For the Independent Journal. Thursday, November 15, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It would be a full answer to this question to say—precisely the same inducements which have, at different times, deluged1 in blood all the nations in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the question admits of a more particular answer. There are causes of differences within our immediate2 contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under the restraints of a federal constitution, we have had sufficient experience to enable us to form a judgment3 of what might be expected if those restraints were removed.
Territorial4 disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile sources of hostility5 among nations. Perhaps the greatest proportion of wars that have desolated6 the earth have sprung from this origin. This cause would exist among us in full force. We have a vast tract7 of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States. There still are discordant8 and undecided claims between several of them, and the dissolution of the union would lay a foundation for similar claims between them all. It is well known that they have heretofore had serious and animated10 discussion concerning the rights to the lands which were ungranted at the time of the Revolution, and which usually went under the name of crown lands. The States within the limits of whose colonial governments they were comprised have claimed them as their property, the others have contended that the rights of the crown in this article devolved upon the union; especially as to all that part of the Western territory which, either by actual possession, or through the submission11 of the Indian proprietors12, was subjected to the jurisdiction13 of the king of Great Britain, till it was relinquished14 in the treaty of peace. This, it has been said, was at all events an acquisition to the Confederacy by compact with a foreign power. It has been the prudent15 policy of Congress to appease16 this controversy17, by prevailing18 upon the States to make cessions to the United States for the benefit of the whole. This has been so far accomplished20 as, under a continuation of the union, to afford a decided9 prospect21 of an amicable22 termination of the dispute. A dismemberment of the Confederacy, however, would revive this dispute, and would create others on the same subject. At present, a large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession19 at least, if not by any anterior23 right, the common property of the union. If that were at an end, the States which made the cession, on a principle of federal compromise, would be apt when the motive24 of the grant had ceased, to reclaim25 the lands as a reversion. The other States would no doubt insist on a proportion, by right of representation. Their argument would be, that a grant, once made, could not be revoked26; and that the justice of participating in territory acquired or secured by the joint27 efforts of the Confederacy, remained undiminished. If, contrary to probability, it should be admitted by all the States, that each had a right to a share of this common stock, there would still be a difficulty to be surmounted28, as to a proper rule of apportionment. Different principles would be set up by different States for this purpose; and as they would affect the opposite interests of the parties, they might not easily be susceptible29 of a pacific adjustment.
In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an ample theatre for hostile pretensions30, without any umpire or common judge to interpose between the contending parties. To reason from the past to the future, we shall have good ground to apprehend31, that the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter32 of their differences. The circumstances of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, respecting the land at Wyoming, admonish33 us not to be sanguine34 in expecting an easy accommodation of such differences. The articles of confederation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision of a federal court. The submission was made, and the court decided in favor of Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications of dissatisfaction with that determination; nor did she appear to be entirely35 resigned to it, till, by negotiation36 and management, something like an equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself to have sustained. Nothing here said is intended to convey the slightest censure37 on the conduct of that State. She no doubt sincerely believed herself to have been injured by the decision; and States, like individuals, acquiesce38 with great reluctance39 in determinations to their disadvantage.
Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the transactions which attended the progress of the controversy between this State and the district of Vermont, can vouch40 the opposition41 we experienced, as well from States not interested as from those which were interested in the claim; and can attest42 the danger to which the peace of the Confederacy might have been exposed, had this State attempted to assert its rights by force. Two motives43 preponderated44 in that opposition: one, a jealousy45 entertained of our future power; and the other, the interest of certain individuals of influence in the neighboring States, who had obtained grants of lands under the actual government of that district. Even the States which brought forward claims, in contradiction to ours, seemed more solicitous46 to dismember this State, than to establish their own pretensions. These were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. New Jersey47 and Rhode Island, upon all occasions, discovered a warm zeal48 for the independence of Vermont; and Maryland, till alarmed by the appearance of a connection between Canada and that State, entered deeply into the same views. These being small States, saw with an unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness. In a review of these transactions we may trace some of the causes which would be likely to embroil49 the States with each other, if it should be their unpropitious destiny to become disunited.
The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention50. The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar51 to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions52, which would beget53 discontent. The habits of intercourse54, on the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been accustomed since the earliest settlement of the country, would give a keener edge to those causes of discontent than they would naturally have independent of this circumstance. WE SHOULD BE READY TO DENOMINATE INJURIES THOSE THINGS WHICH WERE IN REALITY THE JUSTIFIABLE55 ACTS OF INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGNTIES CONSULTING A DISTINCT INTEREST. The spirit of enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade by which particular States might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The infractions of these regulations, on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel56 them, on the other, would naturally lead to outrages57, and these to reprisals58 and wars.
The opportunities which some States would have of rendering59 others tributary60 to them by commercial regulations would be impatiently submitted to by the tributary States. The relative situation of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey would afford an example of this kind. New York, from the necessities of revenue, must lay duties on her importations. A great part of these duties must be paid by the inhabitants of the two other States in the capacity of consumers of what we import. New York would neither be willing nor able to forego this advantage. Her citizens would not consent that a duty paid by them should be remitted61 in favor of the citizens of her neighbors; nor would it be practicable, if there were not this impediment in the way, to distinguish the customers in our own markets. Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit? Should we be long permitted to remain in the quiet and undisturbed enjoyment62 of a metropolis63, from the possession of which we derived64 an advantage so odious65 to our neighbors, and, in their opinion, so oppressive? Should we be able to preserve it against the incumbent66 weight of Connecticut on the one side, and the co-operating pressure of New Jersey on the other? These are questions that temerity67 alone will answer in the affirmative.
The public debt of the union would be a further cause of collision between the separate States or confederacies. The apportionment, in the first instance, and the progressive extinguishment afterward68, would be alike productive of ill-humor and animosity. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of apportionment satisfactory to all? There is scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free from real objections. These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse69 interest of the parties. There are even dissimilar views among the States as to the general principle of discharging the public debt. Some of them, either less impressed with the importance of national credit, or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the question, feel an indifference70, if not a repugnance71, to the payment of the domestic debt at any rate. These would be inclined to magnify the difficulties of a distribution. Others of them, a numerous body of whose citizens are creditors72 to the public beyond proportion of the State in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous73 for some equitable74 and effective provision. The procrastinations of the former would excite the resentments75 of the latter. The settlement of a rule would, in the meantime, be postponed76 by real differences of opinion and affected77 delays. The citizens of the States interested would clamour; foreign powers would urge for the satisfaction of their just demands, and the peace of the States would be hazarded to the double contingency78 of external invasion and internal contention.
Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted, and the apportionment made. Still there is great room to suppose that the rule agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon some States than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it would naturally seek for a mitigation of the burden. The others would as naturally be disinclined to a revision, which was likely to end in an increase of their own incumbrances. Their refusal would be too plausible79 a pretext80 to the complaining States to withhold81 their contributions, not to be embraced with avidity; and the non-compliance of these States with their engagements would be a ground of bitter discussion and altercation82. If even the rule adopted should in practice justify83 the equality of its principle, still delinquencies in payments on the part of some of the States would result from a diversity of other causes—the real deficiency of resources; the mismanagement of their finances; accidental disorders84 in the management of the government; and, in addition to the rest, the reluctance with which men commonly part with money for purposes that have outlived the exigencies85 which produced them, and interfere86 with the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies, from whatever causes, would be productive of complaints, recriminations, and quarrels. There is, perhaps, nothing more likely to disturb the tranquillity87 of nations than their being bound to mutual88 contributions for any common object that does not yield an equal and coincident benefit. For it is an observation, as true as it is trite89, that there is nothing men differ so readily about as the payment of money.
Laws in violation90 of private contracts, as they amount to aggressions on the rights of those States whose citizens are injured by them, may be considered as another probable source of hostility. We are not authorized91 to expect that a more liberal or more equitable spirit would preside over the legislations of the individual States hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional checks, than we have heretofore seen in too many instances disgracing their several codes. We have observed the disposition92 to retaliation93 excited in Connecticut in consequence of the enormities perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island; and we reasonably infer that, in similar cases, under other circumstances, a war, not of PARCHMENT, but of the sword, would chastise94 such atrocious breaches95 of moral obligation and social justice.
The probability of incompatible96 alliances between the different States or confederacies and different foreign nations, and the effects of this situation upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently97 unfolded in some preceding papers. From the view they have exhibited of this part of the subject, this conclusion is to be drawn98, that America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive99, would, by the operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled100 in all the pernicious labyrinths101 of European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions102 of the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become a prey103 to the artifices104 and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them all. Divide et impera(1) must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.(2)
PUBLIUS
1. Divide and command.
2. In order that the whole subject of these papers may as soon as possible be laid before the public, it is proposed to publish them four times a week—on Tuesday in the New York Packet and on Thursday in the Daily Advertiser.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
deluged
|
|
| v.使淹没( deluge的过去式和过去分词 )；淹没；被洪水般涌来的事物所淹没；穷于应付 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
immediate
|
|
| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
judgment
|
|
| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
territorial
|
|
| adj.领土的，领地的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
hostility
|
|
| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
desolated
|
|
| adj.荒凉的，荒废的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
tract
|
|
| n.传单，小册子，大片(土地或森林) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
discordant
|
|
| adj.不调和的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
decided
|
|
| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
animated
|
|
| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
submission
|
|
| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
proprietors
|
|
| n.所有人，业主( proprietor的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
jurisdiction
|
|
| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
relinquished
|
|
| 交出，让给( relinquish的过去式和过去分词 )； 放弃 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
prudent
|
|
| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
appease
|
|
| v.安抚，缓和，平息，满足 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
controversy
|
|
| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
prevailing
|
|
| adj.盛行的；占优势的；主要的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
cession
|
|
| n.割让，转让 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
accomplished
|
|
| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
prospect
|
|
| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
amicable
|
|
| adj.和平的，友好的；友善的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
anterior
|
|
| adj.较早的；在前的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
motive
|
|
| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
reclaim
|
|
| v.要求归还，收回；开垦 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
revoked
|
|
| adj.[法]取消的v.撤销，取消，废除( revoke的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
joint
|
|
| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
surmounted
|
|
| 战胜( surmount的过去式和过去分词 )； 克服（困难）； 居于…之上； 在…顶上 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
susceptible
|
|
| adj.过敏的，敏感的；易动感情的，易受感动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
pretensions
|
|
| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
apprehend
|
|
| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
arbiter
|
|
| n.仲裁人，公断人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
admonish
|
|
| v.训戒；警告；劝告 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
sanguine
|
|
| adj.充满希望的，乐观的，血红色的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
entirely
|
|
| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
negotiation
|
|
| n.谈判，协商 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
censure
|
|
| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
acquiesce
|
|
| vi.默许，顺从，同意 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
reluctance
|
|
| n.厌恶，讨厌，勉强，不情愿 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
vouch
|
|
| v.担保；断定；n.被担保者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
opposition
|
|
| n.反对，敌对 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
attest
|
|
| vt.证明，证实；表明 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
motives
|
|
| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
preponderated
|
|
| v.超过，胜过( preponderate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
jealousy
|
|
| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
solicitous
|
|
| adj.热切的，挂念的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
jersey
|
|
| n.运动衫 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
zeal
|
|
| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
embroil
|
|
| vt.拖累；牵连；使复杂 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
contention
|
|
| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
peculiar
|
|
| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
exclusions
|
|
| n.不包括的项目：如接受服务项目是由投保以前已患有的疾病或伤害引致的，保险公司有权拒绝支付。；拒绝( exclusion的名词复数 )；排除；被排斥在外的人（或事物）；排外主义 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
beget
|
|
| v.引起；产生 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
intercourse
|
|
| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
justifiable
|
|
| adj.有理由的，无可非议的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
repel
|
|
| v.击退，抵制，拒绝，排斥 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
outrages
|
|
| 引起…的义愤，激怒( outrage的第三人称单数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
reprisals
|
|
| n.报复（行为）( reprisal的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
rendering
|
|
| n.表现，描写 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
tributary
|
|
| n.支流；纳贡国；adj.附庸的；辅助的；支流的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
remitted
|
|
| v.免除（债务），宽恕( remit的过去式和过去分词 )；使某事缓和；寄回，传送 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
enjoyment
|
|
| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
metropolis
|
|
| n.首府；大城市 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
derived
|
|
| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
odious
|
|
| adj.可憎的，讨厌的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
incumbent
|
|
| adj.成为责任的，有义务的；现任的，在职的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
temerity
|
|
| n.鲁莽，冒失 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
afterward
|
|
| adv.后来；以后 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
adverse
|
|
| adj.不利的；有害的；敌对的，不友好的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
indifference
|
|
| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
repugnance
|
|
| n.嫌恶 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
creditors
|
|
| n.债权人，债主( creditor的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
strenuous
|
|
| adj.奋发的，使劲的；紧张的；热烈的，狂热的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
equitable
|
|
| adj.公平的；公正的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
resentments
|
|
| （因受虐待而）愤恨，不满，怨恨( resentment的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
postponed
|
|
| vt.& vi.延期，缓办，（使）延迟vt.把…放在次要地位；[语]把…放在后面（或句尾）vi.（疟疾等）延缓发作（或复发） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
affected
|
|
| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
contingency
|
|
| n.意外事件，可能性 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
plausible
|
|
| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
pretext
|
|
| n.借口，托词 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
withhold
|
|
| v.拒绝，不给；使停止，阻挡 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
82
altercation
|
|
| n.争吵，争论 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
justify
|
|
| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
disorders
|
|
| n.混乱( disorder的名词复数 )；凌乱；骚乱；（身心、机能）失调 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
85
exigencies
|
|
| n.急切需要 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
86
interfere
|
|
| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
87
tranquillity
|
|
| n. 平静, 安静 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
88
mutual
|
|
| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
89
trite
|
|
| adj.陈腐的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
90
violation
|
|
| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
91
authorized
|
|
| a.委任的，许可的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
92
disposition
|
|
| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
93
retaliation
|
|
| n.报复，反击 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
94
chastise
|
|
| vt.责骂，严惩 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
95
breaches
|
|
| 破坏( breach的名词复数 )； 破裂； 缺口； 违背 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
96
incompatible
|
|
| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
97
sufficiently
|
|
| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
98
drawn
|
|
| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
99
defensive
|
|
| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
100
entangled
|
|
| adj.卷入的；陷入的；被缠住的；缠在一起的v.使某人（某物/自己）缠绕，纠缠于（某物中），使某人（自己）陷入（困难或复杂的环境中）( entangle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
101
labyrinths
|
|
| 迷宫( labyrinth的名词复数 )； （文字，建筑）错综复杂的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
102
contentions
|
|
| n.竞争( contention的名词复数 )；争夺；争论；论点 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
103
prey
|
|
| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
104
artifices
|
|
| n.灵巧( artifice的名词复数 )；诡计；巧妙办法；虚伪行为 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |