Both of these then are capable of originating local movement, mind and appetite: (1) mind, that is, which calculates means to an end, i.e. mind practical (it differs from mind speculative1 in the character of its end); while (2) appetite is in every form of it relative to an end: for that which is the object of appetite is the stimulant2 of mind practical; and that which is last in the process of thinking is the beginning of the action. It follows that there is a justification3 for regarding these two as the sources of movement, i.e. appetite and practical thought; for the object of appetite starts a movement and as a result of that thought gives rise to movement, the object of appetite being it a source of stimulation4. So too when imagination originates movement, it necessarily involves appetite.
That which moves therefore is a single faculty5 and the faculty of appetite; for if there had been two sources of movement-mind and appetite-they would have produced movement in virtue6 of some common character. As it is, mind is never found producing movement without appetite (for wish is a form of appetite; and when movement is produced according to calculation it is also according to wish), but appetite can originate movement contrary to calculation, for desire is a form of appetite. Now mind is always right, but appetite and imagination may be either right or wrong. That is why, though in any case it is the object of appetite which originates movement, this object may be either the real or the apparent good. To produce movement the object must be more than this: it must be good that can be brought into being by action; and only what can be otherwise than as it is can thus be brought into being. That then such a power in the soul as has been described, i.e. that called appetite, originates movement is clear. Those who distinguish parts in the soul, if they distinguish and divide in accordance with differences of power, find themselves with a very large number of parts, a nutritive, a sensitive, an intellective, a deliberative, and now an appetitive part; for these are more different from one another than the faculties7 of desire and passion.
Since appetites run counter to one another, which happens when a principle of reason and a desire are contrary and is possible only in beings with a sense of time (for while mind bids us hold back because of what is future, desire is influenced by what is just at hand: a pleasant object which is just at hand presents itself as both pleasant and good, without condition in either case, because of want of foresight8 into what is farther away in time), it follows that while that which originates movement must be specifically one, viz. the faculty of appetite as such (or rather farthest back of all the object of that faculty; for it is it that itself remaining unmoved originates the movement by being apprehended9 in thought or imagination), the things that originate movement are numerically many.
All movement involves three factors, (1) that which originates the movement, (2) that by means of which it originates it, and (3) that which is moved. The expression ‘that which originates the movement’ is ambiguous: it may mean either (a) something which itself is unmoved or (b) that which at once moves and is moved. Here that which moves without itself being moved is the realizable good, that which at once moves and is moved is the faculty of appetite (for that which is influenced by appetite so far as it is actually so influenced is set in movement, and appetite in the sense of actual appetite is a kind of movement), while that which is in motion is the animal. The instrument which appetite employs to produce movement is no longer psychical10 but bodily: hence the examination of it falls within the province of the functions common to body and soul. To state the matter summarily at present, that which is the instrument in the production of movement is to be found where a beginning and an end coincide as e.g. in a ball and socket11 joint12; for there the convex and the concave sides are respectively an end and a beginning (that is why while the one remains13 at rest, the other is moved): they are separate in definition but not separable spatially14. For everything is moved by pushing and pulling. Hence just as in the case of a wheel, so here there must be a point which remains at rest, and from that point the movement must originate.
To sum up, then, and repeat what I have said, inasmuch as an animal is capable of appetite it is capable of self-movement; it is not capable of appetite without possessing imagination; and all imagination is either (1) calculative or (2) sensitive. In the latter an animals, and not only man, partake.
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1 speculative | |
adj.思索性的,暝想性的,推理的 | |
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2 stimulant | |
n.刺激物,兴奋剂 | |
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3 justification | |
n.正当的理由;辩解的理由 | |
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4 stimulation | |
n.刺激,激励,鼓舞 | |
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5 faculty | |
n.才能;学院,系;(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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6 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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7 faculties | |
n.能力( faculty的名词复数 );全体教职员;技巧;院 | |
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8 foresight | |
n.先见之明,深谋远虑 | |
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9 apprehended | |
逮捕,拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 ); 理解 | |
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10 psychical | |
adj.有关特异功能现象的;有关特异功能官能的;灵魂的;心灵的 | |
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11 socket | |
n.窝,穴,孔,插座,插口 | |
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12 joint | |
adj.联合的,共同的;n.关节,接合处;v.连接,贴合 | |
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13 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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14 spatially | |
空间地,存在于空间地 | |
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