Ambiguous position of language
Speech has such a peculiarly intimate connection with thought as to require special discussion. Although the very word logic1 comes from logos (λογο?), meaning indifferently both word or speech, and thought or reason, yet "words, words, words" denote intellectual barrenness, a sham2 of thought. Although schooling3 has language as its chief instrument (and often as its chief matter) of study, educational reformers have for centuries brought their severest indictments4 against the current use of language in the schools. The conviction that language is necessary to thinking (is even identical with it) is met by the contention5 that language perverts6 and conceals7 thought.
Language a necessary tool of thinking,for it alone fixes meanings
Three typical views have been maintained regarding the relation of thought and language: first, that they are identical; second, that words are the garb8 or clothing of thought, necessary not for thought but only for conveying it; and third (the view we shall here maintain) that while language is not thought it is necessary for thinking as well as for its communication. When it is said, however, that thinking is impossible without language, we must recall that language includes much more than oral and written speech. Gestures, pictures, monuments, visual images, finger movements—anything con[Pg 171]sciously employed as a sign is, logically, language. To say that language is necessary for thinking is to say that signs are necessary. Thought deals not with bare things, but with their meanings, their suggestions; and meanings, in order to be apprehended9, must be embodied10 in sensible and particular existences. Without meaning, things are nothing but blind stimuli11 or chance sources of pleasure and pain; and since meanings are not themselves tangible12 things, they must be anchored by attachment13 to some physical existence. Existences that are especially set aside to fixate and convey meanings are signs or symbols. If a man moves toward another to throw him out of the room, his movement is not a sign. If, however, the man points to the door with his hand, or utters the sound go, his movement is reduced to a vehicle of meaning: it is a sign or symbol. In the case of signs we care nothing for what they are in themselves, but everything for what they signify and represent. Canis, hund, chien, dog—it makes no difference what the outward thing is, so long as the meaning is presented.
Limitations of natural symbols
Natural objects are signs of other things and events. Clouds stand for rain; a footprint represents game or an enemy; a projecting rock serves to indicate minerals below the surface. The limitations of natural signs are, however, great. (i) The physical or direct sense excitation tends to distract attention from what is meant or indicated.[27] Almost every one will recall pointing out to a kitten or puppy some object of food, only to have the animal devote himself to the hand pointing, not to the thing pointed14 at. (ii) Where natural signs alone exist, we are mainly at the mercy of external happenings; we[Pg 172] have to wait until the natural event presents itself in order to be warned or advised of the possibility of some other event. (iii) Natural signs, not being originally intended to be signs, are cumbrous, bulky, inconvenient15, unmanageable.
Artificial signs overcome these restrictions16.
It is therefore indispensable for any high development of thought that there should be also intentional17 signs. Speech supplies the requirement. Gestures, sounds, written or printed forms, are strictly18 physical existences, but their native value is intentionally19 subordinated to the value they acquire as representative of meanings. (i) The direct and sensible value of faint sounds and minute written or printed marks is very slight. Accordingly, attention is not distracted from their representative function. (ii) Their production is under our direct control so that they may be produced when needed. When we can make the word rain, we do not have to wait for some physical forerunner20 of rain to call our thoughts in that direction. We cannot make the cloud; we can make the sound, and as a token of meaning the sound serves the purpose as well as the cloud. (iii) Arbitrary linguistic21 signs are convenient and easy to manage. They are compact, portable, and delicate. As long as we live we breathe; and modifications22 by the muscles of throat and mouth of the volume and quality of the air are simple, easy, and indefinitely controllable. Bodily postures23 and gestures of the hand and arm are also employed as signs, but they are coarse and unmanageable compared with modifications of breath to produce sounds. No wonder that oral speech has been selected as the main stuff of intentional intellectual signs. Sounds, while subtle, refined, and easily modifiable, are transitory. This defect is met by the system of written[Pg 173] and printed words, appealing to the eye. Litera scripta manet.
Bearing in mind the intimate connection of meanings and signs (or language), we may note in more detail what language does (1) for specific meanings, and (2) for the organization of meanings.
I. Individual Meanings. A verbal sign (a) selects, detaches, a meaning from what is otherwise a vague flux24 and blur25 (see p. 121); (b) it retains, registers, stores that meaning; and (c) applies it, when needed, to the comprehension of other things. Combining these various functions in a mixture of metaphors26, we may say that a linguistic sign is a fence, a label, and a vehicle—all in one.
A sign makes a meaning distinct
(a) Every one has experienced how learning an appropriate name for what was dim and vague cleared up and crystallized the whole matter. Some meaning seems almost within reach, but is elusive27; it refuses to condense into definite form; the attaching of a word somehow (just how, it is almost impossible to say) puts limits around the meaning, draws it out from the void, makes it stand out as an entity28 on its own account. When Emerson said that he would almost rather know the true name, the poet's name, for a thing, than to know the thing itself, he presumably had this irradiating and illuminating29 function of language in mind. The delight that children take in demanding and learning the names of everything about them indicates that meanings are becoming concrete individuals to them, so that their commerce with things is passing from the physical to the intellectual plane. It is hardly surprising that savages31 attach a magic efficacy to words. To name anything is to give it a title; to dignify32 and honor it by[Pg 174] raising it from a mere33 physical occurrence to a meaning that is distinct and permanent. To know the names of people and things and to be able to manipulate these names is, in savage30 lore34, to be in possession of their dignity and worth, to master them.
A sign preserves a meaning
(b) Things come and go; or we come and go, and either way things escape our notice. Our direct sensible relation to things is very limited. The suggestion of meanings by natural signs is limited to occasions of direct contact or vision. But a meaning fixed35 by a linguistic sign is conserved36 for future use. Even if the thing is not there to represent the meaning, the word may be produced so as to evoke37 the meaning. Since intellectual life depends on possession of a store of meanings, the importance of language as a tool of preserving meanings cannot be overstated. To be sure, the method of storage is not wholly aseptic; words often corrupt38 and modify the meanings they are supposed to keep intact, but liability to infection is a price paid by every living thing for the privilege of living.
A sign transfers a meaning
(c) When a meaning is detached and fixed by a sign, it is possible to use that meaning in a new context and situation. This transfer and reapplication is the key to all judgment39 and inference. It would little profit a man to recognize that a given particular cloud was the premonitor of a given particular rainstorm if his recognition ended there, for he would then have to learn over and over again, since the next cloud and the next rain are different events. No cumulative40 growth of intelligence would occur; experience might form habits of physical adaptation but it would not teach anything, for we should not be able to use a prior experience consciously to anticipate and regulate a further experience. To be able to use[Pg 175] the past to judge and infer the new and unknown implies that, although the past thing has gone, its meaning abides41 in such a way as to be applicable in determining the character of the new. Speech forms are our great carriers: the easy-running vehicles by which meanings are transported from experiences that no longer concern us to those that are as yet dark and dubious42.
Logical organization depends upon signs
II. Organization of Meanings. In emphasizing the importance of signs in relation to specific meanings, we have overlooked another aspect, equally valuable. Signs not only mark off specific or individual meanings, but they are also instruments of grouping meanings in relation to one another. Words are not only names or titles of single meanings; they also form sentences in which meanings are organized in relation to one another. When we say "That book is a dictionary," or "That blur of light in the heavens is Halley's comet," we express a logical connection—an act of classifying and defining that goes beyond the physical thing into the logical region of genera and species, things and attributes. Propositions, sentences, bear the same relation to judgments43 that distinct words, built up mainly by analyzing44 propositions in their various types, bear to meanings or conceptions; and just as words imply a sentence, so a sentence implies a larger whole of consecutive45 discourse46 into which it fits. As is often said, grammar expresses the unconscious logic of the popular mind. The chief intellectual classifications that constitute the working capital of thought have been built up for us by our mother tongue. Our very lack of explicit47 consciousness in using language that we are employing the intellectual systematizations of the race shows how thoroughly48 accustomed we have become to its logical distinctions and groupings.[Pg 176]
§ 2. The Abuse of Linguistic Methods in Education
Teaching merely things, not educative
Taken literally49, the maxim50, "Teach things, not words," or "Teach things before words," would be the negation51 of education; it would reduce mental life to mere physical and sensible adjustments. Learning, in the proper sense, is not learning things, but the meanings of things, and this process involves the use of signs, or language in its generic52 sense. In like fashion, the warfare53 of some educational reformers against symbols, if pushed to extremes, involves the destruction of the intellectual life, since this lives, moves, and has its being in those processes of definition, abstraction, generalization54, and classification that are made possible by symbols alone. Nevertheless, these contentions55 of educational reformers have been needed. The liability of a thing to abuse is in proportion to the value of its right use.
But words separated from things are not true signs
Symbols are themselves, as pointed out above, particular, physical, sensible existences, like any other things. They are symbols only by virtue56 of what they suggest and represent, i.e. meanings. (i) They stand for these meanings to any individual only when he has had experience of some situation to which these meanings are actually relevant. Words can detach and preserve a meaning only when the meaning has been first involved in our own direct intercourse57 with things. To attempt to give a meaning through a word alone without any dealings with a thing is to deprive the word of intelligible58 signification; against this attempt, a tendency only too prevalent in education, reformers have protested. Moreover, there is a tendency to assume that whenever there is a definite word or form of speech there is also a definite idea; while, as a matter of fact, adults and children alike are capable of using even precise verbal formul?[Pg 177] with only the vaguest and most confused sense of what they mean. Genuine ignorance is more profitable because likely to be accompanied by humility59, curiosity, and open-mindedness; while ability to repeat catch-phrases, cant60 terms, familiar propositions, gives the conceit61 of learning and coats the mind with a varnish62 waterproof63 to new ideas.
(ii) Again, although new combinations of words without the intervention65 of physical things may supply new ideas, there are limits to this possibility. Lazy inertness66 causes individuals to accept ideas that have currency about them without personal inquiry and testing. A man uses thought, perhaps, to find out what others believe, and then stops. The ideas of others as embodied in language become substitutes for one's own ideas. The use of linguistic studies and methods to halt the human mind on the level of the attainments69 of the past, to prevent new inquiry and discovery, to put the authority of tradition in place of the authority of natural facts and laws, to reduce the individual to a parasite70 living on the secondhand experience of others—these things have been the source of the reformers' protest against the pre?minence assigned to language in schools.
Words as mere stimuli
Finally, words that originally stood for ideas come, with repeated use, to be mere counters; they become physical things to be manipulated according to certain rules, or reacted to by certain operations without consciousness of their meaning. Mr. Stout71 (who has called such terms "substitute signs")remarks that "algebraical and arithmetical signs are to a great extent used as mere substitute signs.... It is possible to use signs of this kind whenever fixed and definite rules of opera[Pg 178]tion can be derived72 from the nature of the things symbolized73, so as to be applied74 in manipulating the signs, without further reference to their signification. A word is an instrument for thinking about the meaning which it expresses; a substitute sign is a means of not thinking about the meaning which it symbolizes75." The principle applies, however, to ordinary words, as well as to algebraic signs; they also enable us to use meanings so as to get results without thinking. In many respects, signs that are means of not thinking are of great advantage; standing76 for the familiar, they release attention for meanings that, being novel, require conscious interpretation77. Nevertheless, the premium78 put in the schoolroom upon attainment68 of technical facility, upon skill in producing external results (ante, p. 51), often changes this advantage into a positive detriment79. In manipulating symbols so as to recite well, to get and give correct answers, to follow prescribed formul? of analysis, the pupil's attitude becomes mechanical, rather than thoughtful; verbal memorizing is substituted for inquiry into the meaning of things. This danger is perhaps the one uppermost in mind when verbal methods of education are attacked.
