During the four years I was in Burma, I was in constant communication with the Viceroy; and every week, unless I was absent in distant places, I wrote to him confidentially1, keeping him fully3 informed of events and of my wants and wishes. Lord Dufferin had asked me to write to him in full confidence and regularly, and Lord Lansdowne allowed me to continue the practice. It was an addition, and often not an insignificant4 addition, to my work. It repaid me, for it established and maintained confidential2 relations between the Viceroy and his subordinate in Burma. It was a great help to the Chief Commissioner5, who had no one on the spot to whom he could open his mind.
I have noticed already the change in the province and the diversion of attention from the interior to the frontier districts. This change shows itself very clearly in my correspondence with the Viceroy, which reflected the matters giving me most anxiety from week to week. During the first half of 1889 the affairs of the frontiers occupied the chief place. I have given their history in separate chapters.
It might be thought, from the space I have given to[129] dacoits and their leaders, that the time had hardly yet come for reducing the military police. In truth the struggle with the dacoits was drawing to a close, and the forces of order were winning all along the line. The outbursts in Magwè and elsewhere were like the last dying efforts of a fire.
The extent to which the military police and the troops had changed places can best be understood from this, that on the 1st of January, 1887, the troops held one hundred and forty-two posts and the military police fifty-six. On the 1st of January, 1889, the police held one hundred and ninety-two posts and the troops forty-one. And the state of the province was such as to lead me to consider the possibility of reducing the military police strength.
It has been seen how the withdrawal6 of the troops led for a time to renewed activity on the part of the discontented and criminal classes.
With this experience before us it was resolved to move with the greatest caution, and to feel our way step by step. The following procedure was adopted. The state of each district and of its subdivisions was carefully reviewed. The posts which might be altogether withdrawn7 were first selected, then those of which the garrisons9 might be reduced in numbers. The changes thus determined10 were to be made gradually, so as to attract as little attention as might be. The men brought in from the posts were not to leave the district at once, but were to remain at headquarters, where their discipline, drill, and musketry could be worked up.
If it should appear from an increase in disorder11 that reduction had been premature12, the mistake could be remedied at once by ordering the men back to their posts. If, on the contrary, no mischief13 followed, the surplus men were to be drafted, by companies if possible, into a provincial14 reserve battalion15, which would be brought to a high standard of military efficiency, and would be available in case of need for any part of the province. Finally, when the reserve battalion became crowded, I proposed to offer the trained companies to the army, if the Commander-in-Chief would accept them and if the men would take military service, of which there was no doubt.
[130]
This scheme was carried out, and continued until the strength of the military police force was not greater than the Government of Burma needed.
Another change was made in order to reduce the forces, namely, the amalgamation16 of two or more battalions17 under one Commandant. It was necessary at first to give a separate battalion to each district, in order that each Deputy Commissioner should have a sufficient force of military police at his hand and under his control. But when the country became peaceful and active service was rarely called for, there was no reason for maintaining an organization that was costly18 in money and men. Thus by doubling up the battalions, aggregating19 nineteen companies, in the Eastern Division, into one battalion of fifteen companies, four companies were saved and drafted into the Reserve.
This process went on until, in the year 1892, seven fine regiments20 had been given to the army. These were treated at first and for some time as local regiments attached to the province. Of late years, however, the policy in the Indian Army has been to obliterate22 all local distinctions and to make service general.
The strength of the military police in Upper Burma now is, I understand, fifteen thousand men in round numbers. The strength in 1889 was eighteen thousand. The reduction, therefore, has not been so very great. The fact is that no sooner had the interior of the province been reduced to order, than fresh territory began to come under administration. Vast tracts23 of hill country on the east, on the north, and on the west, which were left to themselves in 1890, are now held by the military police. From the frontier of French Indo-China on the east to the Bengal boundary on the west, and northwards along the Chinese boundary wherever it may be, the military police keep the marches of Burma. In the mountains inhabited by Kachin tribes on the north and east of the Myitkyina district, the whole of this troublesome borderland is held by the police. Sixteen hundred and twelve rifles, with forty-one native officers and nine British officers, more than a tenth of the whole strength, are stationed in this district, which in 1887[131] was outside the pale. The Shan States and the Chin country are similarly garrisoned24.[32]
I have always felt that our failure to train the Burmans to be soldiers is a blot25 on our escutcheon. I have mentioned an experiment to enlist26 Karens. This succeeded for a time. The men learnt their drill quickly, and as trackers and for forest work they were very useful. It was decided27 in 1891 to raise a Karen battalion, with which, and an Indian battalion, it was proposed to form a military police force for Lower Burma. The Karens were placed on the same footing as the Indians, and British officers were appointed to command them. In drill, endurance in the field, and courage, the Karen showed himself a good man. But from some cause he failed in discipline, and in 1899 it was found advisable, owing to insubordinate conduct, to disband the battalion and distribute the companies among the Indian battalions. There has been more success, I am told, with the Kachins, who are showing themselves trustworthy. They are certainly a strong race, probably the strongest we have in Burma.
