THE REVOLUTION—THE ABDICATION1 OF NICHOLAS II.
(MARCH, 1917)
RASPUTIN was no more and the nation was avenged2. A few brave men had taken upon themselves to secure the disappearance3 of the man who was execrated4 by one and all.[51] It might be hoped that after this explosion of wrath5 faction6 would die down. Unfortunately it was not so. On the contrary, the struggle between the Czar and the Duma became more bitter than ever.
The Czar was convinced that in existing circumstances all concessions7 on his part would be regarded as a sign of weakness which, without removing the causes of the discontent which resulted from the miseries9 and privations of the war, could only diminish his authority and possibly accelerate a revolution. The opposition10 of the Duma revealed the incapacity and impotence of the Government and in no way improved the situation. Faction became more intense, intrigue11 multiplied{188} at a time when nothing but the presentation of a united front by all the intelligent classes of the nation could have paralysed the evil influence of Protopopoff. A universal effort would have been required to avert12 the catastrophe13 which was rapidly approaching. It was true that this meant asking the upper classes to prove that they could show as much self-denial as enlightened patriotism14, but in the tragic15 circumstances through which the country was passing such action might have been expected of them.
How is it that in Russia no one realised what everyone in Germany knew—that a revolution would inevitably16 deliver up the country to its enemies? “I had often dreamed,” writes Ludendorff in his War Memories, “of the realisation of that Russian revolution which was to lighten our military burden. A perpetual illusion! We had the revolution to-day quite unexpectedly. I felt as if a great weight had fallen from my shoulders.”[52]
The Germans were the only people in Europe who knew Russia. Their knowledge of it was fuller and more exact than that of the Russians themselves. They had known for a long time that the Czarist régime, with all its faults, was the only one capable of prolonging the Russian resistance. They knew that with the fall of the Czar Russia would be at their mercy. They stopped at nothing to procure18 his fall. That is why the preservation19 of the existing system should have been secured at any cost. The revolution was inevitable20 at that moment, it was said. It could only be averted21 by the immediate22 grant of a constitution. And so on! The fact is{189} that the perverse23 fate which had blinded the sovereigns was to blind the nation in turn.
Yet the Czar was inspired by two dominant24 sentiments—his political enemies themselves knew it—to which all Russia could rally. One of them was his love for his country and the other his absolute determination to continue the war to the bitter end. In the universal blindness which was the result of party passion men did not realise that, in spite of all, a Czar pledged to the cause of victory was an immense moral asset for the Russian people. They did not see that a Czar who was what he was popularly supposed to be could alone lead the country to victory and save it from bondage25 to Germany.
The position of the Czar was extraordinarily26 difficult. To the Extremists of the Right, who regarded a compromise with Germany as their only road to salvation27, he was the insurmountable obstacle, who had to make way for another sovereign. To the Extremists of the Left who desired victory, but a victory without a Czar, he was the obstacle which the revolution would remove. And while the latter were endeavouring to undermine the foundations of the monarchy28 by intensive propaganda at and behind the front—thus playing Germany’s game—the moderate parties adopted that most dangerous and yet characteristically Russian course of doing nothing. They were victims of that Slav fatalism which means waiting on events and hoping that some providential force will come and guide them for the public good. They confined themselves to passive resistance because they failed to realise that in so acting29 they were paralysing the nation.
The general public had unconsciously become the docile30 tool of German intrigue. The most alarming rumours31, accepted and given the widest currency, created an anti-monarchist and{190} defeatist atmosphere behind the front—an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion which was bound to have a speedy effect upon the men in the firing-line themselves. Everyone hacked32 at the central pillar of the tottering33 political edifice34, and no one thought of attempting to shore it up while still there was time. Everything was done to accelerate the revolution; nothing to avert its consequences.
It was forgotten that Russia did not consist merely of fifteen to twenty million human beings ripe for parliamentary government, but that it had one hundred and twenty to one hundred and thirty million peasants, most of them rude and uneducated, to whom the Czar was still the Lord’s Anointed, he whom God had chosen to direct the destinies of Great Russia. Accustomed from his earliest youth to hear the priest invoke35 the name of the Czar in the offertory, one of the most solemn moments in the Orthodox liturgy36, the moujik in his mystical exaltation was bound to attribute to him a character semi-divine.[53]
The Czar was not the head of the Russian Church. He was its protector and defender37. But after Peter the Great abolished the patriarchate the people were inclined to regard him as the incarnation of both spiritual and temporal authority. It was an error, of course, but it survived. It was this double aspect of the person of the sovereign which made Czarism mean so much to the masses, and as the Russian people are essentially38 mystic, the second factor was not a whit39 less important than the first. For in the mind of the moujik, autocracy40 could not be separated from Orthodoxy.
The Russian revolution could not be exclusively a political{191} revolution. It must necessarily have a religious character. When the old system fell it was bound to create such a void in the political and religious conscience of the Russian people that unless care were taken it would involve the whole of the social organism in its fall. To the humble41 peasant the Czar was both the incarnation of his mystic aspirations42 and in a sense a tangible43 reality, impossible to replace by a political formula, which would be an incomprehensible abstraction to him. Into the vacuum created by the collapse44 of the Czaristic régime the Russian revolution—in view of the passion of the absolute and the proneness45 to extremes which are characteristic of the Slav nature—was certain to hurl46 itself with a violence that no government could control. There was a fatal risk that it would all end in political and religious chaos47 or sheer anarchy48.
As the revolution was desired, preparations should have been made to avert this eventuality. Even in times of peace it would have been a formidable risk: to venture upon such a step in war was simply criminal. We Westerners are apt to judge Russian affairs by the governing classes with which we have come in contact—classes which have attained49 a degree of culture and civilisation50 equal to our own. We too often forget the millions of semi-barbarous and ignorant beings who understand the simplest and most primitive51 sentiments alone. Of these the Czarist fetish was one of the most striking examples.
The British Ambassador, getting his information from Russian politicians whose patriotism was above suspicion, but who saw their country as they wanted it to be and not as it really was, allowed himself to be led astray. Insufficient52 account was taken of the special conditions which made Russia a religious, political, and social anachronism to which none of the{192} formul? or panaceas53 of Western Europe would apply. They forgot that in any country at war the early stages of a revolution almost always produce a weakening of the national effort and adversely54 affect the fighting power of the army. In a country like Russia this would be true to a far greater extent. The Entente55 made a mistake[54] in thinking that the movement which the beginning of February, 1917, revealed was of popular origin. It was nothing of the kind, and only the governing classes participated in it. The great masses stood aloof56. It is not true that it was a fundamental upheaval57 which overturned the monarchy. It was the fall of the monarchy itself which raised that formidable wave which engulfed58 Russia and nearly submerged the neighbouring states.
After his return from G.H.Q. the Czar had remained at Tsarsko?e-Selo for the months of January and February. He felt that the political situation was more and more strained, but he had not yet lost all hope. The country was suffering: it was tired of the war and anxiously longing17 for peace. The opposition was growing from day to day, and the storm was{193} threatening, but in spite of everything Nicholas II. hoped that patriotic60 feeling would carry the day against the pessimism61 which the trials and worries of the moment made general, and that no one would risk compromising the results of a war which had cost the nation so much by rash and imprudent action.
His faith in his army was also unshaken. He knew that the material sent from France and England was arriving satisfactorily and would improve the conditions under which it had to fight. He had the greatest hopes of the new formations which had been created in the course of the winter.[55] He was certain that his army would be ready in the spring to join in that great offensive of the Allies which would deal Germany her death-blow and thus save Russia: a few weeks more and victory would be his.
Yet the Czar hesitated to leave Tsarsko?e-Selo, such was his anxiety about the political situation. On the other hand, he considered that his departure could not be deferred62 much longer, and that it was his duty to return to G.H.Q. He ultimately left for Mohileff on Thursday, March 8th, arriving there next morning.
He had hardly left the capital before the first symptoms of insurrection began to be observable in the working-class quarters. The factories went on strike, and the movement spread rapidly during the days following. The population of Petrograd had suffered great privations during the winter, for owing to the shortage of rolling-stock the transport of food and fuel had become very difficult, and there was no sign of improvement in this respect. The Government could think of nothing likely to calm the excitement, and Protopopoff merely{194} exasperated63 everyone by the measures of repression—as stupid as criminal—taken by the police. Troops also had been employed. All the regiments64 being at the front, the only troops at Petrograd were units under instruction, whose loyalty65 had been thoroughly66 undermined by organised propaganda in the barracks in spite of counter-measures. There were cases of defection, and after three days of half-hearted resistance unit after unit went over to the insurgents67. By the 13th the city was almost entirely68 in the hands of the revolutionaries, and the Duma proceeded to form a provisional government.
At first we at Mohileff had no idea of the scale of the events which had occurred at Petrograd. Yet after Saturday, March 10th, General Alexeieff and some officers of the Czar’s suite69 had tried to open his eyes and persuade him to grant the liberties the nation demanded immediately. But once more Nicholas II. was deceived by the intentionally70 incomplete and inaccurate71 statements of a few ignorant individuals in his suite[56] and would not take their advice.
By the 12th it was impossible to conceal72 the truth from the Czar any longer; he understood that extraordinary measures were required, and decided73 to return to Tsarsko?e-Selo at once.
The Imperial train left Mohileff on the night of the 12th, but on arriving at the station of Malaia-Vichera twenty-four hours later it was ascertained74 that the station of Tosno, thirty miles south of Petrograd, was in the hands of the insurgents, and that it was impossible to get to Tsarsko?e-Selo. There was nothing for it but to turn back.{195}
The Czar decided to go to Pskoff to General Russky, the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front. He arrived there on the evening of the 14th. When the General had told him the latest developments in Petrograd the Czar instructed him to inform M. Rodzianko by telephone that he was ready to make every concession8 if the Duma thought that it would tranquillise the nation. The reply came: “It is too late.”
Was it really so? The revolutionary movement was confined to Petrograd and its suburbs; in spite of propaganda, the Czar still enjoyed considerable prestige in the army, and his authority with the peasants was intact. Would not the grant of a Constitution and the help of the Duma have been enough to restore to Nicholas II. the popularity he had enjoyed at the beginning of the war?
The reply of the Duma left the Czar with the alternatives of abdicating75 or marching on Petrograd with the troops which remained faithful to him: the latter would mean civil war in the presence of the enemy. Nicholas II. did not hesitate, and on the morning of the 15th he handed General Russky a telegram informing the President of the Duma that he intended to abdicate76 in favour of his son.
A few hours later he summoned Professor Fiodorof to his carriage and said:
“Science teaches us, sire, that it is an incurable disease. Yet those who are afflicted81 with it sometimes reach an advanced old age. Still, Alexis Nicola?evitch is at the mercy of an accident.{196}”
The Czar hung his head and sadly murmured:
“That’s just what the Czarina told me. Well, if that is the case and Alexis can never serve his country as I should like him to, we have the right to keep him ourselves.”
His mind was made up, and when the representatives of the Provisional Government and the Duma arrived from Petrograd that evening he handed them the Act of Abdication he had drawn82 up beforehand and in which he renounced83 for himself and his son the throne of Russia in favour of his brother, the Grand-Duke Michael Alexandrovitch.
I give a translation of this document which, by its nobility and the burning patriotism in every line, compelled the admiration84 of even the Czar’s enemies:
The Act of Abdication of the Czar Nicholas II.
By the grace of God, We, Nicholas II., Emperor of all the Russias, Tsar of Poland, Grand-Duke of Finland, etc., etc.... to all Our faithful subjects make known:
In these days of terrible struggle against the external enemy who has been trying for three years to impose his will upon Our Fatherland, God has willed that Russia should be faced with a new and formidable trial. Troubles at home threaten to have a fatal effect on the ultimate course of this hard-fought war. The destinies of Russia, the honour of Our heroic army, the welfare of the people and the whole future of Our dear country demand that the war should be carried to a victorious85 conclusion at any price.
Our cruel foe86 is making his supreme87 effort, and the moment is at hand in which Our valiant88 army, in{197} concert with Our glorious allies, will overthrow89 him once and for all.
In these days, which are decisive for the existence of Russia, We think We should follow the voice of Our conscience by facilitating the closest co-operation of Our people and the organisation90 of all its resources for the speedy realisation of victory.
For these reasons, in accord with the Duma of the Empire, We think it Our duty to abdicate the Crown and lay down the supreme power.
Not desiring to be separated from Our beloved son, We bequeath Our heritage to Our brother, the Grand-Duke Michael Alexandrovitch, and give him Our blessing91. We abjure92 him to govern in perfect accord with the representatives of the nation sitting in the legislative93 institutions, and to take a sacred oath in the name of the beloved Fatherland.
We appeal to all the loyal sons of the country, imploring94 them to fulfil their patriotic and holy duty of obeying their Czar in this sad time of national trial. We ask them to help him and the representatives of the nation to guide the Russian state into the path of prosperity and glory.
God help Russia.
The Czar had fallen. Germany was on the point of winning her greatest victory, but the fruits might still escape her. They would have escaped her if the intelligent section of the nation had recovered itself in time and had gathered round the Grand-Duke Michael, who, by his brother’s desire—the Act of Abdication said so in terms—was to be a constitutional sovereign{198} in the full sense of the word. Nothing prevented so desirable a consummation, for Russia was not yet in the presence of one of those great popular movements which defy all logic95 and hurl nations into the gulf59 of the unknown. The revolution had been exclusively the work of the Petrograd population, the majority of which would not have hesitated to rally round the new ruler if the Provisional Government and the Duma had set the example. The army, which was still a well-disciplined body, represented a serious force. As for the great bulk of the nation, it had not the slightest idea that anything had passed.
This last chance of averting96 the catastrophe was lost through thirst for power and fear of the Extremists. The day after the Czar’s abdication the Grand-Duke Michael, acting on the advice of all save two of the members of the Provisional Government, renounced the throne in turn and resigned to a constituent97 assembly the task of deciding what the future form of government should be.
The irreparable step had been taken. The removal of the Czar had left in the minds of the masses a gaping98 void it was impossible for them to fill. They were left to their own devices—a rudderless ship at the mercy of the waves—and searching for an ideal, some article of faith which might replace what they had lost, they found nothing but chaos around them.
To finish her work of destruction, Germany had only to give Lenin and his disciples99 a plentiful100 supply of money and let them loose on Russia. Lenin and his friends never dreamed of talking to the peasants about a democratic republic or a constituent assembly. They knew it would have been waste of breath. As up-to-date prophets, they came to preach the{199} holy war and to try and draw these untutored millions by the attraction of a creed101 in which the finest teaching of Christ goes hand in hand with the worst sophisms—a creed which, thanks to the Jews, the adventurers of Bolshevism, was to be translated into the subjection of the moujik and the ruin of the country.
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1
abdication
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| n.辞职；退位 | |
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avenged
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| v.为…复仇，报…之仇( avenge的过去式和过去分词 )；为…报复 | |
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disappearance
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| n.消失，消散，失踪 | |
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execrated
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| v.憎恶( execrate的过去式和过去分词 )；厌恶；诅咒；咒骂 | |
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wrath
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| n.愤怒，愤慨，暴怒 | |
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faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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concessions
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| n.（尤指由政府或雇主给予的）特许权( concession的名词复数 )；承认；减价；（在某地的）特许经营权 | |
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concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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miseries
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| n.痛苦( misery的名词复数 )；痛苦的事；穷困；常发牢骚的人 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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avert
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| v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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13
catastrophe
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| n.大灾难，大祸 | |
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patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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tragic
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| adj.悲剧的，悲剧性的，悲惨的 | |
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inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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longing
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| n.（for）渴望 | |
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procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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averted
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| 防止，避免( avert的过去式和过去分词 )； 转移 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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perverse
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| adj.刚愎的；坚持错误的，行为反常的 | |
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dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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bondage
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| n.奴役，束缚 | |
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extraordinarily
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| adv.格外地；极端地 | |
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salvation
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| n.（尤指基督）救世，超度，拯救，解困 | |
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monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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docile
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| adj.驯服的，易控制的，容易教的 | |
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rumours
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| n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 )；风闻；谣言；谣传 | |
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hacked
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| 生气 | |
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tottering
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| adj.蹒跚的，动摇的v.走得或动得不稳( totter的现在分词 )；踉跄；蹒跚；摇摇欲坠 | |
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edifice
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| n.宏伟的建筑物(如宫殿，教室) | |
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invoke
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| v.求助于(神、法律)；恳求，乞求 | |
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liturgy
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| n.礼拜仪式 | |
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defender
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| n.保卫者，拥护者，辩护人 | |
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essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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whit
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| n.一点，丝毫 | |
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autocracy
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| n.独裁政治，独裁政府 | |
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humble
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| adj.谦卑的，恭顺的；地位低下的；v.降低，贬低 | |
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aspirations
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| 强烈的愿望( aspiration的名词复数 )； 志向； 发送气音； 发 h 音 | |
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tangible
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| adj.有形的，可触摸的，确凿的，实际的 | |
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collapse
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| vi.累倒；昏倒；倒塌；塌陷 | |
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proneness
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| n.俯伏，倾向 | |
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hurl
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| vt.猛投，力掷，声叫骂 | |
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chaos
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| n.混乱，无秩序 | |
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anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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civilisation
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| n.文明，文化，开化，教化 | |
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primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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panaceas
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| n.治百病的药，万灵药( panacea的名词复数 ) | |
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adversely
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| ad.有害地 | |
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entente
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| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
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aloof
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| adj.远离的；冷淡的，漠不关心的 | |
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upheaval
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| n.胀起，(地壳)的隆起；剧变，动乱 | |
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engulfed
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| v.吞没，包住( engulf的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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gulf
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| n.海湾；深渊，鸿沟；分歧，隔阂 | |
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patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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pessimism
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| n.悲观者，悲观主义者，厌世者 | |
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deferred
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| adj.延期的，缓召的v.拖延，延缓，推迟( defer的过去式和过去分词 )；服从某人的意愿，遵从 | |
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exasperated
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| adj.恼怒的 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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suite
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| n.一套(家具)；套房；随从人员 | |
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intentionally
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| ad.故意地，有意地 | |
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inaccurate
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| adj.错误的，不正确的，不准确的 | |
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conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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abdicating
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| 放弃（职责、权力等）( abdicate的现在分词 )； 退位，逊位 | |
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abdicate
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| v.让位，辞职，放弃 | |
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frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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malady
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| n.病，疾病(通常做比喻) | |
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incurable
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| adj.不能医治的，不能矫正的，无救的；n.不治的病人，无救的人 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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afflicted
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| 使受痛苦，折磨( afflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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renounced
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| v.声明放弃( renounce的过去式和过去分词 )；宣布放弃；宣布与…决裂；宣布摒弃 | |
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admiration
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| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
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victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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valiant
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| adj.勇敢的，英勇的；n.勇士，勇敢的人 | |
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overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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organisation
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| n.组织，安排，团体，有机休 | |
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blessing
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| n.祈神赐福；祷告；祝福，祝愿 | |
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abjure
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| v.发誓放弃 | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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imploring
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| 恳求的，哀求的 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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averting
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| 防止，避免( avert的现在分词 )； 转移 | |
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constituent
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| n.选民；成分，组分；adj.组成的，构成的 | |
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gaping
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| adj.口的；张口的；敞口的；多洞穴的v.目瞪口呆地凝视( gape的现在分词 )；张开，张大 | |
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disciples
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| n.信徒( disciple的名词复数 )；门徒；耶稣的信徒；（尤指）耶稣十二门徒之一 | |
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plentiful
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| adj.富裕的，丰富的 | |
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creed
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| n.信条；信念，纲领 | |
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