§ 3. The Use of Language in its Educational Bearings
Language stands in a twofold relation to the work of education. On the one hand, it is continually used in all studies as well as in all the social discipline of the school; on the other, it is a distinct object of study. We shall consider only the ordinary use of language, since its effects upon habits of thought are much deeper than those of conscious study.
Language not primarily intellectual in purpose
The common statement that "language is the expres[Pg 179]sion of thought" conveys only a half-truth, and a half-truth that is likely to result in positive error. Language does express thought, but not primarily, nor, at first, even consciously. The primary motive80 for language is to influence (through the expression of desire, emotion, and thought) the activity of others; its secondary use is to enter into more intimate sociable81 relations with them; its employment as a conscious vehicle of thought and knowledge is a tertiary, and relatively82 late, formation. The contrast is well brought out by the statement of John Locke that words have a double use,—"civil" and "philosophical83." "By their civil use, I mean such a communication of thoughts and ideas by words as may serve for the upholding of common conversation and commerce about the ordinary affairs and conveniences of civil life.... By the philosophical use of words, I mean such a use of them as may serve to convey the precise notions of things, and to express in general propositions certain and undoubted truths."
Hence education has to transform it into an intellectual tool
This distinction of the practical and social from the intellectual use of language throws much light on the problem of the school in respect to speech. That problem is to direct pupils' oral and written speech, used primarily for practical and social ends, so that gradually it shall become a conscious tool of conveying knowledge and assisting thought. How without checking the spontaneous, natural motives—motives to which language owes its vitality84, force, vividness, and variety—are we to modify speech habits so as to render them accurate and flexible intellectual instruments? It is comparatively easy to encourage the original spontaneous flow and not make language over into a servant of reflective thought; it is comparatively easy to check and[Pg 180] almost destroy (so far as the schoolroom is concerned) native aim and interest, and to set up artificial and formal modes of expression in some isolated85 and technical matters. The difficulty lies in making over habits that have to do with "ordinary affairs and conveniences" into habits concerned with "precise notions." The successful accomplishing of the transformation86 requires (i) enlargement of the pupil's vocabulary; (ii) rendering87 its terms more precise and accurate, and (iii) formation of habits of consecutive discourse.
To enlarge vocabulary, the fund of concepts should be enlarged
(i) Enlargement of vocabulary. This takes place, of course, by wider intelligent contact with things and persons, and also vicariously, by gathering88 the meanings of words from the context in which they are heard or read. To grasp by either method a word in its meaning is to exercise intelligence, to perform an act of intelligent selection or analysis, and it is also to widen the fund of meanings or concepts readily available in further intellectual enterprises (ante, p. 126). It is usual to distinguish between one's active and one's passive vocabulary, the latter being composed of the words that are understood when they are heard or seen, the former of words that are used intelligently. The fact that the passive vocabulary is ordinarily much larger than the active indicates a certain amount of inert67 energy, of power not freely controlled by an individual. Failure to use meanings that are nevertheless understood reveals dependence89 upon external stimulus90, and lack of intellectual initiative. This mental laziness is to some extent an artificial product of education. Small children usually attempt to put to use every new word they get hold of, but when they learn to read they are introduced to a large variety of terms that there is no ordinary opportunity to use.[Pg 181] The result is a kind of mental suppression, if not smothering92. Moreover, the meaning of words not actively93 used in building up and conveying ideas is never quite clear-cut or complete.
Looseness of thinking accompanies a limited vocabulary
While a limited vocabulary may be due to a limited range of experience, to a sphere of contact with persons and things so narrow as not to suggest or require a full store of words, it is also due to carelessness and vagueness. A happy-go-lucky frame of mind makes the individual averse94 to clear discriminations, either in perception or in his own speech. Words are used loosely in an indeterminate kind of reference to things, and the mind approaches a condition where practically everything is just a thing-um-bob or a what-do-you-call-it. Paucity95 of vocabulary on the part of those with whom the child associates, triviality and meagerness in the child's reading matter (as frequently even in his school readers and text-books), tend to shut down the area of mental vision.
Command of language involves command of things
We must note also the great difference between flow of words and command of language. Volubility is not necessarily a sign of a large vocabulary; much talking or even ready speech is quite compatible with moving round and round in a circle of moderate radius96. Most schoolrooms suffer from a lack of materials and appliances save perhaps books—and even these are "written down" to the supposed capacity, or incapacity, of children. Occasion and demand for an enriched vocabulary are accordingly restricted. The vocabulary of things studied in the schoolroom is very largely isolated; it does not link itself organically to the range of the ideas and words that are in vogue97 outside the school. Hence the enlargement that takes place is often nominal,[Pg 182] adding to the inert, rather than to the active, fund of meanings and terms.
(ii) Accuracy of vocabulary. One way in which the fund of words and concepts is increased is by discovering and naming shades of meaning—that is to say, by making the vocabulary more precise. Increase in definiteness is as important relatively as is the enlargement of the capital stock absolutely.
The general as the vague and as the distinctly generic
The first meanings of terms, since they are due to superficial acquaintance with things, are general in the sense of being vague. The little child calls all men papa; acquainted with a dog, he may call the first horse he sees a big dog. Differences of quantity and intensity98 are noted99, but the fundamental meaning is so vague that it covers things that are far apart. To many persons trees are just trees, being discriminated100 only into deciduous101 trees and evergreens102, with perhaps recognition of one or two kinds of each. Such vagueness tends to persist and to become a barrier to the advance of thinking. Terms that are miscellaneous in scope are clumsy tools at best; in addition they are frequently treacherous103, for their ambiguous reference causes us to confuse things that should be distinguished104.
Twofold growth of words in sense or signification
The growth of precise terms out of original vagueness takes place normally in two directions: toward words that stand for relationships and words that stand for highly individualized traits (compare what was said about the development of meanings, p. 122); the first being associated with abstract, the second with concrete, thinking. Some Australian tribes are said to have no words for animal or for plant, while they have specific names for every variety of plant and animal in their neighborhoods. This minuteness of vocabulary repre[Pg 183]sents progress toward definiteness, but in a one-sided way. Specific properties are distinguished, but not relationships.[28] On the other hand, students of philosophy and of the general aspects of natural and social science are apt to acquire a store of terms that signify relations without balancing them up with terms that designate specific individuals and traits. The ordinary use of such terms as causation, law, society, individual, capital, illustrates105 this tendency.
Words alter their meanings so as to change their logical functions
In the history of language we find both aspects of the growth of vocabulary illustrated106 by changes in the sense of words: some words originally wide in their application are narrowed to denote shades of meaning; others originally specific are widened to express relationships. The term vernacular107, now meaning mother speech, has been generalized from the word verna, meaning a slave born in the master's household. Publication has evolved its meaning of communication by means of print, through restricting an earlier meaning of any kind of communication—although the wider meaning is retained in legal procedure, as publishing a libel. The sense of the word average has been generalized from a use connected with dividing loss by shipwreck108 proportionately among various sharers in an enterprise.[29]
Similar changes occur in the vocabulary of every student
These historical changes assist the educator to appreciate the changes that occur with individuals together with advance in intellectual resources. In studying[Pg 184] geometry, a pupil must learn both to narrow and to extend the meanings of such familiar words as line, surface, angle, square, circle; to narrow them to the precise meanings involved in demonstrations109; to extend them to cover generic relations not expressed in ordinary usage. Qualities of color and size must be excluded; relations of direction, of variation in direction, of limit, must be definitely seized. A like transformation occurs, of course, in every subject of study. Just at this point lies the danger, alluded110 to above, of simply overlaying common meanings with new and isolated meanings instead of effecting a genuine working-over of popular and practical meanings into adequate logical tools.
The value of technical terms
Terms used with intentional exactness so as to express a meaning, the whole meaning, and only the meaning, are called technical. For educational purposes, a technical term indicates something relative, not absolute; for a term is technical not because of its verbal form or its unusualness, but because it is employed to fix a meaning precisely111. Ordinary words get a technical quality when used intentionally for this end. Whenever thought becomes more accurate, a (relatively) technical vocabulary grows up. Teachers are apt to oscillate between extremes in regard to technical terms. On the one hand, these are multiplied in every direction, seemingly on the assumption that learning a new piece of terminology112, accompanied by verbal description or definition, is equivalent to grasping a new idea. When it is seen how largely the net outcome is the accumulation of an isolated set of words, a jargon113 or scholastic114 cant, and to what extent the natural power of judgment is clogged115 by this accumulation, there is a reaction to the opposite extreme. Technical terms are banished:[Pg 185] "name words" exist but not nouns; "action words" but not verbs; pupils may "take away," but not subtract; they may tell what four fives are, but not what four times five are, and so on. A sound instinct underlies116 this reaction—aversion to words that give the pretense117, but not the reality, of meaning. Yet the fundamental difficulty is not with the word, but with the idea. If the idea is not grasped, nothing is gained by using a more familiar word; if the idea is perceived, the use of the term that exactly names it may assist in fixing the idea. Terms denoting highly exact meanings should be introduced only sparingly, that is, a few at a time; they should be led up to gradually, and great pains should be taken to secure the circumstances that render precision of meaning significant.
Importance of consecutive discourse
(iii) Consecutive discourse. As we saw, language connects and organizes meanings as well as selects and fixes them. As every meaning is set in the context of some situation, so every word in concrete use belongs to some sentence (it may itself represent a condensed sentence), and the sentence, in turn, belongs to some larger story, description, or reasoning process. It is unnecessary to repeat what has been said about the importance of continuity and ordering of meanings. We may, however, note some ways in which school practices tend to interrupt consecutiveness118 of language and thereby119 interfere120 harmfully with systematic121 reflection. (a) Teachers have a habit of monopolizing122 continued discourse. Many, if not most, instructors123 would be surprised if informed at the end of the day of the amount of time they have talked as compared with any pupil. Children's conversation is often confined to answering questions in brief phrases, or in single disconnected sentences. Expatia[Pg 186]tion and explanation are reserved for the teacher, who often admits any hint at an answer on the part of the pupil, and then amplifies124 what he supposes the child must have meant. The habits of sporadic125 and fragmentary discourse thus promoted have inevitably126 a disintegrating127 intellectual influence.
Too minute questioning
(b) Assignment of too short lessons when accompanied (as it usually is in order to pass the time of the recitation period) by minute "analytic128" questioning has the same effect. This evil is usually at its height in such subjects as history and literature, where not infrequently the material is so minutely subdivided129 as to break up the unity91 of meaning belonging to a given portion of the matter, to destroy perspective, and in effect to reduce the whole topic to an accumulation of disconnected details all upon the same level. More often than the teacher is aware, his mind carries and supplies the background of unity of meaning against which pupils project isolated scraps130.
Making avoidance of error the aim
(c) Insistence131 upon avoiding error instead of attaining132 power tends also to interruption of continuous discourse and thought. Children who begin with something to say and with intellectual eagerness to say it are sometimes made so conscious of minor133 errors in substance and form that the energy that should go into constructive134 thinking is diverted into anxiety not to make mistakes, and even, in extreme cases, into passive quiescence135 as the best method of minimizing error. This tendency is especially marked in connection with the writing of compositions, essays, and themes. It has even been gravely recommended that little children should always write on trivial subjects and in short sentences because in that way they are less likely to make mistakes, while[Pg 187] the teaching of writing to high school and college students occasionally reduces itself to a technique for detecting and designating mistakes. The resulting self-consciousness and constraint136 are only part of the evil that comes from a negative ideal.
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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sham
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| n./adj.假冒(的)，虚伪(的) | |
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schooling
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| n.教育；正规学校教育 | |
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indictments
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| n.（制度、社会等的）衰败迹象( indictment的名词复数 )；刑事起诉书；公诉书；控告 | |
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contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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perverts
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| n.性变态者( pervert的名词复数 )v.滥用( pervert的第三人称单数 )；腐蚀；败坏；使堕落 | |
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conceals
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，遮住( conceal的第三人称单数 ) | |
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garb
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| n.服装，装束 | |
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apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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stimuli
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| n.刺激（物） | |
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tangible
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| adj.有形的，可触摸的，确凿的，实际的 | |
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attachment
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| n.附属物，附件；依恋；依附 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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inconvenient
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| adj.不方便的，令人感到麻烦的 | |
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restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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intentional
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| adj.故意的，有意（识）的 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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intentionally
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| ad.故意地，有意地 | |
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forerunner
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| n.前身，先驱（者），预兆，祖先 | |
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linguistic
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| adj.语言的，语言学的 | |
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modifications
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| n.缓和( modification的名词复数 )；限制；更改；改变 | |
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postures
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| 姿势( posture的名词复数 )； 看法； 态度； 立场 | |
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flux
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| n.流动；不断的改变 | |
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blur
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| n.模糊不清的事物；vt.使模糊，使看不清楚 | |
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metaphors
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| 隐喻( metaphor的名词复数 ) | |
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elusive
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| adj.难以表达(捉摸)的；令人困惑的；逃避的 | |
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entity
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| n.实体，独立存在体，实际存在物 | |
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illuminating
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| a.富于启发性的，有助阐明的 | |
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savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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savages
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| 未开化的人，野蛮人( savage的名词复数 ) | |
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32
dignify
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| vt.使有尊严；使崇高；给增光 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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34
lore
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| n.传说；学问，经验，知识 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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36
conserved
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| v.保护，保藏，保存( conserve的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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evoke
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| vt.唤起，引起，使人想起 | |
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38
corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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39
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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cumulative
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| adj.累积的，渐增的 | |
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41
abides
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| 容忍( abide的第三人称单数 )； 等候； 逗留； 停留 | |
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dubious
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| adj.怀疑的，无把握的；有问题的，靠不住的 | |
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judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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44
analyzing
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| v.分析；分析( analyze的现在分词 )；分解；解释；对…进行心理分析n.分析 | |
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45
consecutive
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| adj.连续的，联贯的，始终一贯的 | |
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discourse
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| n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述 | |
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47
explicit
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| adj.详述的，明确的；坦率的；显然的 | |
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48
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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49
literally
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| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
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50
maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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51
negation
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| n.否定；否认 | |
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52
generic
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| adj.一般的，普通的，共有的 | |
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53
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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54
generalization
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| n.普遍性，一般性，概括 | |
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55
contentions
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| n.竞争( contention的名词复数 )；争夺；争论；论点 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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57
intercourse
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| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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58
intelligible
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| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
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59
humility
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| n.谦逊，谦恭 | |
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60
cant
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| n.斜穿，黑话，猛扔 | |
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61
conceit
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| n.自负，自高自大 | |
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62
varnish
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| n.清漆；v.上清漆；粉饰 | |
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63
waterproof
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| n.防水材料；adj.防水的；v.使...能防水 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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66
inertness
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| n.不活泼，没有生气；惰性；惯量 | |
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inert
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| adj.无活动能力的，惰性的；迟钝的 | |
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68
attainment
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| n.达到，到达；［常pl.］成就，造诣 | |
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attainments
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| 成就，造诣； 获得( attainment的名词复数 )； 达到； 造诣； 成就 | |
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70
parasite
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| n.寄生虫；寄生菌；食客 | |
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72
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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symbolized
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| v.象征，作为…的象征( symbolize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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symbolizes
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| v.象征，作为…的象征( symbolize的第三人称单数 ) | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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78
premium
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| n.加付款；赠品；adj.高级的；售价高的 | |
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detriment
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| n.损害；损害物，造成损害的根源 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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81
sociable
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| adj.好交际的，友好的，合群的 | |
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82
relatively
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| adv.比较...地，相对地 | |
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83
philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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84
vitality
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| n.活力，生命力，效力 | |
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85
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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86
transformation
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| n.变化；改造；转变 | |
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87
rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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88
gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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89
dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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90
stimulus
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| n.刺激，刺激物，促进因素，引起兴奋的事物 | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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92
smothering
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| （使）窒息， （使）透不过气( smother的现在分词 )； 覆盖； 忍住； 抑制 | |
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actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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94
averse
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| adj.厌恶的；反对的，不乐意的 | |
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paucity
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| n.小量，缺乏 | |
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96
radius
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| n.半径，半径范围；有效航程，范围，界限 | |
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97
Vogue
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| n.时髦，时尚；adj.流行的 | |
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98
intensity
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| n.强烈，剧烈；强度；烈度 | |
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99
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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100
discriminated
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| 分别，辨别，区分( discriminate的过去式和过去分词 )； 歧视，有差别地对待 | |
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101
deciduous
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| adj.非永久的；短暂的；脱落的；落叶的 | |
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102
evergreens
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| n.常青树，常绿植物，万年青( evergreen的名词复数 ) | |
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103
treacherous
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| adj.不可靠的，有暗藏的危险的；adj.背叛的，背信弃义的 | |
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104
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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105
illustrates
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| 给…加插图( illustrate的第三人称单数 )； 说明； 表明； （用示例、图画等）说明 | |
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106
illustrated
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| adj. 有插图的，列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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107
vernacular
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| adj.地方的，用地方语写成的；n.白话；行话；本国语；动植物的俗名 | |
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108
shipwreck
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| n.船舶失事，海难 | |
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109
demonstrations
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| 证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威 | |
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110
alluded
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| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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111
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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112
terminology
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| n.术语；专有名词 | |
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113
jargon
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| n.术语，行话 | |
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114
scholastic
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| adj.学校的，学院的，学术上的 | |
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115
clogged
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| （使）阻碍( clog的过去式和过去分词 )； 淤滞 | |
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116
underlies
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| v.位于或存在于（某物）之下( underlie的第三人称单数 )；构成…的基础（或起因），引起 | |
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117
pretense
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| n.矫饰，做作，借口 | |
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118
consecutiveness
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| Consecutiveness | |
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119
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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120
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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121
systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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122
monopolizing
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| v.垄断( monopolize的现在分词 )；独占；专卖；专营 | |
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123
instructors
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| 指导者，教师( instructor的名词复数 ) | |
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124
amplifies
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| 放大，扩大( amplify的第三人称单数 )； 增强； 详述 | |
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125
sporadic
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| adj.偶尔发生的 [反]regular；分散的 | |
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126
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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127
disintegrating
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| v.（使）破裂[分裂，粉碎]，（使）崩溃( disintegrate的现在分词 ) | |
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128
analytic
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| adj.分析的，用分析方法的 | |
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129
subdivided
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| 再分，细分( subdivide的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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130
scraps
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| 油渣 | |
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131
insistence
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| n.坚持；强调；坚决主张 | |
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132
attaining
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的现在分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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133
minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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134
constructive
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| adj.建设的，建设性的 | |
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135
quiescence
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| n.静止 | |
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136
constraint
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| n.(on)约束，限制；限制(或约束)性的事物 | |
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