If the question relate to one of those exceptional taxes which are imposed on certain products, I grant readily that it is reasonable to impose the same duty on the foreign product. For example, it would be absurd to exempt6 foreign salt from duty; not that, in an economical point of view, France would lose anything by doing so, but the reverse. Let them say what they will, principles are always the same; and France would gain by the exemption7 as she must always gain by removing a natural or artificial obstacle. But in this instance the obstacle has been interposed for purposes of revenue. These purposes must be attained8; and were foreign salt sold in our market duty free, the Treasury9 would lose its hundred millions of francs (four millions sterling); and must raise that sum from some other source. There would be an obvious inconsistency in creating an obstacle, and failing in the object. It might have been better to have had recourse at first to another tax than that upon French salt. But I admit that there are certain circumstances in which a tax may be laid on foreign commodities, provided it is not protective, but fiscal10.
But to pretend that a nation, because she is subjected to heavier taxes than her neighbours, should protect herself by tariffs11 against the competition of her rivals, in this is a sophism, and it is this sophism which I intend to attack.
I have said more than once that I propose only to explain the theory, and lay open, as far as possible, the sources of protectionist errors. Had I intended to raise a controversy12, I should have asked the protectionists why they direct their tariffs chiefly against England and Belgium, the most heavily taxed countries in the world? Am I not warranted in regarding their argument only as a pretext13? But I am not one of those who believe that men are prohibitionists from self-interest, and not from conviction. The doctrine14 of protection is too popular not to be sincere. If the majority had faith in liberty, we should be free. Undoubtedly15 it is self-interest which makes our tariffs so heavy; but conviction is at the root of it. "The will," says Pascal, "is one of the principal organs of belief." But the belief exists nevertheless, although it has its root in the will, and in the insidious16 suggestions of egotism.
The State may make a good or a bad use of the taxes which it levies19. When it renders to the public services which are equivalent to the value it receives, it makes a good use of them. And when it dissipates its revenues without giving any service in return, it makes a bad use of them.
In the first case, to affirm that the taxes place the country which pays them under conditions of production more unfavourable than those of a country which is exempt from them, is a sophism. We pay twenty millions of francs for justice and police; but then we have them, with the security they afford us, and the time which they save us; and it is very probable that production is neither more easy nor more active in those countries, if there are any such, where the people take the business of justice and police into their own hands. We pay many hundreds of millions (of francs) for roads, bridges, harbours, and railways. Granted; but then we have the benefit of these roads, bridges, harbours, and railways; and whether we make a good or a bad bargain in constructing them, it cannot be said that they render us inferior to other nations, who do not indeed support a budget of public works, but who have no public works. And this explains why, whilst accusing taxation of being a cause of industrial inferiority, we direct our tariffs especially against those countries which are the most heavily taxed. Their taxes, well employed, far from deteriorating20, have ameliorated, the conditions of production in these countries. Thus we are continually arriving at the conclusion that protectionist sophisms are not only not true, but are the very reverse of true.*
* See Harmonies économiques, ch. xvii.
If taxes are improductive, suppress them, if you can; but assuredly the strangest mode of neutralizing21 their effect is to add individual to public taxes. Fine compensation truly! You tell us that the State taxes are too much; and you give that as a reason why we should tax one another!
A protective duty is a tax directed against a foreign product; but we must never forget that it falls back on the home consumer. Now the consumer is the tax-payer. The agreeable language you address to him is this: "Because your taxes are heavy, we raise the price of everything you buy; because the State lays hold of one part of your income, we hand over another to the monopolist."
But let us penetrate22 a little deeper into this sophism, which is in such repute with our legislators, although the extraordinary thing is that it is just the very people who maintain unproductive taxes who attribute to them our industrial inferiority, and in that inferiority find an excuse for imposing23 other taxes and restrictions24.
It appears evident to me that the nature and effects of protection would not be changed, were the State to levy25 a direct tax and distribute the money afterwards in premiums27 and indemnities28 to the privileged branches of industry.
Suppose that while foreign iron cannot be sold in our market below eight francs, French iron cannot be sold for less than twelve francs.
On this hypothesis, there are two modes in which the State can secure the home market to the producer.
The first mode is to lay a duty of five francs on foreign iron. It is evident that that duty would exclude it, since it could no longer be sold under thirteen francs, namely, eight francs for the cost price, and five francs for the tax, and at that price it would be driven out of the market by French iron, the price of which we suppose to be only twelve francs. In this case, the purchaser, the consumer, would be at the whole cost of the protection.
Or again, the State might levy a tax of five francs from the public, and give the proceeds as a premium26 to the ironmaster. The protective effect would be the same. Foreign iron would in this case be equally excluded; for our ironmaster can now sell his iron at seven francs, which, with the five francs premium, would make up to him the remunerative29 price of twelve francs. But with home iron at seven francs the foreigner could not sell his for eight, which by the supposition is his lowest remunerative price.
Between these two modes of going to work, I can see only one difference. The principle is the same; the effect is the same; but in the one, certain individuals pay the price of protection; in the other, it is paid for by the nation at large.
I frankly30 avow31 my predilection32 for the second mode. It appears to me more just, more economical, and more honourable33; more just, because if society desires to give largesses to some of its members, all should contribute; more economical, because it would save much expense in collecting, and get us rid of many restrictions; more honourable, because the public would then see clearly the nature of the operation, and act accordingly.
But if the protectionist system had taken this form, it would have been laughable to hear men say, "We pay heavy taxes for the army, for the navy, for the administration of justice, for public works, for the university, the public debt, etc.—in all exceeding a milliard [￡40,000,000 sterling]. For this reason, the State should take another milliard from us, to relieve these poor ironmasters, these poor shareholders34 in the coal-mines of Anzin, these unfortunate proprietors35 of forests, these useful men who supply us with cod-fish."
Look at the subject closely, and you will be satisfied that this is the true meaning and effect of the sophism we are combating. It is all in vain; you cannot give money to some members of the community but by taking it from others. If you desire to ruin the tax-payer, you may do so. But at least do not banter36 him by saying, "In order to compensate37 your losses, I take from you again as much as I have taken from you already." To expose fully38 all that is false in this sophism would be an endless work. I shall confine myself to three observations. You assert that the country is overburdened with taxes, and on this fact you found an argument for the protection of certain branches of industry. But we have to pay these taxes in spite of protection. If, then, a particular branch of industry presents itself, and says, "I share in the payment of taxes; that raises the cost price of my products, and I demand that a protecting duty should also raise their selling price," what does such a demand amount to? It amounts simply to this, that the tax should be thrown over on the rest of the community. The object sought for is to be reimbursed40 the amount of the tax by a rise of prices. But as the Treasury requires to have the full amount of all the taxes, and as the masses have to pay the higher price, it follows that they have to bear not only their own share of taxation but that of the particular branch of industry which is protected. But we mean to protect everybody, you will say. I answer, in the first place, that that is impossible; and, in the next place, that if it were possible, there would be no relief. I would pay for you, and you would pay for me; but the tax must be paid all the same.
You are thus the dupes of an illusion. You wish in the first instance to pay taxes in order that you may have an army, a navy, a church, a university, judges, highways, etc., and then you wish to free from taxation first one branch of industry, then a second, then a third, always throwing back the burden upon the masses. You do nothing more than create interminable complications, without any other result than these complications themselves. Show me that a rise of price caused by protection falls upon the foreigner, and I could discover in your argument something specious41. But if it be true that the public pays the tax before your law, and that after the law is passed it pays for protection and the tax into the bargain, truly I cannot see what is gained by it.
But I go further, and maintain that the heavier our taxes are, the more we should hasten to throw open our ports and our frontiers to foreigners less heavily taxed than ourselves. And why? In order to throw back upon them a greater share of our burden. Is it not an incontestable axiom in political economy that taxes ultimately fall on the consumer? The more, then, our exchanges are multiplied, the more will foreign consumers reimburse39 us for the taxes incorporated and worked up in the products we sell them; whilst we in this respect will have to make them a smaller restitution42, seeing that their products, according to our hypothesis, are less heavily burdened than ours.
In fine, have you never asked yourselves whether these heavy burdens on which you found your argument for a prohibitory regime are not caused by that very regime? If commerce were free, what use would you have for your great standing43 armies and powerful navies?.... But this belongs to the domain44 of politics.
Et ne confondons pas, pour trop approfondir,
Leurs affaires avec les n?tres.
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1
sophism
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| n.诡辩 | |
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neutralize
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| v.使失效、抵消，使中和 | |
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procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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recurs
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| 再发生，复发( recur的第三人称单数 ) | |
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exempt
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| adj.免除的；v.使免除；n.免税者，被免除义务者 | |
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exemption
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| n.豁免，免税额，免除 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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fiscal
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| adj.财政的，会计的，国库的，国库岁入的 | |
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tariffs
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| 关税制度； 关税( tariff的名词复数 )； 关税表； （旅馆或饭店等的）收费表； 量刑标准 | |
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controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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insidious
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| adj.阴险的，隐匿的，暗中为害的，（疾病）不知不觉之间加剧 | |
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revert
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| v.恢复，复归，回到 | |
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taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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deteriorating
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| 恶化，变坏( deteriorate的现在分词 ) | |
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neutralizing
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| v.使失效( neutralize的现在分词 )；抵消；中和；使（一个国家）中立化 | |
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penetrate
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| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
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imposing
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| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
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restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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premium
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| n.加付款；赠品；adj.高级的；售价高的 | |
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premiums
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| n.费用( premium的名词复数 )；保险费；额外费用；（商品定价、贷款利息等以外的）加价 | |
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indemnities
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| n.保障( indemnity的名词复数 )；赔偿；赔款；补偿金 | |
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remunerative
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| adj.有报酬的 | |
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frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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avow
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| v.承认，公开宣称 | |
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predilection
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| n.偏好 | |
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honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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shareholders
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| n.股东( shareholder的名词复数 ) | |
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proprietors
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| n.所有人，业主( proprietor的名词复数 ) | |
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banter
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| n.嘲弄，戏谑；v.取笑，逗弄，开玩笑 | |
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compensate
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| vt.补偿，赔偿；酬报 vi.弥补；补偿；抵消 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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reimburse
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| v.补偿，付还 | |
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reimbursed
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| v.偿还，付还( reimburse的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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specious
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| adj.似是而非的；adv.似是而非地 | |
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restitution
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| n.赔偿；恢复原状 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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domain
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| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
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