(FEBRUARY-SEPTEMBER, 1915)
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IN spite of the successes gained by the Russians in Galicia in the autumn, the situation was very uncertain in the spring of 1915. On both sides preparations were being made for a fierce renewal1 of the struggle to which the fighting of January and February was only the prelude2. On the Russian side it looked as if everything possible had been done to strengthen the army’s fighting power and assure the normal flow of supplies. The Czar, at any rate, believed that it was so, on the faith of the reports he had received. He had placed all his hopes on the success of this spring campaign.
The Austrians were the first to take the offensive, but the Russians counter-attacked vigorously, and their superiority was soon made manifest all along the front. In the first fortnight of March their successes were continued. On the 19th they captured the fortress3 of Przemysl. The whole garrison4 and considerable booty in war material fell into their hands. There was tremendous excitement in the country. The Czar returned from G.H.Q. on March 24th. He was in{134} high spirits. Were the fortunes of war at length going to turn in favour of Russia?
In the middle of April Russian divisions stood on the crest5 of the Carpathians and menaced the rich plains of Hungary. The Austrian army was at the end of its tether. But these successes had been bought at the price of enormous losses, and the mountain fighting continued under conditions which were extremely trying even for the victor. The prolongation of the war was also beginning to show effects on the population at home. It had begun to feel the high cost of food and the poverty of communications was paralysing all economic life. There must be no delay in finding a solution.
But Germany could not remain indifferent to the dissolution of the Austrian army, and as soon as she clearly appreciated the danger she made up her mind to avert6 it by taking every step in her power. Several German army corps7 had been massed east of Cracow and placed under the command of General Mackensen, who was to take the offensive against the flank of the Russian army and try to cut the communications of the troops operating in the Carpathians. The onslaught began in the first days of May, and under the pressure of the Germans the Russian army of Western Galicia was obliged to retreat rapidly to the east. It had to accept the loss of the Carpathians, the capture of which had cost so much blood and effort, and descend8 into the plains. The troops fought with remarkable9 courage and endurance, but they were cruelly short of arms and ammunition10.
The retreat continued. On June 5th Przemysl was lost, and on June 22nd Lemberg. By the end of the month all Galicia—that Slav land the conquest of which had filled all Russian hearts with joy—had been evacuated11.
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THE CZAR.
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THE CZAREVITCH.
Facing page 134.{135}
Meanwhile the Germans had begun a vigorous offensive in Poland and made rapid progress in spite of the fierce resistance of the Russians. It was a grave moment. The whole Russian front had been shaken and given way under the pressure of the Austro-German armies. Men wished to know who was responsible for these disasters. They called for the guilty and demanded their punishment.
The development of events had been a terrible blow to the Czar. It had been a shock, especially as he had certainly not expected anything of the kind. But he set his teeth against adversity. On June 25th he dismissed the Minister of War, General Sukhomlinoff, whose criminal negligence12 seemed to have been responsible for the fact that it was impossible to secure the army’s supplies. He replaced him by General Polivanoff. On the 27th he summoned a conference at G.H.Q., at which all the Ministers were present. It was a question of rousing all the energies of the country, of mobilising all its forces and resources for the life-and-death struggle with the hated foe13.
It was decided14 to summon the Duma. The first sitting took place on August 1st, the anniversary of the declaration of war by Germany on Russia. The firm and courageous15 attitude of the Assembly did a good deal to calm the public agitation16. But while calling on the whole nation to co-operate in the defence of the Fatherland, the Duma demanded that the guilty should be discovered and punished. A few days later the Czar appointed a “Commission of Enquiry” with a view to fixing responsibility for the nation’s misfortunes.
Meanwhile the German offensive in Poland had made further progress. On August 5th Warsaw was abandoned by the Russians, who withdrew to the right bank of the Vistula.{136} On the 17th Kovno was lost. One after the other all the Russian fortresses18 fell before the onslaught of the enemy, whose advance no obstacle seemed capable of staying. By the end of August the whole of the Government of Poland was in the hands of the Germans.
The reverses assumed the proportions of a catastrophe19 which endangered the very existence of the country. Should we be able to stop the invading hordes20 or should we have to follow the precedent21 of 1812 and withdraw into the interior, thus abandoning Russian soil to the enemy? Had all our willing sacrifices brought us nothing?
The country was suffering from the incessant22 withdrawals23 of men and from requisitions. Agriculture was short of labour and horses. In the towns the cost of living was rising with the disorganisation of the railways and the influx24 of refugees. The most pessimistic news passed from mouth to mouth. There was talk of sabotage25, treason, etc. Russian public opinion, so changeable and prone26 to exaggeration whether in joy or sorrow, indulged in the most gloomy forebodings.
It was just when Russia was passing through this acute crisis that Nicholas II. decided to take the command of his armies in person.
For several months the Czarina had been urging the Czar to take this step, but he had stood out against her suggestion as he did not like the idea of relieving the Grand-Duke Nicholas of the post he had given him. When the war broke out his first impulse had been to put himself at the head of his army, but, yielding to the representations of his Ministers, he had abandoned an idea which was very close to his heart. He had always regretted it, and now that the Germans had conquered all Poland and were advancing on Russian soil, he considered{137} it nothing less than criminal to remain away from the front and not take a more active part in the defence of his country.
The Czar had returned from G.H.Q. on July 11th, and spent two months at Tsarsko?e-Selo before making up his mind to this new step. I will relate a conversation I had with him on July 16th, as it shows quite clearly what were the ideas that inspired him at that time. On that day he had joined Alexis Nicola?evitch and myself in the park, and had just been telling his son something about his recent visit to the army. Turning to me, he added:
“You have no idea how depressing it is to be away from the front. It seems as if everything here saps energy and enfeebles resolution. The most pessimistic rumours27 and the most ridiculous stories are accepted and get about everywhere. Folk here care nothing except for intrigues28 and cabals30, and regard low personal interests only. Out at the front men fight and die for their country. At the front there is only one thought—the determination to conquer. All else is forgotten, and, in spite of our losses and our reverses, everyone remains31 confident. Any man fit to bear arms should be in the army. Speaking for myself, I can never be in too much of a hurry to be with my troops.”[38]
The Czarina was able to take advantage of this great ambition. She set herself to overcome the scruples32 which considerations of another character inspired. She desired the removal of the Grand-Duke Nicholas, whom she accused of secretly working for the ruin of the Czar’s reputation and prestige and for a palace revolution which would further his{138} own ends. On the strength of certain information she had received from Madame Wyroubova, she was also persuaded that G.H.Q. was the centre of a plot, the object of which was to seize her daring the absence of her husband and confine her in a convent.
The Czar, on the other hand, had full confidence in the loyalty33 of the Grand-Duke Nicholas. He considered him incapable34 of any criminal action, but he was compelled to admit his complicity in the intrigue29 against the Czarina. Yet he did not give way until the imperious instinct urging him to put himself at the head of his army had become an obligation of conscience. By intervening personally in the struggle he hoped to show the world that the war would be fought out to the bitter end and prove his own unshakable faith in ultimate victory. In this tragic35 hour he thought it was his duty to stake his own person, and as head of the state to assume the full burden of responsibility. By his presence among the troops he wished to restore their confidence, for their morale36 had been shaken by the long series of reverses, and they were tired of fighting against an enemy whose strength consisted principally in the superiority of his armament.
In spite of the recent retreats, the prestige of the Grand-Duke Nicholas was still considerable in Russia. During this first twelve months of the war he had given proof of resolution and an iron will. The fact that he was deprived of his command in times of defeat indicated that he was held responsible, and was bound to be interpreted as a punishment, as unjust on the merits as insulting to his honour. The Czar fully37 realised all this, and only decided as he did much against his will. His first idea had been to keep the Grand-Duke with him at G.H.Q., but that would have made the position of the{139} ex-Generalissimo somewhat delicate. The Czar decided to appoint him Lieutenant-General of the Caucasus and Commander-in-Chief of the army operating against the Turks.
The Czar communicated his decision to take over the Supreme38 Command to his Ministers at a council which took place at Tsarsko?e-Selo a few days before his departure for G.H.Q. The news threw most of those present into utter consternation39, and they did their best to dissuade40 him from his project. They pointed17 to the grave difficulties in the way of public business if the head of the state was to spend practically all his time at G.H.Q., more than five hundred miles from the seat of government. They referred to his innumerable duties and asked him not to take new and crushing responsibilities upon himself. In the last resort they begged him not to place himself at the head of his troops at a moment so critical. In case of failure he was running a risk of exposing himself to attacks which would undermine his prestige and authority.
Yet the Czar was not to be moved. Several members of his immediate41 entourage made several further attempts to convince him, but these failed also, and on the evening of September 4th he left for Mohileff, where G.H.Q. was established at that time. The next day he signed the Prikase, in which he announced to the troops that he was taking command in person, and at the foot he added in his own hand:
“With unshakable faith in the goodness of God and firm confidence in final victory we shall accomplish our sacred duty in defending our Fatherland to the end, and we shall never let the soil of Russia be outraged42.”
He was repeating the oath he had taken at the outset of the war and casting his crown into the arena43.
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In France and England this announcement came as a surprise which was not without a certain element of apprehension44, but this action was regarded as a pledge which irrevocably associated the Russian Empire, in the person of its Czar, with the fortunes of the Entente45, and this at a moment when a series of defeats would have been grounds for fearing separatist tendencies. All the great newspapers of the Allied46 countries emphasised the importance of this decision. It was hoped that it would have a considerable effect on the morale of the Russian army and contribute to further the cause of final victory. In Russia the whole Press raised a shout of triumph, but in sober reality opinion about the wisdom of changing the command was sharply divided at first. In the army itself we shall see that the presence of the Czar helped to raise the spirits and courage of the men and gave the campaign a new impetus47.
History will some day reveal the political and military consequences of this step, which was certainly an act of courage and faith on the part of the Czar himself.
As I had feared, the apparent indifference48 with which Rasputin had been treated during the winter had only been temporary, and at the time of the disasters in May there was a revival49 of his influence, which grew steadily50 stronger. The change is easily explained. At the beginning of the war the Czar and Czarina were utterly51 obsessed52 by the greatness of their task, and had passed through hours of exaltation in the knowledge of the love they bore their people, a love they felt was reciprocated53. That fervent54 communion had filled them with hope. They believed that they were really the centre of that great national movement which swept over the whole of Russia. The military events of the following months had not shaken their courage. They had maintained their ardent55 faith
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THE CZARINA.
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THE FOUR GRAND-DUCHESSES.
[Facing page 140.
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in that spring offensive which was to bring about the final success of the Russian armies.
When the great catastrophe followed they passed through a time of unspeakable anguish56. In her sorrow the Czarina was bound to feel impelled57 to seek moral support from him whom she already regarded not only as the saviour58 of her son, but as the representative of the people, sent by God to save Russia and her husband also.
It is not true that personal ambition or a thirst for power induced the Czarina to intervene in political affairs. Her motive59 was purely60 sentimental61. She worshipped her husband as she worshipped her children, and there was no limit to her devotion for those she loved. Her only desire was to be useful to the Czar in his heavy task and to help him with her counsel.
Convinced that autocracy62 was the only form of government suited to the needs of Russia, the Czarina believed that any great concessions63 to liberal demands were premature64. In her view the uneducated masses of the Russian people could be galvanised into action only by a Czar in whose person all power was centralised. She was certain that to the moujik the Czar was the symbol of the unity65, greatness, and glory of Russia, the head of the state and the Lord’s Anointed. To encroach on his prerogatives66 was to undermine the faith of the Russian peasant and to risk precipitating67 the worst disasters for the country. The Czar must not merely rule: he must govern the state with a firm and mighty68 hand.
To the new task the Czarina brought the same devotion, courage, and, alas69! blindness she had shown in her fight for the life of her son. She was at any rate logical in her errors. Persuaded, as she was, that the only support for the dynasty was the nation, and that Rasputin was God’s elect (had she not{142} witnessed the efficacy of his prayers during her son’s illness?), she was absolutely convinced that this lowly peasant could use his supernatural powers to help him who held in his hands the fate of the empire of the Czars.
Cunning and astute70 as he was, Rasputin never advised in political matters except with the most extreme caution. He always took the greatest care to be very well informed as to what was going on at Court and as to the private feelings of the Czar and his wife. As a rule, therefore, his prophecies only confirmed the secret wishes of the Czarina. In fact, it was almost impossible to doubt that it was she who inspired the “inspired,” but as her desires were interpreted by Rasputin, they seemed in her eyes to have the sanction and authority of a revelation.
Before the war the influence of the Czarina in political affairs had been but intermittent71. It was usually confined to procuring72 the dismissal of anyone who declared his hostility73 to the staretz. In the first months of the war there had been no change in that respect, but after the great reverses in the spring of 1915, and more particularly after the Czar had assumed command of the army, the Czarina played an ever-increasing part in affairs of state because she wished to help her husband, who was overwhelmed with the burden of his growing responsibilities. She was worn out, and desired nothing more than peace and rest, but she willingly sacrificed her personal comfort to what she believed was a sacred duty.
Very reserved and yet very impulsive74, the Czarina, first and foremost the wife and mother, was never happy except in the bosom75 of her family. She was artistic76 and well-educated, and liked reading and the arts. She was fond of meditation77, and often became wholly absorbed in her own inward thoughts{143} and feelings, an absorption from which she would only emerge when danger threatened. She would throw herself at the obstacle with all the ardour of a passionate78 nature. She was endowed with the finest moral qualities, and was always inspired by the highest ideals. But her sorrows had broken her. She was but the shadow of her former self, and she often had periods of mystic ecstasy79 in which she lost all sense of reality. Her faith in Rasputin proves it beyond a doubt.
It was thus that in her desire to save her husband and son, whom she loved more than life itself, she forged with her own hands the instrument of their undoing80.
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1 renewal | |
adj.(契约)延期,续订,更新,复活,重来 | |
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2 prelude | |
n.序言,前兆,序曲 | |
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3 fortress | |
n.堡垒,防御工事 | |
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4 garrison | |
n.卫戍部队;驻地,卫戍区;vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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5 crest | |
n.顶点;饰章;羽冠;vt.达到顶点;vi.形成浪尖 | |
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6 avert | |
v.防止,避免;转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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7 corps | |
n.(通信等兵种的)部队;(同类作的)一组 | |
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8 descend | |
vt./vi.传下来,下来,下降 | |
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9 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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10 ammunition | |
n.军火,弹药 | |
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11 evacuated | |
撤退者的 | |
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12 negligence | |
n.疏忽,玩忽,粗心大意 | |
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13 foe | |
n.敌人,仇敌 | |
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14 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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15 courageous | |
adj.勇敢的,有胆量的 | |
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16 agitation | |
n.搅动;搅拌;鼓动,煽动 | |
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17 pointed | |
adj.尖的,直截了当的 | |
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18 fortresses | |
堡垒,要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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19 catastrophe | |
n.大灾难,大祸 | |
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20 hordes | |
n.移动着的一大群( horde的名词复数 );部落 | |
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21 precedent | |
n.先例,前例;惯例;adj.在前的,在先的 | |
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22 incessant | |
adj.不停的,连续的 | |
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23 withdrawals | |
n.收回,取回,撤回( withdrawal的名词复数 );撤退,撤走;收回[取回,撤回,撤退,撤走]的实例;推出(组织),提走(存款),戒除毒瘾,对说过的话收回,孤僻 | |
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24 influx | |
n.流入,注入 | |
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25 sabotage | |
n.怠工,破坏活动,破坏;v.从事破坏活动,妨害,破坏 | |
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26 prone | |
adj.(to)易于…的,很可能…的;俯卧的 | |
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27 rumours | |
n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 );风闻;谣言;谣传 | |
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28 intrigues | |
n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 );神秘气氛;引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 );激起…的好奇心 | |
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29 intrigue | |
vt.激起兴趣,迷住;vi.耍阴谋;n.阴谋,密谋 | |
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30 cabals | |
n.(政治)阴谋小集团,(尤指政治上的)阴谋( cabal的名词复数 ) | |
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31 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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32 scruples | |
n.良心上的不安( scruple的名词复数 );顾虑,顾忌v.感到于心不安,有顾忌( scruple的第三人称单数 ) | |
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33 loyalty | |
n.忠诚,忠心 | |
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34 incapable | |
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
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35 tragic | |
adj.悲剧的,悲剧性的,悲惨的 | |
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36 morale | |
n.道德准则,士气,斗志 | |
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37 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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38 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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39 consternation | |
n.大为吃惊,惊骇 | |
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40 dissuade | |
v.劝阻,阻止 | |
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41 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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42 outraged | |
a.震惊的,义愤填膺的 | |
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43 arena | |
n.竞技场,运动场所;竞争场所,舞台 | |
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44 apprehension | |
n.理解,领悟;逮捕,拘捕;忧虑 | |
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45 entente | |
n.协定;有协定关系的各国 | |
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46 allied | |
adj.协约国的;同盟国的 | |
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47 impetus | |
n.推动,促进,刺激;推动力 | |
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48 indifference | |
n.不感兴趣,不关心,冷淡,不在乎 | |
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49 revival | |
n.复兴,复苏,(精力、活力等的)重振 | |
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50 steadily | |
adv.稳定地;不变地;持续地 | |
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51 utterly | |
adv.完全地,绝对地 | |
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52 obsessed | |
adj.心神不宁的,鬼迷心窍的,沉迷的 | |
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53 reciprocated | |
v.报答,酬答( reciprocate的过去式和过去分词 );(机器的部件)直线往复运动 | |
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54 fervent | |
adj.热的,热烈的,热情的 | |
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55 ardent | |
adj.热情的,热烈的,强烈的,烈性的 | |
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56 anguish | |
n.(尤指心灵上的)极度痛苦,烦恼 | |
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57 impelled | |
v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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58 saviour | |
n.拯救者,救星 | |
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59 motive | |
n.动机,目的;adv.发动的,运动的 | |
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60 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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61 sentimental | |
adj.多愁善感的,感伤的 | |
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62 autocracy | |
n.独裁政治,独裁政府 | |
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63 concessions | |
n.(尤指由政府或雇主给予的)特许权( concession的名词复数 );承认;减价;(在某地的)特许经营权 | |
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64 premature | |
adj.比预期时间早的;不成熟的,仓促的 | |
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65 unity | |
n.团结,联合,统一;和睦,协调 | |
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66 prerogatives | |
n.权利( prerogative的名词复数 );特权;大主教法庭;总督委任组成的法庭 | |
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67 precipitating | |
adj.急落的,猛冲的v.(突如其来地)使发生( precipitate的现在分词 );促成;猛然摔下;使沉淀 | |
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68 mighty | |
adj.强有力的;巨大的 | |
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69 alas | |
int.唉(表示悲伤、忧愁、恐惧等) | |
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70 astute | |
adj.机敏的,精明的 | |
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71 intermittent | |
adj.间歇的,断断续续的 | |
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72 procuring | |
v.(努力)取得, (设法)获得( procure的现在分词 );拉皮条 | |
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73 hostility | |
n.敌对,敌意;抵制[pl.]交战,战争 | |
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74 impulsive | |
adj.冲动的,刺激的;有推动力的 | |
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75 bosom | |
n.胸,胸部;胸怀;内心;adj.亲密的 | |
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76 artistic | |
adj.艺术(家)的,美术(家)的;善于艺术创作的 | |
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77 meditation | |
n.熟虑,(尤指宗教的)默想,沉思,(pl.)冥想录 | |
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78 passionate | |
adj.热情的,热烈的,激昂的,易动情的,易怒的,性情暴躁的 | |
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79 ecstasy | |
n.狂喜,心醉神怡,入迷 | |
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80 undoing | |
n.毁灭的原因,祸根;破坏,毁灭 | |
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