DESIRE FOR PEACE
Whatever opinion we may entertain of the Servian character or of her policy in recent times, it is at all events certain that she did not desire war with Austria. That she submitted to the very depths of humiliation6 in order to avoid war cannot be doubted by any one who has read her reply to the demands put forward by Vienna. Only a few months since, she had emerged from two sanguinary wars—the first against Turkey and the second against Bulgaria—and although victory had crowned her arms in both of these contests, her losses in men and material had been very severe.
That Russia did not desire war was equally plain. {23} She was still engaged in repairing the gigantic losses which she had sustained in her struggle with Japan. At least two years must elapse before her new fleet would be in a condition to take the sea, and it was generally understood that at least as long a period would be necessary, in order to carry through the scheme of reorganisation by which she hoped to place her army in a state of efficiency. Whatever might be the ultimate designs of Russia, it was altogether incredible that she would have sought to bring about a war, either at this time or in the near future.
Russia, like England, had nothing to gain by war. Her development was proceeding9 rapidly. For years to come her highest interest must be peace. A supreme10 provocation11 was necessary in order to make her draw the sword. Such a provocation had been given in 1909 when, ignoring the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, Austria had formally annexed12 the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But at that time Russia's resources were not merely unprepared; they were utterly13 exhausted14. Menaced simultaneously15 by Vienna and Berlin, she had been forced on that occasion to stand by, while her prestige in the Balkan peninsula suffered a blow which she was powerless to ward7 off. Now a further encroachment16 was threatened from the same quarters. A Serb power which looked to St. Petersburg[1] for protection was to be put under the heel of Austria.
Nor can any one believe that France wanted war. It is true that for a year, or rather more, after the Agadir episode[2] the spirit of France was perturbed17. But no Foreign Office in the world—least of all that {24} of Germany—was so ill-informed as to believe that the sporadic18 demonstrations19, which occurred in the press and elsewhere, were caused by any eagerness for adventure or any ambition of conquest. They were due, as every calm observer was aware, to one thing and one thing only—the knowledge that the Republic had come to the very end of her human resources; that all her sons who were capable of bearing arms had already been enrolled20 in her army; that she could do nothing further to strengthen her defences against Germany, who up to that time, had taken for military training barely one half of her available male population, and who was now engaged in increasing her striking power both by land and sea. The cause of this restlessness in France was the fear that Germany was preparing an invincible21 superiority and would strike so soon as her weapon was forged. If so, would it not be better for France to strike at once, while she had still a fighting chance, and before she was hopelessly outnumbered? But this mood, the product of anxiety and suspense22, which had been somewhat prevalent in irresponsible quarters during the autumn of 1912 and the early part of the following year, had passed away. Partly it wore itself out; partly popular interest was diverted to other objects of excitement.
France, during the twelve months preceding Midsummer 1914, had been singularly quiescent23 as regards foreign affairs. Her internal conditions absorbed attention. Various events had conspired24 to disturb public confidence in the fidelity25 of her rulers, and in the adequacy of their military preparations. The popular mood had been sobered, disquieted26, and scandalised to such a point that war, {25} so far from being sought after, was the thing of all others which France most wished to avoid.
THE CASE OF BELGIUM
It is unnecessary to waste words in establishing the aversion of Belgium from war. There was nothing which she could hope to gain by it in any event. Suffering and loss—how great suffering and loss even Belgium herself can hardly have foreseen—were inevitable27 to her civil population, as well as to her soldiers, whether the war went well or ill. Her territory lay in the direct way of the invaders28, and was likely, as in times past, to become the 'cockpit of Europe.' She was asked to allow the free passage of the Germanic forces. She was promised restoration of her independence and integrity at the end of the war. But to grant this arrogant29 demand would have been to destroy her dynasty and wreck30 her institutions; for what King or Constitution could have withstood the popular contempt for a government which acquiesced31 in national degradation32? And to believe the promise, was a thing only possible for simpletons; for what was such an assurance worth, seeing that, at the very moment of the offer, Germany was engaged in breaking her former undertaking33, solemnly guaranteed and recorded, that the neutrality of Belgium should be respected? That the sympathies of Belgium would have been with France in any event cannot of course be doubted; for a French victory threatened no danger, whereas the success of German arms was a menace to her independence, and a prelude34 to vassalage35 or absorption in the Empire.
Neither the British people nor their Government wanted war. In the end they accepted it reluctantly, and only after most strenuous36 efforts had been made {26} to prevent its occurrence. To the intelligent foreign observer, however unfriendly, who has a thorough understanding of British interests, ideas, and habits of mind this is self-evident. He does not need a White Paper to prove it to him.
It is clear that Austria wanted war—not this war certainly, but a snug38 little war with a troublesome little neighbour, as to the outcome of which, with the ring kept, there could be no possibility of doubt. She obviously hoped that indirectly39, and as a sort of by-product40 of this convenient little war, she would secure a great victory of the diplomatic sort over her most powerful neighbour—a matter of infinitely41 more consequence to her than the ostensible42 object of her efforts.
The crushing of Servia would mean the humiliation of Russia, and would shake, for a second time within five years, the confidence of the Balkan peoples in the power of the Slav Empire to protect its kindred and co-religionists against the aggression43 of the Teutons and Magyars. Anything which would lower the credit of Russia in the Balkan peninsula would be a gain to Austria. To her more ambitious statesmen such an achievement might well seem to open the way for coveted44 expansions towards the Aegean Sea, which had been closed against her, to her great chagrin45, by the Treaty of Bucharest.[3] To others, whose chief anxiety was to preserve peace in their own time, and to prevent the Austro-Hungarian State from splitting asunder46, the repression47 of Servia seemed to promise security against the growing unrest and discontent of the vast Slav population which was included in the Empire.
{27}
AUSTRIAN ILL-FORTUNE
For something nearer two centuries than one the Austro-Hungarian Empire has been miscalculating and suffering for its miscalculations, until its blunders and ill-fortune have become a byword. Scheming ever for safety, Austria has never found it. The very modesty48 of her aim has helped to secure its own defeat. Her unvarying method has been a timid and unimaginative repression. In politics, as in most other human affairs, equilibrium49 is more easily attained50 by moving forward than by standing37 still. Austria has sought security for powers, and systems, and balances which were worn out, unsuited to our modern world, and therefore incapable51 of being secured at all. The more she has schemed for safety the more precarious52 her integrity has become. There are things which scheming will never accomplish—things which for their achievement need a change of spirit, some new birth of faith or freedom. But in Vienna change in any direction is ill-regarded, and new births are ever more likely to be strangled in their cradles than to arrive at maturity53.
Distracted by the problem of her divers54, discordant55, and unwelded[4] races, Austria has always inclined to put her trust in schemers who were able to produce some plausible56 system, some ingenious device, some promising57 ladder of calculation, or miscalculation, for reaching the moon without going through the clouds. In the present case there can be no doubt that she allowed herself to be persuaded by her German neighbours that Russia was not in a position to make {28} an effective fight, and would therefore probably stand by, growling58 and showing her teeth. Consequently it was safe to take a bold line; to present Servia with an ultimatum59 which had been made completely watertight against acceptance of the unconditional60 and immediate61 kind; to reject any acceptance which was not unconditional and immediate; to allow the Government of King Peter no time for second thoughts, the European Powers no time for mediation62, her own Minister at Belgrade time only to give one hasty glance at the reply, call for his passports, and catch his train. So far as poor humanity can make certain of anything, Austria, with German approval and under German guidance, made certain of war with Servia.
But the impression produced, when this matter first began to excite public attention, was somewhat different. Foreign newspaper correspondents at Vienna and Berlin were specially63 well cared for after the Serajevo murders, and when the ultimatum was delivered, they immediately sent to England and elsewhere accounts of the position which made it appear, that the Austrian Government and people, provoked beyond endurance by the intrigues64 of Servia, had acted impetuously, possibly unwisely, but not altogether inexcusably.
At this stage the idea was also sedulously65 put about that the Kaiser was behaving like a gentleman. It was suggested that Germany had been left very much in the dark until the explosion actually occurred, and that she was now paying the penalty of loyalty66 to an indiscreet friend, by suffering herself to be dragged into a quarrel in which she had neither interest nor concern. In these early days, when {29} Sir Edward Grey was striving hopefully, if somewhat innocently, after peace, it was assumed by the world in general, that Germany, for her own reasons, must desire, at least as ardently67 as the British Foreign Minister, to find a means of escape from an exceedingly awkward position, and that she would accordingly use her great influence with her ally to this end. If there had been a grain of truth in this assumption, peace would have been assured, for France and Italy had already promised their support. But this theory broke down very speedily; and as soon as the official papers were published, it was seen never to have rested on the smallest basis of fact.
GERMANY USES AUSTRIA
So far from Germany having been dragged in against her will, it was clear that from the beginning she had been using Austria as an agent, who was not unwilling68 to stir up strife69, but was only half-conscious of the nature and dimensions of the contest which was bound to follow. It is not credible8 that Germany was blind to the all-but-inevitable results of letting Austria loose to range around, of hallooing her on, and of comforting her with assurances of loyal support. But it may well be believed that Austria herself did not see the situation in the same clear light, and remained almost up to the last, under the delusion70, which had been so industriously71 fostered by the German ambassador at Vienna, that Russia could not fight effectively and therefore would probably choose not to fight at all.
But although Austria may have had no adequate conception of the consequences which her action would bring about, it is certain that Germany foresaw them, with the single exception of British {30} intervention72; that what she foresaw she also desired; and further, that at the right moment she did her part, boldly but clumsily, to guard against any miscarriage73 of her schemes.
Germany continued to make light of all apprehensions74 of serious danger from St. Petersburg; but at the eleventh hour Austria appears suddenly to have realised for herself the appalling75 nature of the catastrophe76 which impended77. Something happened; what it was we do not know, and the present generation will probably never know. We may conjecture78, however—but it is only conjecture—that by some means or other the intrigues of the war cabal79 at Vienna—the instrument of German policy, owing more fealty80 to the Kaiser than to their own Emperor—had been unmasked. In hot haste they were disavowed, and Austria opened discussions with Russia 'in a perfectly81 friendly manner,'[5] and with good hopes of success, as to how the catastrophe might still be averted82.
On Thursday, July 30, we are informed, the tension between Vienna and St. Petersburg had greatly relaxed. An arrangement compatible with the honour and interests of both empires seemed almost in sight when, on the following day, Germany suddenly intervened with ultimatums83 to France and Russia, of a kind to which only one answer was possible. The spirit of the Ems telegram[6] had inebriated84 a duller generation. "A few days' delay," our Ambassador at Vienna concludes, "might in all {31} probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities85 in history."[7]
SIR EDWARD GREY
As we turn over the official pages in which the British Government has set out its case, we are inclined to marvel—knowing what we now know—that our Foreign Minister should have shown so much zeal86 and innocence87 in pleading the cause of peace on high grounds of humanity, and with a faith, apparently88 unshaken to the last, that in principle at least, the German Government were in full agreement with his aims. The practical disadvantages of being a gentleman are that they are apt to make a man too credulous89 and not sufficiently90 inquisitive91. Sir Edward Grey acted according to his nature. His miscalculation was one which his fellow-countrymen have not hesitated to forgive. But clearly he misjudged the forces which were opposed to him. He was deceived by hollow assurances. He beat hopefully, but vainly and pathetically, against a door which was already barred and bolted, and behind which (could he but have seen) the Kaiser, with his Ministers and Staff, was wholly absorbed in the study of war maps and tables of mobilisation.
Sir Edward Grey failed to prevent war, and in the circumstances it is hardly to be wondered at. But if he failed in one direction he succeeded in another. His whole procedure from first to last was so transparently92 disinterested93 and above board that, when war did actually come upon us, it found us, not merely as a nation, but also as an Empire, more united than we have ever been at any crisis, since the Great Armada was sighted off Plymouth Sound. English people felt that whatever else there {32} might be to reproach themselves with, they at any rate went into the fight with clean hands. What is even more remarkable94, the people of all neutral countries, with the possible exception of the rigid95 moralists of Constantinople, appeared for once to share the same opinion.
This was a great achievement; nearly, but not quite, the greatest of all. To have prevented war would have been a greater achievement still.... But was war inevitable? Or was M. Sazonof right, when he said to our Ambassador, on the morning of the day when Servia replied to the Austrian ultimatum,[8] that if Britain then took her stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war; but that if we failed them then, rivers of blood would flow, and in the end we should be dragged into war?[9]
Sir Edward Grey refused to take this course. He judged that a pronouncement of such a character would appear in the light of a menace to the governments of Germany and Austria, and also to public opinion in those countries; that it would only stiffen96 their backs; that a more hopeful way of proceeding was for England to deal with Germany as a friend, letting it be understood that if our counsels of moderation were disregarded, we might be driven most reluctantly into the camp of her enemies. To this, when it was urged by our Ambassador at St. Petersburg, the Russian Minister only replied—and the words seem to have in them a note of tragedy and weariness, as if the speaker well knew that he was talking to deaf ears—that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon the neutrality of Britain.[10]
{33}
The alternative was to speak out as Mr. Lloyd George spoke97 at the time of the Agadir crisis, 'to rattle98 the sabre,' and to take our stand 'in shining armour99' beside the other two members of the Entente100.
Sir Edward Grey believed that this procedure would not have the effect desired, but the reverse. Further, it would have committed this country to a policy which had never been submitted to it, and which it had never considered, far less approved, even in principle. The Agadir precedent101 could be distinguished102. There the danger which threatened France arose directly out of treaty engagements with ourselves. Here there was no such particular justification103, but a wide general question of the safety of Europe and the British Empire.
With regard to this wider question, notwithstanding its imminence104 for a good many years, the British Empire had not made up its mind, nor indeed had it ever been asked to do so by those in authority. Sir Edward Grey appears to have thought that, on democratic principles, he had not the right to make such a pronouncement as M. Sazonof desired; and that even if this pathway might have led to peace, it was one which he could not tread.
The one alternative was tried, and failed. We proffered105 our good offices, we urged our counsels of moderation, all in vain. That, at any rate, is among the certainties. And it is also among the certainties that, although this alternative failed, it brought us two signal benefits, in the unity106 of our own people and the goodwill107 of the world.
About the other alternative, which was not tried, we cannot of course speak with the same sureness. If Sir Edward Grey had taken the step which {34} M. Sazonof desired him to take, he would at once have been vehemently108 opposed and denounced by a very large body of his own fellow-countrymen, who, never having been taken frankly109 into the confidence of the Government with regard to the foundations of British policy, were at this early stage of the proceedings110 almost wholly ignorant of the motives111 and issues involved. This being so, if war had ensued, we should then have gone into it a divided instead of a united nation. On the other hand, if peace had ensued, it must have been a patched-up ill-natured peace; and it is not improbable that Sir Edward Grey would have been driven from office by enemies in his own household, playing the game of Germany unconsciously, as on previous occasions, and would have brought the Cabinet down with him in his fall. For at this time, owing to domestic difficulties, the Government stood in a very perilous112 position, and it needed only such a mutiny, as a bold departure in foreign affairs would almost certainly have provoked among the Liberal party, to bring Mr. Asquith's government to an end.
As one reads and re-reads the official documents in our present twilight113, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that on the main point Sir Edward Grey was wrong and M. Sazonof right. Germany, with her eyes wide open, had determined114 on war with Russia and France, unless by Russia's surrender of her prestige in the Balkans—a surrender in its way almost as abject115 as that which had already been demanded of Servia—the results of victory could be secured without recourse to arms. Germany, nevertheless, was not prepared for war with Britain. She was reckoning with confidence on our standing aside, {35} on our unwillingness116 and inability to intervene.[11] If it had been made clear to her, that in case she insisted on pressing things to extremity117, we should on no account stand aside, she might then have eagerly forwarded, instead of deliberately118 frustrating119, Austria's eleventh-hour negotiations120 for an accommodation with St. Petersburg.
No one, except Germans, whose judgments121, naturally enough, are disordered by the miscarriage of their plans, has dreamed of bringing the charge against Sir Edward Grey that he wished for war, or fomented122 it, or even that through levity123 or want of vigilance, he allowed it to occur. The criticism is, that although his intentions were of the best, and his industry unflagging, he failed to realise the situation, and to adopt the only means which might have secured peace.
The charge which is not only alleged124, but established against Austria is of a wholly different order. It is that she provoked war—blindly perhaps, and not foreseeing what the war would be, but at any rate recklessly and obstinately125.
The crime of which Germany stands accused is that she deliberately aimed at war, and that when there seemed a chance of her plan miscarrying, she promptly126 took steps to render peace impossible. Among neutral countries is there one, the public opinion of which has acquitted127 her? And has not Italy, her own ally, condemned128 her by refusing assistance on the ground that this war is a war of German aggression?
[1] The name of the Russian capital was not changed until after the declaration of war, and therefore St. Petersburg is used in this chapter instead of Petrograd.
[2] July-September 1911.
[3] August 1913.
[4] The total population of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, is roughly 50 millions. Of these 11 millions are Germans and 10 millions Magyars. About 24 millions are composed of a strange variety of Slav races. The remaining 5 millions consist of Italians, Roumanians, and Jews.
[5] White Paper, No. 161.
[6] A harmless and unprovocative telegram from the King of Prussia to Bismarck in July 1870 was, by the latter, so altered in tone that when published it achieved the intention of its editor and served as 'a red rag to the Gallic bull' and brought about the declaration of war by Napoleon III.—Bismarck's Reflections and Reminiscences, vol. ii. p. 100.
[7] White Paper, No. 161.
[8] Saturday, July 25.
[9] White Paper, No. 17.
[10] Ibid. Nos. 17 and 44.
[11] A proof of this is the outburst of hatred129 in Germany against England so soon as we ranged ourselves with France and Russia.
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chronological
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| adj.按年月顺序排列的，年代学的 | |
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underlying
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| adj.在下面的，含蓄的，潜在的 | |
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conflagration
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| n.建筑物或森林大火 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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plunged
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| v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
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humiliation
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| n.羞辱 | |
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ward
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| n.守卫，监护，病房，行政区，由监护人或法院保护的人（尤指儿童）；vt.守护，躲开 | |
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credible
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| adj.可信任的，可靠的 | |
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proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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provocation
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| n.激怒，刺激，挑拨，挑衅的事物，激怒的原因 | |
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annexed
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| [法] 附加的，附属的 | |
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utterly
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exhausted
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simultaneously
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encroachment
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perturbed
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| adj.烦燥不安的v.使（某人）烦恼，不安( perturb的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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sporadic
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| adj.偶尔发生的 [反]regular；分散的 | |
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demonstrations
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| 证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威 | |
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enrolled
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| adj.入学登记了的v.[亦作enrol]( enroll的过去式和过去分词 )；登记，招收，使入伍（或入会、入学等），参加，成为成员；记入名册；卷起，包起 | |
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invincible
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suspense
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quiescent
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conspired
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fidelity
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disquieted
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| v.使不安，使忧虑，使烦恼( disquiet的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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inevitable
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invaders
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arrogant
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wreck
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acquiesced
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degradation
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undertaking
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prelude
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vassalage
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strenuous
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standing
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snug
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indirectly
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by-product
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infinitely
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ostensible
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aggression
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coveted
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| adj.令人垂涎的；垂涎的，梦寐以求的v.贪求，觊觎(covet的过去分词)；垂涎；贪图 | |
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chagrin
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| n.懊恼；气愤；委屈 | |
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asunder
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| adj.分离的，化为碎片 | |
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repression
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modesty
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| n.谦逊，虚心，端庄，稳重，羞怯，朴素 | |
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equilibrium
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| n.平衡，均衡，相称，均势，平静 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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maturity
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| n.成熟；完成；(支票、债券等)到期 | |
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divers
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| adj.不同的；种种的 | |
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discordant
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| adj.不调和的 | |
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plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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promising
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| adj.有希望的，有前途的 | |
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growling
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| n.吠声, 咆哮声 v.怒吠, 咆哮, 吼 | |
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ultimatum
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| n.最后通牒 | |
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unconditional
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| adj.无条件的，无限制的，绝对的 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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mediation
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| n.调解 | |
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specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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sedulously
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| ad.孜孜不倦地 | |
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loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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ardently
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| adv.热心地，热烈地 | |
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unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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strife
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| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
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delusion
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| n.谬见，欺骗，幻觉，迷惑 | |
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industriously
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intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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miscarriage
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| n.失败，未达到预期的结果；流产 | |
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apprehensions
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| 疑惧 | |
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appalling
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| adj.骇人听闻的，令人震惊的，可怕的 | |
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catastrophe
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| n.大灾难，大祸 | |
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impended
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| v.进行威胁，即将发生( impend的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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conjecture
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| n./v.推测，猜测 | |
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cabal
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| n.政治阴谋小集团 | |
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fealty
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| n.忠贞，忠节 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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averted
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| 防止，避免( avert的过去式和过去分词 )； 转移 | |
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ultimatums
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| 最后通牒( ultimatum的名词复数 ) | |
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inebriated
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| adj.酒醉的 | |
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calamities
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| n.灾祸，灾难( calamity的名词复数 )；不幸之事 | |
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zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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innocence
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| n.无罪；天真；无害 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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credulous
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| adj.轻信的，易信的 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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inquisitive
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| adj.求知欲强的，好奇的，好寻根究底的 | |
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transparently
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| 明亮地，显然地，易觉察地 | |
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disinterested
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| adj.不关心的，不感兴趣的 | |
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remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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stiffen
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| v.(使)硬，(使)变挺，(使)变僵硬 | |
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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rattle
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| v.飞奔，碰响；激怒；n.碰撞声；拨浪鼓 | |
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armour
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| （=armor）n.盔甲；装甲部队 | |
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entente
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| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
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precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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imminence
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| n.急迫，危急 | |
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proffered
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| v.提供，贡献，提出( proffer的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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goodwill
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| n.善意，亲善，信誉，声誉 | |
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vehemently
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| adv. 热烈地 | |
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frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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twilight
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| n.暮光，黄昏；暮年，晚期，衰落时期 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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115
abject
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| adj.极可怜的，卑屈的 | |
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unwillingness
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| n. 不愿意，不情愿 | |
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extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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frustrating
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| adj.产生挫折的，使人沮丧的，令人泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的现在分词 )；挫败；使受挫折；令人沮丧 | |
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negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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fomented
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| v.激起，煽动（麻烦等）( foment的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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levity
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| n.轻率，轻浮，不稳定，多变 | |
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alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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obstinately
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| ad.固执地，顽固地 | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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acquitted
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| 宣判…无罪( acquit的过去式和过去分词 )； 使（自己）作出某种表现 | |
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condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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