His hatred of his parliamentary opponents, it was said at the time, was very nearly instrumental in creating serious international complications. Further imprudence was shown by his endeavour to palliate the effect of his first ill-considered act, and he was finally forced to consent to concessions4 on behalf of France which France need not have made at all if Monsieur Caillaux had been more prudent7 from the beginning.
This, stripped of all vituperation, is the accusation1 which Monsieur Caillaux has to answer before the tribunal of history. Let us look into it. In order to do so we must go back to the Act of Algeciras. It will be remembered that the Act of Algeciras gave France the right of policing Morocco because of its neighbourhood to Algiers. Three years after the Act of Algeciras French troops were in occupation of certain portions of Moroccan territory, and the jingo party, the Pan-Germanists, in Germany were protesting with heat against this military occupation.
The peace party in Germany, however, had other views. There was a feeling that an understanding on the basis of the act of Algeciras [Pg 152] between France and Germany might lead to a weakening of the Entente8 between France and Great Britain, and be useful economically to German enterprise.
On February 8, 1909, when Monsieur Clemenceau was at the head of the French Government with Monsieur Stephen Pichon as his Foreign Minister, Germany recognized, more freely than it had recognized before, the interests of France in Morocco for the maintenance of order, and promised collaboration9 economically. A secret letter changed hands, confirming this agreement, and admitting that Germany should remain disinterested10 in the politics of Morocco. In this same letter it was admitted also that the economic interests of France in Morocco were more important than the economic interests of Germany. The importance of this letter rested of course on the fact that it practically entailed11 the suppression of immediate12 friction13 between the two countries.
The Clemenceau Cabinet worked hard to carry the good work further still, so that the spirit of this Franco-German understanding should be [Pg 153] extended to the Congo. The French representative of the bondholders of the Moroccan debt, Monsieur Guiot, who had been in the French Foreign Office, paid a visit to Berlin, and the result of his negotiations14 with the German Foreign Office in the Wilhelmstrasse was a memorandum15 dated June 2, 1909, by which it was decided16 to create a Franco-German Company for the purpose of exploiting certain concessions. On June 5 the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Pichon, took counsel with the French Colonial Minister, Monsieur Milliés-Lacroix, on the advantages and disadvantages of this Franco-German collaboration.
At the end of July 1909, the Clemenceau Cabinet fell. Monsieur Briand became Prime Minister and retained Monsieur Pichon at the Quai d’Orsay, but Monsieur Clemenceau dropped out of the Cabinet and Monsieur Caillaux was no longer Minister of Finance.
It is not too much to say that the Clemenceau-Caillaux alliance dates from this little upheaval17 in French internal politics, and it was at this point that Monsieur Caillaux’s enmity to Monsieur Briand and Monsieur Pichon first led him astray. [Pg 154]
On August 2, 1909, the N’Goko Sanga Company, in reply to a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs offered to give up, against a substantial indemnity18, a portion of the territory for which it held concessions. A commission was formed to discuss terms, but it was not till April 29, 1910, that the amount of the indemnity was definitely stated. The indemnity was to be F2,393,000 or ￡95,720.
On February 17, 1910, after the French and German Governments had signified in October of the year before their approval of the provisional agreement between Monsieur Guiot and the Wilhelmstrasse, the Moroccan Company of Public Works was formed. It had a capital of F2,000,000, fifty per cent. of which was in French hands, twenty-six per cent. in German hands, and the remaining twenty-four per cent. in the hands of the other Powers who had signed the Act of Algeciras. Then parliamentary politics in France had their say in the matter, and the Radicals20, Socialists21 and Radical19-Socialists in France, with Monsieur Caillaux in the foreground of debate, made use of the question of the N’Goko Sanga indemnity as a weapon in Parliament against Monsieur Briand. [Pg 155]
In consequence of this, the summer of 1910 did not bring with it any definite advance in the Franco-German understanding which had appeared to be so full of promise. In November 1910, after the strike of railway men had weakened the authority of the French Government somewhat, the N’Goko Sanga question came up in Parliament once more, and the Franco-German understanding on Moroccan affairs and the affairs of the Congo became enveloped22 in an immense haze23 of words. By February 1911 the German negotiators began to show impatience24, although on or about the 15th of the month the Imperial Government had, to all practical intent, agreed to allow, to a Franco-German company, concessions in the German Cameroons. A fortnight after that, on February 28, 1911, Monsieur Briand and his Cabinet were forced to resign. On March 3, Monsieur Monis became Prime Minister of France, and Monsieur Caillaux was his Minister of Finance. The Monis Cabinet found itself weighted [Pg 156] with immense responsibility. The situation in Morocco was extremely difficult, and the French Government found itself on the horns of a dilemma25. On the one side were the promises made and the engagements formed by the Governments in France which had preceded Monsieur Monis, owing to which the Monis Cabinet was obliged, if it wished to remain true to the policy on which it had gained power, to break with the line of conduct followed by former French Cabinets in relation to Germany for two years. On the other side was the very real danger of breaking, without any other reason than that of internal politics, with the pacific policy of the last twenty-four months.
The internal troubles in Morocco, making French military action a necessity, put the French Government in the awkward position of giving Germany the appearance of a real grievance26 by the military steps which had to be taken, and the Pan-Germanists of course jumped at the pretext27 for accusing France of laying forcible hands, or attempting to lay forcible hands on Morocco in spite of all past treaties and agreements and without ensuring to Germany the share which had been promised her in 1909. [Pg 157]
I would ask the reader of this book who has had the strength of will to struggle with the tortuous28 paths of Franco-German difficulties which led to the Agadir climax29, to memorize this situation for the sake of a clearer comprehension of what follows. On the one side two years of Anglo-French negotiations which promised comparative peace for the future; on the other, the sudden breaking off of all negotiations and apparent disregard on the part of France for everything which had smoothed over the situation before. The fact that the change of policy had become a necessity owing to Cabinet changes in France and the promises made by members of the new Cabinet to their constituents30 could not be offered as a reason. At the best they could be offered as an excuse, and it was this necessity of making excuses which enabled the German Government to voice the claim for compensation which was to result in a territorial31 loss which France will never forgive the Ministers who were responsible, and which will make it difficult for either of them to take leading parts in France’s government again for many years to come. [Pg 158]
The first thing which the Monis Cabinet did was to bulldose (it seems the only word to use) the question of the Franco-German understandings in Congo and Cameroon. This measure was taken in spite of warnings in high quarters in France. President Fallières is known to have been against the measure and to have expressed his views as forcibly as the French Constitution allowed him to express them, and Monsieur Conty, the director of political affairs in the French Foreign Office, was distinctly adverse32 to the measure as well. Monsieur Conty knew that for twenty years past, one of the principal pre-occupations of the German Government was the African question, and he knew that the German colonial party was very warmly supported by the Pan-Germanists, and had considerable influence with the Kaiser himself.
On these grounds in a note which he handed to Monsieur Cruppi, Monsieur Conty (who is now in 1914 the French Minister at Pekin) pointed33 out the wire-pulling powers of the German interests in the Cameroon and Congo companies, and warned the French Government that there was grave danger to peace in ignoring their claims. He pointed out that while the [Pg 159] Kaiser was known to be pacific and conciliatory at the time, he might be forced by the Pan-German and colonial interests to demonstrate again as he had demonstrated once before at Tangier, and that the result was almost bound to be France’s abandonment to Germany of advantages which she might, by a show of generosity34 now, keep secure.
How right Monsieur Conty was Monsieur Caillaux himself was obliged to admit nearly a year later when in the Senate he said: “I do not deny that the rupture35 of the Franco-German partnership36 in Cameroon and the Congo had diplomatic consequences.” Unfortunately at this time (March 1911) the principal pre-occupation of the Monis Cabinet was its desire to break away from the policy of the Cabinet of Monsieur Briand to which, logically, it should have adhered.
Monsieur Caillaux was credited at the time with one of those famous epigrammatic outbursts of his which have done him harm on various occasions, when, as this one must be, they are quoted against him. “We really can’t have Briand’s policy mounted in diamonds and wear it as a [Pg 160] scarfpin,” Monsieur Caillaux is reported to have said. The epigram, whether he made it or not—and I believe that he did make it—expresses very neatly—far too neatly—the chief motive37 which underlay38 the policy of the Monis Cabinet at that time, and which was the main cause of that Cabinet’s stubborn opposition39 to the advice of Monsieur Conty and the advice of the President of the Republic himself.
On March 29, in spite of an eloquent40 and perfectly41 constitutional warning from Monsieur Fallières at a Cabinet Council, the Colonial Minister in the Monis Cabinet, Monsieur Messimy, was instructed to declare the consortium in Cameroon and the Congo arrangement impossible. He made this declaration before the Budget committee at the end of March and to the Chamber42 of Deputies on April 4. On April 3, the French Government learned of serious trouble in Morocco. Several tribes were rising, and military intervention43 became inevitable44. German irritation45 was growing. The German object, or at all events one of Germany’s main objects, in the discussions and negotiations which began [Pg 161] in 1909 and broke off so suddenly and so dangerously in 1911 had been to ensure a German share in the public works which were becoming needful in Morocco. Germany had received as the price of a concession5 to France an assurance that this share would be granted. In the secret letter, which I have mentioned already, Germany admitted the pre-eminence of French interests in Morocco, and approved the constitution of a society of public works in which the German share of capital was to be much smaller than the French share.
When the Monis-Caillaux-Cruppi Cabinet took the reins46 in France, the German Government asked the French Government to intervene semi-officially so that the promised interests of the German shareholders47 should be properly protected. The French Government refused. Such intervention would be equivalent, it was explained, to admitting privilege or monopoly, and such an admission was against all Radical principles.
The German Government, with great patience, pointed out that what was really required was some sort of a guarantee that a French tender should not be accepted to the prejudice of the German share of the [Pg 162] concessions. The question was one which lent itself to much discussion, many words, long correspondence and wearisome delays, and presently the question of the railways complicated it still further. In the secret letter of 1909 it had been stipulated48 that the directors of the Moroccan railways should be French. The German Government now claimed that this clause should be taken to mean that only the directors of the railway lines should be Frenchmen and that a large proportion of the subordinate railway servants should be German. Here again Monsieur Caillaux’s unfortunate propensity49 for epigram did not forsake50 him. “We can’t have German stationmasters in spiked51 helmets in the railway stations of Morocco,” he said.
The French Government made no counter-proposal with regard to the management of the Moroccan railways, and the Berlin Government remained silent on the question. This silence gave all thinking men considerable grounds for uneasiness. It was felt that a very thinly veiled antagonism52 on all questions of detail was making itself very apparent at the Wilhelmstrasse. There was no definite decision made with regard to Moroccan mining rights either, and it was just about this time that the claims and concessions of the Mannesmann Brothers began to be spoken of. [Pg 163]
The situation became quite critical, and there is no doubt that the critical trend of the situation was due very largely to the determination of the Monis Government not to “have Monsieur Briand’s policy mounted as a scarfpin.” If Monsieur Cruppi and his colleagues had been able to approve the convention with Germany for N’Goko Sanga and the Congo which Monsieur Pichon had prepared, there would have been no excuse for the remark which was made soon afterwards to the French Ambassador in Berlin by Herr von Kiderlen Waechter. “When the railway question fell through I saw that you had made your minds up not to work in concert with us in any matter whatsoever54.”
Things were going from bad to worse in Morocco itself, and French troops had to be sent on the road to Fez. On April 3, 1911, the French Government ordered French troops to co-operate with the Sultan in the chastisement55 of rebel bands. On April 17 (President Fallières had left [Pg 164] for Tunis on the 15th), the French Government placed 2400 men at the disposal of General Moinier. On April 23, a column was sent to the suburbs of Fez and on May 21 the French tricolour floated beneath the walls of the Moroccan capital.
The German Government said nothing, but a rumble56 of popular displeasure was heard all over Germany. Herr von Kiderlen Waechter and the German Chancellor57 received in stony58 silence the communication made by the French Ambassador in Berlin, Monsieur Jules Cambon, that it had been necessary to send French troops to Fez to protect French subjects and to preserve order. German official newspapers announced, unofficially but obviously on official inspiration, that Germany was about to resume her freedom of action.
At this time there was question (it was about the end of April) of a railway from the German Cameroons to the Belgian Congo. The line would of course, as a glance at the map shows, have to run through the French Congo. For the moment it looked as though there was a loophole for agreement which might lead to others, in this German line across French [Pg 165] territory. This hope disappeared however, and in May 1911 the Agadir coup59 was decided on. Germany realized that the only way of obtaining “compensation” was a threat. The Panther went to Agadir. The French Ambassador had a conversation with the German Secretary of State at Kissingen. The German Press was howling. Herr von Kiderlen Waechter answered Monsieur Jules Cambon’s question as to what Germany wanted, in these words: “See what you can give us in the Congo.” A few days later the Monis Cabinet fell, the Caillaux Cabinet came into power, and the Panther and the Berlin arrived off Agadir. The question of compensation had become acute.
At the beginning of July 1911, English opinion was favourable60 to Germany’s desires. The Potsdam agreement had soothed61 Russian fears in the East, France’s march on Fez had excited Spain and made her uneasy, and Italy was beginning to cast greedy eyes on Tripoli. There was very little protest internationally, at first at all events, when the Panther and the Berlin went to Agadir. Monsieur de Selves, the French Foreign Minister, left Paris for Holland on July 3. On July 4, [Pg 166] Monsieur Caillaux, who as Prime Minister took over the Foreign Office while Monsieur de Selves was away, instructed Monsieur Paul Cambon to advise the British Government that France would make no immediate retort to the threat of Germany off Agadir. Monsieur Caillaux gave these instructions in direct opposition to the opinion of Monsieur de Selves which he expressed very clearly in a long telegram from Holland to Paris.
In spite of this telegram from the Minister for Foreign Affairs Monsieur Caillaux telegraphed to Monsieur Paul Cambon as follows: “The German Government has invited us to enter into conversation with regard to Moroccan affairs. We must therefore ask the German Government first of all to explain the object of this conversation. According to the reply of the German Government it will be time, after it has been made, for us to decide whether we should make a naval62 demonstration63 in the southern waters of Morocco. I beg you therefore to avoid advising the British Government of any intention for the moment on our part of sending warships64 either to Agadir or to Mogador.” [Pg 167]
The British Cabinet had been asked by Monsieur Paul Cambon, on the instructions of Monsieur de Selves, as to England’s intentions, but before a reply was given Monsieur Caillaux’s telegram had arrived. The Russian Government remained passive. Germany realized that her bluff65 would not be called. On July 7 Monsieur de Selves returned from Holland, and Herr von Schoen, the German Ambassador in Paris made the first suggestion of “compensation.” France, in principle, was not averse66 to compensation of a kind. If it was to be a question of the Congo she asked Germany to explain what she wanted.
There was no objection in Paris to a rectification67 of the Cameroon frontier line, but France wanted to know what Germany was prepared to do in exchange in Morocco. Herr von Kiderlen Waechter on July 30 suggested that an agreement which should follow the lines of the 1909 understanding might be possible. Monsieur de Selves immediately asked, through Monsieur Jules Cambon, for a written note explaining and setting forth68 this suggestion. It was not till July 15 that the French [Pg 168] Government knew what the German demands really were, and decided that on such lines as the cession6 of all Gabon and all the Congo between the ocean and the Sanga it was quite useless to continue talking. English opinion became uneasy at Germany’s demands.
Lord Morley wrote in the Times on July 19, “If we do not learn by other means what is going on at Agadir, public opinion may be that we ought to go and see for ourselves.”
Belgian opinion became alarmed at the menace to the Belgian Congo. On July 21, Sir Edward Grey spoke53 very clearly and Mr. Lloyd George declared the same evening that war was better than peace with humiliation69. He added that the safety of Great Britain’s commerce overseas was no question of party, and that the national honour was at stake. England to a man showed that it was prepared to back France against the German demands. The Franco-British Entente Cordiale, which had been asleep for a fortnight, became more wideawake than ever. Mr. Asquith described the situation as “extremely difficult.” [Pg 169]
The situation of the German Government in view of this awakening70 of public opinion seemed to have two issues only. Either an ultimatum71 in reply to the French Government’s refusal to submit, or the acceptance in principle of a rectification of the Congo-Cameroon frontier and the granting to France of sufficient authority to cope with the threat of anarchy72 in Morocco. An ultimatum would have meant war, and Germany would have appeared to be the aggressor. The abandonment of her claims was an awkward step to take.
It seems, however, likely that Germany would have taken it, if she had not believed that secret negotiations with prominent men in France were possible. The conduct of these secret negotiations without the knowledge of Monsieur de Selves is the reason which induced Monsieur Clemenceau to say later that Monsieur Caillaux ought to be impeached73 by the high court for high treason. It is very difficult to state with absolute precision exactly what these negotiations were. According to Monsieur Caillaux the first mention of the Belgian Congo was made by Monsieur von Lancken, but there seems to be every reason to believe that Monsieur Caillaux lost his head a little and introduced the [Pg 170] question himself. If this be so Monsieur Caillaux committed a grave fault in tactics, and it appears certain that the German Government considered Monsieur Caillaux an easier person to deal with in these matters than his Foreign Minister. Monsieur Caillaux’s opinions on the value to France of British help were certainly very well known—too well known in fact—in the German Embassy in Paris. Monsieur Caillaux was believed by the German Foreign Office to put no faith in eventual74 help in France’s need from the British army. This anxiety on the part Monsieur Caillaux, and the knowledge of this anxiety in German official quarters, enabled the Wilhelmstrasse to exercise indirect pressure.
It is not known exactly, and I do not suppose ever will be known exactly, what negotiations were carried on with Herr von Gwinner of the Deutsche Bank and with or through Sir Ernest Cassel. But on July 28, the German Government was convinced that Monsieur Caillaux was ready to treat. On that date, when Monsieur Jules Cambon asked the German Foreign Minister whether Germany were not ready to find some means of [Pg 171] transaction other than the mutilation of the French Congo, Herr von Kiderlen Waechter replied: “No, the question is no longer what it was.” This reply is noted75 in the French Yellow Book.
Monsieur Caillaux’s personal interference in the negotiations undoubtedly76 allowed the German Foreign Office time to breathe, and the Cabinet of Berlin took care to fix her claims on the Congo in such a way as not to justify77 British alarm, and to offer with one hand what it withdrew with the other, in Morocco. These negotiations lasted fully78 three months, during which time it is not too much to say that France and Germany, or better still France, Germany and Europe generally, were on the very verge79 of war more than once.
Rumour80 has been busy with sidelights on the negotiations which took place, and not the least interesting of these sidelights is afforded by the telegram which is said to have passed between Berlin and Paris, between the Wilhelmstrasse and the German Embassy: “Do not waste time in discussion with De Selves or Cambon. We can get more out of Caillaux.” I do not know whether these are the exact words of the [Pg 172] famous telegram, but they are certainly the gist81 of its meaning. It may be taken as certain that the telegram was sent and received, that Monsieur de Selves obtained possession of it, and that Monsieur Calmette would have published it in the Figaro in the course of his campaign against Monsieur Caillaux if he had not been induced to refrain from so doing on patriotic82 grounds. Several people have seen and read this telegram. After the death of Gaston Calmette it was found in his pocket book with a bullet-hole through it, and handed over, by the brothers of the dead man, to Monsieur Raymond Poincaré in person, for safe keeping. It is the telegram which is currently known as “the green document” because of the paper on which it was transcribed83. The French Foreign Office was in possession at this time of the cipher84 which was used for telegraphic communications between Paris and Berlin by the Wilhelmstrasse and the German Embassy in Paris. Monsieur de Selves knew therefore that “the green document” had been sent, knew its contents, and had a very stormy interview with Monsieur Caillaux, his Prime Minister, in consequence. [Pg 173]
The interview was a dramatic one. Monsieur de Selves when he learned of “the green document” consulted Monsieur Clemenceau and Monsieur Briand. He spoke of it, I believe, in other quarters also, and eventually he asked President Fallières to confront him with Monsieur Caillaux so that the discussion on Monsieur Caillaux’s interference with the negotiations between the French and German Foreign Offices should take place in the presence of the President of the Republic. Monsieur Caillaux, in a fury of indignation, declared to Monsieur Fallières that there was no truth in the insinuation contained in the message, and went straight to the German Embassy to ask what they meant there by the assertion made in “the green document.” The obvious answer to this ill-considered step was an immediate change in the Wilhelmstrasse cipher. Monsieur Caillaux, by his fit of anger and his imprudence, had lost to his Government a valuable source of information.
There is no need here to give the details of the agreement with Germany which was concluded not very long after the events just mentioned. [Pg 174] There can be little doubt, I think, that France might have made a much better bargain if Monsieur Caillaux had been a little cooler and shown less unwisdom. On November 6 Monsieur Caillaux in a speech to his constituents at Saint Calais defended his policy. A week after this speech the German treaty was discussed for a full week in the Chamber, and accepted on November 21. During this week’s debate Monsieur Caillaux was attacked with some vivacity85, and Monsieur de Selves’ attitude gave cause for much excitement. On January 9, 1912, the Senate sitting in committee discussed the Franco-German treaty. In the course of this discussion Monsieur Caillaux, the Prime Minister, explained the conditions under which the negotiations for Franco-German collaboration in the N’Goko Sanga Company and the Congo Cameroon Railway had fallen through, and made this declaration: “An attempt has been made in the Press and elsewhere to establish the story that negotiations with Germany were carried on outside the negotiations of the Ministry86 for Foreign Affairs. I give my word of honour that there were never any such negotiations beyond those carried on through diplomatic channels.” [Pg 175]
This declaration was listened to in deep silence, which Monsieur Clemenceau broke. “Will the Minister for Foreign Affairs,” said Monsieur Clemenceau, “state whether documents are in existence showing that our Ambassador in Berlin complained of the intrusion of certain people into the diplomatic negotiations between France and Germany?”
The members of the senatorial commission all turned to Monsieur de Selves, but Monsieur de Selves remained silent. Monsieur Caillaux, who had sat down, jumped up again, but Monsieur Clemenceau prevented him from speaking. “I am not addressing myself to you, Monsieur le President du Conseil,” he said. “I put this question to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.”
Monsieur de Selves, who showed considerable emotion and some hesitation87, rose from his seat and said, “Gentlemen, I am divided between the wish to speak the truth and the responsibilities of my situation as Minister for Foreign Affairs. I ask the permission of the commission to remain silent and to give no answer to the question [Pg 176] Monsieur Clemenceau has just asked.” “Your reply,” said Monsieur Clemenceau, “may be perfectly satisfactory to my colleagues, but it cannot be satisfactory to me. I maintain that your reply cannot and does not give satisfaction to the man to whom you have already given your confidence. I am that man, and I will add that you gave me your confidence unsolicited.”
There was a moment of extreme tension, of extreme uneasiness, almost of stupor88. Monsieur Clemenceau had spoken with great emphasis. His meaning was self-evident. The situation was a painfully dramatic one, for the statement of Monsieur Caillaux, the Prime Minister, that there had been no negotiations carried on without the knowledge of the Minister for Foreign Affairs appeared to be in flagrant contradiction with Monsieur de Selves’ reticence89, and the statement was given the lie direct by Monsieur Clemenceau. The emotion was such that the session of the senatorial commission broke up there and then, and the senators dispersed90 after adjourning91 to another day. [Pg 177]
That afternoon there was a confidential92 interview between Messrs. Caillaux, Clemenceau and De Selves, and the same evening the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Monsieur de Selves, handed in his resignation to the President of the Republic in the following letter, dated Paris January 9. “Monsieur le Président,” he wrote, “After the painful incident which occurred to-day at the session of the senatorial commission, I have the honour to ask you to accept my resignation as Minister for Foreign Affairs. It would be impossible for me to undertake any longer the responsibility of a foreign policy for which unity93 of views and unity of action are withheld94 from me in the Cabinet. My anxiety to obtain a satisfactory result in official negotiations of difficulty and to obtain the approval of Parliament on my efforts has been responsible for my remaining in office so long. But the double anxiety I have endured neither to withhold95 the truth, nor to fail in my duty to my colleagues, makes it impossible for me to remain in the Cabinet. I shall always remember the forbearance and kindness with which you have honoured me in delicate circumstances which it is impossible for me to forget. I beg you to receive, Monsieur le Président, the assurance of my profound respect.” [Pg 178]
We know now that Monsieur Clemenceau alluded96 to the “document vert” when he made the accusation against Monsieur Caillaux to which I have already referred. The President of the Republic accepted the resignation of Monsieur de Selves on the evening of January 9, and on January 10, 1912, the Caillaux Cabinet was forced to resign office.
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accusation
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| n.控告，指责，谴责 | |
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accusations
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| n.指责( accusation的名词复数 )；指控；控告；（被告发、控告的）罪名 | |
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hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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concessions
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| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
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concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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cession
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| n.割让，转让 | |
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prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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entente
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| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
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collaboration
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disinterested
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entailed
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immediate
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friction
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negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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memorandum
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decided
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upheaval
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indemnity
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radical
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radicals
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socialists
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enveloped
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haze
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impatience
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dilemma
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| n.困境，进退两难的局面 | |
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grievance
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| n.怨愤，气恼，委屈 | |
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pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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tortuous
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| adj.弯弯曲曲的，蜿蜒的 | |
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climax
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| n.顶点；高潮；v.(使)达到顶点 | |
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constituents
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| n.选民( constituent的名词复数 )；成分；构成部分；要素 | |
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territorial
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| adj.领土的，领地的 | |
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adverse
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| adj.不利的；有害的；敌对的，不友好的 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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generosity
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| n.大度，慷慨，慷慨的行为 | |
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rupture
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| n.破裂；(关系的)决裂；v.(使)破裂 | |
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partnership
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| n.合作关系，伙伴关系 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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underlay
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| v.位于或存在于（某物）之下( underlie的过去式 )；构成…的基础（或起因），引起n.衬垫物 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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eloquent
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| adj.雄辩的，口才流利的；明白显示出的 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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chamber
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| n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所 | |
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intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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irritation
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| n.激怒，恼怒，生气 | |
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reins
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| 感情，激情； 缰( rein的名词复数 )； 控制手段； 掌管； （成人带着幼儿走路以防其走失时用的）保护带 | |
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shareholders
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| n.股东( shareholder的名词复数 ) | |
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stipulated
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| vt.& vi.规定；约定adj.[法]合同规定的 | |
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propensity
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| n.倾向；习性 | |
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forsake
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| vt.遗弃，抛弃；舍弃，放弃 | |
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spiked
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| adj.有穗的；成锥形的；有尖顶的 | |
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antagonism
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| n.对抗，敌对，对立 | |
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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whatsoever
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| adv.（用于否定句中以加强语气）任何；pron.无论什么 | |
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chastisement
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| n.惩罚 | |
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rumble
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| n.隆隆声；吵嚷；v.隆隆响；低沉地说 | |
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chancellor
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| n.(英)大臣；法官；(德、奥)总理；大学校长 | |
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stony
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| adj.石头的，多石头的，冷酷的，无情的 | |
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coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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soothed
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| v.安慰( soothe的过去式和过去分词 )；抚慰；使舒服；减轻痛苦 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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warships
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| 军舰，战舰( warship的名词复数 )； 舰只 | |
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bluff
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| v.虚张声势，用假象骗人；n.虚张声势，欺骗 | |
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averse
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| adj.厌恶的；反对的，不乐意的 | |
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rectification
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| n. 改正, 改订, 矫正 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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humiliation
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| n.羞辱 | |
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awakening
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| n.觉醒，醒悟 adj.觉醒中的；唤醒的 | |
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ultimatum
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| n.最后通牒 | |
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anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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impeached
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| v.控告（某人）犯罪( impeach的过去式和过去分词 )；弹劾；对（某事物）怀疑；提出异议 | |
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eventual
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| adj.最后的，结局的，最终的 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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verge
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| n.边，边缘；v.接近，濒临 | |
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rumour
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| n.谣言，谣传，传闻 | |
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gist
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| n.要旨；梗概 | |
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patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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transcribed
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| （用不同的录音手段）转录( transcribe的过去式和过去分词 )； 改编（乐曲）（以适应他种乐器或声部）； 抄写； 用音标标出（声音） | |
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cipher
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| n.零；无影响力的人；密码 | |
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vivacity
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| n.快活，活泼，精神充沛 | |
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ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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stupor
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| v.昏迷；不省人事 | |
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reticence
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| n.沉默，含蓄 | |
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dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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adjourning
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| （使）休会， （使）休庭( adjourn的现在分词 ) | |
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confidential
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| adj.秘（机）密的，表示信任的，担任机密工作的 | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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withheld
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| withhold过去式及过去分词 | |
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withhold
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| v.拒绝，不给；使停止，阻挡 | |
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alluded
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| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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