The conception of the so-called 'philosophy of history' is perpetually opposed to and resisted by the deterministic conception of history. Not only is this clearly to be seen from inspection1, but it is also quite evident logically, because the 'philosophy of history' represents the transcendental conception of the real, determinism the immanent.
But on examining the facts it is not less certain that historical determinism perpetually generates the 'philosophy of history'; nor is this fact less evidently logical than the preceding, because determinism is naturalism, and therefore immanent, certainly, but insufficiently4 and falsely immanent. Hence it should rather be said that it wishes to be, but is not, immanent, and whatever its efforts may be in the contrary direction, it becomes converted into transcendency. All this does not present any difficulty to one who has clearly in mind the conceptions of the transcendent and of the immanent, of the philosophy of history as transcendency and of the deterministic or naturalistic conception of history as a false immanence. But it will be of use to see in more detail how this process of agreements and oppositions7 is developed and solved with reference to the problem of history.
"First collect the facts, then connect them causally"; this is the way that the work of the historian is[Pg 65] represented in the deterministic conception. Après la collection des faits, la recherche9 des causes, to repeat the very common formula in the very words of one of the most eloquent10 and picturesque11 theorists of that school, Taine. Facts are brute12, dense13, real indeed, but not illumined with the light of science, not intellectualized. This intelligible14 character must be conferred upon them by means of the search for causes. But it is very well known what happens when one fact is linked to another as its cause, forming a chain of causes and effects: we thus inaugurate an infinite regression, and we never succeed in finding the cause or causes to which we can finally attach the chain that we have been so industriously15 putting together.
Some, maybe many, of the theorists of history get out of the difficulty in a truly simple manner: they break or let fall at a certain point their chain, which is already broken at another point at the other end (the effect which they have undertaken to consider). They operate with their fragment of chain as though it were something perfect and closed in itself, as though a straight line divided at two points should include space and be a figure. Hence, too, the doctrine16 that we find among the methodologists of history: that it is only necessary for history to seek out 'proximate' causes. This doctrine is intended to supply a logical foundation to the above process. But who can ever say what are the 'proximate causes'? Thought, since it is admitted that it is unfortunately obliged to think according to the chain of causes, will never wish to know anything but 'true' causes, be they near or distant in space and time (space, like time, ne fait rien à l'affaire). In reality, this theory is a fig-leaf, placed there to cover a proceeding18 of which the historian, who is a thinker and a critic, is ashamed,[Pg 66] an act of will which is useful, but which for that very reason is wilful19. The fig-leaf, however, is a sign of modesty20, and as such has its value, because, if shame be lost, there is a risk that it will finally be declared that the 'causes' at which an arbitrary halt has been made are the 'ultimate' causes, the 'true' causes, thus raising the caprice of the individual to the rank of an act creative of the world, treating it as though it were God, the God of certain theologians, whose caprice is truth. I should not wish again to quote Taine just after having said this, for he is a most estimable author, not on account of his mental constitution, but of his enthusiastic faith in science; yet it suits me to quote him nevertheless. Taine, in his search for causes, having reached a cause which he sometimes calls the 'race' and sometimes the 'age,' as for instance in his history of English literature, when he reaches the concept of the 'man of the North' or 'German,' with the character and intellect that would be suitable to such a person—coldness of the senses, love of abstract ideas, grossness of taste, and contempt for order and regularity—gravely affirms: Là s'arrête la recherche: on est tombé sur quelque disposition21 primitive22, sur quelque trait propre à toutes les sensations, à toutes les conceptions d'un siècle ou d'une race, sur quelque particularité inséparable de toutes les démarches de son esprit et de son cour. Ce sont là les grandes causes, les causes universelles et permanentes. What that primitive and insurmountable thing contained was known to Taine's imagination, but criticism is ignorant of it; for criticism demands that the genesis of the facts or groups of facts designated as 'age' and 'race' should be given, and in demanding their genesis declares that they are neither 'universal' nor 'permanent,' because no universal and permanent 'facts' are known, as far[Pg 67] as I am aware, certainly not le Germain and l'homme du Nord; nor are mummies facts, though they last some thousands of years, but not for ever—they change gradually, but they do change.
