For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 10, 1787
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch1 Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the union then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: "An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting2 peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies3 and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island, being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions4 of different interest, will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES." "We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity6 in this great and weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS union."
It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within ourselves. This subject is copious7 and cannot easily be exhausted8.
The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by their experience without paying the price which it cost them. Although it seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an island should be but one nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into three, and that those three were almost constantly embroiled9 in quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental10 nations was really the same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those nations, their mutual11 jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed12, and for a long series of years they were far more inconvenient13 and troublesome than they were useful and assisting to each other.
Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined in affection" and free from all apprehension5 of different "interests," envy and jealousy14 would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.
The most sanguine15 advocates for three or four confederacies cannot reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them so at first; but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of such equality? Independent of those local circumstances which tend to beget16 and increase power in one part and to impede17 its progress in another, we must advert18 to the effects of that superior policy and good management which would probably distinguish the government of one above the rest, and by which their relative equality in strength and consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound policy, prudence19, and foresight20 would uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long succession of years.
Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold21 her with envy and with fear. Both those passions would lead them to countenance22, if not to promote, whatever might promise to diminish her importance; and would also restrain them from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly dispositions24. She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition23 equally unfavorable to them. Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.
The North is generally the region of strength, and many local circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America which it formerly26 did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture27 that its young swarms28 might often be tempted29 to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious30 and more delicate neighbors.
They who well consider the history of similar divisions and confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend31 that those in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one another, but on the contrary would be a prey32 to discord33, jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in the situations in which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz., FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH OTHER.
From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive34 might be formed between these confederacies, and would produce that combination and union of wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary to put and keep them in a formidable state of defense35 against foreign enemies.
When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties be essentially36 different. Different commercial concerns must create different interests, and of course different degrees of political attachment37 to and connection with different foreign nations. Hence it might and probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the NORTHERN confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so contrary to their immediate38 interest would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith.
Nay39, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring nations, acting40 under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one another than from distant nations, and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to guard against the others by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let us not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade or compel them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and others make in the characters of allies, and what innovations did they under the same character introduce into the governments of those whom they pretended to protect.
Let candid25 men judge, then, whether the division of America into any given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us against the hostilities41 and improper42 interference of foreign nations.
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1
scotch
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| n.伤口，刻痕；苏格兰威士忌酒；v.粉碎，消灭，阻止；adj.苏格兰(人)的 | |
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2
lasting
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| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
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3
jealousies
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| n.妒忌( jealousy的名词复数 )；妒羡 | |
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apprehensions
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| 疑惧 | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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6
unanimity
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| n.全体一致，一致同意 | |
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7
copious
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| adj.丰富的，大量的 | |
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8
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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9
embroiled
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| adj.卷入的；纠缠不清的 | |
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10
continental
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| adj.大陆的，大陆性的，欧洲大陆的 | |
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11
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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12
inflamed
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| adj.发炎的，红肿的v.（使）变红，发怒，过热( inflame的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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13
inconvenient
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| adj.不方便的，令人感到麻烦的 | |
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14
jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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15
sanguine
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| adj.充满希望的，乐观的，血红色的 | |
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16
beget
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| v.引起；产生 | |
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impede
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| v.妨碍，阻碍，阻止 | |
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18
advert
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| vi.注意，留意，言及；n.广告 | |
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19
prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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20
foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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21
behold
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| v.看，注视，看到 | |
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22
countenance
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| n.脸色，面容；面部表情；vt.支持，赞同 | |
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23
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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24
dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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25
candid
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| adj.公正的，正直的；坦率的 | |
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26
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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27
conjecture
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| n./v.推测，猜测 | |
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28
swarms
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| 蜂群，一大群( swarm的名词复数 ) | |
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29
tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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30
luxurious
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| adj.精美而昂贵的；豪华的 | |
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31
apprehend
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| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
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32
prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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33
discord
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| n.不和，意见不合，争论，（音乐）不和谐 | |
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34
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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35
defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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36
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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37
attachment
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| n.附属物，附件；依恋；依附 | |
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38
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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39
nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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40
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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41
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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42
improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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