause of that cause, and answer every new question which may incessantly58 be started? And what philosophers could possibly submit to so rigid59 a rule? philosophers, who confess ultimate causes to be totally unknown; and are sensible, that the most refined principles into which they trace the phenomena, are still to them as inexplicable60 as these phenomena themselves are to the vulgar. The order and arrangement of nature, the curious adjustment of final causes, the plain use and intention of every part and organ; all these bespeak61 in the clearest language an intelligent cause or author. The heavens and the earth join in the same testimony62: The whole chorus of Nature raises one hymn63 to the praises of its Creator. You alone, or almost alone, disturb this general harmony. You start abstruse64 doubts, cavils65, and objections: You ask me, what is the cause of this cause? I know not; I care not; that concerns not me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my inquiry66. Let those go further, who are wiser or more enterprising.
I pretend to be neither, replied PHILO: And for that very reason, I should never perhaps have attempted to go so far; especially when I am sensible, that I must at last be contented67 to sit down with the same answer, which, without further trouble, might have satisfied me from the beginning. If I am still to remain in utter ignorance of causes, and can absolutely give an explication of nothing, I shall never esteem68 it any advantage to shove off for a moment a difficulty, which, you acknowledge, must immediately, in its full force, recur69 upon me. Naturalists70 indeed very justly explain particular effects by more general causes, though these general causes themselves should remain in the end totally inexplicable; but they never surely thought it satisfactory to explain a particular effect by a particular cause, which was no more to be accounted for than the effect itself. An ideal system, arranged of itself, without a precedent71 design, is not a whit72 more explicable than a material one, which attains73 its order in a like manner; nor is there any more difficulty in the latter supposition than in the former.
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deity
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| n.神，神性；被奉若神明的人(或物) | |
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strenuously
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| adv.奋发地，费力地 | |
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likeness
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| n.相像，相似（之处） | |
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mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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atheist
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| n.无神论者 | |
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unintelligible
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| adj.无法了解的，难解的，莫明其妙的 | |
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intelligible
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| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
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temerity
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| n.鲁莽，冒失 | |
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scrupulous
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| adj.审慎的，小心翼翼的，完全的，纯粹的 | |
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bestow
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| v.把…赠与，把…授予；花费 | |
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sublime
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| adj.崇高的，伟大的；极度的，不顾后果的 | |
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eulogies
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| n.颂词，颂文( eulogy的名词复数 ) | |
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epithet
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| n.（用于褒贬人物等的）表述形容词，修饰语 | |
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epithets
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| n.（表示性质、特征等的）词语( epithet的名词复数 ) | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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antagonists
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| 对立[对抗] 者，对手，敌手( antagonist的名词复数 )； 对抗肌； 对抗药 | |
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affixing
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| v.附加( affix的现在分词 )；粘贴；加以；盖（印章） | |
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invective
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| n.痛骂，恶意抨击 | |
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declamation
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| n. 雄辩，高调 | |
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appellation
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| n.名称，称呼 | |
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faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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discourse
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| n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述 | |
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diversify
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| v.（使）不同，（使）变得多样化 | |
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immutability
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| n.不变(性) | |
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simplicity
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| n.简单，简易；朴素；直率，单纯 | |
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hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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diminution
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| n.减少；变小 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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immutable
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| adj.不可改变的，永恒的 | |
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inveighing
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| v.猛烈抨击，痛骂，谩骂( inveigh的现在分词 ) | |
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Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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conclusive
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| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
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inquiries
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| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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specimens
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| n.样品( specimen的名词复数 )；范例；（化验的）抽样；某种类型的人 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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mundane
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| adj.平凡的；尘世的；宇宙的 | |
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inquisitive
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| adj.求知欲强的，好奇的，好寻根究底的 | |
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corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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speculations
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| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
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faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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50
purged
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| 清除（政敌等）( purge的过去式和过去分词 )； 涤除（罪恶等）； 净化（心灵、风气等）； 消除（错事等）的不良影响 | |
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purgative
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| n.泻药；adj.通便的 | |
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subterfuge
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| n.诡计；藉口 | |
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ingenuous
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| adj.纯朴的，单纯的；天真的；坦率的 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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accounting
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| n.会计，会计学，借贷对照表 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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conformity
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| n.一致，遵从，顺从 | |
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incessantly
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| ad.不停地 | |
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rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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inexplicable
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| adj.无法解释的，难理解的 | |
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bespeak
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| v.预定；预先请求 | |
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testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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hymn
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| n.赞美诗，圣歌，颂歌 | |
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abstruse
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| adj.深奥的，难解的 | |
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cavils
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| v.挑剔，吹毛求疵( cavil的第三人称单数 ) | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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esteem
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| n.尊敬，尊重；vt.尊重，敬重；把…看作 | |
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recur
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| vi.复发，重现，再发生 | |
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naturalists
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| n.博物学家( naturalist的名词复数 )；（文学艺术的）自然主义者 | |
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precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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whit
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| n.一点，丝毫 | |
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attains
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的第三人称单数 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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