For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 21, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
A FIRM union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions2 with which they were continually agitated3, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration4 between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy5. If they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast to the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then intervals6 of felicity open to view, we behold7 them with a mixture of regret, arising from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous8 waves of sedition9 and party rage. If momentary10 rays of glory break forth11 from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a transient and fleeting12 brilliancy, they at the same time admonish13 us to lament14 that the vices15 of government should pervert16 the direction and tarnish17 the lustre18 of those bright talents and exalted19 endowments for which the favored soils that produced them have been so justly celebrated20.
From the disorders21 that disfigure the annals of those republics the advocates of despotism have drawn23 arguments, not only against the forms of republican government, but against the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried24 all free government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious25 exultation26 over its friends and partisans27. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics28 reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid foundation of other edifices29, not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of their errors.
But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched30 of republican government were too just copies of the originals from which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative31 balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellences32 of republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened33 or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such systems are to revolve34, either in respect to the dimensions of a single State or to the consolidation35 of several smaller States into one great Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately concerns the object under consideration. It will, however, be of use to examine the principle in its application to a single State, which shall be attended to in another place.
The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to guard the internal tranquillity37 of States, as to increase their external force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has been practiced upon in different countries and ages, and has received the sanction of the most approved writers on the subject of politics. The opponents of the plan proposed have, with great assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government. But they seem not to have been apprised38 of the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his work, nor to have adverted39 to the consequences of the principle to which they subscribe40 with such ready acquiescence41.
When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be compared with the models from which he reasoned and to which the terms of his description apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy42, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity43 of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths44, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord45, and the miserable46 objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who have come forward on the other side of the question seem to have been aware of the dilemma47; and have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy, such a desperate expedient48, might, by the multiplication49 of petty offices, answer the views of men who possess not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue50, but it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the people of America.
Referring the examination of the principle itself to another place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark here that, in the sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon the occasion, it would only dictate51 a reduction of the SIZE of the more considerable MEMBERS of the union, but would not militate against their being all comprehended in one confederate government. And this is the true question, in the discussion of which we are at present interested.
So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing52 in opposition53 to a general union of the States, that he explicitly54 treats of a confederate republic as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.
"It is very probable," (says he(1)) "that mankind would have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single person, had they not contrived55 a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical56 government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC."
"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller STATES agree to become members of a larger ONE, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united body."
"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without any internal corruptions57. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences."
"If a single member should attempt to usurp58 the supreme59 authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue60 a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he had usurped61 and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation62."
"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states the others are able to quell63 it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty."
"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external situation, it is possessed64, by means of the association, of all the advantages of large monarchies65."
I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages, because they contain a luminous66 abridgment67 of the principal arguments in favor of the union, and must effectually remove the false impressions which a misapplication of other parts of the work was calculated to make. They have, at the same time, an intimate connection with the more immediate36 design of this paper; which is, to illustrate68 the tendency of the union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.
A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a CONFEDERACY and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. The essential characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction69 of its authority to the members in their collective capacities, without reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It is contended that the national council ought to have no concern with any object of internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage70 between the members has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a confederate government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary; they are supported neither by principle nor precedent71. It has indeed happened, that governments of this kind have generally operated in the manner which the distinction taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example will go, that there is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown in the course of this investigation72 that as far as the principle contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable73 disorder22 and imbecility in the government.
The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be "an assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more states into one state. The extent, modifications74, and objects of the federal authority are mere75 matters of discretion76. So long as the separate organization of the members be not abolished; so long as it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local purposes; though it should be in perfect subordination to the general authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of states, or a confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition77 of the State governments, makes them constituent78 parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power. This fully79 corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.
In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES or republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in the COMMON COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest to ONE. The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and magistrates80 of the respective CITIES. This was certainly the most, delicate species of interference in their internal administration; for if there be any thing that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions81, it is the appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this association, says: "Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate Republic, it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive that the distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this enlightened civilian82; and we shall be led to conclude, that they are the novel refinements83 of an erroneous theory.
PUBLIUS
1. "Spirit of Laws," vol. i., book ix., chap. i.
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1
faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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distractions
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| n.使人分心的事[人]( distraction的名词复数 )；娱乐，消遣；心烦意乱；精神错乱 | |
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agitated
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| adj.被鼓动的，不安的 | |
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vibration
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| n.颤动，振动；摆动 | |
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anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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6
intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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behold
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| v.看，注视，看到 | |
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tempestuous
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| adj.狂暴的 | |
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sedition
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| n.煽动叛乱 | |
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momentary
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| adj.片刻的，瞬息的；短暂的 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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fleeting
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| adj.短暂的，飞逝的 | |
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admonish
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| v.训戒；警告；劝告 | |
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lament
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| n.悲叹，悔恨，恸哭；v.哀悼，悔恨，悲叹 | |
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vices
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| 缺陷( vice的名词复数 )； 恶习； 不道德行为； 台钳 | |
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pervert
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| n.堕落者，反常者；vt.误用，滥用；使人堕落，使入邪路 | |
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tarnish
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| n.晦暗，污点；vt.使失去光泽；玷污 | |
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lustre
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| n.光亮，光泽；荣誉 | |
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exalted
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| adj.(地位等)高的，崇高的；尊贵的，高尚的 | |
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celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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disorders
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| n.混乱( disorder的名词复数 )；凌乱；骚乱；（身心、机能）失调 | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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decried
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| v.公开反对，谴责( decry的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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malicious
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| adj.有恶意的，心怀恶意的 | |
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exultation
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| n.狂喜，得意 | |
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partisans
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| 游击队员( partisan的名词复数 )； 党人； 党羽； 帮伙 | |
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fabrics
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| 织物( fabric的名词复数 )； 布； 构造； （建筑物的）结构（如墙、地面、屋顶）：质地 | |
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edifices
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| n.大建筑物( edifice的名词复数 ) | |
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sketched
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| v.草拟（sketch的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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excellences
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| n.卓越( excellence的名词复数 )；（只用于所修饰的名词后）杰出的；卓越的；出类拔萃的 | |
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lessened
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| 减少的，减弱的 | |
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revolve
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| vi.(使)旋转；循环出现 | |
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consolidation
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| n.合并,巩固 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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apprised
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| v.告知，通知( apprise的过去式和过去分词 )；评价 | |
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adverted
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| 引起注意（advert的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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subscribe
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| vi.(to)订阅，订购；同意；vt.捐助，赞助 | |
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41
acquiescence
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| n.默许；顺从 | |
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42
monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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infinity
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| n.无限，无穷，大量 | |
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commonwealths
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| n.共和国( commonwealth的名词复数 )；联邦；团体；协会 | |
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45
discord
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| n.不和，意见不合，争论，（音乐）不和谐 | |
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46
miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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47
dilemma
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| n.困境，进退两难的局面 | |
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48
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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49
multiplication
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| n.增加，增多，倍增；增殖，繁殖；乘法 | |
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50
intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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51
dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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52
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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53
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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explicitly
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| ad.明确地，显然地 | |
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55
contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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56
monarchical
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| adj. 国王的，帝王的，君主的，拥护君主制的 =monarchic | |
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57
corruptions
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| n.堕落( corruption的名词复数 )；腐化；腐败；贿赂 | |
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58
usurp
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| vt.篡夺，霸占；vi.篡位 | |
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59
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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subdue
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| vt.制服，使顺从，征服；抑制，克制 | |
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61
usurped
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| 篡夺，霸占( usurp的过去式和过去分词 )； 盗用； 篡夺，篡权 | |
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usurpation
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| n.篡位；霸占 | |
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63
quell
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| v.压制，平息，减轻 | |
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64
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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65
monarchies
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| n. 君主政体, 君主国, 君主政治 | |
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66
luminous
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| adj.发光的，发亮的；光明的；明白易懂的；有启发的 | |
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abridgment
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| n.删节，节本 | |
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illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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restriction
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| n.限制，约束 | |
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70
suffrage
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| n.投票，选举权，参政权 | |
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71
precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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73
incurable
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| adj.不能医治的，不能矫正的，无救的；n.不治的病人，无救的人 | |
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74
modifications
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| n.缓和( modification的名词复数 )；限制；更改；改变 | |
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75
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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77
abolition
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| n.废除，取消 | |
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constituent
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| n.选民；成分，组分；adj.组成的，构成的 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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magistrates
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| 地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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81
jurisdictions
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| 司法权( jurisdiction的名词复数 )； 裁判权； 管辖区域； 管辖范围 | |
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civilian
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| adj.平民的，民用的，民众的 | |
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83
refinements
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| n.（生活）风雅；精炼( refinement的名词复数 )；改良品；细微的改良；优雅或高贵的动作 | |
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