Thus whoever adopts the deterministic conception of history, provided that he decides to abstain24 from cutting short the inquiry25 that he has undertaken in an arbitrary and fanciful manner, is of necessity obliged to recognize that the method adopted does not attain26 the desired end. And since he has begun to think history, although by means of an insufficient5 method, no course remains27 to him save that of beginning all over again and following a different path, or that of going forward but changing his direction. The naturalistic presupposition, which still holds its ground ("first collect the facts, then seek the causes": what is more evident and more unavoidable than that?), necessarily leads to the second alternative. But to adopt the second alternative is to supersede28 determinism, it is to transcend3 nature and its causes, it is to propose a method opposite to that hitherto followed—that is to say, to renounce29 the category of cause for another, which cannot be anything but that of end, an extrinsic30 and transcendental end, which is the analogous31 opposite, corresponding to the cause. Now the search for the transcendental end is the 'philosophy of history.'
The consequent naturalist6 (I mean by this he who 'continues to think,' or, as is generally said, to draw the consequences) cannot avoid this inquiry, nor does he ever avoid it, in whatever manner he conceive his new inquiry. This he cannot even do, when he tries, by declaring that the end or 'ultimate cause' is unknowable, because (as elsewhere remarked) an unknowable affirmed is an unknowable in some way known. Naturalism is[Pg 68] always crowned with a philosophy of history, whatever its mode of formulation: whether it explain the universe as composed of atoms that strike one another and produce history by means of their various shocks and gyrations, to which they can also put an end by returning to their primitive state of dispersion, whether the hidden God be termed Matter or the Unconscious or something else, or whether, finally, He be conceived as an Intelligence which avails itself of the chain of causes in order to actualize His counsels. And every philosopher of history is on the other hand a naturalist, because he is a dualist and conceives a God and a world, an idea and a fact in addition to or beneath the Idea, a kingdom of ends and a kingdom or sub-kingdom of causes, a celestial32 city and one that is more or less diabolical33 or terrene. Take any deterministic historical work and you will find or discover in it, explicit34 or understood, transcendency (in Taine, for example, it goes by the name of 'race' or of 'siècle,' which are true and proper deities35); take any work of 'philosophy of history' and dualism and naturalism will be found there (in Hegel, for example, when he admits rebellious36 and impotent facts which resist or are unworthy the dominion38 of the idea). And we shall see more and more clearly how from the entrails of naturalism comes inevitably39 forth40 the 'philosophy of history.'
II
But the 'philosophy of history' is just as contradictory41 as the deterministic conception from which it arises and to which it is opposed. Having both accepted and superseded42 the method of linking brute facts together, it no longer finds facts to link (for these have[Pg 69] already been linked together, as well as might be, by means of the category of cause), but brute facts, on which it must confer rather a 'meaning' than a linking, representing them as aspects of a transcendental process, a theophany. Now those facts, in so far as they are brute facts, are mute, and the transcendency of the process requires an organ, not that of thought that thinks or produces facts, but an extra-logical organ, in order to be conceived and represented (such, for example, as thought which proceeds abstractly a priori, in the manner of Fichte), and this is not to be found in the spirit, save as a negative moment, as the void of effective logical thought. The void of logical thought is immediately filled with praxis, or what is called sentiment, which then appears as poetry, by theoretical refraction. There is an evident poetical43 character running through all 'philosophies of history.' Those of antiquity44 represented historical events as strife45 between the gods of certain peoples or of certain races or protectors of certain individuals, or between the god of light and truth and the powers of darkness and lies. They thus expressed the aspirations46 of peoples, groups, or individuals toward hegemony, or of man toward goodness and truth. The most modern of modern forms is that inspired by various national and ethical48 feelings (the Italian, the Germanic, the Slav, etc.), or which represents the course of history as leading to the kingdom of liberty, or as the passage from the Eden of primitive communism, through the Middle Ages of slavery, servitude, and wages, toward the restoration of communism, which shall no longer be unconscious but conscious, no longer Edenic but human. In poetry, facts are no longer facts but words, not reality but images, and so there would be no occasion to censure49 them, if it remained pure poetry.[Pg 70] But it does not so remain, because those images and words are placed there as ideas and facts—that is to say, as myths: progress, liberty, economy, technique, science are myths, in so far as they are looked upon as agents external to the facts. They are myths no less than God and the Devil, Mars and Venus, Jove and Baal, or any other cruder forms of divinity. And this is the reason why the deterministic conception, after it has produced the 'philosophy of history,' which opposes it, is obliged to oppose its own daughter in its turn, and to appeal from the realm of ends to that of causal connexions, from imagination to observation, from myths to facts.
The reciprocal confutation of historical determinism and the philosophy of history, which makes of each a void or a nothing—that is to say, a single void or nothing—seems to the eclectics as usual to be the reciprocal fulfilment of two entities50, which effect or should effect an alliance for mutual51 support. And since eclecticism52 flourishes in contemporary philosophy, mutato nomine, it is not surprising that besides the duty of investigating the causes to history also is assigned that of ascertaining53 the 'meaning' or the 'general plan' of the course of history (see the works on the philosophy of history of Labriola, Simmel, and Rickert). Since, too, writers on method are wont54 to be empirical and therefore eclectic, we find that with them also history is divided into the history which unites and criticizes documents and reconstructs events, and 'philosophy of history' (see Bernheim's manual, typical of all of them). Finally, since ordinary thought is eclectic, nothing is more easy than to find agreement as to the thesis that simple history, which presents the series of facts, does not suffice, but that it is necessary that thought should return to the[Pg 71] already constituted chain of events, in order to discover there the hidden design and to answer the questions as to whence we come and whither we go. This amounts to saying that a 'philosophy of history' must be posited55 side by side with history. This eclecticism, which gives substance to two opposite voids and makes them join hands, sometimes attempts to surpass itself and to mingle56 those two fallacious sciences or parts of science. Then we hear 'philosophy of history' defended, but with the caution that it must be conducted with 'scientific' and 'positive' method, by means of the search for the cause, thus revealing the action of divine reason or providence57.[1] Ordinary thought quickly consents to this programme, but afterward58 fails to carry it out.[2]
There is nothing new here either for those who know: 'philosophy of history' to be constructed by means of 'positive methods,' transcendency to be demonstrated by means of the methods of false immanence, is the exact equivalent in the field of historical studies to that "metaphysic to be constructed by means of the experimental method" which was recommended by the neocritics (Zeller and others), for it claimed, not indeed to supersede two voids that reciprocally confute one another,[Pg 72] but to make them agree together, and, after having given substance to them, to combine them in a single substance. I should not like to describe the impossibilities contained in the above as the prodigies59 of an alchemist (the metaphor60 seems to be too lofty), but rather as the medleys61 of bad cooks.
[1] See, for example, the work of Flint; but since, less radical62 than Flint, Hegel and the Hegelians themselves also ended in admitting the concourse of the two opposed methods, traces of this perversion63 are also to be found in their 'philosophies of history.' Here, too, is to be noted64 the false analogy by which Hegel was led to discover the same relation between a priori and historical facts as between mathematics and natural facts: Man muss mit dem Kreise dessen, worin die Prinzipien fallen, wenn man es so nennen will, a priori vertraut sein, so gut65 als Kepler mit den2 Ellipsen, mit Kuben und Quadraten und mit den Gedanken von Verh?ltnissen derselben a priori schon vorher bekannt sein musste, ehe er aus den empirischen Daten seine unsterblichen Gesetze, welche aus Bestimmungen jener Kreise von Vorstellungen bestehen, erfinden konnte. (Cf. Vorles. üb. d. Philos, d. Gesch., ed. Brunst?d, pp. 107-108.)
[2] Not even the above-mentioned Flint carried it out, for he lost him-self in preliminaries of historical documentation and never proceeded to the promised construction.
III
The true remedy for the contradictions of historical determinism and of the 'philosophy of history' is quite other than this. To obtain it, we must accept the result of the preceding confutation, which shows that both are futile66, and reject, as lacking thought, both the 'designs' of the philosophy of history and the causal chains of determinism. When these two shadows have been dispersed67 we shall find ourselves at the starting-place: we are again face to face with disconnected brute facts, with facts that are connected, but not understood, for which determinism had tried to employ the cement of causality, the 'philosophy of history,' the magic wand of finality. What shall we do with these facts? How shall we make them clear rather than dense as they were, organic rather than inorganic68, intelligible rather than unintelligible69? Truly, it seems difficult to do anything with them, especially to effect their desired transformation70. The spirit is helpless before that which is, or is supposed to be, external to it. And when facts are understood in that way we are apt to assume again that attitude of contempt of the philosophers for history which has been well-nigh constant since antiquity almost to the end of the eighteenth century (for Aristotle history was "less philosophical71" and less serious than poetry,[Pg 73] for Sextus Empiricus it was "unmethodical material"; Kant did not feel or understand history). The attitude amounts to this: leave ideas to the philosophers and brute facts to the historians—let us be satisfied with serious things and leave their toys to the children.
But before having recourse to such a temptation, it will be prudent72 to ask counsel of methodical doubt (which is always most useful), and to direct the attention precisely73 upon those brute and disconnected facts from which the causal method claims to start and before which we, who are now abandoned by it and by its complement74, the philosophy of history, appear to find ourselves again. Methodical doubt will suggest above all things the thought that those facts are a presupposition that has not been proved, and it will lead to the inquiry as to whether the proof can be obtained. Having attempted the proof, we shall finally arrive at the conclusion that those facts really do not exist.
For who, as a matter of fact, affirms their existence? Precisely the spirit, at the moment when it is about to undertake the search for causes. But when accomplishing that act the spirit does not already possess the brute facts (d'abord la collection des faits) and then seek the causes (après, la recherche des causes); but it makes the facts brute by that very act—that is to say, it posits75 them itself in that way, because it is of use to it so to posit8 them. The search for causes, undertaken by history, is not in any way different from the procedure of naturalism, already several times illustrated77, which abstractly analyses and classifies reality. And to illustrate76 abstractly and to classify implies at the same time to judge in classifying—that is to say, to treat facts, not as acts of the spirit, conscious in the spirit that thinks them, but as external brute facts. The Divine Comedy[Pg 74] is that poem which we create again in our imagination in all its particulars as we read it and which we understand critically as a particular determination of the spirit, and to which we therefore assign its place in history, with all its surroundings and all its relations. But when this actuality of our thought and imagination has come to an end—that is to say, when that mental process is completed—we are able, by means of a new act of the spirit, separately to analyse its elements. Thus, for instance, we shall classify the concepts relating to 'Florentine civilization,' or to 'political poetry,' and say that the Divine Comedy was an effect of Florentine civilization, and this in its turn an effect of the strife of the communes, and the like. We shall also thus have prepared the way for those absurd problems which used to annoy de Sanctis so much in relation to the work of Dante, and which he admirably described when he said that they arise only when lively ?sthetic expression has grown cold and poetical work has fallen into the hands of dullards addicted78 to trifles. But if we stop in time and do not enter the path of those absurdities79, if we restrict ourselves purely80 and simply to the naturalistic moment, to classification, and to the classificatory judgment81 (which is also causal connexion), in an altogether practical manner, without drawing any deductions82 from it, we shall have done nothing that is not perfectly83 legitimate84; indeed, we shall be exercising our right and bowing to a rational necessity, which is that of naturalizing, when naturalization is of use, but not beyond those limits. Thus the materialization of the facts and the external or causal binding85 of them together are altogether justified86 as pure naturalism. And even the maxim87 which bids us to stop at 'proximate' causes—that is to say, not to force classification so far[Pg 75] that it loses all practical utility—will find its justification88. To place the concept of the Divine Comedy in relation to that of 'Florentine civilization' may be of use, but it will be of no use whatever, or infinitely89 less use, to place it in relation to the class of 'Indo-European civilization' or to the 'civilization of the white man.'
IV
Let us then return with greater confidence to the point of departure, the true point of departure—that is to say, not to that of facts already disorganized and naturalized, but to that of the mind that thinks and constructs the fact. Let us raise up the debased countenances90 of the calumniated91 'brute facts,' and we shall see the light of thought resplendent upon their foreheads. And that true point of departure will reveal itself not merely as a point of departure, but both as a point of arrival and of departure, not as the first step in historical construction, but the whole of history in its construction, which is also its self-construction. Historical determinism, and all the more 'philosophy of history,' leave the reality of history behind them, though they directed their journey thither92, a journey which became so erratic93 and so full of useless repetitions.
We shall make the ingenuous94 Taine confess that what we are saying is the truth when we ask him what he means by the collection des faits and learn from him in reply that the collection in question consists of two stages or moments, in the first of which documents are revived in order to attain, à travers la distance des temps, l'homme vivant, agissant, doué de passions, muni d'habitudes, avec sa voix et sa physionomie, avec ses gestes[Pg 76] et ses habits, distinct et complet comme celui que tout23 à l'heure nous avons quitté dans la rue17; and in the second is sought and found sous l'homme extérieur l'homme intérieur, "l'homme invisible," "le centre," "le groupe des facultés et des sentiments qui produit le reste," "le drame intérieur," "la psychologie." Something very different, then, from collections de faits I If the things mentioned by our author really do come to pass, if we really do make live again in imagination individuals and events, and if we think what is within them—that is to say, if we think the synthesis of intuition and concept, which is thought in its concreteness—history is already achieved: what more is wanted? There is nothing more to seek. Taine replies: "We must seek causes." That is to say, we must slay95 the living 'fact' thought by thought, separate its abstract elements—a useful thing, no doubt, but useful for memory and practice. Or, as is the custom of Taine, we must misunderstand and exaggerate the value of the function of this abstract analysis, to lose ourselves in the mythology96 of races and ages, or in other different but none the less similar things. Let us beware how we slay poor facts, if we wish to think as historians, and in so far as we are such and really think in that way we shall not feel the necessity for having recourse either to the extrinsic bond of causes, historical determinism, or to that which is equally extrinsic of transcendental ends, philosophy of history. The fact historically thought has no cause and no end outside itself, but only in itself, coincident with its real qualities and with its qualitative97 reality. Because (it is well to note in passing) the determination of facts as real facts indeed, but of unknown nature, asserted but not understood, is itself also an illusion of naturalism (which thus heralds98 its other illusion, that of the[Pg 77] 'philosophy of history'). In thought, reality and quality, existence and essence, are all one, and it is not possible to affirm a fact as real without at the same time knowing what fact it is—that is, without qualifying it.
Returning to and remaining in or moving in the concrete fact, or, rather, making of oneself thought that thinks the fact concretely, we experience the continual formation and the continual progress of our historical thought and also make clear to ourselves the history of historiography, which proceeds in the same manner. And we see how (I limit myself to this, in order not to allow the eye to wander too far) from the days of the Greeks to our own historical understanding has always been enriching and deepening itself, not because abstract causes and transcendental ends of human things have ever been recovered, but only because an ever increasing consciousness of them has been acquired. Politics and morality, religion and philosophy and art, science and culture and economy, have become more complex concepts and at the same time better determined99 and unified100 both in themselves and with respect to the whole. Correlatively with this, the histories of these forms of activity have become ever more complex and more firmly united. We know 'the causes' of civilization as little as did the Greeks; and we know as little as they of the god or gods who control the fortunes of humanity. But we know the theory of civilization better than did the Greeks, and, for instance, we know (as they did not know, or did not know with equal clearness and security) that poetry is an eternal form of the theoretic spirit, that regression or decadence101 is a relative concept, that the world is not divided into ideas and shadows of ideas, or into potencies102 and acts, that slavery is not a category of the[Pg 78] real, but a historical form of economic, and so forth. Thus it no longer occurs to anyone (save to the survivals or fossils, still to be found among us) to write the history of poetry on the principle of the pedagogic ends that the poets are supposed to have had in view: on the contrary, we strive to determine the forms expressive103 of their sentiments. We are not at all bewildered when we find ourselves before what are called 'decadences,' but we seek out what new and greater thing was being developed by means of their dialectic. We do not consider the work of man to be miserable104 and illusory, and aspiration47 and admiration105 for the skies and for the ascesis joined thereunto and averse106 to earth as alone worthy37 of admiration and imitation. We recognize the reality of power in the act, and in the shadows the solidity of the ideas, and on earth heaven. Finally, we do not find that the possibility of social life is lost owing to the disappearance107 of the system of slavery. Such a disappearance would have been the catastrophe108 of reality, if slaves were natural to reality—and so forth.
This conception of history and the consideration of historiographical work in itself make it possible for us to be just toward historical determinism and to the 'philosophy of history,' which, by their continual reappearance, have continually pointed109 to the gaps in our knowledge, both historical and philosophical, and with their false provisional solutions have heralded110 the correct solutions of the new problems which we have been propounding111. Nor has it been said that they will henceforth cease to exercise such a function (which is the beneficial function of Utopias of every sort). And although historical determinism and the 'philosophy of history' have no history, because they do not develop, they yet receive a content from the relation in which[Pg 79] they stand to history, which does develop—that is to say, history develops in them, notwithstanding their covering, extrinsic to their content, which compels to think even him who proposes to schematize and to imagine without thinking. For there is a great difference between the determinism that can now appear, after Descartes and Vico and Kant and Hegel, and that which appeared after Aristotle; between the philosophy of history of Hegel and Marx and that of gnosticism and Christianity. Transcendency and false immanency are at work in both these conceptions respectively; but the abstract forms and mythologies112 that have appeared in more mature epochs of thought contain this new maturity113 in themselves. In proof of this, let us pause but a moment (passing by the various forms of naturalism) at the case of the 'philosophy of history.' We observe already a great difference between the philosophy of history, as it appears in the Homeric world, and that of Herodotus, with whom the conception of the anger of the gods is a simulacrum of the moral law, which spares the humble114 and treads the proud underfoot; from Herodotus to the Fate of the Stoics115, a law to which the gods themselves are subjected, and from this to the conception of Providence, which appears in late antiquity as wisdom that rules the world; from this pagan providence again to Christianity, which is divine justice, evangelical preparation, and educative care of the human race, and so on, to the refined providence of the theologians, which as a rule excludes divine intervention116 and operates by means of secondary causes, to that of Vico, which operates as dialectic of the spirit, to the Idea of Hegel, which is the gradual conquest of the consciousness of self, which liberty achieves during the course of history, till we finally[Pg 80] reach the mythology of progress and of civilization, which still persists and is supposed to tend toward the final abolition117 of prejudices and superstitions118, to be carried out by means of the increasing power and divulgation119 of positive science.
In this way the 'philosophy of history' and historical determinism sometimes attain to the thinness and transparency of a veil, which covers and at the same time reveals the concreteness of the real in thought. Mechanical causes thus appear idealized, transcendent deities humanized, and facts are in great part divested120 of their brutal121 aspect. But however thin the veil may be, it remains a veil, and however clear the truth may be, it is not altogether clear, for at bottom the false persuasion122 still persists that history is constructed with the 'material' of brute facts, with the 'cement' of causes, and with the 'magic' of ends, as with three successive or concurrent123 methods. The same thing occurs with religion, which in lofty minds liberates124 itself almost altogether from vulgar beliefs, as do its ethics125 from the heteronomy of the divine command and from the utilitarianism of rewards and punishments. Almost altogether, but not altogether, and for this reason religion will never be philosophy, save by negating126 itself, and thus the 'philosophy of history' and historical determinism will become history only by negating themselves. The reason is that as long as they proceed in a positive manner dualism will also persist, and with it the torment127 of scepticism and agnosticism as a consequence.
The negation128 of the philosophy of history, in history understood concretely, is its ideal dissolution, and since that so-called philosophy is nothing but an abstract and negative moment, our reason for affirming that[Pg 81] the philosophy of history is dead is clear. It is dead in its positivity, dead as a body of doctrine, dead in this way, with all the other conceptions and forms of the transcendental. I do not wish to attach to my brief (but in my opinion sufficient) treatment of the argument the addition of an explanation which to some will appear to be (as it appears to me) but little philosophical and even somewhat trivial. Notwithstanding, since I prefer the accusation129 of semi-triviality to that of equivocation130, I shall add that since the criticism of the 'concepts' of cause and transcendental finality does not forbid the use of these 'words,' when they are simple words (to talk, for example, in an imaginative way of liberty as of a goddess, or to say, when about to undertake a study of Dante, that our intention is to 'seek the cause' or 'causes' of this or that work or act of his), so nothing forbids our continuing to talk of 'philosophy of history' and of philosophizing history, meaning the necessity of treating or of a better treatment of this or that historical problem. Neither does anything forbid our calling the researches of historical gnoseology 'philosophy of history,' although in this case we are treating the history, not properly of history, but of historiography, two things which are wont to be designated with the same word in Italian as in other languages. Neither do we wish to prevent the statement (as did a German professor years ago) that the 'philosophy of history' must be treated as 'sociology'—that is to say, the adornment131 with that ancient title of so-called sociology, the empirical science of the state, of society and of culture.
These denominations132 are all permissible133 in virtue134 of the same right as that invoked135 by the adventurer Casanova when he went before the magistrates136 in[Pg 82] order to justify137 himself for having changed his name—"the right of every man to the letters of the alphabet." But the question treated above is not one of the letters of the alphabet. The 'philosophy of history,' of which we have briefly138 shown the genesis and the dissolution, is not one that is used in various senses, but a most definite mode of conceiving history—the transcendental mode.
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inspection
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| n.检查，审查，检阅 | |
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den
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| n.兽穴；秘密地方；安静的小房间，私室 | |
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transcend
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| vt.超出，超越(理性等)的范围 | |
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insufficiently
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insufficient
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naturalist
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| n.博物学家(尤指直接观察动植物者) | |
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oppositions
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| （强烈的）反对( opposition的名词复数 )； 反对党； （事业、竞赛、游戏等的）对手； 对比 | |
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posit
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recherche
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eloquent
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| adj.雄辩的，口才流利的；明白显示出的 | |
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picturesque
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| adj.美丽如画的，（语言）生动的，绘声绘色的 | |
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brute
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| n.野兽，兽性 | |
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dense
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| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
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intelligible
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| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
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industriously
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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rue
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| n.懊悔，芸香，后悔；v.后悔，悲伤，懊悔 | |
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proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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wilful
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| adj.任性的，故意的 | |
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modesty
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| n.谦逊，虚心，端庄，稳重，羞怯，朴素 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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tout
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| v.推销，招徕；兜售；吹捧，劝诱 | |
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abstain
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| v.自制，戒绝，弃权，避免 | |
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25
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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26
attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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27
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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28
supersede
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| v.替代；充任 | |
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29
renounce
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| v.放弃；拒绝承认，宣布与…断绝关系 | |
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30
extrinsic
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| adj.外部的；不紧要的 | |
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31
analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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32
celestial
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| adj.天体的；天上的 | |
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33
diabolical
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| adj.恶魔似的，凶暴的 | |
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34
explicit
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| adj.详述的，明确的；坦率的；显然的 | |
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35
deities
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| n.神，女神( deity的名词复数 )；神祗；神灵；神明 | |
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36
rebellious
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| adj.造反的，反抗的，难控制的 | |
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37
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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38
dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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39
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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40
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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41
contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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42
superseded
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| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
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43
poetical
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| adj.似诗人的；诗一般的；韵文的；富有诗意的 | |
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44
antiquity
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| n.古老；高龄；古物，古迹 | |
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45
strife
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| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
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46
aspirations
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| 强烈的愿望( aspiration的名词复数 )； 志向； 发送气音； 发 h 音 | |
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47
aspiration
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| n.志向，志趣抱负；渴望；(语)送气音；吸出 | |
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48
ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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49
censure
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| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
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50
entities
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| 实体对像； 实体，独立存在体，实际存在物( entity的名词复数 ) | |
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51
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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52
eclecticism
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| n.折衷主义 | |
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53
ascertaining
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的现在分词 ) | |
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54
wont
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| adj.习惯于；v.习惯；n.习惯 | |
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55
posited
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| v.假定，设想，假设( posit的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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56
mingle
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| vt.使混合，使相混；vi.混合起来；相交往 | |
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57
providence
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| n.深谋远虑，天道，天意；远见；节约；上帝 | |
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58
afterward
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| adv.后来；以后 | |
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59
prodigies
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| n.奇才，天才（尤指神童）( prodigy的名词复数 ) | |
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60
metaphor
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| n.隐喻，暗喻 | |
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61
medleys
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| n.混杂物( medley的名词复数 )；混合物；混杂的人群；混成曲（多首声乐曲或器乐曲串联在一起） | |
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62
radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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63
perversion
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| n.曲解；堕落；反常 | |
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64
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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65
gut
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| n.[pl.]胆量；内脏；adj.本能的；vt.取出内脏 | |
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66
futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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67
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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68
inorganic
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| adj.无生物的；无机的 | |
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69
unintelligible
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| adj.无法了解的，难解的，莫明其妙的 | |
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70
transformation
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| n.变化；改造；转变 | |
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71
philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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72
prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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73
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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74
complement
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| n.补足物，船上的定员；补语；vt.补充，补足 | |
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75
posits
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| v.假定，设想，假设( posit的第三人称单数 ) | |
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76
illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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77
illustrated
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| adj. 有插图的，列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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78
addicted
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| adj.沉溺于....的，对...上瘾的 | |
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79
absurdities
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| n.极端无理性( absurdity的名词复数 )；荒谬；谬论；荒谬的行为 | |
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80
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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81
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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82
deductions
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| 扣除( deduction的名词复数 )； 结论； 扣除的量； 推演 | |
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83
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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84
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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85
binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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86
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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87
maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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88
justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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89
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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90
countenances
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| n.面容( countenance的名词复数 )；表情；镇静；道义支持 | |
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91
calumniated
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| v.诽谤，中伤( calumniate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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92
thither
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| adv.向那里；adj.在那边的，对岸的 | |
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93
erratic
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| adj.古怪的，反复无常的，不稳定的 | |
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94
ingenuous
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| adj.纯朴的，单纯的；天真的；坦率的 | |
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95
slay
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| v.杀死，宰杀，杀戮 | |
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96
mythology
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| n.神话，神话学，神话集 | |
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97
qualitative
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| adj.性质上的，质的，定性的 | |
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98
heralds
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| n.使者( herald的名词复数 )；预报者；预兆；传令官v.预示( herald的第三人称单数 )；宣布（好或重要） | |
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99
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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100
unified
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| (unify 的过去式和过去分词)； 统一的； 统一标准的； 一元化的 | |
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101
decadence
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| n.衰落，颓废 | |
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102
potencies
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| n.威力( potency的名词复数 )；权力；效力；（男人的）性交能力 | |
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103
expressive
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| adj.表现的，表达…的，富于表情的 | |
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104
miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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105
admiration
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| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
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106
averse
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| adj.厌恶的；反对的，不乐意的 | |
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107
disappearance
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| n.消失，消散，失踪 | |
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108
catastrophe
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| n.大灾难，大祸 | |
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109
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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110
heralded
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| v.预示( herald的过去式和过去分词 )；宣布（好或重要） | |
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111
propounding
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| v.提出（问题、计划等）供考虑[讨论]，提议( propound的现在分词 ) | |
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112
mythologies
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| 神话学( mythology的名词复数 )； 神话（总称）； 虚构的事实； 错误的观点 | |
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113
maturity
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| n.成熟；完成；(支票、债券等)到期 | |
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114
humble
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| adj.谦卑的，恭顺的；地位低下的；v.降低，贬低 | |
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115
stoics
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| 禁欲主义者，恬淡寡欲的人，不以苦乐为意的人( stoic的名词复数 ) | |
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116
intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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117
abolition
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| n.废除，取消 | |
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118
superstitions
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| 迷信，迷信行为( superstition的名词复数 ) | |
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119
divulgation
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| 泄露 | |
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120
divested
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| v.剥夺( divest的过去式和过去分词 )；脱去（衣服）；2。从…取去…；1。（给某人）脱衣服 | |
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121
brutal
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| adj.残忍的，野蛮的，不讲理的 | |
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122
persuasion
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| n.劝说；说服；持有某种信仰的宗派 | |
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123
concurrent
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| adj.同时发生的，一致的 | |
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124
liberates
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| 解放，释放( liberate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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125
ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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126
negating
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| v.取消( negate的现在分词 )；使无效；否定；否认 | |
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127
torment
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| n.折磨；令人痛苦的东西(人)；vt.折磨；纠缠 | |
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128
negation
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| n.否定；否认 | |
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129
accusation
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| n.控告，指责，谴责 | |
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130
equivocation
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| n.模棱两可的话，含糊话 | |
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131
adornment
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| n.装饰；装饰品 | |
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132
denominations
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| n.宗派( denomination的名词复数 )；教派；面额；名称 | |
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133
permissible
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| adj.可允许的，许可的 | |
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134
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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135
invoked
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| v.援引( invoke的过去式和过去分词 )；行使（权利等）；祈求救助；恳求 | |
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136
magistrates
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| 地方法官，治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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137
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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138
briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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