The state has two aspects: (1) It is the balance wheel of the vocational groups included within it. (2) It is the political expression of the national character, and its ethical purpose is to develop this empirical national character into a spiritual character. I shall speak of the first aspect in this chapter.
1. The state exists in order to furnish increasingly from age to age the conditions under which the reactions between the groups described above can take place effectually. In concentrating attention upon the vocational groups as the entities6 to be harmonized with one another, account is taken by implication of the family and of the individual. The sub-organisms are embraced306 within the superior organisms. A more general statement would be that the state supplies the external conditions required for development towards ethical personality by those who pass through the institutions of the family, of the vocation5, etc.
The state possesses a spiritual character in so far as it supplies these conditions, and in as much as it has a spiritual character it is not merely justified8 but ethically9 required to use force. Force is spiritualized when employed to establish the conditions indispensable to spiritual life. The conditions enforced must be such as in the opinion of the preponderant number of citizens indisputably make for the development of personality. Examples of such conditions are protection of life, property, reputation, compulsory10 education, the maintenance of the monogamic family, protection against foreign invasion, etc. All the functions of the state commonly enumerated11 follow from the ethical principle. But over and above the recognized ones, new and nobler functions of the state will appear.
The redeeming12 thought with respect to the use of force by the state consists in regarding force as ethical discipline, and in making the extent to which it is favorable to spiritual freedom the measure and test of its rightful use.85 When men are compelled to spend the major part of their time in the protection of bare life, as was the case, for instance, in the early days of feudalism, they are to that extent unfree. Freedom consists in energizing13 the highest and most distinctive14 human faculties15.
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The development of the state should proceed in two directions. It should withdraw from many functions exercised by it in the past, notably16 from such as properly belong to the sub-organisms. At the same time, it should lay its coercive hands upon new matters, imposing17 new limitations on capricious freedom in the interest of spiritual freedom, as soon as the pertinency19 of such limitations to the ethical end becomes clear. For instance, the state may, and doubtless will, interfere20 with marriage to a far greater extent than it has yet done. It will forbid the marriage of the unsound. If a study of character-types should ever become advanced enough—a hazardous21 conjecture—to make it predictable that the union of certain character-types will lead to infelicitous22 marriage, the state will be justified in prohibiting such unions.
Law, ideally defined, is the sum total of conditions, capable of being enforced, which are necessary or favorable to the development of personality. The purpose of law is two-fold: to maintain the more developed members of society at the level they have reached, and, by educative penalties, to bring the backward up to the same level. In the article on “Force and Freedom” referred to above, law is compared to such bodily actions as walking, which at first are superintended by consciousness, and then become automatic, thereby23 setting consciousness free to attend to new and more important business. Similarly, law is designed to render the conditions favorable to personality so explicit24 that their observance shall become automatic, and that mankind shall be at liberty to discover new and more significant308 conditions which in their turn are again to become automatic.
Because of the lack of the ethical point of view, the exercise of force by the state has seemed purely25 arbitrary, and has given rise to a perverted26 and disastrous27 conception of sovereignty. The sovereignty of the state has two aspects: the one internal, the other external. Sovereignty means supremacy28. The state is sovereign, within limits, however, with respect to its citizens. The state is also sovereign, within limits, however, with respect to other outside states.
With respect to the internal aspect of sovereignty some writers hold that citizens have no rights as against the state—only rights accorded by the state. But this from the ethical point of view is a wholly untenable position. There are rights of the individual, rights of the family, rights of the vocational group, which the state does not create but is bound to acknowledge and which its power cannot properly infringe29. As against the state the individual has, for instance, the right which is commonly designated as “the freedom of conscience.” The family has rights against the state; the law cannot interfere with the intimacies30 of the marriage and parental31 relations. The vocational group likewise is only partially32 subject to public reglementation. I have defined law as the sum total of the conditions. The state can prescribe the conditions, but cannot trace the ways of freedom within the conditions. The state prescribes the enforceable conditions; it has no concern with unenforceable inner processes.
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It thus appears that sovereignty or supremacy is an attribute not peculiar33 to the state, although it looms34 up larger and more impressive when exercised by the state. Supremacy belongs to the individual in his private sphere, to the family in its proper province, to the vocation, etc. Sovereignty or supremacy belongs to each of the social institutions within its precincts, in so far as the supremacy within that precinct is requisite35 for the accomplishment36 of the ethical end to be therein attained37. But sovereignty is not absolute in any sphere; neither in that of the individual, nor of the family, nor yet of the state. The absolute conception of sovereignty is the result of the lack of an ethical conception of the social institutions. The state is sovereign only so far as the exercise of its supremacy is necessary to the spiritual end of citizenship38. On this account and for this purpose it may rightfully constrain40 the sub-organisms within it, and may also pronounce its noli me tangere as against the larger group of states encompassing41 it. But so far as the spiritual ends to be achieved in the international relations are concerned, the state with respect to these is subject to international sovereignty,—a new conception which mankind is striving to bring to the birth today. The false notion of state sovereignty as arbitrary and absolute, is admittedly today a chief stumbling-block in the way of the formation of an international organization of peoples.
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The System of Representation Which Is Required to Give Expression to the Organic Idea of the State.
The ethical aim of political reformation and reconstruction42 may be put in a single word, Organization. The state and especially the democratic state must be organized.86 This means practically that the basis of representation shall be the vocational group, that vocational representation shall replace representation by geographical43 districts.87 The law-making body on this basis311 will consist of representatives or delegates of the agricultural, the commercial, the industrial, the scientific group, etc. Women belonging to these groups will exercise the franchise44 within them. There will also be a distinct group of home-makers; motherhood will be recognized as a vocation.
Attention may be called to certain practical advantages of the proposed rearrangement of the representative system. It will tend to bring forward in political life the best citizens, instead of the mediocre45 or the base. This is likely to come about because there is no distinction that men more ardently46 covet47 than that of being considered primus inter18 pares; as, for instance, the first or one of the first of the city’s merchants, or one of the most eminent48 scientists, or an artist whom his fellow-artists select as the fittest to represent them in the great council of city, state, or nation. And if only this much can be gained by the new representative system, that the law-making body shall consist of the most experienced, the most enlightened, the wisest, the actual leaders in the various walks of life, in brief, that the elected shall be the elect, certainly one of the principal evils with which individualistic democracy is afflicted49 will tend to be removed.
But other advantages will accrue50. This, in particular, that the constituencies, instead of merely delegating their powers, will share in the business of law-making,312 will be in vital touch with their leaders or representatives, while the latter conversely will politically educate the constituencies. The mode of procedure under the system here sketched51 will be somewhat as follows:
Take, as an illustration, the group of industrial laborers52. They will first meet in a primary assembly, and discuss measures deemed by them important in the interests of their group. The leader who represents them in the legislature will take part in the initial discussions, and exercise no doubt a strong influence in bringing matter finally to a head. He will then carry into the law-making body,—which consists of representatives of the various social groups,—the sifted-out demands of the laborers, the measures which they desire to have enacted53 into law. He will bring forward these measures in the legislature. But there objections are likely to be raised. The representatives of the other groups will discover what the laborers naturally failed to note, that the proposed law or laws, if enacted, will have certain injurious effects on the interests of the other groups. The sifting54-out process, therefore, will now begin anew and be carried on on a higher level in the legislature. The representatives of all the various groups will separate the wheat from the chaff55 in what is proposed by any one group. The next stop will be that the representative of the laborers, returning to his constituency, will communicate to them the difficulties that were raised, the decisions reached, and will thus impart to them the wider vision which he himself gained in the discussions of the law-making body. In this way he will be the instructor56, the political teacher of his constituents57. And the principle313 by which the value of any new measure will finally be judged will be simply this: that the supposed interests of one group cannot be its true interests unless they are found to promote the interests of all the other vocational groups.88
The law-making body should be a council of the groups. It should not be a “Parliament,” or “talking body,” but a sifting body. Nor yet a body of mandatories59 commissioned to merely give effect to a public opinion or a public sentiment already existing. In fact, public opinion or public sentiment in the raw is apt to be a poor index of what is really for the public good. Public opinion is apt to be unripe60, haphazard61, impulsive62 rather than reflective. Besides, it is often contaminated at its very source, the facts on which the public depend for their opinions being deliberately63 falsified or placed in false perspective; while the opinions furnished in newspaper editorials are almost inevitably64 biased65. Only on great occasions, when simple moral issues are presented, can the common sense and moral sense of the people be wholly depended on. But such occasions are episodical; and the orderly business of government cannot be carried on by spurts66. Government by public opinion may be and in some respects is better indeed than class government; in other important respects it is worse. A class at the head of the state at least as a rule knows what it wants, and proceeds methodically to carry out its purposes. Public opinion, on the other hand, like all opinion, is unsure, unsafe, as Plato has long since314 made dialectically clear. And public sentiment, like all sentiment, is fluctuating. To build the state on public opinion and public sentiment, as many of our writers on politics would have us do, is after all a good deal like building a house on sand.89
Instead of “public opinion” and “public sentiment” let us say public reason and public will!—reason and will to discover in conjunction what the public good really is. For what it really is no one as yet knows. The “public good” is a problem to be approximately solved. The public good will be consummated67 when the conditions are furnished necessary and favorable to the development of personality in each of the constituent58 groups of the social body. To study these conditions is the office of the law-making body, and therefore that body must be so constituted as to include these groups in their capacity as groups.
Another advantage to be expected from vocational representation is that the different interests of society,—I stress the fact that they are different, and often temporarily conflicting,—will be compelled under this plan to come out into the open. An industry, for instance, may require the assistance of a protective tariff68, in its infant stages, and the agricultural group may rightly be asked to make the necessary sacrifices.
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In the long run there will be compensation. The agriculturists will eventually benefit by the diversification69 of the national life. But “in the long run” means that the next generation will benefit, not the present agriculturists, a distinction sometimes somewhat cavalierly ignored. The present generation will be called upon to make a sacrifice, precisely70 as in the family some of the members may have to sacrifice a part of their income to provide for a weaker member. But the circumstance that the sacrifice is recognized as a sacrifice will serve to put an end to the protection when the special need for it has ceased. Under the present system, on the other hand, the state is supposed to have no concern with the special interests of any group. All the same, there are the special interests, and in consequence that which is for the interest of one group has to be advocated as if it were for the general interest of the entire community. And since general interest is easily mistaken for perpetual interest, the protection is apt to be continued long after its particular usefulness has ceased.90
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I am earnestly concerned that vocational representation shall not be regarded as a mere7 device in the mechanism71 of politics, like the substitution of the long for the short ballot72, or the initiative and referendum. Innovations of the latter kind leave the prevalent conception of democracy untouched, they are merely intended to improve the machinery73 by which that conception is to be worked out in practice; they are mechanical contrivances, not fundamental reconstructions74. Vocational representation, in my view of it, is the appropriate expression of the organic idea of the state. The state is the soul. The soul must have a body. Vocational representation is that body.
Two remarks may here be added. One relates to a question which has given rise to considerable discussion, namely, the question where the state resides? In a monarchy it seems to reside visibly in the person of the king. Louis XIV is said to have declared “I am the state.” But where does it reside in a democracy? The chief executive, the law-making body, and even the constituencies, are organs of the state. But where does the state itself have its habitation? The state has no separate domicile. So far as it truly exists at all it exists in the minds of the individuals who truly conceive of it. The object of political life is to educate the citizen so that he may more and more truly con317ceive of the state, so that he may give birth to the state idea within himself. To do this is to pass through one of the necessary phases on the road to personality. In the family the individual is in reactive relations with a few, in the vocation with a larger number. In the state or nation he may be one of a hundred millions or more. Yet it is not the numerical extension as such that constitutes the enlargement. It is rather the diversity of the points of contact, and the complexity75 of the relations by which the spiritual ideal is more fully39 illustrated76 in the finite world in proportion as the circle widens. To engender77 the idea of the state in oneself is to place oneself ideally into reactive relations with the diverse groups embraced within one’s nation. And to do this is a spiritual achievement of no mean order. I should prefer to use the word “stateship” instead of citizenship. Stateship is attained by one who brings to birth within himself the idea of the state, and in whom that idea becomes a controlling ethical force.
A second remark concerns the perplexed78 subject of the conflict of duties. The nearer duties are sometimes preferred to the more remote, and at other times we are asked to sacrifice everything to the larger whole. We owe our first devotion, it is said, to the members of our family; but then again we must be willing to sacrifice life itself and the welfare of our family to our country when it calls upon us in its need. Largeness alone certainly does not serve as an ethical ground for preference. The quantitative79 standard implied in such phrases as “the greatest good of the greatest number” is out of place when we deal with ethical relations, which318 in their very nature are qualitative80. Now the account of the social institutions given in previous chapters as successive stations on the road to the spiritual goal may throw some light on this difficult subject. Normally, the claims of the anterior81 stations are to be preferred—the claims of the family for instance to those of the vocation, because the family is the matrix of the three-fold reverence82, and the individual must pass under the ethical influence of family life before he is fit to use vocational life ethically to good purpose. The anterior groups are not merely smaller, they are germinal. The training received in them is the condition on which spiritual progress depends later on. On the other hand, the later groups are the more complete and more explicated expressions of the spiritual ideal; hence if the very existence of one of the later groups is threatened, or is in danger of being denatured of its spiritual use, then the later group is to be preferred to the earlier, the terminus ad quem, precisely because it is the terminus ad quem, to the terminus a quo.
To give a familiar illustration. In our time, which is a time of transition and doubt, many a religious teacher finds himself in sore straits to decide between the claims of the vocation and the family. As a religious teacher he is pledged to teach only what in his heart of hearts he believes to be true; he is especially under obligation to use words in such a way as to convey to others the same meaning that he attaches to them himself. But this may mean exposing his family to serious privations. The situation is full of perplexity and pain, but the line of choice is plain enough. The claims of his319 high vocation must in this case take precedence. In like manner, when the existence or the integrity of the state is at issue, the claims of the state as the terminus ad quem override83 those of the vocation, the family, and the state, and may even demand the sacrifice of the physical existence of the individual himself.
NOTES
1. The idea of democracy is often neatly84 put—all too neatly, into the following formula: In antiquity85 the individual existed for the sake of the state, in modern democracy the state exists for the sake of the individual. Both of these statements as they stand are mischievous86 and misleading and require to be qualified87. It is not true that in antiquity the individual existed for the sake of the state in the sense that his separate existence was extinguished. The citizen class in Aristotle’s state, the rulers in Plato’s state, and even a member of one of the inferior classes, each in his own way fulfilled a distinct function. He was not suppressed in the state, he expressed his function by the action appropriate to his station. The philosophic88 rulers might do the thinking and governing. They were the head of the body politic—others the hands and feet. The underlying89 conception was what may be called spuriously organic, borrowed more or less from the animal type of organism.
The second limb of the formula is no less superficial. In no modern nation does the state exist, or at bottom is it supposed to exist, for the benefit of the individuals who at any time compose it. If this were the ruling conception, how could the democratic state require its citizens to give up their lives in its defense90? If the state existed for the benefit of the individuals, the state would be the means, and the so-called good of the individual the end. And in that case it would surely be irrational91 to sacrifice the end for the sake of the means, in other words to320 put an end to one’s life in defense of the state, a mere instrument for the protection and prosperity of one’s own life.
To reply that the state exists for the sake not of one individual but of all (observe however that the formula says “the individual,” and is ambiguous and slippery at this point), nor even only for the sake of all the individuals now living, but also for the sake of the millions yet unborn—to say this is once more to introduce an ideal entity92 which it was the very object of the formula as quoted to banish93. The formula was intended to give us, in place of “the metaphysical entities” of the Greeks and the Germans, a very palpable thing—the good of the individual. The good of the individual seemed to be a palpable thing, though in truth it is the most impalpable thing in the world. And by defining the state in this wise we were supposed to come onto solid ground. But now, behold94, it is the good of unborn millions which is to be the object of our devotion, and who can imagine what this good of unborn millions is likely to be?
The fact is that without ideal entities the conception of the state in any noble shape cannot be construed95 at all. The organic conception must now take the place of the individualistic. The organic conception indeed as it was worked out in antiquity, or as it lived on in the theories of medi?val writers, or as it survives in the works of certain German publicists, who use it to defend the feudalistic structure of society, has rightly fallen into discredit,—not because it is organic, but because it is pseudo-organic, that is, based on the type of the animal organism. The individualistic conception of the state at present current in America and in all modern democracies, is a violent reaction against this false idea of organization. The inestimable germ of truth individualism contains is that no such distinction can be allowed as between head and hands or feet in political life, that all the multitudes of “hands” who work in the factories, for instance, must be respected as personalities96 having not only hands but also heads and hearts. But individualism, though it affirms this idea, belies97 it in practice, as321 the actual state of society in America and elsewhere abundantly proves. And it is bound to do so, because personality implies more than material well-being98, either for a single individual or for all individuals now living or for all future individuals. Personality implies truly organic relations to other fellow-beings—and this can only be achieved by organizing the society in which men live.
The way taken has been, by reaction from pseudo-organization, to extreme individualism and concomitant materialism99. The way out lies in the direction of genuine organization.
2. Certain evils observable in the workings of American democracy may be traced to the following causes:
(a) The people as a whole are still in the pioneer stage. A country enormously rich in material resources stimulates100 wealth-production. A host of immigrants escaped from poverty abroad are stung into wealth-getting here. The frontier line is now far to the West, but the influence of the pioneer movement still in progress flows back upon the Eastern states.
(b) More important still are the evils due to the crude individualistic idea of democracy just characterized. If the state exists for the good of the individual, and if the good of the individual is conceived to be the acquisition of wealth, then private business will take precedence of the public business. Yet under the democratic system of frequent elections the public business demands constant attention. In consequence, a special class of professional politicians arises, comprising a minority of disinterestedly101 patriotic102 men, and a majority of persons whose private business is not sufficiently103 remunerative104 to divert them from the public service. The appearance of the political dictator called “boss” is the inevitable105 outcome of these conditions. This army of professional politicians, and in particular the vulgar figure at their hand, is the chief disgrace of the American democracy, and has been the target of incessant106 invective107 by American writers. But it is idle to stigmatize108 the effect and overlook the cause, to squander109 invective upon the322 symptom and at the same time to leave the malady110 untouched. The malady itself is the individualistic conception of democracy, and until this is replaced by a better one, the evil in question may be modified in form but will certainly not disappear.
A way must be found for the citizen to attend to his private business, which is coming to be more and more exacting111, and to the public business at the same time. The system of vocational representation offers an opportunity in this direction. Citizens will be voting in their vocational groups for measures intended to advance their vocational interests, but will be taught to advance them in such a way that the related interests of other groups, or the public interest, shall be thereby promoted.
3. Proportional representation, which is at present being tested abroad, and earnestly considered in France, England and Germany, may be a bridge leading over from the present plan of geographical to that of vocational representation. The proportional system itself, it is true, is still based on the individualistic idea. It is a movement on behalf of submerged minorities. It quarrels with the present arrangement for the reason that the will of the greater number of individuals, but not of all individuals, is brought to bear on public decisions. But if adopted it may well offer, without violent change, a way for the collective representation of vocational groups.
4. Citizenship should be graded. A youth of twenty-one is scarcely prepared to exercise the duties of the citizen intelligently. As long as the view prevails that the functions of the state are to be restricted to a minimum, it is perhaps not wholly absurd to admit a mere stripling to a share in the conduct of government. But the sphere of government is steadily112 enlarging, and its problems are becoming more and more intricate. Twenty-five would certainly be a better minimum age. Under vocational representation there is likely to be an Upper House consisting of members who have served in the Lower House.323 Citizens who have attained the age of twenty-five might be empowered to vote for members of the Lower House, those who have attained the age of thirty-five for members of the Upper House, but these are details upon which it is unfitting to expatiate113 here. The point I have in mind is that citizenship should be graded.
点击收听单词发音
1 ethical | |
adj.伦理的,道德的,合乎道德的 | |
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2 propounded | |
v.提出(问题、计划等)供考虑[讨论],提议( propound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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3 embodied | |
v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 );象征;包括;包含 | |
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4 monarchy | |
n.君主,最高统治者;君主政体,君主国 | |
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5 vocation | |
n.职业,行业 | |
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6 entities | |
实体对像; 实体,独立存在体,实际存在物( entity的名词复数 ) | |
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7 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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8 justified | |
a.正当的,有理的 | |
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9 ethically | |
adv.在伦理上,道德上 | |
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10 compulsory | |
n.强制的,必修的;规定的,义务的 | |
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11 enumerated | |
v.列举,枚举,数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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12 redeeming | |
补偿的,弥补的 | |
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13 energizing | |
v.给予…精力,能量( energize的现在分词 );使通电 | |
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14 distinctive | |
adj.特别的,有特色的,与众不同的 | |
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15 faculties | |
n.能力( faculty的名词复数 );全体教职员;技巧;院 | |
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16 notably | |
adv.值得注意地,显著地,尤其地,特别地 | |
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17 imposing | |
adj.使人难忘的,壮丽的,堂皇的,雄伟的 | |
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18 inter | |
v.埋葬 | |
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19 pertinency | |
有关性,相关性,针对性; 切合性 | |
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20 interfere | |
v.(in)干涉,干预;(with)妨碍,打扰 | |
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21 hazardous | |
adj.(有)危险的,冒险的;碰运气的 | |
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22 infelicitous | |
adj.不适当的 | |
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23 thereby | |
adv.因此,从而 | |
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24 explicit | |
adj.详述的,明确的;坦率的;显然的 | |
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25 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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26 perverted | |
adj.不正当的v.滥用( pervert的过去式和过去分词 );腐蚀;败坏;使堕落 | |
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27 disastrous | |
adj.灾难性的,造成灾害的;极坏的,很糟的 | |
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28 supremacy | |
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29 infringe | |
v.违反,触犯,侵害 | |
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30 intimacies | |
亲密( intimacy的名词复数 ); 密切; 亲昵的言行; 性行为 | |
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31 parental | |
adj.父母的;父的;母的 | |
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33 peculiar | |
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35 requisite | |
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36 accomplishment | |
n.完成,成就,(pl.)造诣,技能 | |
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37 attained | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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38 citizenship | |
n.市民权,公民权,国民的义务(身份) | |
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39 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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40 constrain | |
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42 reconstruction | |
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43 geographical | |
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44 franchise | |
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45 mediocre | |
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使受痛苦,折磨( afflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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52 laborers | |
n.体力劳动者,工人( laborer的名词复数 );(熟练工人的)辅助工 | |
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53 enacted | |
制定(法律),通过(法案)( enact的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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54 sifting | |
n.筛,过滤v.筛( sift的现在分词 );筛滤;细查;详审 | |
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55 chaff | |
v.取笑,嘲笑;n.谷壳 | |
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56 instructor | |
n.指导者,教员,教练 | |
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57 constituents | |
n.选民( constituent的名词复数 );成分;构成部分;要素 | |
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58 constituent | |
n.选民;成分,组分;adj.组成的,构成的 | |
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59 mandatories | |
n.受托管理国( mandatory的名词复数 ) | |
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60 unripe | |
adj.未成熟的;n.未成熟 | |
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61 haphazard | |
adj.无计划的,随意的,杂乱无章的 | |
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62 impulsive | |
adj.冲动的,刺激的;有推动力的 | |
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63 deliberately | |
adv.审慎地;蓄意地;故意地 | |
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64 inevitably | |
adv.不可避免地;必然发生地 | |
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65 biased | |
a.有偏见的 | |
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66 spurts | |
短暂而突然的活动或努力( spurt的名词复数 ); 突然奋起 | |
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67 consummated | |
v.使结束( consummate的过去式和过去分词 );使完美;完婚;(婚礼后的)圆房 | |
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68 tariff | |
n.关税,税率;(旅馆、饭店等)价目表,收费表 | |
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69 diversification | |
n.变化,多样化;多种经营 | |
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70 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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71 mechanism | |
n.机械装置;机构,结构 | |
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72 ballot | |
n.(不记名)投票,投票总数,投票权;vi.投票 | |
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73 machinery | |
n.(总称)机械,机器;机构 | |
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74 reconstructions | |
重建( reconstruction的名词复数 ); 再现; 重建物; 复原物 | |
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75 complexity | |
n.复杂(性),复杂的事物 | |
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76 illustrated | |
adj. 有插图的,列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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77 engender | |
v.产生,引起 | |
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78 perplexed | |
adj.不知所措的 | |
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79 quantitative | |
adj.数量的,定量的 | |
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80 qualitative | |
adj.性质上的,质的,定性的 | |
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81 anterior | |
adj.较早的;在前的 | |
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82 reverence | |
n.敬畏,尊敬,尊严;Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称;v.尊敬,敬畏,崇敬 | |
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83 override | |
vt.不顾,不理睬,否决;压倒,优先于 | |
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84 neatly | |
adv.整洁地,干净地,灵巧地,熟练地 | |
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85 antiquity | |
n.古老;高龄;古物,古迹 | |
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86 mischievous | |
adj.调皮的,恶作剧的,有害的,伤人的 | |
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87 qualified | |
adj.合格的,有资格的,胜任的,有限制的 | |
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88 philosophic | |
adj.哲学的,贤明的 | |
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89 underlying | |
adj.在下面的,含蓄的,潜在的 | |
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90 defense | |
n.防御,保卫;[pl.]防务工事;辩护,答辩 | |
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91 irrational | |
adj.无理性的,失去理性的 | |
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92 entity | |
n.实体,独立存在体,实际存在物 | |
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93 banish | |
vt.放逐,驱逐;消除,排除 | |
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94 behold | |
v.看,注视,看到 | |
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95 construed | |
v.解释(陈述、行为等)( construe的过去式和过去分词 );翻译,作句法分析 | |
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96 personalities | |
n. 诽谤,(对某人容貌、性格等所进行的)人身攻击; 人身攻击;人格, 个性, 名人( personality的名词复数 ) | |
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97 belies | |
v.掩饰( belie的第三人称单数 );证明(或显示)…为虚假;辜负;就…扯谎 | |
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98 well-being | |
n.安康,安乐,幸福 | |
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99 materialism | |
n.[哲]唯物主义,唯物论;物质至上 | |
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100 stimulates | |
v.刺激( stimulate的第三人称单数 );激励;使兴奋;起兴奋作用,起刺激作用,起促进作用 | |
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101 disinterestedly | |
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102 patriotic | |
adj.爱国的,有爱国心的 | |
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103 sufficiently | |
adv.足够地,充分地 | |
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104 remunerative | |
adj.有报酬的 | |
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105 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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106 incessant | |
adj.不停的,连续的 | |
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107 invective | |
n.痛骂,恶意抨击 | |
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108 stigmatize | |
v.污蔑,玷污 | |
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109 squander | |
v.浪费,挥霍 | |
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110 malady | |
n.病,疾病(通常做比喻) | |
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111 exacting | |
adj.苛求的,要求严格的 | |
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112 steadily | |
adv.稳定地;不变地;持续地 | |
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113 expatiate | |
v.细说,详述 | |
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