The Shans are a distinct race from the Burmans. The existing Burmese people may be traced, it is said, to tribes dwelling11 in the Eastern Himalaya and the adjoining region of Thibet. The Tai or Siamese branch of the Indo-Chinese people, called Shan by the Burmese, are supposed to have migrated from their original seat in Central Asia towards the south, and to have settled along the rivers Mekong, Menam,[134] Irrawaddy, and Brahmaputra. They are found as a distinct race from the borders of Manipur to the heart of Yunnan, and from the Valley of Assam to Bangkok and Cambodia. Major H. R. Davies found them occupying most of the low-lying valleys in Southern Yunnan, and on the Tongking border, and in small communities even in Northern Yunnan and on the Upper Yangtze. Although so widely spread, in some cases even scattered12, and, except in Siam, subjected to alien races, they have preserved to a great extent a common language and national character.[34] In religion they are Buddhist13 of the Burmese type, but less strict in the observance of religious duties and ceremonies and less regardful of animal life. They are in many ways a civilized14 people, unwarlike, and given to agriculture and commerce. They are not unfriendly to foreigners. "I must have travelled," writes Major Davies, "some fifteen hundred miles through Shan countries, and I never remember any difference of opinion, or unpleasantness of any kind."[35]
"It may be accepted as historical," says Phayre, "that the Tai race became supreme15 in the country of the Upper Irrawaddy early in the Christian16 Era and continued to be so under a consolidated17 monarchy18 for several centuries. About the ninth century A.D. it began to break up into separate States which eventually were conquered by the Burmans."[36] In the Irrawaddy Valley the Shans lost their autonomy, and were amalgamated20 with the Burman population; but those on the high plateau to the east continued to be governed by their own chiefs, according to their own customs, subject to the suzerainty of Burma. Some small States west of the Irrawaddy, survived the dissolution of the Shan kingdom, and they also enjoyed a similar but less marked independence.
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Up to the time of the annexation at the end of 1885, the King of Burma had exercised a real, although spasmodic and irregular control over the Shan chiefs. In theory the office of chief, or Sawbwa, was hereditary21 in the family. The Sawbwa was supreme in his own territory. He had the power of life and death, and so far as his subjects were concerned, wielded22 absolute authority unfettered by any rule stronger than custom. The character of the Government varied23 in consequence with the personal character of the chief. The main check on oppression was the facility with which the people could emigrate into some neighbouring State. In practice, however, the Burma Government did not scruple24 to interfere25 with the Sawbwa; and this interference was the chief cause of the strife26 and contention27 which divided and ruined the country. A Burmese Bo-hmumintha, or Resident, to use the Indian term, had his seat of administration at M?ngnai, and was supported by a force of brigands28 rather than soldiers. He was assisted by political agents subordinate to him residing in some of the more important States.
The interference thus exercised was seldom if ever in the interests of good administration. As a rule it was confined to efforts to raise a revenue. Tolls29 and exactions at various points on the trade routes were numerous and oppressive; enough at times to obstruct30 commerce, and even to close a trade route altogether for a season. The ease, however, with which another road could be found, and the duty evaded31, was some check, and the Shans, who are industrious32 cultivators and born traders, contrived33 to remain fairly prosperous and not much below their Burman neighbours in wealth and comfort. As in Burma, while there were some rich men, there was no real poverty. No one but the idle and vicious needed to be in want.
The office of Sawbwa was, as has been said, hereditary in theory, and it does not seem that the Burmese Government diverted the succession from mere34 caprice or favouritism. Some pains were taken to secure the loyalty35 of the chiefs. The King not seldom invited the sons of Sawbwas to the Court of Ava at an early age, for the twofold purpose of rearing them under Court influence, and of keeping them as hostages for their fathers' good conduct. Notwithstanding this marked subordination to the King of Burma, each chief assumed the same insignia and marks of royalty37 as his Suzerain, and in his own view, and to his subjects, probably, was a great and independent monarch.
It has been said that the influence of the Burmese Government was seldom in the interests of good administration. On the contrary, it was frequently used to stir up strife[136] between the Sawbwas, in order to prevent them from combining against the King. Not unnaturally38, therefore, he was not always regarded with feelings of loyalty or affection. Rebellions against his government were frequent, but owing to the want of cohesion39 amongst the Shans, and the absence of a leader of capacity to unite them and to organize resistance, even the loose-jointed Mandalay administration was able to put down revolt without difficulty. It was done with ruthless severity. There was little inclination40 on the part of the Sawbwas, in spite of this oppression, to seek aid or protection from the Siamese, whose rule would not have been a change for the better. The M?ngnai Sawbwa and others, after failing in a rebellion against Burma, sought refuge in Kengtung, the largest and most powerful of the Trans-Salween States, which had some traditional connection with China, and owing to its distance from Burma, and the rugged nature of the intervening country, enjoyed more than a shadow of independence. Nor did those States which lie on the Mekong and formerly41 owned or claimed to own territory on the east bank, invite Chinese protection. Their feelings towards China were friendly enough. But their position on the very extremity42 of that Empire, where there was little life in the administration, rendered it unsafe to lean on help from that quarter.
A letter written to the Chief Commissioner43 by the Sawbwa of Hsipaw (Northern Shan States) in 1886 shows the attitude of the Shan Chiefs towards Burma and China.
"During the last war between the English and the Burmese," he writes, "the Chinese Emperor placed 300,000 men at Maingmawgyi to guard the Chinese frontier. The Chinese officials wrote to the Sawbwas inviting44 them to a conference at Maingmawgyi to draw up a friendly treaty, as the Burmese King had been taken away by the English.
"But I am under great obligations to the Queen-Empress, so I made answer thus: 'From time immemorial we Shans have not sought protection either from China or Burma; of late, however, the Burmans, regardless of law and justice, have exacted our submission45 to them by force of arms.
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"'Since the conquest of Burma by the British and the removal of the Burmese King, the Sawbwas and Myozas have been trying their best to restore peace and order. And now we are asked to come to Maingmawgyi and draw up a treaty of friendship. We cannot respond to the invitation as yet. We, chiefs of the Shan country, must first of all consider which side could confer on us peace and happiness, and then enter into friendly relations with the Government of such side.'"
The problem before the Administration of Burma in 1886 was, to use the political slang of to-day, "The peaceful penetration46" of the Shan country. The mantle47 of the Burmese monarch had fallen on the shoulders of the British Government. The Shan chiefs and their people had to be persuaded to make submission to the Queen-Empress and to accept her as their overlord. This persuasion48 had to be effected if possible without the use of force. A show of force, however, was necessary. During 1886 the despatch49 of an expedition to the Shan States was impossible. The work on hand in Upper Burma was more than enough. Thus it happened that until 1887 the only attempt to make British influence felt in the Shan States was the deputation of an officer with a small force to Hsumhsai, a small State lying between Mandalay and Hsipaw.
To make the measures taken to solve this problem intelligible50, a brief account must be given of events in the Shan country immediately preceding and following the deposition52 of the King of Burma. The grouping of the States for administrative53 purposes into North and South, which was not inherited from the Burman Government and was not founded on any distinction recognized by the Shans, had its origin in these events. The States, the history of which is of most importance in this connection, are Hsenwi and Hsipaw, to the north of Mandalay; Yawnghwè and M?ngnai farther south; and, on the east of the Salween, the large State of Kengtung.
Hsipaw lies in the hills on the Mandalay-Lashio road, about one hundred and thirty miles from the capital of Upper Burma. The Sawbwa, by name Hkun Saing, was the first of the Shan chiefs who came in contact with the British Government[138] and the first to submit himself to the suzerainty of the Queen-Empress after the annexation. The circumstances which led to his contact with the British are these. In 1882 Hkun Saing incurred55 the displeasure of King Thebaw and fled to escape his vengeance56. After some wanderings, which extended, it is said, into Siam, he came to Rangoon, and with a wife and servants settled in the Kemmendine suburb. He lived, he said, in fear of assassination57 by agents of the King, and doubted the fidelity58 of some of his followers59. In 1883 his fears, apparently60, overcame him, and he shot down two of his men whom he accused, I believe not without reason, of plotting against his life. He was arrested, tried for murder before the Recorder of Rangoon, and condemned61 to death.
The sentence was commuted62 by the Chief Commissioner to transportation, and he was confined in the jail at Rangoon. The Chief Commissioner visited Hkun Saing a few days after the beginning of his imprisonment63, and found him taking his punishment like a man, uttering no complaints and working with a will at the task[37] imposed on him. The jail authorities were then instructed to treat him as a political prisoner. After a sufficient time had elapsed to make it plain to independent chiefs that if they sought refuge in British territory they must submit themselves to British law, he was released on condition that he left our jurisdiction64. He retired65 to Eastern Karenni, and lived under the protection of Sawlapaw, the chief of that country. On the removal of the King of Burma, he obtained some assistance in men and money from Sawlapaw, and made his way to his own territory.
Meanwhile much had been happening there and in the neighbouring States during his absence.
To the east and north-east of Hsipaw is the State of Hsenwi, which is one of the largest divisions of the Shan country. The tract66 known by this name contains nearly twelve thousand square miles. On the north and north-east it is bordered by Chinese Shan States. The population of the State is said to number about one hundred and fifty thousand and is of mixed races, the pure Shans being outnumbered by Kachins, Palaungs, and Chinese. For many years Hsenwi had been torn by dissension. Frequent struggles between rival claimants to the chiefship, as frequent appeals to Burma by the party who for the time was worsted, had distracted and ruined the country. At the time of the annexation of Upper Burma Naw Hpa was the titular67 Sawbwa, one of whose daughters had been espoused68 by King Mindon. He was the representative of the ancient ruling family of Hsenwi and had been expelled by a usurper69 named Sang Hai. The story is worth telling as an illustration of Burmese ways.
[139]
About the middle of last century the Siamese made an attack on the Trans-Salween State of Kengtung. The Cis-Salween States were called upon for contingents70 to form a force to repel71 the invasion, and Sang Hai, who was previously72 unknown, led the Hsenwi men to victory and won much renown73. On his return, finding himself at the head of victorious74 troops, he rebelled against his lawful75 ruler Naw Hpa, and turned him out.
Naw Hpa was summoned to Mandalay, and condemned to imprisonment for having failed to maintain his authority, while a cadet of the Hsenwi house was appointed in his stead. This cadet, U Po by name, was driven away ignominiously76 by Sang Hai, and was recalled to Mandalay and sent to join Naw Hpa in jail. Numerous Burmese officials of high rank with imposing77 titles were sent up one after another, and one after another was expelled by Sang Hai, and they came back, in the order of their going, to join the company of failures in Mandalay prison.
At last, about 1877, all the Sawbwas from Yawnghwè to M?ng L?ng were ordered to make a combined attack on Sang Hai. This was too much for the usurper. He went east of the Salween, and Naw Hpa was sent back to rule a ruined and distracted country. But Sang Hai before he retired had thrown his mantle over the shoulders of his son-in-law, San Ton Hon, who was for a Shan a good fighting-man. The unlucky Naw Hpa was driven out once more, and again ordered to Mandalay to explain his failure to hold his own. He knew by experience what this meant, and deputed his son, who was known as the Naw M?ng, to represent him at Court, or rather in prison, while he himself took refuge with the Kachins.
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When Thebaw succeeded his father Mindon, he imprisoned78 his stepmother, the Hsenwi Queen, Naw Hpa's daughter, and killed her son. And as Naw Hpa himself was a refugee and Naw M?ng was in jail San Ton Hon was left free to establish himself in Hsenwi, or rather in the Northern and Eastern Divisions of the State. The Southern, known as the Taunglet, had already broken away and separated into four petty chiefships. The middle portion, called the Alelet, was governed in a fashion by Sang Aw, commonly know as the Pa-?k-Chok, who had his headquarters at M?ngyai. A Burmese official with a small force had been left at Lashio, but unable to support himself against San Ton Hon he withdrew as soon as he heard of the fall of the Monarchy.
On the British occupation of Mandalay the son of Naw Hpa, Naw M?ng, who had been imprisoned by Thebaw, was set free. He made his way into Hsenwi, collected followers, and seized the capital, which had been evacuated79 by the Burmans. He was quickly expelled, however, by San Ton Hon. Meanwhile his father, Naw Hpa, with a following of Kachins, came upon the scene, and another element of strife appeared in the Myinzaing Prince, who had been imprisoned by the King and along with other political prisoners was released on the occupation of Mandalay. He made his way to the Shan hills and endeavoured to collect followers and oppose the British. His cause appears to have been taken up by Naw Hpa and Naw M?ng, in the hope of strengthening their own party. A confederacy was formed to raise the standard of the Myinzaing Prince. The plan of campaign was to seize possession of this part of the Shan country. Hsipaw was to be assigned to Naw M?ng, while Hsenwi was to be restored to Naw Hpa. The town of Hsipaw was attacked and completely wrecked80, and a movement was directed against San Ton Hon.
Such was the condition of affairs when Hkun Saing made his way back from the Karenni country. After some opposition81 he made himself master of Hsipaw, to find the place in ruins, the only house standing36 being his own haw, or palace, which had been spared in fear, it was said, of the Spirit of the Palace. Under these circumstances it was natural that Hkun Saing, the lawful Sawbwa of Hsipaw[141] and San Ton Hon, the de facto chief of Northern Hsenwi, should make common cause against the confederacy headed by Naw Hpa and his son. This was in July, 1886.
Between the Hsipaw State and Mandalay on the western border of the Shan plateau lies the small State of Hsumhsai, known to the Burmans as Thonze. It was formerly ruled by its own chief, and had been a very prosperous little district. Its position within easy reach of Mandalay exposed it to the constant and mischievous82 interference of the Burman Government. For forty years before the annexation it had been administered by Burmese officials, but with some regard to Shan customs and sentiment. In 1886, after the British occupation of Mandalay, it became a bone of contention between Kun Meik, acting83 for his brother the Sawbwa of Hsipaw, and the Myinzaing Prince, who had occupied this part of the plateau. There were two men of influence in Thonze, Maung Sa and Maung Se. Maung Sa attached himself to Kun Meik, and Maung Se to the Myinzaing Prince. They fought with varying fortune for some time. Eventually Kun Meik was forced back to Hsipaw. The Myinzaing party remained masters of Hsumhsai for some months, pillaging84 and destroying everything. The trade route was entirely85 closed throughout the year 1886, and traffic between Mandalay and the Shan States either ceased or followed a very circuitous86 route.
The Chief Commissioner and the military commanders had so much on their hands in 1886 that the question of the Shan country was of necessity postponed87. In November, however, it was found imperative88 to give attention to affairs in Hsumhsai. A column under Colonel E. Stedman,[38] with Mr. H. Thirkell White[39] as civil officer, was sent to reopen the road and restore order. Mr. White recorded that at the time of his arrival (18th of November, 1886) "The country was to a great extent deserted89, villages had been abandoned, and many of the inhabitants had fled to the neighbouring States of M?nglon, Hsipaw, and Lawksawk, but chiefly to M?nglon. Much of the land had been left uncultivated; the road was neglected and overgrown with long grass. These evidences of disorder90 we saw as we passed through Hsumhsai, and I learned from the people that the state of the rest of the country was the same as that of the part which we saw." It may be noted91 here that when Hkun Saing, the Sawbwa of Hsipaw, came to Mandalay in 1887 to meet Sir Charles Bernard, he laid claim to three small States—Hsumhsai, M?nglon, and M?ntung—as formerly belonging to him. Inasmuch as Hkun Saing was the first Shan chief to acknowledge the supremacy92 of the British Government, there was a desire to make much of him and to meet his wishes. These three States were made over to him without going into the merits of the case. At the time the intricacies of Shan politics were little understood. The people of M?nglon especially were averse93 to being subjected to the Sawbwa, who failed to govern justly or efficiently94, and the settlement of this part of the country became very difficult. The ultimate result in consolidating95 the States under one chief has, I believe, been good.
[142]
Another State of which it is useful to give some special account is Yawnghwè, called by the Burmese Nyaungywe. Yawnghwè is in the Central, or Myélat, Division of the Shan States, and is easily accessible from the plains. It is remarkable96 for its physical formation. A broad valley running from the north to the south forms the western half of the State, and the centre of this valley is the Inle Lake, a large expanse of water covering an area of seventy square miles (Upper Burma Gazetteer). The eastern side of the State is hilly, and some of the ranges rise to six thousand feet and more. Yawnghwè, it is said, in former days ruled the country from the Hsipaw border on the north to Karenni on the south. It was undoubtedly97 the most prominent State in the Myélat.
At the time of the occupation of Mandalay by the British, Saw M?ng was Sawbwa. He had gone down to Mandalay in 1885 to see King Thebaw. It is said that he brought back with him to Yawnghwè the Legya Queen, one of King Mindon's wives, and her son, whose standard he set up, calling on all the chiefs to aid him to fight the British and retake Mandalay. A combination of small States was formed against him, and he was wounded in both legs and obliged to retire. Being thus incapacitated, he sent for his half-brother, Saw ?n, and handed the conduct of affairs to him while he went to Mandalay to recover from his hurt. Saw ?n defeated the hostile party, and having established his authority, took possession of the State and told Saw M?ng he need not return. Meanwhile the Limbin confederacy had been formed, and Saw ?n was called upon to join it. He refused, and shrewdly proclaimed himself an adherent98 of the British Government and appealed to the Chief Commissioner for aid.
Saw Maung, Sawbwa of Yawnghwè, and his Consort99.
[143]
In order to explain the appearance of the Limbin confederacy, we must now go eastward100 of the Salween to the State of Kengtung. This chieftainship is one of the largest of the States, and comprises about twelve thousand square miles. It lies between the Salween and the Mekong, touching101 both rivers. Owing to its distance from Mandalay and the very rugged and mountainous nature of the country between the two rivers, Kengtung of late years had been left to itself by the Burman Government. Soon after Thebaw's accession to the Kingdom of Ava, many of the Shan States revolted against him, and Kengtung took a conspicuous102 part in the rebellion. The Sawbwa seized the Burmese Resident and his escort and put them to death. He attacked the adjacent and smaller State of Kengcheng and turned out the chief, installing in his room a man of his own. It so happened that the Chinese had occasion about this time to strengthen their forces in Southern Yunnan, probably as a precaution against French aggression103. Hearing of the action taken by Kengtung against Kengcheng, a large part of which lay east of the Mekong, the Chinese general sent a force to Kengtung. It was agreed to submit the dispute between the claimants to the Sawbwaship of Kengcheng to the Chinese commander. He installed one of the claimants, and provided against a revival104 of the quarrel by decapitating the other. After these events the authority of the Burman Government ceased to exist in Kengtung.
In 1882 the Sawbwa of M?ngnai and the chiefs of several neighbouring States revolted against Thebaw and found a safe refuge in Kengtung. M?ngnai is one of the most important of the States. It contains nearly three thousand square miles. The River Salween is the boundary on[144] the east, and divides it from Kengtung. It has been already mentioned that a Burman Bo-hmu, or Resident, with an armed force, was stationed in M?ngnai, which derived105 dignity from being the centre of Burmese power in the Shan States, and suffered proportionately. The exactions of the King's Government at last became intolerable. The Sawbwa, Kun Kyi, was summoned, with other defaulters, to Mandalay, and imprisoned there until the sums demanded were paid.
About 1882 Kun Kyi was again summoned to appear. He preferred to revolt. While the Burmese subordinate official (the Resident had just died) was preparing to seize him, he raised his people, led them against the King's garrison106, and destroyed it. On the news reaching Mandalay, a large force was dispatched to avenge107 this outrage108, and the Sawbwa, with several other chiefs in like straits, took refuge in Kengtung. One, Twet Nga Lu, with the assistance of the Burmese officials, took possession of M?ngnai.
Twet Nga Lu was an unfrocked monk109, a native of Kengtawng, a sub-State of M?ngnai, who signalized his return to a worldly life by making himself unpleasant to his neighbours. He had made an attack on M?ngnai, but was driven off. A younger brother of the M?ngnai Sawbwa had married a lady named Nang U, by whom he had a son. Whether this nobleman died, or was dismissed by Nang U, is uncertain. However that may be, she espoused Twet Nga Lu, and thereupon her minor110 son was appointed by the King to be magistrate111 of Kengtawng with the unfrocked monk as guardian112. This arrangement had taken place before the retirement113 of the Sawbwa, Kun Kyi, to Kengtung, and was very distasteful to him.
It came about thus, that the Sawbwa of M?ngnai, the premier114 chief in the Shan country with Lawksawk and several others, all suffering from the King's tyranny, found themselves in Kengtung.
Naturally they took counsel together regarding the measures to be adopted for recovering their territories, and protecting the Shans generally against the oppressive rule of Burma. It was resolved to form a confederacy under one leader. Their decision and the reasons for it are stated in a letter addressed by them to Hkun Saing, the Sawbwa of[145] Hsipaw, on the 26th of March, 1886. Referring to a communication which they had received from Hkun Saing, in which he advised that "it would be beneficial to the Shans to have their country welded into a congeries of independent States like Germany," they state their own views in the form of resolutions, declaring that there is no hope of establishing peace or putting an end to the endless strife between the States, unless they are united under one suzerain. They consider that the interests of their religion and of the country generally demand the selection of a supreme ruler, who will combine the Sawbwas and enable them to withstand any attempt to injure them or their religion.
Acting on these principles they decided115 in 1885, before the British Government had moved against King Thebaw, to invite the Limbin Prince, one of the Royal Family who was living in British Burma as a refugee on a small pension allotted116 to him by the British Government, to come up to Kengtung and to accept the position of Suzerain of the Shan States, with the object of "wresting117 the crown from King Thebaw." The Prince accepted the call, and arrived at Kengtung on December 10, 1885. On his arrival, forces were raised from Kengtung and the other confederating States, and advance parties were sent forward under the command of the Sawbwas of M?ngnawng, M?ngnai, and Lawksawk.
The States joining in this enterprise under the nominal118 leadership of the Limbin Prince—a poor creature quite unable to lead any one—became known as the Limbin Confederacy. A counter league was formed by all those interested in keeping the exiled Sawbwas out of their territories and maintaining the existing state of things. On the other hand, the Sawbwas of M?ngpawn and several other influential119 Sawbwas espoused the cause of the Confederacy. Twet Nga Lu was the leading spirit of the counter league, and he directed its forces against the States which were allied120 to M?ngnai. He was met and defeated by M?ngpawn, and early in the year 1886 Kun Kyi, the Sawbwa of M?ngnai, and his companions in exile had expelled the usurpers and recovered their territories. The Confederacy then set themselves to induce or compel other States to join[146] them and to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Limbin Prince. Saw ?n, the de facto ruler of Yawnghwè, rejected their invitation. The Confederacy determined121 to move from M?ngnai against him, as it was important to force Yawnghwè, the State adjoining M?ngnai on the west, and the most powerful in the Central, or Myélat, Division, to give its adherence122 to the Prince.
The foregoing outline will perhaps suffice to make the situation at and immediately following the annexation intelligible.
The danger-points appeared to the Chief Commissioner to be the critical situations of the two Sawbwas, who had signified their adherence to the British Government, namely, Hsipaw in the north and Yawnghwè in the central portion of the States. Hsipaw and his ally, San Ton Hon, were pressed by the coalition123 under Naw Hpa, Naw M?ng, and Prince Saw Yan Naing—another scion124 of Royalty who with his brother had raised their standard at Chaunggwa, in the Ava district, and after being driven out of that had eventually joined Naw M?ng in Hsenwi. Yawnghwè was threatened by the powerful Limbin Confederacy, and had no prospect125 of help from any neighbouring State. Both these Sawbwas had declared themselves to be friends of the British Government, and at the time they were our only adherents126.
The deputation of Mr. Herbert White to Hsumhsai in 1886 has already been mentioned. He succeeded in opening the trade route between Hsipaw and Mandalay and in strengthening the position of the Sawbwa Hkun Saing. Accordingly, when Sir Charles Bernard came to Mandalay at the end of 1886, Hkun Saing was able to hasten down to meet him, and to make in person his submission to the British Government. He was received with much ceremony by the Chief Commissioner. His loyalty to the Queen-Empress and belief in her power were not open to doubt. On his return journey from Mandalay in February, 1887, Mr. J. E. Bridges, the Deputy Commissioner, with a small military escort and some officers of the Survey and Intelligence Departments, accompanied the Sawbwa to Hsipaw. Mr. Bridges remained there twenty-five days, gathering127 information regarding Shan politics and the[147] country generally, and opening communications with other States. He came to the conclusion that the Shan chiefs were little disposed to welcome the advent128 of British power. Hkun Saing, the Sawbwa of Hsipaw, stood out alone as our friend. The party under the flag of the Chaunggwa Prince, which was striving to eject San Ton Hon from Hsenwi, was equally hostile to Hsipaw. Much of the country had been ravaged129 by the Myinzaing Prince and his adherents. His view was needlessly despondent130.
Before the end of 1886 it had been decided to begin by sending an expedition to relieve Yawnghwè from the threatened attack by the Limbin Confederacy. To provide men for another movement to help Hsipaw was thought to be impossible. In accordance with a promise made to Hkun Saing by the Chief Commissioner at their meeting in Mandalay, a supply of arms and ammunition131 was sent to him, which, it was hoped, would enable him and San Ton Hon to defeat their enemies. It may be stated here that although some anxiety was felt from time to time regarding events in Hsenwi and Hsipaw, it did not become necessary to move troops to their assistance. Naw Hpa and his son Naw M?ng made submission to the Superintendent132 at Fort Stedman early in August, 1887, and further action in the Northern States was deferred133 until the open season of 1887-8.
But to return to the end of 1886. Although it had been impossible to take more active steps to bring the Shan States into line, the administration had not been idle. The policy to be adopted towards them generally was thought out and the main lines were laid down by Sir Charles Bernard. Letters explaining the principles which would guide the British Government in its relations to them were written to the various chiefs. They were assured that there was no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of the States. British supremacy must be acknowledged, peace must be preserved, the people must not be oppressed. Subject to these conditions and to the payment of a moderate tribute, the British Government undertook to recognize the Sawbwas who were in effective possession, to uphold their rights, and to give freedom and open the way for commerce. Preparations were made accordingly[148] to send an expedition to the Shan plateau. Its immediate51 duty was to relieve Yawnghwè. The ultimate purpose was to establish a political officer with a sufficient military force in a strong position on the Shan plateau from which he could, as the representative of British power, control the States. There was no intention of fighting the Shans. On the contrary, it was desired to win their friendship and to induce them to trust us. Already the duties, imposts and monopolies which strangled trade in the King's time had been swept away. It remained to establish peace and to open the trade routes which the prevailing135 anarchy136 had closed.
Hlaingdet was chosen as the starting-point of the expedition which was to carry out this policy. A force assembled there in December, 1886, under Colonel E. Stedman of the 3rd Gurkha Regiment137, consisting of—
2 guns 1-1 E.D.R.A.
Four Companies 2nd Battalion138 Hampshire Regiment.
Four Companies 3rd Gurkha Regiment.
50 men of the Bombay Sappers and Miners.
40 Mounted Infantry139 (who joined at Pwehla after the force had started).
The objects of the expedition, as has been stated, were peaceful and political. The military commander was responsible for the disposition140 of the troops, and in the event of active operations becoming necessary was to have entire control. The negotiations141 with the Shans and the conduct of affairs generally, apart from purely142 military matters, were entrusted143 to the civil head of the expedition, Mr. A. H. Hildebrand (at that time Deputy Commissioner of Tharrawaddy). Ten years previously Mr. Hildebrand had served on a mission to the Karenni country and had arranged for the protection of that people from the encroachments of the King of Burma. Subsequently as District Officer of the Salween Hill Tracts144 and later in the Arakan Hills he had shown his capacity for ruling and influencing half-civilized peoples. Mr. J. G. Scott, now well known as Sir George Scott, was appointed to assist him. Mr. Scott at a former period had been attached to the S. P. G. College in Rangoon, and under the nom de plume145 of Shway Yoe had made a reputation as a writer on Burma and its[149] people. On the annexation of Upper Burma he had been appointed to the Commission.
The leaders of the expedition, both civil and military, were well chosen. Their instructions were to take every precaution against giving avoidable offence or trouble to the people, to gain the goodwill146 of chiefs, priests, and villagers, to interfere as little as might be with their prejudices, their religious houses, and their private life.
The move from Hlaingdet was to have been made at once on the assembling of the force. But the state of the roads and doubt as to the best route caused delay both at the outset and afterwards. The hill passes leading to the Shan country had become very difficult owing to disuse during the troublous times of 1885-6. In some places also they had been purposely blocked by the Burman villagers to protect themselves against Shan cattle-raiders, and by Shans who wished to obstruct the expedition. It was very hard to get labourers to clear and repair the roads and make them passable by the main body of the force and the transport animals.
On the 3rd of January it was decided to advance, and Colonel Stedman, with two hundred Gurkhas, proceeded to occupy Pyinyaung, twenty-two miles from Hlaingdet. There were doubts as to the best route. As the reports received from Yawnghwè represented the Sawbwa to be hard pressed by the Limbin Confederates, Colonel Stedman resolved to follow the most direct road, disregarding its difficulty, and pushed on to Kyatsakan and across the Pyindeik Pass. Singu was occupied on the 20th. Some show of resistance was made at several places. But it was very faint-hearted, the enemy being only some Shans in the service of the Lawksawk Sawbwa, poorly armed and undisciplined. Mr. Hildebrand had not yet arrived. His subordinate, Mr. Scott, who performed his duties temporarily, distributed copies of a proclamation issued by the Chief Commissioner explaining the motives147 and objects of the expedition to the chiefs of the Myélat States, and wrote letters in his own name to the most prominent men. He made good use of the time also to explore roads and collect labour for improving them.
On the 21st of January Mr. Hildebrand with the remainder[150] of the force joined Colonel Stedman at Singu. On the 27th of January the main body advanced to Kaukon, where another feeble attempt at resistance was made by some of Lawksawk's forces. On the following day numerous elders from the neighbouring villages came in and welcomed the British. The constant fighting between the Limbin's men and their opponents led by the Yawnghwè Sawbwa, had made life a burden to the people. The country was being depopulated. No one dared to sow, not knowing who would reap.
On the 29th of January Pwehla was reached. The chief villagers and the Pongyis met the column outside the town, and a favourable148 and peaceable progress was anticipated. Hitherto there had been some apprehension149 lest the Sawbwa of Yawnghwè, who had represented himself as being hard pressed by the Limbin Confederacy, should be overpowered before help could reach him. It was now ascertained150 that this fear was unfounded. As there was no cause for haste, Mr. Hildebrand decided to take the opportunity of summoning the chiefs of the Myélat States to appear and to make their submission. There was an advantage, moreover, in giving the Lawksawk Sawbwa time to consider his position and to submit peacefully; and with this object every endeavour was made by letter and messenger to explain the situation to him.
On the 7th of February the force reached Bawyethat Pagoda151, about half-way between Yawnghwè and Kugyo. Here it was met by the Sawbwa Saw ?n, who came with the full glory of Shan pomp to welcome the British representative. It was found that a body of men from Lawksawk had occupied Kugyo, which is in Yawnghwè territory. Mr. Hildebrand wished to send a letter to the commander to persuade him to retire his men, but no one could be found willing to carry it, for fear of the wild Kachins and Panthays said to be amongst his followers. There was nothing for it, therefore, but to attack Kugyo, which was taken on the 9th of February, without loss on our side. On the 10th the column made a formal entry into Yawnghwè and was received with much state by the Sawbwa. It had been intended to fix the headquarters of the British Administration a little way off, but the[151] country was found to be low-lying and unhealthy. A site was chosen on the slope which leads up from the great lake of Yawnghwè to the Hsahtung range. A fort was built, and named after Colonel Stedman, the officer commanding the force. Here the headquarters of the Superintendent of the Southern Shan States were established.
The arrival of the expedition at Yawnghwè was followed by an immediate change in the attitude of the neighbouring chiefs. By the middle of February Yawnghwè had been relieved and the bands attacking him dispersed152. The whole of the Myélat had submitted, most of the chiefs appearing in person. To the south, M?ngpai and others of importance had accepted the British suzerainty, some by letter and some in person. To the north, Lawksawk and M?ngping held aloof153, but it was hoped to induce them to come in. Laikha, M?ngkung, and Kehsi Mansam had declared themselves on the British side. Letters were despatched to M?ngnai and all the adjacent States, urging them to accept the supremacy of the British and to cease fighting amongst themselves. Letters were also sent to the chiefs of Karenni, offering friendship and suggesting a meeting.
After the dispersal of the bands at Kugyo, the Limbin Confederacy had withdrawn154 their troops and the Confederate chiefs had retired to their own territories. The Limbin had betaken himself to a place near Hopong. Nevertheless there was no sign of the Eastern States giving in and dissolving the Confederacy. Letters were again written to them. A special letter was addressed to the Limbin, promising155 him his liberty if he surrendered, with a sufficient pension and a house at Moulmein or Rangoon.
While the results of these overtures156 were being awaited, it became urgent to attend to the quarrel between M?ngpai, the most southerly of the Shan States, and Pobye, the chief of Western Karenni, which adjoins M?ngpai on the south. A perennial157 feud158 existed between them, and at this time had broken out with fresh energy. Both the combatants had written to Mr. Hildebrand praying him to send a British officer with a force to put a stop to the strife which was ruining the country. In answer to this appeal Mr. Scott, with a hundred Gurkhas under command of[152] Captain Pulley, was sent southward to Payagon, where the Burmese garrison used to be stationed, and near which the M?ngpai Sawbwa had now made his residence. They made the journey of seventy miles by boat down the Nam Pilu River through a fertile and irrigated159 country, which had evidently suffered much from both the contending factions160.
The Sawbwa received Mr. Scott with hospitality and welcomed the settlement of the Shan States under the British Crown. He said he had prayed for this and urged it on his compatriots for thirty years. "Now that the British have come," he exclaimed, "there will be peace." He asked for a British garrison at Payagon, as a protection against the Karennis, who raided the Shan country for slaves. The Shans were quite unable to withstand them, and men and women were carried off into hopeless slavery (vide Chapter XVII.).
It had been intended that the force under Colonel Stedman should return to Burma by the southern passes to Toungoo, and that Mr. Scott with the troops accompanying him should remain at or about M?ngpai until the main body joined him. Owing to some military exigencies161 this plan was changed, and the expedition was ordered to return by the route by which it came. Captain Pulley with Mr. Scott's escort was recalled at once to Fort Stedman. Mr. Scott had to withdraw, leaving unsettled many matters, more especially the quarrel between M?ngpai and the Karenni chief Pobye, and without waiting for several headmen of neighbouring districts who were on their way to meet him. This was unfortunate.
After the return of Mr. Scott and his escort to Fort Stedman on the 7th of March, 1887, a long halt followed, during which voluminous correspondence was carried on with the various chiefs who held aloof and with the Limbin Prince, who it was hoped might be induced to surrender and thus dissolve the Confederacy. The Prince was reported to be at Hopong. Letters were sent to him and to M?ngnai, and to M?ngpawn, inviting them to meet Mr. Hildebrand at Hopong on the 17th of March, and preparations were made for the march. The difficulties of transport had been overcome, the pack-bullock baskets loaded up; the coolies collected, and everything ready for a start,[153] when letters were received from M?ngpawn saying that he could not meet the Superintendent. M?ngnai was at Gantarawadi, the capital of Eastern Karenni, witnessing the marriage of his nephew to a daughter of Sawlapaw, the Karenni chief. M?ngnai's sister-in-law had died. She could not be buried until M?ngnai returned. Until the funeral was over M?ngnai could not attend to business, and without him the others could do nothing. Royalties162 are governed by conventions.
It was obvious that M?ngpawn's object was to gain time. To countermand163 the march, now that all preparations had been made and the forward movement widely made known was open to many objections. The Yawnghwè Sawbwa argued strongly against a change of plans, which he said would certainly be misinterpreted. Mr. Hildebrand, however, decided to countermand the march. He wished to give the Confederacy full time to consider the alternatives before them. He held that a voluntary acknowledgment of British supremacy made from a conviction that it was the best course for their own interests would be more valuable even if it were delayed than an immediate submission enforced by arms.
This waiting policy was not free from some disadvantages. The delay in taking action was sure to be attributed to weakness. The time was used by Sawlapawgyi, who was hostile to the British, to urge the other Karenni chiefs and those Shan Sawbwas with whom he could communicate to hold aloof. In the neighbourhood of Yawnghwè and in the Myélat States generally signs of unrest and trouble were manifest. For the first time since the occupation of Fort Stedman mail-runners were stopped and robbed. The Sawbwa of Lawksawk, who remained openly and uncompromisingly hostile, was thought to have instigated164 these outrages165. It was resolved to strike the first blow at him. He was warned by letter that the Superintendent was coming to Lawksawk and ordered to remain at his capital to meet him.
The difficulty of collecting transport had to be overcome again. The Yawnghwè Sawbwa for some cause was not zealous166 in assisting the expedition. For one reason he desired to make the most money he could out of the opportunity,[154] and made a very persistent167 effort to extort168 exorbitant169 rates for the carriage furnished.
It was not until the 4th of April that the force began to march for Lawksawk. It moved by very easy stages. The various bands of marauders posted along the route to harass170 the march fled as the expedition advanced. These ruffians had been working in concert with dacoit gangs in the districts below the hills, who had thus been able to resist the British troops; but now, finding themselves liable to be taken in the rear, very soon surrendered to the military post at Wundwin, an unexpected but very useful result of Mr. Hildebrand's action. Before the column reached Lawksawk the Sawbwa Saw Waing fled. The town was occupied on the 11th of April. Temporary arrangements were made for administering the State by putting in charge a Burman, Bo Saing, who had held office under the King's Government and was acceptable to the people, and the force turned its face towards Hopong.
Meanwhile fighting had been renewed in the south-east. M?ngnai returned from Karenni with some men lent to him by Sawlapaw and drove Twet Nga Lu out of Kengtawng. Laikha, M?ngkung, and Kehsi Mansam, who had been invited by Mr. Hildebrand to come to Hoypong to meet M?ngnai and M?ngpawn with a view to their reconciliations171, put their own interpretation172 on this invitation and attacked M?ngpawn in force. Peremptory173 orders were sent to them to withdraw. When the force entered Hopong on the 17th of April, the day appointed for meeting M?ngpawn and the Limbin Prince, the town was found in ruins and all but deserted. The Limbin had not come, and M?ngpawn was occupied in defending himself against his enemies. The intelligence received showed that Laikha and his allies had not obeyed the order to withdraw their men. Finding that an engagement was in progress a few miles off, Mr. Hildebrand and Mr. Scott with forty Mounted Infantry and fifty Punjabis under Major Swetenham rode for the scene of the fight, which went on for a short time unchecked by the arrival of the British party. The opposing forces had stockaded positions on the opposite slopes of a small valley, and were firing briskly on each other. M?ngpawn was induced to cease firing. The Assistant Superintendent, Mr. Scott, went up to the stockade174 of the attacking party, and the leaders were soon persuaded to withdraw their men, who for their part were only too glad to go to their homes. When the British retired to M?ngpawn in the evening, they left the opposing leaders mingled175 together in good-humoured talk, bragging176 of the desperate deeds of valour performed in the combat.
Padaung Ladies—Shan States.
[155]
A few days were spent at M?ngpawn. The Sawbwa Hkun Ti is described as a man of strong character, "the moving spirit in the Limbin Confederacy." He was quite ready, however, to give up this coalition and to transfer his allegiance to the Queen-Empress. He advised the despatch of a party to M?ngnai to hoist177 the British flag and to bring in the Limbin Prince. The rains were now well on, and marching had become very difficult. It was decided, therefore, not to take the whole force but to send the Assistant Superintendent with fifty rifles under Lieutenant178 Wallace to M?ngnai. The Superintendent with the main body marched back to Fort Stedman.
Mr. Scott was detained for some days in M?ngpawn waiting for rations134. The time was well employed. Two of the minor chiefs, Naungmawn (a brother of M?ngpawn) and M?ngsit (M?ngpawn's son-in-law, and half-brother of Mawknai), came and tendered their allegiance. Others offered their submission by messenger and promised to meet the Assistant Superintendent at M?ngnai, which they said was the place of assemblage for the Shan States from ancient times. More than this, very friendly relations were established during this halt between the people and the troops. The Myozas (headmen) from the neighbouring villages came round every evening for rifle-practice with the officers; and it is recorded that M?ngpawn and his brother made very good shooting. The troops were paraded and man?uvred for their entertainment. Notwithstanding these courtesies, however, no promise to surrender the Limbin Prince could be obtained from these chiefs. "It must depend," they said, "on his own decision." They suggested that better terms should be offered to him. "This was an instance," says Mr. Hildebrand, "of the way in which the Shan chiefs cling together, and of the sanctity they attach to an oath." Although the Limbin's cause[156] and the ideas on which it was based were hopelessly lost, they would not coerce179 him to surrender.
On the 2nd of May Mr. Scott's party began their march, and entered M?ngnai on the 5th, having suffered from heavy and incessant180 rain all the way. After crossing the Mewettaung Range, they entered a level valley which extends to Kengtawng on the south-east and up northward181 as far as Laikha. The altitude of this valley is about 4,000 feet. It is the centre of the silk cultivation182, the eggs and larv? being imported periodically from the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Szechuen. When the party passed through the whole district had been ravaged by men from Laikha, and only a few almost empty villages survived. Twet Nga Lu from Kengtawng had also been at work, and on the last march of seventeen miles into M?ngnai most of the villages were found in ruins. They had been burnt by his marauders two months before.
The description of M?ngnai at this time is worth quoting (Mr. Hildebrand's Report, June 22, 1887, par19. 97).
"From the north there is a long avenue-like approach to M?ngnai. The walls of the ancient city still exist in a very dilapidated state. They are about 20 feet high and machicolated. The city was about 1,000 yards square, and there remain signs of extensive suburbs. Everything, however, has been destroyed. Of ten thousand houses only three hundred (mostly recently built) remain; out of one hundred and twenty monasteries183 only three are left standing. The Sawbwa himself lives in a bamboo house, instead of the former teak-wood haw (palace). The interior of the city walls is all jungle-grown."
It is as well to put on record some description of the condition in which the British found the Shan States. A few years hence we shall be denounced as the ruthless destroyers of a country which we had found wealthy and prosperous.
The Sawbwa of M?ngnai came in unpretentious fashion to see Mr. Scott the day after his arrival. His superiority in breeding and character to most of the chiefs was marked, He made no difficulty about accepting British supremacy, and proffered184 all his influence to induce the other chiefs to follow his example. The typical character of the Shans as a race of traders came out in his request that his submission[157] to British authority should be made known in Moulmein. In former times there was a good trade in timber with the Moulmein merchants. When they were informed of the establishment of peace this trade he anticipated would revive.
It remained to induce the Limbin Prince to submit and to accompany Mr. Scott to Fort Stedman. This was not a question of very high diplomacy185, but it required some skill, tact54, and patience to induce the Prince to make a voluntary surrender. It would have been very easy to have arrested and removed him by force. Such action, however, would have been distasteful to the Shan chiefs and might have rendered it more difficult to dispose of other pretenders still remaining in the Northern States. The Prince showed himself to be a poor creature, whose chief characteristic was an immeasurable conceit186. He was, after all, only the illegitimate son of the Ein-she-min, or War Prince, who was the brother of King Mindon. But Burmans and Shans, like some other people, if a man is a prince, do not ask too curiously187 what sort of a prince he may be. When he left M?ngnai, mounted on an elephant, with his gong beating, great numbers of people knelt down by the roadside as he passed, and similar respect was shown to him at other places. Notwithstanding his conceit, he did not put a very high price on his submission. This descendant of kings, who had left his refuge in British Burma to become the head of a great Shan Confederacy to be formed on the model of the German Empire, was glad to barter188 his lofty ambition for a stipend189 of £16 sterling190 a month and a house at Rangoon, or Moulmein, or elsewhere.
While the Prince was making arrangements for the journey, the Assistant Superintendent with Lieutenant Wallace, 27th Punjab Infantry, and Lieutenant Jackson, R.E., rode to Mawkmai, some twenty-five miles over rolling country covered with scrub-oak forest. They found Mawkmai situated in a fine valley 120 miles in extent, irrigated from the Nam Nyim River, and well cultivated; the main crop being paddy. The town was in good order, well built and prosperous. "The one town," records Mr. Scott, "in the Shan States that has not been destroyed in[158] the inter-State wars." The trade relations between Mawkmai and Moulmein are close; the Salween in the rainy season being navigable and affording good means of communication.
The British officers were received with courtesy and hospitality by the Sawbwa and his officials. The suzerainty of the Queen-Empress was accepted as a matter of course. The only anxiety of the chief was in respect of the duty likely to be imposed on exported timber, which had been severely192 taxed by King Thebaw.
On the 11th of May the party returned to M?ngnai. The attitude of the Sawbwa Kun Kyi was excellent. He assured Mr. Scott that he would be able to promise the submission of the Trans-Salween States, who all looked to him as their leader, and to M?ngnai as their place of assemblage. He asked as a special favour to himself, and as a confirmation193 of his authority, that he might be allowed to fly the British flag over his residence. This request was granted. In the evening the British officers with a small guard of honour went to the Sawbwa's haw, or palace, where a flagstaff had been prepared, and the union Jack191 was run up by Mr. Scott, the bugles194 sounding a general salute195 and the troops presenting arms. A great number of people from M?ngnai and the neighbouring villages were present. They saluted196 the flag in their customary attitude of respect, on their knees, and when the troops marched off the Sawbwa's band struck up. What march it played has not been recorded.
The Limbin Prince had now made his arrangements for the journey, and on the 13th the party started for Fort Stedman, which was reached on the 20th of May. The route lay over a road which had not been used for a year and which the contending parties had endeavoured to make impassable. Four sepoys and several camp-followers were spiked197 in the feet. But for this mishap198 the three weeks' march from M?ngpawn round by M?ngnai would have been accomplished199 without having a single man on the sick-list; and this although there had been much rain, especially on the return journey. After five days' rest the Limbin Prince was sent under escort to the plains, and passed into obscurity.
On the 22nd of June the Superintendent was able to report from Fort Stedman: "The Southern Shan States have now all given in their submission; caravans200 of cattle and pedlars move about from State to State with perfect freedom and confidence, a condition of things which has hardly existed since the accession of King Thebaw in 1879." (Mr. Hildebrand's Report, June 22, 1887, par. 147.)
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1 latitude | |
n.纬度,行动或言论的自由(范围),(pl.)地区 | |
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n.西方,西部;adj.西方的,向西的;adv.向西 | |
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3 abruptly | |
adv.突然地,出其不意地 | |
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4 watershed | |
n.转折点,分水岭,分界线 | |
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5 rugged | |
adj.高低不平的,粗糙的,粗壮的,强健的 | |
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6 annexation | |
n.吞并,合并 | |
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7 tributary | |
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8 monarch | |
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14 civilized | |
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15 supreme | |
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17 consolidated | |
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18 monarchy | |
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20 amalgamated | |
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21 hereditary | |
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22 wielded | |
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23 varied | |
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24 scruple | |
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25 interfere | |
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26 strife | |
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27 contention | |
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28 brigands | |
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29 tolls | |
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31 evaded | |
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32 industrious | |
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33 contrived | |
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35 loyalty | |
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37 royalty | |
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38 unnaturally | |
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39 cohesion | |
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41 formerly | |
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42 extremity | |
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48 persuasion | |
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62 commuted | |
通勤( commute的过去式和过去分词 ); 减(刑); 代偿 | |
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63 imprisonment | |
n.关押,监禁,坐牢 | |
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64 jurisdiction | |
n.司法权,审判权,管辖权,控制权 | |
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65 retired | |
adj.隐退的,退休的,退役的 | |
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66 tract | |
n.传单,小册子,大片(土地或森林) | |
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67 titular | |
adj.名义上的,有名无实的;n.只有名义(或头衔)的人 | |
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68 espoused | |
v.(决定)支持,拥护(目标、主张等)( espouse的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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69 usurper | |
n. 篡夺者, 僭取者 | |
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70 contingents | |
(志趣相投、尤指来自同一地方的)一组与会者( contingent的名词复数 ); 代表团; (军队的)分遣队; 小分队 | |
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71 repel | |
v.击退,抵制,拒绝,排斥 | |
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72 previously | |
adv.以前,先前(地) | |
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73 renown | |
n.声誉,名望 | |
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74 victorious | |
adj.胜利的,得胜的 | |
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75 lawful | |
adj.法律许可的,守法的,合法的 | |
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76 ignominiously | |
adv.耻辱地,屈辱地,丢脸地 | |
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77 imposing | |
adj.使人难忘的,壮丽的,堂皇的,雄伟的 | |
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78 imprisoned | |
下狱,监禁( imprison的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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79 evacuated | |
撤退者的 | |
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80 wrecked | |
adj.失事的,遇难的 | |
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81 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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82 mischievous | |
adj.调皮的,恶作剧的,有害的,伤人的 | |
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83 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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84 pillaging | |
v.抢劫,掠夺( pillage的现在分词 ) | |
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85 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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86 circuitous | |
adj.迂回的路的,迂曲的,绕行的 | |
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87 postponed | |
vt.& vi.延期,缓办,(使)延迟vt.把…放在次要地位;[语]把…放在后面(或句尾)vi.(疟疾等)延缓发作(或复发) | |
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88 imperative | |
n.命令,需要;规则;祈使语气;adj.强制的;紧急的 | |
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89 deserted | |
adj.荒芜的,荒废的,无人的,被遗弃的 | |
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90 disorder | |
n.紊乱,混乱;骚动,骚乱;疾病,失调 | |
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91 noted | |
adj.著名的,知名的 | |
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92 supremacy | |
n.至上;至高权力 | |
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93 averse | |
adj.厌恶的;反对的,不乐意的 | |
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94 efficiently | |
adv.高效率地,有能力地 | |
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95 consolidating | |
v.(使)巩固, (使)加强( consolidate的现在分词 );(使)合并 | |
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96 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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97 undoubtedly | |
adv.确实地,无疑地 | |
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98 adherent | |
n.信徒,追随者,拥护者 | |
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99 consort | |
v.相伴;结交 | |
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100 eastward | |
adv.向东;adj.向东的;n.东方,东部 | |
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101 touching | |
adj.动人的,使人感伤的 | |
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102 conspicuous | |
adj.明眼的,惹人注目的;炫耀的,摆阔气的 | |
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103 aggression | |
n.进攻,侵略,侵犯,侵害 | |
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104 revival | |
n.复兴,复苏,(精力、活力等的)重振 | |
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105 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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106 garrison | |
n.卫戍部队;驻地,卫戍区;vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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107 avenge | |
v.为...复仇,为...报仇 | |
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108 outrage | |
n.暴行,侮辱,愤怒;vt.凌辱,激怒 | |
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109 monk | |
n.和尚,僧侣,修道士 | |
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110 minor | |
adj.较小(少)的,较次要的;n.辅修学科;vi.辅修 | |
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111 magistrate | |
n.地方行政官,地方法官,治安官 | |
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112 guardian | |
n.监护人;守卫者,保护者 | |
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113 retirement | |
n.退休,退职 | |
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114 premier | |
adj.首要的;n.总理,首相 | |
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115 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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116 allotted | |
分配,拨给,摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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117 wresting | |
动词wrest的现在进行式 | |
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118 nominal | |
adj.名义上的;(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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119 influential | |
adj.有影响的,有权势的 | |
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120 allied | |
adj.协约国的;同盟国的 | |
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121 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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122 adherence | |
n.信奉,依附,坚持,固着 | |
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123 coalition | |
n.结合体,同盟,结合,联合 | |
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124 scion | |
n.嫩芽,子孙 | |
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125 prospect | |
n.前景,前途;景色,视野 | |
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126 adherents | |
n.支持者,拥护者( adherent的名词复数 );党羽;徒子徒孙 | |
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127 gathering | |
n.集会,聚会,聚集 | |
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128 advent | |
n.(重要事件等的)到来,来临 | |
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129 ravaged | |
毁坏( ravage的过去式和过去分词 ); 蹂躏; 劫掠; 抢劫 | |
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130 despondent | |
adj.失望的,沮丧的,泄气的 | |
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131 ammunition | |
n.军火,弹药 | |
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132 superintendent | |
n.监督人,主管,总监;(英国)警务长 | |
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133 deferred | |
adj.延期的,缓召的v.拖延,延缓,推迟( defer的过去式和过去分词 );服从某人的意愿,遵从 | |
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134 rations | |
定量( ration的名词复数 ); 配给量; 正常量; 合理的量 | |
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135 prevailing | |
adj.盛行的;占优势的;主要的 | |
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136 anarchy | |
n.无政府状态;社会秩序混乱,无秩序 | |
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137 regiment | |
n.团,多数,管理;v.组织,编成团,统制 | |
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138 battalion | |
n.营;部队;大队(的人) | |
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139 infantry | |
n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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140 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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141 negotiations | |
协商( negotiation的名词复数 ); 谈判; 完成(难事); 通过 | |
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142 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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143 entrusted | |
v.委托,托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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144 tracts | |
大片土地( tract的名词复数 ); 地带; (体内的)道; (尤指宣扬宗教、伦理或政治的)短文 | |
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145 plume | |
n.羽毛;v.整理羽毛,骚首弄姿,用羽毛装饰 | |
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146 goodwill | |
n.善意,亲善,信誉,声誉 | |
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147 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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148 favourable | |
adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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149 apprehension | |
n.理解,领悟;逮捕,拘捕;忧虑 | |
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150 ascertained | |
v.弄清,确定,查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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151 pagoda | |
n.宝塔(尤指印度和远东的多层宝塔),(印度教或佛教的)塔式庙宇 | |
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152 dispersed | |
adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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153 aloof | |
adj.远离的;冷淡的,漠不关心的 | |
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154 withdrawn | |
vt.收回;使退出;vi.撤退,退出 | |
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155 promising | |
adj.有希望的,有前途的 | |
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156 overtures | |
n.主动的表示,提议;(向某人做出的)友好表示、姿态或提议( overture的名词复数 );(歌剧、芭蕾舞、音乐剧等的)序曲,前奏曲 | |
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157 perennial | |
adj.终年的;长久的 | |
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158 feud | |
n.长期不和;世仇;v.长期争斗;世代结仇 | |
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159 irrigated | |
[医]冲洗的 | |
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160 factions | |
组织中的小派别,派系( faction的名词复数 ) | |
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161 exigencies | |
n.急切需要 | |
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162 royalties | |
特许权使用费 | |
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163 countermand | |
v.撤回(命令),取消(订货) | |
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164 instigated | |
v.使(某事物)开始或发生,鼓动( instigate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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165 outrages | |
引起…的义愤,激怒( outrage的第三人称单数 ) | |
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166 zealous | |
adj.狂热的,热心的 | |
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167 persistent | |
adj.坚持不懈的,执意的;持续的 | |
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168 extort | |
v.勒索,敲诈,强要 | |
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169 exorbitant | |
adj.过分的;过度的 | |
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170 harass | |
vt.使烦恼,折磨,骚扰 | |
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171 reconciliations | |
和解( reconciliation的名词复数 ); 一致; 勉强接受; (争吵等的)止息 | |
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172 interpretation | |
n.解释,说明,描述;艺术处理 | |
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173 peremptory | |
adj.紧急的,专横的,断然的 | |
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174 stockade | |
n.栅栏,围栏;v.用栅栏防护 | |
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175 mingled | |
混合,混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 ); 混进,与…交往[联系] | |
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176 bragging | |
v.自夸,吹嘘( brag的现在分词 );大话 | |
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177 hoist | |
n.升高,起重机,推动;v.升起,升高,举起 | |
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178 lieutenant | |
n.陆军中尉,海军上尉;代理官员,副职官员 | |
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179 coerce | |
v.强迫,压制 | |
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180 incessant | |
adj.不停的,连续的 | |
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181 northward | |
adv.向北;n.北方的地区 | |
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182 cultivation | |
n.耕作,培养,栽培(法),养成 | |
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183 monasteries | |
修道院( monastery的名词复数 ) | |
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184 proffered | |
v.提供,贡献,提出( proffer的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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185 diplomacy | |
n.外交;外交手腕,交际手腕 | |
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186 conceit | |
n.自负,自高自大 | |
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187 curiously | |
adv.有求知欲地;好问地;奇特地 | |
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188 barter | |
n.物物交换,以货易货,实物交易 | |
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189 stipend | |
n.薪贴;奖学金;养老金 | |
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190 sterling | |
adj.英币的(纯粹的,货真价实的);n.英国货币(英镑) | |
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191 jack | |
n.插座,千斤顶,男人;v.抬起,提醒,扛举;n.(Jake)杰克 | |
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192 severely | |
adv.严格地;严厉地;非常恶劣地 | |
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193 confirmation | |
n.证实,确认,批准 | |
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194 bugles | |
妙脆角,一种类似薯片但做成尖角或喇叭状的零食; 号角( bugle的名词复数 ); 喇叭; 匍匐筋骨草; (装饰女服用的)柱状玻璃(或塑料)小珠 | |
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195 salute | |
vi.行礼,致意,问候,放礼炮;vt.向…致意,迎接,赞扬;n.招呼,敬礼,礼炮 | |
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196 saluted | |
v.欢迎,致敬( salute的过去式和过去分词 );赞扬,赞颂 | |
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197 spiked | |
adj.有穗的;成锥形的;有尖顶的 | |
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198 mishap | |
n.不幸的事,不幸;灾祸 | |
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199 accomplished | |
adj.有才艺的;有造诣的;达到了的 | |
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200 caravans | |
(可供居住的)拖车(通常由机动车拖行)( caravan的名词复数 ); 篷车; (穿过沙漠地带的)旅行队(如商队) | |
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