Another direction in which the change from the sword to the plough and the pen was showing itself was in the prominence28 given to the administration of the civil police. It is very easy to get up a cry against the police in Burma or in India, but they will not be improved by constant abuse, frequent prosecutions29, censures30, and condemnations by High Court judges, or still less competent critics, or by other methods of giving a service a bad name.
One of the hardest tasks connected with the administration of a country by foreign rulers is the creation of a good police force. When the people from whom the force has to be recruited have lived for years under a despotic and altogether corrupt31 government, the task becomes doubly hard. And when the foreigners appointed to officer and train the force have for the most part no knowledge of police work and no acquaintance with the vernacular32 of the people, the task would have made Hercules drown himself in the nearest ditch.
[132]
It had to be done, however, and it was undertaken. The work had not gone far in 1890, but it was started, and two good and experienced police officers of high standing33 had been appointed to go round Upper Burma, district by district, and instruct the English officers. It was not possible at that time to find Burmans fit to take charge of the police of a district. I do not know whether such men are yet forthcoming.[33] We are well advanced in the second century of our rule in India, yet I believe there are few Indian gentlemen who are willing to take an appointment in the police and fewer still who are well fitted for it.
The question of the civil police in Lower Burma was taken up systematically34 in 1888. A committee was appointed by me to diagnose the ailment35 from which the police were suffering, and to prescribe remedies. On their report in 1889 a scheme was drawn8 up, the main features of which were the division of the Lower Burma force into military and civil, the former, as in Upper Burma, to be recruited from India and partly, it was then hoped, from the Karen people, the latter to be natives of the country. To the latter was to be entrusted36 all police work of detection and prevention. They were to be subjected to drill and discipline and accustomed to stand alone, and they were to be schooled and trained to police duties. The military police force was to be organized as one regiment21 under a military officer. Their headquarters were to be in Rangoon, and they were to furnish such detachments for outdistricts as might be wanted from time to time. This scheme, with little alteration37, was carried out in 1891, and I believe is still in force.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
confidentially
|
|
| ad.秘密地，悄悄地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
confidential
|
|
| adj.秘（机）密的，表示信任的，担任机密工作的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
fully
|
|
| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
insignificant
|
|
| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
commissioner
|
|
| n.（政府厅、局、处等部门）专员，长官，委员 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
withdrawal
|
|
| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
withdrawn
|
|
| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
drawn
|
|
| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
garrisons
|
|
| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
determined
|
|
| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
disorder
|
|
| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
premature
|
|
| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
mischief
|
|
| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
provincial
|
|
| adj.省的，地方的；n．外省人，乡下人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
battalion
|
|
| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
amalgamation
|
|
| n.合并，重组；；汞齐化 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
battalions
|
|
| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
costly
|
|
| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
aggregating
|
|
| 总计达…( aggregate的现在分词 )； 聚集，集合； （使）聚集 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
regiments
|
|
| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
regiment
|
|
| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
obliterate
|
|
| v.擦去，涂抹，去掉...痕迹，消失，除去 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
tracts
|
|
| 大片土地( tract的名词复数 )； 地带； （体内的）道； （尤指宣扬宗教、伦理或政治的）短文 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
garrisoned
|
|
| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
blot
|
|
| vt.弄脏（用吸墨纸）吸干；n.污点，污渍 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
enlist
|
|
| vt.谋取(支持等)，赢得；征募；vi.入伍 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
decided
|
|
| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
prominence
|
|
| n.突出；显著；杰出；重要 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
prosecutions
|
|
| 起诉( prosecution的名词复数 )； 原告； 实施； 从事 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
censures
|
|
| v.指责，非难，谴责( censure的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
corrupt
|
|
| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
vernacular
|
|
| adj.地方的，用地方语写成的；n.白话；行话；本国语；动植物的俗名 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
standing
|
|
| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
systematically
|
|
| adv.有系统地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
ailment
|
|
| n.疾病，小病 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
entrusted
|
|
| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
alteration
|
|
| n.变更，改变；蚀变 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |