From the New York Packet. Tuesday, November 20, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck2 of the general Confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes3 of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united under one government, let us enter into a concise4 detail of some of the consequences that would attend such a situation.
War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses5 than it commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments have long obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant6 aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of rendering8 sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified9 places, which mutually obstruct10 invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons11, to gain admittance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an invader12. Formerly13, an invading army would penetrate14 into the heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as intelligence of its approach could be received; but now a comparatively small force of disciplined troops, acting15 on the defensive16, with the aid of posts, is able to impede17, and finally to frustrate18, the enterprises of one much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter of the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued19 and empires overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and little acquisition.
In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy20 of military establishments would postpone21 them as long as possible. The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous22 States would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be desultory23 and predatory. PLUNDER24 and devastation25 ever march in the train of irregulars. The calamities26 of individuals would make the principal figure in the events which would characterize our military exploits.
This picture is not too highly wrought27; though, I confess, it would not long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent28 love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates29. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose30 and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.
The institutions chiefly alluded31 to are STANDING7 ARMIES and the correspondent appendages32 of military establishments. Standing armies, it is said, are not provided against in the new Constitution; and it is therefore inferred that they may exist under it.(1) Their existence, however, from the very terms of the proposition, is, at most, problematical and uncertain. But standing armies, it may be replied, must inevitably33 result from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant apprehension34, which require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce them. The weaker States or confederacies would first have recourse to them, to put themselves upon an equality with their more potent35 neighbors. They would endeavor to supply the inferiority of population and resources by a more regular and effective system of defense36, by disciplined troops, and by fortifications. They would, at the same time, be necessitated37 to strengthen the executive arm of government, in doing which their constitutions would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy38. It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative39 authority.
The expedients40 which have been mentioned would soon give the States or confederacies that made use of them a superiority over their neighbors. Small states, or states of less natural strength, under vigorous governments, and with the assistance of disciplined armies, have often triumphed over large states, or states of greater natural strength, which have been destitute42 of these advantages. Neither the pride nor the safety of the more important States or confederacies would permit them long to submit to this mortifying43 and adventitious44 superiority. They would quickly resort to means similar to those by which it had been effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost pre-eminence. Thus, we should, in a little time, see established in every part of this country the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge45 of the Old World. This, at least, would be the natural course of things; and our reasonings will be the more likely to be just, in proportion as they are accommodated to this standard.
These are not vague inferences drawn46 from supposed or speculative47 defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged48 in the hands of a people, or their representatives and delegates, but they are solid conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress of human affairs.
It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did not standing armies spring up out of the contentions49 which so often distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally satisfactory, may be given to this question. The industrious50 habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and devoted51 to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible52 with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the people of those republics. The means of revenue, which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and silver and of the arts of industry, and the science of finance, which is the offspring of modern times, concurring53 with the habits of nations, have produced an entire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens, the inseparable companions of frequent hostility54.
There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive55 of them. The rulers of the former can have no good pretext56, if they are even so inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the first case, rarely, if at all, called into activity for interior defense, the people are in no danger of being broken to military subordination. The laws are not accustomed to relaxations57, in favor of military exigencies58; the civil state remains59 in full vigor41, neither corrupted60, nor confounded with the principles or propensities61 of the other state. The smallness of the army renders the natural strength of the community an overmatch for it; and the citizens, not habituated to look up to the military power for protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear the soldiery; they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence62 in a necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of their rights.
The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate64 to suppress a small faction65, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of the great body of the people.
In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of all this happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel66 it; its armies must be numerous enough for instant defense. The continual necessity for their services enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements67 on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition from this disposition68 to that of considering them masters, is neither remote nor difficult; but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by the military power.
The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description. An insular69 situation, and a powerful marine70, guarding it in a great measure against the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede71 the necessity of a numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force to make head against a sudden descent, till the militia72 could have time to rally and embody73, is all that has been deemed requisite74. No motive75 of national policy has demanded, nor would public opinion have tolerated, a larger number of troops upon its domestic establishment. There has been, for a long time past, little room for the operation of the other causes, which have been enumerated76 as the consequences of internal war. This peculiar77 felicity of situation has, in a great degree, contributed to preserve the liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in spite of the prevalent venality78 and corruption79. If, on the contrary, Britain had been situated80 on the continent, and had been compelled, as she would have been, by that situation, to make her military establishments at home coextensive with those of the other great powers of Europe, she, like them, would in all probability be, at this day, a victim to the absolute power of a single man. It is possible, though not easy, that the people of that island may be enslaved from other causes; but it cannot be by the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been usually kept up within the kingdom.
If we are wise enough to preserve the union we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance81. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security. But if we should be disunited, and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is most probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the continental82 powers of Europe—our liberties would be a prey83 to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other.
This is an idea not superficial or futile84, but solid and weighty. It deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent85 and honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn pause, and meditate86 dispassionately on the importance of this interesting idea; if they will contemplate87 it in all its attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a Constitution, the rejection88 of which would in all probability put a final period to the union. The airy phantoms89 that flit before the distempered imaginations of some of its adversaries90 would quickly give place to the more substantial forms of dangers, real, certain, and formidable.
PUBLIUS
1. This objection will be fully63 examined in its proper place, and it will be shown that the only natural precaution which could have been taken on this subject has been taken; and a much better one than is to be found in any constitution that has been heretofore framed in America, most of which contain no guard at all on this subject.
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1
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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wreck
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| n.失事，遇难；沉船；vt.(船等)失事，遇难 | |
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vicissitudes
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| n.变迁，世事变化；变迁兴衰( vicissitude的名词复数 )；盛衰兴废 | |
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4
concise
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| adj.简洁的，简明的 | |
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distresses
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| n.悲痛( distress的名词复数 )；痛苦；贫困；危险 | |
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malignant
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| adj.恶性的，致命的；恶意的，恶毒的 | |
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7
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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8
rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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9
fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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10
obstruct
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| v.阻隔，阻塞(道路、通道等)；n.阻碍物，障碍物 | |
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garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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invader
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| n.侵略者，侵犯者，入侵者 | |
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13
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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14
penetrate
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| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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16
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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17
impede
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| v.妨碍，阻碍，阻止 | |
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18
frustrate
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| v.使失望；使沮丧；使厌烦 | |
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subdued
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| adj. 屈服的，柔和的，减弱的 动词subdue的过去式和过去分词 | |
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jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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21
postpone
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| v.延期，推迟 | |
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populous
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| adj.人口稠密的，人口众多的 | |
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desultory
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| adj.散漫的，无方法的 | |
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plunder
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| vt.劫掠财物，掠夺；n.劫掠物，赃物；劫掠 | |
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devastation
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| n.毁坏；荒废；极度震惊或悲伤 | |
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calamities
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| n.灾祸，灾难( calamity的名词复数 )；不幸之事 | |
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wrought
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| v.引起；以…原料制作；运转；adj.制造的 | |
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ardent
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，强烈的，烈性的 | |
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29
dictates
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| n.命令，规定，要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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repose
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| v.(使)休息；n.安息 | |
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alluded
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| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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appendages
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| n.附属物( appendage的名词复数 )；依附的人；附属器官；附属肢体（如臂、腿、尾等） | |
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inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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potent
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| adj.强有力的，有权势的；有效力的 | |
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defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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necessitated
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| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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expedients
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| n.应急有效的，权宜之计的( expedient的名词复数 ) | |
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41
vigor
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| n.活力，精力，元气 | |
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42
destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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43
mortifying
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| adj.抑制的，苦修的v.使受辱( mortify的现在分词 )；伤害（人的感情）；克制；抑制（肉体、情感等） | |
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44
adventitious
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| adj.偶然的 | |
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45
scourge
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| n.灾难，祸害；v.蹂躏 | |
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46
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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47
speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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48
lodged
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| v.存放( lodge的过去式和过去分词 )；暂住；埋入；（权利、权威等）归属 | |
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49
contentions
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| n.竞争( contention的名词复数 )；争夺；争论；论点 | |
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50
industrious
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| adj.勤劳的，刻苦的，奋发的 | |
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51
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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52
incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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53
concurring
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| 同时发生的，并发的 | |
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54
hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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55
apprehensive
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| adj.担心的，恐惧的，善于领会的 | |
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56
pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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57
relaxations
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| n.消遣( relaxation的名词复数 )；松懈；松弛；放松 | |
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58
exigencies
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| n.急切需要 | |
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59
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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60
corrupted
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| （使）败坏( corrupt的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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61
propensities
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| n.倾向，习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
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62
acquiescence
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| n.默许；顺从 | |
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63
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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64
magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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65
faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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66
repel
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| v.击退，抵制，拒绝，排斥 | |
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67
infringements
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| n.违反( infringement的名词复数 )；侵犯，伤害 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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69
insular
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| adj.岛屿的，心胸狭窄的 | |
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70
marine
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| adj.海的；海生的；航海的；海事的；n.水兵 | |
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71
supersede
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| v.替代；充任 | |
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72
militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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73
embody
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| vt.具体表达，使具体化；包含，收录 | |
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requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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enumerated
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| v.列举，枚举，数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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78
venality
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| n.贪赃枉法，腐败 | |
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corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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80
situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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81
annoyance
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| n.恼怒，生气，烦恼 | |
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82
continental
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| adj.大陆的，大陆性的，欧洲大陆的 | |
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83
prey
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| n.被掠食者，牺牲者，掠食；v.捕食，掠夺，折磨 | |
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84
futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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85
prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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86
meditate
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| v.想，考虑，（尤指宗教上的）沉思，冥想 | |
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87
contemplate
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| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
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88
rejection
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| n.拒绝，被拒，抛弃，被弃 | |
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phantoms
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| n.鬼怪，幽灵( phantom的名词复数 ) | |
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adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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